Eva van Haaster (s)1991493
International Relations and Organizations – BA Thesis
Agenda-setting and Policy-making in the European Union (2019-2020) Leiden University
Supervisor: Dr. I.L. Elias Carrillo 01-06-2020
Word count: 7995
The global environment on the agenda of the European Union:
examining a success story
Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 2
2. International cooperation on the global environment ... 5
2.1 Difficulties of managing the ecological burden ... 5
2.2 United Nations Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009 ... 6
2.3 United Nations Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015 ... 7
3. Theoretical framework ... 9
3.1 Description of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework ... 9
3.2 Previous literature on the Multiple Streams Framework ... 12
3.3 Theoretical appropriateness ... 13
4. Research design and method ... 15
4.1 Research design and method ... 15
4.2 Operationalization of key concepts ... 15
5. Qualitative analysis ... 16
5.1 Analysis of EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 Paris Conference ... 16
5.2 Presentation of the research findings ... 23
6. Concluding remarks ... 24
1. Introduction
In late 2015, the United Nations Climate Change Conference took place in Paris, resulting in the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal: the Paris Agreement (Liobikiene & Butkus, 2017, p. 299). The agreement, which will be described in more detail later, contains binding targets on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels and is considered one of the main documents in the EU involving energy and climate policy (Liobikiene & Butkus, 2017, p. 298). Shortly after the formal adoption of the Paris Agreement on 12 December 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, former President of the European Commission, stated the following in a press release:
“Today the world is united in the fight against climate change. Today the world gets a lifeline, a last chance to hand over to future generations a world that is more stable, a healthier planet, fairer societies and more prosperous economies. This robust agreement will steer the world towards a global clean energy transition. This deal is also a success
for the European Union. We have long been the global leader in climate action, and the
Paris Agreement now reflects our ambitions worldwide. I would like to thank the EU’s chief negotiator Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete and his team for working day and night to make this agreement happen and for keeping the European Union the central
player throughout the negotiations. I am proud of all of you.” (emphasis added)
(European Commission, 2015a).
In line with the above quotation, the central role of the EU at the Paris Conference has been referred to in the literature as a so-called ‘leadiator’ (a mix between a leader and a mediator) (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 6). As a leader in the negotiations, the EU kept pressing for ambitious GHG emission reduction targets and committed itself to the highest ‘intended nationally determined contribution’ (INDC) of at least 40% by 2030 (from 1990 levels) (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 3). As a mediator, it pursued a strategy of bridgebuilding and coalition forming, especially across the North-South divide (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 6).
In a nutshell, this thesis is devoted to the process(es) leading up to a perceived ‘success story’ (in terms of legally binding outcomes) like the Paris Conference, as opposed to previous climate conferences. Hereby, specific emphasis will be put on the prominent role of the EU and EU agenda-setting. As a leadiator, the EU played an active role especially in the run-up to the Paris
Conference, during which agenda-setting has been a crucial element, both within the EU and on the global scene. In this regard, the EU was among the parties that made most efforts to attract attention to the climate issue via written submissions (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 5). According to previous research, policy-making processes in the EU can be simplified by means of the so-called policy cycle, which is comprised of five separate stages: agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, implementation and feedback (Young, 2010, p. 45). Although the policy process tends to be not as linear and straightforward in practice as the policy cycle implies, agenda-setting is regarded a necessary step, without which an issue would not come up for decision-making at all (Alexandrova, Carammia, Princen & Timmermans, 2014, p. 153). In other words, in order to better understand policy-making in the EU in general and the prominent role of the EU at the Paris Conference more specifically, looking at the stage of agenda-setting is a necessary hurdle to take.
By means of my thesis, an attempt will be made to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on (environmental) setting and policy-making in the EU, by analyzing EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 UN Paris Climate Change Conference. To this end, the central research question of this thesis reads as follows:
‘How can the legally binding 2015 Paris Agreement be explained from an agenda-setting perspective, by focusing on the role of the European Union?’
As regards the agenda-setting perspective, the research will be based on the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), as originally defined by John Kingdon in 1984 (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). Accordingly, the actual analysis will be structured to a large extent by the five key elements of the MSF: the problem stream, policy stream, politics stream, window of opportunity and policy entrepreneur (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016).
In order to ensure a coherent and logically structured overview, my thesis is subdivided into separate chapters and paragraphs as outlined in the index above. Chapter 2 is primarily intended to provide for some necessary background knowledge and information on international cooperation on the global environment. Apart from some general remarks on the difficulties of managing the environmental issue, attention will be given to two United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conferences in particular, respectively the UN Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009 and the UN Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015.
The third chapter allows for an accurate description of the theoretical approach used in this thesis: the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). Furthermore, the chapter contains a literature review on previous research in the field of agenda-setting studies and the MSF. To conclude, this section will elaborate on the strengths of the theoretical approach and a justification of its appropriateness in the context of the EU, as well as in the specific research context of environmental policy-making.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the research design and method. In paragraph 4.1, the specific research context and its design will be addressed, as well as the type of analysis and a description of the research material. The second paragraph will elaborate on the operationalization of the key concepts, listed in a table.
Subsequently, Chapter 5 is devoted to the actual research part. An in-depth qualitative analysis will be conducted, based on formal policy documents and academic publications of previous studies. Hereby, the MSF as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, will be applied to the agenda-setting process within the EU, prior to the UN Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015. This way, I will endeavor to reveal key actors, events and interactions that accounted for the successful agenda-setting process surrounding the environmental issue within the EU. The chapter will conclude by a visual representation of the analysis.
Eventually, the research findings will be briefly summarized in the concluding chapter, along with a critical reflection on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of my thesis. Furthermore, this section contains directions for further research that could contribute to the existing body of knowledge on agenda-setting and policy-making in the EU.
2. International cooperation on the global environment
2.1 Difficulties of managing the ecological burden
The environmental issue has been a matter of concern for over decades. According to a 1985 study on the global environment, depletion of natural resources, ecological disturbances and environmental degradation had long been recognized as serious problems (Biswas & Biswas, 1985, p. 26). All were considered negative (side) effects of widespread development processes and substantial population growth. These phenomena, being still apparent in present-day environmental debates, are thus not new (Biswas & Biswas, 1985). What is new, however, is the accelerating pace and scope of the problems. As stated in the latest published United Nations Climate Change Annual Report, the World Meteorological Organization expects a global average temperature increase of 3-5 °C by the year 2100, if the current trends continue (UNFCCC, 2018, p. 3).
Some argue that the pressing nature and scope of the sustainability issue have indeed been recognized, but not decisively acted upon because of political considerations (Sanwal, 2010, p. 3). This notion is confirmed by a report from the Committee on International Environmental Affairs of the United States (US) Department of State, already in 1970 (US Department of State, 2005). The report, outlining the US priority interests on the environment, indicated the following:
Long-range policy planning to cope with global environmental problems must take account of the total ecological burden. This burden tends to increase with population, growth and with the level of economic activity, whereas the capacity of the environment to provide essential inputs to production and to absorb unwanted outputs from consumption is fundamentally limited. The problem of managing total ecological burden will remain even after world population is stabilized. Controlling that burden by
systematic reduction in per capita production of goods and services would be politically unacceptable. A concerted effort is needed to orient technology toward making human
demands upon the environment less severe. (emphasis added) (US Department of State, 2005).
Aside from the acceptability criteria mentioned in the above quotation, international environmental cooperation can also be hampered by political considerations in terms of national
self-interest. According to Wagner & Zeckhauser (2012, p. 515), environmental cooperation entails a global free-rider problem. Despite the fact that the costs of global warming (and the measures against it) are far from evenly distributed, the free-rider problem is universal in principle. Each individual (state) faces a similar global reality of the private benefits versus the shared costs of greenhouse gas pollution, which results in a reluctance to take responsible action (Wagner & Zeckhauser, 2012, p. 515). According to the US Department of State:
The issues posed by the continual growth of world-wide demands upon the environment are primarily important for long-range planning, but they also require long lead times for resolution. Cooperative efforts to devise and implement technical solutions to global environmental problems may need to be supplemented by two admittedly difficult measures. One is to move toward zero population growth more rapidly; the other is to
re-orient human values, especially in regard to national self-interest versus the interests of all mankind. (emphasis added) (US Department of State, 2005).
Notwithstanding these concerns, various attempts have been made to arrive at a global consensus on climate change mitigation. Two such attempts will be discussed below: the 2009 United Nations Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and the 2015 United Nations Paris Climate Change Conference. As will be explained, the Paris Climate Change Conference was widely considered a politically successful performance, whereas the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was not (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 1). The resulting differences in terms of policy outcomes form the starting point for this thesis.
2.2 United Nations Copenhagen Climate Change Conference of 2009
In late 2009, the United Nations Climate Change Conference took place in Copenhagen, to which an unprecedented number of countries (193) sent their delegations to achieve a joint agreement on climate mitigation (Ottinger, 2010, p. 412). The summit was one of the largest political events of its kind and attracted no less than 3880 journalists from 119 countries (Liang, Tsai, Mattis, Konieczna & Dunwoody, 2014, p. 254).
One can identify a number of positive achievements resulting from the Copenhagen Conference. First, the near universal recognition of the seriousness of the climate change challenge and broad-based support for a binding international agreement to address it were vitally important, especially in light of future climate conferences (Ottinger, 2010, p. 412). In addition, civil society expressed its support for the sustainability issue, which generated a great
deal of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international and scientific organizations and industrial groups to become involved in addressing the global environment by hosting numerous side events and panels (Ottinger, 2010, p. 414). Besides, the general architecture and funding for the newly established REDD program (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation program) were agreed upon in Copenhagen, in order to initiate a joint forest preservation project (Ottinger, 2010, p. 417).
In terms of concrete policy outcomes however, the Copenhagen Conference was widely regarded unsuccessful, since it lacked binding agreements on sufficiently reducing global GHG emission levels as determined by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Ottinger, 2010, p. 412). The EU, traditionally seen as an international leader on climate policy and committed to relatively large GHG emission reductions, found itself in a marginalized position (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 1). In spite of broad-based support by the absolute majority of countries including the US and China, any such commitments were obstructed by five countries: Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela (Ottinger, 2010, p. 413).
2.3 United Nations Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015
In response to the Copenhagen Conference of 2009, the EU adjusted its strategy during the Paris negotiating sessions, thereby adapting to the rise of newly emerging economies (including Brazil, South Africa, India and China) and the reengagement of the US under President Barack Obama (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 1). As mentioned earlier, the EU took on the role of a ‘leadiator’ by pursuing a strategy of building bridges and coalitions across the North-South divide (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 6). This, combined with the great-power-politics between China, the US and the French Presidency, largely shaped the contours of the United Nations Paris Climate Change Conference of 2015 (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 1).
In terms of policy outcomes, the Paris Conference -also known as COP21- has been claimed to stand out from all previous environmental summits, since it succeeded in establishing a legally binding climate agreement to limit the rise in global temperature to ‘well below’ 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (Rhodes, 2016, p. 97). The concluded Paris Agreement aims to address a wide range of subjects, including climate mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, transfer of technology and capacity-building (Doelle, 2016, p. 1). It applies to all nations and is based on transparency, a clear articulation of the collective goal, emphasis on science and opportunities for interaction and information-sharing, along with the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances (Doelle, 2016, p. 4). Once signed, ratified and prepared for
implementation, the Paris Agreement will represent the legally binding core of the post-2020 global climate regime (Doelle, 2016, p. 5).
3. Theoretical framework
3.1 Description of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is based on the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), as originally defined by John Kingdon in 1984 (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). According to this theoretical model, high profile agenda-setting and policy change are the results of incremental and continuous processes. Crises can indeed emerge, as well as sudden shifts in (media) attention to new problems or issues, but without the willingness and ability of policymakers to alter the status quo, this will not necessarily lead to fundamental policy change. In fact, there is often a ‘gap’ between a policymaker’s attention to a problem and the adoption of a meaningful solution (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). Besides, the policy-making process is not linear or static, but rather chaotic instead, involving many different elements that are not bound by a fixed sequence. In his original work, Kingdon identifies five structural elements, respectively (1) the problem stream, (2) the policy stream, and (3) the politics stream, as well as a (4) window of opportunity and (5) policy entrepreneur(s), described in more detail below (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1).
The problem stream – attention to a (policy) problem
The first stream is about problem definition and the amount of attention being paid to a certain issue. Hereby, the concept of bounded rationality helps to understand why policymakers only address a small fraction of all possible problems, while the vast majority of issues is excluded from the policy process (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 5). Theories of bounded rationality argue that policymakers have only limited cognitive capacity and resources: time to devote to research, available data and information to inform decisions, knowledge to understand the full policy context and ability to pay attention to the wide range of issues (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 3). Accordingly, issues cannot be processed comprehensively and policymakers, by necessity, make decisions in the face of uncertainty (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 3). Besides, decisions are constrained by a certain degree of ambiguity, which is related to the way in which a potential policy problem can be defined or framed (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 4). As stated by Rochefort and Cobb (1993, p. 56), processes of problem definition always entail a certain degree of arbitrariness and bias, which can cause a discrepancy between the level of seriousness of a problem or conflict and the amount of attention devoted to it. Instead of being objective entities, problems (and solutions) are subject to divergent perceptions and
interpretations, causing policymakers and the public to rely on a particular understanding of a problem (Rochefort & Cobb, 1993, p. 56). Therefore, a large part of agenda-setting is based on the use of persuasion and rhetoric to encourage people to understand issues primarily in terms of their positive or negative aspects and to shift attention likewise (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 4).
The policy stream – available solutions to a (policy) problem
The second stream concerns the availability of a (range of) viable solution(s) to a problem in terms of policy recommendations, proposals or memos (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 432). Hereby, a process of ‘softening’ takes place first, during which the solutions proposed are assessed against certain criteria, in order to make them acceptable within policy communities (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 6). These criteria are related, for instance, to technical feasibility, public acceptability, tolerable anticipated costs and receptivity among elected decisionmakers. Moreover, in anticipation of future resistance to a policy recommendation, policymakers seek to develop widely-accepted solutions, even before the relevant problem itself is formally addressed. Finally, they await the right time to exploit or encourage political attention to the issue, which is referred to in the literature as ‘solutions chasing problems’ (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 6).
The politics stream – motive and opportunity for policy change
The politics stream focuses on the motive and opportunity of policymakers to actually decide on concrete policy measures. Whether they are willing and able to do so, can be influenced by a variety of factors, including their own established beliefs, responses to swings in ‘national mood’, feedback from interest groups and national political parties or a change in the balance of power or government (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 7). As touched upon in the previous section, timing is an essential element for policy change. Accordingly, policymakers await the right time for a development in the politics stream that they can use to their advantage (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 7). This third stream is of key importance, since attention to a problem and a possible solution at hand will not automatically lead to major policy change, unless the issue is actively addressed by politicians (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1).
Coupling of the streams: window of opportunity and policy entrepreneur(s)
Kingdon suggests that major policy change can only occur if the three separate streams described above, are coupled during a window of opportunity. Stated otherwise, a particular
problem needs to receive high attention, a viable solution to that problem does exist, and policymakers must have the motive and opportunity to select it, all at once in a relatively short period of time (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). This confluence of streams is not an inevitable or self-evident process. A window of opportunity can be seen as a short interruption in time -either predictable or unpredictable- that signals a possibility for policy entrepreneurs to promote their particular proposal and push it high(er) up the agenda (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 39). Often however, attention is drawn to another policy issue and the window closes before anyone had the opportunity to sufficiently exploit it (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). A window of opportunity as one of the key elements of Kingdon’s MSF, emphasizes the crucial fact that agenda-setting does not take place in a ‘contextual vacuum’, but is largely dependent on timing and a specific confluence of actions and events (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 18).
Despite these contextual conditions, agenda-setting is an actor-based process in which the confluence of streams can be facilitated and encouraged by a so-called policy entrepreneur (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 19). A policy entrepreneur assumes an essential role in the agenda-setting process, by advocating policy solutions, fostering communication and building or sustaining coalitions (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 20). The degree to which a policy entrepreneur is successful, depends on a combination of skill and strategy (operationalized, for example, in terms of persistence, personal attributes and access to centers of power) (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 20). A visual representation of Kingon’s MSF is displayed below in figure 1.
3.2 Previous literature on the Multiple Streams Framework
Kingdon’s MSF was originally designed for describing policy-making and agenda-setting processes at the domestic, US political level (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 2). Since then, the framework has been applied by other scholars in a large number of studies (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414). Although most of this research focuses on only one or a few of Kingdon’s key elements (e.g. Keeler, 1993; Mintrom & Norman, 2009), there are studies that have empirically assessed the potential of the MSF by a full application of the framework (e.g. Herweg, 2016; Ackrill & Kay, 2001; Maltby, 2013). Especially in the last decades, scholarly interest in Kingdon’s MSF has grown substantially, which resulted in an increasing number of contributions in three respects: policy areas, stages and units of analysis (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414). Hereby, the EU as a field of study has attracted a significant amount of attention, particularly since the late 2000s (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414). Examples of specific policy areas in the EU to which the MSF has been applied, include natural gas regulations (Herweg, 2016), territorial cohesion in EU Member States (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015) and the 2005 EU sugar reforms (Ackrill & Kay, 2011).
When applying the MSF to the EU however, some difficulties arise. As argued by Herweg (2016, pp. 18-19) for instance, considerable adjustments to the politics stream are required, since the functional equivalents of interest groups, governmental institutions and a ‘national mood’ at EU level have yet to be defined. Consequently, the analysis of the politics stream varies significantly from one study to another (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 38). Besides, whereas the policy entrepreneur usually refers to an exceptional individual in Kingdon’s original analysis (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 19), MSF related studies in the context of the EU often think of the policy entrepreneur in terms of institutions or small groups of people. As Mintrom & Norman (2009, p. 653) argue, successful policy entrepreneurs are team players, whose strength is mainly reflected in their ability to cooperate effectively with others. Similarly, a comparative case study in which the MSF is applied to economic policy change in the context of the EU, indicates that policy entrepreneurs do not act on an individual basis, but are linked in tied networks instead (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 41). Despite (or thanks to) those necessary modifications made in previous studies, Kindon’s MSF is considered appropriate for analyzing agenda-setting in the context of the EU, as is discussed in more detail in the next paragraph.
3.3 Theoretical appropriateness
A common point of criticism on the MSF concerns its alleged theoretical underdevelopment (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414). As mentioned earlier, the body of research on Kingdon’s MSF has grown substantially in the last decades, extending the framework to various policy areas, stages and units of analysis. Contrary to this development, Kingdon’s MSF has hardly been modified, causing some to call into question the merits of applying the framework to numerous contexts (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414).
Others however, refer to this universal applicability as one of the strengths of Kingdon’s MSF (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 2). Although originally developed for the US political level, the theoretical model is largely based on a metaphorical language, that is flexible in terms of application. Therefore, the central elements and concepts of the framework as described above, can be used to analyze various processes of agenda-setting in differing contexts (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 2). Accordingly, the MSF has repeatedly been applied to numerous political arenas, including the EU and its member states (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016; Saurugger & Terpan, 2016; Bache, 2013; Maltby, 2013). As Saurugger and Terpan (2016, p. 38) argue, the MSF is especially useful for an accurate observation of the EU’s multilevel governance structure.
This notion is confirmed by earlier studies, in which Kingdon’s framework is deemed well-suited to be applied in the multilevel context of the EU, mainly due to its theoretical emphasis on ambiguity (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015; Richardson, 2006). As stated by Sarmiento-Mirwaldt (2015, p. 433), policy-making in the EU is a changing and complex process in which a specific policy issue can span the legal competences of a variety of different political actors. This is related to the concept of ‘vertical institutional ambiguity’, arising from the multilevel governance structure of the EU (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 433). Hereby, policy-making competences are shared between different levels of government, resulting in a complex political system in which decision-making authority has been delegated both upwards to (supranational) EU institutions and downwards to local and regional authorities. Consequently, policy-making in the EU involves a wide range of different actors, among which the various EU institutions, member state governments, subnational and non-state actors (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 433). Kingdon’s MSF has the useful ability to capture these complex interactions among institutions, issues and agency in an ambiguous multilevel governance system like the EU’s (Ackrill, Kay & Zahariadis, 2013, p. 883).
As regards the suitability and usefulness of the MSF in the research context of this thesis more broadly, one could emphasize the capacity of Kingdon’s theoretical approach to accurately trace the course of a given policy process (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 432). For my thesis, the MSF is intended to offer explanations on the environmental issue on the EU agenda a
posteriori. However, whenever it is possible to identify the five key elements of the MSF (the
three streams, a window of opportunity and the policy entrepreneur), it should also be possible to use the MSF in predicting preliminary outcomes of future (climate oriented) agenda-setting (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 433). In line with this, Keeler (1993, p. 434) states that it is possible to identify regularities to window-opening processes, which enables scholars to better understand policy-related problems and opportunities in the past, as well as in the future.
4. Research design and method
4.1 Research design and method
This chapter is concerned with the research design and method. The research conducted in Chapter 5 is a qualitative case-study and can be considered as secondary research, examining existing texts as part of the analysis. Hereby, most texts are primary source documents (including formal policy documents and consultative communication papers) produced by EU institutions, as well as academic publications of previous scholars. Where possible, direct quotations are used to capture perspectives as transparent and accurately as possible, in order to prevent personal interpretations and differences in tone. As for the time frame, the analysis reports on EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 Paris Conference, so the sources used are all published in the last two decades. Besides, the structure of the analysis will be shaped to a large extent by the five key elements of Kingdon’s MSF, as described in more detail in Chapter 3. In doing so, an attempt will be made to gain a deeper understanding of the process(es) leading to a perceived ‘success story’ like the Paris Conference and the prominent role of the EU within this process.
4.2 Operationalization of key concepts
Based on the description of the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, Table 1 shows an overview of the operationalization of the key theoretical terms of Kingdon’s MSF. This forms the foundation for the analysis in the next chapter.
5. Qualitative analysis
5.1 Analysis of EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 Paris Conference
(1) Problem stream: The European Council’s strategic agenda of ‘high priority issues’
As described in Chapter 3, the problem stream is about problem definition and the amount of attention being paid to a certain issue. Hereby, the use of persuasion and rhetoric can encourage people to understand issues primarily in terms of their positive or negative aspects and to shift attention likewise (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016). In the context of the EU, it is argued that, despite the lack of explicit powers of initiative, agenda-shaping powers are mainly enjoyed by the European Council, including through its assumed ‘problem formulation prerogative’, which allows it to frame and define policy issues that need collective attention (Tallberg, 2003, pp. 5-6). In the case of EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 Paris Conference, the European Council agreed on five overarching high priority issues, as listed in its ‘strategic agenda’ (European Council, 2014a). The European Council Conclusions of 27 June 2014, indicated the following:
It [the European Council] agreed the attached strategic agenda. It invites the EU institutions and the Member States to fully implement these priorities in their work. The agenda will also guide the institutions in the annual and multiannual programming as well as in legislative planning; they should organize their work accordingly. The European Council will ensure the regular monitoring of the implementation of these strategic priorities. (European Council, 2014a)
As for the environment-related content of the strategic agenda, the section under priority 3: ‘A secure energy and climate future’, reads as follows:
Geopolitical events, the worldwide energy competition and the impact of climate change are triggering a rethink of our energy and climate strategy. We must avoid Europe relying to such a high extent on fuel and gas imports. To ensure our energy future is under full control, we want to build an Energy Union aiming at affordable, secure and sustainable energy. Energy efficiency is essential, since the cheapest and cleanest energy is that which is not consumed.
In light of this challenge, our energy and climate policies for the upcoming five years must focus on: … green energy: by continuing to lead the fight against global warming ahead of the United Nations COP 2015 meeting in Paris and beyond, including by setting ambitious 2030 targets … (European Council, 2014a).
Based on the quotations above, the environmental issue was framed by the European Council as, (energy) security-related, urgent/high priority (but manageable) and in need of a collective approach.
(2) Policy stream: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Second, the policy stream concerns the availability of a (range of) viable solution(s) to a problem in terms of policy recommendations, proposals or memos (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 432). As for the environmental issue prior to the 2015 Paris Conference, a potential EU solution was presented on 27 March 2013 by the European Commission in the form of a Green Paper: ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’ (European Commission, 2013a). With this new regulatory framework, the Commission aimed to present an EU approach that takes into account international developments and promotes stronger global climate action. The new framework is supposed to maintain an open and integrated single market that keeps the balance between the three core objectives: sustainability, international competitiveness and security of energy supplies. With regard to the targets, the official 2030 climate and energy framework (following from the Commission’s Green Paper), introduces a 40% reduction target for GHG emissions (from 1990 levels), a 32% share for renewable energy, and at least 32,5% improvement in energy efficiency (European Commission, 2013a). Besides, the Green Paper suggests various implementation measures (as briefly summarized below), in order for the individual Member States to achieve the specified targets.
With respect to the reduction target for GHG emission levels, the Commission refers to the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which allows for a uniform carbon price for large industrial companies, the energy sector and the airline industry. A uniform carbon price is said to ensure that climate goals are met cost-effectively and guarantees a level playing field for a variety of business across the EU. The ETS carbon prices are now taken into consideration by EU businesses’ operational and investment decisions and have contributed to substantial emissions reductions. Furthermore, the Commission stresses the importance of long-term low carbon investments and national policies (depending on the economic capacity of the Member States) (European Commission, 2013a).
As regards the second target, major investments in R&D, innovation and large-scale deployment will be needed to ensure renewable energy sources in the most cost-efficient way. Besides, a coupling of the EU Member States’ electricity markets and therefore, a completion of the internal energy market is said to contribute to integrate renewable energy into the entire EU electricity system, as will the roll-out of smart grids (European Commission, 2013a).
Third, the target on improvement in energy efficiency requires all Member States to adopt the existing Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), which is already part of the EU legislative framework since 2012, but needs to be implemented on the national level as well. In addition, the EU adopted the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) in 2010, requiring the construction industry to ensure that all new buildings are nearly ‘zero-energy’ by 2021. Despite delays and insufficient Member State efforts to translate this directive into national policy, the Commission’s Green Paper stresses the necessity of substantial contributions by the construction sector and supports the development of new energy efficient technology through various public partnerships and mobilization of funds. Finally, the transport sector is bound by several Regulations that establish performance standards for light duty vehicles. Those measures have led to substantial reductions in GHG emission levels in the past, and therefore, will continue to be applied (European Commission, 2013a).
(3) Politics stream: Joint agenda setting and willingness to compromise
Following from Chapter 3, the politics stream requires policymakers to have the motive and
opportunity to decide on concrete policy measures (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 7). In order
for this stream to be ‘ripe’, the specific policy issue needs to be backed by broad-based support across different institutional layers. As stated before, policy-making in the EU is a changing and complex process in which a specific policy issue can span the legal competences of a variety of different political actors (Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015, p. 433). With regard to the institutional framework of the EU, a qualitative study into legislative agenda-setting has shown that the relationship between the European Council and the Commission can be characterized by mutual influence and competitive cooperation (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014, p. 26). On the one hand, the European Council depends on the Commission in order to set in motion the legislative process and, at a later stage, supervision of implementation and compliance. On the other hand, the Commission relies on effective cooperation with the European Council when it is eager to put ambitious initiatives on the EU policy agenda. Furthermore, both institutions benefit from mutual support and approval as a source of legitimacy. This institutional interaction is referred to in the literature as the joint agenda setting approach (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014, p. 26).
A similar dynamic appears to be present in the EU agenda-setting process on the environmental issue prior to the 2015 Paris Conference. As becomes clear from the official Conclusions from 27 June 2014, the European Council stressed the importance of a swift development of the 2030 climate and energy framework and looked forward, in particular, to the Commissions’ review of the EED in this regard (European Council, 2014a). Following from the Commission’s original Green Paper, the official 2030 climate and energy framework was adopted by the European Council later that year in October (European Council, 2014b). Besides, the European Council Conclusions from 24 October 2014 called upon the Commission to take further action on environmental policy in the run-up to the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference. The Conclusions, inter alia, indicated the following:
(2.13) It is important to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and risks related to fossil fuel dependency in the transport sector. The European Council therefore invites the Commission to further examine instruments and measures for a comprehensive and technology neutral approach for the promotion of emission reduction and energy efficiency in transport, for electric transportation and for renewable energy sources in transport also after 2020. (European Council, 2014b).
(2.14) The multiple objectives of the agriculture and land use sector, with their lower mitigation potential, should be acknowledged, as well as the need to ensure coherence between the EU’s food security and climate change objectives. The European Council invites the Commission to examine the best means of encouraging the sustainable intensification of food production, while optimizing the sector’s contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation and sequestration, including through afforestation. (European Council, 2014b).
The abovementioned text implies that both the European Council and the Commission were willing to contribute to environment-related policymaking in advance of the 2015 Paris Conference. The environmental issue thus enjoyed support across multiple institutional layers and in line with the joint agenda setting approach, the European Council and the Commission influenced each other(s agenda), as the input of one fed into the work of the other (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014, p. 26). Besides, while the Commission’s initial Green Paper: A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, was designed for the EU and its Member States, the
Commission was well-aware of the need (and opportunity) for a more broad-based international agreement. The introduction of the Commission’s Green Paper reads as follows:
Third, while negotiations for a legally binding international agreement on climate mitigation have been difficult, an international agreement is still expected by the end of
2015. The EU will have to agree on a series of issues, including its own ambition level,
in advance of this date in order to engage actively with other countries. (emphasis added) (European Commission, 2013a).
The willingness to lower ambitions to a certain extent in order to achieve a common binding international agreement, would later prove to be of key importance at the Paris Conference. As repeatedly stated by Oberthür & Groen (2017, p. 4), the high level of goal achievement in terms of policy outcomes at the 2015 Paris Conference was possible because of a moderation of the EU’s policy objectives in the run-up to the Conference.
(4) Window of opportunity: Annually held United Nations Climate Change Conference
As described in the previous chapter, major policy change can only occur if the three separate streams are coupled during a window of opportunity (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 1). In this research context, it appears that such a window was created by the annually held United Nations Climate Change Conference. In June 2013, the European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a reflection paper called ‘EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond’. With regard to EU diplomatic efforts in support of a legally binding global climate agreement, the paper reads as follows:
The EU will actively use events and processes at the highest level for consistent political messaging in support of climate ambition and the 2015 objectives, in particular:
- by supporting the EU position and messaging on the UNFCCC process ahead of negotiating sessions and Conferences of the Parties (COP);… (European Union External Action, 2013).
The quoted section above implies that the EEAS, the EU’s diplomatic service, considered the upcoming 2015 Paris Conference (COP21) as an opportunity for international environmental policymaking. Broadly recognized as the foremost global forums for multilateral discussion of climate change issues, the purpose of the UN Conferences is twofold: to review the
implementation of former conventions, protocols and agreements, and to adopt decisions to further develop and implement these three instruments (United Nations, n.d.). In other words, the possibility for policy change, created by the 2015 UN Paris Climate Change Conference, was a predictable window of opportunity. Accordingly, the Commission’s Green Paper (as quoted on the previous page) indicated that an international agreement was expected by the end of 2015 (European Commission, 2013a).
(5) Policy entrepreneur: The European Commission as an international ‘leadiator’
As stated before, a policy entrepreneur plays a key role in the agenda-setting process by advocating policy solutions, fostering communication and building or sustaining coalitions between the different actors involved. Hereby, the degree to which a policy entrepreneur is successful, depends on a combination of skill and strategy (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016, p. 20). In the EU agenda-setting process prior to the 2015 Paris Conference, the role of policy entrepreneur was mainly assumed by the Commission, headed by the chief negotiator Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete. With regard to EU diplomatic efforts in the run-up to the Paris Conference, the aforementioned EEAS reflection paper ‘EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond’, stated the following:
The EU has for some time now been playing a leading role, through its own climate policy but also by projecting it internationally. It is time to further step up efforts and develop a strategic toolbox to deploy an effective EU climate diplomacy and strengthen the EU’s voice internationally in support of the 2015 Agreement and of a low emission development path. Building on the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of July 2011, this reflection paper outlines some ideas on how to deploy an even more strategic climate diplomacy through joint and mutually reinforcing actions by the EEAS, Commission services and Member States, in their respective and complementary roles and competences. (European Union External Action, 2013).
As to the content of this strategic toolbox in the UN climate negotiations more specifically, the EEAS referred to a Consultative Communication paper by the Commission, called ‘The 2015 International Climate Change Agreement: Shaping international climate policy beyond 2020’ (European Commission, 2013b). The Consultative Communication paper, aimed at the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, outlined the challenges and opportunities, as well as the strategy to
be adopted in preparation of a 2015 Agreement. Closer to the 2015 Paris Conference, an even more detailed Communication paper on the negotiating strategies, ‘The Paris Protocol – A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020’ was issued by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (European Commission, 2015b). Briefly summarized, the strategy suggested by the Commission underlined the following elements: bridge-building, incentivizing ambitious targets, ensuring enough flexibility for future adjustments and careful attention to contextual factors and the North-South paradigm (European Commission, 2013b, 2015b). In line with the negotiating strategy suggested by the Commission’s Communication papers, Oberthür and Groen (2017, p. 1) conclude that the high level of goal achievement at the Paris Conference was facilitated by the EU as an international ‘leadiator’. As regards GHG emission mitigation, the EU kept pressing for ambitious targets and committed itself to the highest intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) of at least 40% by 2030 (from 1990 levels). Also, with respect to the aforementioned flexibility objective, the EU insisted on a review mechanism that would allow for increased ambitions every five years (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 3). Besides, through diplomatic activity both inside the UNFCCC and beyond, it engaged actively in building bridges and coalitions, especially across the North-South divide (Oberthür & Groen, 2017, p. 5).
5.2 Presentation of the research findings
Following the same structure of the operationalization table in Chapter 4, the analyzed research findings are summarized below in Table 2.
Table 2. Presentation of the research findings, structured by the five key elements of Kingdon’s MSF
Having identified the five structural elements of Kingdon’s MSF, a visualization of the research findings is demonstrated below in figure 2. The figure graphically represents how the legally binding 2015 Paris Agreement can be explained from an agenda-setting perspective (MSF), by focusing on the role of the European Union.
6. Concluding remarks
By means of this thesis, an attempt has been made to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on (environmental) agenda-setting and policy-making in the EU, by explaining the legally binding 2015 Paris Agreement from an agenda-setting perspective. To this end, a qualitative analysis of EU agenda-setting prior to the 2015 UN Paris Climate Change Conference has been conducted, based on Kingon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). Despite being criticized for its theoretical (under)development (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015), the framework has been considered particularly suited for observing the EU’s multilevel governance structure and its ability to accurately trace the course of a given policy process (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2015; Richardson, 2006; Ackrill, Kay & Zahariadis, 2013). The analysis, based on formal policy documents and academic publications of previous studies, was structured by the five key conditions of Kingdon’s MSF: the problem stream, policy stream, politics stream, window of opportunity and policy entrepreneur (Cairney & Zahariadis, 2016). The research findings, visually demonstrated in paragraph 5.2, indicate that the legally binding 2015 Paris Agreement can indeed be explained from an agenda-setting perspective (MSF) that focuses on the role of the EU. Hereby, the European Council and the European Commission turned out to be particularly important actors.
In the light of previous research, this study can be valued for its full application of the MSF to a policy area and context other than originally envisaged by Kingdon: EU environmental agenda-setting. Studies covering the ‘full’ MSF to EU policy analysis are relatively scarce (Ackrill, Kay & Zahariadis, 2013, p. 874). Nonetheless, these contributions are highly relevant, as they can demonstrate the applicability of the framework to empirical cases -at least ex post- in differing contexts, thereby also identifying any theoretical shortcomings (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg & Rüb, 2015, p. 414). In this regard, it should however be acknowledged that the MSF has been applied here more or less unmodified to the context of the EU. Arguments in favor of the theoretical appropriateness have indeed been made in paragraph 3.2, but some analytical difficulties still remain. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most prominent example of this is provided by the politics stream, whereby the functional equivalents of interest groups, governmental institutions and the national mood at EU level have yet to be defined (Herweg, 2016, pp. 18-19). Further research could therefore be conducted to explore how the MSF could be adapted, modified or completed in such a way that suits the specific characteristics of the EU and provides a level playing field for future agenda-setting analyses. Besides, a significant number of sources used in this thesis is published by EU
institutions. Although the choice for this research material was made deliberately in order to analyze primary source documents, this might have biased the research findings and overstated the effect of the EU as a predominant factor in the negotiations. For a more complete and objective analysis, future research could therefore be enhanced by involving external sources as well.
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