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More than the sum of its parts : compact preference representation over
combinatorial domains
Uckelman, J.D.
Publication date 2009
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Citation for published version (APA):
Uckelman, J. D. (2009). More than the sum of its parts : compact preference representation over combinatorial domains. Institute for Logic, Language and Computation.
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