Master of Arts Thesis
EurocultureUniversity of Groningen (Home) University of Uppsala (Host)
July 2014
European identity through ‘thick’ and ‘thin’
Normative theory and the challenge of diversity
Submitted by: Jorick Albers S1724975 (University of Groningen) ID 0560 6429 (University of Uppsala) +31(0)6 15115856 Albers.jorick@gmail.com Supervised by: James Leigh, Ph.D. Fil. Dr. Mathias Persson
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ... 4
Part I: Theorising European Integration 1.1 HISTORIOGRAPHY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ... 9
INTEGRATION FROM THE1950S TO THE 1990S ... 9
THE 'NORMATIVE TURN' ...13
1.2 THE PARADOX OF UNITY IN DIVERSITY ...17
IDENTITY AND LEGITIMACY ...17
DIVERSIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ...21
Part II: Three Paths for the European Project 2.1 THE EUROPEAN NATION OR A EUROPE OF NATIONS ...29
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS ...29
IMPLICATION OF THE NATION-STATE MODEL FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ...33
'FORTRESS EUROPE' ...36
2.2 EUROPE AS AN EMERGING MULTILEVEL POLITY ...40
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS ...40
IMPLICATION OF MLG FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ...42
MLG AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY ...44
2.3 POST-NATIONAL DEMOCRACY ...48
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS ...48
IMPLICATION OF THE HABERMASIAN MODEL FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ...52
PATRIOTISM AND DIVERSITY ...54
CONSENSUS VERSUS CONFLICT ...57
CONCLUSION….………. 60
INTRODUCTION
Jean Monnet, one of the architects of modern Europe, at the end of his life is said to have remarked that if he had to start building the ‘European House’ anew, he would first address culture rather than economic or political life. Similarly, Gonzague de Reynolds wrote: "Wenn ich noch einmal meine Europäische Arbeit beginnen könnte würde ich mit der Kultur anfangen".1 What these two prominent 'Europeans' meant exactly remains uncertain, for they
did not define their concept of European culture. It is clear, however, that they refer to an idea of a European community that is more than a mere political entity or economic union; an idea of Europe that is anchored in the 'people of Europe'. Yet, the European project was not founded on a European people or culture. While visionaries like Monnet and Reynolds might have hoped for a 'communion of spirits' upon which the shared home of all Europeans was to be erected, the project itself advanced on the basis of technocratic, and economic, imperatives. The European Union did not become a reality because ever more Europeans saw the moral value of European-wide political community-building. As the Polish sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Baumann aptly describes:
"Our "European Union" was not born on public squares, it did not start from public meetings and demonstrations. There were few pep-talks or harangues, little flag-waving and no frenzied mobs in the streets. Instead of bishops, kings or philosophers, it was the likes of Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul Henri Spaak and Konrad Adenauer, seasoned, adroit and cunning politicians, aware that deeds count more than words - who assisted at its birth. No one asked nations to agree, no one really explained what there was to agree upon - at least until things no more depended on nations' agreement. Whatever was done needed little preaching, few converting missions, no call to arms. As far as public opinion is concerned - even the "enlightened" opinion, let alone the "unenlightened" one - the unification of Europe went on through faits accomplis rather, than through the publicly fought battle of ideas. If protests were heard, as a rule they sounded when the point of no return had been already reached or passed".2
1 Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A cultural history (New York, Routledge, 2006), 479. 2 Zygmunt Bauman, “Europe of strangers,” Online paper. URL:
It was indeed the perseverance of a small group of likeminded statesmen that pushed the integration process forward, not the people of Europe. For decades political leaders were able to exploit the so-called 'permissive consensus'.3 The European Union largely evolved quietly, with small steps and little public attention. The European integration process was "integration by stealth", as Jan-Werner Müller, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, expressed less politely.4
Integration by stealth, however, has come to an end. Now that Europe is seemingly on the path of becoming an ‘ever closer union’ it is increasingly visible and tangible in people's everyday lives. Since the late 1980s it has been an expressed policy of the union to strengthen integration in important respects. Especially after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) integration reached a level that affected the lives of citizens in concrete ways.5 This development gives increased gravity to the words of Monnet and Reynolds. Their call for a shared European culture as the underpinning of the European community has become more salient now that the European Union is as real as the reality of nation-states. Consequently, with the European integration project moving forward swiftly since the early 1990s, a lively academic debate on the social dimension of European integration has come to life. To use Dimitris Chryssochoou's6 words, the social dimension of European integration shifts the emphasis from the question "who governs and how?" to the more demanding question of "who is governed?”7 A European people, or demos, is no longer considered to be a by-product of the
European project, but occupies a central place in the theorizing of European integration. Part of this debate on European integration deals with the question how much diversity, or how great a difference, among the EU member states is sustainable before the union cracks. The problématique of diversity can be understood in roughly two ways. It is usually understood as the impact of diversification on the institutional structures, policies, and political dynamic of the European Union. Throughout the history of European integration enlargement has fuelled debates about the impact of increased diversity on established European regimes. Existing members have often voiced concerns about the 'absorption
3 Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010). 4 Jan-Werner Müller, 'The failure of European intellectuals?' Eurozine (4-11-2012).
5 Maia K. Davis Cross, "Identity Politics and European Integration," Comparative Politics No. (2012): 229-246. 6 Dimitris Chryssochoou is an Associate Professor of European Integration at the Panteion University.
capacity' of the European Union. A second approach to diversity, which will be central in this thesis, concerns the fundamental values of Europe. Enlargement of the EU, the wider process of globalisation, and the cross-fertilisation of cultures have made the European Union politically and culturally diverse. Widening and diversification of the EU introduced members with different historical experiences and trajectories, and culturally diverse and multi-ethnic societies. This raises the question of how to align the political-cultural diversity with the perceived need for a common European identity and a core of shared values. A challenge is to formulate a conception of European identity that can accommodate this diversity while at the same time it avoids being too abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging.8 Put more simply, the question is where to locate the unity in diversity.
Normative theories on European integration, however, generally look at the emerging European polity from the point of view of unity.9 Explicitly or implicitly their main interest is to answer the question how is this unity furthered. Questions of diversity within this unity accordingly are marginal. While scholars usually acknowledge Europe's political-cultural diversity, it is mostly not considered to be a fundamental challenge to the direction of the European project itself.10 As Gerard Delanty, a British sociologist, put it: “The story of European integration told in the conventional political science narrative denies the salience of normative elements, and even more so the relevance of cultural models of Europe that go beyond the efficacy of functional systems or a framework of legality”.11 This paper will
defend the opposite claim by elaborating the need to conceptualize the European project not simply as a political project but as one that defines what it means to be European. This is not only a philosophically interesting matter. The still uncertain future of the European project will be shaped by how questions of identity and diversity will be addressed in the near future. It has been rightfully remarked that the EU is an “ongoing project in diversity
8 Andrea Baumeister, "Diversity and unity: The Problem with 'Constitutional Patriotism'," European Journal of
Political Theory 6 (2007): 483-503; Andrea Schlenker-Fischer, "Unity in Diversity? European and National
Identities in Respect to Cultural Diversity," Working Paper Series Glocal Governance and Democracy (2010): 1-35.
9 Markus Thiel and Elisabeth Prügl, “Understanding Diversity in the European Integration” in: Elibeth Prügl and
Markus Thiele, eds., Diversity in the European Union (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3-21.
10 Paul Blokker, "The Post-enlargement European Order: Europe United in Diversity?" European diversity and
autonomy papers 1 (2006): 5-32.
11 Gerard Delanty, “Introduction: Perspectives on crisis and critique in Europe today,” European Journal of
management”.12 The ability and willingness to learn to live with diversity will be crucial in a
Union that “exhibits the full cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity of the entire world”.13 The
guiding question of this thesis therefore is: How do normative theories on European integration recognize and take into account the increased political-cultural diversity of the European Union? The overall intent, then, is to broaden the understanding of European integration beyond functional, institutional approaches - which are predominant in the fields of political science and international relations - by introducing the problématique of diversity to European integration theory.
The approach of this thesis is twofold. The first part of this thesis will explore the concept of diversity in the context of the European Union. The concept of diversity does not have a clear definition as its use “differs from person to person, from organization to organization, and from author to author”.14 The use of the concept depends on the kind of diversity in question, e.g. diversity in ethnicity, gender, religion or socio-economic status. The aim of this thesis, however, is not to analyse specific kinds diversity but rather to conceptualize diversity as the multitude of differences and similarities at the cultural and political level that exist in the European Union. Rather than developing a central concept of diversity the first objective of this thesis is to elaborate Europe’s increased political-cultural diversity and to discuss its relevance to European integration theory. More specifically, the thesis will address the theoretical assumptions underlying the problématique of diversity in regard to European integration and its relation to legitimacy and democracy.
The second part of the thesis will analyse different normative theoretical approaches to European integration and examine how they recognize and take into account the challenge of diversity outlined in the first part of the paper. Following the work of Paul Blokker15 it is
12 Michael Becker, “Managing diversity in the European Union: Inclusive citizenship and Third-Country
nationals,” Yale Human Right & Development Law Journal Vol. 17 (2004): 132-183; Turgut Karaköse and Canan Demir, “Cross-Cultural Differentiation and Diversity Management,” International Journal of Business
and Commerce Vol. 1 No. 4 (2011): 56-63; Gabriel Toggenburg, “Who is managing cultural and ethnic diversity
in the European condominium? The moment of entry, integration and preservation,” Journal of Common Market
Studies Vol. 43 No. 4 (2005): 717-738.
13 Becker, 2004, 133.
14 David Washington, The concept of diversity (Durham, Washington & Company, 2008), 3; Markus Thiel and
Elisabeth Prügl, “Understanding Diversity in the European Integration” in Diversity in the European Union, eds. Elibeth Prügl and Markus Thiele (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 3-21, 5.
15 Paul Blokker is principal investigator (project CoPolis) and lecturer in the department of Sociology, University
argued that the academic community has largely taken three different views of integration: Europe as an emerging supra-national state; Europe as a form of multi-level governance; and a model of post-national democracy based on the concept of constitutional patriotism.16 Each of these approaches will be introduced with a conceptual analysis. Subsequently, the paper will examine the implications of these theories on the direction of the European project and the construction of a European identity. The aim is to deconstruct the three normative theories on European integration in order reveal potential tensions and limits in their ability to accommodate the increased political-cultural diversity of the European Union. It is argued that the significance of Europe’s complex diversity for the integration project is not always reflected and sometimes difficult to deal with in these normative theories on European integration.
are the political sociology of democracy, modern constitutionalism, constitutional rationalities, critique and dissent, democracy and plurality, multiple modernities and multiple democracies, pragmatic sociology, (local) democratic participation, and Central and Eastern Europe.
16 Paul Blokker, "The Post-enlargement European Order: Europe United in Diversity?" European Diversity and
PART I: THEORISING E UROPEAN
INTEGRATION
Introduction
The first part of the opening chapter will briefly address the origins and evolution of the European Union and provide an overview of the scholarship on European integration theory. This is not simply a matter of setting the stage. By doing so it will be shown that, with the European community evolving into an ever closer union, European integration theory took a normative turn, moving from descriptive to prescriptive analyses of the European order. Subsequently, in the second part of the chapter, the paper will explore the concepts of unity and diversity of the European Union on both a theoretical and empirical level. Firstly, in theoretical terms, the paper will analyse the underlying assumptions of the problématique of diversity in regard to European integration and its relation to legitimacy and democracy. Secondly, in empirical terms, the paper examines the constitutional debate and the wider public political discourse on EU enlargement and immigration to illustrate the increased significance of diversity and potential value-conflict in the European Union.
1.1
Historiography of European integration
"Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals".17
- Edmund Burke.
Integration from the 1950s to the 1990s
Since the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) the project of European integration has come a long way. From the ECSC grew a union that has come to encompass
17 James Chandler, Wordsworth's Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and Politics (Chicago, Chicago
almost the whole of Europe, forming the largest economic entity in the world and arguably the most fascinating political project in contemporary history. Within little over half a century Europe witnessed the completion of the single market, the introduction of the Euro, the Schengen zone and an extraordinarily successful policy of enlargement. While the European project faced numerous setbacks, few would disagree that the gradual and voluntary merging of Europe's nation-states into a common Union is the most successful integration project in European history.
The European project has attracted the attention of many academics from a wide range of disciplines. From the beginning, scholars have observed European integration and have tried to explain the phenomenon of voluntary surrender of national sovereignty to the supranational level of governance in Europe. For much of the twentieth century the federalist narrative dominated the thinking about European integration. According to this account the nation-state was in long-term decline and the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC) presaged the eventual emerge of a federal Europe, a United Stated of Europe. The idea that the European nation-state was at is end was fuelled by the bitter experience of excessive nationalism and the two World Wars that ravaged the European continent. Furthermore, the Soviet bid for domination of Europe strengthened the sentiment in favour for new arrangements for international relations in the early post-war years. The presence of a powerful common enemy behind the iron curtain proved to be a stronger incentive for European integration than the words of far-sighted intellectuals such as Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi18 had been. In the early post-war years there was much talk of replacing
the traditional system of nation-states in Europe with federal or con-federal arrangements. The inability of international organisations, such as the League of Nations, to prevent the atrocities that took place between 1939 and 1945 strengthened the belief that the international community had to be reorganised. This gave rise to the establishment of the European Movement in the late 1940's, a diverse group of influential Europeans representing the entire political spectrum that advocated the formation of a European federation. Support for a
18 Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894 –1972) was an Austrian politician, geopolitician,
European federation culminated in the Congress of Europe. Yet, the congress failed to reach an agreement on European unification. Its achievement was the birth of the Council of Europe, an organisation that was far from the federalist dream of building an institutional structure for a United States of Europe. While the federalist movement's champions, like Altiero Spinelli, had hoped for a 'big bang' approach to European integration, it was the low-key tactic of the Monnet-method that proved to be more successful. Jean Monnet, a backroom boy, took a more ‘stealthy’ approach to European to integration. Instead of advocating grand schemes, he preferred to take small steps towards a European federation via the unglamorous path of functional integration. It was through coal and steel that the European project took its first steps in supranational governance. While from a market perspective the ECSC was a failure - the two sectors were singularly unsuited for economic integration - it was of great symbolic value for the Franco-German reconciliation and an important experiment in the European integration project.19 The ECSC was a stalking horse of European integration, leading the way for further deepening in the form of the EEC and EURATOM.20
With the establishment of the ECSC, and later with the EEC, European nation-states agreed to give up parts of their sovereignty to a supranational power in Brussels. Early on political theorists and other thinkers developed theories to explain the phenomenon of voluntary surrender of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. The dominant theory on European integration from the 1950s to the late 1970s was neofunctionalism, a theory that corresponds with the Monnet-method, i.e., integration by small steps. The main protagonist of this theory was Ernst B. Haas, a US political scientist. Neofunctionalism maintains that integration in one (functional) area would lead to integration in other areas through the so-called 'spill-over' effect. The spill-over effect is threefold. Firstly there is functional spill-over in an economic context, meaning that interrelated economic sectors will integrate once one sector is governed at the supranational level. Supranational governance of coal and steel production, for instance, will be an incentive for integrating transport systems that are related to this economic sector. Secondly there is political spill-over, where political actors who have experienced supranational governance connect with their peers in other countries and shift
19 John R. Gillingham, “The German Problem and European Integration,” in European Identity, ed. Desmond
Dinan (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)
20 Craig Parsons, “The Triumph of Community Europe,” in European Identity, ed. Desmond Dinan (Oxford,
their allegiance from the national to the supranational level in Brussels. Thirdly there is cultivated spill-over, meaning that once autonomic supranational institutions are in practice they will push the integration further. According to this approach states would thus initially integrate in limited functional, economic areas. Thereafter, partially integrated states are driven forward with increasing momentum to engage in further rounds of integration in related areas. Through the spill-over effect the integration process will inevitably continue to expand and it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses, eventually resulting in a full-fledged European federation.21
By the mid–1970s, however, neofunctionalism lost its appeal. The 'empty chair crisis'22 showed that European integration was not as inevitable as the Neofunctionalist School had claimed. It appeared that integration could be checked by nation-states. This led to an increased emphasis on intergovernmentalism - the argument that member states play a strong gatekeeping role. A scholar who played a key role in the revision of European integration theory was Alan Milward. With his hugely influential book, The European Rescue of the
Nation State, Milward reversed the prevailing view of the emerge of the ECSC and the EEC,
which posited that the new supranational entities heralded the fall of the nation-state and the rise of a united states of Europe.23 Contrary to the federalist narrative, Milward argued that national governments voluntarily surrendered sovereignty in key policy areas to the supranational level in order to ensure their own survival. Milward wrote: "The development of the European Community, the process of European integration, was, so runs the argument of this book, a part of the post-war rescue of the European nation-state, because the new political consensus on which this rescue was built required the process of integration, the surrender of limited areas of national sovereignty to the supranational".24 Far from undermining the nation-state, as the Neofunctionalists School argued, the Milwardian position
21 Peter Wolf, "International organization and attitude change: a re-examination of the functionalist approach",
International Organization Vol. 27 (1973): 347-371. + MEER VERWIJZINGEN (DINAN)
22 The empty chair crisis was caused when the French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France's
representatives from the EC after being unable to reach agreement over the financing of the Common
Agricultural Policy and the use of qualified majority voting in the EC. Ultimately differences were resolved with the Luxembourg compromise, which gave member states the possibility to block progress in the Council of Ministers on points opposed to its 'very important interest'. This compromise basically meant a halt to supranationalism and had a strongly influenced the direction of the European project.
Desmond Dinan, Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 157-159.
23 Idem, 298.
claimed that the European integration process was to ensure the survival of the nation-state and to enhance its authority.
The 'normative turn'
While the neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches to European integration helped in developing understanding of the phenomenon of voluntary surrender of national sovereignty to the supranational level of governance, they are less fruitful as normative theories on the emerging European order. Part of the problem with these approaches is that they place little emphasis on human agency and popular consent. This is understandable given the fact that the issue of Europe's democratic credentials barely arose in the first decades of the integration process. However, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, this changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the 'dark ages' of the 1970s in which the EEC suffered from the global economic turndown and seemed to be at a deadlock, the European integration project gained new impetus.25 With the launch of the single market programme - with the newly appointed Commission president Jacques Delors as its front man - the European Community went from a seemingly moribund entity to a dynamic and rapidly developing community. In the 1980s the union was well underway to deepen integration in important respects. To use the words of Lynn Dobson, professor of political theory at the University Edinburgh, the European project evolved far beyond a mere "intergovernmental organisation grubbing around steel production and the like ('low politics') and run by a caste of technocrats ('the Monnet method') to the benefit of an oblivious population ('permissive consensus')".26 Especially after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) integration reached a level that affected peoples lives in concrete ways. This development triggered norm-orientated discourses addressing the nature of Europe's political order and the EU's democratic standing. Concerns were raised about the so-called 'deficits' of the European Union. A substantial body of work has been devoted to the EU’s 'democratic deficit', i.e. the idea that the governance of the EU in some way lacks democratic legitimacy. While the concept of democratic deficit became a fashionable catchword in the debate surrounding the EU’s functioning, it does not have a consensual and clear-cut definition. Usually the concept is used to refer to the allegedly
25 Dinan, 2006, 169.
defective mechanisms through which citizens’ preferences can be translated into policy outputs.27 The European Union itself acknowledges that EU bodies “suffer from a lack of
democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is so complex”.28 Other deficits that have received less attention are the Union's 'legitimacy
deficit' and 'community deficit', that is, the perceived lack of shared values and bonds among the European Union’s diverse population.29 Whereas the concept of democratic deficit raised
question regarding the democratic functioning and the structural ‘design’ of the EU, scholars that have addressed the community deficit have pointed out that the level and scope of European integration activities far exceeds the degree of community that it sustains.30 The underlying argument, as the Israeli-American sociologist Amitai Etzioni put it, is that the European Union is to be “a community whose members share a core of values, whose common good and purpose they find compelling and whose institutions are considered legitimate to the extent that their design and actions are compatible with the shared values”.31 Yet, there is “no functional demos to whom EU institutions could in any case be made accountable”.32 Etzioni therefore argues that “the community deficit must be curtailed if the union is to continue to solidify and must be reduced before the democratic deficit can be overcome”.33 The need for a normative foundation for the European Union is further
underlined by Dobson, who argues that:
"[...] the EU’s most pressing normative problem is whether, and how, its institutions, practices and policies might be rendered justifiable. The political arrangements shaping and constraining persons’ lives must be capable of being made acceptable to them within terms that each could accept, because this is the only condition on which such arrangements are tolerable to free and rational agents. There is nothing in that understanding to support the limiting of public reasoning to within the boundaries of the
27 Albert Weale and Michael Nentwich, eds, Political theory and the European Union: legitimacy, constitutional
choice and citizenship (London: Routledge, 1998); Dobson, 2006, 512.
28 URL: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm
29 Amitai Etzioni, “The community deficit,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 45. No. 1 (2007): 23–42. 30 Daniel Innerarity, “What kind of deficit? Problems of legitimacy in the European Union,” European Journal
of Social Theory Vol. 17 No. 3 (2014): 307-325; Etzioni, 2007.
state or super state, and there seem to be good reasons why a liberal theory should seek to extend the reach of justification for political institutions to all persons subject to their impacts".34
The legitimacy of the European Union's institutions, practices and policies thus relies on their recognition and acceptance by the European people - who since the Maastricht Treaty were given the status of ‘citizen of the European Union’. In order for European citizens to recognize and accept the EU’s political arrangements as legitimate a certain identification and sense of belonging to the European polity is needed.35 The democratic legitimacy of the EU is
thus closely related to questions of identity and hence to the EU’s diversity, which is an important part of the Union’s self–portrayal.36 Clearly Jacques Delors' definition of Europe as 'un object politique non-identifié' is no longer sufficient. Quite the contrary. The European Union is now in need of a clear definition of its nature, i.e. its elusive identity. Without it, it might become difficult to craft a sense of 'who we are' let alone create a sense of belonging and loyalty to the European polity. As Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, in their stimulating book European Identity, describe in a striking metaphor:
"The ship of European identity has entered uncharted waters. Its sails are flapping in a stiff breeze. Beyond the harbour, whitecaps are signalling stormy weather ahead. The crew is fully assembled, but some members are grumbling - loudly. While food and drink are plentiful, maps and binoculars are missing. Officers are vying for rank and position as no captain is in sight. Sensing a lack of direction and brooding bad weather, some passengers are resting in the fading sun on easy chairs thinking of past accomplishments; others are huddling in an openly defiant mood close to the lifeboats, anticipating bad times ahead. With the journey's destination unknown, the trip ahead seems excruciatingly difficult to some, positively dangerous to others. Anxiety and uncertainty, not hope and self-confidence, define the moment".37
The ship of European identity indeed needs a destination. As the EU continues its integration process, and the demands of the European polity towards its citizens increase, normative
34 Dobson, 2006, 523.
35 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Efficient and Democratic? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 36 Armin von Bogdandy, “Die Europäische Union und das Völkerrecht kultureller Vielfalt - Aspekte einer
wunderbaren Freundschaft,” European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 1 (2007): 1-66.
arguments concerning the purpose, underlying values, future shape and desirable structures of the European Union cannot be avoided.38 With the normative turn in European Studies the
academic community became interested in areas other than functional efficiency or national interests as drivers of the European integration process. The notion of a European people and questions of identity and diversity are thus increasingly significant in European integration theory. The paper will now move on to explore the concepts of unity and diversity of the European Union and to further discuss the underlying assumption of the problématique of diversity in regard to European integration and its relation to legitimacy and democracy.
38 Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, "Normative Theory and the European Union: Legitimising the
1.2
The paradox of unity in diversity
"Whatever road to [European] integration is chosen, it starts from diversity, leads through diversity and is unlikely to reach beyond it, at least not in a foreseeable future".39
- Zygmunt Baumann.
Identity and legitimacy
With the normative turn in European studies, identity became an important concept in European integration theory. The lack of a European identity is often considered to be a central problem of European integration. The necessity of a European identity is usually derived from two assumptions with regard to European integration and its relation to democracy. Firstly, Europe is understood as some kind of answer to the eroding consequences of globalisation of the nation-state and democratic decision-making. Already decades ago, Daniel Bell in his book The End of Ideology, asserted that the nation-state as we know it is in decline. His argument was that states would eventually become too small to handle problems posed by globalisation, while at the same time states are too large to deal effectively with problems on the local level.40 The word globalisation is defined here as "the process whereby
state-centric agencies and terms of reference are dissolved in favour of a structure of relations between different actors operating in a context which is truly global rather than merely inter-national".41 This process is indeed manifest today. Certainly, if we are to believe the
communis opinio in contemporary political philosophy and sociology, the position of the
traditional nation-state as we know is challenged by new political and economic conditions. In
Paths to Post-Nationalism Monica Heller, professor of sociology at the University of Toronto,
presents an extensive study in which she concludes that hegemonic discourses of language, identity, and the nation-state are being destabilized by processes of globalisation. Heller
39 Zygmunt Bauman, “Europe of strangers,” Online paper. URL:
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/bauman.pdf
40 Sylvia Ostry, “Globalization of the nation-state: Erosion from above.” (1999): 2-19. URL:
http://www.utoronto.ca/cis/ostry/docs_pdf/timlin.pdf
argues that these processes put us on the path to post-nationalism.42 Consequently, a new
geopolitical reality is coming into being. In this new and modified political space political theorists and other thinkers search for alternative models of political order. In this sense, as Paul Blokker argues, "the identification of a distinct set of European values would mean the demarcation of Europe as a polity in the world and the defence of specifically European values in terms of democracy, human rights, and social democracy".43 The importance of shared values as the underpinning of a European identity is also stressed by Christine Leitner, Head of the Center for European Public Administration (CEPA) at Danube University Krems, who states that the European project is only feasible insofar politicians, peoples and individuals share fundamental values and political objectives and at the same time understand and respect the wide range of cultural identities within the EU.44 This supposition is shared by the European Commission in its statement that “our European model shows that an ever closer union between peoples is possible where it is based on shared values and common objectives”.45
Secondly, a European identity and a shared set of fundamental values is considered to be a precondition for the emergence of a European public sphere, and hence for the viability and democratic legitimacy of the European order.46 As outlined above, the elitist approach to European integration is increasingly challenged. Concerns about Europe’s alleged democratic deficit have raised demands for more influence of the European ‘people’ at the supra-national level. This requires a European public sphere, a discursive space wherein both government and civil society participate to discuss matters of mutual interest with the aim of reaching a common judgment.47 As the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues, “democratic legitimation requires mutual contact between, on the on hand, institutionalised deliberation and decision-making within parliaments, courts and administrative bodies and, on the other,
42 Monica Heller, Paths to post-Nationalism. A critical ethnography of language and identity (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2011).
43 Strath Bo, “Multiple Europes: Integration, Identity and Demarcation to the Other,” in Europe and the Other
and Europe as the Other, ed. Bo Strath (Brussels, Peter Lang, 2010), 385-420; Blokker, 2006, 6.
44 Christine Leitner, “Walking the Tightrope – Cultural Diversity in the Context of European Integration,”
Eipascope 1 (2000): 20-24.
45 “Sharing the New Europe”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, Strategic objectives 2000-2005, COM (2000) 154 final.
46 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Efficient and Democratic? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999). 47 Gerard Hauser, “Vernacular dialogue and the rhetorically of Public Opinion,” Communication
an inclusive process of informal mass communication”.48 A common political-cultural
framework that defines the nature of what constitutes European belonging is a prerequisite for meaningful deliberation and collective social action in a European public sphere. A shared set of fundamental values is thus not only of symbolic importance, but it is also vital for the effective functioning of the EU as an emerging political entity.49
The argument concerning the need for a European identity that transcends ethnic and cultural diversity and forms the common ground that allows meaningful engagement in the public sphere has been endorsed by a number of leading scholars. Habermas speaks of the need for a "common European consciousness"; that is, the need to "activate citizen's consciousness in the process of political integration, requiring an explicit form of political identity".50 The need for a common political identity is also underpinned by Dario Castiglione, Associate Professor of political theory at the University of Exeter, who states:
"In the conditions of ‘modern’ politics, political identity has come to matter a great deal. This is the result of numerous socio-historical developments, which have made the basis of political and social power more secular, anonymous and detached from personalised relationships. In these conditions (which are the conditions of a ‘society of strangers’), it has become essential to rely on ‘political identity’ as a self-standing basis for political allegiance".51
People’s self-perceptions and identifications are essential in the growing together of a political community. It can be said that a common identity constitutes a political community.52 This is the more so in democratic polities which, as the Canadian philosopher
48 Jürgen Habermas, “Why Europe needs a constitution,” New Left Review 11 (2001): 5-26, 17.
49 Madeleine Heyward, “What constitutes Europe? Religion, law and identity in the draft constitution for the
European Union,” Hanse Law Review Vol. 2 No. 1 (2005): 227-235, 228; Daniela Obradovic,
“Policy Legitimacy and the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 34 No. 2 (1996): 190,193.
50 Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), 86.
51 Dario Castiglione, "Notes on the Role of Political Identity in European Integration" Paper presented at
the EKEM Conference “Federalizing the EU: Why Do It?”, Athens, Greece, May 2007.
52 Angelika Scheuer, "Dynamics in European Political Identity" (Paper prepared for presentation at the Spring
Charles Taylor argues, need some strong motivation for inclusion.53 After all, in democracies
citizens cannot separate themselves from society since "a common discourse about collective matters of public concern is required".54 Richard Jenkins, a professor of sociology who greatly contributed to the theorising of social identities, even claims that without identity there can be no society. In other words, without frameworks of similarity and difference people would be unable to relate to each other in a consistent and meaningful way.55 According to Jenkins, "in our relationships with significant others we draw up identification of similarities and differences, and, in the process, generate group identities. At the same time, our self-conscious group memberships signify others and creates relationships with them".56 While identities function as points of attachment and identification, their construction depends on the capacity to exclude and leave out ‘others’.57 The unity, which identity suggests, is
"constructed within the play of power and exclusion, and is the result, not of a natural and inevitable primordial totality but of the naturalized, over determined process of closure".58
The need for a European identity thus rest on two assumption. Firstly, a common identity based on a set of shared fundamental values is seen as a precondition for the demarcation of Europe as an emerging polity in the world. Secondly, a European identity is considered to be a precondition for the emergence of a European public sphere, which in turn is to ensure democratic influence of European citizens on governance at the supranational level. The European polity, in short, is seen as in need of a common political-cultural framework that defines the nature of what constitutes European belonging in order to function democratically. At the same time, however, the memory of excessive nationalism in Europe and the moral abyss of the twentieth century has led the European community to endorse cultural diversity within a common European framework, expressed in the slogan 'unity in diversity'. The challenge that any normative theory on European integration faces is that it needs to be able to reconcile social cohesion with diversity. It needs to define a common European framework that is open to include the 'other' while at the same time avoiding being too abstract to sustain a real sense of solidarity and belonging.
53 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1994), 37–38, 44, 51.
54 Craig J. Calhoun, Social theory and the politics of identity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) 2. 55 Richard Jenkins, Social identity (New York, 2008).
56 Idem 105.
Diversification of the European community
The European Union has become increasingly diverse over the last decades. Diversity in the EU does not only encompass the national cultures and languages of the member states - which have increased in number with every round of enlargement - but also the cross-fertilisation with non-European cultures as a consequence of increased mobility and immigration. Enlargement of the European Union and the large-scale movement of people gave rise to unprecedented societal and political diversity, both among the EU Member States and within those states.59 Against this background, it is not a coincidence that the European Commission chose 'unity in diversity' as its credo. Acknowledging diversity, however, has not come easily to Europeans. While the European Union has clearly embraced diversity as a value, concerns about further enlargement, immigration, and the European Union's democratic standing have raised larger questions of a European identity and the nature of the European polity. Diversity is a central concept to these debates and is often framed as a problem. The 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement, for instance, have raised concerns about bringing more - and to some unwanted - diversity into the European community.60 This is reflected in a report on the 'Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe' provided by the Reflection Group of the Institute for Human Science in Vienna. The report states:
"The Union's expansion, bringing in ten new member countries, also brings into the Union people who are often much poorer and culturally vastly different from the majority of the citizens in the old member states. The vast majority of the new EU citizens, many of whom endured decades of subjugation to Communist regimes, hold thoughts and values indelibly marked by the experiences unfamiliar to the long-time EU citizens. As a result, economic and cultural differences within the Union have, at a stoke,
59 Rinus Penninx, Maria Berger, Karen Kraal (eds.) The Dynamics of International Migration and Settlement in
Europe: A State of the Art (Amsterdam 2006) 19-41; Adrian Favell, ‘Immigration, migration, and the free
movement in the making of Europe’, in: Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, European identity (Cambridge 2009) 167-189; Giovanna Zincone and Rinus Penninx, Migration policymaking in Europe: The dynamics of
actors and contexts in past and present (Amsterdam 2011) 7; Papademetriou, Demetrious G, 'Rethinking
national identity in the age of migration' Council statement from the 7th plenary meeting on the Transatlantic
Council on Migration (Washington Februari 2012). URL:
<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/tcmstatement-identity.pdf>.
become much greater and more intense. The constitutional process to define the Union in a more ambitious ways fuels this intensity to an even greater degree".61
A striking example of a conflict over cultural differences within the Union can be seen in the constitutional debate at the beginning of this century. While the debate surrounding the Draft
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was intended to focus primarily on the EU's
institutional structures, it also evoked questions about Europe's identity and fundamental values, and in particular the question of whether the European Constitution should make an explicit reference to Europe's Christian identity and heritage. In many national constitutions references to God can be found in the preamble. The German Constitution, for example, opens with: "Im Bewußtsein seiner Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen [...]". In even more explicit wording the Irish invocatio states: "In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Éire, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial".62 During the constitutional debate Christian Democrats and leading church representatives advocated the inclusion of similar references to Christianity in the preamble of the European constitution. Pope John Paul II, for one, stressed that "Christendom's decisive contribution to the history and culture of the different countries is part of a common treasure and it would thus make sense to inscribe this in the constitutional project".63 A number of member states with strong religious traditions supported the notion of the ‘historical truth’ of Europe’s Judeo-Christian roots, which they considered to be a unifying factor and a source of the Union’s fundamental values.64 These included Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Czech Republic and Slovakia. They found support with the Vatican and the European People’s Party.65 Calls for a
religious foundation of Europe's identity were especially apparent in Poland. As an
61 "The Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe" (paper presented by the IWM 'Institut fϋr die
Wissenschaften vom Menschen' Reflection Group, Vienna, Austria, 2004).
<http://www.iwm.at/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79&Itemid=286>.
62 Source URL:
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Youth_Zone/About_the_Constitution,_Flag,_Anthem_Harp/Constitution_of_Ir eland_Eng_Nov2004.htm
63 Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 95. 64 Honor Mahony, “Does God Belong in the Future EU Constitution?” The Parliament Magazine (10
March 2003): 12, 12; John Coughlan, “Keep the Faith,” The Parliament Magazine (2003): 14.
increasingly influential new member-state it took a leading role in the constitutional debate. The Polish public debate on the Constitutional Treaty contains abundant references to Europe's Christian roots. Data from Europub.com shows that in the Polish debate over the period of 2002-2004 Europe's ethno-religious nature was considered to be a more important topic than Europe's democratic values (14.4% versus 6.1%).66 Meanwhile, opponents of explicitly linking European identity to Europe's Christian roots argued instead for the emphasise of shared human rights, democratic values and tolerance, advocating for the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in a European Constitution rather than
nominationes dei.67 France, Britain, Sweden and Denmark, among others, argued that any invocation of Christian values would be exclusionary and inappropriate in a multicultural and multi-ethnic Europe that is home to many different national traditions as well as many non-Christian believers and atheists.68 They insisted to frame the EU constitution in the context of an ‘inclusive identity’. As Matthias Mahlman expressed, in the building of a contemporary constitution “the only identity that is relevant on the political and legal level of deliberation is centred on the substantial normative contents of a universalistic outlook […] one that potentially excludes nobody”.69
The debate surrounding the place of religion in the Preamble and art. 2 – which identify the EU’s core values – has been described as ‘the most emotive’ issue of the negotiation process.70 The various opinions expressed by member states as to the role of
religion reflect the significance of the differences in member states’ conceptions of the common values of the Union and notions of what constitutes Europe's core identity. Arguments for, or against, a certain reference to Christianity in a European constitution can be seen as attempts to uphold distinct national identities and constitutional traditions. Moreover, the resurfacing of religious issues appears to indicate the limits of the inclusiveness of a European identity, particularly in regard to Europe’s Muslim population and the possible
66 Europub link
67 Checkel and Katzenstein, 2010, 95; Madeleine Heyward, “What constitutes Europe? Religion, law and identity
in the draft constitution for the European Union,” Hanse Law Review Vol. 2 No. 1 (2005): 227-235, 228.
68 Ian Black, “EU Constitution: Doubting North Wins Battle to Leave God out of It,” The Guardian (London, 29
May 2004); István Ertl, “God in the Constitution, Devil in the Details,” The Parliament Magazine (Brussels), 10 March 2003, 13.
69 Matthias Mahlman, “Constitutional Identity and the Politics of Homogeneity,” German Law Journal Vol. 6
No. 2 (2005): 316.
70 Madeleine Heyward, What constitutes Europe? Religion, law and identity in the draft constitution for the
accession of Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state. As Ian Ward, a professor of law at Newcastle University, argues: “Whilst the Union would hesitate to openly admit the fact, it has always been assumed that the “new” Europe is a Christian Europe, or at least it is not a Muslim one”.71 The European project thus entails contestations of the extent to which
religious and cultural diversity threatens a European self-understanding. What is at stake, then, is the question how much difference is considered acceptable, or desirable, in the name of diversity.
The challenge of reconciling social cohesion and diversity in the EU is also apparent in the wider discourses72 on European enlargement and immigration. To some the idea of further enlargement to the east, and to Turkey specifically, threatens the very core of European identity, which is defined on the basis on Europe's Christian heritage and that needs to be defended against political Islam.73 Such concerns - which revolve around the topic of diversity - are not only heard from the political parties of the far right, but are part of a much broader public political discourse.74 A good illustration is a speech entitled "Our nation's future: Multiculturalism and integration" delivered in 2008 by the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a British Labour Party politician. The speech addressed the sensitive topic of dealing with cultural diversity in the United Kingdom. Blair referred to the horrible event of the 2005 bombings of the London metro that happened the day after England had been awarded the bid for the 2012 Olympics. At the time, the award to host the Olympics was viewed as a ratification of England's successful policy of accommodating racial and cultural diversity over the last decades. Against this background, and referring to the terrorists attack Blair said:
71 Ian Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 23. 72 I acknowledge that the concept of discourse is a heavily theorized and debated concept. The semantic history
of the concept is complex and cannot be unravelled within the scope of this thesis. The concept is used here to describe the totality of communication including the use of spoken, written, signed language, visual and oral media in a social context and/or a field of intellectual enquiry. I follow Norman Fairclough’s understanding of discourses as “ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice”. This notion of discourse maintains that ideas and values are embodied in the language of a community or society. Importantly, language does not only reflects but constructs social reality. See: Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).
73 Thiel and Prugl, 2009.
74 Janny de Jong, “‘Here We Go Again’. The Supposed Failure of Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective,”
in: Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal, eds., Europe - Space for Transcultural
"Everything the Olympic bid symbolized was everything they hated. Their emphasis was not on shared values but separate ones, values based on a warped distortion of the faith of Islam. It has thrown into sharp relief, the nature of what we have called, with approval, "multicultural Britain". We like our diversity. But how do we react when that "difference" leads to separation and alienation from the values that define what we hold common. For the first time in a generation there is an unease, an anxiety, even at points a resentment that our very openness, our willingness to welcome difference, our pride in being home to many cultures is being used against us; abused, indeed, in order to harm us".75
Importantly, Blair frames the core of the problem as one of values. While stressing that difference should not lead to alienation, he also expresses his concern about losing sight of the values that underpin, or should underpin, the British society. According to Blair, these “essential values” include the belief in democracy, the value of law, tolerance, equal treatment of all, and respect for Britain and its shared heritage. These are the values that British citizens hold in common and that give citizens “the right to themselves British”.76 The use of words ‘they’ and ‘us’ reflect the notion of the existence of an in-group that has certain values in common as opposed to the out-group that does not share those values, or even rejects them altogether. Here the dilemma of reconciling social cohesion and diversity clearly comes to the fore. While reasserting the notion of tolerance and the will to embrace diversity, Blair also argues for the need of a framework of shared fundamental values that forms the common bond that supersedes the notion of diversity:
"The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a celebration of division; but diversity. The purpose was to allow people to live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their difference an encouragement to discord. The values that nurtured it were those of solidarity, of coming together, of peaceful co-existence. The right to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British and black, British and white. Those whites who support BNP's policy of separate races and those Muslims who shun integration into British society both contradict the fundamental values that define Britain today; tolerance, solidarity across the racial and religious divide, equality for all and between all".
Thus, although Blair emphasizes the value of diversity he also acknowledges that diversity does not equate 'anything goes'. Clearly he finds himself in the difficult position of wanting to formulate a framework of shared fundamental values that binds people together while at the same time it sets the boundaries of diversity. Blair speaks of “shared boundaries within which we all are obliged to live precisely in order to preserve our right to our own different faiths, races and creeds”.
While Blair addressed a societal problem of his own country, his speech applies to a European-wide challenge of dealing with diversity. His optimistic analysis, however, is not shared by all. A less positive analysis that stirred up the debate about questions of diversity, integration and multiculturalism in Germany and beyond is Thilo Sarrazin’s bestseller and hugely influential Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land auf Siel setzen.77 Sarazin, a German politician and former member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, alarms his audience about the failure of integration and subsequent development of so-called
Parallelgesellschaften, i.e., communities of non-European immigrants that have little or no
attachment or sense of belonging to their host countries. Concerns about increasing diversity as a consequence of European enlargement and immigration are further fuelled by the 'war on terror' and the discourse on the 'clash of civilizations'. These discourses have framed those who want to enter the EU - whether citizens from applicant states or non-European immigrants - as potential security and “sociocultural” risks.78 The statistics of the 2008-2010
European Value Survey (EVS) show that such concerns are widely shared in European countries.79 A more recent study of the MAXCAP project80 confirms the finding of the EVS.
77 Thilo Sarrazin, Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser land aufs Spiel setzen (Berlin. Random House,
2010)
78 Thiel and Prugl, 2009; Ray Taras, Europe Old and New: Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia (New
York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).
79 The European Values Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research
programme on basic human values, initiated in the late 1970s. The statistics used here are derived from the 2008-2010 survey. According to the statistics, attitudes towards immigrants differentiate throughout Europe. However, the general attitude is negative (with extremes in Greece, Great Britain and Austria were the percentage of people who think too many migrants reside in their country is approximately 70%). The main concerns about immigration are fear of undermining cultural life, putting a strain to the welfare system, and increasing crime rates; Uwe Krause, 'The atlas of European Values Project: Mapping the values of European for educational purposes' European Journal of Geography Volume 3, Issue 2 (2011) 54-71.
80 MAXCAP is a research project that consists of a nine-partner consortium of academic, policy, dissemination
Its analysis of public opinion on European enlargement and immigration shows that as of 2012 a majority of the European population expressed opposition towards future enlargements of the EU. The MAXCAP working paper states that "perceived cultural threat appears to drive the increasingly negative citizens' opinion towards enlargement throughout Europe - Eastern and Western. Individual level public opinion determinants related to national identity and anti-immigration attitudes are important across east and west and also north and south".81 Anxiety about increased diversity as a result of European enlargement and immigration found its expression at the political level in the declaration of the 'failure of multiculturalism' by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and other leading politicians. Merkel, at a conference of the youth wing of the Christian Democratic Union party in 2010, remarked: "Of course the tendency had been to say, 'let's adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by side, and be happy to be living with each other'. But this concept has failed, and failed utterly".82
The debate over demos and identity reveals the struggle to deal with increased diversity in the European Union. While Europeanness is often defined in terms of (universal) human rights, fear of diversity - not only in the form of xenophobia but also in bigotry against lesbian, gay, and transgender (LGBT) individuals and social minorities such as the Roma - shows how values across Europe can be seen to differ. Enlargement of the European Union and immigration have brought to the fore religious and ethnic diversity, and have magnified the cleavages that cross the European Union. Along with diversity came new demands for special group rights and recognition. Sexual minorities have demanded equal rights, and regional and cultural minorities have clamoured for recognition and participation. With this in mind, the perceived need of a common European political-cultural framework and set of shared values, as described above, clearly becomes a problematic issue. In the face of the EU’s increased political-cultural diversity the construction of a collective (political) identity
academic and the policy world on matters relating to the current and future enlargement of the EU. Its objective is to analyse of the effects of the 2004-2007 enlargement on stability, democracy and prosperity of candidate countries, on the one hand, and the EU’s institutions, on the other. The overall aim of the researchers is to investigate how the EU can maximize its integration capacity for current and future enlargements.
81 Dimiter Toshkov, Elita Kortenska, Antoaneta Dimitrova and Adam Fagan, “The ‘Old’ and the ‘New’
Europeans: Analyses of Public Opinion on EU Enlargement in review,” MAXCAP Working Paper Series No. 2 (2014): 1-41.
to increase the Union’s normative and democratic legitimacy will prove to be a challenging task. As Sanem Baykal, Hauser Research Scholar and Professor in European Union Law at the Ankara University Law School, states: “The main challenge for the Union will be to strike a balance between diversity/dynamism/plurality on the one hand, and unity/cohesion/solidarity on the other, while aspiring to become a normative civilian power and a sufficiently democratic and efficient system of governance”.83 Normative theories on European integration - which look at the emerging European polity from the point of view of unity – thus face the challenge of having to formulate ways to further integration while at the same time they must take into account the reality of Europe's increased diversity. Against this background, the paper will now move on to analyse the three abovementioned views on European integration from the perspective of diversity.
83 Sanem Baykal, Unity in diversity? The challenge of diversity for the European political identity and
democratic governance: Turkish membership as the ultimate test case (New York, New York School of Law,
PART II: THREE PATHS FOR THE
EUROPEAN PROJECT
Introduction
The first part of this thesis has elaborated Europe’s increased political-cultural diversity and discussed its relevance to European integration theory. The second part of the thesis will explore the three abovementioned normative theories on European integration. The aim here is not so much to replicate the ideas of any particular scholar but to set out the elements that underlie the three contending views on European integration. After a conceptual analysis the approaches to the emerging European order will be related to the challenge of diversity as outlined in the first part of the thesis.
2.1 The European nation or a Europe of nations
“A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours”.84
-Karl Deutsch.
Conceptual analysis
In many political theoretical approaches to European integration the nation-state takes a central place. The core ideas of the state-centric model are put forward by a number of scholars.85 What these scholars hold in common is that they consider the nation-state to be either the underpinning of the European order, or the nation-state is seen as a model for the emerging European polity. Put differently, the emerging European order is either considered to evolve into a European super state, replacing existing nation-states, or the European order
84 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York, Random House, 1969) 3.
85 Gary Marks and Liesbeth Hooghe, “European integration from the 1980’s: State-centric vs multi-level
