How Has European Identity Been Defined, Theorised and
Instrumentalised by New Far-Right Movements
By Calum Fisher
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Student Number: 11774754
European Studies: Identity and Integration
2017-2018
Supervisor: Dr. Krisztina Lajosi-Moore
Table of Contents:
INTRODUCTION ... 3
1 Background ... 4
1.1 Globalisation and the Resistance of Nationalism ... 6
1.2 Immigration, Integration and the Re-Emergence of Nationalism ... 9
2 Methodology and Aims ... 14
2.1 Methodology ... 14
2.2 Aims ... 17
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW ... 19
1 Theoretical Framework ... 19
1.1 Useful Terminology ... 20
2 Definitions and Theories of Identity ... 21
2.1 National Identity versus European Identity ... 22
2.2 Contested Views ... 28
2.3 Instrumentalising Identity ... 31
2.4 Metapolitics ... 33
CHAPTER 1: HOW IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY DEFINED, THEORISED AND INSTRUMENTALISED BY GENERATION IDENTITY? ... 35
1 What is Generation Identity? ... 35
2 How Does Generation Identity Define and Theorise Identity? ... 38
2.1 How does Generation Identity Instrumentalise Identity? ... 44
CHAPTER 2: GENERATION IDENTITY AND ARKTOS MEDIA ... 49
1 What is Arktos Media and What Contributions Does it make to the Field of Far-Right Identity Theorisation? ... 49
2 What Role Does Arktos Media Play in Facilitating Generation Identity’s Process of Identity Instrumentalisation? ... 53
3 How, and Through What Processes, Does Arktos Media Facilitate Identitarian Discourse? ... 56
CHAPTER 3: THE GLOBAL IDENTITARIAN SPHERE AND IDENTITARIAN HEGEMONY ... 65
1 How Extensive is Friberg and Spencer’s Network and What Influence Does the Identitarian Movement Have Within it? ... 65
2 How Can the Identitarian Movement’s Aim of Achieving Cultural Hegemony be Analysed and Evaluated? ... 74
2.1 Obstacles and Barriers to Identitarian Hegemony ... 81
CONCLUSIONS ... 85
Introduction
What, exactly, is European identity? It appears there are as many interpretations of this subject as there are Europeans, divided along many sets of lines including separatism versus integrationism, liberal democracy versus illiberal democracy, and secular modernism versus Christian traditionalism, amongst others. European identity plays a subordinate role to national identity, with 51% of Europeans feeling a sense of attachment to ‘Nation first, then Europe,’ and while those who identify solely with the nation outnumber those who identify solely with Europe by 39% to 8%, it is becoming an ever more important and contentious issue amongst citizens, as a society changed by cosmopolitanism and European migration, which have lowered barriers and blurred boundaries, has developed a definite sense of an overarching, European identity.1
This sense of ‘European’ identity has also entered the consciousness of a wave of new far-right movements (FRMs), whose approach of simultaneously adopting a pan-European and hyper-regionalist viewpoint based on a bottom-up interpretation of European Identity as an inherent, hereditary and exclusive characteristic sets them apart from previous far-right movements such as Nazism and Fascism which saw the unification of a civilisation of Europe as achievable only via the enforcement of a top-down system of governance. While the ideology proposed by these new, Identitarian movements is not novel – they are the descendants of Fascist thought and count many neo-Nazis amongst their ranks – the centralisation of ‘European identity’ to their beliefs enables them to collaborate across European borders. National branches of this pan-European movement support each other’s cultures and traditions, enabling them to claim to be the ‘true protectors’ of European diversity, while still appealing to a very nationalistic support base.2 In targeting this support base, Identitarianism presents Europe as a patchwork
1 Camelia Cmeciu and Mădălina Manolache, “A Narrative Approach to Europe’s Identity Crisis.” The European Legacy (2018): 1-2. 2 Markus Willinger, Generation Identity: A Declaration of War Against the ‘68ers, trans. David Schreiber (London: Arktos, 2013): 87.
quilt, with each square representing the local, regional and national identities of each European country, each contributing a distinct, equal and permanent contribution to the blanket of European Identity. While the wool from which each square was woven, they say, was shorn from the same sheep, the many hands, dyes and looms used to form and colour them has given each square distinct, inimitable patterns and styles that distinguish each one from the rest. If the coloured fibres of two squares begin to mix or are contaminated by outside fibres, they claim, the integrity of the entire blanket is compromised. Thus, a duality of thought is present in Identitarianism in which the preservation of national cultural difference is seen as a way of protecting continental cultural similarity.
This duality of thought can be seen in ideas they promote such as ‘a Europe of Nations’ or ‘a Europe of 100 flags’ in which Europe is conceptualised as an organic civilisation of many nations, each with its own ‘identity, culture and collective beliefs, its own spirit’ as well as a ‘pan-European spirit’ that bonds them together.3 Moreover, this ‘European spirit’ has been adopted by American White Supremacists, whose interpretation of Identitarianism
deterritorialises and ethnicises European Identity.
1 Background
As the world has opened up and Liberalism and its universal values have spread, Liberal Democracy counts nations from Europe and North America amongst its ranks while European nations have become unified under the European Union, ushering in the age of globalism. Cosmopolitanism, that is, a ‘fluid’ and ‘thin’ type of identification that occurs alongside, not in place of, national identity, has flourished within Europe, enabling national cultural elements
to cross over borders to create shared cognitions of belonging to an overarching European identity.4
However, globalisation has connotations of universalised interests and traditions emanating from the political and economic culture of the West, representing a homogenisation of traditions and cultures which can highlight – or even instigate – strong feelings of attachment or re-identification with one’s own nation-state.5 It is also a target for the far-right, who make use of a Conservative Revolution-style Romantic rhetoric that portrays globalisation as a vehicle for multiculturalism that stimulates ‘a degradation of values and culture’ within Europe.6 Matthew Sharpe notes how globalisation has acted as a stirring force for the European New Right (ENR) – the main ideological precursor to Identitarianism – which was deeply opposed to Liberalism in all forms, and highly suspicious of free markets, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.
Despite the challenges of globalisation faced by nation-states, such as migration, and even though supporters of globalisation have made predictions that it would abolish ‘even political borders and make nationalism archaic’ in the belief that economic interests would take priority over promoting national identities, anti-globalist nationalism has proven highly resilient and effervescent.7 Transnational migration, communications and information spreading have led to competing theories considering a ‘global culture.’ Some theorists such as Mike Featherstone believe that the global availability of information and standardised products can lead, and may already be leading, towards a more homogenous global culture while others, such as Anthony Smith, believe that a lack of global ‘memory’ and an ‘ethnic core’ mean that a global collective
4 Gerard Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity,” in Making the European Polity: Reflexive integration in the EU, ed. Erik Odvar Eriksen
(Oslo: Routledge, 2007): 138-139.
5 Philip Resnick, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” in Revisiting Nationalism, eds. Alain Dieckhoff and Christophe Jaffrelot (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005): 239-253.
6 Matthew Sharpe, “The Long Game of the European New Right,” The Conversation. March 13, 2018.
https://theconversation.com/the-long-game-of-the-european-new-right-75078; Raphael Schlembach, “The Transnationality of European Nationalist Movements,” Revue Belge
de Philologie et d’Histoire 89, no. 3 (2011): 1344.
identity is not possible. Jaffrelot and Dieckhoff believe there is merit in both arguments and suggest that while a single global culture may not be possible, global flows of products, migration and information do in fact affect all global cultures, though differing cultural contexts will mean that different values and meanings will be attributed by different people. They call this ‘glocalisation,’ which refers to the ‘vernacularisation’ and ‘indigenisation’ of transnational cultural elements where the ‘global impact is reinterpreted and appropriated at cultural level.’8 In the eyes of the members of new far-right movements such as the Identitarian movement, such cultural mixing and forced homogenisation represent the unacceptable loss of local cultures, traditions, histories and identities.
1.1 Globalisation and the Resistance of Nationalism
Over time, Liberalism and its values have become the overriding ideological factors in Europe. Society has developed in a way that means individual citizens are able to act rationally and independently, set free from ‘established hierarchy and formality.’9 Events such as the student uprising in France in May 1968, in which students revolted and workers held strikes in response to what they perceived as unfair labour and scholarly hierarchies helped cement Liberalism as Europe’s primary political system. While this revolution was not successful in the sense that it failed to overthrow a regime, it instigated a dramatic social change in France as well the rest of Europe and America in which the established hierarchies and formalities were reversed, workers were treated better and liberal values such as freedom of speech, feminism and environmentalism became the social and legal norms. The 1968 revolution also accelerated the growing movements of environmentalism and feminism, which were indicative of the culture of individual freedom and responsibility that Liberalism necessitated. Capitalism came
8 Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot, “Conclusion,” 257-259.
9 Alissa J. Rubin, “May 1968: A Month of Revolution Pushed France Into the Modern World,” The New York Times. May 05, 2018.
alongside Liberal Democracy, which also emphasised the individual, giving people a sense of ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’ that ‘fundamentally transformed the social, political, economic and psychological spheres’ to the extent that ‘people understand themselves in public life primarily as individuals.’10 Another revolution in 1989 saw the fall of Communism which seemed, at the time, to destine Liberal Democracy to become the dominant global ideology. Francis Fukuyama famously declared this event as the ‘end of history’ due to the ‘unabashed victory of economic and political Liberalism.’11
However, Liberalism has not benefitted everybody. While many Europeans have taken advantage of the freedoms afforded by a cosmopolitan lifestyle, Ivan Krastev has noted the division and conflict related to the unequal spread of cosmopolitanism in society between two groups identified by David Goodheart as the ‘Anywheres’ that is, the cosmopolitan ‘winners’ of globalisation supporting open society values, versus the ‘Somewheres,’ whose societal values are closed, nativist and nationalist.12 While aspects of globalisation such as migration, feminism and Capitalism have served the Anywheres well, they have contributed to a weakening of national identification and traditional bonds that have damaged the senses of ‘security’ and ‘belonging to a particular community’ of the Somewheres. Mark Little and Matthew Feldman also suggest that in the face of ‘stagnating wages, identity precariousness, immigration and rising inequality,’ the Somewheres have become susceptible to a narrative that has placed the blame for these social problems on ‘establishment’ figures such as ‘social democrats and other centre-left political parties,’ as well as the EU.13 It is also important to note the distinction between a European identity and a European Union (EU) identity. FRMs are typically – if not always – anti-European Union. FRMs see Europe as a cultural and
10 Pankaj Mishra, “Prologue: Forgotten Conjunctures,” in Age of Anger: A History of the Present. (United Kingdom: Macmillan, 2017): 12. 11 Francis Fukuyama, “The end of history?” in The National Interest 16 (1989): 3.
12 Ivan Krastev, After Europe. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017): 34; Jonathan Freedland, “The Road to Somewhere by
David Goodhart – a Liberal’s Right-wing Turn on Immigration,” The Guardian. March 22, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/mar/22/the-road-to-somewhere-david-goodhart-populist-revolt-future-politics.
historical civilisation, while they view the EU as an institution that threatens regional European identities by enabling migration, globalisation and cosmopolitanism. The rise of separatist groups in Europe also reflects differing attitudes on nationalism, Europeanism and integrationism within the EU. Populist-nationalist groups such as the Front National (FN) are highly nationalistic and believe in national sovereignty and the dissolution of the EU, whereas autonomist movements such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Convergence and Union (Convergència i Unió, CiU) in Catalonia are ardent supporters of the European Project, believing that European integration is ‘the best way to limit powers of the central state and to reinforce those of the regions.’14
The far-right, according to Rafael Schlembach, portray globalisation ‘as the erosion of national-cultural values and as an attack against the achievements of the European social model of the welfare state.’15 Some of the processes of globalisation are very similar to those which instigated the emergence of nations, including the development of new communications technologies. Jaffrelot and Dieckhoff claim that some of the process which ‘contributed to the making of the nation-state are now undermining it in the era of globalisation,’ citing the transition of print to digital media as one example. Where print media used the extension of communications to bring ‘social mobility over a given territory,’ electronic media now surpass the borders of such territories, thus contributing to a weakening of the traditional nation-state.16
Globalisation, they claim, compresses space-time, making ‘greater connectedness and deterritorialisation possible, the latter of which they view as the ‘heaviest blow struck against the nation-state,’ dividing the world into two systems. The first is the international system of ‘transnational flows,’ superimposed onto the alternate system ‘primed on state logic’.17
14 Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot, “Conclusion,” 264.
15 Schlembach, “The Transnationality of European Nationalist Movements,” 1333. 16 Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot, “Conclusion,” 255.
Migration, as the most important of these flows, challenges the nation-state through changes to allegiance, either from one nation-state to another or ‘loyalty from the nation to other entities.’ Migration also produces new ‘ethnoscapes,’ referring to the way diasporic groups create new interactions with nationalism. This includes identity hybridisation as well as varying levels of cultural homogenisation or Americanisation. Ultimately, these all bring about a weakening of the perceived bond between ‘the citizen and his nation-state,’ despite there being some use of new technologies such as social media to create and maintain new, nationalist, online ‘in-groups.’18
1.2 Immigration, Integration and the Re-Emergence of Nationalism
While there can be no universal theory for nationalism that fits all nations equally, Erika Harris claims that nationalism tends to re-emerge in times of political uncertainty and in the face of real and perceived threat towards the identity, autonomy and unity of a nation.19 Following World War II, the peoples of Europe and America set about creating international institutions with the intention of letting ‘nationalism fade away, to be replaced by international co-operation,’ particularly in cases of crisis.20
Moreover, nationalism has made a resurgence in the last decade, due to many factors including the global financial crash and, perhaps most importantly, the migration crisis. Harris claims that the vertical structure of nation-states, which is based loosely on ethnic homogeneity and citizenship, drives geo-politics to become an ‘ethnicity-driven competition for power and control of resources,’ and becomes contradictory when simultaneously acting as the protector
18 Ramona Kreis, “#refugeesnotwelcome: Anti-Refugee Discourse on Twitter,” Discourse & Communication 11, no. 5 (2017): 501. 19 Erika Harris, “Why Has Nationalism Not Run Its Course?” Nations and Nationalism 22, no. 2 (2016): 243-247.
20 Geoffrey Hosking, “Why Has Nationalism Revived in Europe? The Symbolic Attractions and Fiscal Capabilities of the Nation‐
of cultural and ethnic heritage while promoting cosmopolitan virtues such as European integration and the protection of minority groups.21
European integration appears to have even reinvigorated nationalism, as nations and ethnic groups feel it is corrosive towards local languages and culture. Beyond the expansion of the English language and the weakening of local traditions, Europe has also integrated a ‘substantial influx of refugees and asylum seekers’ which has caused indigenous cultures to feel ‘challenged, rejected and confronted by those of the newcomers.’22
Furthermore, efforts to overcome nationalism such as ‘pan-’ movements have not successfully replaced nation-states even when aligning on bases of shared culture, religion or language. Arab unity, for example, was given a ‘death-blow’ under the United Arab Republic of 1958-1961, as the assumption that shared geography and culture would lead automatically to unity was proven wrong. While a common sense of belonging is fosterable, it is primarily the nation-state that people feel a sense of attachment towards.23
Regionalisation, through projects such as the EU, has been more effective in diminishing, though not eradicating, nationalism.24 Regionalism has reduced the number of Europeans who are willing to die for their nation at war and who feel a sense of ‘national pride’ while increasing the number of Europeans who trust in their national neighbours, yet despite this ‘smoothening’ effect on nationalistic behaviour, it is very sensitive and the current situation in Europe has proven how quickly nationalism can return. Moreover, this effect could be attributed to the ‘development of individualistic values’ which undermines the ethos of collective nationalism, at a time when trust in the EU ‘emanates primarily from national concerns’ of economics and
21 Harris, “Why Has Nationalism Not Run Its Course?”, 244. 22 Ibid., 243-247.
23 Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot, “Conclusion,” 260. 24 Ibid., 260-261.
security.25 A good example of the nation coming first in people’s psyche is when the people of France voted ‘No’ to the Maastricht Treaty in 1972, in order not to relinquish any more national sovereignty.
Furthermore, migration has combined with identity precarity and growing disparities in culture, economics and politics to create simmering feelings of resentment, set to boil over in protests of anger and outrage. The sentiments of anger and resentment have aided the growing support for far-right and populist ‘movements of rage.’ Anger towards globalisation has been particularly damaging for the Left, which, in the 1970s, supported rural Indian communities in defending their cultures from globalisation but are now faced with nativist, yet relatively prosperous, Europeans who are trying to ‘resist’ refugeeism and ‘defend their way of life.’26 Karen Stenner explains this anger as a psychological reaction to ‘normative threats,’ which manifests itself as an illiberal, intolerant and often aggressive reaction to social changes such as migration or the acceptance of gay marriage which challenge the imagined demographic collective an individual belongs to.27 However, Maria Montserrat Guibernau suggests that it is not necessarily ‘the presence of foreigners’ that Europeans find challenging, as they are generally accepting of migration from the wider ‘in-group’ of other European citizens, but more the ‘fear of the Islamic way of living.’28 In fact, new FRMs such as Generation Identity are very open about their objection to what they perceive as the ‘Islamisation’ or ‘Islamification’ of Europe.
Islam’s growing presence in the demography of Europe has caused unease across the continent, sparking debates about Europe’s heritage and identity in terms of tolerance, secularism and religion, as well as stimulating social and political changes to which its people and politicians
25 Ibid.
26 Krastev, After Europe, 33. 27 Ibid., 41.
have been compelled to respond. With change comes ‘insecurity and uncertainty’ that new FRMs have used to direct discourse along lines regarding belonging and alterity. Guibernau claims that this has produced a trans-class, nativist form of ‘ethnic nationalism’ intended to defend national identity from ‘alien’ cultures and influences. 29
In fact, it is exactly this alterity that enables nationalism to re-emerge and maintain itself. While hybridisation and homogenisation dilute national collective identities, they also increase the interaction of diasporas with ‘Others,’ potentially strengthening nationalisms further through increased sentiments of nostalgia for the motherland in migrant groups as well as heightened awareness of local feelings of national pride. Benedict Anderson suggests that globalisation and capitalism do not just bring nationalism back to the fore, but instigate new types of nationalism – one type of which is ‘long-distance nationalism’ in which ‘ethnic material in relation to the Other’ is prioritised over cultural and territorial aspects of identity. However, long-distance nationalism is not completely deterritorialised as migrants often maintain strong feelings of attachment to the homeland which is ‘imbued with an emotional, almost reverential dimension.’30 Furthermore, diaspora citizens are not necessarily against the nation-state system, with many of them seeking to ‘help their co-ethnics living in their homelands’ along the lines of national goals. In this way, sovereignties are challenged under the current system, but the nation is still kept alive and supported by people who primarily identify with their nation-state.
Immigration, therefore, is fundamental to all debates on the conception of Europe. Social problems which arose from the combined crises of the financial crash of the noughties and the refugee crisis of 2015 have pushed immigration to be perceived as Europe’s most pressing
29 Guibernau, Belonging, 22.
matter across the entire continent.31 Anti-immigration and xenophobic rhetoric, spurred on after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 which led to increased migration within Europe, intensified almost immediately and succeeded in mobilising European voters to support far-right ideologies.32 In fact, this rhetoric has been so effective it has been adopted by right-wing movements beyond Europe, perhaps most famously in US President Donald Trump’s ‘build the wall’ dialogues. Such rhetoric has paved the way for fringe, radical groups to forge narratives of impotence, incompetence and distrust in regard to the institutions of globalisation, as well as developing a political discourse that is hostile towards migration.33 Furthermore, documented rises in nationalist sentiments and anti-immigration movements have been stimulated by the emergence of new far-right movements which have used similar rhetoric to point towards these social problems, and particularly migration, as issues of identity.
Such rhetoric has led to the emergence of a recent movement based on the ideology of the ENR, Identitarianism. Its first incarnation, the French Bloc Identitaire, emerged in 2003 as a movement based on the ideology of ENR thinkers such as Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye.34 In turn, the youth wing of the BI broke away in 2012 to form Génération Identitaire, which quickly spread across Europe as Generation Identity (GI), a movement which has adopted and reappropriated ENR ideology to the extent that its de facto leader, Martin Sellner, claims that they are ‘taking the ideological and strategic action of Alain de Benoist.’35 Since its inception, GI has spread quickly across Europe, with the Austrian Identitäre Bewegung
Österreich, the German Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland and the Italian Generazione Identitaria branches all founded in 2012. The British GI movement was launched in 2017,
31 Imran Khan, “Autumn 2016 Standard Eurobarometer: Immigration and Terrorism Continue to Be Seen as the Most Important Issues Facing
the EU” Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings. December 22, 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/autumn-2016-standard-eurobarometer-immigration-and-terrorism-continue-be-seen-most-important_en.
32 Ruth Wodak and Michał Krzyżanowski, “Right-wing populism in Europe & USA.” Journal of Language and Politics 16, no. 4 (2017):
471-484.
33 Littler and Feldman, “Social Media and the Cordon Sanitaire,” 513.
34 Simon Murdoch et al., A New Threat? Generation Identity UK and Ireland. (London: HOPE Not Hate, 2018): 6.
35 J. Lester Feder and Pierre Buet, “The Man Who Gave White Nationalism A New Life.” Buzzfeed News. December 26, 2017.
enlarging the movement to 13 active national GI branches in Europe. The GI movement arose in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, which has brought about ‘the most dramatic rise of far-right political forces in the Western world,’ including the breakout success of UKIP in the 2009 European Parliament election amongst others.36
2 Methodology and Aims
2.1 Methodology
One of the aims of the Identitarian movement is to attain cultural hegemony, that is, when ‘knowledge, beliefs, understanding, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values’ are successfully influenced by discourses to create ‘social cognitions,’ which are shared models of understanding society.37 In Identitarian parlance, this process is known as ‘metapolitics,’ which is a right-wing reinterpretation of Gramscian hegemony. Crucially, the Identitarian movement seeks hegemony in particular in the realm of ‘identity,’ which it seeks to redefine and theorise as an immutable, innate and primordial characteristic of personal and collective identification. It then also wants to instrumentalise identity as an exclusive aspect of membership of a homogenous-yet-diverse European society, bound together by its ‘Europeanness,’ a deliberately vague concept which has cultural, ethnic, racial and religious boundaries.
Since the processes of hegemony acquisition or metapolitics occur through discourse, I will undertake a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as set out by Teun Van Dijk, which ‘focuses on the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance […] defined here as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or group, that results in social inequality.’38 CDA also makes a distinction between ‘social power’ and ‘dominance.’39 Van Dijk defines
36 Sharpe, ibid.
37 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourse & Society 4, no. 2 (1993): 257. 38 Ibid., 250.
power as ‘privileged access to socially valued resources’ that is obtained legally and legitimately, whereas dominance occurs when the same privileged access is acquired illegally or illegitimately. Furthermore, Van Dijk explains that the power or dominance of a group in forming social cognitions can be measured by its control over or access to discourse. Therefore, there are three key areas in which I will analyse Identitarian discourse:
1) Power and dominance,
2) Access to and control over discourse, 3) Social cognition.
For the first area, I will examine the (re)production of dominance and social inequalities that occur as a result of the discourses of Identitarian and far-right groups as well as institutions such as the media in their coverage of Identitarian matters or material produced in the media by Identitarians. I will focus in particular the publishing industry, with a specific focus placed on Arktos Media, a publisher of far-right literature with close connections to the Identitarian movement. By studying such groups, I will analyse real examples of dominance or social inequalities, exploring the exclusionary, discriminatory and marginalising effect that Identitarian discourses have on non-Europeans, particularly those who are non-white and/or Muslim, but also addressing other inequalities that may be present such as sexual, gender or culture-based inequalities.
In the second area, I will analyse the access to and control over discourse that are available to different stakeholders within the Identitarian movement, the privileges and benefits such access and control offer, and the impact they have on creating hegemony. Access to and control over discourse, in particular, will be the most important part of my analysis. This is due to the nature of Arktos Media as a publishing company and the status of its founder, Daniel Friberg, who also heads a number of related but separate multi-media organisations. I will also look at both
‘produced’ and ‘received’ discourse, wherein the former refers to ‘the enactments, expression or legitimation of dominance in various structures of discourse,’ while the latter refers to the ‘functions, consequences or results of such discourse on the (social) minds of participants.’40 This analysis will include discourses produced and received by Generation Identity and other Identitarian activists, members of connected far-right movements both within Europe and beyond with connections to politicians or people with high political connections, and the public.
Thirdly, I will assess ‘social cognitions,’ that is, the extent to which hegemony is achieved by creating a widely-spread, shared social understanding of and belief in subjects promoted by Identitarian movements. This extent can be measured, for example, in the quantity of discourse that is produced reflecting Identitarian values such as defending European identity from mass immigration. Social cognitions will also be influenced by the two former areas, such as when, for example, socially powerful contributors such as politicians use their access to the media to endorse an issue relevant to the Identitarian movement, and thus influence or control the minds of the readership of the publication, which could be the public.
Since this paper seeks to answer the question of how identity is defined, theorised and instrumentalised by new far-right movements, the texts to be studied will be ones which discuss the various aspects and interpretations of (European) identity, which is a, if not the, major theme of Identitarian ideology. These texts will include literature produced by members of the Identitarian movement itself and literature it has adopted from other movements, and also related literature from connected far-right movements. A particular focus will also be placed on Arktos Media and its various staff members. While Arktos Media publishes much of the literature the Identitarian movement uses as ideological material, such as translations of the
works of ENR intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye, its diverse group of employees has access to a wide range of media sources which it uses to publish, create, reproduce and disseminate Identitarian literature to a wide range of audiences.
2.2 Aims
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how Generation Identity, as a fringe political movement, uses discursive strategies to transform Identitarianism, into a mainstream political ideology. This will include analysing the groups that make up the Identitarian movement based in both Europe and North America, and their strategies of producing and controlling discourse to achieve cultural hegemony. The thesis will be split into four main chapters, the first of which will analyse GI’s human and ideological makeup, its strategies for defining, theorising and instrumentalising identity, and will answer the following questions:
1) What is Generation Identity?
2) How is identity defined, theorised and instrumentalised by Generation Identity?
In Chapter Two, I will explore the relationship between Generation Identity and Arktos Media, a far-right publishing company. I will analyse the role played by Arktos Media in facilitating Generation Identity’s process of identity instrumentalisation, and how it facilitates the production and reproduction of Identitarian discourse. I will also look at how Arktos Media manages control over and access to Identitarian discourse through an extensive network based on Arktos Media’s diverse team of staff. This chapter will contain the following questions:
1) What is Arktos Media and what contributions does it make to the field of far-right identity theory?
2) What role does Arktos Media play in facilitating Generation Identity’s process of identity instrumentalisation?
In Chapter Three, I will look at the influence of Identitarianism beyond Generation Identity and Arktos Media by analysing an extended network of global far-right movements maintained by Arktos Media’s founder, Daniel Friberg and his American counterpart, Richard Spencer. Through this network, I will analyse the extent to which the reproduction of Identitarian ideas can be found in far-right discourses across Europe and North America and on which platforms they can be found. I will then analyse the extent to which hegemony has been achieved by analysing examples of Identitarian discourse that has been produced or reproduced by the public or mainstream politicians. This chapter will answer the questions:
1) How extensive is Friberg and Spencer’s network and what influence does the Identitarian movement have within it?
2) How can the Identitarian movement’s aim of achieving cultural hegemony be analysed and evaluated?
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review
1 Theoretical Framework
From the literature review, the theoretical framework for this thesis will be based upon the instrumentalisation of European identity through discursive strategies as performed by the Identitarian movement. In particular, I will be looking at its current incarnation and flag-bearer,
Generation Identity (GI), as well as non-European movements which support or have adopted
Identitarian values, such as the Alt-right in North America as well as organisations which support such movements, including Arktos Media.
In looking at previous theoretical outlooks of nationalism, it will be important to determine how or if the GI’s view of nationalism can be categorised by the ways in which it views citizenship along the lines of ethno-cultural belonging versus civic participation. This process can then be applied to Europe in place of the nation to see if there are differences in the way GI constructs an image of the continent to how it constructs an image of the nation. Moreover, it will be intriguing to see if conceptions of ethno-culturalism versus civic participation change when the focus is transposed from the nation to the continent. Beyond that, I will also examine any new contributions GI makes to nationalist or Europeanist theory.
I will also examine GI’s formation, history and development in the contexts of classical illiberal European ideology, in particular that of the ENR, since it is GI’s ideological forefather and one that is still partially active, with intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist still producing literature and assisting far-right thinkers today. I will examine the key concepts GI has adopted from this movement, as well as any it has modified, expanded on or contributed towards. For instance, the Conservative Revolution revolved around a search for ‘authentic culture,’ while GI’s main purpose is to seek for an ‘authentic identity.’
Beyond this, I will look outside Europe to examine Identitarianism’s historical and contemporary position in global far-right politics. I will do this by looking at North American movements such as the Alt-Right and Identity Evropa (IE) and establish the commonalities and differences they share in terms of ideology, influencers and purpose. Moreover, I will propose that GI is part of an organised network which I will call the Global Identitarian Sphere (GIS) that contains several distinct far-right movements that remain in regular contact with each other, share similar ideologies and aims and enhance each other’s reputations and reaches of influence within and beyond Europe. I will also investigate the ways in which these movements promote the concept of Identitarianism while following the concept of metapolitics, as well as any other methods of instrumentalising identity they may utilise.
1.1 Useful Terminology
While studying far-right, nationalist, populist and non-mainstream ideologies and movements, I have discovered that these terms and their relatives are used interchangeably by some authors while they are given very distinct meanings by others. For purposes of simplification, I will use the term ‘far-right’ as a catch-all term covering all movements and ideologies that are generally considered right-wing and non-mainstream, unless a distinction is necessary or clarity is compromised.
Therefore, groups such as Generation Identity, Traditional Britain, the European New Right and the American Alt-Right will be referred to as ‘far-right’ in this thesis, despite the clear distinctions in their ideologies and methodologies. An exception to this will be made for explicitly populist movements, such as the French Front National, the Dutch Partij Voor de
Vreiheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) and the Hungarian Fidesz, which act as official,
movements, despite sharing some characteristics that can be considered far-right as well as maintaining connections to the Global Far-Right Sphere.
The terms ‘Generation Identity’ and ‘the Identitarian movement’ will be distinct from each other, despite GI’s own use of the terms as interchangeable. This is because the Identitarian movement comprises of historical Identitarian movements such as its founding movement Bloc
Identitaire, American movements such as the Alt-Right which utilise Identitarian theory, and
organisations like Arktos Media, which mediate Identitarian discourse.
2 Definitions and Theories of Identity
All types of identity, whether personal or collective, national or continental, are socially constructed, with meaning given to them from social perceptions and classifications which mutate over time and from place to place. 41 While personal identities are malleable amalgamations comprised of the ‘matrix’ of an individual’s role, class, gender and homeland, amongst other aspects, collective identities require ‘the existence of a social group with a collective project’ in order to provide ‘existential meaning’ and ‘a degree of continuity between individuals and their social environment.’42 Territorial identities, such as national and continental identities, are amongst the most pertinent aspects of both personal and collective identity matrices, with Anthony D. Smith arguing that territorial identity gives a cohesiveness to collective identification that even gender, as the most fundamental and universal category of identification, cannot match.43 However, territorial identities take on very different roles when comparing, for example, a national identity with a continental one.
41 Anthony D. Smith, “National and Other Identities” in National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991): 4. 42 Delanty, “The Quest for European Identity,” 129-130.
2.1 National Identity versus European Identity
Nationalism is an ‘active movement’ which intends to ‘attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a nation’ that is beyond ‘simply a shared sentiment or consciousness.’44 Anthony Smith proposes a core doctrine of nationalism which contains the following six aspects: that
‘1) humanity is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny, 2) the nation is the sole source of political power, 3) loyalty to the nation takes precedence over other loyalties, 4) to be free, human beings must belong to a nation, 5) nations require maximum autonomy and self-expression and 6) global peace and justice can only be built on the basis of a plurality of free nations.’45
Smith distinguishes between political nationalism, which seeks to secure an independent and sovereign state for a nation, and cultural nationalism, which, in place of political activities, seeks ‘moral regeneration’ of a community to form a self-sustaining and solidary nation. These types of nationalism are not mutually incompatible, and in fact complement each other, often alternating periodically.
In the eyes of nationalists, nations are viewed as primordial organisms whose existence is natural and therefore ‘prior to the state,’ whereas non-nationalists tend to view them as ‘historic culture communities,’ distinguishable from the state and definable as ‘a set of autonomous institutions exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory.’46 Smith has proposed three paradigms of nationalism, primordialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism, and when the majority of a population is able to identify with aspects of any or all of the
44 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009): 61. 45 Ibid., 21.
paradigms, a nation is formed.47 These are aided by ‘nation-building processes,’ which include the propagation of symbols, images and shared memories through which individuals can identify with the state. By applying the different approaches of the different paradigms of nationalism, these symbols are interpreted and re-interpreted in order to define ‘the boundaries and character of the national community’. Primordial nationalism views nations as ethnic communities that are inherent in humanity and have always existed, and supplemented by cultural ‘givens’ such as ‘language, custom, religion, race and territory,’ as well as ‘civic actions,’ such as making adjustments like responding to modern secular states in order to maintain itself.48 Modernism refers to a view of nations as social and historical constructions that can be ‘abandoned, changed or reconstructed by constitutional means like cultural policies.’49 According to Peter Duelund, national identity is ‘both a historical construct and the outcome of myths and symbols,’ which is passed on from one generation to the next through ‘recollections, values, emotions, myths, rituals, symbols and stories etc,’ leaving identity to be subject to reinterpretation and personal experience. This inheritance of ‘aesthetic artefacts’ has been identified by Smith as the paradigm of ethno-symbolism. When the resulting set of cultural markers is adopted by a cultural community, or ethnie, whose members believe in ‘historical memories, myth of common ancestry and association with a specific homeland,’ a national identity is formed around a de facto nation, which is defined by Smith as:
‘A named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common enemy and common legal rights and duties for all members.’50
47 William Bloom, “Nation-Building,” in Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993): 61-62.
48 Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism, 8.
49 Peter Duelund, “A Sense of Belonging: Paradoxes of Identity, Nationalism and Diversity in Europe and Beyond,” in Identifying with Europe,
eds. Ineke van Hamersveld and Arthur Sonnen (Amsterdam: Boekmanstudies, 2009): 160-187.
Modern FRMs place much importance on the ethnic aspects of identity, particularly while promoting concepts such as ‘white resistance,’ ‘white genocide’ and the ‘Great Replacement.’ These are all aspects of what Guibernau labels ‘cultural nativism,’ that is, the protection of an ‘endangered European identity.’51 While race can still be a defining factor in extreme nationalist politics, it often takes an ‘ethno-pluralistic’ turn, whereby culture, or culturally-defined ethnicity, is seen as the predominant marker of a community. Advocates of ethno-pluralism have thus argued that European nations can contribute equally towards the construction of a European identity.52
However, when a population is too diverse to consist of a single cultural ethnie or political
demos – such as the European population – markers of identification occur at a broader societal
level, with foundations based on discourse and communication.53 Therefore, European identity for many reasons does not and cannot occur in the same way as national identity. Lacking the cultural, political and historical cohesiveness needed to form a homogenous society, European identity, as reflected in European Union cultural policy, celebrates diversity. Furthermore, having a diverse ethnic and racial population means that there can be no fictive myth of ‘a people,’ while the lack of a common language and of shared myths and memories mean that ‘the possibility of a common European culture is limited.’
Nevertheless, European citizens do identify as Europeans. Research by Camelia Cmeciu and Mădălina Manolache shows that only 39% of citizens of European nations feel a sense of attachment solely towards the nation and not towards Europe.54 However, the way in which the remaining 61% of Europeans feel European is ripe for discussion. Alterity is often an important factor in the formation of identities – it can sometimes be easier to articulate what
51 Guibernau, Belonging, 80.
52 Schlembach, “The transnationality of European nationalist movements,” 1347. 53 Smith, “National and Other Identities,” 1-18.
one is not rather than what one is – which gives weight to the argument which claims that Christianity has given Europe a cultural heritage distinct from, and antithetical to, that of its Islamic neighbours to the south and east.55
However, while Christianity remains very influential within Europe and its various adaptations have been used to strengthen national identities and shape European cultural history, Gerard Delanty argues that since the 17th century, secularism, not Christianity, has been the unifying characteristic of European nations in terms of culture.56 Delanty points out the various divisions and even wars that have occurred between different Christian groups such as Catholics and Protestants, claiming that it is ‘difficult to see how it offers a basis for cultural identification,’ although it does appear that the presence of Islam apparently enables a loose sense of collective identity.
Philip Resnick also suggests that Christianity, through promoting a ‘universalistic ethos’ intended to unite all those who believe, may have deliberately or inadvertently created a factor of identification that does bond Europeans together: cosmopolitanism.57 With roots going back to the Hellenistic era, cosmopolitanism is a growing sentiment and ‘theoretical ideal’ that emancipates cosmopolitans from religious or territorial markers of identification, allowing them to connect to and identify with others who believe in promoting human rights, environmentalism, feminism and other concepts that demand international, co-operative efforts.58 However, while cosmopolitans can be ‘at home throughout the world or in many spheres of interest,’ cosmopolitanism cannot succeed if it does not respect needs for cultural, linguistic and political diversities. It must respect these in order to ‘prevent undue homogenization’ while still levelling the playing fields of technology, finance and progress.
55 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe. (London: Springer, 1995): 67. 56 Ibid., 67.
57 Resnick, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 239-240. 58 Ibid.
Resnick claims that Claude Lévi-Strauss sums this up well in this quote: ‘humanity is constantly struggling with two contradictions. One of these tends to promote unification while the other aims at maintaining or re-establishing diversification.’59 This contradiction can be seen in the cultural policies of the European Union which demand ‘ever closer union’ while also promoting cultural diversity.
Moreover, cosmopolitan identity is unequally possessed by the middle and upper classes, in particular those who are comfortable with English, are wealthy enough to afford ‘the goods and life-styles associated with post-industrial societies’ and are competent with modern technology.60 Moreover, it is an optional identity that can be taken advantage of – or declined – by those who are able to afford it. This separates it from national identity, which people are born into and become ‘socialized within their own specific cultures endowed with their own specific languages.’
Cosmopolitanism is also related to what Philip Resnick calls ‘integrated European democratic space,’61 (IEDS) in which civil society and citizens movements such as protests develop into a political will at a European level as well as a European Public Sphere, described by Jürgen Habermas as a communicative and transactional ‘common political mentality,’ that enables ‘European citizens feel a responsibility for one another’ as a ‘post-national moral community.’62 While this collective political mentality can often be seen in humanitarian or liberal protests such as those against the Iraq war, it is also adopted by the far-right through actions such as GI’s ‘Defend Europe,’ in which far-right activists attempt to create a hostile environment towards immigrants and refugees across Europe.
59 Ibid., 243.
60 Guibernau. Belonging, 42.
61 Resnick, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 243.
62 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A plea for a common foreign policy, beginning
Despite this, European identity usually takes the form of a ‘thin’ identity based on possible shared ‘values, concern for the common good, and political participation’. European identity is therefore in contrast to national identity, whose more tangible components such as place, ethnicity and language constitute its ‘thickness.’63 Where IEDS may bond Europeans around a specific subject or belief, ‘linguistic and cultural diversity undercut any move to a single European identity’ and keep old political, cultural and economic approaches in place, where European co-operation is valued over European integration.64 Furthermore, the existing global power structures of nation-states will not be easily replaced, particularly since nation-state citizenship is much more identifiable with than global citizenship. Nation-states also offer their citizens many protections as well as being ‘extremely exigent common enterprises of self-rule.’
Also, historically, the ‘application of rights has been territorially bound,’ and territory is the ‘hard currency’ of national politics. Therefore, identifications beyond the nation, such as that with a hemisphere or continent, can only be applied to urbanized, internationally-minded citizens and, thus, remain ‘thin.’65 Furthermore, national citizenship is alluded to almost constantly and subconsciously in everyday life through what Michael Billig has termed ‘banal nationalism.’66 Banal nationalism refers to the inactive national images that one encounters on a daily basis that range from unwaved flags hung from official buildings, to monarchs’ heads on coins or supermarkets advertising local produce, emphasising stereotypical characteristics of nations. Banal nationalism also serves to reproduce images of foreign nations, and can be seen in everyday life when, for example, one sees adverts for Italian-style pizza or
Scandinavian furniture. Billig labels these images as ‘constant flaggings of nationhood’ which
63 Resnick, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 250. 64 Ibid., 244-245.
65 Ibid., 250.
reproduce and solidify social cognitions of the attributes and characteristics each nation is supposed to have.67 These constant reminders are highly influential in maintaining the position of being a ‘national’ at the forefront of citizens’ identities, which can have extreme consequences since it takes ‘relatively little to inflame nationalist passions into something larger.’68
2.2 Contested Views
Prior to the French Revolution, Europe experienced the Age of Enlightenment which changed the way Europeans thought of themselves in terms of individuals, as opposed to the medieval view of society as being part of a natural social order in which ‘lineage, gender, social status and other attributes […] were fixed by birth.’69 This new way of thinking spawned Liberalism,
secularism and Christian humanism, which together placed ‘Reason, Progress and Science’ at
the centre of a universal value system that established a ‘European’ identity in which human rights, individuality and Liberalism as an ideology became a defining part of European history. In fact, intellectuals such as Anthony Pagden see Enlightenment-inspired Liberalism as the defining aspect of European identity, since it was a uniquely European event. However, the development of Liberalism also gave birth to illiberal and anti-liberal ideologies, representing the complicated relation Europe has with the legacy of the Enlightenment.
Jens Rydgens claims that the new far-right is continuing a tradition of the post-war radical right-wing that stems from the 1980s in which ethnic nationalism was the driving force for radical right-wing parties to ‘safeguard the nation’s majority culture and to keep the nation as ethnically homogenous as possible.’70 Many of these parties – such as France’s Front National , Austria’s Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland – have
67 Ibid., 174.
68 Resnick, “Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism,” 245. 69 Guibernau, Belonging, 15.
transitioned from fringe movements to well-supported political parties. All, in some way, act as continuations of the European New Right (ENR) of the 1960s, which was a revival of the thoughts of early antiliberal scholars such as Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821), Charles Maurras (1868-1952) and Augustin Barruel (1741-1820). Where these old intellectuals saw Enlightenment-inspired Liberalism as a threat to the ancien régime, religion and the nation, modern far-right parties see cosmopolitanism, migration, and secular humanism as a threat to national identity, traditions, and heritage. This has led to a resurgence of far-right nationalist movements, and while there are some, such as PEGIDA, whose opposition to the Islamisation of Europe comes from a position of defending particular Enlightenment values, most are highly illiberal.71
The ‘universal’ value system did not override the fact that Europeans identified more strongly with the nation-state than the continent. Territorial nationalism was part of the foundation of European order after the French Revolution, and conceptions of Europe such as the ‘social
contract’ theorised by Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant viewed
Europe as an ‘alliance of nations’ which ensured that the nation-state, not the continent, was the main marker of identification. Moreover, while the values produced by the Enlightenment created and crystallised the idea of ‘Europe as a civilisation of national cultures,’72 the concept of ‘civilisation,’ alongside ‘modernity,’ was resisted by illiberals who preferred instead to fight for the ‘rediscovery’ of European culture.73 However, ‘European culture’ is not a universally recognized subject and its authenticity has been challenged. Raphael Schlembach, for instance, describes the ‘reconstruction of “Europe”’ by right-wing parties and organisations as ethnically
71 Malte Thran and Lukas Boehnke, “The Value-Based Nationalism of Pegida.” Journal for Deradicalization 3 (2015): 178-209. 72 Delanty, Inventing Europe, 67.
charged with notions such as protecting ‘the values of Christianity,’ or ‘liberation from both Bolshevik attacks and capitalist rule’ being used as cover for ideas of ‘Aryan mythology.’
Gerard Delanty also attributes much of the search for European culture to ‘European pessimism,’74 described as a thought process in which ‘modernity and technological civilisation’ are seen as an intellectual void that must be replaced by a ‘supposedly authentic European culture.’ However, while intellectuals such as José Ortega y Gasset and Carl Schmitt have lamented the ‘feeling of European degeneration,’ the European dimension of their complaints contributed significantly to the ‘European identity’. The ultimate result of European pessimism, according to Schlembach, was the Conservative Revolution.This was a movement of intellectuals in Weimar Germany that ‘argued for a cultural and political revolution against both communism and Liberalism – known as the ‘third way’ - with the aim of a unified
Volksgemeinschaft,’ or People’s Community, within Europe.75 The third way became a strong influence on Fascists such as Oswald Mosley and Benito Mussolini, who saw the third way as a ‘post-historical aesthetic order’ that could transcend the nation ‘to create a truly European supra-national civilisation.’ In fact, the resistance to the dichotomy of Communism and Liberal Democracy meant that Eurocentrism was not just key to Fascism, but almost essential. Pandering to ‘both American and Bolshevik’ sentiments, Fascism offered an anti-capitalist, romantic agenda of ‘sovereignty and independence’ which was intended to create a supranational identity that would be ‘perceived as a return to, or reawakening of, a supposedly authentic and natural culture.’ In fact, Europe was so central to Fascism that Mosley proposed the idea of ‘Europe a Nation,’ in which pan-European Fascist rule would ‘transcend hostility
74 Delanty, Inventing Europe, 109-110.
between European states.’ However, the ‘Europe’ envisaged by such Fascists relied on a Romantic view of nationalism.76
Romanticism, according to Smith, is part of a ‘wider search for authenticity,’ or the search for the ‘true essence’ of a nation.77 This is what gives an us its usness, and its ‘cultural values that could not be replicated’. It is also seen by authors such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau as part of a quest for ‘the return to nature,’ indicating the primordialist, organicist approach taken by Romantic Nationalists, and also of the search for the ‘homeland’. Romantic nationalists implicate a ‘sublime’ landscape as having idealistic and subjective attachments to its people, which has enabled cultural nationalists to extol ‘the simple and healthy life of the countryside and its inhabitants […] by identifying the land with the “real” people.’78
2.3 Instrumentalising Identity
In fact, it is resistance to immigration and liberal migration policies that defines the success and following of the new FRMs. Cosmopolitanism, open borders, tolerance and civility, the aspects of globalisation and key characteristics of the EU that were heralded in the 1990s, are now seen as their ‘core vulnerabilities’. Tolerance is under attack from illiberals, who view Europe as being ‘polluted’ by foreign cultures, religions and races as well as by liberals, whose own tolerance towards pluralism in political views is being tested by the growth of illiberal thought. New FRMs are now championing alternatives to liberal values, even including alternatives to democracy itself. In order to modernise, the new far-right has modified its approach, or at least its discourse, in the promotion of traditional viewpoints by intertwining ‘culture’ and ‘heritage’ into previous theories of society based on race, which it has repackaged and instrumentalised as ‘identity’.
76 Ibid., 1341-1342.
77 Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism, 86. 78 Ibid., 69.
National identities are demarcated by symbolic boundaries, reflecting community members’ perceptions of themselves ‘as refracted through all the complexities of their lives and experiences’ as well as how they believe they are perceived by outsiders.79 Thus, the symbols that represent these boundaries, such as the displaying of emblems, symbols and images, are used to ‘constitute and strengthen the belief in a common identity’. Even if the members of a community may have very different or even incompatible beliefs, the adoption of the same symbols transforms ‘the reality of difference into the appearance or illusion of similarity’ and thus enhances a sense of belonging and community.
According to Manuel Castells, living conditions that make ‘life unbearable for most people’ prompt social change via social movements which emerge in response to negative emotions such as anxiety, anger and fear.80 Fear and anxiety act as emotional repressors, but through ‘communicative action’ they can be taken over by anger which acts as a trigger for action, including risky behaviour. These same communicative actions can help bring together ‘networks of outrage’ that can develop into a ‘conscious, collective actor.’81
The role of the internet in social movements is crucial for new far-right movements. Internet-based movements can thrive because of the way they are able to structure themselves. As they are not monolithic structures, but ‘networks of networks,’ they are not hindered by a lack of a physical base or formal leadership. Participation is maximised through decentralised, open access, which supplements physical presence in urban spaces with continuous online activity. Many online movements actually benefit from a reduced threat of oppression due to having few specific targets to repress. This decentralisation also enables online networks to be ‘local and global at the same time,’ which they manage through occupying what Castells calls ‘the
79 Guibernau, Belonging, 37.
80 Manuel Castells, “Changing the World in the Network Society” in Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age.
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015): 246-265.
space of autonomy,’ which is a hybridisation of the occupation of urban and online space. It is autonomous because it allows online social movements to self-organise in the free spaces of the internet and also practice their exercises by reclaiming or occupying urban spaces in the city.82 This autonomy creates a public space that connects members of the social movement. The international and free qualities of the internet also mean that these movements often have some type of cosmopolitan culture by connecting people from different backgrounds. They also follow typical patterns of Internet network ‘logic,’ such as harnessing the power of symbolism, imagery and video through websites such as YouTube, as well as relying on the potential of ‘virality’.
2.4 Metapolitics
Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, theorised that in order for a regime to wield control over a population, it must first win its consent by shaping ‘debate in the cultural sphere’83 by filling ‘schools, universities, newspapers and think tanks with proponents of one’s own ideological perspective’ in order to spread and normalise that ideology. Gramsci called this ‘Cultural Hegemony.’ Once a cultural change has occurred, direct politics can then take place.
Alain de Benoist, of GRECE, read and re-evaluated Gramsci’s theories on the power of culture and repackaged it as ‘metapolitics.’ Metapolitics, also known as right-wing Gramscianism, was adopted by the ENR who organised ‘new journals, publishing houses, think tanks and fora’ to promote its ideology, particularly in relation to narratives of the ‘decline of the West’ caused by non-European, and particularly Islamic, immigration.84
In order to claim legitimacy, these systems need to be able to create an accessible and usually non-violent image of themselves, which they juxtapose with the perceived or accused injustice
82 Ibid., 250. 83 Sharpe,” ibid. 84 Ibid.
or violence of the system they are protesting against. Images of police violence have been used to increase sympathy and remobilise movements.85
Chapter 1: How is European Identity Defined,
Theorised and Instrumentalised by Generation
Identity?
In this chapter, I will describe Generation Identity as the flagship branch of the Identitarian movement, analysing what Identitarian ideology entails and how it has developed from predecessor ideologies, as well as how it compares to contemporary far-right ideologies. I will also look into who makes up the Identitarian movement, including the key individuals in the movement as well as the more active national branches of Generation Identity. Following that, I will then assess using discourse analysis what the key concepts of Identitarianism are relating to identity, such as ‘ethnopluralism,’ and the ‘Great Replacement,’ as well as methods of instrumentalising identity such as metapolitics. In particular I will analyse the inequalities present in the Identitarian conception of identity, how it upholds social dominance and how strategic use of discourse enables Identitarians to exercise such dominance. In order to ascertain the Identitarian position towards identity theorisation, the primary source for analysis in this chapter will be the book adopted as Generation Identity’s manifesto, Generation Identity: A
Declaration of War Against the ’68ers (‘A Declaration of War’), with secondary sources
comprising literature from the European New Right that GI has adopted, academic and media articles as well as other discourses produced by the GI such as YouTube videos and Social Media material.
1 What is Generation Identity?
The Identitarian Movement was born in France in 2003, when the ideology of Nouvelle Droit intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye was compiled to form the basis of Identitarianism’s first movement, the Bloc Identitaire. This movement fractured in 2012, with
