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Who has a say in the land of a thousand hills?
Voices of the vulnerable in Rwanda
Kim Baudewijns
kimbaudewijns@hotmail.com 6052762
Bachelor Culturele Antropologie en Ontwikkelingssociologie Universiteit van Amsterdam
20 juni 2013
Begeleider: Karen Witsenburg Tweede lezer: Flip Lindo
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Who has a say in the land of a thousand hills?
Voices of the vulnerable in Rwanda
Map of the Republic of Rwanda
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‘From that moment [implementation of the first Master Plan, post 1994] onwards the illegal and precarious neighbourhoods have increased, where inhabitants live in very uncomfortable conditions. Their existence is often ignored, thanks to a manipulation of administrative boundaries which excludes them from the city and its services, a phenomenon that has been defined as a true war for “services”. But as soon as the plots on which they are settled become appealing, they are noted and forced to relocate…’ (Sano and Pérouse de Montclos
in Berlanda 2012: 138).
The city that Sano and Pérouse de Montclos witness and write about is Kigali, the capital city of Rwanda. Rwanda is a small country in the central part of Africa defined by its geography of hills, but also by a history of colonialism, war and the genocide of 1994. During the last two decades plans have been designed to renew the city of Kigali, and to improve the infrastructure of the country after the destruction - the physical legacy of the war and genocide. Knowing that Kigali is the economic and international centre which attracts new inhabitants continuously, the government included in its reform plan ideas and projects to improve the attractiveness of the other cities in Rwanda to slow down the migration towards the capital city Kigali (Berlanda 2012: 139). Trying to solve the major housing problem in the country, predominantly caused by ten thousands of refugees returning from neighbouring countries in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the government also included the programme of villagisation to accommodate a substantial number of refugees in the rural area.
The government apparently makes a distinction between different resettlement groups; those who will live in the city centre and those who will not. The ‘weaker’ social groups in society have hardly a say in respect of the resettlement process although the government claims they involve the population of the city. In the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, designed by an American company, the focus is on planning the city efficiently and effectively (Rwanda Development Board 2008). This includes expropriation and relocation of citizens who now still live in ‘wrong settlements’. One promises them alternative and better housing options from the planner’s perspective. Meanwhile the business centre of the city is expanding and the housing projects arise far away from the centre in other districts. The processes of planning and the new formation of the city segregate social groups eventually; pushing the poor to the outskirts of the city.
Post 1994 Rwanda had to suddenly deal with the wave of refugees returning from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania and Uganda. People had fled the country during the
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war and genocide in 1994; they were now moving back to their country after having taken shelter elsewhere. Besides developing the master plan to organise the city, the new
government now also had to accommodate in their development strategies the provision of accommodation for refugees and displaced persons. There was little space available for the large numbers of people longing for housing in the capital Kigali; the only alternative option was to use the rural areas. Therefore villagisation became a viable strategy in the new settlement program. The villagisation strategy became one of the most important planning schemes of the country (Berlanda 2012: 140). This new settlement program was put into place by the new Rwandan government with assistance from international agencies (Hillhorst and van Leeuwen 2000). The program turned out to be very top down orientated, leaving little or no room to the former refugees to contribute to the planning of their future housing. The uncertainty of land entitlement and the fact that they were dependent on the government and foreign aid contributed to their position as being a vulnerable group within the Rwandan society.
In the context of a wave of returnees and the reconstruction of the capital city designs of the urban and rural landscape were prepared. The idea existed that the country would be transformed and developed1 according to the plans made. One envisioned a bright future for Rwanda which will ‘emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic situation’ while constructing a ‘united and inclusive identity’. At least, that is how the Rwanda Vision
2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2000) is introduced. The Rwanda Vision 2020 is a broad,
overarching strategy that encompasses more specific plans for a number of developmental activities throughout the country. When reading the targets of this all-embracing plan bearing in mind the real situation (for example processes of social exclusion, concealed in the
housing plans in Kigali and in the new settlement program for refugees) one wonders how
1The plans focus explicitly on development, using this term to describe the motion of making
the country a better place to live in. Here, development is a measurable term for development; the equivalent of economic growth. Even though the Government of Rwanda states in
Rwanda Vision 2020 that not only economic growth will do, they link this growth directly to development and poverty reduction. When referring to development in the case of Rwanda, I use development in the sense as defined in the government’s plans. Ideally, I would suggest to view development not solely in economic and financial terms, but incorporating also social dynamics. Such a view on development leaves more space for discussions concerning
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much room there is for the vulnerable2 in society. It can be questioned whether the government of Rwanda, in the extensive Rwanda Vision 2020, takes into account the vulnerable groups. The poor citizens and refugees or displaced people who in the given examples were excluded from certain environments and located to other areas.
In Rwanda, with a turbulent history where the genocide of 1994 turned the country upside down, the government and its people face many challenges. In the aftermath of the turbulences returnees encounter severe difficulties. Many people struggle to find
accommodation and others have housing but face relocation. A lot of them count in their vulnerable situation on the assistance of the state. The government decides about the resettlement process and housing issues in which the vulnerable are entangled. The state cannot at random assign land and housing but needs a strategy (initiating plans, consulting stakeholders, securing funds and the eventual implementation) to eventually accommodate such a huge number of people. Are the vulnerable at the mercy of the state or do they have a say in this process of resettlement and relocation? This is my principal research question. To find an answer there is need for an analysis of the governmental strategic planning processes in the specific Rwandan context.
The Heart of Africa
Today’s Rwanda can only be understood if one looks at the recent important social events that shaped the country. Rwanda is a relatively small, landlocked country in the centre of the African continent known as the land of a thousand hills. It is part of the Great Lakes region and a member of the East African Community. There is intensive communication between the participating countries. The neighbouring states have played an important role for the Rwandan refugees by being reasonably safe havens where a large number of people found shelter over the years. The 1994 genocide was not confined to the Rwandan territory but had also an impact on the surrounding countries.
Rwanda has a history of colonisation. It was put under colonial rule by Germany in 1899 and twenty years later by Belgium at the end of World War I. Before the colonial rule,
2Here I describe the vulnerable as an overarching term for people that share vulnerability on individual or collective level, intrinsic or extrinsic; relating to the livelihood approach. People are vulnerable through dynamics that constitute access to opportunities in daily life. In this context I use the term to describe the (urban) poor and the (displaced) refugees. Later I will discuss the term vulnerability more extensively.
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Rwanda’s landscape was characterised by a ‘scattered and diffused settlement pattern across the whole country … the kingdoms did not hold permanent seat, but moved from hill to hill’ (Berlanda 2012: 136). Also during Belgian colonial rule, the government and the influential catholic church did not promote any idea of developing urban centres. The absence of a settlement hierarchy was in the advantage of the catholic missions. It favoured their desire to maintain the leading role of the church in the countryside. When Rwanda became
independent in 1962, this idea of preserving the scattered and diffused pattern of settlements was adopted by the government. Only after 1994 a change occurred, shifting the focus and movement towards the cities. Developing urban areas, especially the capital city of Kigali, became one of the main objectives of the government now focusing on the city as a social and economic centre of the country.
Explosions of ethnic violence in the early nineties impacted the recent history of Rwanda. Under Belgian colonial rule ethnic divides were created between the Hutu’s and the Tutsi’s. People were provided with passports that stated to which ethnic group one belonged to. This enhanced the power and legibility over the population for the colonial ruler. The Belgians chose to give more political power to the Tutsi’s. This was one of the reasons why gradually the divide and tensions increased between the two main ethnic groups. The mounting controversy lead to a civil war in the beginning of the 1990’s. This culminated eventually in the outburst of Hutu violence against the Tutsi minority between April and the end of June 1994. The violence spread out from the capital Kigali to all corners of the country. Hutu military and militia groups massacred about 800,000 people, mainly Tutsi’s but also many Hutu’s. Large numbers of people fled to neighbouring countries to find shelter for the violence (Van Leeuwen 2001). A predominantly ethnic Tutsi group, the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which was also involved in the civil war overthrew the regime in June 1994 under the leadership of Paul Kagame. Kagame ultimately formed a government uniting Tutsi’s with Hutu’s. He has been president since he was first elected in March 2000. Since 1994 this government has put a strong emphasis on development with the support of the international community. Although the country is presently at peace, the Rwandan people continue to struggle with the legacy of the genocide. The major aims of the government are to reconcile its people and to develop the country - development with a strong focus on economic growth of the republic. Despite the intention to keep the economy growing over the years by investing in agriculture and construction Rwanda continues to be greatly reliant on foreign assistance to finance its development. According to the UN Habitat report of 2007 external money funded 60 percent of total public expenses through 2004 –
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2007 (Un Habitat 2007). The position of the Rwandan economy depends for a big deal on peace and stability in the Great Lakes region and the agreements with the neighbouring countries according to the economic and institutional reform program (ibid.: UN Habitat) Without peace and a significant reform program economic growth, even under positive circumstances, ‘would remain below 6 percent per annum (which is the minimum needed to reach the poverty level of 1990 by 2020)’ (ibid.: UN Habitat). Therefore regional cooperation is essential for an adequate economic growth.
To overcome the legacy of the colonial past and the atrocities of the early nineties the Rwandan government focuses on development. Although progress has been made since 1994 Rwanda ‘still remains a severely under-developed, agrarian based economy with around 60% of the population living under the poverty line’ (Republic of Rwanda 2000). The Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning defined the objectives concerning the
development and economic growth (ibid.). The government made these aims and the desire to build a strong and united country top priorities. Together with national and international input the government has made plans to ‘lift Rwanda up’. An overarching plan that
encompasses those ideas and development targets is named the Rwanda Vision 2020 with the focus on realising the set ambitions before the year 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 3).
Rwanda Vision 2020
The Rwanda Vision 2020 is a master plan concerning the future of the republic. The documents outlining the plans for Rwanda were published in July 2000 by Rwanda’s
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. As stated in the introduction of the document it originated from a dialogue with the Rwandan people unanimously sharing the idea that there was a ‘necessity for Rwandans to clearly define the future of the country’ (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 3). This was the cornerstone for the development of the Rwanda Vision 2020. In 2000, the government claims that Rwanda finds itself ‘at a crossroads, moving from the humanitarian assistance phase associated with the 1994 genocide into one of sustainable development’. Since 1994, the political situation stabilised and the economy has been recovering with ‘considerable assistance from development partners’ (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 3). However the Rwanda Vision 2020 does state that there is still much more to be done. The Rwandan population is expected to double to around 16 million by 2020 and since the ambition is to transform the economy into that of a middle income country (with per capita income of about 900 USD per year, from 290 USD today) (Tabel 1), an annual growth
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rate of at least 7% is necessary (ibid.). To achieve this target the objective is to transform the subsistence agriculture economy into a knowledge based society accompanied by high levels of savings and investment. This shift will decrease Rwanda’s dependence on external aid eventually (ibid.).
Table 1: Key economic variables of the Vision 2020
2005 2010 2015 2020 Population (Million)
Population growth rate
Nominal GDP (Billion) GDP Growth Rate GDP per Capita (Rwf) GDP per Capita (USD)
Agriculture(billion) Agriculture (%of GDP) Services (Billion) Services (% of GDP) Industry (Billion) Industry (% of GDP)
Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) Public Private
Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) % of GDP) Public
Private
Total Capital Expenditure
8.65 2.7% 1,218.75 7% 140,915.87 231.39 560.63 46% 439 36% 219 18% 321.75 124.19 197.56 26% 10% 16% 124.19 9.88 2.7% 2,147.85 8% 217,369.10 336.48 923.58 43% 795 37% 430 20% 614.29 163.26 451.02 29% 8% 21% 163.26 11.29 2.7% 3,957.28 9% 350,540.18 542.63 1,582.91 40% 1,504 38% 871 22% 1,131.78 314.35 817.44 29% 8% 21% 314.35 12.90 2.7% 7,291.04 9% 565,298.46 875.08 2,376.88 33% 3,048 42% 1,867 26% 2,085.24 605.25 1,479.99 29% 8% 20% 605.25 Table retrieved from Rwanda Vision 2020: http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf
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The Rwanda Vision 2020 lists a sequence of objectives that are spread over time showing prioritisation on the short, medium and long run3. In the short term the essential issues are the stabilisation of the economy, reducing aid dependency and developing own exports (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 9). Building on the short term goals, the medium term envisages a transformation of the economy towards a growing sector based on services. In this stage enhancing the education system and improvements in the health sector are crucial. Furthermore, the long term goals aim for an economy with a backbone of middle-class Rwandan entrepreneurs, through stimulation of the private sector and broadening the financial market. The government envisions the shift to a knowledge-based society (ibid.).
The Introduction of the Rwanda Vision 2020 document ends with this important statement: ‘Vision 2020 is to be achieved in a spirit of social cohesion and equity,
underpinned by a capable state. Rwanda’s ongoing development will have, at its core, the Nation’s principal asset - its people’ (Republic of Rwanda 2000:4). Later in the document one proclaims ‘to “vanquish hunger” growth must be Pro-Poor, giving all Rwandan’s a chance to gain from new economic opportunities’ (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 3-4). This aim is substantiated through the medium-term Economic Development and Poverty Reduction
Strategy (EDPRS). This strategy concerns ‘economic growth, poverty reduction and human
development’ over the four year period 2008 - 2012 (Republic of Rwanda 2007). This EDPRS was the second strategy to realise the long term objectives of the Rwanda Vision 2020. The first strategy was initiated when the so-called emergency period was coming to an end. It focussed on ‘securing the nation, rebuilding the economy, growing enough food, building roads, providing housing, educating our children, providing health care and ensuring justice was done’ (ibid.). This was the hands-on recovery from the war and genocide. By the end of the first strategy period the government claimed the lives of the inhabitants had improved as far as health and education were concerned. Where this first strategy encompassed essential emergency relief, the second strategy shifted the focus towards
‘improving economic governance, through the decentralisation of public service delivery and the involvement of the private sector in both decision making and policy implementation’ (Republic of Rwanda 2007: Foreword).
The Government of Rwanda realised the EDPRS in consultation with different parties. There was collaboration with domestic and international stakeholders ‘including
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donors, the civil society and the private sector. Participation at grass-root level was ensured through various consultations with citizens’ (Republic of Rwanda 2007: Foreword). The Government of Rwanda thus claims that they have considered different opinions in
developing the strategy by including stakeholders at various levels. The strategy document explicitly aims for the eradication of poverty by a focus on economic productivity. This will be attained by prioritising ‘public spending and improving coordination across sectors, to achieve the joint goals of stronger growth, faster poverty reduction and a better governed Rwanda’ (ibid.).
Urbanisation
One of the essential topics to be addressed to develop the country according to the Rwanda Vision 2020 is the need to accommodate people adequately in urban and rural areas. The process of urbanisation is accompanied by an increasing demand for housing, education and employment opportunities. The immense growth of the cities requires the development of urban master plans and specific land management schemes. The government realises that uncontrolled growth of urban areas will impede the envisioned balanced economic growth. It wants to assure that the differences in income between urban and rural areas will be ‘within reasonable proportions’ by decentralising economic activities from the cities to the periphery (Republic of Rwanda 2000: 16).
The principal urban area of Rwanda is its capital Kigali. Because of the estimated future growth of the population it is essential to plan the city and surrounding areas
extensively. The Kigali Conceptual Master Plan (KCMP) was created as part of rebuilding efforts to plan the capital city and peripheral areas (2008). ‘It presents the most advanced sustainability in land use, infrastructure, environment, society and economy’ (Rwanda Development Board). The main goal is to develop Kigali in a sustainable manner that will ‘help expand its economy while providing safe and liveable neighbourhoods for a population that is projected to triple by 2030’( ASLA 2010).
The KCMP document proudly states that the KCMP, which was designed by the American architecture and design bureau OZ Architecture, even won key international planning awards. The American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) Professional Award was handed out to the team that designed the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan with the praise that it addresses the unrestrained migration from the rural to the urban regions in Rwanda. The plan also intends to alter Kigali’s gloomy image associated with the legacy of the atrocities of the nineties into a positive example of sustainable urban development. The
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capital’s challenge is to develop an urban space that will contribute to the growth of the country’s economy while at the same time providing safe and liveable areas for an expanding population. To realise this strive it is necessary to develop clear and consistent planning codes as well as building guidelines and regulations that will end the uprising of informal settlements. This will allow for proper management of areas in need of improvement (ibid.). According to the ASLA this design can only become successful if it is properly put into practice: through pilot projects allowing local planners and government officials to obtain the skills for future implementation activities (Rwanda Development Gateway. Government of Rwanda)4. The ASLA is very positive about the design of the KCMP. Unfortunately the architects do not consider the distress for the citizens caused by the implementation process. During the improvement and reconstruction of certain districts of Kigali people are ‘relocated’. The government promises that they will live in better circumstances after completion of the project. Most people who face relocation are the urban poor living under harsh conditions (Rwanda Development Gateway. Government of Rwanda)5. With the promise that their living conditions will improve they are removed from their houses and often even from their district. In practice living circumstances often change for the worse because the promises made by the government institutions do not always materialise. If a renovated area becomes an attractive space due to the improved infrastructure it becomes too expensive and out of reach for the poor. Being able to purchase land is still a privilege of the rich, as they can meet the standards set in the Master Plan (Niyosenga 2013: 2).
In his research about Kigali concerning urban planning and social inclusion David Niyosenga does not share the overall optimistic thoughts of ASLA. He argues that numerous challenges and threats are linked to the design and implementation of development plans. He states that local authorities do not focus on the aspect of urban social development but concentrate on the planning of the physical layout instead (Niyosenga 2013: 1). The social development aspect encompasses the equal and fair allocation of urban facilities. This facet is often neglected. Human settlement is more than just housing and infrastructure - it concerns the whole lifestyle and organisation of the environment in which people live. Unbalanced urban development is accompanied by an unequal access to services. Wealthier people are able to get better services than the urban poor who live in squatter settlements. Although it is important to attract a wealthy group that contributes to the economic growth, their position sometimes leads to the expropriation of citizens with a low income. The relocation of the
4Government of Rwanda http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/spip.php?article83 5(ibid.)
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latter forces them out of the sphere of planned and improved areas. They have to settle in the poor outskirts of the city. Niyosenga claims that the Kigali approach of city development does not solve the problem of informal settlements. These are simply transferred to less attractive locations becoming ‘health-endangering residential areas’. They contribute to the unsustainable land management and ecological degradation. Niyosenga states that: ‘low income dwellers are deprived of the freedom to decide over and shape their lives, and be the direct beneficiaries of the value of their land. Yet, secure land rights are fundamental to the reduction of poverty in emerging economies and enhancing economic development’ (ibid: 2). The example of Kigali shows a discrepancy between the ideals in the top down
Master Plan and the grassroots figures. ‘[the] rapid growth of urban area and population poses a problem to the city. The latest figures report that the level of infrastructure in Kigali was intended to accommodate about 450,000 people (The World Bank in Niyosenga 2013), whereas the number of inhabitants of Kigali is nowadays approximately 1,000,000.
Subsequently, more than 80% of the population of Kigali currently lives in informal neighbourhoods’ (ibid.).
Pérouse de Montclos (2000) also recognises the complications linked to the vast growing population of Kigali. Just as Niyosenga he underlines the importance of social development of the expanding city. Where Niyosenga describes the rich-poor dichotomy Pérouse de Montclos stresses the challenges of ethnic reconciliation in Rwanda. The main difference in Kigali with the pre-war period is that the Tutsi are now in charge. They replaced the previous Hutu elite (Pérouse de Montclos 2000: 3). With the Rwandan history in mind this shows that development does not solely entail urban reconstruction but requires inclusion of all social aspects. Reconciliation is necessary, otherwise the risk exists to develop Kigali ‘along ethnic cleavages and social exclusions’ (ibid. :3). After the war many returning refugees sought accommodation in the capital city. The big challenge for Kigali is to find a way to tackle the problems linked with the different social layers that constitute the
population of the city and the shortage of housing for all citizens, as part of the reconciliation process (ibid.).
Villagisation
War provokes forced displacements. In Rwanda this results in aforementioned concentration in cities but also the dispersion of people to rural areas or accommodation in camps (Pérouse de Montclos 2000). Due to the large number of returnees, the Rwanda Ministry of Social Reintegration started to plan resettlement in the rural areas in the form of villagisation sites
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immediately after the genocide in 1994.Focussing on the rural landscape for resettlement purposes could prevent the city from becoming overpopulated (Van Leeuwen 2001: 630).
People who had fled the country, during and after the war and genocide of 1994 are returning in extensive numbers and seek a place to live again. In most cases the refugees do not have a right anymore to what once was their property and become dwellers (Pérouse de Montclos 2000). It is possible to speak about two large waves of Rwandan refugees over the years; old case and the new case refugees. Old case refugees were mainly Tutsi who had fled to neighbouring countries during outbursts of violence in Rwanda in the early sixties and seventies. The new case refugees are composed of the people who had fled the country during the war and immediately after the genocide in the nineties.
In post-1994 Rwanda the government designed an emergency programme to overcome the housing shortage partially caused by the return of old case refugees (Van Leeuwen 2001: 630). The government received help from international agencies, mainly NGO’s, for the villagisation programme, named Imidugudu. To prevent a negative response the government marketed the programme as different from earlier resettlement programmes. Villagisation as a settlement strategy had been used in the past in several East African
countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia and also in Rwanda. In all countries these top-down programmes were not very successful leaving the inhabitants with everyday problems (Van Leeuwen 2001). Some villagisation programmes failed due to the forced resettlement. The top-down approach ‘was justified by the idea that people could not always see what was best for them, and had to be shown the “right way” to lead them away from backwardness into modernity’ (ibid: 627). In other cases rural resettlement strategies failed when the
programmes were aimed at ‘promoting agricultural development and modernisation’
although in practice these improvements were not realised (ibid: 628). International agencies involved hardly questioned the Rwandan villagisation approach. If they did, they were satisfied with the answer from the government that it was a different strategy than used before (ibid: 624).
In Rwanda the villagisation strategy was designed to house the returning refugees in pre-designed villages. However the government did not only use the scheme for resettlement of returnees but also for the relocation of certain people who already had housing. The local population was barely asked to participate in developing the strategy (van Leeuwen 2001: 639). Relocation in villages would allow for easier management of the rural landscape. The government provided the people who participated in the programme with a piece of land in a village. The habitation policy made it impossible to live outside these villages. According to
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the government everyone participated freely in this programme. However, this statement can be queried. People who did not voluntarily participate were in most cases not entitled to land (ibid).
In the villagisation strategy power and influence were decentralised to local
authorities. In many communities these authorities ‘had come to form the main link between the population and the outside world’ (ibid: 640). The government made use of this structure by giving the communities the instructions that had to be carried out at local level, using these local power structures. The expected incentive of this procedure was that local authorities would represent a large part of the population. In reality this approach did not resound the voice of the affected people. The population obviously had to echo the local authorities. People could not act differently without harming themselves. In this government directed strategy the local population seemed to be more victim than actor.
Van Leeuwen discusses the problematic relation between local authorities and the population they represent:
It may be argued that the lines of communication between the local population and their leaders were relatively short, as a result of the multilayered authoritative system with each official presiding over only a limited number of people. This could have assured a kind of representative decision-making. However, traffic on those lines of communication was usually one-way: top-down. Although since the war many of the office holders in the local authorities had changed, this had not necessarily diminished the power of and control by these authorities. 'What they "think" is what is told
them', commented NGO workers on people's opinions. It was their shared experience that people in the rural areas felt more secure repeating local authorities' rhetoric than expressing their own opinion (van Leeuwen 2001: 640).
The vulnerable at risk
The urbanisation and villagisation strategies are complex processes. Groups of people are dependent on the access of services and the opportunities that are provided by the authorities and the state. The urban poor and the displaced are here recognised as vulnerable due to their position of dependency and the limited access to services. The poor in the urban environment of Kigali are pushed to the outskirts of the city through relocation schemes so that the city centre could be used for major business activities. They are at the mercy of the government
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officials. Also the displaced refugees are dependent on what the officials of the state arrange for them – or deny. They returned to Rwanda empty handed finding themselves in a
vulnerable position. Being vulnerable is not solely an economic issue but also encompasses the lack of access to opportunities and services in daily life.
The issue of vulnerability is addressed in the livelihood approach. In development studies, this approach focuses on the actor and the world of the lived experience,
concentrating on issues concerning poverty, vulnerability and marginalisation on the grassroots level of family, network and community. The livelihood studies emphasise ‘the inequalities in the distribution of assets and power’, but also recognise ‘that people make their own history’ and it even opposes ‘the view that economic concerns are necessarily of primary importance’ (de Haan and Zoomers 2005: 28). The livelihood approach as a study takes on a holistic view of a dynamic that makes up someone’s life. Not solely from a
material and economic point of view, but from an objective that entails the non-material well-being of a person as well (ibid: 32).
A key concern in this approach is the question of access to opportunities. The authors distinguish different strategies in their livelihood study. They note that structural settings as geography and demography, whether urban or rural, play an important role in access to opportunities for example access to the market or access to labour (ibid: 39). In addition, socio-cultural variables, such as social relations, institutions and organisations - with power as significant variable - play an important role in access to opportunities. A second key concern in livelihood studies is the relation between access and decision-making. This relationship entails strategic and unintentional behaviour combined with structural factors (ibid: 44-45). To identify different behaviours concerning livelihood, it is important to bear in mind the dynamics that occur when studying these ever-changing concepts as well as being thoughtful towards all the influences that effect one’s well-being (ibid.).
According to the authors of the paper Dimensions of vulnerability of livelihoods in
less favoured areas (2007) livelihoods are vulnerable at an individual and collective level.
External vulnerability is the collective concern in the form of risks, shocks and stress that people and households are exposed to. Internal vulnerability is the individual way how people cope with the hazards. Hazards, on their turn can be natural or contain human elements (Brons et al. 2005: 3). Trends that can have negative impacts on livelihoods are ‘climate, population numbers, political change, war, terms of trade, food production and social differentiation’ (ibid.: 3). These trends directly affect the external side of vulnerability; the internal side refers to the ‘specific characteristics of a person or a group’ and how they cope
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with the hazards and distress (ibid.: 3). The internal vulnerability is linked to a lack of access to opportunities.
It is evenly important, according to the authors, to bear in mind the social
organisation. Moreover, the impact of violence and war is not to be neglected. It obstructs access to otherwise available resources. The aftermath of war impacts the social situation heavily. This certainly applies to the Rwandan context, where the war in the early nineties and the aftermath have influenced the people who lived in the country, those who fled and those who returned. The war and genocide also had a substantial impact on the political and economic organisation of the country. These factors all contribute to the existing social system in which the actors either able to access certain opportunities or are denied access. The livelihood approach forms an important tool understanding the dynamics of people at a grassroots level. It focuses on the earlier mentioned dynamics through a holistic account of people’s lives. This concerns sustenance, capacities and access to resources. The focus on vulnerability through the livelihood approach could possibly help ‘explain the persistence of poverty’ in certain areas (Brons et al. 2005: 3). The thorough research that is required to understand vulnerability according to the livelihood approach could help clarify certain dynamics in the Rwandan context. This view could be useful to create a more holistic image in respect of development purposes.
In- or exclusion
The lives of the vulnerable have not been the key concern in the history of states in Africa according to Iliffe who wrote The African Poor: a History (1987). Iliffe says that there is not a history of uplifting the poor in Africa. He argues that it would be naïve to assume that African societies can build on institutionalised local knowledge in caring for the poor. The poor have mainly to survive on their own efforts and resourcefulness to overcome difficult circumstances:
[the poor] relied for their survival chiefly on their own efforts … Africa is and was a harsh world for its weak. By protecting themselves from famine, by exploiting the bush, by hawking or begging or stealing, by endurance or industry or guile, by the resourcefulness of the blind or the courage of the cripple, by the ambition of the young or the patience of the old – by all these means the African poor survived in their harsh world. These are their inheritance amidst the harshness of the present (Iliffe 1987: 8).
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Iliffe points out how the poor have to be equipped by a sense of creativity to survive in the harsh, everyday world. By mentioning this he shows that the poor have to be self-reliant. He illustrates that the state does not take care of the poor and does not reach out to support them. Iliffe says that in the history of Africa there is not a practice of uplifting the poor. The poor are ignored and not relieved from their dire situation. Unlike countries in western Europe where caring for the vulnerable people is institutionalised by government and private
institutions. According to Iliffe African countries do not have a history of caring for the poor. It is not so much the intention that is lacking, but the practice of caring for the poor needs to be applied. He states that African countries are characterized as non-egalitarian and excluding the poor. It is not in the ‘African nature’ that the state takes care of the vulnerable people and that the government protects the poor by law (Iliffe 1987).
However, if one looks at Rwanda’s current plans there is a shift from ‘not looking over the shoulder’ towards recognising the vulnerable groups and including them in the plans explicitly. The state now identifies these groups and foresees space in the plans to make them eligible for help from the government. For example in the Rwanda Vision 2020 and the EDPRS the Rwandan government mentions the vulnerable groups in society. They are now included in government policies. In the perspective of Iliffe’s description of the ‘African tradition’ this means a turning point. Where the government in the past did not appropriate the responsibility nor take note of these groups it does so now. This is the case in the large top-down plans of the Rwandan government in which the vulnerable are currently
recognised.
Top-down plans are subjected to critique. The plans that Rwanda presents are top down in the sense that the government designs them and implements them. Scott has written a critique of this type of planning as a high modernist technique for the government to control its people. In his book ‘Seeing like a State’ (1998) Scott demonstrates with different cases, including villagisation, land reform, forestry and urban planning, how top-down planning is no guarantee for success. He emphasises the dangers of blueprints and top-down
development based upon scientific control. A modernist ideology underlies the idea of top-down planning. According to this ideology scientific intervention will enhance human living conditions. Scott pinpoints intrinsic shortcomings in such planning programmes that were intended to improve the human living condition but were not successful eventually. The flaw in blue-prints is that the ‘balanced system of place-specific local knowledge or existing rural practice’ is not taken into account (Scott 1998). According to Scott local knowledge and
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practice are fundamental prerequisites to successfully implement plans, also in long-term strategies. Scott critiques the idea of authoritarian top-down planning and illustrates this with a number of examples. These cases show the differences between the designs of plans and the actual realisation. He argues that this discrepancy could be overcome if the local knowledge and practice are incorporated into plans (ibid.).
In the Rwandan top-down villagisation and resettlement strategies the government, to a certain degree, incorporated the local knowledge and practice through communication with local authorities. This was done through decentralising the power and influence to the
community. This was supposed to enhance the understanding of local practice. Handing over power to the local authorities in the community would contribute to more shared decision-making. To a certain extent the Rwandan government incorporates the knowledge and practice at community level through the use of existing power structures. This means decentralisation of power. In this case the local authority represents the ‘voice’ of the local population and communicates with the decision makers at a higher level. This procedure guarantees that the government is better informed about local issues. This method of
communication approaches Scott’s idea of the incorporation of local knowledge and practice that could enhance the top-down plans.
When implementing the villagisation strategy the Rwandan government worked with the paradigm of decentralisation. It hereby decentralised power and seemingly handed over more influence to communities. The assumption was that this would lead to more
understanding and contribute to more representative decision-making. The representation does not necessarily mean equal participation of those concerned. Representation engenders an idea of participation whereby people can contribute their opinion when decisions
concerning them will be made. In reality there maybe constraints. If for example not all people can express their opinion freely the participation is hampered. The villagisation strategy shows the shortcomings of participation in the decentralisation process initiated by the Rwandan government. The ‘voice’ of the majority of citizens remains unheard.
The decentralisation perpetuates the existing governmental power structures only creating the feeling of more bottom-up involvement.
Participation
The notion of participation entered the mainstream development discourse in the 1990’s. The idea of participatory development became integrated vastly in ‘official aims and objectives of governments and international development agencies’ (Williams 2004: 557).
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The shift into wide-ranging development motives can be witnessed in the World Bank’s
World Development Report 2000/1: Attacking Poverty (WDR 2001 in Williams 2004: 558).
The project ‘Voices of the Poor’ stood at the basis of the aforementioned report aiming to represent the views of the poor themselves. The project took place in more than one hundred ‘developing’ countries (ibid.). The World Bank initiated the widespread use of the concept
participation in the development discourse. From that moment participation is increasingly
used in ‘Southern governments' (social) development projects’ (Williams 2004: 558). Chambers, a leading proponent of participatory development, suggested that participation can change the existing power relations between top and bottom –between development officials and the people at grassroots level. Promoting the move away from ‘hierarchical top-down development towards more fluid and open power structures that will be prompted by a series of personal, professional and institutional changes’ (ibid. 560). Moving the idea of ‘participation’ to ‘empowerment’, the focus shifted to the subjects of development as well. The primary focus was on ‘including those previously marginalised within development activities –challenging the various biases of development projects that make the poor invisible’ (Chambers in Williams 2004: 560). In more recent work he emphasises the importance of challenging the ‘powerful directly, by “putting the first last”’ (Chambers 1997). He proposes to transcend fixed hierarchies and replace these by ‘free-floating relationships’ that are considered to be equally empowering all involved (Williams 2004: 560).
The notion of participation is a topic of discussion, engendering critique by several authors. Populist ideals are often proposed convincingly, without stating how these should be realised (ibid.). Evenly problematic is the idea of community, the space where empowerment is supposed to occur. Williams says ‘that “the community” is often a thing of development projects’ own making’ (Williams 2004: 561). Boundaries are created, often forgetting the social dynamics. Divides in the community are naturalised and power effects of these divides are ignored. This entails the danger that the people ‘who don't fit into easily demarcated and territorial “communities” can all too easily fall foul of visions of development, participatory or otherwise’ (ibid.).
Concluding the discussion on participatory development Williams argues that questions of power need to be taken more seriously. ‘Power over and within participatory development is not simply a result of individual choices and values, but neither is it systemic, totalising and irresistible’ (ibid. 573) He pleads that there is always space for dynamics and contestation.
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The notion of participation as a democratic process is more complex than simply giving people a voice (Barnes 1999:60). It is difficult enough to get to a consensus, therefore people are represented through communities or self-organised groups. These also represent people who are otherwise not spoken to (ibid. 62). The question is then whether the organised groups represent the interests of all people in the dynamics of a community. An understanding of the different backgrounds and circumstances of different groups is important. Moreover when participation in development processes is being discussed it is essential to consider the power relations that exist between the people that are being represented by communities as well as the power relations between individuals, communities, development agencies and governments (Barnes 1999, Williams 2004).
These power relations are important in the understanding of the process and effects of development planning. To increase the understanding of these processes the authors
Tannerfeldt and Ljung, identify how vulnerable groups in the urban context are represented on the level of policy-making. In their book ‘More Urban, Less Poor’, the authors state that the poor have little or no opportunities to make their voice heard and are rarely represented in the government. They see the participation in the civil society as essential when making an all-embracing plan for the city. ‘The poor have the right to speak and act for themselves. The relationships are clear as long as the urban poor are seen as active agents rather than passive recipients. When improvement plans are discussed and decided the perspective and priorities of the poor themselves should apply’ (Tannerfeldt and Ljung 2006: 88). Tannerfeldt and Ljung recognise the poor as a social group that still does not have a say in improvement plans that concern themselves and their livelihoods. They propose that the poor should be included when plans are being designed. If this does not happen the segregation will worsen and the poor will end up living in separate communities. The discrimination of this group will correspondingly get a spatial dimension (ibid: 91).
Tannerfeldt and Ljung identify the urban poor as vulnerable and underline that it is necessary to include this group of people when top-down designs are created. Cleaver stresses that the hidden danger of top-down planning is that it perpetuates poverty and
unequal power relations. Tannerfeldt and Ljung argue that the poor can be active participants, contributing substantially to plans that concern them. They propose inclusion of the poor in designing processes as an obvious solution that is not a matter of argument. But Cleaver problematises the idea that Tannerfeldt and Ljung propose. She argues that when we talk about the group that we call ‘the poor’ we should be careful not to ascribe too much agency to them. She questions the ideas of mainstream development policy that building social
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capital can be readily ‘created, used, or substituted for other missing assets, and thereby overcome poverty’(Cleaver 2005: 893). She argues that social relationships, collective action and local institutions may structurally reproduce the exclusion of the poorest. Policy focused on public participation is therefore unlikely to lead to more inclusion in the mainstream or lessening poverty. ‘Attempts to overcome poverty through promoting participation,
institutional engagement, and the formation of social capital cannot work without a deeper consideration of the structural disadvantages of the poor and the constraints on their agency’ (Cleaver 2005: 904). She claims we need to pay more attention to the effects of the lack of ‘material and physical assets of the poor, and to the socio-structural constraints that impede their exercise of agency’(ibid: 904). Tannerfeldt and Ljung do not consider the structure in which the poor find themselves. A way out of the social and economic situation is not as easy as simply giving them a voice to contribute to master plans. Also, considering the poor as a social group seems to be a simplification of a large and heterogeneous group that does not per se share one opinion and cannot be narrowed down to one single voice.
The complexity of participative planning in Rwanda
The Rwandan government decentralises the power and influence to communities, which would contribute to an idea of people’s participation at grassroots level. Cleaver extends Iliffe’s point of view by arguing that care should be taken when assuming the agency of communities in the African context. Handing over power to local authorities does not automatically mean that all people are represented. It does not all of a sudden change the hierarchy within the community and it does not necessarily mean that the poor or socially excluded people are included. In fact, the government still does not protect the poorest group in society in the process of decentralising power. Decentralisation only perpetuates the
existing power relations and does not force these to be redefined. Hypothetically, if the existing power structures would be overturned a fighting over power could take place. In this situation the vulnerable will lose the fight as they are less organised. Cleaver highlights that we should be careful how much agency we ascribe to the poor (Cleaver 2005).
Continuing on this, bottom-up planning sounds like a solution to the critique given to top-down planning, only if it was not for the problem it hides in itself. The pitfall in bottom-up planning is that it destabilises the existing order, where the most vulnerable are likely to lose the fight. Julie Crespin unfolds why. She states that first the underlying power relations have to be exposed and addressed, and also the ‘cultural and social interests that sustain
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unequal access to economic opportunity and social resources’ (Crespin in Myers 2011: 125). Poverty, inequality and injustice are inseparable in African cities, and thus so would be any governance reforms that would try to change them. Social injustice is partly fostered by global processes but ultimately becomes ‘bound up with…the extent to which low-income groups can influence local government policies’ (Nunan and Devas in Myers 2011: 126). Crespin critiques the shortcomings of development assistance in favour of the poor. She argues that, ‘real reform of governance would require poorer groups having the power and voice to change their relationship with government agencies and other groups at the local level,’ and yet donors in urban Africa, overwhelmingly funnel money into ‘pro-poor’ sustainable urban development via government agencies that the vast majority of the urban poor are alienated from and marginalised by (Crespin in Myers 2011: 125-126).
Cleaver extends Crespin’s thoughts by noting that when the community is given power it is unclear who contributes to the voice of the community. Cleaver as well as Crespin are critical towards the pro-poor development, they illustrate that this approach is not entirely what one says. Usually these development activities come about through top-down
investments and are biased by interests of institutions. The Kigali Conceptual Master Plan has been criticised where local participation was claimed and on the strategies that were used to include public participation. According to the design bureau OZ Architecture; the
involvement was based on ‘stimulating the communities to come to a local authority, i.e. sector office, through means of different approaches such as public meetings, consultation documents, and question and answer sessions’ (Niyonsenga 2013: 13). Professionals worked together with officials to identify key stakeholders and these were invited to participate by means of telecommunication. This strategy is criticised and recognised to be ‘inadequate in involving the more hard-to-reach groups those who are normally not motivated in
involvement’ (ibid: 13). In addition, the idea of identifying stakeholders or ‘relevant actors’ implies the idea of ‘irrelevant actors’ who are not directly involved or necessary in the process (Oliviera in Niyosenga 2013: 13). The ‘relevant actors’ comprise a small part of the population that has the means to invest and influence, the greater part of the population left unheard. In the end the conflicts in the city are disguised by a ‘consensus’ between all social actors and the people with no participation are ‘converted into “authors” and invited to applaud their own defeat’ (Crot; Oliveira in Niyonsenga 2013: 13). Niyonsenga foresees that this is the case with the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan, which intends to provide alternative accommodation for the inhabitants of the city’s slums and to give these people the prospect of accessing basic infrastructure and public utilities. According to the author the KCMP lacks
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a ‘consensual vision’, which negates the idea of social inclusion that the government has to include the population in decision-making (ibid).
Another critical point of view on the KCMP is the argument that the data concerning the ‘quality of life’ and the ‘promotion of equity’ are difficult to retrieve. The absence of reliable data makes it almost impossible to measure the progress of the plans; the supporting data mostly consist of ‘subjective assessment’ or ‘biased appreciation’. Because of a
shortage of research regarding the implementation of earlier plans, the projections for the future plans are based on secondary data. This is an unreliable method and does not provide a thorough framework to use as a basis for future plans (ibid: 12).
‘Social inclusion’ is one of the themes for the UN Habitat in their quest for development.‘This targets those vulnerable groups in society who find themselves marginalised – the urban poor, and especially women and young people. … it works with local authorities, non-governmental organizations, youth groups, governments and
municipalities to promote better opportunities for those living on the margins of society6. The UN Habitat -which is referred to repeatedly in the medium-term EDPRS to reduce poverty in Rwanda- strives to work towards social inclusion through working with different institutions, although still not with the target groups themselves. This is a development which is
anticipated by consulting the Rwandan population and planning in dialogue with its people: ‘EDPRS is a forward-looking service delivery agreement between the Government and the people of Rwanda ... written by and for the Rwandan people. As we move into the period of implementation, we look forward to achieving our overarching goal of a happier and more prosperous nation for all of us’ (Republic of Rwanda 2007). In the foreword of this
document, the Rwandan Government claims that the plan is a product that was developed in collaboration with the Rwandan people.
The critique given on the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan could be applied to other plans as well. The critical comments focus on the limited input and the hardly heard voice of the vulnerable population that is lost in the process between creation and implementation of plans. Social inclusion is claimed but not on equal grounds.
In conclusion
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The population of the land of a thousand hills is expanding vastly and rapidly. Today’s Rwanda seems to prepare itself for this –it has planned in detail important aspects of the country. Rwanda aims for controlled development through master plans on short, medium and long term. A focus in the research is on the so-called vulnerable, especially their say in the development strategies.
Rwanda is a country that has been able to make a radical shift. The pivotal point was the genocide that took place in 1994. Post 1994, major political changes were implemented and a new era started. This also meant that the state had to take a different responsibility for its people. Reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure became an important issue for Rwanda. This all stood in the light of reconciliation, by far the most important social aspect of the rebuilding of the country. To overcome the legacy of the atrocious historical events, the government embarked on unifying the population of the country.
Extensive planning with the focus on economic growth was an important step stone in the remarkable and significant development of the country. In the perspective of economic growth all aspects of the country are viewed against the background of facts and figures. The top-down plans were designed to improve the Rwandan context and lift the country up from where it was to a condition as envisioned in the plans. The government claims that the people who will be affected by the eventual implementation of the plans have a say in the planning process. In reality the inclusion is biased. The better-off citizens have more input eventually. The top-down plans contain pitfalls and dangers. Vulnerable groups targeted in the strategies are not included in the decision processes. In Rwanda the groups that are referred to as vulnerable are mainly the (urban) poor and the former refugees. Citizens belonging to these groups often do not have the chance to contribute substantially to plans concerning their well-being.
Although criticising the top-down development planning and limited decentralisation efforts, one cannot state that it is realistic to radically overthrow the top-down system and replace it with a bottom-up system. It would encompass more than just giving a voice to the vulnerable and letting this group design their future. Designing appropriate future plans which take into account the voice of the vulnerable, would require reassessment of the existing power relations. Another approach than the currently practised ‘participation’ of the population is necessary in that case. The strategies that are now used perpetuate the existing power structures and inequality.
Do the vulnerable have a say in Rwanda? One cannot simply answer this question. In
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stake: Rwanda’s history, the position of the vulnerable in the African context and the notion of participation. Historically vulnerable groups were not represented by the government nor by law. However, in recent Rwandan governmental plans the vulnerable are considered and recognised. In the perspective of the problematic context this gives the important impression the vulnerable are recognised, slowly moving closer towards having a say. Still there is a long way to go before the voice of the vulnerable is equally represented in plans. The
complexity of participation contributes to the intangibility of how the theory of participation is realised. In my opinion it will be a laborious and time-consuming process to increase the input from the vulnerable groups in future governmental plans in the land of a thousand hills.
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