Then we came to understand that I was hurt and you were hurt too

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Then we came to understand that I was

hurt and you were hurt too

The role of Islamic initiatives and the interreligious dialogue in the

reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Marieke Maria Anna Zoodsma 5948177

mariekezoodsma@gmail.com Master thesis – University of Amsterdam

History: Holocaust and Genocidestudies Supervisor: dr. Uğur Ümit Üngör Second reader: dr. Vladimir Petrović

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Abbreviations

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IZ Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

JNA Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav National Army)

MRV Međureligijsko Vijeće u Bosni i Hercegovini (Interreligious Council in

Bosnia and Herzegovina) RS Republika Srpska

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Preface

Sevda, or sevdalinka, is a traditional Muslim urban song whose name originates from the Turkish

word sevda meaning ‘love’ or ‘desire’. These highly ornamented love-songs were originally accompanied by a saz (a Turkish lute) but modern interpretations often involve an accordion, a fiddle (gusle) or a guitar. Sevdalinkas evolve around religious, patriotic, social, and ethical

sentiments, but are also often inclined to moralize its audience. Balić, in his essay on The Cultural

Achievements of Bosnian Muslims, writes: “In the sentiments expressed in the sevdalinkas, writes

one South Slavic scholar, we recognize our common tradition, our philosophy, our character, and all that forms our unique personality.” (Balić 1997: 151-151). Although the sevdalinka clearly expressed imaginary and values that were typically not shared by other communities, “ thanks to their popularization, particularly through mass media after World War II, sevdalinkas reached not only broad audience in rural areas but also fans and performers among other national groups.” (Laušević 1996: 123).

I would hereby like to dedicate my favourite sevdalinka to my family, friends, fellow-students, and my university supervisors dr. Uğur Ümit Üngör, dr. Vladimir Petrović, and dr. Nena Tromp-Vrkić for their support and trust in this project. And to Sabiha, Valida, Nejla, and Edina – who introduced me to the beautiful world of sevda, a world where ethnic, religious or national boundaries are indeed forgotten once the first tone is struck:

Žute Dunje Yellow Dunje1

Voljelo se dvoje mladih Two youngsters loved each other

šest mjeseci, godinu six months, a year

kad su htjeli da se uzmu, da se uzmu aman, aman when they wanted to get married, aman, aman

dušmani im ne dadoše fiends didn’t let them

Razbolje se lijepa Fatma Beautiful Fatma got sick

jedinica u majke Mother’s only child

poželjela žute dunje, žute dunje aman, aman she wished for yellow quinces, aman, aman

žute dunje iz Stambola yellow quinces from Stambol [Istanbul, MZ]

Pođe dragi da donese Her darling left to bring

žute dunje Carigradske Carigrad’s [Byzantium, MZ] yellow quinces

al’ ga nema tri godine, tri godine aman, aman but he’s been gone for three years, aman, aman

nit’ se javlja, niti dolazi not a word, nor he appears

Dođe dragi sa dunjama Her darling came back bringing quinces

nađe Fatmu na nosilima to find Fatma on stretcher

dvjesta dajem spustite je, trista dajem otkrijte je “I offer two hundred, put her down da još jednom Fatmu ljubim ja I offer three hundred, uncover her

so that I can kiss Fatma one more time”

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Introduction

“Last year we applied for thirty eight grants and honours, and we got zero. They tell us: ‘Why building peace? You got peace! Iraq does not have peace, Syria does not, but you have.’ This is not peace what we have, this is another preparation for genocide and I cannot believe that the international community does not see that this is an obvious state of preparation.”

Vahidin Omanović. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sanski Most, September 8, 2013

The “Bosnian” or “Balkan Spring” is what it has already been called, the large demonstrations that engulfed the cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of February 2014.2_{While I} was in a nice and quiet library in Amsterdam analysing my fieldwork data and writing this thesis – based on research done in Bosnia in August and September 2013 –, workers, students and ordinary citizens united together on the streets of Tuzla, Sarajevo, Zenica, Bihac and Mostar to protest against the high unemployment rate, abominable social and health benefits, extremely low pensions, corruption and nepotism. Pictures of the, to me well-known, streets of Sarajevo and Tuzla would pass by – now filled with people throwing rocks and setting fire to government buildings out of general outrage. The official unemployment rate in Bosnia is around forty percent, with a number of 57% among youth. Shady privatisation schemes have left thousands of workers jobless, pensions have dropped3_{while the wages of Bosnia’s bureaucrats have grown} and several major elected officials, under which the president of the Federation entity Zivko Budimir, are under investigation for corruption (Mujanović 2014).

Whether or not this can be viewed as, according to the quote given above, “an obvious state of preparation for genocide” is not the point, apart from the fact that Omanović – a peace-worker and former imam in the north-western Bosnian village of Sanski Most – was clearly acquainted with theories developed in this field of studies.4_{The state of affairs in Bosnia that}

2_{Although not as large in size, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have before demonstrated} demanding change in the current economic and political situation, in June 2013. This so-called Baby Revolution was sparked by the death of a new-born baby who could not travel outside Bosnia for medical treatment, since the baby could not be issued a passport or medical card. Due to the fact that the different parties in Bosnian parliament were in dispute on the matter of personal identification numbers, Bosnian citizens born after February 2013 were left without the necessary identity numbers for passports to be issued.

3_{An average pension is Bosnia is 300 KM (konvertibilna marka), around 150 euro per month.}

4_{A case in point is the role the international community has played in the creation of this state of affairs,} and what role it should play now it has reached a boiling point. The war and ensuing peace – which we

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Omanović is referring to is one that has created, according to him, these conditions – one where politicians, public persons and members of each ethnic community repeatedly reiterate the ethno-nationalistic rhetoric that has been used during the conflict to divide the people among ethnic lines. And now, for the first time in twenty years after the conflict has ended, people of Bosnia and Herzegovina come out on the streets not because of demands based on ethnicity or religion but against the ethno-nationalistic policies that rule their land. “We are dealing with a rebellion against nationalist elites: the people of Bosnia have finally understood who their true enemy is: not other ethnic groups, but their own leaders who pretend to protect them from others.” (Žižek 2014).

Dissatisfaction with the political situation and the general standard of life in the country was often subject of discussion during my time in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all my

respondents would bring it up during our conversations. But although these economic and political problems (such as the high unemployment rate and corruption) affect everyday life and are widespread over the whole territory of the country, there is virtually no debate within (civil) society about these issues. Whether this can be attributed to a sense of political passivity

traceable to the Yugoslav communist outlook, to the lack of political will to build a shared community, the underdeveloped status of civil society in general or the inexistent critical mass of internal peace-building leadership (Funk Deckard 2012: 51) is not what I set out to

investigate. I came to Bosnia and Herzegovina to look at Islamic initiatives or individuals and their engagement in and contribution to the reconciliation process, by conducting interviews with local representatives of these initiatives. The above given issues and consequences did however, naturally, highly influence the way they viewed the process of reconciliation in Bosnia, similarly as it influenced the level of impact of their activities in Bosnian society. It is as Ishak Zahirović, a high-school teacher in Islam in Sanski Most, would tell me: “The most problems are economic problems, to talk about dialogue with an empty stomach is not very productive. This country has so many problems. Whatever you talk about, it does not reach them because they have their own problems.”5

Research motivation and outline

How would Islamic initiatives engage in this troublesome socio-political environment, how do they solve these issues, or avoid them, and still be able to contribute to reconciliation? Since religious affiliation – among other factors I will return to later – has been an important source of

shall explore in this thesis – in Bosnia and Herzegovina has both been overseen by international observers but thereby unfortunately entrenched ethno-nationalistic particracy in BiH, whom quickly gained control of state-run enterprises and government jobs, thereby stunting the country’s economy and politics. 5_{Zahirović, Ishak. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sanski Most, September 10, 2013}

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differentiation during the war, I was interested in how religion can play (or perhaps already plays) a soothing role instead of being used as a catalyst. Religion is one of the key cultural components of each nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereby generally speaking most Bosniaks are affiliated with Islam, most Bosnian Croats with Catholicism and most Bosnian Serbs with Serbian Orthodoxy. Funk Deckard writes: “Though instigated by nationalist elites, war came to all residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992-1995 and religion played its sinister part in supporting the competing claims of each nation in its political goals.” (Funk Deckard 2012: 2). It is irrefutable that the wars that raged in the countries of the former Yugoslavia had a significant religious dimension. The hundreds of mosques and churches that were intentionally and methodically destroyed, the use of religious symbols and rituals during the fighting and the undeniable appeals to religion in official propaganda are some illustrations of the religious facets of the war (Powers 1996: 222). According to Sells: “The religious symbols, rituals and institutions have been central to the violence and will be central to any

reconciliation” (Sells 2003: 325).

To place religious symbols, rituals, institutions and leaders at a central position in the process of reconciliation does not, however, correspond to how most people in Bosnia and Herzegovina would see the role of religion. “Nothing good comes out of religion” is an often-heard phrase when I told people I was conducting fieldwork into Islamic initiatives and the reconciliation process in Bosnia. Funk Deckard’s Bosnian translator would tell her at the

beginning of her fieldwork into religion and peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: “Religion is what divides us” (Funk Deckard 2012: 2). The director of a secular NGO in north western Bosnia, would state: “In the end, every religious involvement in the reconciliation process is counter-productive.”6_{Apart from the fact that these statements are an obvious demonstration of} the ambiguous role religion is playing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is also a peace-building, reconciliatory and positive side to religion. Clark (2010) points to the potential part religion can play in any peace-building process and argues that specifically in the case of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, religion is a potentially valuable but critically under-utilized peace-building tool. Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney (2010) view the specific religious aspect of the nature of the conflict as a serious constraint on the potential for peace-building by religious groups. “How can something that is perceived to be part of the problem become part of the solution? What are the mechanisms by which religion transforms itself from a site of conflict into one of reconciliation?” (ibid.: 1021).

Instead of focusing on all three main religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and investigate their contribution to the reconciliation process, I decided to focus on the role Islamic faith-based organizations and individuals have in the reconciliation process. This decision came with many

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questions before, during and after my fieldwork from interested strangers to the field of

genocide studies and peace-building to respected professors or experienced peace-workers. My focus on Islamic initiatives and the reconciliation process, however, was guided by several reasons. First of all, out of practical concerns regarding the general requirements of a thesis – which would not have been sufficient to be able to properly study the whole range of religious initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their connection to the reconciliation process.

Secondly, demographic data conducted by the ICTY prosecution office as well as by the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Centre showed that, relatively speaking, the Muslim or Bosniak population suffered the highest death toll during the war from 1992-1995. Ewa Tabeau, ICTY’s chief demographer, reports that “the ethnic composition of casualties [in Sarajevo, MZ] includes a majority of Muslims (2,340 killed and 8,715 wounded, also killing and wounding rates for Muslims were considerably higher than for any other ethnic group), which may be related to the ethnic composition of the population at risk.” (Tabeau 2009: 456). According to the report published by the Research and Documentation Centre, in total 33,070 Bosniak Muslim civilians were killed, against 4,075 Serb civilians, 2,163 Croat civilians and 376 civilians of other nationalities (Hoare 2008).7_{Since the Bosniak population, quantitatively} speaking, suffered the most losses, one could assume that they would have the least interest in cooperating, participating in or initiating the reconciliation process. As we shall see in chapter one, an important characteristic of the reconciliation process is that it is a society-wide process with mutual and shared commitment from all sides. My point here is thus not to relativize the Croat and Serb obvious suffering from the war, but to highlight the fact that it is crucial for all sides to participate in the reconciliation process. My decision to focus on the endeavours of the Bosniak Muslim community was motivated by this interesting friction of being victimized and living in a traumatized community, and on the other hand having to cooperate and work together with people belonging to the communities associated with this trauma and pain.

This work is therefore not meant to absolve the Catholic and Serbian Orthodox

communities from their duty of cooperating in the reconciliation process. Although there have been some major studies conducted involving all three religions and the reconciliation process8_; I highly believe that the role of all three sides must keep on being studied, observed and

scrutinized.

7_{The report gives a body count of 97,207 war-dead in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period of} 1991-1995, which is much lower than the generally accepted 150,000 - 200,000 war-related deaths. This is because a body count only takes into account documented deaths, rather than all the deaths to have likely occurred but for which documentary proof is lacking. It therefore does not include indirect victims of war, such as those who died of starvation or lack of medicine because of wartime conditions (Hoare 2008). 8_{See, for instance, Goodwin (2006), Funk Deckard (2012), Mjerdanova and Brodeur (2009), Pejić-Sremac} (2011), Wilkes, G. et al. (2013)

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The above outlined purpose of this paper, to research the role of Islamic initiatives in the reconciliation process, led me to the following research questions:

To what extent are the Islamic initiatives that are engaged in the interreligious dialogue in Bosnia and Herzegovina contributing to the reconciliation process?

To be able to answer my main questions, I constructed the following sub questions – which will consequently correspond with the upcoming chapters:

 What is reconciliation and how can this process be described in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 What is the historical background of the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 What sort of informal Islamic grassroots initiatives aimed at the interreligious dialogue and reconciliation are prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina? What is their function/goal?

 What sort of formal Islamic initiatives aimed at the interreligious dialogue and reconciliation are prevalent in Bosnia and Herzegovina? What is their function/goal?

Religion and reconciliation

My approach to religion focusses on the way it influences social life, behaviour and practices, thereby grounded in socio/anthropological theory. Although my respondents obviously might not separate this view of religion from their individual theological conviction (religion as faith), I wanted to learn how religious actors could use their religion as a means or a focus of

reconstructing (reconciling) relations between oppositional religious groups and within their own faith-community.

In common formula: religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a

confessional community. A creed defines the standard of beliefs and values concerning the ultimate origin, meaning, and purpose of life. It develops from myths – symbol-laden narratives of sacred encounters – and finds official expression in doctrines and dogmas. Cult encompasses the prayers, devotions, spiritual disciplines, and patterns of communal worship that give richly suggestive ritual expression to the creed. A code of conduct defines the explicit moral norms governing the behavior of those who belong to the confessional community. Thus religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of forming

personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behavior in profound ways.

(Appleby 2000: 8-9, my italics)

In this thesis, when I refer to ‘religion’, I refer to this definition of an intrinsic culture which can form personal and social identity (individual and collective identity; see chapter two) and influence subsequent experience and behaviour. ‘Religious actors’ are defined by Appleby as to include “people who have been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts.” (ibid.: 9). Since the term ‘religion’ suggests a communal orientation and common purpose grounded in a distinctive and

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encompassing tradition (ibid.), this term can include a variety of individuals, collectivities and institutions. Religious leaders – such as imams and priests –, religious movements, religious militias, religious NGOs and other voluntary associations therefore all fall under this overarching label.

In a European perspective, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a relatively religious society. According to the survey data collected by Wilkes et al., 72% of the respondents declared they were religious, of whom 36.7% indicated that religion was a very important part of their life, 35.3% that it was important, while 10.5% were explicitly non-religious (2013: 13).9

Significantly, 80.9% of the respondents indicated that all members of their immediate family belonged to the same religious tradition, compared to 17.5% who stated that they live in a mixed family – pointing to the homogeneity of family life (ibid.: 14).10_{Bosnia and Herzegovina is}

currently partitioned between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Sprska. According to the unofficial results of the recent census (held in October 2013, the official results are expected in July 2014), when these two entities are taken together, Bosnian Muslims are the largest minority with 48% Bosniaks, 32% Serbs, and 14% Croats.11_{This puts Bosnia and} Herzegovina in a unique position in Europe, which has historically been not only at the

crossroads of two major world religions (Islam and Christianity) but also of Eastern and Western Christianity (Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism). Accommodating this view, one museum in Sarajevo describes Bosnia and Bosnian culture favourably as ‘The Occident meeting the Orient’.12

Religious worldviews are socially constructed. Therefore, religious diversity can be viewed as a potential source for negative as well as positive developments depending on the geopolitical, economic, social and cultural context – either leading to competition and confrontation or to tolerance and coexistence (Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009: 2).13_{For my} research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I was interested as to how religious diversity could be utilized by religious initiatives to lead the way out of confrontation to a path of coexistence. The

9_{According to the survey summary, the research involved a written questionnaire with 78 questions} answered by a diverse sample of 2060 respondents from thirteen cities. These included larger and smaller cities, both in the Federation as well as the Republika Srpska, thereby capturing very different economic, cultural, political and geographical contexts (Wilkes et al. 2013: 5).

10_{In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is an overlap of religious, ethnic and national identity which can} account for this high number of religiosity compared to other European countries. The question of ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ religiosity versus ‘token’ religiosity, will be discussed in chapter four. The significance here lies in the fact that if so many people declared themselves to be religious, how can religion than become a valuable tool for the reconciliation of relationships?

11_{“U BiH ima 48,4 post Bošnjaka, 32,7 posto Srba i 14,6 posto Hrvata”}

http://www.avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/u-bih-ima-484-posto-bosnjaka-327-posto-srba-i-14-6-posto-hrvata. Accessed April 18, 2014

12_{Museum of the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand, research trip to Sarajevo, August-September 2013} 13_{This contradictory role of religion is what Appleby (2000) has referred to as “the ambivalence of the} sacred”.

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previously cited survey of Wilkes et al. (2013) showed a large public support for reconciliation and trust building in Bosnia and Herzegovina – particularly amongst religious citizens. “What seems quite clear is that the less religious or non-religious respondents were generally less optimistic about reconciliation and trust-building than those to whom religion is important in life.” (ibid.: 26). Why is this the case? Why should religion play a role in the reconciliation process?

The most often-cited reason why religion should play a vital role in the

reconciliation process relates to trust and the absence of trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina – specifically in those areas that suffered some of the worst war atrocities of the conflict (e.g. Trnopolje, in the Prijedor area, or Ahmici, in central Bosnia). This post-war situation of severe segregation and mistrust poses a major challenge for the reconciliation

process. While political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are widely regarded as corrupt and self-interested, religious actors still enjoy considerable respect and trust, at least within their own ethno-religious communities (Clark 2010: 674). Especially lower-ranking

religious actors such as local imams and priests, who are “an integral part of the social fabric of their communities”(ibid.), are present in ordinary people’s lives in an immediate way that differs from politicians. This enables them to easier gain people’s trust since “no actors are more local – and more trustworthy – than the leader of worship at a mosque, synagogue, church or temple.”(ibid.).

Another reason for the trust placed in religious leaders, is the inextricable link between ethnic, national and religious identity typical to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since most Serbs are Orthodox, most Croats Catholic and most Bosniaks Muslim, their religious leaders are to some Figure 1. Trust in Bosnian institutions (Gallup Balkan Monitor 2009: 26)

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extent not only the guardians of their nation’s religious identity, but also the guardians of its national identity (ibid., Powers 1996: 252, Cohen in Mojžes 1998). In other words:

Religions are more clearly seen as protecting the people, while politicians, parties, government, and even the international community are seen as opportunists pursuing power. … religions perceive themselves and are perceived as responsible for the survival and well-being of their followers. During a time of crisis, security is priority. Although the war is over, the current situation is still experienced as violent and threatening.

(Funk Deckard 2012: 88)

However, during my fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I noticed that not only political leaders were considered untrustworthy and compromised, but also religious leaders –

specifically those in the higher echelons of the institutional religions – lost or were losing their credibility and legitimacy of working in favour of the reconciliation process. My respondents would often point to the dubious role played by religious leaders during the war (while many of them continued holding their position afterwards) and the overlap of religious and political establishments. Since, post-war, “people consider politics as fundamentally dirty, impure because of its perceived corruption”, (public) interference of religious leaders in this sector significantly undermines the legitimacy of religion (ibid.: 12). The trust placed in ‘religious institutions’ by the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the above Gallup Balkan Monitor survey data from 2009 does therefore not necessarily refer to those higher religious leaders but to local religious representatives and actors, as Funk Deckard also noticed during her research. This embeddedness of religion through the local religious communities is one of its greatest assets of building peace.

There are some potential limitations to be pointed out by mainly focusing on the role of religion – in our case on one religion within a multi-religious society – that need to be addressed here. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have been attributed to ethnic, economic, political, social and religious factors. All of these factors have played a crucial role in the outbreak and continuation of violence and logically play an important role in the reconciliation process as well. It is therefore self-defeating, as Appleby also argues, to exaggerate the peace-building potentials of religious actors and communities, to see them in isolation from other contributors or to present them as uncomplicated, ready-made resources (Appleby 2000: 7). As will be seen throughout the course of this thesis, religion as well as other factors such as the political context, the economic conditions, and sociocultural factors are important denominators in the

reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. My hypothesis is therefore that religious initiatives – especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina – do contain unique and powerful potentials for harbouring reconciliation between the different communities, but these will have to coincide with reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts on all before mentioned levels of society.

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Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney(2010) point to the shortcomings of the case-study

approach in researching the relation between religion and peace making (ibid.: 1020). With the case study approach, they write, religion is separated from other factors and becomes an independent variable. Religion will become prioritized amongst the range of other factors important for peace making and, where broader processes that intersect with religion are

discussed, these cases are dealt with as localized instances (ibid.: 1021). For them, the case study approach is not well suited to research the role religion plays in the reconciliation process, promoting instead a comparative analysis that will identify generic factors across several cases. Although I recognize the arguments Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney make, I believe that through the richness of detail and thoroughness of studying one case in particular – especially through conducting fieldwork – I will be able to analyse the specific role Islamic initiatives play in the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perhaps generic factors can be dissected from my analysis that can be applied to other cases, but that is not my initial goal.

The interreligious dialogue

In what way could Islamic initiatives play a potential role in the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina? When I started my fieldwork, I was quite blank on the matter as to how these initiatives would approach the subject. Soon enough, I would find that although some Islamic organizations particularly focused their work on peace and nonviolence, most of them named ‘interfaith dialogue’ or ‘interreligious cooperation’ specifically in their mission statement. Since dialogue is an essential tool to overcome division and enmity, restore peaceful relations, and thereby become reconciled, I decided to shift my focus more to the interreligious dialogue. Therefore, while ‘religious peace-building’ can be defined as “the range of activities performed by religious actors and institutions for the purpose of resolving and transforming deadly conflict, with the goal of building social relations and political institutions characterized by an ethos of tolerance and non-violence” (Little and Appleby 2004: 5), I decided to particularly focus on only one of these (most common) activities: the interreligious dialogue.

Encouraging, enriching and nurturing the interreligious dialogue can be a useful tool to establish tolerance, to create understanding, to eliminate prejudice, and to build trust between the different religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At its most basic level,

interreligious dialogue can simply consist of dialogue between two individuals of different faiths. Participants can belong to all sectors of a religious community (not just religious leaders) and the content does not necessarily have to evolve around theological issues (Stein 2014: 3). As I noticed during my fieldwork, subjects during these interreligious meetings would often encompass common concerns, prejudices or grievances. The interreligious dialogue can therefore be carried out on different levels (the top, middle and grassroots level) and can be

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subdivided into different dimensions, such as the interreligious, intra-religious and interworldview dialogue (Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009: 3).

One broad definition of the interreligious dialogue can be: “All forms of human

communication both through speech and shared activities that help mutual understanding and cooperation between different people who self-identify religiously” (ibid.). Brajović, arguing why the role of religious traditions cannot be overlooked in the peace-building and reconciliation process, writes:

If people of different religious communities encounter each other in their everyday activities and establish trust by dialogue, this will enable them to know better areas in

which mutual activity can enhance society, and also to identify the areas in which religious difference can make mutual undertakings difficult. People who participate in dialogue will

also better understand their own faith. … This will increase their self-understanding and enable them to differentiate between the pure religious message and the cultural lenses through which they are interpreted.

(Brajović 2006: 154, italics in original)

The interreligious dialogue thereby not only enhances the inter-community relations but also the intra-community relations. “Focussing on the differences between religions, participants are forced to examine their own beliefs in order to support these positions” (ibid.). During my research, I found that the interreligious dialogue was equally important as the intra-religious dialogue within the community of Bosnian Muslims for the process of reconciliation. My initial assumption on this matter (how can a person open up to the other if one is not entirely

knowledgeable of his/her own beliefs?) proved to be a very relevant topic. The importance of improving the intra-religious dialogue is exemplified in chapter four when I discuss the

interreligious activities of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically on the high level of the religious leadership.

Naturally, solely the interreligious dialogue will not be able to facilitate and build a viable Bosnian state. As argued above, initiatives engaged in this field of peace-building have to go hand in hand with other measures such as the return of refugees, the formation of civil and political institutions and further reconstruction (Brajovic 2006: 150). However, religion is a key part of the mosaic that shape peoples identities in Bosnia, and enhancing the interreligious dialogue can therefore play a crucial part in creating the common ground, tolerance and trust needed for the reconciliation process to move forward.

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Defining Islamic initiatives

Who are then these ‘agents for peace’ that are seen as trustworthy enough to foster the reconciliation process through their religiously motivated peace work? Religious actors, as argued above, can include a variety of individuals, collectivities and institutions that are formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend or defend its values. At the most basic level, Islamic initiatives therefore consist of religious actors motivated by their Islamic faith, and in this specific case thereby doing peace work. The religious beliefs of the actors involved do not necessarily have to be obvious or explicit in their actions, and the initiative or organization does not necessarily have to state its religious commitment in their mission statement. The religious approach to the reconciliation process utilized by these Islamic initiatives tends to vary by the actors involved. One initiative in this research for instance mainly focusses on women issues and primarily involves female employees, whereas another initiative is run by two imams. The ‘degree of religiosity’ also varies in the activities, for instance: whether or not they mainly involve members of their own religious community, or if they are educational activities. Religious initiatives, or faith-based NGOs, are engaged in a range of activities,

including interfaith dialogue, providing immediate humanitarian aid, and fostering long-term reconstruction and sustainable development (Leban 2003).

The interreligious dialogue is thus not necessarily exclusive for the elite or religious leaders, as is the common assumption. As will be shown in the course of this thesis, the interreligious dialogue merely carried out at the level of the religious leadership does not significantly affect ordinary believers (Funk Deckard 2012: 188). There is thus a difference between the formal interreligious dialogue which is mainly carried out on the level of the higher religious leadership, and the informal interreligious dialogue which is carried out by local religious representatives or actors. The Islamic initiatives that are involved with the formal interreligious dialogue are initiatives often established by religious institutions, in this case the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, the informal interreligious dialogue is often carried out by Islamic initiatives locally established by citizens.

According to the survey data collected by Wilkes et al. (2013), respondents who

identified according to their religion were more likely to support a public reconciliation process – whereby Muslim respondents were more likely than Catholic or Orthodox respondents to support reconciliation activities addressing the past or focused on the needs of victims and minority groups (ibid.: 8). Funk Deckard also noticed this tendency during her research: “Broadly speaking, it seems that Muslim believers, compared to Catholic and Orthodox Christians, are more likely to pursue conflict transformation between religious communities from a faith foundation” (2012: 145). This however does not tally with the initial difficulties I had with finding organizations or initiatives that were engaged in faith-based peace-building

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and the reconciliation process from an Islamic perspective. According to Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana, and Abu-Nimer (2005), this discrepancy can be explained by the difference in

organizational structure of Western and Muslim communities and institutions. Although I do not agree with their argument that “generally speaking, the institutional development of Muslim actors lags behind that of Christian and multi-faith actors” (ibid.: 6) – I find it rather unhelpful to view Muslim societies or institutions as different or even as ‘lagging behind’ – the visibility of Islamic initiatives is hampered by the fact that they often do not emphasize their religiosity within their (peace) work. “The presence of Islam in their work is usually assumed both by their communities and Muslim peace-building actors”(ibid.). I therefore categorized Islamic initiatives engaged in the reconciliation process and interreligious dialogue according to the following criteria: if the actor(s) involved identify as Muslim or Islamic, if the initiative is led by a Muslim religious actor or leader, if it utilizes Islamic values, teachings, and practices within their work, and if it is established by Muslims inspired by Islamic values (ibid.).

Methodology & Source Discussion

This research has included a wide variety of literature research: written material on Bosnia and Herzegovina broadly, publications on reconciliation, peace-building, and transitional justice, and literature from the fields of history, genocide studies, anthropology, sociology, religious studies, and political sciences. As an interdisciplinary study, by relying on written material from various disciplines, this thesis thereby aims for a wide perspective and diverse conceptualization of the subject matter. Literature research was naturally part of the preliminary phase, but also coincided my field research and the writing phase of this project. Also, as part of my research, I have consulted the websites of the organizations that were the focus of my fieldwork. These internet sources, a list of which can be found in my bibliography, provided me with additional information on the activities and mission statements of these organizations.

During my fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have interviewed seventeen

respondents, participated in a seminar on Faith-based Organizations in Civil Society organized by the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo, and helped organize a youth workshop in Mostar on Reconciliation and Education. Additionally, I have taken dozens of notes from personal discussions and observations during my two months stay there. My research method was ethnographic. By living in a Bosnian home and associating primarily with Bosnian citizens I was able to gain a clear view of present day Bosnian society and how people experience living there. Through the participation in the events mentioned above I was able to discuss and share my ideas and preliminary results with experts in this field of study as well as residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thereby fine-tune my argument. Starting with one or two organizations and individuals I contacted before travelling to Bosnia and Herzegovina, I used the snowball

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methodology by pursuing new contacts through those I already established. Since I had only two months for conducting my fieldwork, I decided to keep Sarajevo as my home-base and work from there. Consequently, most organizations and individuals featured in this thesis are located in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital. However, I fortunately also had the opportunity to extend my research field with a long trip to the north western region (around Prijedor and Sanski Most), with a trip to Tuzla, and with a weekend in Mostar and its vicinity. This enabled me to also gain insight in the role of Islamic initiatives and the reconciliation process outside an urban environment.

Ten of the seventeen interviews were held with representatives either of grassroots Islamic organizations or of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I conducted interviews with representatives of two specifically multi-religious organizations, four interviews were carried out with representatives of organizations with a non-religious grounding and one interview I conducted was with a high-school teacher in Islam. Thirteen of the interviews conducted were with Muslims, two with people from a secular point of view, one interview I conducted was with a representative of the Inter Religious Council who was of Jewish descent, and one interview was with a Catholic representative of the multi-religious organization IMIC. I specifically state here the religious background of the respondent since my interviews revolved around their view, or their organization’s view, on the role of religious actors in the

reconciliation process and how these actors engage in interreligious dialogue. Although the organizations they were involved in, or employed by, might have a secular or multi-religious grounding, their religious conviction often surfaced during the interviews and therefore have to be taken into account.

My interviews were of semi-structured nature. I had a set of standard questions, sometimes adjusted to the type of organization of the respondent, but often elaborated on specific topics valuable for my research that came to the table during an interview. As shown in the overview of my respondents in Appendix I, I also interviewed respondents from multi-religious organizations where intermulti-religious dialogue is a primary part of their mission, but who were not particularly Islamic. Finally, I also decided I wanted to talk to non-religious people who are active in the field of reconciliation and peace-building and hear their view of the role of religion in this process. An overview of my interview-questions can be found in Appendix II.

During my time in the field I noticed that there were some topics that kept on surfacing which I did not anticipate beforehand, or I at least had not assigned it as important. These were topics such as the state of social wellbeing within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the importance of religious education, and subsequently the status of the intra-religious dialogue within the Bosniak Muslim community. As discussed above, this led to a particular focus on the

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interreligious dialogue (chapter three) and the intra-religious dialogue (chapter four). To be able to dissect my transcribed interviews, the following coding was used during transcription:

xxxx = social wellbeing/political situation xxxx = reconciliation

xxxx = role of religion/interreligious dialogue xxxx = religious leadership

xxxx = strong/weak religion (or: ‘true/false’, ‘authentic religion’) xxxx = intra-religious dialogue

These codes largely correspond to my sub-questions, and thus to the chapters of this thesis in the same order as they are presented here. The methodology of coding my interviews would prove very efficient during the writing part of this project, since I was quickly able to pinpoint those parts of an interview deemed necessary for the relevant topic I was writing on. Also, I was able to conduct all but two of my interviews in English, thereby greatly reducing the risk of errors in interpretation or misunderstanding. Except for the interview with the deputy mufti of Tuzla dr. Sead-ef. Seljubać, for which the English teacher of the local Madrasa served as an interpreter, and Edin Ramulić, for which my local contact translated, all of my respondents were able to communicate in English.

As stated above, the sub-questions proposed in this thesis correspond to the upcoming chapters. After a brief overview of the events that happened during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its causes, and the Dayton Peace Accords, chapter one is primarily concerned with tackling the ambiguous concept of reconciliation. Through literature research as well as data from my own research, I will show that reconciliation is a complex process of the rebuilding of relationships and restoring of trust, stemming from all previously warring sides and including all levels of society. The poor political and economic conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina however create serious obstacles to any attempts aimed at improving the reconciliation process. Following this, chapter two will cover the historical background of the Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ottoman conquest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the gradual Islamization of this part of the Balkan, and the legacy this system left behind is of critical importance to the

development of the Bosnian Muslim identity. Chapter three and four will respectively deal with the informal and the formal interreligious dialogue. Through assessing the activities of three informal Islamic initiatives, I will argue that it is within these grassroots local initiatives, through the interreligious dialogue, that genuine reconciliation happens ‘on the ground’ between people of different faith.

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1. The Ambiguity of Reconciliation

“In Mostar it is impossible to agree on the truth. So let us first trust in each other to choose for the right truth.”

Personal conversation. Mostar, September 28, 2013

“Reconciliation, we suggest, is a murky concept with multiple meanings.”

Stover and Weinstein 2004: 5

A few days before I would leave Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital from which I had conducted fieldwork for two months, I went out for a typical Bosnian dinner with my host Sabiha – a sixty year old Bosnian lady. Several times during these two months she had curiously asked me what exactly I was doing research on, with whom I had met and what my findings were. I would explain to her that I was looking at the way in which Islamic religious initiatives aimed at ‘bridging the gap’ between the different religious communities, how they actually contribute to the reconciliation process and how they approach this. I would tell her that I thus mainly tried to talk to people from the Islamic community, either individuals or organizations, but also people that are involved in interreligious organizations or those with a non-religious background to try to get the full picture.

Up until this particular night, she would nod her head, state that ‘nothing good comes out of religion’, before going on with her business. Although Sabiha was born in a Muslim family, she never practiced Islam and was very negative about the role the religious communities played in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But she resigned to the fact that this was also a subject that should be researched and mainly told her visiting Bosnian friends that I was a Dutch student doing

research into genocide in Bosnia. And so, while eating our beloved krompirusa (a typical Bosnian potato pie), she would raise her eyebrows and ask me: “Marieke, I still do not understand why you did not try to talk to the other religious communities? Why did you not approach the Catholic church and especially not anyone from the Orthodox community?” Although this was a legitimate question, I could feel and hear there was some anger in her tone of voice. I therefore carefully tried to explain that I agree that their role in the reconciliation process needs to be researched too, but that this was not my approach to the subject. Sabiha: “But how can you expect from a people that have been the victim of a genocide and of terrible crimes, to start any

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project aimed at reconciling with the perpetrators? They did this to us and got away with it! You should have gone to them and see what they are doing.”

Sabiha’s opinion about my research is an explanatory example of one of the key

problems facing the reconciliation process in Bosnia. “The war and its dynamics played a crucial role in the evolution of existing ethno-national framings of the root causes of the conflict, and resulted in three mutually exclusive ethno-national narratives about the role of their own community and the role of others in the Bosnian war.” (Kostić 2012: 653). When I asked her what reconciliation should entail for her, the following answer given by Ɖermana Šeta14_{is also} an illustration of this mechanism:

I do not know, I really do not know. It should definitely be about telling the truth, but the problem is these three truths. We will never agree on that, I really do not see that. What I feel that helps, but what is so painful, are personal stories. My personal story is: I had been living in a small village in central Bosnia and then the Yugoslav army came and expelled us from this village, Donji Vakuf. No one can tell me anything else but that. If there is someone who will say that it was a civil war, I cannot accept that. Because I know that the uniform stated JNA [Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – the Yugoslav National Army, MZ]. Sorry guys, but this had to come from Belgrade. For me, there is no discussion about this. But for someone else who was in some other city, who was from the other ethnic group, he has a different story. And I respect that story, but this is what happened to me!

So his truth is basically different than mine. And I do not know what to do about this. Because this will always pop up, wherever you go, anywhere. You will sit and have a discussion on agriculture, within fifteen minutes you get down to on who started the war and who is guilty for what. It just pops up because we do not agree. So how can we reconcile? … There is no trust.15

These three truths, these three meta-narratives, have been perpetuated ever since the war was brought to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreements. Politicians, public persons and members of each ethnic community repeatedly call on the need for each community to stick together, out of (imagined) fear for war or violence, and are thereby not only deepening the divide between the three main ethnic groups but also marginalising those who are open for reconciliation across ethnic boundaries. In this chapter, I will answer my sub-question: what is reconciliation and how can this process be described in Bosnia and Herzegovina? To be able to understand the fragile status of the reconciliation process in Bosnia, I will first discuss the Dayton Peace Accords that – although making an end to the violence in 1995 – has never been able to address the structural issues that have partly caused this violence to break out in the first place.

14_{Ɖermana Šeta (1981) is Head of the Research Department at the Centre for Research and Education}

Nahla (an Islamic NGO), Head of the Human Rights and Freedom of Faith Commission of the Islamic

Community of BiH (Rijaset) as well as a senior fellow at the Centre for Advanced Studies, Sarajevo. 15_{Šeta, Ɖermana. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sarajevo, September 14, 2013.}

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1.1 Dayton: an uneasy cease-fire

In November 1995, an American-led peace conference took place in Dayton, Ohio, on the war in the former Yugoslavia. The representatives of the parties of the conflict agreed to participate in these negotiations not because they desired to get along, but because they were coerced by mediators and/or wished to see an end to the violence. A peace accord was formulated in which 49 % of the Bosnian territory remained Serbian (the Republika Srpska) and 51% would belong to the Muslim-Croat federation (De Graaff 2005: 204). The Accords forbade persecution or discrimination on the basis of religious or ethnic identity (Sells 2003: 322). They required support for the return of refugees to their former places of residence, the return to the refugees of their surviving property, prosecution of those who carried out war crimes and the

reconstruction of the destroyed sacral heritage (ibid.). One of the long-term objectives of Dayton is to reassemble and recreate a country that has been torn apart by war (Reid in Shatzmiller 2002: 149).

The presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the Dayton Peace Agreements, is a three-person rotating institution, where each of the main ethnic groups elects a representative to the presidency (Reid in Shatzmiller 2002: 154). Under the relatively weak central government there are two more powerful entity governments, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An elaborate system of controls ensures that each ethnic group has a veto (ibid.). This is an important part of the agreement since competing memories of the war and a profound lack of trust within and between the three ethnic groups are still strong (ibid.: 149). The influence of nationalistic politicians remains strong in both entities of the country (De Graaff 2005: 234). According to the agreement, both regions were allowed to form its own army, police force and parliament. Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ten cantonal governments were created under which 142 municipalities were established. The 3,8 million citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are thereby governed by 168 ministries (on canton-, entity-, and state-level) consisting of 70,000 employees on four governing-levels (that of the

municipality, canton, entity and state). According to Reid: “implicit in the Accords is the attempt to create circumstances that will lead to the development of a multi-ethnic society” (Reid in Shatzmiller 2002: 149). However, time has shown that this system is not only highly expensive but also completely ineffective for governing.

“An ‘uneasy cease-fire’ is an apt description of the circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina today”(Goodwin 2006: 1). It is ‘a truce’, enforced at a crucial moment by the international community – and the military might of NATO (Reid in Shatzmiller 2002: 149). Or, as Ɖermana Šeta firmly stated, “our main problem is our political Frankenstein constitution”.16_{Dayton has}

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proven to be insufficient in terms of the elimination of the sources of the war and conflict transformation (Brajović 2007: 149). It set out a broad framework for building a new state, but thereby lacked a comprehensive vision in the area of transitional justice17_{– resulting in ad hoc} and incomplete transitional justice efforts, especially in the areas of truth-seeking and

reparations (Pejić-Sremac 2011: 83). But what is widely regarded as one of the main failures of the Dayton Agreements, is the inability of the Bosnian refugees to return home. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that around 2.2 million people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina were displaced or became refugees as a result of the war – about half the population at that time (Funk Deckard 2012: 7). As of mid-2013, there were still around 103,000 internally displaced people residing in Bosnia and approximately 30,000 Bosnian refugees outside its borders.18

Important to note is that no civil society actor from Bosnia and Herzegovina was involved in the negotiations for the Dayton Accords. Civil society, while Bosnia was part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was minimal and Bosnia therefore does not have a strong tradition of civic action. However, there were some initiatives that emerged after the death of Tito in 1980 (Funk Deckard 2012: 71). Funk Deckard writes : “According to peace researcher Roberto Belloni, civil society ‘has been deemed indispensable for the long-term sustainability of peace processes[,]… a critical space where participation is enhanced and diversity and pluralism can be fostered … [and] a crucial agent in influencing the political system.’”(Funk Deckard 2012: 70). Since many of my respondents navigate and work within civil society19_{, ‘from below’ or} ‘grassroots’, their exclusion to the (at least formal) process of peace-building has been crucial to the success of it. Civil society is extremely marginalised, especially when the identity of ethnic groups is threatened by it. Those institutions, organisations or individuals that might create the social platform for civil society to prosper do not agree, lose credibility and – eventually – importance and influence. Consequently, “… the country lacks a mature civil society. … it seems Bosnia-Herzegovina has some elements that are found in civil society, such as NGOs, but it lacks a complete array of actors and functions as well as a deep entrenchment in political and social life.” (ibid.: 73). I will return to these issues more thoroughly in chapter three, in which I will

17_{I will follow Teitel (2003) by defining transitional justice – the overarching term covering processes} such as rehabilitation, lustration, amnesties and reparations – as the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes (ibid.: 69). Transitional justice is therefore not a ‘special’ form of justice, but an approach to achieving justice in time of transition from conflict and/or state repression (“What is Transitional Justice?”, http://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. Accessed February 24, 2014). 18_{“UNHCR regional operation profile – South-Eastern Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina”}

http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d766.html#. Accessed February 26, 2014

19_{Civil society actors could include religious institutions, social movements, trade unions, citizens’ action} groups, independent media, and the critical public (Funk Deckard 2012: 73).

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turn to an analysis of the influence of Islamic and interreligious initiatives on the reconciliation process in Bosnia.

1.2 The conflict: structural issues

The question remains: why is peace-building and reconciliation so hard to accomplish in Bosnia and Herzegovina? To gain more insight in this complicated issue, we have to turn to an overview of the causes of war in this part of the western Balkans. The structural problems that will

emerge, which lie at the root of the conflict, have never been properly addressed. Along with an ineffective peace treaty that created an administrative mud pool, this situation has created a divided, politically and economically unstable and underdeveloped Bosnia.

The former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was made up out of six republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. Yugoslavia, half the size of France and with a population of 24 million people, existed for almost seventy-five years as an autonomous state (Zwaan 2005: 57). After the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, nationalism became a political mobilizer for the different ethnic groups. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war that followed were accompanied by violence, the deaths of many people, large refugee flows, and enormous material damage. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was complex: periods of heavy fighting were followed by relatively quiet periods in different regions of the country (ibid.: 59). The course of the war reflected the complex ethnic composition of Yugoslavia as well as the different interests and ideologies between the actors involved (ibid.).

Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state in which no single group formed a majority. Each republic did however have a clear majority of the group for which the republic was named, for example the Serbs in Serbia and the Croats in Croatia (Hayden 1996: 787). With the exception of one: the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was Tito’s aspiration of uniting the different groups, who had fought each other in the past, in a new Yugoslavia. One problem was that Tito knew that “the major groups would not be able to agree on a version of the past, on a common ‘Yugoslav’ history” (Bringa 1995: 23). He therefore decided to “forget the past” and create a carefully constructed system for the balance of power between the largest ethnic groups, so that no people would feel dominated (ibid.).

Serious long-term problems, however, were unavoidable in Yugoslavia’s policy: should the political power be concentrated at the level of the federation or is it more desirable to give the six republics more political autonomy? How much autonomy should be given to the different ethnic categories (this problem is often called the ‘national question’)? (Banac 1984: 415). The Yugoslav leadership had to face all of these closely related problems. They were not only hard to manage, but they also contributed to the crisis and disintegration of Yugoslavia. At his death in 1980, Tito had ruled for almost 35 years, but had not appointed a successor (ibid.). It was in the

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post-Tito period of transition that the problems became more evident. Political life shifted in the vacuum of authority that developed from the League of Communists, where it consisted of in-fighting between representatives of the republics, to the six republics and the provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina (Meier 1995: 3).

In the free elections held in 1990, after the break-up of the League of Communists, nationalism was the outcome: Serbia for the Serbs, Croatia for the Croats et cetera. In Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim, Serb and Croat nationalist parties received votes. And so each republic, except for Bosnia and Herzegovina, became a nation-state based on the sovereignty of the majority national group (Hayden 1996: 787). Hayden argues: “The politics of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and the early 1990s thus turned territories populated by

concentrations of the various national groups into states in which the members of the majority nation were sovereign.” (ibid.: 788). Minorities, such as Albanians in Kosovo and Serbs in Croatia, were suddenly defined as second class citizens as the nation-states were defined by their ethnic majorities. This is what Michael Mann has called ‘the dark side of democracy’: “since amid multiethnicity the ideal of the rule by the people began to entwine the demos [rule by ordinary people, MZ] with the dominant ethnos [an ethnic group, MZ]” (Mann 2005: 3).

On June 25, 1991, both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. Ethnically homogeneous Slovenia without any significant minority would not become a significant theatre of war. The situation turned out to be quite differently in the two republics with large Serb minorities, Croatia en Bosnia (Bringa 1995: 24). When, following a referendum, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on March 3, 1992, war started a month later and lasted for three and a half years (Zwaan 2005: 59).

The wars in the former Yugoslavia have been commonly attributed to diverse factors, ranging from political-economic factors to ethno-national causes. The most widely known is the ‘ancient hatreds’-thesis, the idea that the atrocities taking place in the region of the former Yugoslavia were due to the fact that the different communities actually ‘cannot live together’. On the eve of the war, in Sarajevo 1992, the Bosnian Serb nationalist leader Radovan Karadžić spoke: “We cannot live with the Muslims and the Croats, for there is too much hatred, centuries old hatred. Serbs fear the Muslims. They cannot live together.” (Bringa in Hinton 2002: 197). This line of argument, Bringa continues, not only became an explanation for the war for international bystanders, but also an argument not to intervene.

Ethnic cleansing, the expulsions of unwanted populations through terror tactics such as looting, rape, murder, the burning of homes and the destruction of religious and cultural objects (Bringa in Hinton 2002: 203), is also a term commonly used to describe the crimes that took place during the wars. However, the term is also referred to by academics as a euphemism for ‘genocide’ (Bringa in Hinton 2002: 203) or for ‘religious cleansing’ (Sells 1996: 15). For Bringa,

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the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was not so much about ‘ethnic purification’ but rather about the ‘destruction of alternatives’ and therefore the elimination of people who represented those alternatives (2002: 213). Ideologies of nationalist supremacy were hereby significant driving factors of the war, with the ideology of a ‘Greater Serbia’ or ‘Greater Croatia’ claiming only one ethnonational group as valuable while all other should be ‘purified’ from the territory (Funk Deckard 2012: 5).

The projects to support such ideologies (primarily Serbian and to a lesser extent, Croatian) not only produced great physical suffering – displacement, loss, torture, death – during the four years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also immense psychological trauma that continues to grow even as these ideologies perpetuate themselves in political forms.

(ibid.)

Ultimately, attempts to single out one cause for the conflict risk reductionism and several factors may therefore legitimately be cited for the demise of Yugoslavia (Goodwin 2006: 3). How can these multiple factors that have played a crucial role in the outbreak and continuation of violence be addressed in order for the traumatized society to reconcile? What is reconciliation, what does it entail according to my respondents and what does reconciliation mean in the specific context of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

1.3 Reconciliation: in theory

When, after violent conflict, a settlement is negotiated between the warring sides (often with the help of a third party), new structures for governances are being formed. These structures are almost always democratic, often in a context or situation where democracy has not before been the system of governing. One of the basic principles of democracy is the need for cooperative relationships to implement the structures of democracy, structures which are based on

managing the natural differences prevalent in society – being it differences in ideology, culture, religion or opinion (Bloomfield 2003: 11). This means that former enemies are faced with a situation in which they have to implement, work and live within this democratic structure by cooperating together, being it not that their relationships are based on antagonism, distrust and often hatred (ibid.). For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the extreme violence and traumas of the war caused deep wounds, distinct relational divisions and widespread mistrust. In such an

environment, “… reconciliation between estranged groups proves essential for sustainable peace.” (Funk Deckard 2012: 9).

Reconciliation is a very complex and ambiguous term. Priscilla Hayner defines

reconciliation as “the act of building or rebuilding relationships today that are not haunted by the conflicts and hatreds of yesterday” (Hayner 2001: 161). According to Hayner, there are

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several indicators that can point to the level of reconciliation within a specific society, such as how the past is integrated and spoken about between former enemies; whether contradictory versions of the past have been reconciled; and whether relationships are based on the present or on the past. To become reconciled, Clark (2010) writes, is to overcome alienation, division and enmity and to restore peaceful, cooperative relationships based on a shared commitment to communal solidarity. Reconciliation is dynamic (Quinn 2009: 4) and has no universal meaning (Kostić 2012: 664).

One of the key ingredients of the reconciliation process is the ‘healing of relationships’, of rebuilding trust and cohesion. But reconciliation must be understood as an overarching process which also includes the search for justice, truth and forgiveness and coincides with the

democratic underpinning of economic justice and political and social power-sharing (Bloomfield 2013: 12). Peuraca (2010) too understands reconciliation to occur within these prosaic realms. For instance, in the economic sphere, reconciliation includes a willingness to hire workers across community lines or, in politics, reconciliation encompasses tolerance of opposition and acceptance of joint participation within formal institutions that permit collective decision making (ibid.: 2). The sociocultural and religious aspects of reconciliation, Peuraca continues, can constitute the rededication of houses of worship, rebuilding schools and developing

curricula. “The postconflict challenge is to establish relationships through which former enemies can affirm their own collective identities while simultaneously tolerating and respecting others” (ibid.).

Stover and Weinstein (2004) have a more critical approach to the concept of reconciliation, its ambiguous definition and its actual effectiveness for bringing peace.

In the context of war and political violence, reconciliation has been described as ‘developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups.’ … Yet what do such abstract notions as ‘mutual conciliatory accommodation’ or ‘a normal life in a normal country’ mean to a woman who has been held captive and repeatedly raped by members of a paramilitary gang who were once her classmates?

(ibid.: 13)

For them, a term such as ‘social reconstruction’, a process that reaffirms and develops society and its institutions based on shared values and human rights, or ‘reclamation’, the act or process of reclaiming in any sense restoration, better captures the processes of social repair in post-war countries (ibid.: 14). These processes must incorporate elements of identity, culture, memory, and history.

One scholar of international peace-building and conflict mediation was also mentioned by my respondents, perhaps because of his specific religious (Mennonite Christian) approach to

Then we came to understand that I was hurt and you were hurt too