Thesis completed in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Master of Laws (LL.M.) in
International and European Law: International Investment and Trade Law programme at
Amsterdam Law School
July 2020
Student
Eunjung Oh
Student Number
12799475
Title
What For? E-Commerce Provisions in Asia-Pacific Preferential Trade
Agreements and the Future of Digital Trade Governance
Supervisor
Dr. Ingo Venzke
Length
11973 words of content (footnotes included)
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law
Amsterdam Law School
What For? E-Commerce Provisions in Asia-Pacific Preferential
Trade Agreements and the Future of Digital Trade Governance
Eunjung Oh
Abstract
The expansion of global digital market and electronic commerce (e-commerce) is aided by the
rapid advancement in information and telecommunication technologies (ICT) and the internet of
things (IoT). As a result of the current impasse of the Doha Development Round, WTO member
states have shifted their attention to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) to promote global
governance on e-commerce. This paper evaluates the elements of e-commerce provisions in
bilateral and mega-regional PTAs and analyzes the development towards digital liberalization in
the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the paper makes note of the stakes of developing
countries that are under pressure to keep up with the changing dynamic of global economy.
These countries find themselves locked in difficult position, as they are expected to accelerate
their conclusions over major e-commerce negotiations while the effects of such proposals are yet
difficult to predict. This is especially the case for ASEAN member states that are mutual
signatories of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Keywords: Digital Economy, Electronic Commerce, International Trade Law, WTO Law,
Preferential Trade Agreements, Free Trade Agreements, Asia-Pacific, Developing Countries,
Cross-Border Data Flow, CPTPP, RCEP
Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations ... 1
I. INTRODUCTION ... 2
II. Is the Existing Trade Law Dated? ... 4
A. Rewind: WTO Work Programme and Moratorium on E-Commerce ... 6
B. Classification Issues: To Apply GATS or GATT Commitments, or Both?... 8
III. Assessing E-Commerce Rules in Preferential Trade Agreements ... 11
A. Anatomy of E-commerce Provisions in PTAs: Key Elements ... 11
Definitions ... 11
Non-Discriminatory Treatment of Digital Products ... 13
Elimination of Digital Customs Duties ... 13
Cross-Border Data Flows and Data Localization ... 15
Intellectual Property (IP) Provisions ... 17
Cooperation ... 17
Recognition of the applicability of WTO rules to e-commerce ... 18
B. Evolution of E-Commerce Regulations on Bilateral/Plurilateral Level in the Asia-Pacific
Region ... 18
Paperless trading [2000-2002] ... 18
Emergence of e-commerce chapters [2003] ... 19
Mixed picture of e-commerce regulations [2004-2011]... 19
New generation of e-commerce liberalization [2014+] ... 20
C. Two Competing Mega-Regional Paths in the Asia-Pacific: CPTPP and RCEP ... 21
IV. Understanding the Dilemmas of the Developing Countries in Digital Governance ... 23
A. Data Commercialization, Privacy Protection, and Concern for Digital Colonialism ... 24
B. Weighing the Benefits and Balancing between Multiple Jurisdictions... 26
APPENDIX A. List of Tables and Figures ... 32
Table 1. Digital Trade Components and Applicable WTO Rules ... 32
Table 2. Accomplishments by the WTO versus PTAs in Response to Digital Trade Issues
Raised in WTO Work Programme on E-Commerce ... 32
Table 3. Comparison of CPTPP and RCEP E-Commerce Chapters ... 33
Figure 1. Evolution of PTAs with E-commerce Provisions ... 35
Figure 2. Parties to PTAs with E-commerce Provisions... 35
Figure 3. Evolution of average number of e-commerce provisions by country ... 36
Appendix B. Selected list of e-commerce provisions in PTAs ... 37
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA)... 38
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) ... 40
EU-Japan EPA ... 45
Japan-Mongolia EPA ... 47
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) ... 50
Singapore-Australia FTA ... 55
US-Korea FTA (KORUS)... 60
US-Singapore FTA (USSFTA) ... 62
WTO Work Programme on E-Commerce ... 63
1
Acronyms and Abbreviations
APAC
Asia-Pacific
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CPTPP
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
EPA
Economic Partnership Agreement
FTA
Free Trade Agreement
GATS
General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDPR
General Data Protection Regulation
GVCs
Global Value Chains
ICT
Information and Communication Technologies
IoT
Internet of Things
IP
Intellectual Property
ITA
Information Technology Agreement
MFN
Most-Favoured Nation
RCEP
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
PTA
Preferential Trade Agreement
RTA
Regional Trade Agreement
SMEs
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
TBT
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
TFA
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (2017)
TNC
Transnational Corporation
TPP
Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRIPS
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
WTO
World Trade Organization
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The internet and the rapid development in digital technology have significantly changed the
traditional means and modes of international trade over the past few decades. Industrial production
processes are being replaced with adoption of 3D printing, smart goods and IoT, and business
models are also adapting to these developments.
1Purchase and delivery of goods and services are
now being operated by digital platforms run by major corporations such as Google and Amazon.
2However, as printed books and music CDs become substituted by e-books and music streaming
and downloading services, the classification of goods and services becomes blurry, making it more
challenging for governments to determine which rules apply.
3The present rules of the WTO, namely the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), have resulted from the negotiations in
the 1994 Uruguay round.
4Considering that digital trade is a novel concept which emerged at a
later stage than when the Uruguay round took place, WTO faces criticism that its trade rules are
not suitable for governing the new global trade dynamics.
5Since the collapse of the 2001 Doha
Development Agenda negotiations, Member States have continuously called for the need to reform
the WTO.
6Therefore, WTO member states have been resorting to preferential trade agreements
(PTAs), with expectations to obtain more benefits in an efficient manner than from the WTO.
7A
growing number of new generation PTAs now dedicate a special chapter on e-commerce or include
relevant provisions.
8These agreements mainly propose: (1) elimination or reduction of customs
duties on e-transmissions, (2) prohibition of data localization requirements, and (3) the enabling
of free flow of data across borders.
1 R. S. Neeraj, ‘Trade Rules for the Digital Economy: Charting New Waters at the WTO’ (2019] 18 World Trade
Review S1, S121-S122.
2 See J P Meltzer, ‘Governing Digital Trade’ (2019) 18 World Trade Review S1, S23-S24.
3 J L González and J Ferencz, ‘Digital Trade and Market Openness’ (2018) 217 OECD Trade Policy Papers, 34. 4 M I Latif, ‘Uruguay Round of GATT and Establishment of the WTO’ (2012) 65 Pakistan Institute of International
Affairs 1, 53.
5 M E Janow and P C Mavroidis, ‘Digital Trade, E-Commerce, the WTO and Regional Frameworks’ (2019) 18
World Trade Review S1, S1.
6 See WTO, ‘Annual Report for 2018’ (Appellate Body 2019) WT/AB/29, 6-7.
7 See Meltzer, ‘Governing Digital Trade’ (n 2), S44; R Wolfe, ‘Learning about Digital Trade: Privacy and
Commerce in CETA and TPP’ (2019) 18 World Trade Review S1, S64-S66; R H Weber, ‘The Expansion of E-commerce in Asia-Pacific Trade Agreements’ (10 September 2015) ICTSD < https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/the-expansion-of-e-commerce-in-asia-pacific-trade-agreements>.
3
This paper investigates e-commerce provisions negotiated in the PTA arena to promote
liberalization of commerce and explores the following question: what framework(s) of
e-commerce governance do PTAs provide, and why does developing countries’ concerns over the
context of e-commerce liberalization matter for the future of e-commerce governance? This study
particularly examines in great detail the development of PTAs with e-commerce provisions
initiated in the Asia-Pacific region. A plethora of existing literatures has already focused on trade
agreements initiated by the U.S. and the EU (i.e. NAFTA, CETA, TTIP), but few have provided
insight on how trade agreements initiated by Asia-Pacific countries approach e-commerce
regulation. Furthermore, this paper introduces the e-commerce chapter of the most recent regional
negotiation initiated by the ASEAN member states, the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), and provides comparative analysis with another key mega-regional
agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
To add clarity to the following discussions, it is important to define some terminologies.
The term “Asia-Pacific (APAC)” in this paper refers to countries located in the Western Pacific
Ocean. It encompasses Northeast, South, and Southeast Asia, and Oceania. This paper primarily
focuses on the ASEAN+6 (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand) countries.
“Electronic commerce (E-commerce)”, synonymous with digital trade, is not explicitly defined,
but will be used to refer to transfer of digital products, services, and data through electronic
transmission.
9A trade agreement with at least two parties have various nomenclatures, inter alia,
free trade agreement (FTA), preferential trade agreement (PTA), regional trade agreement (RTA),
or economic partnership agreement (EPA), but there is lack of clarity in distinguishing the meaning
and scope of these terms. Although “RTA” appears to be the generally used term among literature
to encompass various forms of trade agreements,
10this paper prefers to use the term “PTA” to
include agreements signed between countries that are not from the same region.
11Therefore,
“Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)” will be used to indicate all bilateral/plurilateral/regional
9 See S Wunsch-Vincent, ‘Trade Rules for the Digital Age’ in Panizzon M et al., (eds) GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (CUP 2008).10 The widespread use of “regional trade agreements” as an overarching term may be based on the World Bank,
which defines it as an agreement between two or more governments that “define the rules of trade for all signatories.” See World Bank, ‘Regional Trade Agreements’. (April 5, 2018).
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/regional-trade-agreements> accessed June 14, 2020.
11 This aligns with the position in the World Trade Report 2011. See WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011: The WTO
and Preferential Trade Agreements: from co-existence to coherence’; Also economists, such as Bhagwati, prefers to use “PTA” or “RTA” rather than “FTA” to avoid discriminating non-members of an agreement. He also proceeds to use the term “RTA” to indicate agreements on customs unions, regional trading blocs, and free trade areas.
4
trade agreements termed as RTAs, FTAs, and EPAs, which give preferential access to participating
parties.
This study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 following the introduction (Chapter 1) lays
out previous initiatives within the WTO with regards to digital trade, concluding that significant
change has not taken place despite the efforts. Following a brief overview of the current WTO
rules, an analysis of initiatives in the WTO Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce (1998)
and the limitations in the e-commerce moratorium is provided. The remaining section elaborates
on the classification challenges in relation the GATT and GATS commitments and analyzes what
the Panel and the Appellate Body have said on previous disputes on classification.
Following the discussion on the shortcoming of WTO rules, Chapter 3 offers an in-depth
analysis of e-commerce provisions in PTAs. It will first identify the most common provisions in
e-commerce chapters and then review how e-commerce liberalization movement evolved in the
APAC region. The later section of this chapter will look into the newest mega-trade agreements
and negotiations initiated by countries from the APAC region, namely the CPTPP and the RCEP.
Chapter 4 covers the concerns of developing countries towards implementation of these
e-commerce provisions. Continuing the discussions on PTAs on Chapter 3, this chapter addresses
some risks associated with certain provisions of e-commerce chapters with particular emphasis on
the cross-border data transfer. It also discusses divergent interests among developing countries and
how they have expressed their views towards e-commerce liberalization initiatives.
Based on the discussions above, chapter 5 summarizes the implications of growing
e-commerce provisions in PTAs. It concludes that while PTAs do present a more concrete mandate
on e-commerce, WTO member states also need to return to the unresolved discussions in the GATS
and work towards a more inclusive future digital governance.
II. Is the Existing Trade Law Dated?
WTO Agreements form the foundation of international trade law and consist of a set of enforceable
rules governing trade of goods, services, and protection of intellectual property (see Table 1 of
Appendix A),
12though lack of success of the multilateral regime on certain issues have stimulated
5
action in preferential venues.
13Before the introduction of the e-commerce work programme, the
WTO has adopted the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
14and the Fourth Protocol on
Basic Telecommunications Services
15to cover technologies that affect trade to liberalize digital
trade. However, no significant developments have been made with regards to regulating intangible
products and online service trade.
16Although the Doha Development Round was intended to serve
this purpose, developed countries have shown reluctance to continue the agenda,
17which faces
criticism from the African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), who resist the
adoption of new e-commerce proposals until the Doha round addresses the asymmetries of existing
rules of the WTO.
18One may argue that there is no need to amend existing law in response to every emergence
of new innovation; opponents of WTO reform suggest WTO laws are flexible and resilient in
nature.
19The principle of non-discrimination, enshrined in most-favored nation (MFN)
20and
national treatment provisions,
21is a key element of WTO that could potentially provide better
protection to States than new regulations, particularly in the domain of intellectual property
rights.
22It is also possible that WTO could manage to tackle issues on standards, trade facilitation,
subsidies, and government procurement by adhering to its basic principles rather than focusing on
the technology itself. For example, the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA), adopted in
the 2013 Ministerial conference in Bali and entered into force on February 2017, will contribute
to enhancing efficiency of global trade by reducing customs and other excessive trade barriers.
2313 M Burri, ‘The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements’ (2017) 48 Georgetown Journal of
International Law, 410; A D Mitchell and N Mishra, ‘Data at the Docks: Modernizing International Trade Law for the Digital Economy’ (2018) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, 1078.
14 See WTO, Ministerial declaration on trade in Information Technology Products [13 Dec 1996] WT/MIN (96)/16. 15 See Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services [30 Apr. 1996] Annex I, WTO Doc. S/L/20
(entered into force 1 Jan. 1998).
16 Burri, ‘The Regulation of Data Flows’ (n 13), 410-411.
17 S Donnan, ‘US Calls Time on Doha Trade Negotiations’ (13 December 2015) Financial Times
<https://www.ft.com/content/2f9a7ee4-a190-11e5-bc70-7ff6d4fd203a>
18 J Kelsey, ‘How a TPP-Style E-Commerce Outcome in the WTO would Endanger the Development Dimension of
the GATS Acquis (and Potentially the WTO)’ (2018) 21 Journal of International Economic Law, 274.
19 Burri, ‘How Should the WTO Respond to the Data-Driven Economy?’ (2020); also see F H Easterbrook,
‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) 207 U. Chic. Legal F.
20 Rules on MFN can be found in GATT Article I, GATS Article II, TRIPS Article 4.
21 Rules on national treatment can be found in GATT Article III, GATS Article XVII, TRIPS Article 3.
22 See S K Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (CUP 2003); Burri (n
13), 411.
23 Agreement on Trade Facilitation Ministerial Decisions [7 December 2013] WT/MIN(13)36; Global Alliance for
Trade Facilitation, ‘The Trade Facilitation Agreement: A Simple Guide’, available at:
6
Under the TFA, Member States are required to publish information of all laws, regulations, and
procedures affecting trade, including transit procedures, duty rates, and import fees. Most of this
information must be made available on the Internet.
24Moreover, regarding WTO jurisprudence on
dispute settlement, the Panel and the Appellate Body have clarified in the famous US—Gambling
dispute that the obligations under the GATS are also applicable to electronically supplied
services.
25They have also clarified key notions of services regulation, such as likeness and the
scope of the “public morals/public order” defense under the general exceptions of article XIV of
GATS.
26However, skepticism remains as many issues discussed in the framework of the 1998
WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce remains unresolved or lacks clarification.
27Also,
there remains a particularly visible dilemma over goods-services classification.
A. Rewind: WTO Work Programme and Moratorium on E-Commerce
At the Second Ministerial Conference in May 2998, WTO member states issued a Ministerial
Declaration on global e-commerce
28which called for a Work Programme on e-commerce, later
adopted in September the same year.
29The key feature of the Work Programme on is that it utilized
existing multilateral trade agreements to address e-commerce related issues, by designating
specific issues to respective WTO Councils and Committees as follows:
30▪
Council for Trade in Services (CTS): treatment of e-commerce in GATS legal framework
(i.e. MFN, domestic regulation, national treatment, customs duties, market access
commitments, classification issues);
▪
Council for Trade in Goods: relevant aspects to GATT (1994) and Annex 1A of WTO
Agreement (i.e. customs duties, classification issues, market access to and for digital
products);
▪
Council for TRIPS: IP matters (i.e. protection and enforcement of copyright and
trademarks, new technologies, access to technology);
24 See WTO, ‘Trade Facilitation’, <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm> (accessed 21 April,
2020).
25 Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling (7 April 2005), WT/DS285/AB/R
26 M Krajewski, ‘Playing by the Rules of the Game? Specific Commitments after US—Gambling and Betting and
the Current GATS Neotiations’ (2005), 32 Legal Issues Econ. Integration 417, 438.
27 WTO, ‘Work Programme on Electronic Commerce’ (adopted 25 Sept. 1998) WTO Doc. WT/L/274. 28 WTO, ‘Ministerial Declaration on Global E-Commerce’ (20 May 1998), WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2. 29 WTO, ‘Electronic commerce’ <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_e.htm> 30 Ibid.
7
▪
Committee on Trade and Development: examination of considerations for developing
countries (i.e. effects of e-commerce on prospects of developing countries, use of
information technology in the integration process, considerations to enhance participation
of developing countries).
Meanwhile the Declaration also included a political statement (the WTO Duty-free Moratorium
on Electronic Transmissions) calling upon Members to “continue their current practice of not
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions.”
31Table 2 in Appendix A attached to this
paper presents a checklist comprised of questions CTS raised as part of the work programme.
Although GATS-specific inquiries in the Work Programme will not be discussed in detail due to
the interest of this paper,
32these initiatives are relatively forward-looking with respect to
e-commerce issues.
Nevertheless, despite the fact the Work Programme included fair amount of easily
achievable agenda, i.e. confirming the applicability of WTO rules and commitments to services
traded electronically, it has failed to draw substantial results to date.
33This is because the WTO
members, particularly the developed countries, have been maintaining a minimalistic stance
towards implementing the Work Programme, as can be inferred from the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration of 2005:
We take note that the examination of issues under the [Work Programme on E-Commerce]
is not yet complete. We agree to reinvigorate that work […] We declare that Members will
maintain their current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions
until our next Session.
34As a result, the Work Programme remains at a state of incompleteness and Member States continue
to prolong the agenda to each subsequent Ministerial Conference.
35Only the duty-free moratorium
on electronic transmissions, which every WTO Member state can consent to, have drawn some
results, but even the moratorium came to a deadlock at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2004.
The 2009 and the 2013 Ministerial Conference both provisionally extended the moratorium on
e-31 WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2 (see footnote 5)
32 For further information on agenda pertaining to GATS, see W. Drake and K. Nicolaidis, ‘Global Electronic
Commerce and the GATS: The “Millennium Round” and Beyond’, in P. Sauvé and R.M. Stern (eds.), GATS 2000;
New Directions in Services Trade Liberalisation (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000), 399-437. 33 Wunsch-Vincent, ‘Trade Rules for the Digital Age’ (n 9)
34 See Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 2005 (para. 46)
35 See WTO, ‘WTO Members Agree to Extend E-Commerce, Non-Violation Moratoriums’ (10 December 2019)
8
commerce
36and the 2019 General Council decision also simply agrees to maintain the current
practice of lifting customs duties on electronic transmissions and restated that Member states
would continue working on the Work Programme.
37B. Classification Issues: To Apply GATS or GATT Commitments, or Both?
Governance of international trade of goods and services pivots on the GATS
38and the GATT
39,
supported by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). GATS and GATT provide different set of rules for
trade in services and goods, respectfully, and the applicability of one agreement precludes the
applicability of the other agreement.
40However, the arrival of digital products, such as physical
goods ordered over the internet, digitizable media, 3D manufactured products, and smart goods,
41has muddied the waters of GATT-GATS based classification.
42This is legally challenging since
the level of trade liberalization of a digital product is determined based on the choice of regulatory
trade discipline.
A single platform such as online games, for example, already has a wide array of
possibilities for categorization under present WTO rules. It can be classified under computer
categories and related services, or alternatively under value-added telecommunications services,
or under entertainments; each of these categories encompass a different set of obligations.
43Taking
electronically-transmitted data intrinsic to a service into account further complicates the issue;
should this form of data transfer then be viewed separately or as part of the traditional form of
services?
44If online platforms and their services are to be classified as computer services, states
would have lesser freedom and would have to grant full access to foreign services and service
36 WTO, ‘Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Decision of 2 December 2009’ (11 December 2009)
WT/L/782; WTO, ‘Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013’ (11 December 2013) WT/L/907
37 WTO, ‘Work Programme on Electronic Commerce: General Council Decision’ (11 December 2019) WT/L/1079 38 General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 UNTS 183 (hereby GATS).
39 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 (hereby GATT).
40 Neeraj (n 1), S124. 41 Neeraj (n 1), S124-S128.
42 R Cooney and A T F Lang, ‘Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and International Trade’
(2007) 18 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 523, 524; A T F Lang and J Scott, ‘The Hidden World of WTO Governance’ (2009) 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 575-614.
43 R H Weber and M Burri, Classification of Services in the Digital Economy (Springer 2013), Chapter 3. 44 Ibid, see also S Peng, ‘GATS and the Over-the-Top Services: A Legal Outlook’ (2016) 50 J. World Trade 21.
9
suppliers. This also implies that states would have to treat them no less favorable than they treat
domestic services and suppliers according to the GATS commitments.
45International trade law
offers scant clarity regarding the classification status of IoT devices, whether they constitute a
good or service.
The Appellate Body has made some attempts to take a more flexible approach towards the
classification dilemma, which could potentially serve as guidelines to governing digital products.
In China—Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body has interpreted schedules of specific
commitments as “sufficiently generic that what they apply to may change over time”,
46and in
EC—Bananas III and Canada—Autos, it clarified that the GATT and the GATS are not mutually
exclusive and could overlap.
47EC—Bananas III
48was the primordial dispute in which the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body had to decide whether the measure targeted a good or a service. The
interpretation employed by the Appellate Body offers some help with the classification of IoT
devices. The Appellate Body of the WTO found that “particular measures could be found to fall
within the scope of both GATT and GATS”, and that “such measures include those that involve a
service relating to a particular good or a service supplied in conjunction with a particular good”.
49In Canada—Periodicals,
50the dispute involved a tax on split-run periodicals equal to 80%
of the value of all the advertisements contained in the split-run edition. In response to the U.S.’
allegation of national treatment obligation violation under the GATT, Canada argued that the tax
was targeting advertising services, which were not bound by obligations under the GATT. The
Appellate Body, concurring with the Panel Report, rejected Canada’s characterization of the
measure; it observed that the final product was a “good comprised of two components: editorial
content and advertising content”.
51Both components can be viewed as having services attributes,
but they combine to form a physical product, which is he periodical itself. The finding of the
Appellate Body expressly acknowledges that a product can be a good and simultaneously have
service attributes. Moreover, it has also laid down that the adjudicating body should primarily
focus on examination of the measure at issue rather than on examination of the product itself while
45 Burri (n 13), 414.
46 Appellate Body Report, China—Audiovisual Products (21 Dec. 2009) WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 396. 47 See Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas (9 Sept. 1997) WTO Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R; Appellate Body Report, Canada—Autos (31 May 2000) WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB,R.
48 Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas (n 47). 49 Ibid., para 221.
50 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Periodicals (30 June 1997) WT/DS31/AB/R. 51 Ibid., pp. 17
10
determining whether the GATT or the GATS would be the controlling agreement.
52The finding
of the Appellate Body that the “measure at issue in this appeal […] is a measure which clearly
applies to goods” (this finding has been reconfirmed in China—Audiovisuals
53) evades the need to
determine whether an i.e. IoT product is a good or a service by choosing to focus on the measure
instead; if the concerned measure targets the service component, GATS would apply, and if the
measure targets the goods attribute, the GATT would apply.
However, this does not resolve the core issue of classification. So as to determine whether
a measure is targeting the “service attribute” or “goods attribute” of a product, there has to be a
conclusive understanding on whether that attribute is a good or a service. In the absence of
consensus on whether data flow constitutes a good or a service, the Dispute Settlement Body would
still have no answer to the question on whether the “measure at issue” is targeting a good or service
when the measure concerns regulation of data flow. Also as incidences of “servicification” of
manufactured products grow, it would become more difficult in the future to reason against this
blurring of boundaries between goods and services.
The dispute settlement of the WTO has been used sparingly to address such measures
despite the regulatory barriers to digital trade.
54E-commerce is cross-cutting in nature, not only
affecting international trade but also touching upon delicate political issues such as human rights,
Internet governance, and economic development. Due to the uncertainty surrounding how WTO
rules apply to digital trade, the outcome of bringing disputes on digital trade (i.e. challenging a ban
on a search engine like Google or a social networking service like Facebook) before the WTO still
presents an unclear image. Since the panel and Appellate Body reports upon the adoption of the
DSB might affect domestic regulation on online censorship, data protection, and Internet
governance, this is a sensitive matter.
55Moreover, Members that adopt a guarded or interventionist
approach in e-commerce regulation tend to be warier of the limits of the GATS framework in
taking account of domestic policy concerns such as addressing privacy or consumer protection
52 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Periodicals (n 50), pp. 18. 53 Appellate Body Report, China—Audiovisuals (n 46).
54 See for example, Appellate Body Report, China—Publications and Entertainment Products (21 December 2009)
WT/DS363/AB/R; Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling (n 25); Panel Report, Mexico—Telecoms (2 April 2004), WT/DS204/R.
55 C Barfield, ‘China’s Internet Censorship: A WTO Challenge is Long Overdue’ (29 April 2016) American
11
concerns or protecting public order.
56As a result, other solutions are sought—for example,
regulating bilateral solutions such as the Privacy Shield between the EU and the U.S. or relevant
rules in PTAs within a smaller group of like-minded countries.
57III. Assessing E-Commerce Rules in Preferential Trade Agreements
The lack of progress on digital trade governance in WTO context has stimulated WTO member
states to actively seek other measures through which they can better incorporate their interests and
efficiently attain their targets for digital development. Rapid proliferation of PTAs in recent years
demonstrate this trend in international trade policy. As of July 2020, there are currently 305 PTAs
in force, of which 182 PTAs contain provisions related to e-commerce.
58Provision on digital trade
was first included in the 2000 Jordan-US FTA
59and the concept of an e-commerce chapter was
pioneered by the 2003 FTA between Australia and Singapore (SAFTA).
60Provision on data flow
was first introduced in the Korea-US FTA from 2007.
61Provisions on e-commerce can usually be
found in the following locations: (1) in a separate chapter dedicated to e-commerce topics; (2) in
chapters on cross-border service supplies; (3) in ICT chapters; (4) through TRIPS-plus provisions
that concern IP law in digital trade.
A. Anatomy of E-commerce Provisions in PTAs: Key Elements
This section will entertain a number of commonly included e-commerce provisions in PTAs. A
full list of topics including those not discussed in this section can be observed from Table 3 of
Appendix A.
Definitions
Definitions of key terms are crucial, as they determine the scope of application of individual
e-commerce provisions. Although the terms selected for definition and the language of definition
itself may vary depending on the type of agreement, e-commerce provisions typically define the
56 Note: negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) revealed the EU’s reluctance to
negotiate on standards of data protection in trade agreements. See J Fontanella-Khan, ‘Data Protection Ruled out of EU-US Trade Talks’ (2013) FIN. Times.
57 M Burri, ‘Designing Future-Oriented Multilateral Rules for Digital Trade’ in (eds) P Sauve and M Roy, Research Handbook on Trade in Services (2016) 331, 343-44.
58 WTO, ‘Regional Trade Agreements Database’ <https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx>; Burri
and Polanco, ‘Digital Trade Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset’ (2019). 6.
59 See Jordan-US FTA, Article 7. Concluded on 24 Oct 2000, entered into force 17 December 2001. 60 See SAFTA. Concluded on 17 February 2003, entered into force on 28 July 2003.
61 M Elsig and S Klotz, ‘Data flow-related provisions in preferential trade agreements.’ (2018) World Trade Institute
12
following terms: “digital product”, “electronic authentication”, “electronic transmission”, and
“unsolicited commercial electronic message”.
Starting from early US FTAs, e-commerce provisions—particularly the ones in the US,
Canada, and Singapore FTAs—include a definition of what constitutes a digital product.
62TPP
(and now CPTPP)
63is an example with such provision. According to Article 14.4 of TPP, a digital
product refers to “a computer programme, text, video, image, sound recording or other product
that is digitally encoded, produced for commercial sale or distribution, and that can be transmitted
electronically”. It is further added that the term “does not include a digitized representation of a
financial instrument, including money”
64nor in any way to be understood as a reflection of “a
Party’s view on whether trade in digital products through electronic transmission should be
categorized as trade in services or trade in goods”.
65It should again be noted that while this
definition is commonly found in most US, Canadian, and Singaporean FTAs; other trade
agreements do not necessarily include a separate definition of the term.
E-commerce provisions also commonly cover the definition of the term electronic
authentication. According to Article 2 Chapter 10 of ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA
(AANZFTA), it refers to “the process of testing an electronic statement or claim, in order to
establish a level of confidence in the statement’s or claim’s reliability”.
66In the TPP, it is defined
as “the process or act of verifying the identity of a party to an electronic communication or
transaction and ensuring the integrity of an electronic communication”.
67The general idea is
similar, although the exact language differs slightly.
PTAs are more uniform with the definition of electronic transmission or transmitted
electronically, which generally refers to transmission generated by electromagnetic means.
68The
definition of electronic transmissions is relevant for the provision on customs duties. Other terms
observed in the definitions section of e-commerce chapters include digital certificates, trade
administration documents, or carrier medium. The choice of terms to be defined and to what extent
62 Wu, ‘Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Existing Models and Lessons for the
Multilateral Trade System’ (Geneva: ICTSD and IDB 2017) RTA Exchange, 9.
63 Note: In CPTPP, chapter on e-commerce remains unchanged from the original TPP agreement. 64 TPP, Article 14.1 and footnote 2
65 TPP, footnote 3 to Article 14.1 66 AANZFTA, Chapter 10 Article 2(b) 67 (CP)TPP, Article 14.1
68 See for example CPTPP, Article 14.1; Korea-Australia FTA, Article 15.10; Singapore-Australia FTA, Article
13
the definition of terms are to be included in e-commerce provisions depend on PTAs; while
agreements such as the CPTPP include an extensive list of definitions, some agreements do not
include any. Given the growing sensitivity of personal data, it is likely that more PTAs in the future
would include definitions of terms such as personal information and computing facilities.
69Non-Discriminatory Treatment of Digital Products
More robust forms of e-commerce chapters aim to extend the principle of non-discrimination and
MFN treatment to digital products and commerce. The special provision on CPTPP for example,
which emulates the Singapore-Australia FTA, mandates non-discrimination of like digital
products as follows:
No Party shall accord less favourable treatment to digital products created, produced,
published, contracted for, commissioned or first made available on commercial terms in the
territory of another Party, or to digital products of which the author, performer, producer,
developer or owner is a person of another Party, than it accords to other like digital products.
70Similar language goes for the US-Singapore FTA:
A Party shall not accord less favourable treatment to some digital products than it accords
to other digital products.
71The like product treatment concerns both physically- and digitally- delivered products. PTAs that
set non-discrimination requirement of like digital products may have additional provisions
defining the scope of the obligation. Examples of these additional stipulations include not
extending the scope of application to broadcasting,
72exclusion of government procurement or
subsidies,
73or inconsistency with obligations in the TRIPS agreement or Intellectual Property
Chapter.
74Elimination of Digital Customs Duties
Nearly all PTAs contain a provision that sets an obligation not to impose customs duties on digital
products. See Singapore-Australia FTA and US-Singapore FTA, for example:
Neither Party shall impose customs duties on electronic transmissions, including content
transmitted electronically, between a person of a Party and a person of the other Party.
7569 Wu ‘Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ (n 62), 9-10. 70 (CP)TPP, Article 14.4.1
71 US-Singapore FTA, Article 14.3.3 72 (CP)TPP, Article 14.4.4
73 Japan-Mongolia EPA, Article 9.4.2 74 Singapore-Australia FTA, Article 5.2 75 Singapore-Australia FTA, Article 4.1
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A Party shall not apply customs duties or other duties, fees, or charges on or in connection
with the importation or exportation of digital products by electronic transmission.
76The significance of this duty-free moratorium is that it contributes to wider adoption of digital
trade between PTA members, particularly pertaining to physical goods that can be digitized, such
as e-books, movies, and music.
77For some countries, this obligation of non-imposition of customs
duties is the core of the e-commerce chapter, as it is one of the few legally binding digital trade
related obligation in the PTA.
78This is the case in EU-Central America Association Agreement,
the Canada-Jordan FTA, and the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement.
79The prohibition of imposing customs duties is limited to digital products belonging
to PTA partners and does not extend to non-PTA partners based on MFN principle. Furthermore,
in most cases, this obligation extends to all forms of digital products regardless of their origin,
since it is complicated to track the source of a digital product when data can flow across borders
and various jurisdictions. It should be noted, however, that some PTAs choose a narrower approach
and do consider the rule of origin. Japan-Switzerland EPA, for instance, includes a requirement
that “upon request by the other Party, [each Party shall] explain how it determines the origin of a
digital product in implementing its obligations under paragraph 1”
80and “shall cooperate in
international organisations and for a to foster the development of criteria determining the origin of
a digital product, with a view to considering the incorporation of such criteria into this
Agreement.”
81Korea-Singapore FTA does not explicitly state this requirement but it can be
inferred that it also takes the narrower approach.
82Settlement of how to handle customs duties is crucial for digital trade, because while digital
products can be bought and be transferred online via Internet, it is also possible to carry the
physical form across borders.
83Some PTAs may be more vocal on distinguishing these different
means of transmission, while others may not explicitly address this difference. In case of
Korea-76 US-Singapore FTA, Article 14.3.1
77 WTO, ‘Fiscal Implications of the Customs Moratorium on Electronic Transmissions: The Case of Digitisable
Goods’ (20 December 2016), JOB/ GC/114.
78 Wu ‘Digital Trade-Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ (n 62), 13.
79 See EU-Central America Association Agreement, Article 201; Canada-Jordan FTA, Article 3.1; India-Singapore
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, Article 10.4
80 Japan-Switzerland EPA, Article 73.3 81 Japan-Switzerland EPA, Article 73.4 82 Korea-Singapore FTA, Article 14.4.1
83 For example, think of ordering an e-book online by Amazon versus getting delivered a hard copy book to your
15
Singapore FTA, the e-commerce chapter leaves the discretion to the governments of involved
parties “to determine the customs value of an imported carrier medium bearing a digital product
in accordance with the customs Valuation Agreement.”
84Provisions in US FTAs are more specific
regarding digital products transmitted physically; customs duties are generally prohibited on
“digital products by electronic transmission”,
85but when digital products are physically
transmitted, customs value is to be determined based on the “cost or value of the carrier medium
alone” regardless of the actual “cost or value of the digital product stored on the carrier medium.”
86Some PTAs clarify that the elimination of customs duties does not preclude members from
imposing internal taxes. CPTPP adds that the obligation “shall not preclude a Party from imposing
internal taxes, fees or other charges on content transmitted electronically, provided that such taxes,
fees or charges are imposed in a manner consistent with this Agreement.”
87Similar language is
found in for example US-Morocco FTA,
88the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement
of the Pacific Alliance,
89and Costa Rica-Singapore FTA,
90to list a few.
Cross-Border Data Flows and Data Localization
The provisions governing data (i.e. data flows, data protection, data localization) are of
considerable importance to privacy protection, and the scope significantly varies depending on
which regions are involved in the agreement. The concept of data flow has been introduced in a
relatively early stage, considering that it was addressed in the 2000 New Zealand-Singapore Closer
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
91and was presented as a distinct provision in the 2007
KORUS e-commerce chapter, which places an intermediate level of commitment under the
statement that each Parties “shall endeavor to refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessary
barriers to electronic information flows across borders”.
92The first binding provision on
cross-border data flow is found in the 2014 Mexico-Panama FTA, which provides that each Party “shall
allow its persons and the persons of the other Party to transmit electronic information, from and to
84 Korea-Singapore FTA, Article 14.4.2 85 US-Singapore FTA, Article 14.3.1
86 See for example, US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (COTPA), Article 15.3.2 87 (CP)TPP, Article 14.3.2
88 Footnote 1 to US-Morocco FTA, Article 14.3.1: “paragraph 1 does not preclude a Party from imposing internal
taxes or other internal charges on digital products, provided that these are imposed in a manner consistent with this Agreement.”
89 Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance, Article 13.4 90 Costa Rica-Singapore FTA, Article 12.1.2
91 CEPA, Annex 2.1, Schedule of Commitments of New Zealand 92 KORUS, Article 15.8
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its territory, when required by said person, in accordance with the applicable legislation on the
protection of personal data and taking into consideration international practices.”
93The (CP)TPP
e-commerce chapter at a later stage has adopted a harder commitment on data-flow regulation;
Article 14.11 stipulates that each Party “shall allow the cross-border transfer of information by
electronic means, including personal information, when this activity is for the conduct of the
business of a covered person”
94and nothing “shall prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining
measures […] to achieve a legitimate public policy objective.”
95Further discussion on this
(CP)TPP provision will follow in section C and Chapter IV, since there is controversy over the
risk of data appropriation upon liberalizing digital trade. Trade agreements adopted post-(CP)TPP
have incorporated similar hard commitments in data-related provisions and proceeds further to
clarify the conditions in which restriction over data flow does not amount to “legitimate public
policy objective”.
96Recent PTAs, such as the Korea-US FTA (KORUS), tend to more explicitly
include commitment on cross-border data flows, albeit it being hortatory in nature.
97An interesting
exception is the trajectory of the EU, since the EU has been more reluctant when it comes to digital
trade rules in FTAs, particularly concerning data flows. This is since the EU members are required
to abide to the commitments of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which presents
high standards of data regulation. Instead of including a binding provision, a clause can be found
both in the 2018 EU-Japan EPA and the Digital Trade chapter of the currently ongoing negotiations
on EU-Mexico Modernized Global Agreement, which notes that parties will resume the discussion
on whether there is a need to add data flow provision to the given treaty once specified period has
passed since the implementation of the agreement.
98Also note that data flow provisions are
sometimes found in chapters on services, since data flows are interlinked with sectors providing
financial and telecommunication services.
99In comparison to provisions on data flows, all provisions on data localization to this date
have binding nature.
100The first incidence of including data localization provision is the 2015
Japan-Mongolia FTA, which states that Parties are prohibited from requiring “a service supplier
93 Mexico-Panama FTA, Art. 14.10 94 (CP)TPP Article 14.11.2
95 (CP)TPP Article 14.11.3
96 See USMCA, Article 11.19, footnote 6 97 KORUS, Art. 15.8.
98 EU-Japan EPA Article 8.81; EU-Mexico Modernised Global Agreement, Digital Trade Chapter, Article XX 99 Burri and Polanco, ‘Digital Trade Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements’ (n 58), 22-23.
17
of other Party, an investor of the other Party, or an investment of an investor of the other Party in
the area of the former Party, to use or locate computing facilities in that area as a condition for
conducting its business”.
101The TPP has included similar provision in 2015, which has been kept
intact in the CPTPP.
102It also further clarifies that “each Party may have its own regulatory
requirements regarding the use of computing facilities, including requirements that seek to ensure
the security and confidentiality of communications” and that “nothing shall prevent a Party from
adopting or maintaining [inconsistent measures] to achieve a legitimate public policy objective”,
provided that the measure is (1) non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary, and (2) does not exceed the
requirements.
103Most trade agreements following the (CP)TPP have adopted the wording of the
(CP)TPP template, with the exception of the 2017 Argentina-Chile FTA, which merely states that
States are to “recognize the importance” of not requiring local computer facilities, rather than
having a directly binding nature.
104Intellectual Property (IP) Provisions
IP is a more recent terrain that caught the attention of PTAs. Although this paper primarily focuses
on the provisions in the e-commerce chapter, several components of the Intellectual Property
Rights chapter are noteworthy to mention in line with digital trade. These provisions impose
requirements regarding country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) domain names,
105require
ratification or affirm commitments in the WIPO internet treaties,
106mandate enforcement
mechanisms against those attempting to circumvent technological protection measures (TPMs),
107specify requirements of internet service providers (ISPs) in exchange for ISP liability,
108and
provide protection of rights management information (RMIs).
109These provisions can provide
protection for rightsholders against illegal downloads and distribution of digital products.
Cooperation
Parties of PTAs mention a range of areas requiring regulatory cooperation which encompasses
commitments to collaborate on initiatives to govern cross-border digital transactions
110and
101 Japan-Mongolia FTA, Article 9.10 102 (CP)TPP, Article 14.13
103 Ibid.
104 Argentina-Chile FTA, Article 11.7 105 (CPT)PP, Article 18.28
106 (CPT)TPP, Article 18.7
107 See for example, EU-Korea FTA, Article 10.12; (CPT)TPP Article 18.68 108 (CPT)TPP, Article 16.11.29
109 (CPT)TPP Article 18.69
18
facilitate the incorporation of e-commerce into SMEs.
111A small number of PTAs also include
provisions to provide assistance, ranging from technical support to training and capacity building,
from a developed country to its developing PTA partner. An example is the EPA between EU and
CARIFORUM States to aid CARIFORUM states in obtaining sufficient information and
improving service supplier capacities to comply to the EU standards and regulations.
112Recognition of the applicability of WTO rules to e-commerce
A common form of provision prominent in US FTAs
113as well as in several Singaporean FTAs
114specifies that the parties explicitly affirm to the WTO rules regarding matters affecting
e-commerce.
115Such provision is absent from the CPTPP, however.
B. Evolution of E-Commerce Regulations on Bilateral/Plurilateral Level in the
Asia-Pacific Region
Paperless trading [2000-2002]
The expansion of PTAs arrived at a later period in the APAC region comparison to the U.S. or the
EU, where number of trade agreements greatly expanded in the 1990. Although mid-1990s was an
era in which the APAC region was opening up trade relationships and gearing towards
multilateralism, the ongoing political and historical unsettlement in the region delayed
implementation of PTAs.
116In particular, the North Asian countries (i.a. Korea, China, Japan,
Hong Kong) have not been part of the global PTA game before 2000.
117A few exceptions are, for
example, the Closer Economic Cooperation (CER) between Australia and New Zealand in 1983
and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA)
signed in 1981. The dynamic noticeably changed, however, in the aftermath of the 1997 financial
crisis. More attention was brought to PTAs and the call for institutional cooperation increased.
Starting from 1998, trade negotiations accelerated and more than 15 PTAs including APAC
countries have entered into force within the first five years.
118111 Japan-Mongolia EPA, Article 9.12.3 112 EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Article 121. 113 US-Panama FTA Article 14.1.1
114 See for example, Costa Rica-Singapore FTA, Article 12.1.1; Panama-Singapore FTA, Article 13.1;
Korea-Singapore FTA, Article 14.2.1; CECA Article 10.1
115 See Table 1 in Annex A.
116 T Feridhanusetyawan, Preferential Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region (2005). IMF, Issue 2005-2149,
5-6.
117 Ibid.
118 For example, trade initiatives/negotiations took place between Korea and Japan, ASEAN and China, Singapore
19
Although e-commerce was yet a novice concept during this period, some bilateral
agreements in APAC region began recognizing the need for digital trade and have included
“paperless trading” chapters. For example, Chapter 4 of the Closer Economic Partnership (CEP)
between Singapore and New Zealand includes provisions on paperless trading and mentions the
aim of implementing the “APEC Blueprint for Action on Electronic Commerce” by calling parties
to the agreement to adopt “an electronic environment that supports electronic business applications
between each Customs administration and its trading community”.
119Singapore has also included
a chapter on paperless trading in the New Age Economic Partnership (2002)
120agreement with
Japan, emphasizing the need for cooperation on paperless trading and calling upon parties to
recognize electronic versions of trade related documents.
121A Joint Committee on Paperless
Trading has also been established under Article 44.
Emergence of e-commerce chapters [2003]
The concept of ‘e-commerce chapter’ was first introduced in the Singapore-Australia FTA
(SAFTA) in 2003. Elements included in this e-commerce chapter include definitions,
122commitments on transparency
123and customs duties,
124reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Electronic Commerce,
125and e-certification.
126It also encompasses provisions on consumer
and data protection,
127as well as issues of paperless trading.
128The e-commerce chapter in SAFTA
is pioneering not only because it is the first PTA in the APAC region introducing an e-commerce
chapter, but also because it is comprehensive in nature; the topics covered in this chapter are still
important factors for regulation at the present time.
Mixed picture of e-commerce regulations [2004-2011]
More divergence among e-commerce chapters of PTAs in the APAC occurred between 2004 and
2011. This was a period when there was no specific pattern among APAC countries and the level
of liberalization significantly varied among agreements.
119 Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership (2000), Article 12.
120 Note: Along with the chapter on paperless trading, Article 1 of this agreement states “promoting paperless trading
between the Parties” as one of the objectives of the Agreement.
121 Agreement between Japan and Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership, Article 40-43. 122 SAFTA, Article 1 Chapter 14
123 SAFTA, Article 2, Chapter 14 124 SAFTA, Article 3 Chapter 14 125 SAFTA, Article 4 Chapter 14 126 SAFTA, Article 5 Chapter 14 127 SAFTA, Article 6-7, Chapter 14 128 SAFTA, Article 8 Chapter 14
20
At the lower end of the liberalization scale is the Japan-Philippines EPA in 2006, which
presents a retroactive image by only including a paperless trading chapter, as was reflected in PTAs
in the beginning of the millennium. In comparison, bilateral trade agreements between Australia
and Thailand (2004/2005) and between New Zealand and Thailand (2005) appears to adhere to
more widespread format of an e-commerce chapter as was in the SAFTA. A bit higher up on the
liberalization scale is the Singapore-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement
(2006), but it is not as liberalized as the Korea-Singapore FTA (2005/2006) which guarantees full
scale non-discriminatory treatment of digital products and a duty-free moratorium. Although the
e-commerce chapter in Singapore-India CECA is largely alike the one in Korea-Singapore FTA,
the main difference is that the CECA does not include MFN or national treatment regarding digital
products. Furthermore, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand PTA of 2009 offers an unusually
extensive e-commerce chapter, which addresses wide range of topics ranging from paperless
trading and data/consumer protection to questions of cooperation.
It should, however, be also noted that large number of PTAs involving China or Japan
during this period do not contain e-commerce chapters because each government was reluctant
towards extensive e-commerce provisions.
129The FTA between China and New Zealand in 2008
did include some matters on digital trade, but instead of having a separate e-commerce chapter,
these questions were dealt upon on chapters on TBT and conformity assessments.
New generation of e-commerce liberalization [2014+]
PTAs concluded after 2014 resumed the development towards a more open e-commerce. A
country that has shifted the most is Japan, which has been maintaining a more restrictive stance
during 2004-2011. This change can be observed from the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership
Agreement (JAEPA) of 2014, in which Japan consented to adopt a set of extensive e-commerce
regulations that resembles the regulations set out in the Singapore-India PTA and the
Korea-Singapore PTA. Similar achievement is observed in the Japan-Mongolia EPA (2015), in which the
e-commerce chapter takes an additional step to (1) prohibit the requirement of local computing
facilities,
130(2) call upon Parties to regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail,
131and (3) prohibit the
129 See for example, Japan-ASEAN EPA and other agreements Japan entered with India, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Vietnam during 2007-2011.
130 Japan-Mongolia EPA, Article 9.10 131 Japan-Mongolia EPA, Article 9.7
21
requirement of transfer of or access to source code.
132A more recent achievement is the EU-Japan
EPA, which entered into force in February 2019.
133As a result of these developments, a complex web has been formed in the APAC region
through intersection of multiple bilateral, plurilateral and regional trade agreements.
134Among
these PTAs, there is variance to what extent digital trade should be liberalized. Some agreements
that are unaffiliated to U.S. trade agreements refrain from including an extensive e-commerce
chapter.
135Others contain a mixture of binding and non-binding rules on digital trade and ICT
cooperation, in addition to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) statements and other
agreements on cooperation.
136The free trade area agreement between ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand (AANZFTA) is also a different model; while it contains a comprehensive e-commerce
chapter with cooperation commitments and deep digital trade rules, the agreement does not contain
e-commerce provision on applicability of WTO rules or services, obligation of non-discrimination,
or a chapter on IP regulation.
137Mega PTAs emerged in response to the call for governance over
the extension of GVCs.
138C. Two Competing Mega-Regional Paths in the Asia-Pacific: CPTPP and RCEP
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also
known as the TPP-11, entered into force in December 30
th, 2018 and represents approximately
13.5% of global GDP.
139This agreement was formed between 11 countries from the Asia-Pacific
region, who were originally signatories to the TPP.
140Despite the fact that the US is not part of the
pact, the CPTPP is still widely regarded as a new norm of trade agreements and a template for
132 Japan-Mongolia EPA, Article 9.11
133 European Commission, ‘EU-Japan Trade Agreement Enters into Force’ (31 January 2019).
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1976#:~:text=31%20January%202019-,EU%2DJapan%20trad e%20agreement%20enters%20into%20force,trade%20zone%20in%20the%20world.>
134 See Feridhanusetyawan, Preferential Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific Region (n 116), 9-11. 135 See for example, India-Korea FTA and Japan-Vietnam FTA
136 See for example, China-ASEAN FTA, India-Thailand FTA, Maghreb Arab Union; Chauffour and Christophe, Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook (2011), 259.
137 Burri and Cottier, Trade Governance in the Digital Age: World Trade Forum (2012), 199.
138 F Kimura and L Chen, ‘Implications of Mega Free Trade Agreements for Asian Regional Integration and RCEP
Negotiation’ (2016), 1-2.
139 Government of Canada, ‘Economic Impact of Canada’s Participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (16 Feb. 2018). Office of the Chief Economist, Global Affairs Canada <
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/impact-repercussions.aspx?lang=eng>
140 Note: The CPTPP replaced the TPP in the aftermath of Trump Administration’s announcement on US’
withdrawal from the TPP, which precluded the agreement from entering into force. Further overview on the CPTPP can be found on New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade website <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp>