IN PURSUIT OF ESTABLISHMENT
GROUP FORMATION IN THE NORTHERN IRISH CONFLICT
Bachelor thesis Cultural Anthropology Zerline Henning 6221998-10011625 Supervisor: Dr. M. Philip Lindo Tweede lezer: Dr. P.T. van Rooden December 2012 Word count: 11038 zerlainus@hotmail.com
1 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS AND TERMS
DUP Democratic Unionist Party: the larger of the two main Unionist political parties in Northern Ireland.
IRA Irish Republican Army: an Irish Republican revolutionary military organisation, descending from the in 1913 founded Irish Volunteers.
Loyalist The view mainly held by Protestants that Northern Ireland should stay under British rule. This term is associated with a more violent pursuit of interests than is the case with the term Unionist.
Nationalist The view mainly held by Catholics that Northern Ireland should abolish British rule and join the autonomous Republic of Ireland.
NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NOS Nederlandse Omroep Stichting, Dutch for Dutch Broadcasting Foundation. PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland
Republican The view mainly held by Catholics that Northern Ireland should abolish British rule and join the autonomous Republic of Ireland. This term is associated with a more violent pursuit of interests than is the case with the term Nationalist.
Sinn Fein A Nationalist, left-wing party, currently the second-largest party in Northern Ireland. Tricolour The flag of Ireland.
Ulster One of the four original Provinces of Ireland, of which two-thirds is a part of Northern-Ireland. This term is most commonly used by Unionists. The usage of it is sometimes objected by Nationalists, because the whole Province of Ulster consists of nine counties, three of which are in the Republic of Ireland.
Union Jack The flag of the United Kingdom.
Unionist The view mainly held by Protestants that Northern Ireland should stay under British rule.
2 INTRODUCTION
On September 3rd this year (2012) the Dutch news agency NOS covered an item on riots between Catholics and Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. It was stated that at least twenty-six police officers were injured when they tried to keep Protestant militants from protesting against a Catholic marching band march. A week before these riots, another disturbance had occurred when a
Protestant band marched past a Catholic church, causing a riot to break out that injured seven police officers.1
Northern Ireland has a long history of violence and tension, roughly said starting with the attempts of British take-over in the sixteenth century, when the island of Ireland and governance of it was taken from the Catholics. While the southern part of the island eventually became the
independent Republic of Ireland, with a majority of Catholics living in it, the northern part has to this day stayed a part of the United Kingdom, harbouring a majority of Protestants. Ever since there has been tension between the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, resulting in the so-called Troubles: a period in the Ulster history marked by severe sectarian violence. With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement2 in 1998, a long awaited period of peace was anticipated, but the apparent tranquillity of contemporary Northern Irish society can be questioned. Riots still break out, resulting in sectarian violence up to present day. If we today think of Northern-Ireland as a more or less trouble-free society, this has perhaps more to do with the media coverage of the ongoing tensions in the area, than with an actual decline in Catholic-Protestant clashes. The NOS itself made it clear that even though riots took place a week before the item of the newest riots was discussed, this previous disturbance was not reported. One can expect this not to be the first time such an event goes unnoticed, and I therefore suspect that although media coverage appears to be thin, the actual Troubles in Northern Ireland are far from over. Academic literature also seems to suggest a continuum of tensions (Bryan 2002, Donnan 2010, Jarman 2005).
What I find interesting about this ongoing conflict, is how and why the two groups –Catholics and Protestants- are so opposed to each other; what makes people from the same nation form two separate groups that are known to despise each other and live with a lot of tension? When I will go into the history of the conflict, the answer to this becomes a lot clearer, but still the question remains why struggles continue even though the majority of the Northern Irish population seems to want them tot end. An answer to this question may be found when we look into group formation. I’m interested to explore how these group formations work, why the groups form the way they do - especially in a case where the specifics of the continued construction of community seems unlogical. What strikes me about the conflict in Northern Ireland is that the more recent clashes seem to have no real reason other than a determination to condemn the other group no matter what. The two groups have different religions, but religion hardly ever seems to be at stake within the
confrontation. It seems to be a mere distinguishing fact, a label by which people can recognize each other, but is not the cause of group separation. One virtually never hears of a Catholic expressing his dislike of a Protestant because he is mistaken about God, ore vice versa. So if religious disagreement
1http://nos.nl/artikel/413889-agenten-nierland-gewond-bij-rellen.html 03-09-2012
2 An agreement in which the status and system of government of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom,
the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and the relationship between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom is covered. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Good_Friday_Agreement
3 is not the reason why these two groups of people distance themselves from each other, and often not peacefully so, then what is? What causes group formation in Northern Ireland to take place the way it does, and how are boundaries created and maintained during the process? Again, in finding an answer, history of course will provide part of the explanation, but the workings and dynamics of social processes must also not be forgotten. As we will see, even on a very small scale, processes of segregation and hostility can take place in human societies that ensure conflicts not to be solved easily (Elias 1994).
So, looking into social and geographical borders in Northern Ireland will prove to be important in the process of trying to solve the group formation puzzle. The geographical national border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (as a part of the United Kingdom), the often materialised borders between communities in Belfast, the somewhat less visible borders between mostly Protestant and mostly Catholic villages, and the more elusive borders that reside in people’s minds: all these boundaries are informative when trying to understand how group
formation works in Northern Ireland, because an important part of this formation takes place at the borders and boundaries of the community. Therefore, the creation and impact of contested borders on people is important to investigate. In this thesis, I will look into the concept of boundaries with the help of the ideas of i.a. Anthony Cohen, Norbert Elias, and Anton Blok, viewing them as bodies people create through interaction in order to distinguish themselves from others whom they wish to view as outsiders, caused by the ever-present struggle for power of people in any given society.
A good example in which boundaries between Catholics and Protestants are recreated and emphasised, are the parades of the Orange Order. Through this case we can see how ideas about group identities and the boundaries between them are acted out, and how this affects a segregated society. But cases like the flying of the Union flag at the Belfast City Hall, and the 12 November protest of Republicans against the Police Service of Northern Ireland also prove to be good examples by means of which I will make my argument.
NORTHERN IRISH HISTORY: CONTEXT OF A CONFLICT
To understand the context in which the Northern Irish conflict came into existence, I will first give a brief overview of the events that led up to the Troubles and the tension and violence that ensued. Although various attempts to subdue Ireland and establish British rule over the island took place since the twelfth century, the first truly successful take-over was carried out when Henry VIII – the English king who facilitated the establishment of the Anglican church- was declared king of Ireland in 1541. Following this event, Catholic Irish lost most of their land and rights, and revolts were suppressed ruthlessly.3 This imposition of Protestant power in Ireland certainly has had its effects on group formation, as we will see when I discuss among others Norbert Elias’ ideas about outsider-insider figuration later in this thesis.
Ireland, before British colonisation, had been a collection of independent kingdoms ruled by chiefs and bound by a common set of legal, social and religious traditions.4 (Catholic) Christianity had come to the island by the early fifth century, spread by missionaries such as Saint Patrick (Hanson
3http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/troubles/ 21-11-2012
4 1986). Ireland’s eventual colonizer England had been Catholic, too, but king Henry VIII brought change to this. He desperately sought after a male heir, but his first out of six marriages did not seem to be able to produce one. I.a. the Pope’s disallowance of a second marriage to the woman he was having an affair with, led Henry VIII to reject the Pope in 1533 and establish the Anglican church, which could eventually considered to be Protestant (although with some Catholic characteristics5) and had a monarch for a leader in stead of a Pope (Merriman 2010: 111-114, 124). Ireland and Wales were invaded out of Henry’s fear that they would assist Holy Roman Emperor Charles V while attempting to conquer England as to restore Catholicism there (IBID : 180). In the sixteenth century, Scotland became Protestant, too, and England and Scotland were ruled by the same monarch when former king of the Scots, James VI, succeeded queen Elizabeth I to the throne of England and Ireland as James I. (IBID: 209). When England had taken over Ireland, after a while a lot of Ulster Earls fled the country in 1607. This happened during the reign of king James I, who confisquated the
abandoned land and gave a great deal of it to English and Scottish settlers. Many Scots came to Ulster because of unfavorable conditions back home in Scotland: religious prosecution had its heyday, and hunger and poverty were all too common for the less well-off. Because the Scots had a Scottish monarch sitting on the British throne, they had a substantial share in the land
redistribution6, even though the Kingdom of Great Britain with the Union Jack as its flag and an official linkage to Scotland and Wales only came into being in 1707 (IBID: 390). There was also an ideological and strategical idea behind the settlement of so many Scots in Ulster, namely that they would pacify and bring civilization to this perceived to be most rebellious and barbaric part of Ireland (Armitage 1997, Canny 1973).
During the following centuries, Irish uprisings such as the Irish Rebellion of 1641, in which many Protestant landlords were killed and the putting down of which led to the majority of what was left of Catholic property to be transferred to English Protestants, took place every few decades or so. By the time the Kingdom of Great Britain was officially formed, seven-eights of Irish land was owned by English Protestants, and legal restrictions prevented Catholics from becoming merchants, lawyers or members of the already rather powerless Irish Parliament (IBID: 390).
In the 20th century, tensions rose up primarily first because of discord about the Home Rule bill7 in 1911 and some years later the passing up of it, causing Protestant and Nationalist bodies to react strongly and start arming themselves. In 1916, a violent outburst of these tensions took place on Easter Sunday, when Irish Republican rebels occupied the capital of Dublin and declared the independent Irish Republic. By the time the British troops had forced the rebels to surrender five days later, the insurrection had lead to the death of 450 persons, injury of 2,614, and missing of 9. In 1920, the country was split up in the twenty-six counties of Southern Ireland, and the six counties of Northern Ireland, but this decision met neither Nationalist wishes for an independent and united
5 The Church of Ireland, as a province of the Anglican Communion, states itself that the opposition Catholic –
Protestant is wrong, as there are Catholics in the Anglican Communion. In its view, the real opposition should be Roman Catholic vs. Protestant/Reformed Catholic, that is to say accepting the universal jurisdiction of the Pope vs. not doing so. http://www.ireland.anglican.org/index.php?do=information&id=6 19-12-2012
6http://www.bbc.co.uk/legacies/immig_emig/northern_ireland/ni_1/article_2.shtml 17-12-2012
7Home Rule was the name given to the process of allowing Ireland more say in how it was governed. The bill
would free the people from the rule of London.
5 country, nor Loyalist wishes for remaining an undifferentiated part of Britain. After the Irish War of Independence that started in 1919, however, Southern Ireland became the Republic of Ireland in 1922 and the Nationalist majority there was finally granted its wish to form an independent state.8
But friction in the North was far from over. The large Nationalist minority there could not come to terms with most of Ulster’s continued state of dependence of and allegiance to the British crown, and began to suffer (again) from discrimination because of the power the Protestant majority had obtained. The impression that the Unionists were the natural ruling party is symbolized by the 19 years office of Unionist prime minister James Craig from 1927 until 1940 (from 1927 as Viscount Craigavon), and the outdoing of this long term by a year by Unionist prime minister Basil Brooke from 1943 to 1963 (from 1952 Viscount Brookeborough). One of the few reasons that Catholics, who were very much aware of the discrimination, could have to refrain from seeking to make a union with the Republic of Ireland, is the economic strength of Northern Ireland, which in this time well outpaced that of the Republic.9
So by the mid-sixties, while home rule was well established, the Catholic population felt they were treated as second-class citizens. Unionists, on the other hand, perceived the situation for the Catholics to be improving by this time (Munck 1992: 211-212). They viewed those pursuing the united Ireland dream to bite the hand that fed them, being deceived by ruthless enemies of the state (Smyth 1972). Society was still segregated rather severely; socially through for example the existence of different Catholic and Protestant sports clubs, but also physically through signs of Protestant dominance and bodily enforcement of Catholic gathering prohibitions. The Catholic discrimination mentioned before concerned for example housing and job opportunities. But it also included some more symbolic matters, like the opening of a new university in nearby Protestant Coleraine rather than in Derry, Northern Ireland’s second-largest city with an unusual majority of Catholic inhabitants. This Catholic-Protestant inequality led to either migration of Catholics, or to Catholics staying and creating a fertile environment for the birth of the Civil Rights movement that would take flight during the sixties (Munck 1992: 212-214).
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) developed a focus on the
disadvantaged position of Catholics in the North, with various parties such as the Communist Party and the student-based People’s Democracy playing substantial roles. The association was formed to take up individual civil rights cases in court, but soon people wanted to have marches, too. Parallels were made to the Civil Rights movement in America, but for most people, it was a very local matter. The Protestant population saw the NICRA as some sort of Trojan Horse: they believed the movement was just another way for the IRA to try to reach the old goal of an independent, united Ireland. This view, called the conspiracy theory, can be opposed by Munck’s conclusion that for a lot of people, the NICRA was really ‘just’ about equal rights for Catholics and Protestants alike. What is more, the movement was definitely not as united as is sometimes conveyed, with different people and parties using it for different reasons and a lack of an overall consensus. However, the NICRA does often get framed as if it was all about uniting North and South, and a collective of individuals arguably stopped the movement from being more successful –in a less violent way- in achieving its goals by acting out
8http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=733&HistoryID=aa72>rack=pthc
09-12-2012
9http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=734&HistoryID=aa72>rack=pthc
6 of a Republican agenda. Also, as a respondent to Munck’s research states, “there was a gap between ideology and the executive, and the perceptions of NICRA which the mass movement had, so that when the violence started or when things began to go wrong, NICRA couldn't hold these people because they had nothing to hold them with” (Munck 1992: 216-228).
The first civil rights demonstration took place in August 1968, and became, according to another respondent, “pretty dramatic” because of heavy disturbances that occurred when the Catholic demonstrants were stopped in their march. Subsequent riots and general turmoil caused the NICRA, whether its members intended to or not, to be successful in destabilising the Northern Irish state. At least prior to violent clashes with the police, most marchers primarily wanted equal treatment, and any want for a united Ireland was secondary. The pursuit of Nationalist interests was not something that was very prominently present in Northern Irish society. But the civil rights marches were often violently suppressed by the police, and this in fact rather created
revolutionarism than either hushed or reinforced a pre-existent version of it. As stated before, Unionists saw demands such as ‘one man, one vote’10 as simply another way of attacking the Unionist state. When tensions, partially facilitated by rumours about armed IRA men planning a take-over, remained to rise, and riots continued to break out almost non-stop, the British army came over to assist the demoralised Northern Irish police force. In July-August 1968 the tension came to a head with i.a. a Protestant march in Derry resulting in violent riots and six killings on one night a few days later. Out of this crisis, the IRA was reborn and the basis for the coming decades of Troubles was laid (Munck 1992: 218-227).
A defining moment in these violent years was ‘Bloody Sunday’ on January 30 1972, when the British army opened fire on a banned civil rights march in Derry, killing thirteen people. This event led the British government to reach the conclusion that the Northern Ireland government had lost control. Direct rule from Westminster was reimposed, in the end denying Northern Irish home rule for more then a year. By the year 1992, the death toll of the sectarian violence within the years dubbed the Troubles passed the 3000 mark, including 2000 civilians.11
The IRA eventually declared a ceasefire in 1994 after meetings since 1993 between the leader of the relatively moderate wing of the Nationalists, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the president of Sinn Fein –a party that is often linked with the militant IRA-, that promised Sinn Fein to be welcome at a future conference table if it would reject violence in the future. A month later, the Loyalist paramilitaries also promised to abandon the use of violence. A period of relative calm and peace talks began, but was roughly called to an end when an IRA bomb exploded in London’s Docklands Canary Wharf in February 1996, killing two people and causing major damage. However, in 1997 Labour party’s Tony Blair wins the elections in Britain, and the new Prime Minister immediately resumes efforts to establish peace in Northern Ireland. For the first time,
representatives of all relevant political parties meet face to face, eventually setting up the Good Friday Agreement. This agreement i.a. includes the phased release of paramilitary prisoners and
10 The ‘one man, one vote’ demand refers to the plural voting system in Northern Ireland that existed until
1968, which allowed owners of businesses to cast more than one vote.
11 See footnote 9 and
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=738&HistoryID=aa72>rack=pthc 12-12-2012
7 gradual disarmament, and is voted for by a majority of Irish and Northern Irish. In the elections that follow, Unionist parties win with 55 seats, while Nationalists obtain 42 seats.12
Yet, in the period that follows, disagreements prevail. The major disputes revolve around the disarming of the IRA, with Unionists demanding complete disarmament before cooperation with Sinn Feinn is to start, and the IRA not willing to give up weapons until Sinn Feinn is actually in the government. To cool tempers, the British government reimposes direct rule several times, until the local government is restored for the last time in 2007 with Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, and Martin McGuinness, of Sinn Fein, sworn in respectively as leader and deputy leader. The latest
breakthrough in the peace process took place on February 5 2010, when the Hillsborough Castle Agreement was signed. This agreement states that Britain will hand over control of the police and justice system to Northern Ireland, a topic that has been at the centre of much dispute during the conflict.13
Although, as we have seen, slowly but surely progress has been made regarding the peace process in Northern Ireland, terrorist attacks continue to be carried out. For example, in 2010 a Catholic police officer14 was seriously injured and lost a leg when a bomb exploded underneath his car, and in 2011 another Catholic police officer was killed by a car bomb.15 This at least partial continuum of animosity and violence indicates remaining group opposition. How then, despite the obvious historical causal factors, does this group opposition take shape? If we think about the fact that 71% of the Northern Irish voted in favor of the Good Friday Agreement, it seems rather obvious that in general, people want to move on. Why is it then so hard to do so? In order to leave the conflict behind, people have to break through processes of group formation that nourish the
development of hostile attitudes. Apparently, this is something that has not been (completely) done yet. Therefore, to find out why the Ulster conflict still does not seem to have come to a halt yet, I will look into how group formation takes shape in Northern Ireland.
PARADES AND BOUNDARIES: GROUP FORMATION THROUGH INTERACTION
The parades of the Protestant organisation ‘the Orange Order’ that Dominic Bryan (2002) discusses are a good example of how interaction creates and maintains boundaries. According to Anthony Cohen, communities are formed by people who have something in common, but who also want to set themselves apart from other people: the outsiders. When studying groups, we must focus on their boundaries, for groups are created by the desire of a collection of people to find something in common, so that they can distance themselves from those who they wish to view as outsiders. The boundaries that are created as a result, can be physical, but also existent in people’s heads. Through interaction, the social and often eventually geographical boundaries are defined, and the own group
12 See website URL footnote 11.
13http://www.infoplease.com/spot/northireland1.html 13-12-2012
14 From 2001 to 2009, government policy prescribed that 50% of the PSNI trainee officers recruited should
have a Catholic background. This measure was undertaken in order to let the PSNI staff reflect the Irish population better; in 2001 about 92% of the policemen had a Protestant/Unionist background -
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12995795 19-12-2012-, now (2012) this percentage is 67% for police officers and 78% for police staff.
http://www.psni.police.uk/directory/updates/updates_statistics/updates_workforce_composition_figures.ht m 19-12-2012 This stems with the trend of a general increase of the Catholic workforce in Northern Ireland. See Monitoring Report No. 21: A profile of the Monitored Northern Ireland Workforce in Bibliography.
8 is formed (Cohen 1985). To understand how these boundaries are made, we therefore must analyse the interaction that takes place around them; how do people set themselves apart from others?
The Orange Order parades are events in which exactly such a process takes place: here boundaries are claimed through interaction. The Orange Institution, commonly known as the Orange Order, was named after king William III. Protestant William III was a Dutch prince upon birth, but deposed of and replaced king James II and VII of England, Ireland and Scotland, who was seen as being too pro-Catholic by many English nobles, in 1689.16 The Orange Order, Bryan writes, was formed in 1795, and “could be characterised as a ‘defensive’ localised friendly society for Protestants – even if the actions of members rarely appeared as defensive” (Bryan 2002: 96). The supposedly traditional parades may seem to express a leaning towards conservatism and a yearning for the good old days at first view, but are rather “complex political resources reflecting contemporary power relations” (IBID: 95). These parades cause(d) a lot of tension and sometimes violent confrontations, and in this are very interactive indeed. Many disputes have arisen over the routes the parades were to take; the Orangemen repeatedly intended to, and sometimes did walk through predominately Catholic areas.
A reason why the parade routes are so disputed, may be that by marching through the Catholic neighbourhoods, Orangemen not only penetrate a physical boundary, but also attempt to demolish the social boundary between the two groups. By marching through these areas, the Protestants deny that there is an invisible border they cannot cross: they have the power to go anywhere they want and bring their norms and group rules along. In this sort of demarcating, or social highjacking of territory, the Protestants try to secure a superior (power) position: that of the established.
The established-outsider figuration, as discussed by Norbert Elias, implies that a group that has a superior power position in society, thinks better of itself than of other people that do not belong to that group. They avoid personal contact with the outsiders, and maintain this taboo through social control. Members of this established group value their group opinion and act according to the group norms because of a belief in the group charisma: they believe their own group to have a superior human virtue, and therefore take great pride in and experience immense satisfaction by being able to see themselves as a member of the group. Forms of social control to annihilate any contact with the outsiders, are blame-gossip and the fear of pollution: the fear of being infected by the anomalic behaviour of the outsider group (Elias 1994: xv-lii).
In the case of Northern Ireland, who are the established and who are the outsiders is difficult to determine. One could argue that the Catholics are the established, because their
ancestors have lived in Ireland for longer than the Protestant’s ancestors. But when Northern Ireland became a part of the United Kingdom, the Catholics might have had a history more connected to the country, and therefore might be considered to be more established, but actually lost their power and became second-class civilians – for example, they were not allowed to buy or rent land in the first century of British rule. Even after legal adjustments were made, the Catholic population was still a minority, and whether justifiable or not, often still felt oppressed and lacking the power it felt it should have. On the other hand, the Protestants might be seen as the established because initially they were the politically dominant group in Northern Ireland, and had the power to stigmatise the
9 Catholics. However, this may not be an entirely correct assumption. Elias argues that the established have the power to impose their own human superiority upon the outsiders, who end up feeling of lesser worth themselves (IBID: xvi & xxvi). But I find it hard to find evidence that the Catholics of Northern Ireland ever felt of lesser worth than the Protestants; possibly because they never really were outsiders to begin with, because they had been the established themselves before the Protestants came. This may have provided them with a large amount of group cohesion, something which, according to Elias, the outsiders lack, and which reinforces the powerful position of the established (IBID: xviii). So, both groups have certain characteristics that Elias ascribes to both the established and the outsiders, but this mixed established-outsider figuration probably makes the analysis of Northern Irish group formation that much more interesting.
I argued that the Orange Order parades provide a stage for interaction between Catholics and Protestants, but by marching through Catholic neighbourhoods, there actually is no face-to-face interaction, so the interaction taboo with regard to the established-outsider figuration may still be valid here. The parades are better understood as interactions between two groups without there being any personal contact; without breaking the interaction taboo Elias speaks of. This, however, can be expected to cause some inner group friction, as there is a message to be conveyed, but simultaneously, there can be no contact –which can be considered to be vital if the conveying of a message is wished to be done successfully- or the group members will be contaminated by the anomaly of the outsiders.
The interaction takes form as a conflict over contested boundaries; both groups are striving to gain an established position, which both feel entitled to. They try to demolish and recreate the established-outsider boundary by marching in each others’ territory and letting them know that they are the dominant group with the right to power, because they have a group charisma that others lack: they have a superior human virtue, while the others, considered to be the outsiders, are
anomic. Because both groups are trying to show through their marches that they are in charge, there is no socially agreed upon version of how society is structured and what the group relationships are. What makes the two groups different, is not thought of the same by both of them. The absence of one universal view of the boundaries and borders causes them to be contested and unclear. BOUNDARY MARKING: THE CLOSING OF GROUP RANKS IN THE FACE OF THREAT
A question that comes to mind when linking the group charisma concept to the Northern Irish case, is whether people believe their superior human value to be well-founded, or whether they –perhaps more or less subconsciously- use it as an instrument to keep others from sharing in, and thus eliminating, power (when everyone shares equally in power, there is no real power, because no one has more right to something than any other person). Is this charisma perhaps a supposedly distinguishing fact that is rather made up than really existent, used to have a reason to block others from assimilating into the group and prevent a diminution of power?
Elias shows how a group of residents in an English suburban community felt threatened in their established way of life and closed their ranks to protect it against newcomers. In a way, they needed a reason to exclude the newcoming group from theirs and, in essence, create two separate groups, and so they started heavily emphasizing their own group charisma, as well as the group disgrace of the outsiders (IBID: xxii). It could be said that a system of human value was created to protect group standards, but at the same time this system must have already existed, or the
10 established residents would not have felt threatened; if they did not already view the newcomers as anomalic, they would have formed no threat. My reasoning here seems to indicate that the belief in group charisma is ‘real’ to a certain extent, and that the propagation of group disgrace is reinforced and recreated in a more intense way when the group charisma is felt to be threatened.
This closing of ranks out of fear of penetration and pollution is certainly detectable in Northern Ireland, where Protestants living alongside the international border17 felt increasingly anxious when possibilities of cross-border cooperation accelerated. With the demilitarisation of the border, taking place since July 2005, these Protestants felt that they were being deprived not only of protection against sectarian violence, but also of protection of their identity as Northern Ireland’s dominant and ruling majority. To these people, the border did not only mean something
demographical and political, but also, and perhaps mostly, something that shaped their identity and solidarity to all those who identified in the same way (Donnan 2010: 255-256). In a certain sense, the Protestants reacted by closing their ranks more strongly and defining the contours of their group more severely than before. Donnan states that communal division became more sharply drawn when the visibility of the border diminished (IBID: 264), and thus when the enclosure of others was anticipated and the fear of penetration and pollution of the group charisma increased.
Again, one sees here that the real action of group formation takes place at the group’s boundaries. The group is recreated when boundaries are marked more intensely in the face of perceived threat. Indeed, the concept of the group only gains real significance when this threat is present; as Cohen argues, the use of the word community is only occasioned by the desire or need to express the distinction of opposite communities (Cohen 1985: 12).
Cohen also argues that, once created, a community can only continue to exist when the people within it believe that they have a shared meaning which they give to community specific symbols. A symbol is a marker for a certain category, to which everyone gives a different meaning. This makes the symbol not just a different word for the category it represents, but also gives it the power to create meaning. As Cohen explains, your own father is a symbol for the category father. Your own father refers to this category, but the specific experience with your father you’ve had, also gives shape to what sense you give to ‘father’ as a concept. Thus, the symbol allows us to make meaning, and everyone does this differently. A symbol is something we can all relate to, even though its significance differs from person to person. According to Cohen, people learn culture through symbols; through symbols, which are more often ideas, for example about behaviour, than something material, people have their most fundamental social experience and learn to be social. The symbolic equipment we use to do this with is something all group members stick to, all with reasons of their own. But what makes that the community is being kept together, is that people believe that they give meaning in the same way to the community symbols; they fail or do not want to recognize that the group members share the same symbols with different motivations (IBID: 12-16).
So an idea about behaviour can be a symbol, and people can act in a same certain way while attaching a different meaning to it. Transactions of that meaning take place in social interaction. This social interaction creates boundaries. The social repertoire of a community ‘merges’ the different
17 I will refer to the Catholics and Protestants living alongside the international border on the Northern Irish
11 meanings and unites people in their joint opposition against perceived outsiders, and thereby shapes the boundaries of the community (IBID: 17-21).
The geographical and social borders and boundaries between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, then, can also be seen as symbols. They keep the community, formed in
opposition to the other, together by the member’s belief in a shared meaning attached to them. An example of the border as a shared symbol are the narratives of the border Protestants and Catholics as described by Donnan and Kelleher. Donnan recalls people telling him repeatedly about conflict occurrences and their locations, which are “widely known and remembered, their memory renewed each time a local passes in their car, and collectively recalled on their anniversary by large gatherings of Protestants.” The narratives are part of a specific pattern of violence that is established in the history of the group, a specific way in which the border Protestants retell their stories about Northern Irish conflict. The focus of these narrations is the clash between Catholics and Protestants (IBID: 260-261). For example, William Kelleher describes how a Catholic woman mapped the border landscape with a manifest fearful and mistrusting disposition. She warned him about (predominantly Protestant) places where Catholics and strangers like himself would not be safe, and pointed out ‘black holes’; bitter places full of police, Protestants and Loyalists (Kelleher 2003: 46-47). This remoulding narrative legitimizes why things happen the way they do (Donnan: 261), why communities are shaped the way they are and why they are so opposed. The shared idea of the border is a symbol that evokes an image of mistrust and anxiety, or, as Donnan characterized the landscape his Protestant informant Billy was talking about, of fear and threat (IBID: 261).
The sharing of this symbol, though undoubtedly harbouring many different personal motivations, unites the Protestant community in their joint opposition against those who they wish to view as outsiders: the Catholics (and vice versa). The transaction of meaning within the
community strengthens the group ties. This can be further explained using Elias’ view on insider-outsider figuration: people adopt community symbols and employ them, because of the rewarding feeling of sharing in the group charisma, and the fear of lowering the group opinion about oneself when pollution by the anomalic outsiders is suspected. The transaction of meaning between Catholics and Protestants can be expected to run less smoothly than the inner group transaction, because of both sides having their own vision of the border. But although who is the victim and who is the perpetrator differs, the workings of their inner group formation ensure that the symbol of the border as a hostile entity, a place where danger and attacks by old enemies are always lurking, is upheld.
As we have seen, fear and perceived threat play an important role in the dynamics of group formation. The fear of losing group identity causes Catholics and Protestants alike to close their ranks and draw boundaries sharper than before. The reason that the border Protestants Donnan studied are so anxious about the demilitarisation of the international border, is exactly this fear; the border is an open one anyway, since the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland are both part of the European Union. The Protestants want to see the importance of the border maintained because they want to keep their identities, which they see as United Kingdom based, protected. They do not want to lose the materialisation of the social boundaries, that secure their perceived group charisma. This is the reason for why, for example, they are pessimistic about cross-border ties (which they perceive as cross-communal, Catholic-Protestant ties); they fear and claim to already see that ‘Irishness’ seeps in through an ever weakening border, exterminating Northern Irish identity (IBID:
12 256-257). As we will see later in this thesis when the ideas of Anton Blok will be discussed, the fear of losing identity as a group can at least partly be explained by a preoccupation with the judgement reference groups: who do people want to convey their identity to, by whom do the Protestants not want to be seen as indistinguishable from the (Republic) Irish?
THE ROLE OF POWER IN NORTHERN IRISH GROUP FORMATION
Aside from the presumably rather universal and timeless workings of group formation and maintenance facilitated by the pull of group charisma and repulsive effect of group disgrace mediated by social interaction, we have to look more closely again at the specific conditions of Northern Irish group formation to get a better grasp of the group formation puzzle.
Looking into the structural characteristics of Northern Irish society that have formed over time, we can conclude that both the Catholic and Protestant community have always had great social cohesion: Catholics have repeatedly organised themselves to try to dislodge the (Northern) Ireland government and unite the Ireland isle under autonomous rule, and quite similarly
Protestants have organised themselves to give voice -and action- to their Loyalist standpoints for centuries, albeit with some inner group friction that is to be expected within all human communities (Todd 1987). This social cohesion is something that Elias viewed as essential to established group domination (Elias 1994: xxii). As we saw earlier, Northern Irish (or at least the border Protestants) use the border to try to secure their identity. But this attempt is not just about abstract, immaterial ideas about an image of the self, it also means that people use the border to try to gain the
established position, as group identity is inextricably linked to a societal power position. The fact that both groups have much social cohesion, contributes to my viewpoint that both are and have been struggling to gain the so-called established position, with which comes great power.
As we saw before, in the case of the Catholics and Protestants, there is no clearly established group versus a clear outsider group. The Protestant community, however, was the group that initially possessed economic and social power: they claimed Irish land and forced Catholics out of various relatively powerful professions. Elias argues that the belief in group charisma and group disgrace that is generated during a time of economic and social superiority, can continue to exist for a very long time after the social domination ceases to exist. However, this is also when a battle of contra-stigmatisation will begin, which ultimately implicates a battle for economic and social power (IBID: xxiii). Catholics seemingly never truly internalised their stigmatisation by Protestants because of their great social cohesion, which made that from the very beginning of British rule, they were able to contra-stigmatise and struggle to (re)gain power. The violent conflict of which the Troubles was a part, is an indication of power differences that do not take on enormous proportions and that can be –and were- challenged (IBID: xxxi). On the other hand, Protestants probably still carry with them communal fantasies about Protestant group charisma and Catholic group disgrace, as it may take a long time, as Elias says, before the reality shock sinks in (IBID: xlv). Of course, what helps is that this reality shock is not one of dramatic proportions, as Protestants have not lost a great amount of power at all, but merely saw Catholics rise up to equal levels in terms of law and,
although this is not agreed upon unanimously, economic perspectives. So while the societal position of Protestants did not worsen, the emancipation of the Catholic population meant that their power diminished somewhat. This relatively small change however can be expected not to cause a huge shock. I therefore believe that it is quite easy for the Northern Irish Protestants to hold on to an
13 emotional barrier that was created in a time of greater social standing, and which enables them to set themselves apart from Catholics rather easily in their own view.
So, I argued that while the origins of the Northern Irish group formation can be found in the power structure of society, these communities are continuously recreated and maintained by social interaction, that among others consists of the employment of narratives, and mediates the workings of group charisma and group disgrace, fuelled by a fear of loss of identity and social position. In this way, Protestant power imposition that once was rather absolute and highly visible18, is still affecting contemporary Catholic-Protestant group dynamics, even though the actual power imbalance may have largely vanished.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFERENTIATION
The deployment of international borders to secure identity and power position call to mind another useful theory about group formation and opposition: Anton Blok’s narcissism of minor differences. Blok argues that we create our identities by positioning ourselves in opposition to others, and in this positioning we use small differences in stead of big ones. The most violent disputes are often those between two groups that are strikingly alike. An example is the rivalry between to villages that are just a few steps apart. When two persons or groups differ from each other hugely, people do not have to be afraid that their identity is under threat. The situation only becomes to be perceived as dangerous when two persons or groups are getting too much alike; when this happens, people begin –sometimes violently- emphasising very small differences, so as to keep the diminishing social distance (Blok 1998).
As has become clear, when the international Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland border ‘vanishes’, it is not only feared that the geographical division loses its importance. This geographical division stands for, and indeed even emanated from a particular social division, namely that of the Catholic-Protestant division that has its roots in the continuous attempts of conquer and resistance by both parties. So, as has also become clear, when the border is demilitarised, people are afraid that ‘otherness’ will seep in and anxiety and fear prevails. The other is seen as closing in on one’s (group) identity, and in moving closer physically, the other is also seen to strive to take over the established way of life; the basis of the own identity, formed by all sorts of social restrictions and directives people stick to out of the belief in their group charisma. When there is no border (anymore) to keep the other from doing this -in other words, when there is no boundary that distinguishes ‘them’ from ‘us’-, the need for a recreation of social division is felt. This wished for social division is one between two groups that, despite of having (had) different structural positions in society, are actually quite the same in all sorts of aspects of life. As Elias points out, too, the only significant difference between two groups bonded to each other as outsiders and insiders, is the amount of power they have. Other differences originating in things as ethnicity, language or custom, distract from what is central to inter-community relationships: power with which the established can exclude outsiders (Elias 1994: xxx).
One can find that in the case of the Catholic-Protestant conflict, the two groups also seem to have more similarities than differences. Apart from holding on to two different forms of Christianity, the people of both sides to which I expect community boundaries matter the most, namely
14 participants of riots and people that make possible the presence of contested en segregated areas, are typically male, young of age, and members of the working-class (Jarman 2005, 2001). Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland are also proven to have had largely the same forms of
management, teaching methods and extracurricular activities in their schools in ast least the seventies of the previous century (Darby 1977). Thus, since apart from power imbalance, (for example cultural) differences between the two groups seem to be either hardly existent or of little significance, people have to focus on small differences in order to be able to differentiate
themselves from the other. This is where the narcissism of minor differences comes into play. One could even say that the minor differences present in Northern Irish life are all consciously designed to keep the division in place: the separate Catholic and Nationalist newspapers, schools, sports clubs, etc. all serve the purpose to stress the Catholic-Protestant boundary that otherwise might have been a lot less visible. They are created to prevent one group merging into the other, just as football supporters of one club create differences between themselves and supporters of other clubs, while when compared based on i.a. class, gender and age, they are all extraordinary alike. And while there are separate forms of media, clubs, societies, etc. their content is still largely the same; Catholics and Protestants do not have notably different ways of enjoying their pastime or obtaining the news. As Cohen states, two groups that are in conflict can have the same structures, while simultaneously both expressing their uniqueness by them (Cohen 1985: 44-50). By borrowing the concept of minor differences and applying it to this case, I do not wish to imply that Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants behave foolishly or give any other sort of value judgement, but rather give more insight into the workings of boundary creation without, as Anthony Buckley puts it, “being over-eager to criticise popular tradition nor attribute blame” (Buckley 2002: 85).
Next to Blok and Cohen, Fredrik Barth’s ideas about the construction of communities with regard to the creation of differentiation can be applied to the Northern Irish case as well. Barth deliberates on this social creation of differences as well. He notes how groups maintain differences despite the constant flow of i.a. information and people. It therefore cannot be isolation, i.e. lack of inter-group contact, that causes groups to maintain their cultural ‘uniqueness’. Bath argues that these differences are created by men themselves to pursue certain kind of goals, starting when they meet face-to-face. This interaction influences the way people think about each other. When groups organise to undertake some sort of political action, they create the appearance of cultural
discontinuity, thus forming their own culture. Group members do this to pursue certain kind of goals, for example political ones (Barth 1969). This seems to apply to the Northern Ireland case very well: (minor) differences between Catholics and Protestants are created and upheld –perhaps not as equally consciously by everyone- in order to pursue the goals of an independent or a Loyalist state.
Now, of course, the two groups have not formed the way they have simply because they were too much alike and began differentiating by calling into life separate societies; the group formation originates in the history of the fight over the right to rule. As Barth’s theory indicates, this struggle is acted out by various agents who create and use differentiation in order to achieve what they want. But, as we have seen, the case of the violent animosity between Catholics and
Protestants in Ireland in some ways does seem to fit very well in the narcissism of minor differences theory proposed by Anton Blok, too. These two groups are the people Blok and also Lawrence
Keeley talk about, that interact most intensely with their neighbours (of all people), be it commercial, nuptial or hostile (Blok 1998: 37, Keeley 1996: 122-123). Even before the final colonisation of Ireland,
15 England and Ireland had been neighbours with centuries of intense contact.19 As Jacob
Black-Michaud states, not only in tribal societies, but in more complex societies too, hostility between neighbours is part of a network of reciprocity, enabling people to distinguish themselves within a common framework (Black-Michaud 1975: 208). By differentiating on a small scale, people make sure the boundary is kept clear.
The concept of the narcissism of minor differences also does help to explain why and how boundaries that were created such a long time ago, are still being upheld up to present day. While in this conflict, political interests were and are definitely at stake, it amounts to more. As Blok puts it, we can recognize the existence of a structural relationship (i.a.) because the feud is deeply
influenced by the way cultural difference is lacking. But he also states that the narcissism of minor differences does not necessarily lead to violence. This physical enactment of feelings of animosity is for example caused by, like in the Northern Irish case, political context. (The history of) this case also exemplifies another arguably necessary condition for the narcissism to result in violence: the
presence of minorities (Catholics) whose rights and social and cultural identity are (or were) unprotected, and a state and army that more or less openly side(d) with one particular group (Protestants) (Blok 1998: 37, 49). So, by feeling the need to set themselves apart from the other more distinctly, which is induced by power-balance-struggles rooted in centuries of conflict, the division between the Catholics and Protestants has been sharpened and maintained by the forming of two separate communities with separate areas for the enactment of everyday social life, the existence of which in turn assured the division not to vanish any day soon.
Blok also points out the importance of a feature of the outsider-insider figuration Elias studied, that Elias himself paid less attention to. I am referring to the feature of reference groups. While Elias paints the picture of a rather isolated English suburb with two main groups between which power struggles are played out, Blok discusses the fact that the working-class established excluded the working-class newcomers out of fear that the middle-class residents, who formed a reference group for the working-class established, might put the established on the same level as the newcomers. The middle-class residents did not feel the need to distinguish themselves so intensely from the newcomers, because the social distance was great enough not to be perceived as the same (Blok 1998: 48). In other words, what lies beneath the narcissism of minor differences is the fear of being viewed as the same as the other by one’s surroundings, and as a result to degrade to a lower status in the broader hierarchy. When we take the reference group feature of the established-outsider figuration to Northern Ireland, we may ask ourselves who form the reference groups for the Catholics, and who do so for the Protestants. By whom do they not want to be put on the same level as each other?
For the Northern Irish Catholics, the reference group may be found in their Catholic coreligionists across the international border. By for example expressing the desire for a united Ireland , the Northern Irish Catholics can be seen to emphasise that they are the same, that they have the same status as the Irish Catholics, and that they are definitely different from their
Protestant, Unionist fellow nationals. In a similar way, the British population overseas could form a reference group for the Northern Irish Protestants. In expressing their Unionist views, these Protestants can be seen as distinguishing themselves from Catholics in their country, preventing to
16 be viewed in the same terms by the people they feel linked to. This does not mean that Catholics and Protestants feel subordinate to their reference groups, as was already exemplified in the eighteenth century by the case of the Irish Patriots: Protestant Irish who advocated strong self-government within the United Kingdom. While wishing to remain part of the British Empire, these Protestants also felt they had the right to govern themselves, and not be dominated by their
coreligionists in the east. The reference groups can then rather be seen as people who are viewed as like-minded, and as equals whose judgement is cared for.
But rather than people they want to share nationality with, or people they actually do share citizenship with, I suspect the most substantial reference groups for the Northern Irish to be
comparable to those Blok pointed out in Elias’ English suburbian neighbourhood: middle-class communities serving as reference groups for same faith working-class ones. As we have seen before, Northern Irish rioters are typically working-class. Also, a Northern Irish acquaintance I discussed this thesis with confirmed apparent working-class preoccupation with Catholic-Protestant differentiating. This stems with the idea that class Protestants try to distinguish themselves from working-class Catholics so explicitly, because they want to assure that they are not viewed as the same by middle-class Protestants -who do not share this concern because of the social distance that already exists-, and vice versa.
POWER AGAIN: PERCEIVING THE OTHER AND THE FLAG AS A SYMBOL
The key factor in Northern Irish group formation, however, seems to remain power, and thereby who has the right to govern and take up the position of the established. As Edward Eugene O’Donnell, who researched prejudice and stereotyping among Catholic and Protestants, already stated four decades ago: “religion per se plays an insignificant role in the stereotypes of Northern Ireland. Power is the crucial factor” (O’Donnell 1977: 155). The fact that the Northern Irish see, or at least saw power as the vital part of the other’s group identity, can be viewed as very telling about what is central to the creation of the own group identity. This line of reasoning is derived from Jasbir K. Puar’s work on the ‘sexual abuse scandal’ of Abu Ghraib, in which she argues that the sexual abuse that took place in an Iraqi prison by American soldiers was not an extreme exception, but rather the result of the effect of sexuality-based American patriotism on the U.S. military. Because sexuality is so central to this particular patriotism, ‘the West’ implements it on the Arab world, and soldiers come to believe that the Arab mind is full of it. They are taught that for Arabs, the worst thing in the world is gay sex, and that it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men; hence the sexual abuse that revolved around gay sexuality in Abu Ghraib (Puar 2004). In a similar manner, what Catholics see as central to the Protestant mind and vice versa could be informative about what their own preoccupations are. As both groups thought of each other in terms of power – Catholics were thought of as having an unfortunate desire for a united Ireland by Protestants, and Protestants were thought of as British and as powerholders by Catholics- (O’Donnell 1977: 155), this is actually something that could be central to their own identity.
Another example of power being central to Northern Irish group formation is the recent turmoil about the hoisting of the Union flag at the Belfast City Hall. The Equality Commission, which is an “independent public body which oversees equality and discrimination law in Northern
17
Ireland”20, proposed a compromise that the flag would be raised on a dozen days or so per year, launching Loyalist outrage because of policy difference compared to other cities within the British realm. A writer of a letter to the Belfast Telegraph, who suggested that the Tricolour was to be flied beside the Union Jack, was told by a responder that “you should come to terms with the fact that you are still living in Northern Ireland, not the Republic”21, and DUP Councillor John Hussey wondered why Belfast should be “treated differently than every other UK city, the vast majority of whom fly the Union flag all year round”22in the same newspaper. The Union flag can be seen as a symbol of Protestant domination by those who oppose to Northern Ireland being a part of the UK, as i.a. comments on a survey about the meaning of the Union Jack, and a survey conducted among i.a. employees of the Belfast City Council show.23 Respondents to this latter survey with a Nationalistic and/or Catholic background generally preferred that the Belfast City Hall would fly a neutral flag in stead of the Union flag. What’s more, 35% of the respondents thought that the current policy of flying the Union flag should be changed, mostly because of the need to promote a neutral and harmonious environment and to ensure that no-one was offended by the policy.
Thus, the hoisting of the Union flag is perceived by some, or more specifically by a majority of Catholics and Nationalists, as creating a biased, hostile environment. This comes as no surprise when one considers the flag, next to the border, as yet another symbol that creates division and thereby exclusion. As one Belfast Telegraph letter writer states, “there is nothing more divisive than flags and emblems.”24The author goes on to say that total victory for one side -either no flag being hoisted at all, or the flag being hoisted on all days of the year- leads to exclusion of the other, and his line of reasoning parallels with my Cohen and Elias based argument in this thesis. As the Protestants share the symbol of the flag, their community is strengthened by the belief in a shared meaning of this flag. The ensuing reinforced social cohesion forms a threat for the Catholic community in the power-balance-struggle of the established-outsider figuration. In this way, Protestant advocates of the all year round flying of the Union Jack are trying to do exactly what the Belfast Telegraph letter writer points out: exclude Catholics from the powerful established position. As this writer further remarks, “some Belfast councillors seem to live in a parallel universe where their own narrow party interests are placed ahead of the common good, specifically so on this issue.” As the Northern Irish political parties are intrinsically linked to the Catholic and Protestant communities, the Belfast councillors that are mentioned are allegedly rather preoccupied with their own Catholic and
Protestant community’s interests in stead of with what would be good for the Northern Irish society as a whole – reaching a compromise.
Yet another case in which power proves to play a prominent role in group formation, and in the way the two groups view each other, is the alleged harassment of Catholic families by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). On 12 November 2012, a gathering of Republicans protested against what they call the ‘latest PSNI charm offensive’ in West Belfast: a meeting of the Policing and
20http://www.equalityni.org/site/default.asp?secid=home 26-11-2012 21http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/letters/tricolour-has-no-place-at-city-hall-16240954.html 26-11-2012 22 http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/letters/alliances-position-puts-the-union-flag-at-risk-16241469.html 26-11-2012
23http://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/05/01/what-does-union-jack-mean-you/ 26-11-2012. See also Equality Impact Assessment on the Flying of the Union Flag in Bibliography.
24
18
Community Partnership in which the Republicans claim question and answer sessions are being staged and real problems remain undiscussed because they are deemed ‘sensitive’. The Republicans, as can be gathered from a leaflet posted on the Republican Network for Unity (RNU) website, see the British government based police force as a corrupt, unionist friendly institution that misuses power to harass Republicans. The leaflet states i.a. that the PSNI is “providing immunity for West Belfast’s worst Anti-Social hoods and Drugs Dealers in return for information on Republican activists”, and that it works “hand in hand with MI5 (British Military Intelligence) to set up Republicans for imprisonment”.25 If this harassment indeed does take place, then it is an example of a remainder of
Protestant-Catholic power imbalance. But even if it does not, the claims show how the RNU members of the Catholic community perceive the Unionist other in terms of power. The main characterisations they ascribe them all have to do with this power: corrupt, harassing, imprisoning, trauma inflicting, infiltrating and dominating. This observation contributes to the argument that both Catholic and Protestant communities have been struggling over the past few centuries to obtain the established position, and that this power-balance-struggle adds to the continued separation of groups in Northern Ireland; both groups strive for a powerful position, and this power can only be theirs when society is structured in such a way that there is another group that is subordinate. The battle of counter-stigmatisation that occurs when differentials decrease, so when the effects of Catholic emancipation start working, are also recognisable in the stigmatising image of the corrupt, aggressive Unionist police officer the RNU leaflet provides.
BREAKING THROUGH GROUP FORMATION STATUS QUO: IS THERE ROOM FOR ANY CHANGE? I have thus far deliberated on the workings of group formation concerning the Catholic and Protestant community in Northern Ireland, discussing different factors that play a role in this process. As we have come to see, ‘tools’ as group charisma, group disgrace, and the creation of differences are deployed through interaction by both groups out of a striving for power and a fear of losing it; out of a want for a privileged position in society. However, I do not want to paint too much of a sombre picture, and I also want to emphasize sufficiently the dynamics of group formation and the constant change that surrounds such a social phenomenon. Therefore, I’d like to look into
possibilities for change concerning Northern Irish group formation, and perhaps, if possible, give reason to believe that since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement things have actually changed and the circle of mutual mistrust and separation can be broken.
So, how do Catholics and Protestants perceive the image-making that is going on in their communities? Of course, as human beings, they have a certain amount of agency and therefore cannot be expected to blindly follow the dogma’s that i.a. the group charisma and group disgrace mechanisms provide. That is why I will go into the question if the status quo of the social boundaries prescribed by the community are being contested, and if so, to what amount. A start to answer this question, is to include a Conflict Research Report on young people’s attitudes and experiences of policing, violence and community safety in North Belfast in this thesis.26 This 2005 report looks to learn about young people’s attitudes and experiences of violence and community safety in North
25
http://www.republicannetwork.ie/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=340:brilliant-show-of- republican-unity-against-the-psnimi5-in-west-belfast-as-psni-use-an-culturlann-to-spy-on-protesters-&catid=1:latest-news 26-11-2012
26 See Young People’s Attitudes and Experiences of Policing, Violence and Community Safety in North Belfast in
19 Belfast through a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. It concludes fom its findings that there is “little reason for optimism about the development of inclusive and stable social structures”. Many young people stated in this research that they had inter-community friendships. However, a significant minority said it had no such relationships and seemed to be in favor of more segregation and sectarian and sometimes violent behavior, which causes all youngsters to regularly experience intimidation and violence. Also, participants from both Catholic and Protestant
communities often viewed the police as unfair, biased and confrontational. These findings indicate that the image of fear and anxiety, that we earlier saw also characterize the international border as a symbol, persists among both groups when it comes to group relations - albeit rather profoundly within North Belfast, and probably to a lesser extent outside of this area, as the report shows that those from outside the area were more likely to have had a positive experience with the police compared to young people from North Belfast (p56).
If we look further, we find another example of an indication of ongoing separist tendencies within group formation, namely the way Northern Ireland society has been dealing with one of its relatively recent developments: the growing diversity of minority ethnic and faith communities. This demographic change seems to have sparked the same reactions Catholic and Protestants have been showing for centuries when it comes to the sharing of residential space. Clusters of minority
households, even if only existing in small proportions in Northern Ireland, have been receiving negative attention and even several attacks since the 1990s according to Jarman (2005: 11, 13). The mingling of new minorities to society thus has not manifestly altered the way it is structured in terms of group opposition, but merely expanded hostile attitudes towards i.a. Chinese and Sikhs. So, the pre-existing desire to exclude the other from a power position seems to last. The fact that the arrival of new minorities sparks further hostility in stead of a stimulant for Catholics and Protestants to unite against an invader that serves as a common enemy, can also be derived from a 2000 study that focuses on the Catholic ‘next generation’. It looks at Northern Irish between 13 and 18 years old, exploring the ways in which they imagine and define community and peace. This study states that the institutionalized bipolarity of the political system and the continued system of communal deterrence cause severe obstacles for the young Catholics in coming to terms with their Protestant peers (McEvoy 2000).
Consequently, however much I would have liked to paint a brighter picture, group formation does not seem to have changed much in comparison to previous times. Demographic change of the sort as it took place in Ireland, might in another case have caused a more fundamental reformation of society. However, small successes are booked by community projects, and
cross-community friendships seem to be relatively common. This gives at least some hope that the
previous workings of group formation are changing slightly, providing a less violent and more socially and politically stable environment for the Nothern Irish.
CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have tried to show how Catholic and Protestant group formation takes place in Northern Ireland, and how are boundaries are created and maintained during the process. While I argued that the origins of the Northern Irish group formation can be found in the power structure of society, rooted in centuries of conflict, I also stated that the opposing communities are continuously recreated and maintained by social interaction, something that can be found in boundary-marking events such as the Orange Order parades. This community-creating interaction consists among
20 others of the employment of narratives, and mediates the workings of group charisma and group disgrace fuelled by a fear of loss of identity and social position. This fear also cues the creation of differentiation on a small scale, through which people, in a more or less conscious way, try to pursue their political goals of a united or Loyalist (Northern) Ireland. The two groups can however not be seen as isolated, and at least part of their fear to become indistinguishable from the other is derived from an unwillingness to drop in a broader hierarchal ranking when being put on the same level as those with a lower status. Power thus seems to be central to group formation in Northern Ireland, an observation which is confirmed by recent power-balance-struggles including the flying of the Union Jack at the Belfast City Hall, and Republican opposition to the PSNI.
In arguing all this, I have made an extensive use of the ideas of scholars such as Anton Blok, Anthony Cohen, Norbert Elias, and Fredrik Barth. These men all to a certain degree have a different take on the general idea that communities are created through interaction by men to be able to differentiate themselves from others, so that they can achieve a higher position in society -be it political, social, or economical. This idea has proved to be the central argument of this thesis as well.
Even though the dynamics of opposition I discussed do not seem to have changed much recently, cross-community projects and friendships indicate that group formation is taking place in a slightly different manner. As a final word, hopefully this small change gives way to a future of a relatively Trouble-free Northern Irish society.
