'Cash rules everything around me' : about a property-owning democracy, egalitarian distribution of capital and equality of opportunity

‘Cash Rules Everything

around Me’

Table of Contents 1. Introduction 4 2. The Reproduction of Capital Inequalities 8 2.1 Cultural and Social Capital Inequalities 10 2.1.1 Structure and Habitus 10 2.1.2 Social Fields and Capital 11 2.2 Economic Capital Inequality 13 2.3 How Capital Inequalities Appear in WSC Society 15 2.3.1 Capital Inequality in Practice 15 3. Property-Owning Democracy 17 3.1 Rawls, Liberalism and the Conception of the Good Life 17 3.2 What is a Property-Owning Democracy? 18 3.2.1 POD and Redistribution of Economic Capital 20 3.2.2 Human Capital, Primary Goods and the Good Life 22 4. Capital Redistribution 25 4.1 Redistribution of Economic Capital 25 4.2 Redistribution of Cultural Capital 32 4.2.1 Institutionalized Cultural Capital 32 4.2.2 Embodied Cultural Capital and Habitus 34 4.2.3 Objectivated Cultural Capital 37 4.3 Redistribution of Social Capital 39 5. Conclusion 46 References 50

Chapter 1. Introduction For many reasons, the twentieth century can be considered an instable political era. The rise and fall of the Soviet Union and National Socialism in Hitler’s Germany as well as the final establishment of a globalised capitalist economy are some of the main indicators of this political instability. Therefore, the emergence of several alternative theoretical models of capitalism that developed in order to deal with this ideological instability should be understood within this context. Moreover, many left-wing political parties—which traditionally disagree with capitalist, neoliberal ideology—are committed to the defence of the welfare state capitalist society against neoliberal policies, rather than alternatives to this model. As a result, many left-wing parties do not have ideologies that are radically different from centrist or right-wing political parties. In the Netherlands for example, the political party GroenLinks (or, GreenLeft) tends to profile itself as a progressive left-wing party, despite the fact that they do not have a radically different ideology from the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), the liberal party; both parties tend to organise institutions within the same, already existing framework. To put it differently, left-wing parties do not have radically different ideologies from the neoliberal policies they oppose, but rather concentrate on the defence of the current welfare state. In contrast, property-owning democracy (POD) is an example of an alternative model that is, ideologically, radically different from welfare state capitalism (WSC). Although POD was not initially as radically egalitarian as it is now, one of the main features of its current model, which James Meade (1964) brought into political theory debate, entails the widespread, equal distribution of various forms of capital. Rawls (2001: 135–140) further developed the idea of POD in relation to his conception of justice as fairness. Justice as fairness is, furthermore, meant to be performed by his two principles of justice. According to Rawls (1971: 53), the first principle suggests that “each person has the same

to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged in society”. He states that justice as fairness cannot be achieved within WSC for three reasons. First, within WSC, inequalities in income-generating assets increase the concentration of economic and political power, which is inconsistent with Rawls’ principles of justice as fairness. Second, according to O’Neill and Williamson (2011: 3), “Rawls suggests at points that welfare state capitalism produces a politics that tends to undermine the possibility of tax transfers sufficiently large to correct for the inequalities generated by the market process”. Finally, WSC fails to create a mutual, equal and reciprocal relationship between citizens, since it maintains a framework of poor citizens who are dependent on state funding on the one hand, and citizens who do not need state funding, but still must pay taxes for the dependence of others, on the other. Welfare state capitalism stigmatises the dependent citizen in contrast to the fortunate, successful citizen. Although Rawls embraces the idea of POD in relation to his conception of justice as fairness, he never specifies the institutional arrangements this model would entail. Nor does he specify how to transform current WSC society into a well-functioning POD. However, Rawls nonetheless states that the principles of justice would be met in a well-functioning POD. Hence, according to Rawls, in order to meet the principles of justice, the implementation of POD would largely improve the aim for justice as farness in comparison to current WSC society, although he never prescribes how to begin the transition towards POD. This gap in Rawls’ theory of POD is precisely what this thesis attempts to fill. Since Rawls’ objections to WSC are actually manifest in current WSC society and are likely to increase further, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the arrangement of institutions in order to deal with the flaws in WSC and ultimately move towards the implementation of POD. It should be noted that Rawls’ principles of justice are neither examined nor evaluated in this thesis. Moreover, it is not the aim of this thesis to explore the correctness of Rawls’ principles of justice. Hence, this thesis should be read under the assumption that Rawls’ principles of justice in relation to justice as fairness are accurate. Hence, without evaluating the principles of justice as such or the extent to which POD would meet the principles of justice, the research question for this thesis is:

How can we start implementing POD principles in current WSC society? To implement POD principles, it is first necessary to examine the mechanisms that cause and reproduce inequalities in capital possession. The examination of those mechanisms will help determine which institutional arrangements in society should be changed in order to redistribute capital in an egalitarian way. Therefore, the first part of this thesis exposes those mechanisms. First, the relationship between structuralism and agency as well as the reproduction of social class are examined. To clarify this relationship, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) theory on the shaping of habitus is elaborated. Moreover, Bourdieu offers a profound analysis of three forms of capital—cultural, social and economic—in relation to specific social fields. The relationship between habitus and the possession, or accumulation, of any form of capital is of essential importance, as both are the theoretical foundations of this thesis. This relationship precisely reveals the mechanisms that maintain the reproduction of inequality in both cultural and social capital. Furthermore, Piketty’s (2014) empirical study on inequalities in economic capital is examined. He reveals a mechanism that maintains and further promotes inequalities in economic capital. Second, and narrowly related to the first part, the main features of POD are examined. Property-owning democracy is concerned with the redistribution of both human and nonhuman productive assets. In POD literature, the distinction between human and nonhuman capital prevails. However, following Bourdieu, I instead argue for the notion of economic, cultural and social capital as subjects for redistribution. Furthermore, I examine how POD aims to decrease unjust inequalities in the possession of both economic as well as cultural and social capital. Third, as stated earlier, this thesis is concerned with bringing POD-oriented institutional arrangements into practice. Therefore, I propose several policy reforms that aim at a more egalitarian redistribution of the distinguished

This thesis is written in the tradition of ideal theory. In no sense is this thesis designed to contribute to or clarify the debate between ideal versus nonideal theory. Thus, this thesis should be understood within the context of the two premises of ideal theory. First, it is assumed that all citizens in society fully comply with the proposed ideas in this thesis. Moreover, it is assumed that all proposed reforms would be implemented in favourable social conditions. For example, people’s behaviour is in no sense determined by external conditions that could possibly change their reasonability, such as a war or a natural disaster. It should be noted that all recommendations for policy reforms are not specifically meant for any particular country. However, examples of events that took place in the United States are mentioned to illustrate how the processes of reproduction of capital inequalities are embedded in the United States. Although all three examples are situated in the United States, more examples are easily found in other countries, as well. However, capital inequalities in the United States are quite large and therefore serve as illustrative examples. Although not much attention is paid to any type of feasibility constraints in this thesis, the thesis is written in full awareness of the lack of such ideal conditions to implement POD principles. However, this is not the purpose of this thesis. The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it tries to contribute to the discussion on the redistribution of productive assets by bringing in relatively new concepts such as cultural and social capital, rather than focussing on the prevailing distinction between human and nonhuman capital. This distinction aims to elucidate the advantages POD offers in comparison to WSC. In this way, this part of the thesis deepens the debate around POD as ideal theory. Second, it tries to propose institutional reforms in order to begin moving towards a POD-oriented society. Those proposed reforms help to deal with the practical implementation of POD principles in relation to a society in which all citizens are fully compliant in reasonably favourable circumstances. The last chapter concludes with the overall achievements of this thesis with regard to the debate surrounding POD while responding to the research question.

Chapter 2. The Reproduction of Capital Inequalities Differences in salary and wealth are common examples of inequality in modern society. However, several scholars have pointed out that, besides material equalities like salary and wealth, various other equality issues, like gender equality, equality of opportunity and racial equality, are manifest in current society (Schweickart 2002; Bourdieu 1990). Moreover, many equality issues are often deeply rooted in mechanisms inherently connected to WSC. Therefore, several distinct forms of inequality are elaborated in this chapter. Rawls delineates three categories of equality: fundamental equality, political equality and social and economic equality. Fundamental equality is concerned with an individual’s moral status. To be fundamentally equal, according to Rawls, every individual must have morally equal worth. Rawls takes this moral claim for granted; he is not concerned with proving his point on this matter, since “ . . . all Rawls his work begins with the premise that we are free and equal in a fundamental and essentially pre-political sense” (Chambers 2012: 18–19). In this sense, fundamental equality is an important moral condition for the establishment of institutional political equality, the capture of the equal basic liberties in institutions. In this regard, political equality should be understood as the practice of the moral conditions of fundamental equality. Basic liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom of religion, are established in institutional arrangements to guarantee every individual equal access to those liberties. According to Rawls, every individual should have equal access to those basic liberties, which must be safeguarded by political institutions; this is what he calls political equality. Ultimately, social and economic equality or social and economic inequality should be understood as all inequalities in the possession of both economic capital as well as in skill, knowledge and ability that exist between individuals (Chambers 2012: 19). In this regard, there is an important distinction between social difference and social

objective criteria that valuate John’s work higher than Pete’s work. Social inequality, however, requires the existence of a hierarchy among individuals. In an imaginary society in which poems are highly regarded and paintings are misprized, a poet will enjoy higher status than a painter will. Hence, it is important to distinguish between social differences, which do not threaten egalitarian ends, and social inequalities or hierarchies. In this regard, economic inequality is a clearer topic to examine, since it focuses inequalities in financial resources. Therefore, the debate surrounding social inequality is first about how special skills are defined as social differences or inequalities and, secondly, the extent to which society allows those social inequalities to exist. Second, in the case of economic inequality, society must ask itself to what extent it allows economic inequalities to exist. In this respect, social and economic equality differ from fundamental and political equality, since there seems to be consensus among Rawlsian scholars on the justness of the latter in WSC societies. The main debate around equality in WSC societies is thus grounded in social and economic equality. In the following sections, the underlying mechanisms of the reproduction of this last type of inequality are explored.

2.1 The Reproduction of Cultural and Social Capital Inequality 2.1.1 Structure and Habitus The debate around social and economic inequality is often determined by dichotomies, like structural flaws in society vs. individual actions and choices, as the main causes of inequality in WSC society. From the structuralist perspective, human action, in positive, negative and neutral senses, should be understood in the context of the social structures in which an individual was socialised. Therefore, Calhoun (2012: 327) points out that human action is “the result of external forces that either push us in one direction or constrain us from going in another”. In contrast, the actor-based approach predominantly appoints individuals as personally responsible for their actions and choices; no societal flaws can be responsible for an individual’s position in a social field. Pierre Bourdieu (1986) broadly agrees with the structuralist view; although, he thought that individuals, because of previous experiences, internalise social structures. This helps people automatically conduct themselves in situations they recognise from former experiences. Bourdieu calls this automatic, internalised pattern of reaction “habitus”. As Wacquant (2005: 316) puts it, “habitus is the way societies become deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them”. This guidance—or habitus—has several implications in the relationship between an individual and the social structure from which he or she originates. The social structure is essential for any individual’s socialisation process. This socialisation process begins at birth and should be understood as the internalisation of the common norms, habits and ideologies of a particular group or social structure that an individual is part of. Those habits, norms and values become essential to the way individuals think, feel and act for the rest of their lives. Hence, since those habits become part of one’s identity, all human action and reaction is based on the norms and values an individual acquired

structures, since individuals rely on their habitus—which is formed by the social structure—in their personal actions. In this regard, Bourdieu reveals a dialectical relation between the structure of a social field and the habitus. On the one hand, social structures or fields determine individuals’ social actions, or habitus; whereas, the social field is reproduced by the habitus. According to McNay (1999: 98), “an institution can only be efficacious if it is objectified in the bodies in the form of durable dispositions that recognize and comply with the specific demands of a given institutional area of activity, the habitus is what enables the institution to attain full realization”. Hence, the habitus is shaped by the dialectical relationship between the whole of internalised dispositions and the social institution. 2.1.2 Social Fields and Capital Social actions take place in what Bourdieu calls the social field. A social field “is a domain of social life that has its own rules of organization, generates a set of positions, and supports the practices associated with them” (Calhoun 2012: 330). The position an individual holds in a social field should be considered as dynamic as the social field itself, since the amount and specific type of capital he or she possesses determines the actor’s position in a field. From this perspective, Bourdieu distinguishes between three types of capital that can be accumulated within a field: economic, cultural and social capital. These three types of capital determine an actor’s hierarchical position in the field. Economic capital is defined as every kind of property that generates money or similar financial means. Cultural capital can be divided into three separate forms: embodied cultural capital, objectivated cultural capital and institutionalised cultural capital. Embodied cultural capital is the “the long-lasting dispositions of the body and mind” (Bourdieu 1986: 48). That is, embodied cultural capital is the incorporation of culturally determined features, like the ability to speak according to dominant etiquettes. Bourdieu defines objectivated cultural capital as the actual outcomes of one’s cultural background, like the clothes one wears at a specific occasion. Institutionalised cultural capital is the formal result of an individual’s achievements, like university diplomas. Last, social capital is “made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which are convertible, in certain

conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility” (Ibid: 243). It should be noted that every social field has its own specific rules regarding the accumulation and importance of specific forms of capital. For example, institutionalized cultural capital is more valuable than embodied cultural capital in some social fields. If one wants to apply for a job as a psychologist, he or she must have specific diplomas. However, it is perfectly possible for an individual to have the capacity to help people with mental problems without said diplomas. However, this individual will not be able to find an official job as a psychologist because he or she does not possess the required institutionalised cultural capital. Moreover, capital in one form—for example, cultural capital—can be converted into another form of capital, like economic capital. For example, a tennis player accumulates economic capital by taking advantage of his or her specific skills—his or her embodied cultural capital. However, this specific skill is worthless in almost every social field besides the tennis court. Being talented in tennis does not help in studying politics, for example. Hence, a social field’s actors determine its rules, while the specific social field itself determines the social positions of the actors within it. An individual’s social position is, in turn, determined by the amount and specific form of capital the individual has accumulated.

2.2 Economic Capital Inequality Although the reproduction of economic inequality might be more obvious than the reproduction of cultural or social inequality because inheritances are widely accepted arrangements, several mechanisms exist within capitalism that unwittingly reproduce economic inequality. According to Thomas Piketty (2014: 242), the concept of wealth should be understood as the sum of income from wage labour and income from capital wealth. It should be noted that Piketty’s definition of capital does not include Bourdieu’s notion of social and cultural capital, but should rather be understood as a detailed specification of the Bourdieuan concept of economic capital. Whereas Bourdieu defines economic capital as every kind of property that generates money or similar economic value, Piketty elaborates the Bourdieuan concept of economic capital by distinguishing between income from wage labour and income from capital wealth. In this respect, income from capital wealth should be understood as all income generated by the possession of economic capital, like dividends, profits or royalties. Income from wage labour is defined as both income from actual labour and income from nonwage labour. The distinction lies in the idea that income from wage labour is based on the actual reward for labour, while income from capital wealth is a direct result of income generated from productive private property (PPP). To avoid further confusion on Piketty’s and Bourdieu’s respective notions concerning capital, income from capital wealth will from now on be redefined as income generated from PPP. In this regard, PPP should be understood as property that in some way generates money or other forms of value. Moreover, the concept of capital will henceforth be grounded in the Bourdieuan terms of economic, cultural and social capital. Inequalities in income generated from PPP are, according to Piketty, structurally larger than those that are generated from labour. Demographically and geographically, income from PPP is more concentrated than income from wage labour. Furthermore, the differences between these two distinguished forms of income are much more extreme in cases of income generated from PPP. Piketty (2014: 256) successfully manages to show that even in the most egalitarian countries, the poorest 50% of the population earns only twice as

much as the richest 10%. In the most un-egalitarian countries, this difference is more pronounced; the richest 10% of people in the country earn one-third more than the poorest 50%. In contrast, income from PPP in the most egalitarian countries is much more unequally divided than income from wage labour is in the most un-egalitarian countries. The richest 10% of the population owns 60% of the total economic capital. These figures show that PPP wealth is far more concentrated than wage labour wealth. In addition, these figures simultaneously show that a large portion of society has no ownership of any wealth-generating properties. Thus, in modern societies, two abstract, theoretical types of total income inequality can be found. First, the concentration of extreme wealth, mostly passed from generation to generation through inheritance, further increases inequalities, since PPP generates more wealth than wage labour. The accumulation of wealth through income from PPP is the main source of income. Second, inequality is likely to increase via what Piketty calls the “hypermeritocratic society”. This type of inequality is partly caused by wage inequalities, in contrast to the former type in which inherited wealth is the main indicator of total income. It should be noted that these two models could coexist; Piketty developed them as ideal-types in order to distinguish between two economic capital inequality-generating models. As he shows, based on empirical evidence, differences in income from inequalities in PPP are likely to grow faster than differences in income from wage labour. In order to achieve a more equal distribution of income, or to counteract the reproduction of economic inequality, it is essential to change institutional arrangements with regard to private property.

2.3 How Capital Inequalities Appear in Current Society In the previous three sections, the theoretical mechanisms behind the reproduction of inequalities are examined. Bourdieu’s analysis of cultural and social capital and Piketty’s work on economic capital function as the fundamentals for the reproduction of capital inequality. Hence, capital inequalities are caused by both the reproduction of existing inequalities as well as the unequal distribution of capital forms. Therefore, the aim of this section is to reveal the extent to which these inequalities in the distribution of social, cultural and economic capital are embedded in modern WSC society. It should be noted that the following embedded inequalities should be considered merely as examples; they in no way fully entail all existing inequalities in any sense. Since the theoretical contours of the reproduction of social and cultural inequality are explained earlier, this section centres on the practical consequences of capital inequalities. Therefore, an example of a fictional, wealthy lawyer is developed. 2.3.1 Economic, Cultural and Social Capital in Practice A wealthy lawyer lives in a large, luxurious house that he was able to buy because he successfully converted his embodied skills as a good lawyer—in Bourdieuan terms, his embodied cultural capital—to economic capital. In most modern cities, luxury homes can be found in the same neighbourhoods. Consequently, the wealthy lawyer lives in a neighbourhood with mostly people who can afford and are willing to spend the amount of money for a house there. Therefore, it is safe to assume that all the residents have well-paying jobs, are highly skilled and/or originate from wealthy families. Hence, all the residents of this particular neighbourhood have access to a valuable social network. Residents of expensive neighbourhoods can easily accumulate social capital, since valuable contacts surround them. After a few years, the lawyer has a son. Since he wants the best for his child, he spends a lot of time with the boy. As such, his son’s socialisation process is predominantly determined by the lawyer’s norms and values. These norms and values are, in turn, formed by the social structures the lawyer is part of. These norms and values become internalised in the boy’s actions; his habitus is

formed by the internalisation of the norms and values of his social structure. This is the dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Bourdieu was concerned with social structures that form the habitus of an individual, while human action that comes forth from the habitus simultaneously and unintentionally reproduces the social structure. In the former example, the lawyer’s son is raised according to the same principles his father was raised with. Later, his father wants his son to be a lawyer, as well. Since his son is an average student, he decides to spend a lot of money in order to have his son admitted to the best university. First, his son is not admitted to the university. Later, he tells his neighbour that his son was rejected from the university. However, the neighbour knows somebody working in the university’s admissions department. He immediately calls his friend, and the next day, the lawyer’s son is invited for an interview with the university. Since the father’s formal codes of conduct are part of his son’s habitus, his son is easily able to apply as a suitable candidate. Two days later, the son receives an acceptance letter from the university. This exaggerated example shows how intergenerational reproduction of economic, cultural and social capital inequalities undermines Western meritocratic ideals. As Bourdieu successfully proves, cultural inequalities are reproduced through a dialectical relationship between social structure and agency. In turn, new generations grow up with the same norms and values. Hence, inequality of both cultural and social capital is maintained in a process that is passed along generations. The following section focuses on the reproduction and enlargement of economic inequality.

Chapter 3. Property-Owning Democracy John Rawls’ contribution to the debate surrounding POD is arguably one of the most influential, since he extensively argued that POD could establish his conception of justice as fairness. Therefore, the first section of this chapter briefly introduces the foundations and assumptions of Rawls’s theory, after which POD as an alternative model is explored more thoroughly. 3.1 Rawls, Liberalism and the Conception of the Good Life According to Rawls (Sodha 2012: 250), the most important fundamental of liberalism is “the right to develop the autonomy and ability to pursue their conception of the good life”. This right, thus entails a certain claim to several liberties and, more importantly, access to what Rawls calls “primary goods”. These primary goods are, according to Rawls (2001: 58): - The basic rights and liberties needed to develop and exercise one’s moral powers. - The freedom to pursue opportunities consistent with one’s view of the good life. - Power and authority. - Income and wealth. - The “social bases of self-respect “. These primary goods are essential to the pursuit of one’s personal conception of the good life. It should be noted that, according to Rawls, there is no such thing as an objective conception of the good life. The good life should thus be considered a subjective, personal conception. However, there is extensive debate regarding which means people have the right to claim. Left-wing sympathisers, for example, are predominantly concerned with equality of opportunity to live one’s conception of the good life. In order to achieve these ideals, equal access to several types of resources is essential. The aim of this section is not to examine Rawls’ primary goods nor to clarify why they are necessary to live according to

one’s conception of the good life. Instead, Rawls’ primary goods are considered requisite conditions to aim for. This thesis assumes everyone requires these primary goods in order to live their own conception of the good life. Consequently, everyone requires financial and human capital to achieve the liberal principle of the good life. Therefore, both forms of capital should be distributed equally in order to achieve equality of opportunity. Theory on POD is, according to Rawls, developed as an alternative to capitalism that deals with a more equal distribution of both human and nonhuman capital. Therefore, POD’s main features will be elaborated in the next section. 3.2 What is a Property-Owning Democracy? Property-owning democracy is often defined as a fairer, alternative model to WSC, since—following Rawls—it is able to meet the principles of justice as fairness. According to O’Neill (2012: 80-81), POD has three central concerns. First is a wide dispersal of human and nonhuman productive assets. Every citizen should have the right to control a certain amount of those assets in order to earn a certain amount of guaranteed income. In most POD theories, capital is divided into both human and nonhuman capital, instead of the aforementioned distinction between economic, cultural and social capital. Human capital should, in this regard, be understood as all skills acquired through education and similar forms of training, whereas nonhuman capital is defined as specific property, like shares in any form of business. Second, the intergenerational transmission of advantage, including intergenerational inheritance of valuable property as well as progressive taxation of gifts and the enactment of significant estates, should be blocked, since these advantages further increase economic inequality. Third, the influence of private and corporate wealth on democratic processes in WSC society should cease. Several actors such as corporate lobbyists, are able to influence policies by persuading government officials in their favour, often by

objectivated cultural capital; and social capital, rather than the prevailing concepts of human and nonhuman capital. The redefinition of both human and nonhuman capital within the context of a POD is necessary due to a lack of clarity about the actual meanings of both terms. Therefore, Bourdieu’s distinction between economic, cultural and social capital is used rather than the traditional conceptions of human and nonhuman capital. It should be noted that some specific cases refer to human capital, because this concept is traditionally used by most POD scholars. However, the use of human and nonhuman capital always relates to the Bourdieuan notion of economic and cultural capital as social capital.

3.2.1 POD and Redistribution of Economic Capital Intergenerational advantages, such as inheritances of economic capital, cause huge inequalities among newer generations. As elaborated by Piketty, inequalities of income from PPP are much larger than inequalities of income from wage labour. Therefore, the redistribution of economic capital is an essential requirement to achieving a more egalitarian society in which meritocratic ideals can flourish. James Meade (1964) imagined an ideal POD-based model in which, without accounting for feasibility constraints, the total amount of private property in society would be equally redistributed among all citizens. Every individual would own an equal amount of private property and receive a minimum income derived from this private property. This ideal model entails several features that would contribute to a more equal distribution of economic capital and is therefore an important theoretical framework for POD. First, since a minimum income is guaranteed through the possession of a certain amount of private property, work becomes a choice rather than a necessity. This has several implications for the valuation of jobs, since people now have the choice to accept a job, instead of being forced into a job because they need the money. For example, in WSC society, working as a supermarket cashier is a poor-paying, arguably unpleasant job. However, some uneducated people are forced into this work because they do not have the skills—or luck—to find a better-paid position. In a well-functioning POD, people would no longer be forced to do such jobs, since their income would be guaranteed by their share of private property. Therefore, unwanted jobs like the latter would have to attract employees in a different way, so it is likely that wages will increase in order to attract people to such jobs. Second, people who want to dedicate their lives to non-commercial activities, like art, would have the freedom to do so, as well. So long as they agree to minimal, but sufficient, living standards, they are free to live their lives according to their personal preferences.

financial capital would grow at a quicker rate in order to catch up with higher income citizens, since higher incomes would not have the ability to save their money as effectively since it would be more highly taxed. The rate of this tax should be based on the value of the total amount of property an individual possesses. Because the ownership of private property generates more financial capital than income from wage labour does, taxation on the total value of all property would prevent the richest from accumulating financial capital. Second, a revision of death duty policies is required to redistribute private property more equally. Consequentially, inter vivos gifts should be taxed in the same way as death duties, because it would otherwise be too easy to avoid such taxes. Instead of transferring wealth inter-generationally, wealth should be redistributed within the same generation to people that are worse off. As O’Neill (2012: 79) argues, “Meade advocated the aggressive taxation of capital transfers between generations where, in distinction from standard forms of inheritance taxation, the system of transfer taxation would be designed so that transfers would attract broadly similar rates of taxation, whether they were realized through inheritance or by means of gifts inter vivos”. Rawls was predominantly concerned with the establishment of an alternative social system to deal with flaws of WSC. He suggested POD as an alternative model to capitalism, since a well-functioning POD meets his principles of justice. Moreover, Rawls states that restructuring the economy is necessary to ensure that all citizens enjoy equal freedoms and have equal control over their lives. In WSC, citizens that receive welfare often suffer from lack of self-respect, since they have a lower social status due to their need for welfare subsidies. Therefore, according to Rawls, it is likely that, besides the economic effects, positive social effects would emerge in a POD. Hence, according to O’Neill (2012: 89), “A Property-Owning Democracy aims to do this through the organization of economic life in a way that reduces the likelihood of social domination or of social loss of status”. Most POD-oriented scholars are predominantly concerned with the redistribution of financial capital, since financial capital inequalities are much more manifest than human capital inequalities. However, wide dispersal of both human and nonhuman capital is mentioned as main feature of POD. In this

regard, nonhuman or financial capital is a clear concept defined as the sum of both income from wealth and income from labour. Human capital, however, is much less examined as a central concept in POD theory. Therefore, the next section focuses on the development of human capital. 3.2.2 Human Capital, Primary Goods and the Good Life Although Rawls considers the redistribution of both nonhuman and human capital essential prerequisites to living “the good life”, it remains unclear what he understands as human capital. His most specific definition of the concept is “all education and trained skills” (Rawls 2001: 139). Therefore, Sodha (2012: 251) rather uses the term “skills”, which she acknowledges as essential prerequisites to living the good life. In this regard, this concept consists of three types of skills: “core” skills, such as literacy, numeracy and oracy; “learning to learn” skills, like the ability to analyse subjects in a critical manner or carry out independent, objective research; and “social and emotional” skills, which are predominantly about intrinsic motivation, aesthetic valuations, communication and personal action. Empirical research shows that huge inequalities exist in the extent to which children internalise these skills, which are, according to Sodha, required conditions for the good life. As elaborated earlier in this chapter, access to Rawls’ primary goods is essential for every individual to pursue their personal conception of the good life. To be able to pursue one’s conception of the good life, the fair and equal distribution of both cultural and social as well as economic capital is an important prerequisite, according to Rawls (Sodha 2012: 250). However, as Amartya Sen (1997) successfully elaborates , the concept human capital is developed and understood as a productive resource in Rawlsian theory. Human capital, according to Sen (1997: 1959), “concentrates on the agency of human beings – through skills and knowledge as well as efforts – in augmenting production possibilities”. Therefore, he argues that human capital should be

those skills. However, Rawls seems, with regard to human capital, mostly concerned with actual outcomes—for example, institutionalised human capital such as diplomas—instead of the mechanisms that create and reproduce those outcomes. However, POD should be concerned with ex ante distribution of outcomes, or the opportunity to achieve a specific outcome. Therefore, Rawls’ concept of human capital no longer applies in the POD debate, as it is too static. On the surface, the concept of human capital seems similar to Bourdieu’s work on capital theory. However, three important distinctions should be noted. First, the concept of human capital is even in its broadest definition too vague to cover all the features it tries to entail. Several definitions of human capital exist. As Lanzi (2007: 424) puts it, “on the one hand we have a narrow view in which human capital is equal to school levels achieved; on the other hand there is a wider view, in which not only school levels, but also formal and informal skills are included in the definition”. Hence, in its broadest definition, human capital is defined as all internalised skills that contribute to an individual’s productive resources. In order to redistribute this form of capital ex ante, as proposed by POD scholars, it is necessary to analyse this concept to determine how and what specific forms of capital are at stake. Second, Bourdieu is predominantly concerned with the relationship between structure and agency in the reproduction of capital inequality. Instead of focusing on actual outcomes of such inequality, Bourdieu reveals the dialectical mechanism that provokes inequalities. However, most POD-oriented scholars solely mention the importance of the redistribution of human capital in fully implemented POD. They do not often elaborate what this concept is meant to entail or which features actually belong in the definition of human capital. Therefore, Bourdieu’s distinction should prevail in this regard. The distinction of human capital in various forms of cultural capital, social capital and most importantly habitus may not be complete. However, the processes of accumulation and reproduction of those forms of capital is an interaction between structural societal causes and the individual conduct that results from those structures. In order to achieve an equal distribution of social and cultural capital, institutional structures must first be changed.

Third, Bourdieu’s notion of economic, cultural and social capital cannot be understood without linking capital to a specific social field. In Bourdieu’s understanding, capital should be understood as a dynamic concept, since the possession of capital in one specific field could be worthless in another. The unequal distribution of cultural and social capital is not always necessarily unjust, since natural differences in competencies and interests exist between people. However, according to Sen (1997: 1959), human capital should be defined as a productive resource in that the possession of a certain form of capital contributes to an individual’s productive value. Therefore, it is important to establish a framework that provides an equal distribution of essential forms of cultural and social capital that improves an individual’s productive value. This is necessary because, according to Bourdieu (1986: 48), all social hierarchies in any social field are determined by the amount and type of capital an individual possesses. In this regard, Bourdieu’s distinction between economic, cultural and social capital prevails over the conception of human capital, since the amount and type of capital an individual possesses determines his or her position in a social field. Therefore, the concept of capital, in its economic, cultural and social forms, is correctly understood as a productive resource. Hence, the next chapter focuses on suggestions for institutional reform in order to equally distribute the economic, cultural and social capital considered essential means to the pursuit of one’s conception of the good life.

Chapter 4. Capital Redistribution As elaborated in the previous chapters, all forms of capital are accumulated, reproduced and distributed unequally in current WSC society. However, some of the mechanisms that cause this unequal distribution of economic, cultural and social capital are institutionally embedded. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to suggest specific modifications to these institutional arrangements in relation to the redistribution of economic, cultural and social capital. In this regard, the notion of ex ante instead of ex post distribution within POD theory is a central concern in this chapter. Although all distinguished forms of capital are evaluated individually at first, it should be noted that the redistribution of those forms of capital has interrelated effects, as well. Those interrelated effects should be understood as overlapping effects with regard to the influence, for example, of economic capital on a specific form of cultural or social capital. 4.1 Redistribution of Economic Capital For several reasons, scholars on institutional reform with regard to POD principles are mainly concerned with the redistribution of economic capital. First, and probably the most importantly, is that the amount of economic capital an individual possesses is easily measurable. Consequently, the possible effects of institutional change can be calculated or at least statistically examined. Therefore, the importance of reform to institutional arrangements in order to redistribute economic capital in such way that every individual has equal access to certain amounts of economic capital is widely supported among POD scholars. As elaborated in Chapter 3, James Meade (1964: 52-55) developed several potential government policies to counteract the reproduction of economic capital inequality. First, he mentions a progressive annual taxation on the total value of the property an individual possesses. The main purpose of such policies is to reduce the possibility for the wealthiest individuals to enlarge their savings. Progressive taxation consequently allows owners of smaller properties, or those without any property, to grow their savings, which are based on small properties or income from wage labour, at a relatively higher pace. Second, death duties should be re-examined since they are, according to Meade, an argument for the

misdistribution of property. Moreover, gifts inter vivos should be handled in the same way as death duties, since the taxation of gifts would be easily avoided otherwise. As elaborated earlier, the process of accumulation as well as reproduction of economic capital inequality is mostly caused by both inherited advantages and higher rates of growth for income from PPP in comparison to income from wage labour. However, it is not the aim of POD to counteract all economic capital inequalities, but rather to guarantee a substantial amount of productive assets, and thus sufficient income, to each household. In order to achieve this, a more equal redistribution of economic capital is necessary. Therefore, both of Meade’s principles, progressive taxation on all income as well as the taxation of gifts and death duties, should be adopted in order to more equally redistribute economic capital. Thad Williamson (2012: 226) offers several possible transitional procedures in order to divide economic capital—in Rawlsian tradition—more equally in society according to POD-oriented principles. However, these suggestions are based on the United States’ current political and economic situation. Therefore, it might not be fully adequate to refer to the exact numbers he mentions, since these numbers logically vary between countries. Nonetheless, it is useful to examine the mechanisms Williamson develops to effectuate this transition towards an equal distribution of economic capital. According to Williamson, only 30% of the economic capital of the richest 1% in the United States would need to be redistributed to provide a buffer of $100,000 annually to every American household (in his example, consisting of two individuals). This should be understood as an enormous improvement in welfare for the poorest Americans in comparison to their current situation. In order to achieve this proposed redistribution, Williamson distinguishes three possible strategies to reform current institutions. First, he mentions the possibility of redistributing all economic capital at once in order to change the current situation as quickly as possible. However, this option is not feasible,

capital. Since flows of economic capital are increasingly globalised, the rich would likely transfer their economic capital to tax havens that are more beneficial. Second, he considers the possibility of a temperate transition towards an equal distribution of economic capital. This option “would be to institute a more moderate package of taxes on wealth and high incomes that would operate slowly to level out inequalities over time – the path apparently favoured by Rawls (1971), and the path which corresponds to most contemporary proposals for a wealth tax (Williamson 2012: 227). In this regard, wealth and high incomes should be understood through Bourdieu’s notion of economic capital. Third, he puts forth the possibility of redistributing economic capital without taking existing wealth into account. In this respect, only newly produced economic capital would be subject to distribution policies, rather than already accumulated economic capital. The implementation of this possibility would solely benefit future generations. As Williamson points out in the case of the United States, with regard to economic capital inequalities, the current difference in the amount of economic capital possessed between the richest and the poorest groups in society is quite large. In the case that the redistribution of economic capital would start without affecting existing inequalities, it would take years for significant results to emerge. Hence, in using this third possibility, the generation that implements redistributive policies would not benefit from them. In short, both the first and the third possibilities are not enforceable. Therefore, a moderate transition towards an equal distribution of economic capital is the only feasible way to implement such redistributive policies. Henceforth, all proposed institutional reforms to redistribute economic capital in both PPP as well as income from wage labour should be understood in the context of a moderate transition of at least 25 years in length. In redistributing economic capital more equally in society, Meade and Williamson agree that progressive taxation of income from PPP and strict death duties with regard to gifts are essential features of POD. According to Williamson, progressive taxation of all economic capital should be introduced gradually. These taxes should be used to install a universal system of savings in order to guarantee substantial income for every household. In order to finance these universal assets for every household, Williamson (2012: 229) proposes

several tax reforms that mainly affect the wealthiest in society and benefit the poorest. To note, all taxes would be levied annually. The first step is to eliminate the tax cuts the Bush administration introduced for all forms of economic capital. This would generate $43 billion. The second is to introduce a 50% top tax for all annual income from wage labour above $2 million. This would generate between $60–70 billion. The third step is to tax income from PPP at the same rate as income from wage labour, which would generate $80 billion. The fourth is to establish a 0.25% transaction tax on all deals. This would generate $100 billion. The fifth step would be to reform estate taxes so that only one of every 200 deceased actually pays effective, but higher, rates. This would generate $40–60 billion. Sixth, important tax havens for corporations and wealthy households should be dismantled. This would generate $100 billion. Finally, subsidies for the top salaries of CEOs should be withdrawn. This would generate $18 billion. All income derived from the above taxes would generate approximately $5 trillion in 10–12 years. Based on Meade’s thoughts, a strict inheritance tax as well as the taxation of gifts inter vivos could be added to these proposed reforms. It is necessary to implement this policy, since intergenerational advantages from inherited wealth will not be blocked otherwise. Moreover, strict death duties, as well as the taxation of gifts inter vivos would generate money that could be used to provide a substantial amount of economic capital to every household. The aim of these taxes is to gradually establish a universal asset fund for every household. The arrangement of this universal asset fund per household is examined later. Note that all said tax reforms should be understood within the context of a compliant society in reasonably favourable conditions. Williamson assumes that the majority of the country would vote in favour of such policies. Although these new forms of taxation might be theoretically possible to implement, an important difficulty emerges. It seems naïve to expect that all tax havens worldwide would shut down. Because there is no global tax authority or law, wealthy households and corporations are currently allowed to transfer their

system of bank transfers, it seems necessary to prohibit the international transfer of economic capital. However, considering the globalised nature of the current economy, this strategy does not seem feasible. Therefore, it is difficult to prevent rich households and corporations from securing their money elsewhere. The best possible solution to this problem might be to oblige all banks to be fully transparent in all international transfers. If a household or corporation has any form of economic capital located outside the country that can be traced back to them, it should be taxed according to the Williamson’s proposed reforms. Moreover, if someone commits any form of tax fraud or evasion, the entire amount of economic capital that is more than average in the country the suspect is a resident of will be immediately redistributed among society. The advantage of this system would be that unpaid taxes would nevertheless benefit society’s poorest. The focus now returns to the desired results of Williamson’s proposed taxation reforms. As elaborated earlier, he develops institutional tax reforms that would generate enough money to provide a substantial amount of economic capital for every household. His third proposed reform, the taxation of income from PPP at the same rate as income from wage labour, has strong equalising effects. As shown by Piketty, income from PPP grows at a higher rate than income from wage labour. Hence, increased taxation on income from PPP would help people without, or at least with less, PPP grow their savings at a relatively faster rate than heavily taxed income from PPP, since they would pay relatively fewer taxes in comparison to the richest citizens. The aim of this policy is not to discourage the rich from having income from PPP, but rather to guarantee that people with less PPP would have access to a guaranteed amount of substantial income in order to give them the possibility of accumulating economic capital, or live their lives, according to their own wishes. This becomes possible for the poorest group because the incentive to possess large amounts of PPP would decrease for the richest group. It should be noted that these policies seem to strongly affect the wealth of the richest citizens. However, since the top annual incomes on which the 50% income tax would be paid are defined as $2 million and up, it would still be possible to accumulate economic capital. Hence, the

suggested policies would not affect the incentive to work. Moreover, lower-income citizens would pay tax, as well; it is not only high-income citizens who would suffer from those policies. In this chapter so far, it has often been mentioned that every household should be guaranteed a substantial amount of economic capital or, in Williamson’s terms, universal assets. Williamson defines a household as two cohabiting adults. To clarify his calculations, Williamson from now on speaks of individual access to universal assets. Although the notion of universal assets appears similar to the concept of basic income, Williamson provides several important additions to the traditional concept of a basic income. Those universal assets should, according to Williamson, entail a few specific forms of property. In this regard, he distinguishes between property as savings, physical property and productive capital. Every household should have access to a determined amount of the three forms of property. As Williamson (2012: 230) puts it, “it is proposed (as a starting point for discussion) that these assets take five principal forms: $10000 for housing acquisition, $20000 in cash assets ($15000 in an unrestricted fund, $5000 in a restricted emergency fund), and $20000 in ownership of productive capital ($10000 in unrestricted investment capital, and $10000 consisting in nontradeable stock coupons”. Van Parijs (2005: 7), however, states that a basic income should be paid in cash, rather than in kind. Williamson’s notion of the concept is therefore more protective of citizens than Van Parijs’s, since it is not possible to spend the entire amount of substantial income at once due to the imposed restrictions. It is questionable to what extent it would be desirable to impose the paternalistic measures that Williamson proposes, since a substantial income that cannot be fully spent according to one’s preferences would not be beneficial to individual freedom. However, the desired effect of a basic income would be for every individual to have access to a substantial amount of income in order to use this economic capital according to his or her own preferences. However, if one is not capable of managing this income and spends it all at once, one is still obliged to accept any job that is

incompatible with his or her needs. It is possible, however, that Williamson’s restricted funds are, in general, too protective. In that case, the restrictions could easily be removed in order to establish full personal control over all assets. However, in order to ensure a specific amount of nontradeable income for every household, Williamson’s proposals regarding universal assets should be implemented first. Williamson provides an extensive economic framework of policy reforms for implementing a POD. However, he does not take the redistribution of cultural and social capital assets into account, which according to Rawls, is an essential feature of a well-functioning POD. In his proposed universal assets fund, in which housing acquisition takes prominence, serious implications emerge for the distribution of cultural and social capital. Those implications are examined in the following sections. The rejection of Williamson’s suggestion to budget money for housing within his universal assets fund does not have any consequences for the rest of the arrangement. Instead of housing, I propose dividing the redundant $5,000 in the proposed restricted emergency fund as well as the $5,000 in “nontradeable coupon stocks”. To conclude, redistributing only economic capital is not sufficient for achieving full equality of opportunity. In the following sections, cultural and social capital redistributive policies are proposed.

4.2 Redistribution of Cultural Capital In traditional POD literature, human capital is often equated to all acquired skills. During one’s socialisation, education is often considered important in the accumulation of human capital. However, as elaborated earlier, the concept of human capital remains vague and static, since it is not clear which skills are important for capital accumulation. Moreover, most POD scholars are not concerned with revealing the mechanisms that reproduce inequalities in human capital due to the lack of a proper definition of the concept. Bourdieu manages to unscramble those mechanisms by distinguishing between several forms of cultural capital. Hence, in order to guarantee every individual ex ante access to a substantial amount of all forms of cultural capital, reforms to institutions that actually reproduce this inequality are essential. Since POD scholars correctly argue that education is an important means to accumulating several forms of cultural capital, this section focuses on the redevelopment of education. In this regard, the aim of the proposed redevelopments is to broaden the influence of education beyond mere acquired skills and knowledge, to the shaping of specific internalised norms and values that benefit the productive value of all individuals. 4.2.1 Institutionalised Cultural Capital For several reasons, it is not desirable, or even feasible, that all students achieve the same level of education. For example, a society in which everybody is a scientist would have a shortage of craftsman. Therefore, differences in the amount of institutionalised cultural capital individuals possess are not necessarily problematic, but those differences must arise from natural differences in talents. Today, several structural reasons, or reasons that individuals cannot influence, determine an individual’s future. For example, in the United States the quality of education in a high school depends on the district the school is located in. Since each district is responsible for financially supporting their schools, rich districts automatically have more money to spend

reforming institutions so that every individual enjoys an equal of opportunity to accumulate institutionalised cultural capital. In this regard, it is not about the level of achievement, but rather about using every individual’s full potential. In Rawlsian terms, everyone should be able to pursue their conception of the good life. In this regard, education is important, since it determines, to a certain extent, what kind of job an individual will find. Therefore, two reforms to current institutional arrangements are proposed with regard to the opportunity or accessibility of accumulating institutionalised cultural capital. The first is that all education from elementary school to university should be free for all citizens. In the United States, several educational institutions are privatised, which means that they determine their tuition fees. For equality of opportunity for all individuals, a child’s access to good education should not be determined by his or her parents’ willingness or ability to pay high tuition fees. In the United States, most private universities have strong reputations, which motivate students, who can afford it, to attend them. It is often suggested that the price paid for an education from a respected university is earned back later in one’s career by virtue of the fact that one will find a well-paying job because of his or her schooling. This idea violates the equality of opportunity principle for two reasons. First, in the current system, access to good education is determined by financial means. Since it is not likely that a young student possesses enough money to finance privatised education, students are dependent on their parents’ economic capital. Or rather, students are dependent on intergenerational advantages in pursuing the highest levels of education. Therefore, tuition fees are an effective way to reproduce and maintain economic, cultural and social capital inequality. Moreover, if a student does not find a well-paying job that ultimately neutralises their tuition, that money was invested without a guarantee of income. Thus, high tuition fees could provoke serious issues if the expected accumulation of economic capital never comes. Second, educational institutions should be managed by public authorities. The most obvious candidate for this would be the government. In the United States, for example, large differences in quality exist between universities. Since providing a proper education is in everybody’s interest, it is evident that it is a public task. Moreover, it is essential to have a central authority that organises,

controls and manages educational institutions to prevent manifest differences in quality. Differences in the quality of universities hinder equality of opportunity, since it is hypothetically possible that two identical students would achieve very different results due to the differences in their education. The aim of this policy is not to homogenise all curricula, but rather to guarantee an equal quality of education at all universities. 4.2.2 Embodied Cultural Capital and Habitus The concept of embodied cultural capital incorporates each individual’s habits, values, tastes, skills and knowledge. Bourdieu successfully shows how embodied cultural capital is accumulated and reproduced by revealing the relationship between structural influences and individual agency. Moreover, he points out that the accumulation of embodied cultural capital takes place throughout an individual’s socialisation process. Although this process does not have a fixed beginning and end, an important part of socialisation happens before the age of 18. Hence, in order to redistribute the opportunity to embody cultural capital more equally, it is a prerequisite that every child have access to similar educational services. Achieving this requires several changes to current institutional arrangements. It is often pointed out (Gamoran 2009: 3; Kelly & Price 2011: 581) that tracked educational systems have serious effects on social inequality. Tracked educational systems were introduced for several reasons. First, students are able to achieve higher levels of success if they discuss difficult topics with people at their same level. Since it is assumed they have more or less similar competencies, they can stimulate each other and further expand these competencies. Second, teachers can better instruct students according to their needs. If every student has more or less the same level of skills and knowledge, it should be easier to adjust instruction. However, as Gamoran (2009: 3) notes, the allocation of students in a tracked educational system is often not based on the students’

compared to mixed-ability classes. Similar evidence has been found in other empirical inquiries (Kerckhoff, 1993; Hoffer, 1992; Gamoran & Nystrand, 1994), which point out that the differences between high and low achievers actually increase in tracked systems. Hence, tracked educational systems predominantly magnify social inequalities. Moreover, tracked educational systems do not significantly contribute to the assumed effect of increased productivity. Those social inequalities could, according to Gamoran (2009: 8), be explained by the fact that “students in high tracks encounter more challenging curricula, move at a faster pace, and are taught by more experienced teachers with better reputations, while students in lower tracks encounter more fragmented, work-oriented, and slower-paced instructions provided by teachers with less experience or clout”. In order to guarantee students’ fair access to similar educational services, mixed-ability groups must be implemented in all educational institutions to replace the prevailing tracked systems. Several scholars note that tracked education’s effects on productivity are limited, while it clearly increases social inequality. Hence, Sweden’s former education model could to a certain extent function as an example of appropriate educational reform. The main purpose of education in Sweden was to achieve both equality of opportunity and equality of outcome (Bjorklund et al 2006: 3). This aim was expressed through several policies, such as offering financial support to children from migrant backgrounds. In order to achieve equality of opportunity and of outcomes, their education system was organised according to certain principles. First, all children began schooling at age seven, with obligatory, free and centrally determined curricula. This schooling lasted seven years, after which students were free to decide whether to continue studying. Hence, at age 16 students were first divided according to their abilities and personal ambitions. After finishing the obligatory course of education, students were free to choose with regard to their future education. However, according to Bjorklund (2006: 4), in the early 90s, 80% of students continued their education and began voluntary tracks in high schools that offered classes ranging from vocational training to university prep. After three years of preparation in high school, students could apply to university. In comparison, in the Netherlands, students are classified

according to their abilities by age 12. In the United States, tracking starts at middle school, although it seems less static than it is in the Netherlands, since students can take courses at different levels, while in the Netherlands all courses at the same level must be passed in order to graduate. If a Dutch student fails two courses at the highest level, they must change to a lower level irrespective of their other grades. However, in the United States, tracking increases during high school. In the seventh and eighth grade, for example, there are differences not only in difficulty, but in course material and content, as well (Trelfa 1999: 59). Moreover, the quality of a school is determined by its location, since districts are responsible for funding education. Thus, rich districts tend to have qualitatively better schools than poorer districts. Hence, tracking is twofold in the United States. It is based on the district the student lives in and on his or her ability to learn. Both determinants, however, violate the student’s equality of opportunity. Hence, in order to guarantee equal access to education for all students, I propose two institutional reforms. First, all educational institutions must introduce mixed-ability groups until students are at least 16 years old. Mixed-ability groups have a positive effect on reducing social inequality and do not significantly lower productivity in the best students. In contrast, it is likely that students from lower social classes would benefit from mixed-ability groups. Since mixed-ability groups would contain students of all social classes for a period of roughly 12 years, all students would benefit from the internalisation of norms and values from both high and low social classes. For students from lower social classes, the influence of their class on their socialisation will be reduced through contact with students from higher social classes. As Bourdieu elaborates, education functions as important means to internalise skills and knowledge as well as habits, norms and values. In this regard, students from lower social classes would have greater opportunities to internalise habits, norms and values from higher social classes, which is perfectly feasible through implementing mixed-ability groups. In mixed-ability groups, students with lower

norms, values and habits that prevail in society. For example, the vocabulary of lower-level students is likely different from the vocabulary of higher-level students. Hence, by implementing mixed-ability groups, lower-level students would have the opportunity to learn from higher-level students. When someone with fewer abilities has a job interview with someone from a higher educational level, the former is at less accustomed to the latter’s locution. On the other hand, students from higher levels would, from a young age, develop a better understanding of people from lower levels, since they would no longer be isolated from them. Hence, mixed-ability groups, besides the fact that tracked educational systems do not significantly contribute to students’ productivity, have two important advantages over tracked systems. First, social class is a less-determinant indicator of students’ achievements, since mixed-ability groups guarantee equal access to education. Second, mixed-ability groups help students from lower educational levels shape their habitus according to the prevailing standards of society, which benefits both high- and low-level students by creating a mutual understanding. In implementing mixed-ability groups at all educational institutions, an important complication emerges. Most cities are segregated into poor, middle-class and rich neighbourhoods. Therefore, in order to have mixed-ability groups in cities, either students from lower social classes must travel farther to school, or students from high-class areas must attend school outside their residential areas. This chapter later proposes an institutional reform that solves both the problem of social segregation in different neighbourhoods as well as the grouping of students in specific schools in order to guarantee the presence of mixed-ability groups at all schools. But first, the third form of cultural capital is examined. 4.2.3 Objectivated Cultural Capital According to Robbins (2000: 35), objectivated cultural capital differs from the other forms of cultural capital because it cannot be incorporated in the body. Therefore, objectivated cultural capital is often defined as the objectification of embodied cultural capital. For example, if someone buys a canvas because he or she thinks it is beautiful, he or she converts appreciation—embodied cultural