THE MYTHS AND REALITIES OF TRANSMIGRASI,
Indonesian Resettlement Policy, 1965-1985
by Mariël Otten,
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Antropologisch-Sociologisch Centrum, October 1986,
Amsterdam
SAMENVATTING
Een van de mythes die het transmigratieprogramme omgeven is het idee dat het verplaatsen van mensen uit het overbevolkte Java naar de relatief minder dichtbevolkte andere eilanden in de Indo-nesische Archipel een oplossing zou zijn voor Java's problemen van armoede, werk- en landloosheid. In deze skriptie worden vier hoofddoe ls tellingen van de transmigratiepolitiek onders c:1eiden: het streven naar wat een "gezonde" demografische struktuur wordt
genoemd, het streven naar regionale ontwikkeling vooral buiten Java en Bali, het streven naar nationale integratie en eenheid en het streven naar nationale veiligheid. Voordat een analyse wordt gegeven van wat tijdens de Nieuwe Orde (1965-1985)
gerea-liseerd is van deze doelstellingen wordt uitvoerig ingegaan op de wijze waarop het transmigratieprogramma in elkaar zit en de toepassing ervan in de praktijk. De konklusie luidt dat de uit-voering van het transmigratiebeleid nogal wat tekortkomingen kent, zowel in het selektie- en rekruteringsbeleid in de gebie-den van herkomst als in het opzetten van nieuwe vestigingen in de ontvangende gebieden. De gevolgen voor miljeu, transmigranten en plaatselijke bevolking zijn desastreus. Daar staat tegenover dat de positieve beoogde effekten van het beleid niet indrukwekkend genoemd kunnen worden. De Indonesische overheid echter hecht veel belang aan de kontinuering van het programma. Naast de belangen van een binnen- en buitenlandse lobby blijkt transmigratie een belangrijk instrument in handen van het Suharto-regiem op het
terrein van kontrole en exploitatie. Het leger blijkt een steeds invloedrijker positie in te nemen, zowel in het bedenken van nieu-we beleidslijnen als de uitvoering van het programma.
Deel 1 beschrijft de geschiedenis van hervestigingsprogramma's en geeft een schets van het transmigrati.eprogramma apno 1985. In het tweede deel wordt de praktijk van transmigratie beschreven. Deel 3 tenslotte bekijkt transmigratie vanuit de vier hoofddoel-stellingen. Het geheel wordt afgesloten met een samenvatting en enkele konkluderende opmerkingen.
TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION
Myths and Realities: the Polities of Demography Transmigrasi: the Crucial Controversy
The Structure of this Thesis Afterword
PART ONE. TRANSMIGRASI: THE OFFICIAL VIEW- MYTHS, IDEOLOGIES AND TAGETS.
CHAPTER 1. A SHORT HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT POLICY
1. Kolonisasi in the pre-Independence Period, 1905-!94! 2 The Bawon Scheme in Kolonisasi Policy
2. Transmigration Policy in the Sukarno Period, 1945-1965 5 3. Traditional Resettlement Policy, 1965-1985 9 The "Population Motive" under the New Order
Quantity not Quality
The Myth of the Happy Transmigrant Family Transmigration's Role in Regional Development
4. New Trends , 19 84-1985 16
The Myth of the Spoon-Fed Transmigrants PIR Khusus
Spontaneous Transmigration New Areas of Settlement
Community/Parallel Development
CHAPTER 2. THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAMME - AN OVERVIEW 1. Transmigration and the Transmigrants
Categories of Transmigrants
The Goals of the Transmigration Programme 2. The Recruitment and Selection Process Targets in the Areas of Origin
Recruitment and Selection Criteria
3. Site Selection and Land/Site Preparation Areas of Settlement
Site Selection
Site and Land Preparation 4. Transmigrant Settlement 5. Executing Agencies
6. Costs and (External) Funding Costs
External Funding
PART TWO. TRANSMIGRASI. 1965-1985: THE REALITIES
CHAPTER 3. RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION IN THE AREAS OF ORIGIN
24 29 31 36 37 41
1. Methods and Procedures of Recruitment of Transmigrants 47 2. Methods and Procedures of Selection of Transmigrants 52 3. Recruitment & Selection: Natural Man-Made Disasters 54
CHAPTER 4. SITE SELECTION AND LAND/SITE PREPARATION 1. Site Selection Land Unavailabilitv East Kalimantan 2. Land/Site Preparation Contracting Failure
3. Site Selection and Land/Site Preparation: The Land of Despair - Impact on Environment CHAPTER 5. TRANSMIGRANT SETTLEMENT
1. Settlement Policy
Food and Health Conditions
From Poverty to Bare Subsistence 2. Consequences of Settlement Policy Outside Income
The Position of Women Remigrasi
3. The 11Happy11 and 11Spoon-Fed11 Transmigrants
PART THREE. GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF TRANSMIGRASI CHAPTER 6. TRANSMIGRASI AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE
1. Overpopulation in Inner Indonesia
2. The Myth of Emptiness in Outer Indonesia 3. The Demographic Impact in Inner Indonesia Number of Families Moved
Impact of Numbers of Families Moved 4. Demo2:raphic Impact in Outer Indonesia 5. 1ne Polities of Demography
CHAPTER 7. TRANSMIGRASI AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
58 64 68 71 78 85 89 90 92 96 99
J. The Polities of Regional Development 101 2. The Concept of Regional Development 104 3. Transmigration's Contribution to Regional Development 106
4. New Initiatives: PIR Khusus 108
5. Transmigrasi: Forced Acceptance of "Deve lopmen t 11 1 12
6. The Clash Between Hungry Transmigrants and Dispossessed
Natives 115
7. Resistance from the Transmigrants 118
CHAPTER 8. TRANSMIGRASI AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION & UNITY
1. Inter-Ethnic Relations Before 1965 2. Inter-Ethnic Tensions and Conflict
3. Resistance against Indonesian Resettlement 4. 11Integration11 of Locals in Resettlement Areas
5. The Necessity of Transmigration for Local Peoples 6. The Impact of Transmi.gration on Local Peoples A. The Land Issue
B. The Ernplovment Issue
C. General Impact on the Local Peoples 7. Social Envy and Poli tical Commotion
122 124 126 127 131 136 144
CHAPTER 9. TRANSMIGRASI AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1. A "Shock & Horror" Aim
2. Transmigration's Role in National Security 3. ABRI Enters the Transmigration Programme 4. ABRI M~nunggal Transmigrasi
5. Transmigrasi and Territorial Management 6- East Timor: War is Development
7. Transmigration and Resettlement in East Timor SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES 146 149 153 156 159 161 164 170 181
INTRO DU CT ION
"Minister Concedes Failure in Pas-t Migra-tion Programme" (Jakarta Post, 2 2 May 1 9 84) .
"Trcrnsmigra-tion Wi ll Be Crucia l in -the Four-th Repeli-ta11 (Jakarta Post,
28 May 1984).
This study is actuated by the announcement made in Jakarta in May 1984 by General Suharto that the transmigration programme was
to play a crucial role in the overall development strategy of In-donesia during its fourth Repelita (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Ta-hun, or Five-Year Development Plan), which had started on the lrst of April. Under the heading "Transmigration Will Be Crucial in the Fourth Repeli ta", the Jakarta Post quoted Suharto saying that what-ever progress made or setbacks suffered in the current Repelita in the national project of transmigration, 11-they will have a s-trong
bearing on -the progress of developmen-t in Indonesia in -the fu-ture~
especially in -the endeavours -to lay down -the foundation of -the Pan-casi lais-t:': society long cherished by -the Na-tion" (28 May 1984).
This announcement carne as a surprise to observers both within and outside Indonesia, since only a week before Transmigration Minister Martono had officially conceded that transmigration was not marked
for "an Indonesian success story" in Repelita III (April 1979-Apil 1984).
With the emphasis on quantity - fulfilling the target figure of number of families to be moved within a certain period - rather
than on quality, the Repelita III programme had aimed at the reset-tlement of 500.000 families, or about two million people. The au-thorities asserted afterwards that they had succeeded in fulfilling
:': The Pancasila is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian State, consisting of five principles: belief in one su.preme God; just and civilised humanity; the unity of Indonesia; democracy led by the wis-dom of deliberations among representatives; and social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Indonesia Handbook, 1984).
the target, but that they had had to work with a system called the "plan as you proceed method". Martono admitted that "this has helped us to meet the target figure" but on the other hand it was disadvantageous because some of the locations were not
properly selected", and he added that 11we wiU caU it a
suc-cess only when those people we have moved to resettlement cen-ters feel happy at home in their new surroundings with a
pros-pect of a better future". During Repelita III, more than 2.000
families had abandoned the new settlements, "mostly because the authorities failed to provide them with the faciUties promised
them before their move", and 67 of 800 resettlement centers~·:
built so far needed reconstructing in order to provide a suita-ble place for new settlers, ''because the authorities could not work with coordination and efficiency as they had felt forced to reach the tarçret" (Jakarta Post, 22 May 1984).
In spite of the qualitative failure of the programme but en-couraged by its quantitative achievements, the programme's major backer, the World Bank spoke glowingly about its future pros-pects. It was claimed that "transmigration has the potential to reap substantial benefits. It can provide empfoyment and land ownership to some o.f the poorest members of the labour force in Java, it also brings underutilised land into intensive cultiva-tion" raises agricuUural production and contributes more
broad-ly to economie devefopment in the Outer Islands" (1985a: 117).
The World Bank' s optimism encouraged the ambi tions of the Transmigration Department's bureaucrats who increased the Repe-lita IV (April 1984-April 1989) target of families to be moved to 750.000, fifty percent up on Repelita III. Instead of devo-ting full attention and the limited funds available to "rehabili-tating" of what went wrong before, the Indonesian government de-cided that transmigration was to play a crucial role and that the programme's activities were to be stepped up, resettling more peo-ple and creatin~ more settlements sites than ever before.
*
In the 67 units requiring rehabilitation 138.878 families had been resettled (Hardjono, 1986: 38).Myths and Realities: the Polities of Demography.
The history of transmigration is characterised by myths, which can no longer be defended on a scientific basis. The most
important myth is that transmigration provides a decisive solu-tion for the Indonesian problem of overpopulasolu-tion.
For Indonesia as a whole, however, there does not exist a critical situation of overpopulation. Overpopulation in Indone-sia is a local phenomenon.and has resulted from ecological as well as social and political conditions. Breaking through the age-old myths, it is very important to know that unequality be-tween the demographic situation in the various parts of Indone-sia is not simply a matter of statistics. Population density figures have to be related to other factors, such as soil
fer-tility, land use, industrial employment etc. On top of this, historical, social and political development over the centuries has played an important role in determining the demographic si-tuation as it exists today.
Unequality is a distinct feature of Indonesian society and has been for many ages. It is present at all levels of society, be it the social, economie, ethnic, political or demographic
level. Over the years, transmigrasi. and its predecessor, kolo-nisasi, have been presented as efforts to overcome such unequa-lities. For a long time, the fundamental notion for the govern-ment-run schemes of population resettlement has been the unequal distribution of population. Up to 70% of the population has li-ved on the islands of Java and Madura, which cover less than 7% of the total land area. On the other side of the coin, over 90% of the land area supports only one third of the total popula-tion (see table 1 on page
In his classic book, Clifford Geertz remarked that "if ever -there was a -tail which wagged a dog_, Java is -the -tail_, Indonesia -the dog" (1963: 15). Instead of the more well-known distinction between the islands of Java, Madura and Bali as the centre of In-donesia and the "Other" or "Outer" islands as the periphery, Geertz divided the archipelago into Inner Indonesia, consisting
b
·
... -I /,,.
( I·-·
( ,J 1.,,. ... .r ,....,,Map 1. Inner versus Outer Indonesia (Geertz, 1963: 14).
of northwest, central and east Java, south Bali and west Lombok, and Outer Indonesia, consisting of the rest including southwest Java (see map 1 above).
This distinction is based on different and contrasting ecolo-gical patterns - these patterns, however, provide only part of the explanation of the unequal distribution of population. Poli-tically and economically motivated elites and power groups have played a decisive role in the upgrading of Java's position as
Indonesia's heartland. For the lords who governed Indonesia, transmigrasi as well as kolonisasi have been mighty weapons in spreading their influence and simultaneously Javanese influence over the vast and widely spread islands. The conti.nuous removal of Javanese settler families from their "overpopulated" home-lands to the other, relatively underpopulated, ishome-lands has
tur-ned overpopulation into a national c.q. international problem. The transfer of Javanese poverty thus became a reality not only for the s,ettlers themselves, but also for the local populations in the areas of settlement.
Transmigrasi: the Crucial Controversy.
When I started my research in April 1984, the Repelita IV transmigration programme had only just begun. It was obvious at the time that, although Kalimantan (Borneo) was to become the most important transmigrant receiving area in terms of numbers of families to be resettled, West Papua (incorporated by Indo-nesia in the 1960s ) and East Timor (occupied by IndoIndo-nesian Ar-med Farces in the 1970s) were main target areas of the program-me. Therefore, serious doubts were raised regarding the inten-tions of the Suharto regime.
The demographic justification for transmigrasi (the "popula-tion motive") had lost much of its significance and economical-ly, it was not clear that transmigrants were indeed "better off" after resettlement. The two other aims of transmigrasi -national integration and -national security - would become more
crucial in the discussion on the transmigration issue.
Finishing the work in the summer of 1986, Indonesia's trans-migration programme has beco~e more crucial and controversial
than it was before. An international campaign, launched by a variety of groups and organisations in the spring of '86, has
aroused a lot of attention, particularly in the Indonesian press. It seems that finally the age-old and new myths, used by
the Suharto regime to justify their policy and cover up their violent and aggressive campaign to submit the Indonesian popu-lation to the Jakarta rule, are replaced by a more realistic image and outlook on what goes on behind the scenes of the transmigration programme.
This study is part of this development. The main purpose of the thesis is to uncover myths and tell the tale as it is. The information on which it is based has been largely derived from reports in Indones ian newspapers .• Li terature on transmigration is limited and does not spread over recent years. The fact that the press in Indonesia is subjected to censorship suggests that the reality of transmigration is even more tragic than as des-cribed by Indonesian journalists. Additional and very useful in-formation has been gathered from rather critical but seldom pu-blished reports from the World Bank. I have tried to use as much as possible neutral or even pro-transmigration sources to com-pensate for my prejudice at the beginning that there is something wrong with the resettlement policy in Indonesia. These sources of information are so critical of the real situation and provide so little perspective for improvement in the near future that the main conclusion of this thesis - being that almost everything is wrong with Indonesian resettlement policy - seems justified.
Millions of Javanese families are resettled into an uncertain future at sites thousands of miles from their homeland; the pro-gramme presents a serious threat to the environment in the areas of settlement and is unable to improve ecological conditions in the areas of origin; the survival of several ethnic groups in In-donesia is at stake; and, finally, InIn-donesia's natural as well as financial resources are :tapidly diminishing as a re sult of this highly ambitious and expensive government programme.
The Structure of this Thesis.
This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part - focussed on the myths - serves as an introduction to the histo-rical background of reset tlement policy, in Indonesia and the wor-kings of the transmigration programme during Repelita IV.
The second part provides a description of the realities of transmigration. Chapter three presents information on the recruit-ment and selection process in the areas of origin (Java and Bali).
Chapter four describes site selection and land/site preparation processes. Chapter five on transmigrant settlement shows what happens with transmigr'ant families after they have arrived at
their new locations.
The third part of this thesis presents an analysis of the transmigration programme in concentrating on the main goals of the policy and the achievements that were made. Chapter six is concerned with the demographic goal of distributing the popula-tion more evenly over the territory and dimishing populapopula-tion pressures in the areas of origin. Chapter s~ven focusses on the aim of promoting regional development through resettlement sche-mes. The eight chapter describes the impact transmigration has on the local populations in the areas of settlement, concentra-ting on the goal of national integration. Chapter nine provides information on the final and seldom mentioned goal of transmi-grasi, i.e. the strengthening of national security.
Included 1n this thesis is a surnmary of the three main parts and concluding remarks on past errors and future perspectives.
AFTERWORD
Apart from this thesis, the results of my research have been publicisêd by the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs
(IWGIA) in Copenhagen. The production of this book would not have been possible without the assistance and support of various per-sons and organisations. I would like to thank the Stichting Huma-nitair Fonds, IMBAS-Giessen (Federal Republic of Germany), INDOC-Leiden, Rob Otten, Rosemiek Cupers, Pa de Vreede, Yvette Lawson, Carmel Budiardjo, Liem Soei Liong, Prof. Dr. W.F. Wertheim, Loek Amstel, Jan MÜter and the members of the Komitee Indonesië for
their contribution.
Mariël Otten,
PART ONE.
TRANSMIGRAS I: THE OFFICIAL VIEW -MYTHS, IDEOLOGIES AND TARGETS.
CHAPTER 1. A SHORT HISTORY OF RESETTLEMENT POLICY
!. Kolonisasi in the Pre-Independence Period, 1905-1941.
The uneven distribution of population over different parts and islands of the archipelago was already a distinct feature of Indonesian society at the beginning of this century. The situation of over-population in Java pressed the Dutch colonial administration to introduce a population resettlement programme which is known as 11
kolonisasi11
• The kolonisasi scheme, which is
generally seen as the predecessor of transmigration, was pre-sented by the Dutch as an integral part of their Ethical Policy
("Ethische Politiek"), allegedly aimed at putting a stop to the process of impoverishment in the rural parts of Java.
The fundamental notion behind kolonisasi was that there were "too many people" in Inner Indonesia, particularly in Java, re-sulting from population growth and causing in its turn landless-ness, unemployment, land fragmentation, overcultivation and
de-forestation. Thus, the Dutch carne to consider a large part of the Javanese population as "surplus people", who were moreover a potential source of social and political unrest. It was ar-gued by the Dutch that moving these "surplus people" away would lead to improved social and economie conditions and raised li-ving standards.
This not ion could be cal led "the population moti ve" in re-se ttlement policy. Here was a care-se of relying on a demographic approach to provide the solution for what in reality were so-cial and economie or even poli tical problems. Tuis approach doomed the resettlement programme to failure from the start.
The first Javanese to be moved under this programme were 155 families who were relocated in Gedong Tataan, a newly developed settlement site in the southern Sumatran province of Lampung. It was in this residency that most though certainly not all of the Dutch settlements were established. In 1909, for instance, Bengkulu was opened for colonists and in 1921 250 families were
settled in Kalimantan. In fact, all areas outside Inner Indone-sia were considered to be available and suitable. The Dutch simply assumed that there was land enough for everyone. The very low population densities in the so-called Outer Islands were not related to other factors, such as geographic and climatic condi-tions that were markedlv different from those in Inner Indonesia. Herewith, the Dutch created a 11
myth of emptiness11
, the erroneous
assumption of under-population that would provide the justifica-tion for resettlement policies for many years to come.
The Dutch pursued an "enclave" policy, relocating Javanese in separate communi ties. "As the wi Uingness to move to "the land
beuond" had not yet developed very greatly at the time~ the
Dutch tried to make settlement attractive~ by reshaping
condi-tions as nearly as possible to resenible those in the homeland"
(Wertheim, 1964: 199). Javanese social institutions. leadership patterns, village regulations and organisation, place names and traditions were all recreated. In this way it was hoped that the Javanese would feel "at home" and remain in the new area (Guin-ness et al, 1977: 75). It was expected that the Javanese settlers would introduce their sawah system of rice cultivation on the
Ou-ter Islands and for this reason they received one bau (0,71 ha) per family.
In general, kolonisasi in the pre-Independence period was not very successful. The number of colonist families that moved out of Java was too insignificant to have any impact on the areas of origin. Up to the time of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies not many families were moved, although some 200.000 were shifted between 1932 and 1941. Furthermore, conditions pro-ved unfavourable for wet rice cultivation. The sawah system had been developed in Java during several centuries and could not be
copied in such a short time under much more difficult circumstan-ces. Coordination problems led to a considerable time-lag in pro-viding irrigation and other facilities. In her classic book on transmigration, Jo an Hardj ono concluded that "from the point of
view of living standards of the new settlers~ very little was
achieved and the outward crppearance of prosperity disguised the fact that economically the individual farmer even in the
Sukada-na district. the '~est" of all the Dutch settlement areas_, was
not reaUy much better off than his relatives back in Java"
(1977: 20).
The Bawon Scheme in Kolonisasi Policy.
The economical world crisis of the 1930s had an effect on the export market in the Dutch East Indies. The production was
redu-ced, worsening the situation of unemployment in Java. At the sa-me tisa-me, fired "coolies" returned to Java from the plantations in the Outer Islands. Therefore. the colonial administration consi-dered the necessity for kolonisasi - being the chosen remedy for over-population and unemployment - more acute, while available funds for kolonisasi projects were more scarce than ever.
The Dutch decided to fully implement the bawon system, which had existed in experimental form since 1928. "Bawon" is the tra-ditional Javanese svstem of employing labourers in return for a share of the harvest. Under this scheme, the pioneer settlers would employ new settlers, usually relatives or friends, for a period, which allowed them to settle themselves.
According to a report of the Gajah Mada Team, which had stu-died transmigration settléments in Kalimantan and Sulawesi, the Dutch '~ere influenced in their plannina by the fact that mi-grants in Ge dong '1.'ataan_, at that time numberina 30. 000 residen ts. had crpproached the Government to bring some of their relatives to .1oin them. In exchange they o.ffered to support the new arrivals during the initial period of settlement. This persuaded the Go-vernment_, anxious to keep costs to a minimum. to introduce the bawon system u.Jherebu new settlers were brought to an established settlement just before harvest in which they then took part. Settlers agreed not only to temporarily support members of their own .families. but also others who carne from Java umier the sche-me. During the next ten years the annual migration under the
vernment scheme rose to a peak of 60. 000 in 1941" (Guinness et al, 1977: 3).
Colin MacAndrews points to the fact that in the early 1930s this mutual assistance system, although officially encouraged, was voluntary. But later the pioneer settlers in some schemes were required to support newcomers in the ratio of five colo-nist families to one incoming family (1982: 11, quoting from: Pelzer, 1945).
The bawon system, again according to the Gajah Mada Team, laid a heavy burden on the migrants themselves. "Earlier set-tlers bore the cost of feeding new families" who in many cases were unrelated to them. In the Metro area of Lamoung the ratio of old to new settlers was 3:1, but in Belitang farmers of only three uears standina were burdened with new arrivals. The latest miarants had to build their own homes" clear their land and con-struct irrigation channels" none of which were familiar tasks to villagers from Java where settlement and irrigation had existed for generations. Health services were poor" with the result that death rates" particularly from malaria" remained high" (Suratnam & Guinnes s, 19 77: 81) .
2. Transmigration Policy in the Sukarno Period, 1945-1965.
In the history of resettlement, the period immediately follo-wing Independence could be seen as an interim period. Because of political and economie problems at the time, transmigration could not become a major issue. There were some although no fundamental
chanRes.
Resettlement was taken out of its colonial context and made part of an overall effort to build up the newly independent state. Moreover, this colonial context was more or less replaced by the Javanese domination over the rest of Indonesia. The inhabitants of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia were considered to be the citizens of a nation/state. belonging to one big family of In-donesians.
Therefore. the prob lem of "overpopulation" could not exist. In Sukarno's view, the problem that had to be dealt with was underproduction. ''My solution is> exploit more land" because i f you exploit all the land in Indonesia" you can feed 250 million" and I have only 103 million . .. For my country> the
more children the better" (Newsweek, 5 October 1964).
Family planning, an alternative instrument in dealing with over-population, was not seriously contemplated. This was only possible because of the mvth of emptiness, created long before Sukarno was born. Gunnar Myrdal suggested that this myth of emptiness was used by the Sukarno administration for postpo-ning the introduction of an "effective birth control program-me " ( 1 96 8 : 2 1 4 4 ) •
After "underproduction" was identified as the crucial issue, it was decided that agriculture in Inner Indonesia would be further intensified and in Outer Indonesia agricultural land would be expanded. Through the resumption of resettlement. now
called transmigrasi, farmers were brought in from outside. Larger plots of land were allotted to each family in comparison wi th the previous period "in an effort to avoid the high
popu-lation density that had already occurred in South Lamoung"
(Su-ratnam & Guinness, 1977: 84). The primary occupation in the settlements remained wet rice cultivation and southern Sumatra the main recip1ent area. The most characteristic feature were the highly ambitious targets. ''If an examination is madE of the policies followed in transmigration in this early period> the most striking feature is the extremely unrealistic targets. In
1952 the Transmigration Service begon the implementation of a fifteen-year Transmiarat?'.on Plan originaUu prepared in 194? with the aim of movina 31 million people. This plan had been
re-formulated in 1951" the inten-tion being to cover the thirtu-five year period from 1953 to . .1987. The aim was to move 48.675.000 durina those years" (Hardj ono, 197 7 : 2 3) .
President Sukarno neither had the time nor the capability to move that many people. More people than in the previous period
were settled, about 400.000 people between 1950 and 1965. "Quite a large nurriber of people did in fact leave Java as a consequence of extensive government propaganda and of the participation of political parties and other non-government bodies in
transmigra-tion schemes11 (Hardjono, 1977: 25). Willingness among the
popu-lation bv far exceeded transport capabilities with the result that only a small part of those who had registered actually left.
In this period, additional land was allocated to each family for the cultivation of commercial crops, as earlier projects had shown that additional land was needed for the increasing number of new migrants and for the second and third generation of set-tlers. This amoun t of land would have been sufficient, but "irri-gation works were lagging behind. After a few harvests the soil was exhausted and the settlers 1JJere driven to look for other
land. Thus_, the process of deforestation progressively extended to other areas_, and alang grass covered the re linquished land"
(Wertheim, 1964: 188-9).
The government was not quite pleased with the achievements and looked for new initiatives. Hardjono. quoting from the high-unreBlistic Eight-Year Plan for Overall National Development which was to guide the national economy in the 1961-1969 period, mentions an effort by the government to connect transmigration with regional development: "the failure now exper>ienced is due to the fact that what has been taking place up to the present is merely agricultural transmigration ( ... ) Therefore a radiaal change ~s considered necessary. namely_, the transmigration should follow the course of regional development outside Java in the fields of industry~ mining_, fisheries_, plantations. and so on"
(1977: 23). President Sukarno was replaced by General Suharto before these plans could be put into practice.
~
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TABLE l:
INDONESIA'S 27 PROVINCIES, CAPITALS, 1. DKI Jakarta
2. West Java Bandung
3. Central Java- Semarang
4. DI Yogyakarta
5. East Java Surabaya
6. South Sumatra Palembang
7. Jambi Jambi
8. Bengkulu Bengkulu
9 .. Riau Pekanbaru
10. West Sumatra Padang
ll. North Sumatra Medan
12. Aceh Banda Açeh
13. Lampung Telukbetung
14. West Kalimantan Pontianak
15. Central Kalimantan Palangkaraya
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1 1 I I IPOPULATION, DENSITY
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Komitee Indonesië6.503.400 ll.023 27.453.500 593 25.372.900 742 2.750.000 868 29.188.900 609 4.629.800 44 l . 446. 000 23 768.100 36 2.168.500 17 3.406.800 51 8.360.900 118 2. 611. 300 43 4.624.800 136 2.486.100 15 954.400 6 16. South Kalimantan 17. East Kalimantan 18. North Sulawesi 19. Central Sulawesi 20. South Sulawesi 21. Southeast Sulawesi 22. Maluku 23. Bali
24. West Nusa Tenggara 25. East Nusa Tenggara 26. Irian Jaya (West Papua) 27. East Timor Banjarmasin Samarinda Menado Palu Ujungpandang Kendari Ambon Denpasar Matararn Kupang Jayapura Dili 2.064.600 l . 218 .100 2.115.400 1.289.600 6.062.200 942.300 l . 411. 000 2.469.900 2.724.700 2.737.200 1.173.900 555.400 Source: Statistik Indonesia 1983 Tables III 1.3 and 1.4
(Biro Statistik Indonesia - Census 1980).
59 6 87 14 73 29 16 444 135 57 2 37 l ( )
3. Traditional Resettlement Policy, 1965-1985.
The "Population Motive" under the New Order.
Under the "New Order" regime of General Suharto, the "popu-lation motive" was restored in all its glory. Once again, the (surplus) people were blamed for the problems they caused for the government. Martono, referring to the high rate of popula-tion in Inner Indonesia (see map 2, table 1), stated that "im~ piications o.f this fact in terms of basic services" improvement of welfare, and even preservation of social order and the
phy-sical environment are serious indeed" (1984: iv). Removal of
huge numbers of families from Java would lead to better condi-tions, it was said. From 1969, when the first Five-Year Deve-loprnent Plan started, the target of families to be resettled grew by leaps and bounds: 45.000 families under the first Repe-lita (1969-1974), 250.000 (reduced later to 100.000) under the second (1974-1979), half a million under the third (1979-1984) and finally 750.000 families under the current Repelita
(1984-1989). Recently, Minister Martono announced that at least 20 million people had to leave Java if life on the island was to be improved (Jakarta Post, 31 July 1985, quoted in: Indonesia Reports). In stressing the need to remove (surplus) people from Java, Madura, Bali and Lombok. the Indonesian government concentrated almost exclusively on the quantitative targets. Apparently with success, since the target of 500.000 families in the Repelita III period is clairned to have been realised*. There was no escape from the fact, however, that population growth in Java by far exceeded the nurnber of transmigrants. Therefore, in contrast to the "Old Order", the Suharto regime did launch a stringent birth control programrne in addition to transrnigration. From a remark made by Martono it seems as
•': See for targets and numbers of families moved within the transmigration programrne part 3, chapter 6, section 3.
though they even want to prevent transmigrant families to be "fertile". Martono stated that "efforts to raise settler wel-fare wiU be ineffective i f steps are not taken to controZ birth rates. High birth rates not onZy hamper agricuZturaZ activity hut wiZZ aZso eventuaZZy reduce the size of the Zand holdings. Thus efforts to sustain and increase farrriZy planning wi Z Z be made " ( 1 9 84 : 45) •
To justify the mass migratory movement in the direction of the Outer Islands, the myth of emptiness played its role. In 1972, the Director General for Transmigration stated that 11
the naturaZ resources to be .found outside Java have bareZy been
touched" (quoted in: Jones, 1979: 217). Sorne years later,
Su-broto," at that time Minister for Manpower, Transmigration &
Cooperatives, said that 11
40 miZZion hectares of Zand outside
Java remained open
for
transmigration and deveZopment"(Indone-sia Times, 3 July 1975. quoted in: Jones, 1979: 221). Transmi-gration Minister Martono once described the Outer Islands as "labour scarce areas'1 (1984: ix). And recently, in a World Bank report the rnyth of emptiness was clearly used to explain the exis tence of population reset tlernen t programmes. "Vast tracks of forest and coastaZ Zand Zie uncuZtivated in the Outer Is-Zands. The Zow popuZation densities in some areas ( ... ) im-pede regionaZ deveZopment and economie growth. These facts have been so striking for so ZOng that programmes to wed the
under-uti Zised Zabour of Java with the underunder-utiZised Zand
of
theOu-ter IsZands have been carried out since the beginning of this century" (1985b: 3).
The myth of emptiness is also used to justify large-scale transmigration to Kalimantan and West Papua, relativelv "new" areas of settlement, where initial investrnent costs are much higher than in the "old" are as, due to the greater dis tance frorn Java and lack of basic infrastructure. West Papua and Ka-limantan together account for about half of the total land area and only 5% of the total population. These figures are very striking indeed when compared to the Javanese situation. Trans-migrasi, therefore, seemed a logical thing to do.
Quantity not Quality.
Due to the Jakarta-inspired drive to· keep expenditures low and to implement the progranune ~s fast as possible, the trans-migrants were confronted with manv problems in their new envi-ronment. On paper, the settlement scheme looked fine. The fami-lies received 0,25 ha with a house plus one hectare of cleared arable land, ready for cultivation. This amount of land was ba-sed on the assumption that this was the maximum a family could cultivate without the help of draught animals or traction power. In the first few months. transmigrants were supposed to receive food aid and agricultural inputs and extension services. After a period of cultivation, they could receive an additional one hec-tare for the cultivation of cash crops.
The reality was very different. The emphasis was once again on wet rice cultivation and for this purpose rainforests were cleared and swampland was reclaimed. In many cases, the contrac-tors hired to clear the land only felled the conunercially attrac-tive trees, leaving large tree stumps bebind. The heavy machinery they used damaged the soil. On arrival, many settlers found their houses were not built or were of low quality. The absence of roads and other infrastructural developments resulted in diffi-culties to market any surplus production. Irrigation and drainage works could not keep pace with the growth of the settlements.
The majority of the transmigrants kept going to southern Suma-tra "due to a desire to keep transportation costs to a rrrinimum rather than to any conscious wish to "settie" this region" (Hard-j ono, 1978: 110). Some areas, particularly in Lampung, were al-ready overcrowded because additional land lacked to allow for the
(natural) increase of the migrant population. More and more often marginal land was brought into cultivation, which severely damaged the environment. Some settlers left the transmigration areas after years of hardship pioneering. Part of them returned to the areas of origin, others settled in the towns and cities of the areas of settlement.
The Myth of the Happy Transmigrant Family.
By 1984, it was clear that transmigration failed to have mo-re than a marginal impact on social and economie conditions in Inner Indonesia. There simply was no "crucial role" for transmi-grasi in coping with landlessness and unemployment. Despite the failure of resettlement as a population policy, the regime per-sisted in setting itself yet more ambitious targets. Suharto himself was so determined to continue the programme that a new myth was invented to compensate for the glaring weaknesses of
the "population motive". lt was proclaimed that, whether or not transmigration could contribute to the solution of Java's pro-blems, it would raise living standards of those Javanese who mo-ved, giving them hope for the future. These transmigrant families would get a once-in-a-lifetime chance to obtain a small plot of
land which they could call their own, a chance that was lost for-ever to those who chose to stay behind~'>. In justifying the conti-nuation of the programme, the myth of the happy transmigrant fa-mily was created. This myth was based on an age-old assumption, formulated by Mayling Oey. "Since most of those resettled bu the
government were either ZandZess Zahourers
or
had onZy very smaZZplots of Zand in their areas of origin ( ... ) it was simpZy taken for granted that transmigrants would become better o.ff after
re-settZement" (1982: 44). In trying to assess the significance of
failure of settlements, the well-known economist Heinz Arndt war-ned us that "it must be remembered that most of the transmigrants are not average Javanese. The majority are recruited .from among the ZandZess and poorest. To them" even an average migrant s-tan-dard of 'living" incZuding a piece of Zand of their own"
repre-sents a big improvement" (1983: 56). lt does tell a lot about the
conditions of life for the maiority of Javanese population, but it also sheds reasonable doubt on the words of Kusman, a 55-year
~·· This myth is part of the propaganda campaign launched to promo-te the willingness to participapromo-te in the programme (see part 2, chapter 5).
old farmer, "sitting in his porch surveuing his plots of Zand
in the South Sumatran settZement of Air Sugihan~ Kusman is
pZea-sed with Zife. Whatever e Zse be wrong_, he owns Zand" (Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 1985). In fact, Air Sugihan:':, consisting of several settlements between the rivers Suleh and Sugihan in South Sumatra, is such a disaster that it has been included on an official list of "least successful transmigration projects".
The myth of the happy transmigrant family was shattered by reality even before it could come to full bloom. The small plots allotted to the families turned out to be no guarantee for a better future. In retaining the same pattern of subsistence agri-culture to be found in Java. the government created the self-same problems from which the transmierants were supposed to have
been res cued. "Observers suggest ", according to Oey, "that the main aim is not so much to enabZe settlers to pull themseZves out of the cycle of poverty as to continue their Zives at sub-sistence level_, growing onZy subsub-sistence/basic .food crops"
( 1982: 45). But even to attain this l,evel of subsistence, the settler families had had to overcome many problems caused by inadequate selection and planning of sites and insufficient pre-paration.
An economist who studied the programme for the World Bank ca-rne to the conclusion that "none of the settZements had returns anything Zike what the World Bank said would be the minimum
fea-sib le in its economie justi.fication .for the programme" (The New
Scientist, 17 May 1984). Even in the rare cases where settlers succeeded in surpassing subsistence production, they could not market it, since settlements were located in remote and relati-vely isolated areas with no roads connecting them to other set-tlements or towns. The World Bank itself carne to the conclusion that the food erop model should be avoided unless followed by "secondary development" such as the cultivation of cash crops,
*
See C. Secrett, 1986: 81-2; C. Caulfield, 1984: 26; also part 2, chapter 5, section 1.mixed farming, etc. (1985c: 33; 1985b: 37).
The combination of the chosen farm model and the overall un-favourable confitions for food production led to what has been described as the transfer of Javanese poverty to the Outer Is-lands. The difference now being that it became a reality not only for the transmigrants b~t also for the indigenous popula-tions in the areas of settlement.
Transmigration's Role in Regional Development.
Some authors suggest that this transfer of Javanese poverty caused dissatisf action among the regional authorities in the Outer Islands, and that they in their turn pressed for innova-tions in policy that would be beneficial to the local population in the areas of settlement. "In order to meet past critici.sm from regional governors, often reluctant to acquiesce in their land being used for purposes of transmigration because of a
ge-neral belief that it moves poverty into their lands", Oey noted,
"transmigration settlements had been designed since Repelita
III as part of overall regional devefopment schemes" ( 1982:
49-50).
The idea to direct transmigration towards the development of the Outer Islands certainly was not new. Several s~ggestions to devote the transmigration programme to regional development
goals and in doing so getting rid of the exclusively agricultural character of settlement, were already made in the Sukarno period.
"One has only to disengage oneself from the notion that there is
but one possible
way",
Wertheim asserted. The scheme of shiftingfrom the extensive land use to the wet rice cultivation as prac-tised in Java was not only impractical but illogical. "Why repeat a pattern which has produced a scarcely enviable situation in Ja-va? Whu should a solution of the popula·tion problems o.f the Outer Islands be exclusivelu sought in the agrarian sector_, which
ine-vitably leads to increasing competition .for land? Why not try_, in
this earlu stage of development_, an industrial development which
would attract workers both from Java and Sumatra with appre-cia.h ly less friction?" (1964: 202-3).
It took a long time before these suggestions were taken se-rious ly. Every new Repelita brought the concept of regional development a step closer to reality. Finally, it was decided that in order to stimulate development through transmigration a growth model would be put into practice. Transmigration set-tlements were to become "growth poles" with tree erop estates, oil refineries and fertiliser factories as some of its magnets. With these growth poles springing up, it was expected that
spontaneous (trans-)migrants would feel attracted to move at their own initiative and own expense and that the role of the government accordingly would then decrease (Martono, 1984: vii).
It was said that large investments in the Outer Islands were unremunerative because of their under-population. Therefore, transmigrants were moved in. Besides, it was claimed that the local populations would benefit from the incoming transmi-grants, because these "native" hunters, gatherers and shifting cultivators would be able 11
to learn from the Javanese"•':, Experiments started with the establishment of plantation communities such as Rimbo Bujang in Jambi and Pematang Panggang in South Sumatra, where settlers were provided with up to five hectares which they had to clear and partly plant with rubber. Under the auspices of the World Bank, which had started funding
the transmigration programme in 1974, and with the assistance of other international organisations such as the Food and Agri-culture Organisation (FAO), the NES scheme (Nucleus Estate and Smallholders) was introduced in Indonesia.
•': In reality, shifting cul ti vation (pe ladang nomaden) proved to be a sound, rational and ecologically wise agricultural system
(see part 3, chapter 6). Instead of locals learning from the Javanese, it aften happened that the Javanese copied the agri-cultural systems and types of land use from the autochthonous.
4. New Trends, 1984-1985.
The Myth of the Spoon-Fed Transmigrants.
At the end of the third Repelita in March 1984, the govern-ment saw itself confronted with huge problems in resettlegovern-ment policy. The food erop model was declared bankrupt, ambitious targets resulted in unfeasible high investments, remigration was frequent and criticism mounted, both within Indonesia and
internationally. The prograrnme again needed a face-lift, a new myth to restore its credibility. This time the transmigrants were held responsible for failure of government policy. It was
all because they had been "spoon-fed" by government assistance and were not prepared to work hard enough. Once their right to food aid expired, many were opting to quit the settlement, leaving their plots unattended. According to official statis-tics, over 2.000 families left their "new homes" during Repe-lita III.
Thus, when describing all the shortcomings, including the absence of an irrigation/drainage system in the Mamosaloto si-te, Central Sulawesi, one reporter quoted the local transmigra-tion officer as saying: 11
It is true that aU the facilities ?,,n
the Mamosaloto project have not been corrrpleted yet
3but the
transrrrigrants should be patient and work
hard~not just sit
idle and be spoon-fed"
(Jakarta Post, 20 January 1984).Apart from throwing the blame on the transmigrants and not on the government, the Suharto regime also used the "spoon-fed" myth to counteract the adverse publicity returning mi-grants attracted· among the Javanese population. Later, the myth of the "spoon-fed" transmigrants was used to justify chea-per forms of government-initiated transmigration (see part 2, chapter 5, section 3). Under the heading, "No More Spoon-Fed Transmigrants, Please", i t was announced that several parts of the country were closed to government-sponsored and conse-quently spoon-fed settler families.
"Only those rrrigrants who
leave at their own will be accepted because they pose no fi-nancial burden to the governmen-t; ". Stating that transmigrants who leave at their own expense have proven to be more steadfast
in overcoming problems and facing challenges, Suwarno Subagyo, legal and organisation chief of the Transmigration Department, con tinued: "Un Zike the state-sponsored migrants _, the sponta-neous migrants are less troubZ.esome and more determined to make a decent living;' (Jakarta Post, 15 January 1985). Thus, the go-vernment-sponsored transmigrants were pictured as spoiled and lazy persons; spoiled because of all the assistance provided to them ànd lazy because they nevertheless did not succeed in building up a new life.
PIR Khusus.
"It is felt that some new initiatives are required", Martono concluded at the beginning of Repeli ta IV. "The government is naw planning for the "second-stage" development of many
Zoca-tions_, where initial investment in settlement wiU be foUowed by further technical and financial investment that will ensure economie "take-off" in the areas. For example_, assistance ma:y be provided for planting reserve land with tree crops to
gua-rantee the settlers' future ( ... ) For new projects_, this se-cond-stage development will be pl'anned for more explicitly from the start. Such models already exist_, for example in the World Bank assisted nucleus estate and smallholder projects_, some o.f which are opened up for transmigrants" ( 1984: viii).
After almost a century of persisting largely on subsistence food production, the government was finally admitting that by and large soils outside Inner Indonesia were not suitable for wet rice cultivation. A switch was announced from these food
crops to estate-oriented migration. Where food production was still feasible, said Martono, traditional transmigration would continue. Here, settlers would have to fend for themselves re-gardless of whether they had good harvests or not. The trans-migration authorities would direct all their energy towards
developing new sites near state-run or privately-owned esta-tes (Kompas, 7 November 1984; Indonesia Reports, 6 November, 7 November 1984).
Several factors account for this major policy shift. In the first place, Indonesia desperately needs to compensate for the loss of earnings from oil exports. The tree erop sector, com-prising export commodities such as palm oil, rubber and coffee, has been identified as one of the most promising sectors to be developed. The decline of oil prices meant a drop not only in export revenues but also in the government's development bud-get. Therefore, there is a growing need to attract .private in-vestment to compensate for Jakarta's tighter financial situa-tion. Thus, secondly, the PIR Khusus•': is important because it could stimulate participation of the private sector. Finally, attainment on self-sufficiency in rice (berswasembada) has made food production sites less attractive to the central
govern-In PIR Khusus, giant state-owned plantations and/or pri-vate estate companies (the PTPs•'::':;':) are responsible for the de-velopment of estate land and surrounding smallholdings. Large areas of land are cleared and planted with high yielding tree crops. The estates - predominantly government owned but commer-cially operated - provide the layout, technical know-how and or-ganisational capacity. This will be maintained until maturity of the crops with the smallholders' production purchased by the nu-cleus estate for processing in the estate's plants. After a cer-tain period of time, blocks of two hectares are allocated to the smallholders. They have to repay two-thirds of what is spent on
*
The combination of NES (Nucleus Estate and Smallholders) scheme and transmigration is called PIR (Perkebunan Inti Rakyat) Khusus(special), or special People's Nucleus Estate.
M: Food shortages and hunger certainly e:xis t on many transmigration sites and is particularly acute in the "resettlement" sites that have been set up in East Timor (see part 3, chapter 9).
•':;':;': PTP is Perseroan Terbatas Perkebunan or Plantation Company Li-mited.
developing the two hectare plot over a 17-year period at 10% interest.
The rising involvement of the Transmigration Department with the NES scheme is particularly stimulated by the World Bank and overall expectations are optimistic. Robin Osborne noted that
"it indicates a new professional approach towards makinq
trans-migrants productive~ and the World Bank is pleased" (1985b: 10).
One disadvantage is the huge initial costs involved, estima-ted by Arndt at US
$
15.000 per family (1983: 62). But for the transmigration authorities, responsibilities as well as costs are much less than in the traditional food erop model. The De-partment 's responsibilities are limited to the construction of housing and providing village infrastructure. It has no longerthe duty of rendering full assistance to the transmigrants, since they have become "smallholders" working on estates.
Spontaneous Transmigration.
The government also tried to reduce the financial budget for transmigration by promoting spontaneous transmigration. Martono acknowledged at the beginning of Repelita IV that as the sending of transmigrants still involved the government's bureaucracy, the system adopted so far had not yet achieved the self-reliance which was the actual target of the government. The intervention
of government institutions on a large scale was explained by the Minister from the fact that ''manu financial~ socio-cultural and physical constraints still exist that are obstacles to the
deve-lopment of larger' flows of migrants" ( 19 84: vi).
Initially, during the first years of the New Order, the policy was to "send" spontaneous settlers to well-established projects,
like Belitang in South Sumatra and Parigi in Central Sulawesi, while government-sponsored transmigrants were placed in newly
created projects, where heavier work was required (Hardjono, 1977: 34). Later, under Repelita II, a special programme was developed, known as Banpres (Bantuan Presiden, involving presidential funds),
moving greater numbers of partly assisted migrants with funds to cover transportation and basic necessities for only four months
(Hardjono, 1977: 33). For the Repelita IV programme, Martono's intention is to promote "spontaneous" transmigration to become the majority share of the total flow of migrants (Kompas, 6 Sep-tember 1985). The spontaneous transmigrants receive (at least officially) the same assistance as regular (umum) transmigrants after they have arrived at the location. Furthermore, spontaneous transmigrants are encouraged by "facilitating factors concern-ing
procedures. administration> issuing permits~ provision of
facili-ties in the areas o.f settlement> corrununication between areas of
origin and areas of settlement and other matters" (Martono, 1984:
25). In cooperation with the World Bank, a study is undertaken to find means to accelerate spontaneous transmigration. The inten-tion is to lower overall transmigrainten-tion costs per settled family, and the choice is based on the relative success of spontaneous settlers as compared to government-sponsored transmigrants.
The fact that spontaneous transmigrants were located in well established projects contributed to this success. Other factors were mentioned by Guinness, who wrote that these migrants often have either friends, acquaintances or relatives to whom they can move, that because they have no land when they arrive they have
to negotiate with local villagers for land, that many of the set-tlers begin by working full time for local villagers, and that they experiment much more widely with crops because they are not required to plant a particular erop. "Here we have people who are moving of their own wiZZ> doing their own experimentation> and establishing veY'Jj good relations, not only with previous settlers
bu·t also with ZocaZ viUagers" (1982: 159).
The ties with farmers already established in .the new area proved to be vital in the settlement process. "They (the new
set-tlers) Zearned farming techniques while working as Zabourers> and obtained cattle on Zoan. Their early search for employment> Zand and knowledge brouqht them in contact with ZocaZ viZZagers. The two groups have established good relations> and a:re mutuaZZy
be-nefitting from the settlers' success in agriculture" (Guinness
et al, 1977: 112-3).
For instance, the success of spontaneous settlers in Binuang, South Kalimantan, is based on their production of bananas. Waves of palms cover the slopes. Because of lack of motor transport, bananas are carried to the Binuang town market on horseback, and from there dealers carry the fruit to Banjarmasin where it has completely replaced imports of bananas from Surabaya in Java
(ibid.: 104).
The promotion of spontaneous transmigration was linked with the concept of regional development. The argument was that suc-cessful regional development would encourage large numbers of spontaneous settlers. Thus, spontaneous migrants would follow at
the heels of a few pioneering transmigrant families, who would receive full government assistance. "The challenge that faces Indonesian leaders is to create the econorrric conditions in the Outer Islands that will attract spontaneous movement of Javanese and Balinese there. Transrrrigrants will then be the pioneers of both successful regional development and a more even distribution
of the national population" (ibid.: 121-2).
Generally, "spontaneous" transmigrants have accounted for 30-35% of the total transmigrant movement, and the government wants to raise their share to 50% of the families moved during the fourth Repeli ta.
New Areas of Settlement.
Another new trend introduced in the Repelita IV programme is to send transmigrant families further away from Java. Relatively new areas of settlement are supposed to receive more transmigrants
than the traditional settlement areas.
According to Arndt, about 60% of the transmigrants have been resettled in Sumatra in each of the previous three Repelitas. The proportion of migrants resettled in Sulawesi declined from 26% in Repelita I to 12% in Repelita III. in "favour" of the eastern pro-vinces of Maluku and West Papua, whose share has risen to 7%. The proportion settled in Kalimantan remained around 15-18% (1983: 50-1).
