Neighbourhood in Flux: A Study on How the Arab Spring Affected the European Union’s Mediterranean Policies

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Neighbourhood in Flux: A Study on How the Arab Spring

Affected the European Union’s Mediterranean Policies

MA Thesis in European Studies: European Policy Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Yuri Alexander Mol Student number: 10091750

Main Supervisor: Prof. Dr. László Marácz Second Supervisor: Dr. M.E. Spiering

ABSTRACT The surge of domestic discontent in the Arab World in the last decade, culminating in widespread protests and even open revolt at the end of 2010 has changed the region considerably. Virtually all the Arab countries around the Mediterranean have been deeply affected, sometimes resulting in violent power struggles, as in Libya, Egypt and Syria. It has changed the balance of power, resulting in destabilisation, the rise of sectarian divides and other spillover effects, such as mass migration and economic malaise. The leaders of the European Union embraced the ‘Arab Awakening’, construing that these changes were an ideal opportunity for the liberalisation of the political and economic systems of this region. In addition, the Union thought that this would in the long-term improve the relations between the South and Eastern Mediterranean and the EU, providing fertile ground for building new partnerships for economic improvement, energy stability, and the fight against terrorism. For that reason, the Union sought to strengthen its instruments and platforms for cooperation, further building on, inter alia, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean. This thesis provides an in-depth examination of the EU Mediterranean policy framework before and after the Arab Spring (December 2010 – December 2012). Using a historical institutionalist research approach and discourse analysis, it examines whether the EU’s post-Arab Awakening Mediterranean policy framework compromises a major policy shift or is a continuation of an established policy approach.

1 July 2017 Barcelona, Spain

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA Association Agreement

ACAA Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy DA Democracy Assistance

DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement EaP Eastern Partnership

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EC European Commission

EEAS European External Action Service EEC European Economic Community EES European Security Strategy EIB European Investment Bank EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

EU European Union

EUSR EU Special Representative GMP Global Mediterranean Policy HI Historical Institutionalism

HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy IEMed European Institute of the Mediterranean

IFI International Financial Institution IMF International Monetary Fund MEFTA Mediterranean Free Trade Area MENA Middle East and North Africa MNC Mediterranean Non-member Country MS Member State of the European Union NAP National Action Plan

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental Organisation NMP New Mediterranean Policy

PfDSP Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean PTA Preferential Trade Agreement

SEMED South and Eastern Mediterranean SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

SPRING Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth UfM Union for the Mediterranean

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Introduction

Up until the early 1970’s, the relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs) remained limited in scope. They consisted of a few bilateral agreements that mainly sought to deepen cooperation in the areas of trade and development.12 A more comprehensive approach to cooperation with the MNCs was, for the most part, a prerogative of France, who maintained strong relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean for historical reasons and the region’s strategic importance for its national interest.3

The first policy framework towards the Southern Mediterranean was introduced with the formulation of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972. Lasting until 1992, the GMP acted as a general policy umbrella for previous and subsequent bilateral agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries.4_{By negotiating a series of agreements with the Maghreb and Mashreq} countries (except for Libya) the EEC aimed to strengthen development and trade cooperation with the region.5_{In addition, within the GMP framework, Association Agreements (AAs) were concluded with} the MNCs of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and Malta. These agreements included prospects for a customs union or eventual membership, introducing a more strategic element to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.6

Due to a worsening of the political and economic climate in the second half of the 1970’s, caused by, inter alia, the death of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the GMP experienced a reduced room of manoeuvre.7_{Consequently, it was not able to achieve its set out goals of, amongst others,} substantially improving the investment climate in the Mediterranean region, and promoting and facilitating regional integration.8

From the 1990’s onwards there was a visible shift in the Community’s Mediterranean policy design. The post-Cold War security framework and broad criticism on the apparent failing of the GMP

1_{Ingeborg Tömmel, ‘The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU: An Appropriate Response to the Arab Spring?’,}

Democracy and Security, no. 9:1-2 (2013), pp. 19-20.

2_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies towards the Mediterranean Region (1957-2016)’, FOCUS article}

IEMed, no. 136 – 10 (2016), pp. 1-2.

3_{Karim Knio, The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy: Model or Muddle?: A new Institutionalist}

Perspective, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013, p. 27.

4_{Bichara Khader, ‘The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring’, 17}

Papers IEMed (2013), p. 14.

5_Ibid.

6_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA),} ‘Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation (Historical)’, http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/, retrieved on 26 January 2017. 7_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, pp. 1-2.}

8_{“[…] it must be recognised that the Arab-Mediterranean countries themselves showed no interest in shelving}

their differences and promoting cooperation arrangements. The only successful cooperation arrangement was the setting up in 1981 of the successful Gulf Cooperation Council but it was not concerned with the Global Mediterranean approach. The Marrakech Treaty instituted the Union for the Arab Maghreb in 1989 but proved to be less promising.” – Bichara Khader, ‘The European Union…’, p. 14.

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called for a new strategy towards the Southern Neighbourhood, spurring the Community to transform its patchwork of measures into a more coherent and systematic policy approach.9_{The outcome was the} New Mediterranean Policy (NMP) which was adopted in 1990. Heralded by the European Commission (EC), the NMP shifted its focus from bilateral agreements to several regional-based programmes with narrower objectives and strategies and bolstered the available funds for cooperation. Furthermore, the New Mediterranean policy emphasised the rule of law, human rights and the strengthening of civil society.10_{This emphasis on liberal democratic norms and values became one of the pillars of the} Barcelona Process that would be launched in 1995.11

The Barcelona Declaration of 27 and 28 November 1995, establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also referred to as the Barcelona Process, provided the then 15 Member States (MS) of the Union with an agenda for comprehensive cooperation with 12 Mediterranean countries.1213_This agenda was split up into three ‘baskets’, with a political & security partnership, an economic & financial partnership, and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.14_{The main objective of the EMP} was the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) through the gradual removal of tariff and nontariff barriers.15

Even though the Barcelona Process introduced ambitious ideas and structures, they were from the very beginning subjected to broad criticism from the Arab World. This criticism emanated from the highly asymmetrical nature of the overarching policy framework, resultant from the agenda-setting role of the European Union (EU) – the Union was responsible for funding the project.16_{Furthermore, the} multilateral approach of the EMP did not always prove to be fruitful due to irreconcilable differences between the different countries of the Mediterranean.17

After achieving an unsatisfactory amount of success in 10 years’ time and due to the emergence of new enlargement dynamics, the EU changed its direction once again with the proposal for a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003.18_{The European Neighbourhood Policy, further strengthened by} regional forms of cooperation such as the Black Sea Synergy, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), granted a more versatile external policy tool, which the Union could apply to both its Eastern and Southern neighbours. The ENP and the UfM seemed to be successful in establishing more effective and efficient ties with the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood, until events in

9_{Ingeborg Tömmel, ‘The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU’, p. 19.} 10_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, pp. 1-2.}

11_Ibid.

12_{Barcelona Declaration, ‘Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95’.} 13_{Bichara Khader, ‘The European Union…’, p. 23.}

14_{Barcelona Declaration, ‘Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95’.} 15_Ibid.

16_{Patricia Bauer, ‘European-Mediterranean Security and the Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges’.}

Democracy and Security, no. 9:1-2 (2013), p. 4.

17_{Idem, pp. 4-6.}

18_{Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for} Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003.

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the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from December 2010 onward once again forced the Union to change its course.

On 17 December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi, plagued by systematic harassment and humiliation at the hands of the authorities, committed the desperate act of self-immolation.19_{This sparked mass protests and demonstrations in Tunisia which were fuelled by} public discontent over a lack of democracy, social justice and dignity. These mass protests and demonstrations were the beginning of what would later be called the Tunisian Revolution. The revolution had far-reaching consequences for the broader Arab World, proving to be the catalyst for similar campaigns of civil resistance and even revolution across the MENA region. These revolutionary waves are now known as the ‘Arab Awakening’, the ‘Arab Spring’ or the ‘Arab Uprisings’.

The Arab Awakening, starting in Tunisia, spread like wildfire, finding similar hotbeds of public discontent in, inter alia, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. This outburst of cropped up estrangement would result in, amongst others, the government of Tunisia being overthrown on 14 January 2011, the resignation of President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, and the uprising in Benghazi, Libya on 15 February 2011 that would lead to the Libyan Civil War and the deposition of its long-lasting dictator, Muammar Gaddafi.202122

“There are storms blowing across countries we call our neighbours: 'Arab spring', 'winds of

change' - whatever imagery we use, none of us in this house know where this will end, and what the end will bring. Aspirations are high, and expectations too, that the revolutions will have been worth the blood that has been spilt, worth the turmoil and fear, worth the economic havoc in a world already grappling with the worst economic problems for decades” – Catherine Ashton, High Representative of

the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (hereafter High Representative or HR), address to the European Parliament on 11 May 2011 in Strasbourg.23

At the beginning of 2011, a large part of the Arab World seemed to finally shake off the shackles of authoritarianism – an unexpected turn of events since the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region

19_{Fahim Kareem, ‘Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia’,}

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/world/africa/22sidi.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2&src=twrhp, retrieved on 26 January 2017.

20_{The Guardian, ‘Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee Tunisia as protesters claim victory’,}

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests, retrieved on 26 January 2017.

21_{The Guardian, ‘Hosni Mubarak resigns – and Egypt celebrates a new dawn’,}

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/11/hosni-mubarak-resigns-egypt-cairo, retrieved on 26 January 2017.

22_{Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Libya Revolt of 2011’, https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011,} retrieved on 26 January 2017.

23_{Catherine Ashton, ‘Speech on main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy} and the Common Security and Defence policy’, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-326_en.htm, retrieved on 26 January 2017.

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were believed to be highly resilient.24_{The revolutions prompted discussions on the effectiveness of the} various multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms in the South and Eastern Mediterranean (SEMED).25_{Furthermore, Europe was still in the midst of the Eurozone crisis, the worst economic} recession since the Great Depression, which put the European institutions as well as the Member States’ domestic systems under strain – the effects of which can still be felt at the time of writing. The Eurozone crisis’ consequences were manifold but the most important ramifications were that the MS were turned inward and had less room for political manoeuvre.

The already economically weaker states of the Southern periphery were most affected by the crisis and were mired in economic difficulty. Therefore, the key players in the EU’s Mediterranean strategy: Spain, France, and Italy, were subdued in their reaction to the events in the Southern Mediterranean. In addition, the Union was amid a reorganisation of its foreign policy toolbox with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, resulting in a reshuffle of responsibilities and competencies across its various institutions, agencies, and decentralised bodies.26

The dire straits Europe found itself in were also compounded by a high degree of internal discord. While newspapers published articles about the Arab freedom fighters, spouting headlines such as ‘Libyan rebels renew hopes of Arab Spring’,and public opinion rallied behind their fight for more equality, civil rights and dignity, European governments were less willing to navigate unchartered waters and “[…] let go of life-long allies […]”, especially when it could affect their national interests.2728_{As a consequence, most European governments were circumspect and vigilant in their} actions, preferring to observe the situation that was unfolding on the other side of the Mediterranean and to monitor ‘which way the wind was blowing’.

The conservative European response exacerbated the situation, which later proved to be to its own detriment. The Europeans barely managed to influence the direction and development of the uprisings which meant that in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening the Union had to adapt itself to a changed environment, characterised by a growing arc of instability. Given these premises, how did the EU decide to address the negative consequences of the Arab Awakening? Did it restructure the extent, substance and underlying objectives of its instruments and platforms for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation or were any changes purely cosmetic in nature? Second, what rationale can be discerned behind policy continuity and change? Third, how can this be explained? In short, this thesis questions

24_{Federica Bicchi, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring:} ‘More for More’ or Less of the Same?’, Mediterranean Politics, no. 19:3 (2014), p. 319.

25_Ibid. 26_Ibid.

27_{Craig Whitlock, ‘Libyan rebels renew hopes of Arab Spring’,}

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/libyan-rebels-prolong-arab-spring/2011/08/22/gIQAl10JXJ_story.html, retrieved on 26 January 2017.

28_{Federica Bicchi, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy Post-Arab Spring…’,} p. 320.

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whether the EU’s post-Arab Awakening Mediterranean policy framework compromises a major policy shift or is a continuation of established policy approach.

This thesis is a case study on how the EU adapted its policies to the changed environment in its Southern Neighbourhood in the wake of the Arab Spring. The purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of EU foreign policy, specifically the EU’s Mediterranean policies, and the EU’s functioning and flexibility when dealing with unforeseen events. The consequent turmoil of the Arab Awakening provides an excellent case study due to its broader consequences for the region and the region’s importance for the security and prosperity of the Union and its Member States. The research question of the study is: did the Arab Awakening starting in December 2010 and ending in December 2012 engender a major shift in the EU’s Mediterranean policies or is the post-Arab Awakening EU Mediterranean policy framework a continuation of an established policy approach, and how can this be explained?

For this study ‘the EU’s Mediterranean policies’ (interchangeably used with EU Mediterranean policy framework) are defined as the overarching policy framework of the European Union when dealing with the various political, civil and social actors active in the SEMED. This means that this case study will mainly focus on the historical development of: The Global Mediterranean Policy, the New Mediterranean Policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Union for the Mediterranean. As such, initiatives such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue or more group to group regional initiatives like the 5+5 formula, and the Forum of the Mediterranean fall outside the scope of this study.

To provide a more multidimensional review of whether a policy shift took place the analysis is split up into two parts. The first part examines whether there has been a shift in policy practice in the EU’s post-Arab Spring Mediterranean policies and, to complement the first part of the analysis, the second part of the analysis studies whether there has been a shift in policy discourse. The structure of the thesis and the analysis of the development of the EU’s Mediterranean policies’ practice is based on concepts and research methodologies set out in historical institutionalist (HI) literature. To be more precise, the research approach is based on historical institutionalist process tracing. The second part of the analysis reviews shifts in the concept of democracy promotion, utilising theory from discourse analysis. Both parts of the analysis are predicated on a holistic examination of the substance, extent, rationale and underlying objectives of the Union’s main policy instruments and platforms for cooperation in the Mediterranean throughout its historical development.

The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter, titled ‘EU Mediterranean Policy: Historical Overview’, provides a review of EU policy towards its Southern Neighbourhood beginning with the first Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) concluded with a Maghreb country in 1969 up until the events of the Arab Awakening starting in December 2010. The second chapter, titled ‘EU Mediterranean Policy: Response to the Arab Awakening’, presents an in-depth examination of the

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beginning with the joint communication ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, released on 8 March 2011 and ending with the second review of the European Neighbourhood Policy published on 18 November 2015.2930_{The third chapter, titled ‘Policy Continuity} and Change: Shifts in Practice and Discourse’, analyses the first two chapters to deduce whether, how and why the EU’s Mediterranean policy framework experienced a major shift in practice and discourse after the events of the Arab Uprisings.

The first two chapters not only examine the shifts in the main institutional principles over time but also the ad hoc policy proposals in response to various external conditions. The key features of the examined policy developments are summarised at the end of each chapter. The research is based on qualitative data, e.g., evaluation reports, communications, and ministerial declarations, released by the EU institutions, agencies, decentralised bodies, and intergovernmental, regional organisations, such as the UfM. Furthermore, the first two chapters make ample use of policy analysis carried out by research institutes, such as the European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation, and various scholars in the field of international relations. The next section lays out the conceptual and methodological framework for the analysis.

29_{European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ‘Joint} Communication to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, 8 March 2010.

30_{European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,} ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN (2015) 50 final.

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Conceptual and Methodological Framework

Historical Institutionalism

With the increasing availability of large statistical datasets, the study of history and institutions, broadly defined as ‘man-made rule structures’, e.g., formal rules, public policies and organisations, by political scientists was largely abandoned in the 1960’s.31_{However, due to a crisis of economic relations starting} from the 1970’s and a challenge against individual centred behaviourism, the study of institutional structures returned in the 1980’s and 90’s.32_{Taking on more analytical and epistemological} characteristics, this new academic terrain of institutionalism focused on state institutions and their partial autonomy from civil society, and their role in creating policies.33_{This new academic field} launched a “[…] search for the causes and agents of institutional change […]”, leading to several epistemological consequences.34_{In economics, this search led to the fall of the Keynesian economic} paradigm and the rise of the Chicago school of economics, while in political science, historical, rational choice and sociological varieties of institutional analysis experienced significant growth.3536

While these schools of institutional analysis differ in the solutions they offer to challenges that have confronted scholars of political science, they do show several similarities.37_{For example, while} the school of rational choice institutionalism take utility-seeking individuals as the starting point for their understanding of institutional constraints, borrowing from economics and mathematics, HI focuses on the maintenance, construction, and creation of institutions.38_{This does not mean that historical} institutionalists are uninterested in individual preferences, they just prefer “[…] to define human motivation in terms of goals […] and in collective action […]”, using a more global approach.39_When it comes to the overlap between the different schools of institutionalism, they are largely in agreement on the premise “[…] that institutions constitute the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”40

Focusing on the school of historical institutionalism, one of the major figures in its development, the American political scientist Charles Tilly, described HI as a method to ‘measure’ “big

31_{Elizabeth Sanders, ‘Historical Institutionalism’, R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman, The}

Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 41.

32_Ibid. 33_Ibid. 34_Ibid. 35_Ibid.

36_{Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Political Science’, The}

Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, pp. 1-2.

37_Ibid.

38_{Elizabeth Sanders, ‘Historical Institutionalism’, pp. 41-50.} 39_Ibid.

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structures, large processes, and [making] huge comparisons”.41_{In other words, historical} institutionalism is predominantly focused on providing answers on macro issues, such as why an actor, in this case study the EU, chose a particular policy approach and how actors, once ventured down this path, find it difficult to reverse course. Thus, historical institutionalism is a research tradition that studies “[…] how temporal processes and events influence the origin and transformation of institutions that govern political and economic relations.”42_{In other words, historical institutionalism’s central} assumption is that one gains more insight into human political interactions: 1) by studying man-made rule structures and 2) their historical development – rather than solely taking a snapshot of those interactions.43

The focal point of the historical institutionalist research approach highlights the persistence of institutional inertia (path-dependence), engendered by self-reinforcing feedback, and the environment under which it changes (commonly called critical junctures).4445_{Accordingly, HI also pays attention to} gradual institutional change, finding patterns in incremental modes of change that can finally lead to transformative outcomes.46_{In the next section, this study specifies historical institutionalism’s core} concepts: ‘path-dependence’ and ‘critical junctures’.

First outlined in 1990 by the American economist Douglas North, institutional development is determined by a ‘historical’ path-dependency: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way society evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.”4748 Moreover, individuals follow these rules because of the benefits it brings them. The concept of path dependence does not mean that change does not occur but rather that the possibilities of change are constrained by choices taken in the formative years of the institution, policy or regulation. When change does occur it normally occurs at so-called ‘critical junctures’.

The concept of critical junctures was introduced within the school of historical institutionalism by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier in 1991, who described it as “[…] a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.”49_{They further argued that “[…] variation in the}

41_{Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, [without place of publication]: Russell} Sage Foundation 1984, p. 60.

42_{Orfeo Fioretos, et al, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Political Science’, p. 13.} 43_{Elizabeth Sanders, ‘Historical Institutionalism’, pp. 41-50.}

44_{Karim Knio, The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy…, p. 27.}

45_{Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annual Review Political Science, no. 2} (1999), p. 372.

46_{Orfeo Fioretos, et al, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Political Science’, p. 13.}

47_{Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge} University Press 1990, p. 3.

48_{Karim Knio, The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy…, p. 17.}

49_{Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the political arena: critical junctures, the labor movement,}

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unfolding of critical junctures across contexts held the key to explaining divergent political legacies and outcomes across countries”, stressing that the duration of such a juncture, as well as its scope, affect its historical legacy.50_{In turn, a critical juncture would, therefore, form the beginning of a new} path-dependence process, leaving a lasting mark in the development of a rule structure.

In subsequent years, further academic discussion revolved around the question of how critical junctures themselves can best be explained by reference to rule-structures or to other prior causes, and to what extent these critical moments influence institutional change. Several scholars argued that critical junctures “[…] are best understood as periods of time that are significantly shorter than the path-dependent processes resulting from them.”51_{The reasoning behind this is that if critical junctures are} assumed to be longer periods, the instrumental influence emanating from these critical moments will be inhibited by re-materialising institutional constraints.52_{In order to gain a complete understanding of} the extent of a specific juncture’s influence and its precursory conditions, a distinction was made between the essential permissive conditions and the productive conditions for critical junctures to transpire.53_{The political scientist Hillel David Soifer defined both conditions in a recent (2012)} contribution.

Per Hillel David Soifer, “permissive conditions are necessary conditions that mark the loosening of constraints on agency or contingency and thus provide the temporal bounds on critical junctures. Productive conditions, which can take various logical forms, act within the context of these permissive conditions to produce divergence.”54_{In other words, permissive conditions are ‘background} conditions’ that loosen up the existing constraints within the institution’s framework, while productive conditions are structural conditions that can act within this more unconstrained context to set institutional change in motion and are reproduced at the end of a critical juncture, setting in action a new path-dependence process. As an illustration, in Soifer’s essay, the collapse of world trade amid the Great Depression formed the permissive conditions for the rise of import substitution industrialisation in Latin America in the twentieth century, while new economic nationalist ideas and political coalitions within the relevant Latin American countries formed the productive conditions and their mechanism.5556

Summarising, “in the context of the study of path-dependent phenomena […]”, critical junctures are defined “[…] as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.”57_{The duration of a} critical juncture, as well as its heightened contingency, are respectively relatively shorter and

50_{Orfeo Fioretos, et al, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Political Science’, p. 19.} 51_{Idem, pp. 9-10.}

52_Ibid. 53_Ibid.

54_{Hillel David Soifer, ‘The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures’, Comparative Political Studies, no. 45 (2012), p.} 1572.

55_{Idem, pp. 1590-1591.}

56_{Orfeo Fioretos, et al, The Oxford Handbook…, p. chapter 1 pp. 9-10.}

57_{Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, ‘The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and} Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’, World Politics, no. 59 (2007), p. 348.

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substantially higher than the events that precede and follow it because a critical juncture sets in motion a new path-dependence process which constraints future choices. Therefore, “[…] the critical juncture constitutes a situation that is qualitatively different from the “normal” historical development of the institutional setting of interest.”58_{Having determined the conceptual framework of critical junctures} and path-dependence, this thesis now examines the methodology of how one should analyse critical junctures and its synonyms.

According to Capoccia and Kelemen, there are four conceptual shortcomings that should be first addressed when carrying out HI analysis: units of analysis, time horizons, near misses, and power asymmetries.59_{First, when examining whether an event constitutes a critical juncture, it is pertinent that} the subject is anchored in a unit of analysis. This is important because “[…] different kinds of external shocks may affect some decision-making arenas and leave others unaffected.”60_{Second, as discussed} in the above, a critical juncture should be brief relative to the path dependent process it triggers.61_Third, a critical juncture does not necessarily effect change, as the outcome may result in the restoration of the status quo.62_{Fourth and final, when confronted with the question of whether a critical juncture (and its} synonyms) took place one should focus on how decisions of influential actors steer the outcome since in comparison to the power exerted by the political elite small random events are most often negligible.63

Taking into consideration the above, Capoccia and Kelemen set out that the analysis of critical junctures should be considered “[…] as the analysis of decision making under conditions of uncertainty. The methods adopted should therefore reconstruct, in a systematic and rigorous fashion, each step of the decision-making process, identify which decisions were most influential and what options were available and viable to the actors who took them, and clarify both their impact and their connection to other important decisions.”64_{They identified various methods of analysis that are most suitable for the} task at hand: process tracing, systematic process analysis, analytic narratives, and several forms of structured, theory-guided narrative.65_{This study uses the method of ‘process tracing’, which is defined} in the next section.

Process tracing is most commonly found in so-called ‘non-formal narrative accounts of institutional crises. Its methodology entails tracing the process “[…] that led from a situation in which several options were open to a new equilibrium based on the choice of one of them […]” through a holistic narrative of its historical development.66_{This non-formal approach to critical juncture and} path-dependence analysis has several advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are, amongst others: it

58_Ibid. 59_{Idem, pp. 347-348.} 60_{Idem, p. 350.} 61_{Idem, p. 351.} 62_{Idem, p. 352.} 63_{Idem, p. 354.} 64_{Idem, pp. 354-355.} 65_{Idem, p. 355.} 66_{Idem, p. 358.}

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is applicable to different units of analysis; through its descriptive narrative it can consider the paths not taken, and it can account for the fundamental decisions and choices that led to the outcome. However, the disadvantage of this non-formal approach is that, due to its broad historical narrative, it may include too many details which can result in digressive argumentation.67

Concluding, following Soifer’s, Capoccia’s and Kelemen’s methodological prescriptions for historical institutionalist research, this study examines the historical development (examining near misses if the available data allows) of the EU Mediterranean policies (unit of analysis), emphasising, if possible, the essential permissive and productive conditions that led to policy change, through the decisions set out in various policy documents of EU institutions and high-level actors (therefore considering power asymmetries) to analyse if the Arab Spring, lasting from December 2010 till December 2012 (the time horizon), formed a critical juncture in the development of the EU’s Mediterranean policy framework. To complement this research approach, the second part of the analysis utilises discourse analysis to determine whether a shift in policy discourse took place. This analytical approach is explained in the next section.

Discourse Analysis

From policy assessments that target the substantive aspects of specific instruments to reviews of more general strategies, there is a substantial corpus of academic literature that examines shifts in EU Mediterranean policy.6869_{However, more linguistic approaches to EU Mediterranean policy analysis} can be found few and far between. This is remarkable because although the EU does utilise some economic policy tools to coerce or persuade the political bodies of the Southern Mediterranean to change their behaviour, the EU is mainly depending on its soft power instruments, based on cultural diplomacy and political values, to influence state actors.70_{This soft power is exercised by the production} of discourses, which is, inter alia, promoted by EU cooperation agreements, such as trade agreements.71

Professor of Linguistics Norman Fairclough defines discourses as ‘ways of representing’ social practices that attribute “[…] significance to a domain of knowledge or experience from a particular standpoint.”7273_{“Discourses are therefore selective representations of economically, politically, socially} and culturally complex phenomena which may be understood in more than a single way.”74

67_{Idem, p. 359.}

68_{Karim Knio, The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy…, pp. 97-126.}

69_{Andrea Teti, ‘The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership} for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, Mediterranean Politics, no. 17:3 (2012), pp. 267-270.

70_{Mathias Großklaus and David Remmert, ‘Political steering: how the EU employs power in its} neighbourhood policy towards Morocco’, Mediterranean Politics, no. 21:3 (2016), pp. 344-345.

71_{Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Civilian, ‘Normative, and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and EU Discourses’,}

European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 16:1 (2011), pp. 1-10.

72_{Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual analysis for social research, London and New York:} Routledge 2003, p. 26.

73_{Andrea Teti, ‘The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’…, p. 268.} 74_Ibid.

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Accordingly, discourses are subjective, selective and are produced to serve a political purpose. This involves the creation of social power relations, which is the research subject of critical research studies. Critical research studies, better known by the name Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), “[…] is discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context.”75

Through a multidisciplinary approach, CDA examines the properties of social interaction and structures, thereby providing a framework to analyse how “[…] discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power dominance.”76_{The main tenets of CDA can be} summarised as: 1) it addresses social problems; 2) “power relations are discursive”; 3) discourse compromises society and culture; 4) “discourse does ideological work”; 5) “discourse is historical”; 6) “the link between text and society is mediated”; 7) “discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory”, and 8) “discourse is a form of social action.”77_{In short, Critical Discourse Analysis does} not have a unitary theoretical framework, it consists of general aims and goals that are targeted at gaining a deeper understanding of how specific discourse structures are utilised in the production of social dominance.78

To reiterate, this study uses CDA as the framework for analysing whether a shift in policy discourse took place after the events of the Arab Awakening. This is meant to supplement the HI analysis. The study targets a specific kind of discourse which has been a key principle of EU Mediterranean policy throughout its historical development, namely, democracy promotion. Democracy promotion, also known as Democracy Assistance (DA), has been an established principle of EU Mediterranean policy since the launch of the New Mediterranean Policy in 1990.79_{The exact} definition of DA has been the subject of fervent debate over the last three decades due to democracy itself being a conflicted concept.80_{However, according to Thomas Carothers, a renowned expert on} international democracy support, it can be divided into two overall different approaches, a political approach and a developmental approach.81

While the political approach operates from a narrow concept of democracy, focusing on, above all, genuine and competitive elections, and political liberties, the developmental approach has a more holistic conception that encompasses socio-economic concerns.82_{Supporters of the political approach} sometimes add further institutional features, such as a strong rule of law and an independent judiciary

75_{Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in: Deborah Tannen e.d., Heidi E. Hamilton e.d., and} Deborah Schiffrin e.d., The Handbook of Discourse Analysis: Second Edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2015, p. 466.

76_{Idem, p. 467.} 77_Ibid.

78_{Idem, pp. 467-470.}

79_{Andrea Teti, ‘The EU's First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’…, p. 266.}

80_{Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental', Journal of Democracy, vol.20, no.1} (2009), pp. 5-6.

81_Ibid.

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to their core concept of democracy but they are wary of diluting their political conception.83_{They direct} most of their aid to political parties, elections and politically oriented civil society groups usually at important conjunctural moments. Supporters of the developmental approach pursue a more incremental, iterative process of change that looks beyond the purely political definition, including economic and social rights in their definition. For that reason, supporters of the developmental approach prefer a more indirect approach to DA, directing their attention to socio-economic development and, state capacity and good governance building.84

The concept of democracy and its relationship with the formulated goals of EU Mediterranean policy has changed through time. The EU’s Mediterranean policies, therefore, serve as an excellent case study for discourse analysis since all references towards the concept of DA expressed in the examined policy documents as, inter alia, ‘democratisation’ and ‘strengthening of democracy’, can be tracked. Accordingly, the analytical method used is to examine the idea of democracy in EU Mediterranean policy documents after the Arab Awakening, noting the definition provided and put into its socio-economic and civil-political context. This discursive organisation of democracy promotion is then contrasted with the latest discourse of democracy in its final iteration before the turmoil of the Arab Awakening. This is used to determine whether a shift in policy discourse took place and how this can be explained.

83_{Idem, p. 7.} 84_{Idem, pp. 5-9.}

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Chapter 1: EU Mediterranean Policies: Historical Overview

The Union’s Mediterranean policy framework developed from the 1960’s onward and has since gone through several phases. These phases reflect the different policy approaches that Europe has utilised throughout the years.85_{The first phase was characterised by a lack of a coherent policy framework,} corresponding to a patchwork of agreements, ranging from trade agreements to Association Agreements.86_{Bilateral trade agreements between the EEC and the Maghreb countries of Algeria,} Morocco, and Tunisia were first signed in July 1969. These preferential agreements linked these countries to the then six-member state EEC for a renewable period of five years.

The agreements were exclusively commercial in nature, exempting specific manufactured goods and agricultural produce from duties which were further subjected to quotas that were based on the economic situation of the EEC.87_{These goods included textiles and leather products, and preferential} tariffs for olive oil and citrus fruits (products that were in demand because Italy could not meet market demand and Spain was not yet a member of the EEC). As such, these agreements were to a certain extent protectionist, only allowing goods on the Community’s market that did not compete with domestic production. The various bilateral agreements introduced two important policy principles: 1) non-reciprocity; and 2) allowing free access to the Community market in so far as it did not infringe on the market share of locally produced foodstuffs.88_{Other forms of cooperation or development assistance} were almost exclusively provided by France, who had critical national interests in the region.89

1972: The Global Mediterranean Policy

Dissatisfaction with the scope of the bilateral agreements, “[…] judged to be too narrow in certain instances, and their length of time, judged too short in others […]” led the EU to come up with a new policy framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.90_{The Global Mediterranean Policy formulated} at the Paris Summit of 19th_{October 1972 was the first step towards a more integrated, inclusive and} uniform Mediterranean policy framework.91_{Lasting until 1992, it implemented more comprehensive} trade agreements with Mediterranean non-member countries with the exception of Albania and Libya.

85_{Ahmed Aghrout, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Trade Relations’, in: Hedwig Giutso ed., The Euro-Mediterranean}

dialogue: prospects for an area of prosperity and security, Rome: Solaris s.r.l. 2012, p. 29.

86_Ibid.

87_{Regulation (EEC) No 1059/69, Regulation (EEC) No 1467/69 and Regulation (EEC) No 1470/69.} 88_{European Commission, ‘Annex 2: EC-MED Relations’,}

http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/theme/rurpol/outputs/diagnostic/html/annex2.htm, retrieved on 31 January 2017.

89_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘EU and Maghreb} Countries: Bilateral Agreements’, http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/eu-and-maghreb-countries-bilateral-agreements/, retrieved on 31 January 2017.

90_{Ahmed Aghrout, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Trade Relations’, p. 29.}

91_{Paris Summit, Meetings of the Heads of State or Government Paris 19-21 October 1972, paragraph on} ‘External Relations’.

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In addition, it provided for financial and economic aid through bilateral financial protocols and included chapters on social co-operation.

The EEC intended this aid for the modernisation and diversification of the agricultural and industrial base of the MNC. However, the GMP agreements made aid conditional on the imposition of new restrictions, such as the introduction of an agricultural tariff calendar and the inclusion of refined petroleum products on the tariff list, which proved to be devastating for North Africa’s exports.92_The first GMP agreement was signed “[…] with Israel in 1975; then with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in 1976; and with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1977.”93_{The agreements contained three main} chapters:

1. Trade Co-operation: The Community enforced “[…] preferential tariffs on agricultural, agro-industrial and horticultural products in conformity with quotas fixed per lists of products and reviewed depending on Europe’s economic situation (so as not to interfere with the Common Agricultural Policy).”94_{Furthermore, industrial products were “[…] exempt from} custom-duties, although the importation of textiles, foot-wears and refined petroleum products […]” were “[…] subject to the quota system.”95

2. Financial and Economic Cooperation: Financial protocols specified “[…] the level of aid given to the […]” MNC.96_{The aid took “[…] various forms: grants, European Investment Bank (EIB)} loans at lower market interest rates and Commission loans at a 1% interest rate.”97

3. Social Co-operation: The EEC pledged “[…] to improve the standard of living of immigrant workers (most are from North Africa and Turkey), legalising family grouping and […]” promised to give “[…] them social rights equal to those of European citizens.”98

These agreements were twice renewed, in 1981 and 1986, with no significant changes apart from a net increase in the grants and loans provided by the Commission as a share of the protocols.99 Overall, the GMP framework proved to be the first step toward a more coherent policy approach to the SEMED. It combined public subsidies in the form of aid with the building of economies of scale through a strategic implementation of a zero-rate tariff fee with the aim to induce socio-economic development in the region. A combination which mirrored the Keynesian approach to economic policy that prevailed

92_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘EU and Maghreb} Countries: Bilateral Agreements’.

93_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA),} ‘Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation (Historical)’.

94_Ibid. 95_Ibid. 96_Ibid. 97_Ibid. 98_Ibid.

99_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘EU and Maghreb} Countries: Bilateral Agreements’.

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in Europe until the late 1970’s.100_{At its core, the GMP can be seen as a vehicle for the propagation of} EEC commercial interests since its main tenet was the protection of European products through the implementation of a quota system and the imposition of preferential tariffs.

1990: The New Mediterranean Policy

Despite the launch of the GMP in 1972, cooperation between the Union and the Mediterranean non-member countries remained predominantly bilateral through the 1970’s and 80’s. The cooperation agreements with the eight “[…] Maghreb and Mashreq countries remained in force and were updated in 1987 to take account of the recent accession of Spain and Portugal.”101_{However, in the course of the} 1980’s many Mediterranean countries expressed their discontent with the GMP because they saw their preference margins deteriorating.102_{This finally led to a reassessment of Community policy towards} the Mediterranean region, starting in 1990 with a communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament titled ‘Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy: Proposals for the period 1992-96’. Its introduction stated that social and economic development of the SEMED was vital for the security of Europe:

“[…] the Commission reiterates the view that owing to geographical proximity and the

closeness of all types of relations, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean non-member countries are key factors in the stability and prosperity of the Community itself. If the courses followed by the Community and the MNC caused a worsening of the economic and social disparities between the two, the Community would be in a difficult position. What is at issue is its security in the broadest sense. Moreover, it is the Commission's view that the Community has a duty to encourage the continuing and at times accelerating progress seen in a number of the MNC towards pluralist democracy and a strengthened market economy.”103

Proposing a greater emphasis on normative values, socio-economic development and horizontal cooperation, the communication proved to be the start of what would later be called the New Mediterranean Policy. The NMP was adopted by the Council in December 1990 and it differed from previous Mediterranean policy on several fronts. Most important of which was that it had narrower objectives and strategies with a more regional-based approach, deploying several regional programmes that did not exist under its predecessor. In addition, it had a larger focus on the civil society dimension

100_{Federica Bicchi, ‘From Security to Economy and Back? Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Perspective’,} http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/bicchiconvergenceofciv.doc, p. 10, retrieved on 31 January 2017.

101_{Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs, London: Lynne Rienner} Publishers, Inc. 1997, p. 78.

102_{Ahmed Aghrout, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Trade Relations’, p. 30.}

103_{Commission of the European Communities, ‘Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy: Proposals} for the period 1992-96’, SEC (90) 812 final, Brussels 1 June 1990.

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and it had a greater budget at its disposal for the financial protocols.104_{Its six main components} consisted of:

1. Providing more support for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes, “[…] with the particular aim of softening their social counter-effects.”105

2. Promoting the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 3. Encouraging the protection of the environment.

4. Financing more regional-based programmes with the aim of reinforcing horizontal co-operation.

5. Emphasising “[…] the importance of human rights with a new clause enabling the European Parliament to freeze the budget of a financial protocol if serious human rights violations justify it.”106

6. Helping “[…] societal actors such as universities, the media and municipalities contribute efficiently to the development and modernisation of SMEs by setting up « Med » programmes of decentralised co-operation.”107

Further negotiations within the framework of the NMP were built on “[…] four pillars: political dialogue; industrial free trade; economic, social and cultural operation; and financial co-operation.”108_{Arguably the most important development within the framework of the New} Mediterranean Policy was the launch of the MED programmes for decentralised cooperation as set out in the sixth component.109

Beginning in 1992 after the Gulf War with Iraq, the aim of the MED programmes was to strengthen political and security cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries. The MED programmes had two objectives: 1) counterbalancing the aid given to Central and Eastern Europe through the PHARE programme, and 2) reducing the economic gap between Europe and its Southern Neighbourhood.110_{Depending on the countries involved, there were five different MED programmes} in the period 1992-1995: MED-Campus (fostering co-operation in higher education between the North and South); MED-Invest (supporting SMEs in the MNC); MED-Media (increasing co-operation between media networks); MED-Urbs (improving quality of urban life and strengthening democracy and cooperation between authorities on a local level), and MED-Migration (enhancing cooperation and

104_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, p. 3.}

106_Ibid. 107_Ibid.

108_{European Commission, ‘Annex 2: EC-MED Relations’.} 109_Ibid.

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partnership between non-governmental organisations and local communities on migration-related issues).111

The MED programmes were an interesting new development in EU-Mediterranean cooperation because, as a rule, programme partners, ranging from local authorities to civil society organisations, were in direct contact with each other without central authorities being involved. The idea behind this new form of cooperation was to be as close to civil society as possible.112_{Even though the MED} programmes were suspended from 1995 until 1998 because “the Court of Auditors found serious irregularities and mismanagement in the MED programmes”, the course of EU Mediterranean policy was set.113114_{The civil society dimension and a people-to-people approach became the linchpin of the} Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that would be launched in 1995.115

1995: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The end of the Cold War resulted in the dawn of a new security framework and drastic changes in the global political environment. Events like the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the Madrid Conference held from 30 October to 1 November 1991, and the Oslo Accords, signed on 13 September 1993 and 28 September 1995 (both part of the Middle East Peace Process), were the source of optimism and newfound hope.116_{However, the vacuum left behind by the demise of the Soviet Union was also a} cause for concern for the EU. Certain regimes in the SEMED started to crumble after the cessation of Soviet support, and organised criminal groups started expanding across the Mediterranean.117_{Thus, the} EU was keen to envelop the region in a new framework for cooperation, strongly linking the MNCs to Western institutions and its own Member States. The outcome was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched on the 27th_{and 28}th_{of November 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration made by the then 15 MS} of the Union and 12 MNC (Maghreb and Mashreq countries including Israel, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Malta and Cyprus, henceforth called partner countries).

The EMP was the first true EU policy towards the Mediterranean region, implementing a new institutional ecosystem that finally broke with the more bilateral approach of the previous three decades.

111_{Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge 1999, p.} 280.

112_{European Parliament, ‘Committee of Independent Experts First report on allegations regarding fraud,} mismanagement and nepotism in the European Commission 15 March 1999’,

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/experts/3_en.htm, retrieved on 2 February 2017.

113_{Court of Auditors, ‘Special report on the MED programmes’, http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/6780_en.html,} retrieved on 2 February 2017.

114_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘MED}

Programmes’, http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/med-programmes/, retrieved on 2 February 2017.

115_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, p. 3.} 116_{Idem, p. 4.}

117_{Hans Günter Brauch, Peter H. Liotta, Antonio Marquina, Paul F. Rogers, Mohammad El-Sayed Selim,}

Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Security and environmental conflicts,

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It was envisioned as a new deep, cohesive and continuous relationship between Europe and the SEMED that by 2010 would result in the creation of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area.118_{This free trade zone} would connect the countries of the Mediterranean basin, together accounting for more than 800 million (including the EU as a whole) potential consumers (twice the size of the North American Free Trade Agreement).119_{The intention was that the EMP would pave the way for more regional integration and} socio-economic development, which in turn would lead to the spread of liberal democratic norms and values, and subsequently, a more peaceful and stable Mediterranean region.120

According to Roger Albinyana, director of Euro-Mediterranean Policies and Regional Programmes at the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), the Barcelona Process was a big step forward in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation since it “[…] generated a broad institutional ecosystem that allowed it to escape from […] pure intergovernmental dynamics.”121_{This new ecosystem consisted} of sectoral Ministerial Meetings that covered domains such as the economy, education and justice; a rotating presidency; Senior Official Meetings; a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, which brought together national and EU parliamentarians, and the Civil Forum, which provided various regional civil society actors with a say in EMP operations.122

The policy framework of the EMP increased the support available for the Mediterranean partner economies. To this end, the EMP set up the MEDA programme, which would become the main financial instrument for the implementation of its policies and activities. MEDA was initially introduced in July 1996 with the aim of progressively replacing the previous system of financial protocols, that for twenty years regulated cooperation with the Mediterranean non-member countries.123_{Its funds were} co-managed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank, providing support for three forms of action:

1. The creation of a MEFTA. This included support for the economic transition of the Mediterranean non-member countries; the focus herein lay in promoting private sector development through the support of various economic and social reforms (by supporting local SMEs, increasing foreign direct investment and domestic investment, improving market openness and supporting the consolidation of pivotal economic and social structures).124

119_Ibid. 120_Ibid.

121_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, p. 4.} 122_Ibid.

123_{European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA), ‘MEDA}

Programme’, http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/meda-programme/, retrieved on 3 February 2017.

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2. Encouraging long-term economic and social development in the region by bolstering civil society, strengthening human rights and democracy, and supporting the development of the transport and energy sector.125

3. Invigorating regional and intra-regional development, through supporting the creation of new structures “[…] aimed at augmenting economic and cultural regional cooperation between and amongst non-member Mediterranean countries and members of the EU.”126127_{MEDA funds in} the period 1995-2005 would eventually amount to more than EUR 10 billion of investment in the region.128_{It would be the main financial aid instrument in the region until its replacement} in 2007 by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).129

In addition to supporting intra-regional development and supporting the creation of a MEFTA, the Barcelona Process introduced a security dimension into the dialogue with the MNC and set out a framework of democratisation, seeking to stabilise the Mediterranean region through the creation of new organisational structures and the introduction of novel policy approaches.130_{These new structures} and approaches can be outlined in three fundamental ‘baskets’: 1) A political and security basket: establishing a common area of peace and stability; 2) An economic and financial basket: creating an area of shared prosperity through partnership agreements and the progressive establishment of a MEFTA, and 3) A social, cultural and human rights basket: to developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.131

Taking a closer look at the framework for democratisation laid out in the Barcelona Declaration, there are two references to the importance of democracy for peace and stability in the Mediterranean region, first in the preamble and second under the political and security basket:

Preamble: “[the signatories are] convinced that the general objective of turning the

Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership.”132

Political and security partnership: “In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of

principles to: develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system; respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the

125_Ibid. 126_Ibid.

127_{Roger Albinyana, ‘A Review of EU Policies…’, p. 4.} 128_Ibid.

129_Ibid.

130_{Barcelona Declaration, ‘Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95’.} 131_Ibid.

Neighbourhood in Flux: A Study on How the Arab Spring Affected the European Union’s Mediterranean Policies