An analysis of international anti-migration awareness campaigns
Master thesis Conflict Resolution and Governance By Lynn van Beek (student number 10539042) Under the supervision of Dr. A.J. van Heelsum Due on September 11, 2014
Word count: 20,619
All human populations are in some sense immigrants. All hostility
between different cultures in one place has an aspect of the classic immigrant
grudge against the next boatload approaching the shore. To defend one's home
and fields and ancestral graves against invasion seems a right. But to claim
unique possession - to compound the fact of settlement with the aspect of a
landscape into an abstract of eternal and immutable ownership - is a joke.
Neil Ascherson
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ... 4
2. THE ISSUE OF MIGRATION ... 6
2.1 Key definitions ... 6
2.2 European migration ... 8
2.3 Transformation of migration perspectives ... 10
2.4 Outsourcing of border control ... 12
2.5 Traditional migration control: European legislation ... 14
2.6 Soft measures of migration control: Information and awareness campaigns ... 16
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 21
3.1 Analyzing effectiveness ... 23
3.2 Effects on democratic values ... 24
3.3 Policy motives ... 24
3.4 Research questions ... 25
3.5 Limitations ... 25
4. METHODOLOGY ... 27
4.1 Qualitative case study methodology ... 27
4.2 Case study selection ... 28
5. CASE STUDIES ... 30
5.1 ‘Raising awareness to combat trafficking and smuggling trough Bossasso’ ... 30
5.1.1Effectiveness ... 31
5. 1.1.1 Capturing the right attention ... 31
5. 1.1.2 Delivering a credible message ... 32
5. 1.1.3 Delivering an influential message ... 34
5. 1.1.4 Fostering supportive social contexts for behavior change ... 34
5.1.2 Effects on democratic values ... 35
5.1.3 Policy motives ... 36
5.1.4 Summary ... 39
5.2 ‘Promoting Safe Migration and Positive Alternatives to Egyptian Youth’ ... 40
5.2.1 Effectiveness ... 41 2
5.2.1.1 Capturing the right attention ... 41
5.2.1.2 Delivering a credible message ... 42
5.2.1.3 Delivering an influential message ... 44
5.2.1.4 Fostering supportive social contexts for behavior change ... 45
5.2.2 Effects on democratic values ... 46
5.2.3 Policy motives ... 47
5.2.4 Summary ... 49
6. CONCLUSION ... 52
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 56
APPENDICES
Appendix I: IOM Special Liaison Mission in Addis Abeba: Final report to UNHCR. Appendix II: IOM Special Liaison Mission in Addis Abeba: Photos and Testimonies from
Bossasso.
Appendix III: IOM Egypt: Information Campaign: Promoting Safe Migration and Positive Alternatives for Egyptian Youth. Case Study.
Appendix VI: IOM Egypt: Brochure: Challenge yourself, don’t challenge the sea!
1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2014, I visited an office of a partner of the United Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees (“UNHCR”) in a suburb of Rabat, which supports sub-Saharan Africans in adapting to life in Morocco. There was exactly one person in the office that spoke English: a clinical psychologist. We spoke briefly about her work with the migrants; she was very open and told me that she sometimes hears horrendous stories from migrants, about how they arrive in Morocco, about their hopes to one day cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, about the abuse that they endured at the hands of traffickers and police alike, and their dire living conditions. Then she told me something I did not expect, something that kept haunting me. She told me how she organized projects in which sub-Saharan African children were explained why they should not try to reach Europe. She would organize boat trips to a nearby river, where she would ask the kids to try and steer the boat to shore. And she would ask them, if you are not even able to control a boat on the river, how do you expect to swim 16 kilometers from Morocco to Spain? I understood that her project was based on a humanitarian principle, of saving a potential migrant’s life before it is even in danger. But this story, however innocent and well-meant, indicates that European border control is now infiltrating other domains of social life. Indirect ways of steering migrants’ behavior are implemented, ways that are seemingly non-coercive, subtle methods that will possibly prove more successful than traditional law and order methods. The rhetoric employed focuses on the well-being of potential migrants, whilst implicitly, the aim is to deter migrants from going to Europe. More professionally organized projects, so-called anti-migration information campaigns, promote such patterns of self-government among would-be migrants, who are supposed to renounce leaving their home because they believe that irregular migration is a dangerous endeavor that is not worth their lives, as they are told. The key issue of this thesis is the way in which European border control has been externalized to other countries through measures that are more implicit than direct control, focusing on campaigns that aim to inform migrants about the risks of migrating, having a deterring, dissuasive and discouraging effect. The object of research is the extent to which the notion of ‘migrant protection’ has transformed into a political rationality of ‘migrant management’. The research thus analyses the prevalence of migration awareness campaigns, developed and funded by the EU and its Member States, and implemented in African countries. It focuses on the institutional rationale of such campaigns in a context of transnational discourses and migration politics. Namely,
the explicit and implicit messages, as well as their expected aims will be analyzed, as well as how they produce and reproduce certain subjects and the degree of agency and subjectivity potential migrants are accounted to. The campaign analysis framework as provided by Weiss and Tschirhart (1994) will function here to attain the aim of this research. The main question posed in this thesis is: What is the rationality behind migration awareness campaigns
and how effective are they expected to be in influencing potential migrants?
This question shall be answered through analyzing two campaigns, employing a qualitative case study methodology. This provides tools to study phenomena within their own contexts by using multiple data sources. It is considered a valuable method for research to develop theory, evaluate programs, and develop interventions. In the following chapter, the context of migration shall be explained, so that the reader may understand the background of the problem that is analyzed here. Following this, Weiss & Tschirhart’s framework for public campaign analysis will be explained, as well as the motive for selecting this framework. Thereupon, the research questions, the sub-questions and the methodology will be set out, upon which the cases will be addressed. After reporting the results of the analyses, a conclusion will be formulated and the results will be discussed.
2. THE ISSUE OF MIGRATION
In this chapter, key definitions of migration and related concepts shall be clarified. Thereupon, a short historical view on migration to Europe will be provided, and it will be explained how perspectives on migration have developed from a notion of economic development and humanitarianism to a problem of economic burden and security. This leads to an account of how Europe’s border control was externalized to countries outside of the sphere of the European Union. Then, traditional methods of border control will be addressed. Subsequently alternative approaches to border control will be introduced, which lead to the key theme in the current thesis, migration awareness campaigns.
2.1 Key definitions
For the current research, the explanation for migration, as set out by the International Organization of Migration (“IOM”) is held:
The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification. (IOM, 2011A).
There has never been a universally accepted definition for a migrant, though generally, it is used to refer to persons moving from one country or region to another, in order to attain a better livelihood, better their socio-economic conditions and improve their own and/or their family’s prospect. The United Nations (“UN”), in order to make the term workable, has accepted a definition that states that a migrant is ‘an individual who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate.’ (IOM, 2011A). This definition excludes, amongst others, tourists, businesspersons and students on short-term travels, but includes, but is not limited to, seasonal workers. The term migrant can be further broken down into categories of documented migrants, economic migrants, irregular migrants, skilled migrants and temporary migrants, though the definitions of these categories fluctuate and it is possible for an individual to fall into one, two or more categories at once, or shift from one to another
(IOM, 2011a). Though IOM states that there is no universally accepted definition, it explains that in general irregular migration encompasses movements outside of the authorized norms of sending, transit and receiving countries, thus, when an individual crosses a border without a valid passport and resides within another country without its authorization. The popular term ‘illegal migration’ is officially restricted to human trafficking and smuggling (IOM, 2011a). Irregular migration can be said to be economically benefitting for many destination states. There is continuous demand for various forms of unskilled and semi-skilled labor, and migrants provide a cheap source of labor and are often willing to work in sectors in which nationals are not (Koser, 2005: 4, 5). Thus, on the demand-side of migration is the promotion of immigration to increase the labor pool. From a supply perspective, four main economic and demographic factors that generate migration are identified. Hatton and Williamson (2002: 8-17) elaborate: (1) the per capita income disparity between rich countries and poor countries; (2) relaxation of poverty constraints, meaning that emigration from poor countries will increase due to economic development, as indicated by the fact that emigration flows from very poor countries are minor in comparison to the flow out of moderately poor countries; (3) a large young adult population in the home country increases emigration, while a large population of young adults in the host country will actually decrease immigration; (4) transnational social networks and family ties.
As the terms asylum-seeker and refugee will also be used in the context of the current research, these also require an explanation. The terms are often confused: an asylum-seeker is someone who has asked for asylum, but whose claim to refugee status has not yet been granted. Refugeeness is a legal status granted to certain individuals that categorized as such by Art. 1(A) (2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and Art. 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol. It is of importance to note here, that, though similar and frequently confused, a refugee is legally different from an internally displaced person, which is essentially a forced migrant that has not crossed any international border (IOM, 2011). UNHCR is mandated to supervise the application of the 1951 Convention/ 1967 Protocol in contracting states, and the contracting states have accepted to cooperate with it in the exercise of this duty. Finally, the term ‘non-refoulement’, a fundamental principle of international law, refers to the prohibition of states from transferring anyone to a place where he or she would have a well-founded fear of persecution or would face other violations of their human rights (Castles & Miller, 2003: 103). The principal of non-refoulement is one of the strongest restrictions to state control regarding entry and stay in their territory and on the exercise of control or authority extraterritorially.
2.2 European migration
It is, first of all, necessary to recognize that, notwithstanding the many categories of migrants and migration regions, all movements have common origins and are interrelated. Colonization, military occupations, political links, trade and investment; these are all effects of Western involvement that caused profound changes in other societies in the world. Consequentially, decolonization, modernization and uneven development furthered processes of economic, social, political, cultural, environmental and demographic changes, resulting in an acceleration of migration (Castles and Miller 2003: 152). As further explained:
..the entry of the South into the international migration arena may be seen as an inevitable consequence of the increasing integration of these areas into the world economy and into global systems of international relations and cultural interchange. These new migratory movements are a continuation of historical processes that began in the fifteenth century with the European colonial expansion, and the ensuing diffusion of new philosophical values and economic and cultural practices around the globe. (Castles and Miller 2003: 152).
This concurs with the numbers mentioned in the 2013 World Migration Report of IOM: the majority of international migrants are from countries in the South (usually referring to ‘developing’ countries), with numbers between 147 and 174 million reported by various sources, being UN DESA, World Bank, UNDP). However, IOM notes that people from Northern countries (usually considered ‘developed’ countries) are more likely to migrate, which to some may be a surprising fact: Migration is usually considered to be prompted by the search for a better life by people in poorer countries, with the lack of development in these countries being a key ‘push factor’. It is assumed that if development increased, migration would decrease. In contrast, people who are already living in a more developed country may be as likely to migrate as those living in developing countries. While the absolute number of migrants is higher for the South, people living in the North are more mobile and, therefore, represent a higher share of the total population living there. In the North, emigrants represent a higher percentage of the total population (between 3.6% and 5.2%) than they do in the South (less than 3%). In other words, the total number of migrants originating in the South is higher than in the North, but migrants account for a smaller percentage, if compared to the population living in the South and the North, respectively. Furthermore, IOM reports that South-South movements remain important, as well as the fact that an increasing amount of people now move from North to South for various reasons such
as growing unemployment. However, still international migrants in the South represent less than 2% of the total population; in the North, they range between 10 and 12%. This can partially be explained by the demographic boom in many developing countries and the decline of birth rates in more developed countries over the last few decades. The United States attracts many nationalities, such as people from Canada, China, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and as such represents the top destination for both South–North and North– North migration: receiving, respectively, 35% and 27% of all migrants. Additionally, it is also the major migrant-sending country for North–South migration, particularly to Mexico and South Africa. For South–South migratory flows, countries such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and India are both major sending and receiving countries. Major South– South sending countries include several Asian countries, such as Afghanistan and Bangladesh, and receiving countries include Kazakhstan and Pakistan. With regards to the EU Member States, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, represent major origin countries in the North–North picture (IOM, 2013A: 58-64).
When placing statistics in an international context, it seems that migration to the EU is rather insignificant. Still, the Member States claim that these numbers are too high to bear. Notwithstanding these competing claims, it is worth noting that migration to the EU is not a new phenomenon. Countries as the UK, Germany, France and the Benelux countries have been receiving migrants already since the 1960s. Due to growing economic prosperity and more restrictive policies in other countries, a second category, amongst which Ireland, Greece and Finland, have also become host to migrants since the 1980s (Boswell, 2005: 2). The European Commission identifies three historical immigration phases: (1) the guest-workers phase, as described above, in which foreigners were recruited to provide temporary labor, (2) continuing immigration resulting from the first phase, as many foreign workers in the 1970s decided to stay and were joined by their families, and (3) the asylum seekers phase in which migration numbers rose significantly as of the 1990s, mostly due to the end of the Cold War and a number of wars and conflicts in Europe, as well as other parts of the world (Beutin et. Al, 2006: 5). Accordingly, in the 1950s and 1960s during the economic boom, some European countries permitted, and sometimes even promoted, migration due to a need for post-war labor (Huysmans, 2000: 753-754). Though states to a certain extent tried to regulate immigration, in actuality, illegality was not of any relevance, more so, this contributed to the exploitability of immigrants. As of the 1970s, immigration policy became more restrictive due to changes in the labor market and a desire to protect the social and economic rights of native workers; however this barely changed the overall perception of immigrants, who were
still viewed as temporary guest workers. In fact they became more and more like ‘permanent guests’. The assumption that there was relationship between migration and social destabilization gradually entered political discourse and public awareness (Huysmans, 2000: 753, 754). This was further problematized by the lifting of restrictions on movement from the former communist countries and an increase in refugee numbers from civil conflict. Today, new patterns of migration have been identified: (1) circular migration, a short-term way of earning extra income to send home; (2) an influx of irregular migrants, usually organized through trafficking or smuggling. With the purpose of placing the development of restrictive immigration policies in context, the following chapter will address the transformation of European perspectives on migration, which have led to the establishment of the current migration control regime (Boswell, 2005: 2).
2.3 Transformation of migration perspectives
There was a shift from permissive immigration policy to an increasingly restrictive policy as early as the 1960s and 1970s. This was due to changes to labor laws, as well as a way to protect the rights of native workers. Although migration was already occasionally associated with public disorder, it was not a matter that was prominent on the agenda of the EU (Huysmans, 2000: 754). It was not until the first oil crisis of 1974 that the pace of immigration slowed down. Subsequently, in 1977 measures to restrict return migration and family unification were implemented. However, the demand for cheap labor remained and even intensified due to these restrictions, especially in sectors such as construction and domestic work (Zimmermann, 1995: 58). Paradoxically, these restrictions led to an increase in asylum applications and new patterns of irregular migration developed. This in turn prompted the view that Europe was being swamped by migrants, and that as states were unable to adequately protect their territories and resources, more restrictive, aligned measures were required (Boswell, 2005: 6).
According to Huysmans (2000: 755), the shift of migration issues from a humanitarian aspect to one of security became clear in the 1980, indicated by the way in which asylum was connected to, or even confused with, irregular migration. Asylum was increasingly seen as an alternative route into Europe, and it became more relevant in European political debate. Boswell emphasizes the irony that is reflected in how citizens and voters of welfare states, especially when it comes to their rights to social services and employment, expect a ‘privileged’ level of protection. However, those states are
fundamentally found on the basis of equality and egalitarianism, and these principles run in contrast to the treatment that is expected by native (or naturalized) citizens. Thus, though liberal states derive their legitimization from those principles, these provisions of rights are actually exclusively limited to native citizens. (Boswell, 2004: 7). Zimmermann argues in line with Boswell that many citizens in receiving countries feel that they are being forced to compete with migrants over scarce goods, to which they are ‘more’ entitled, thus framing the influx of migrants as a risk to the security of the native population (Zimmermann, 1995: 60). Much of the unease that migrants generated has been said to be an effect of a larger socio-economic transformation, indicating the waning of the welfare state, a decline in collectivity and increased emphasis on the individual (Boswell, 2004: 5, 6). Zimmermann (2014: 13, 14) holds that concerns that immigration would foster higher unemployment or lower wages for domestic workers are much stronger in Europe in comparison with the US. He also claims that these concerns are erroneous as the work done by immigrants is often complementary to that of the native workforce. This would then actually increase productivity and wages. Immigration also helps make the labor market more functioning as it is expected to decrease institutional constraints such as those imposed by labor unions, which, especially in Europe, have substantial power. It furthermore generates a higher demand for goods and services, and this in turn requires the work of domestic workers. Thus, the economic yield of immigration is much higher than the burden it is projected to carry. Furthermore, Zimmermann claims that fears of falling wages and subsequent diminishing livelihoods are incentives for the native population to invest in human capital and social mobility, which would result in higher wages. De Haas (2009, 1317) states accordingly that migration is less unwanted than it might seem as it generally has been beneficial for economies due to the cheap labor it generates and the effects on trade and business activities of smugglers, entrepreneurs and even state officials. This demand is likely to persist, enhancing opportunities for migrants. He further maintains:
Despite lip service being paid to ‘combating illegal migration’ for electoral and diplomatic reasons, European and African states are neither able nor willing to stop migration. Yet ‘harsh’ political discourse on immigration accompanying such policies can be a catalyst for and might therefore reinforce the same xenophobia and the concomitant apocalyptic representations of a ‘massive’ influx of migrants to which they seem a political– electoral response. Policy making on this issue seems therefore to be caught in a vicious circle of more restrictions-more illegality-more restriction. (de Haas, 2009: 1318).
2.4 Outsourcing of border control
As predominantly asylum seekers and unskilled workers are being characterized as a danger to public services, wages, social cohesion and even national culture, the 2001 and subsequent terrorist events in Europe have led to such fears becoming more diffuse. Unconnected migrant groups are linked by a single discourse on border control that spills over into the governance of all non-citizens and beyond (Bosworth & Guild, 2008: 705). It has been reasoned that the dominant European approach to irregular migration is broadly framed in terms of security and addressed through security measures. Western countries are increasingly concerned with the perceived permeability of their borders and invest in new strategies of surveillance. One example hereof is the fortification of borders, as Spanish- Moroccan border illustrates, and the increased search for undocumented migrants on state territories. Undocumented migrants may then be subjected to detention and expulsion, measures which used to be specific to exceptional circumstances, such as wars. This notion illustrates the extreme turn taken by migration controls. But notwithstanding such tightened migration policies, undocumented migration persists, and here the issue is raised of whether stopping unwanted migration is even possible. There are many factors, such as the fact that migration flows are structurally embedded in the economies and societies of most countries, which make them almost impossible to stop. Moreover, states face a dilemma because borders must remain open to international trade or tourism, also, through migration, countries are connected via networks that span the globe and facilitate further migration, and lobby groups, such as employers, can press governments to allow migration for market reasons. These factors are key concepts of globalization (Nieuwenhuys & Pecoud, 2007: 1676).
Migration control strategies are innovatively searching for new tools and methods to overcome obstacles such as the abovementioned. Carling & Hernandez-Carretero (2011: 46) have identified the following policy measures that address unauthorized migration, of which several have been mentioned previously: (1) detection and apprehension of migrants; (2) post-arrival processing; (3) repatriation; (4) pre-border-surveillance and control; (5) awareness campaigns in countries of origin; (6) prevention of illegal employment in Europe; (7) employment creation in countries of origin; (8) programs for legal migration. The first three measures obviously represent the core of the traditional control-oriented approach. The fourth point is related to the externalization of migration control. The final three points relate to alternative measures that emphasize incentives and decision-making. The authors further elaborate that the aforementioned policy measures can be divided into three mechanisms, being (1) direct control, which is achieved when migrants are obstructed from reaching
Europe; (2) deterrence, which is a secondary effect of such measures, and occurs when, for example, prospective migrants observe the failure of other s and are deterred from migrating; (3) dissuasion, which also work preventively, but through other means than the demonstrative impact of effective control. In the latter four cases, surveillance is then exercised by different actors, in different places, and through different strategies, illustrating the notion of outsourcing border control. The idea of remote control is not new (as illustrated by visa policies) but is increasingly put in practice through cooperation between destination, sending, and transit states; Western countries provide financial support to help less developed states control their own borders and to stimulate them to reaccept migrants. Countries such as Morocco in this way become buffer zones to contain sub-Saharan African migrants. Moreover, through operating inside sending states and using information to deter, dissuade, or discourage potential migrants from embarking, information campaigns fit into this trend. Control is thus exercised through different means, including media, and is partly passed on to actors such as intergovernmental agencies (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Scholars have claimed that through information campaigns, control takes place well before the border among potential migrants to reduce the numbers of those wanting to reach Europe (Nieuwenhuys & Pecoud, 2007: 1676 – 1677). An important note to be added here is that, notwithstanding the pressure exercised by receiving countries, sending countries have demonstrated interests in affecting migration, and are capable of using the receiving states’ wish to control migration as a way to advance their own agendas. Even though the focus on this power of the sending states has remained in the periphery of scholarship on migration policy, it should not be underestimated. It has been argued that sending states have in fact increased their bargaining influence, and have greater opportunity to affect international negation. In order to understand policy outcomes, it is therefore necessary to recognize the context that stimulates sending states to collaborate on migration regulation (Eide, 2013: 7).
In the following, European migration legislation shall be addressed, which, as set out above, constitutes the core of traditional migration control, ‘coercive measures’. The subsequent chapter will address the issue that is at the heart of the current research, ‘non-coercive measures of migration control’: awareness campaigns directed at those that have not even left their home country.
2.5 Traditional migration control: European legislation
In 1992, restrictions to internal movement for workers within the market of European Commission Member States were ended by adoption of the Single European Act of I988 (Boswell, 2003: 621). The Act was initiated to overcome difficulties such as language differences, unequal education systems, insufficient recognition of degrees, and qualifications and cultural differences (Zimmermann, 1995: 58). But the most significant step toward a joint EU migration policy was the Schengen Agreement of 1985 (Schengen I) and 1990 (Schengen II) which abolishes border control. The agreement was firstly drafted and signed by the Benelux countries, France and Germany and came into force ten years later (Boswell, 2003: 621; Zimmermann, 1995: 58). The Schengen area was gradually expanded and currently, 26 countries are party to the agreement. The key element is the removal of checks on persons at internal borders. It also lays down a common set of rules that apply to people at the external borders of the Member States, the synchronization of entry and visas conditions, amplified police and judicial cooperation, and the establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS) (European Union, 2009). The adoption of the Schengen framework has been said to have led to a need for compensation of the perceived vulnerability to illegal entrance (Boswell, 2004: 621, 622).
Though the European regime was already framed from a security perspective, several
scholars argue that the events of 9/11 have resulted in a further acceleration. Right before these events, in 2000 and the start of 2001, the EU members were reconsidering the zero-immigration policies, as shortages were expected in both skilled and unskilled labor. Consequently, several measures were effected in order to enhance the integration of third-party nationals, with the aim of ensuring the development of the internal market as well as improving economic and social cohesion. But these initiatives were immediately halted after 9/11as migrants were then increasingly associated with risks to internal security. It has therefore been held that the events of 9/11 resulted in a ‘re-securitization’ of EU migration policy, subsequently facilitating and legitimizing even more repressive measures (Levy, 2005: 34, 35). Moreover, according to Boswell (2007: 589) 9/11 provided the basis for the implementation of a highly technologically advanced border agency, ‘Frontières extérieures’, or Frontex, the organization in charge of carrying out EU border management and security policies on the ground and at sea. Frontex has legal, operational, and budgetary autonomy (Ó Súilleabháin, 2013).
Lately, criminal law methodologies have been shifted into the realm of migration management. Increasingly severe consequences have been attached to violations of migration
laws, the use of removal as an adjunct to criminal punishment in cases involving noncitizens has become regularized, as well as the rising dependence on criminal law enforcement actors and mechanisms in civil immigration proceedings (Chacon, 2009: 148). The crossing of external borders of the Member States of the Council of Europe is, of course, regulated by national law as modified by human rights and EU obligations. Nationals of other states may be permitted to enter the state (or not) in accordance with national and EU law, depending on which applies. But when crossing borders into European states, otherwise than in accordance with the national law on border crossing, is penalized in most Member States. For example, in Germany, irregular entry (and residence) is an offence under the criminal law. The penalty for the least severe form is imprisonment up to one year, or a fine in addition to expulsion. Furthermore, even when an individual may have arrived lawfully, he can still illegally extend his permitted period of residence or enter into activities which are not permitted under national law such as working. Increasingly, states make such continued presence on the territory a criminal offence and in many cases a continuing criminal offence. In addition, individuals who assist an irregular migrant may also be subject to sanctions. In April 2009, a French citizen was charged with giving aid and assistance to a person staying in the country illegally, the man she was about to marry. The couple had been living together for over five months. When they applied for marriage, they were questioned and the groom was expelled for irregularity. The woman was charged with the offence, for which the penalty is five years in prison and a EUR 30,000 fine. It must be noted here, however, that following substantial publicity about the case, the prosecutor decided to drop the charges (Guild, 2010).
The criminalization of persons seeking protection under the Geneva Convention is also a matter of considerable concern. Access to Europe has become extremely tough for refugees, through measures such as visa requirements, interdiction at sea, criminal sanctions on the using of false documents, etcetera. Moreover, when asylum seekers manage to arrive at the European border, they often face further criminal charges in respect of the manner of their arrival, prohibition on employment and criminalization of unauthorized employment, in cases when there is no functioning reception system which will permit asylum seekers to eat and have shelter. The treatment of asylum seekers and those whose asylum applications have been rejected in Europe has been comprehensively documented by a number of non-governmental organizations in reports which raise serious questions about human rights compliance. The detention of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, a mechanism of pre-expulsion or deterrence, has also raised deep concern. According to UNHCR, people held in European detention centers are frequently subjected to appalling conditions and even human
rights abuses. Access to social rights such as health care or accommodation is also fundamentally affected by the criminalization of foreigners, as those who are in an irregular status in practice generally do not have access to protection under the European Social Charter (Guild, 2009: 10-26).
Thus, punitive and fearful rhetoric against migrants has been at the center of policy dialogues across many countries. Through discussion, legislation and policy, the risk they may pose has been constructed through the notion of crime. Through criminalizing practices, stretching from increasingly invasive forms of surveillance to migrant detention, the state effectively penalizes and stigmatizes migrants in order to sort and admit only those considered worthy of admission and inclusion. Most control policies and discourses assume potential criminality in everyone; however, the controls on migrants define profound boundaries between citizens and non-citizens.
2.6 Soft measures of migration control: Information and awareness campaigns
The European Migration Network, a project funded by the European Commission, published a Synthesis Report in 2012, named ‘Practical Measures to Induce Irregular Migration’. As the purpose of the study, it states
..to provide an overview of existing approaches, mechanisms and measures to reduce irregular migration in the EU and Norway. In particular, its aim is to inform policymakers and practitioners about the practical measures that have proved effective and proportionate in addressing the issue of irregular migration and to contextualize national policies and practices within the overall EU policy framework. (European Migration Network, 2012: 2).
With regards to information and awareness campaigns, it states that Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and Norway have implemented such policies,
..carefully tailored to address specific issues, and designed to discourage irregular migration whilst raising awareness about legal channels of migration. These have tended to target particular third countries that have an established relationship or a history of irregular migration to the Member State. (European Migration Network, 2012: 27).
It reports that for example, in Italy, campaigns were directed at preventing irregular migration by targeting known sending and transit countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Albania, Moldova, Kosovo and Ukraine. Specific groups were addressed through various channels such as newspapers, media and NGOs. One project in Morocco for example has, among other things, developed a pedagogical kit raising awareness of the dangers of child migration, using multilingual (Arabic, Berber, French and Italian) comics and cartoons, showing the stories of children at risk. In the Ukraine, Italy has also worked with the national authorities to raise awareness of the impact of the migration of Ukrainian women on children and young people left temporarily without their mother (European Migration Network, 2012: 27).
Information campaigns are not a mechanism of direct control, but have a rather deterring and dissuading nature. Information campaigns, such as those showing the hardships of undocumented life in Europe, have the aim of discouraging departures. As Pecoud (2010: 195) elaborates, information campaigns can be considered strategies of remote control, implemented within sending societies; they involve new actors, like international organizations, NGOs, local media, schools, celebrities and so on. But information campaigns also indicate a shift in the stated aims of migration control. Their stated objective is not to prevent people from entering Western states, but to protect them from the abuses and dangers stemming from irregular migration, smuggling or trafficking, a humanitarian justification. This also enables them to be funded by development and humanitarian aid. In this sense, this represents a type of control that is not identified as control, or does not aim at being identified as such, hence having an ambivalent nature, in-between control and humanitarian aims. For example, in Senegal, messages about the dangers of migration have appeared on radio, TV, newspapers, and billboards, sponsored by the Spanish government, the European Union and IOM, and even star international celebrities such as singer Youssou N’Dour. The effects on behavior are uncertain, however, because such information tends to be filtered by previously held opinions. Carling & Hernandez-Carretero provide three reasons for the limited effect of awareness campaigns on discouraging migration:
First, potential migrants may consider themselves better informed about the risks than those producing the campaigns. For instance, many prospective boat migrants are fishermen who are familiar with life at sea. Second, when potential migrants perceive that information campaigns are driven by vested interests, they are likely to dismiss them as biased propaganda. In Senegal, there is widespread awareness of European desires to persuade Africans to stay at home, and the campaigns are interpreted in this light. Many people also 17
saw the Senegalese government as campaigning to preserve its own image; large-scale undocumented migration can be seen as an embarrassment that undermines the government. Third, awareness campaigns may be irrelevant to prospective migrants who consider the attempt at changing their life to justify the risks involved. (Carling & Hernandez-Carretero, 2011: 49).
It can be held that such campaigns are harmless interventions as the safety or integrity of migrants is not directly affected. However these awareness efforts do not inform migrants of the rights to which they are entitled: these campaigns allegedly seek to protect migrants by warning against the dangers of migration, but are primarily geared to shielding Europe from migrant arrivals. Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud further contend that information campaigns rely on the principle that providing information to migrants will help reducing unauthorized migration and trafficking. Such campaigns assume that if people leave, it is because they do not know what awaits them; if they know, they will not leave. This implies at least three assumptions: ‘Firstly that migrants lack information on migration; second, their behavior is based on available information; and third, that information on migration is dark enough to discourage them from leaving.’ (Nieuwenhuys and Pecoud , 2007: 1983, 1684). It can thus be said that information campaigns assume that potential migrants cannot correctly assess their situation because of a lack of accurate knowledge. On the other hand, if migrants do have information, it is described as incorrect, as they are exposed to traffickers’ claims regarding attractive jobs abroad and to widely circulated images of a wealthy Europe. Whatever the migrants may perceive of migration is almost exclusively described as negative, and all forms of unauthorized movement are assimilated to the atrocities of human trafficking. Other, more prosperous experiences and the possibility of making it are rarely mentioned and only that migratory experience that leads to failure, misfortune, and exploitation is highlighted. Unauthorized migration is contrasted with legal migration channels, which are presented as the unique alternative; potential migrants would wrongly believe that only underground channels exist and therefore need to be ‘correctly’ informed of the legal options to migrate. Scholars argue that information campaigns disqualify migration at large and present as an option only for the losers; clever and hard-working people would stay at home.
Information is thus presented as a crucial factor in distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migration. Informed migrants would know the rules and respect them, thus behaving in a way that makes migration ‘optimal’ and beneficial for all, while ‘informed’ public opinions
would support policies that aim at maximizing the positive impact of migration. Information is thus given a normative function: in this ideal world, all actors would be correctly informed on the realities migration and, consequently, of how they should behave. Both migrants and inhabitants of receiving states would rationally react to the knowledge at hand and providing ‘better’ information would then logically lead to changes in their attitudes, behaviors and strategies, because ‘the West knows best’. But Alpes (2012) argues in contrast that even when potential migrants are directly exposed to the downsides of what she calls ‘bushfalling’, the process of travelling or migrating to the West, their perception of migration is not evaluated or changed, as she examples the case of a Cameroonian woman named Pamella:
As I learned about her previous failed emigration attempts (including being sent back from Cairo airport on her way to Cyprus), Pamella was preparing to leave again – this time for Ukraine. Even though she already had failed five times in her bushfalling attempts, the fundamental belief in the potential of bush remained unshattered – above all for her parents. Money had been lost in prior attempts. Yet, her parents insisted and again gave money to a migration broker. (Alpes, 2012: 100).
The costs and gains are to be viewed within context of the local dynamics, and migration is considered an investment, legitimized by to the expected gains. Migration is a way to success, of which the risks do not weigh up to the state of (perceived) crisis and the difficulties of everyday life in the home country: ‘If migration involves sacrifices and investments, then those sacrifices and investments need to be compared to the chances for success and failure available in the context in which aspiring migrants make their choices.’ (Alpes, 2012: 103). The belief in the opportunities that migration offers is so strong, that even narratives of deportations do not diminish this, but are rather ascribed to bad luck. The article further explains how migration ambitions are not an indication of ignorance, but rather a way of interpretation of the reality it offers. Alpes’ concept of the economy of migratory knowledge trumps presuppositions about the availability and nature of information, and thus undermines the notion that migration to Europe can be stopped by providing ‘factual information’ about the reality of life as an immigrant in Europe.
As Western societies are increasingly concerned with border and control, this ‘new strategies and instruments of control’, or more appropriate, new forms of immigrant policing are generated (Fassin, 2011: 216-217). In view of this notion, Truong argues that
governments are today unable to unite the tension that migration brings with global capitalism, which trumpets the opening of national economies and the transnational flow of goods, while it is incapable of comprehending the contrasting consequences of this opening to humanity, or more fittingly, those outsiders (Truong, 2011: 23). Guild and Bigo (2005: 235) argue in line with this when they speak of the economic versus security rationale, which has been coined a ‘liberal paradox’. But the economy and the process of globalization do not lead towards less boundaries and a ‘no borders’ world, in fact they exacerbate other boundaries and they reshape identities. Western states aim at instituting in border in the migrants’ minds, exactly those borders they fail to control. This is done through stimulating a ‘culture of immobility’ amongst the people of sending nations, encouraging ‘self-control’ among potential migrants. This therefore reaches further than the narrow field of police or security and infiltrates other domains of social life such as cultural production, the media, social work schools, or even religion. In this way, indirect ways of steering migrants’ behavior are created, ways that are seemingly non-coercive, subtle methods that will hopefully prove more successful than traditional law and order methods. This further perpetuates confusion between security, humanitarian and human rights arguments, as control-oriented objectives become hidden behind a rhetoric that focuses on the well-being of would-be migrants. Information campaigns promote patterns of self-government among would-be migrants, who are supposed to renounce leaving their home because they believe that irregular migration is a dangerous endeavor that is not worth risking, as they are told.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Whereas much literature focuses predominantly on those coercive measures of migration control, amongst which the blocking of persons at the borders, detaining migrants, expulsions and push-back operations, the current thesis makes an original theoretical contribution with regard to those apparently non-coercive measures and the kind of power and authority that are exercised through them. Scholars who have worked on migration management are interested in theorizing this aspect of political power and authority, and it relates to a broader tradition of thought on liberal power and authority, building forth on the work of Michel Foucault. The current research attempts to provide an understanding of those migration policies that are not primarily coercive, but try to convince and stimulate specific behaviors in targeted populations. Such campaigns fit into the broader realm public information campaigns, which are defined as a way for governments to deliberately shape attitudes, values, or behavior. In our day-to-day, we are constantly confronted with such official government appeals to act in a certain manner, such as to eat healthier foods, to avoid drugs, to refrain from driving after drinking, to quit smoking, to stay in school, and so on. These public information campaigns are government-directed and -subsidized efforts to communicate to the people, or a specific group of citizens, in order to realize a certain policy effect. In other words, they are a tool or instrument of government action. Migration awareness campaigns fit this profile, and for the context of the current thesis a framework for analyzing public information campaigns shall therefore be employed.
While it is not a traditional theory or an analysis model, the work of Weiss & Tschirhart (1994) has frequently been applied to analyze public information campaigns and, due to its reputation in this field, shall be used for the current case study. The most important element of this work is the identification of four tasks that make campaigns more likely to lead to their intended results: (1) To capture the attention of the right audience; (2) To deliver an understandable and credible message; (3) To deliver a message that influences the beliefs or understanding of the audience; and (4) To create social contexts that lead toward desired outcomes. These can be applied in the same manner that a theory would, namely as a framework for evaluating public campaigns. For example, the framework could guide the design of an evaluation of a campaign outcome, or it could serve a role in foundational evaluation, or during pre-evaluation stages. An example of the application of this model is the
work of Henry & Gordon (2002), which examined the Atlanta Voluntary Ozone Action Program to determine the campaign’s success was high enough to warrant an evaluation of its impacts. They concluded that the main element of the campaign, air quality alerts, was sufficiently effective in raising awareness and reducing driving in a segment of the population. When the overall information campaign was moderated by employers’ participation in programs to improve air quality, the number of miles driven was considerably reduced, as well as the number of trips drivers took by car on the days of alerts. The four elements will be further elaborated below.
In their work, Weiss & Tschirhart, define information campaigns to be ‘..intended to generate specific outcomes or effects in a relatively large number of individuals, usually within a specified period of time, and through an organized set of communication activities.’
(Weiss & Tschirhart, 1994: 82). This includes those actions aimed at producing policy
outcomes, influence household behavior, and linked to policy goals, but excludes advertising for political parties or candidates and the direct promotion of government products. Information campaigns are distinctive as they attempt to produce policy results without altering incentives or authority systems. Rather, they aim to work through ideas: ‘..the provision of information, the persuasiveness of argument, the heightening of attention, the arousal of emotion and values attached to policy, the framing of issues and solutions.’(Weiss & Tschirhart, 1994: 83).
The authors pose two, somewhat contradictory, assumptions. First, public information campaigns are insignificant or ineffectual policy measures, and have strictly symbolic value to government. This raises a question of effectiveness: Can information campaigns achieve changes in social outcomes? Furthermore, a question of political appeal is raised: Are public information campaigns politically appealing to public officials, either because they appear to take action without making any substantive changes, or for other reasons? The second hypothesis is that mass communication campaigns that are run by the government constitute powerful state power abuse, having destructive consequences for the integrity of democratic values and processes. This contradicts the first assumption, as this argues that campaigns are effective in shaping social outcomes. But it addresses another concern: Do public information campaigns undermine the democratic relationship between citizens and government? The effectiveness, policy design, and democratic values associated with public information campaigns identify a number of strengths and weaknesses that are said to possibly influence the use of such campaigns as policy instruments. Though in most cases, only the effectiveness analysis is applied, Weiss and Tschirhart (1994: 83, 84) argue that by applying
the three perspectives together helps explain the actual stakes in using campaigns for policy purposes. It is thus the intersection of these three perspectives, effectiveness, policy design, and democratic values, that is the crux of the current research. The following will present and outline these perspectives, providing a clear framework for analysis.
3.1 Analyzing effectiveness
It is difficult to evaluate whether information campaigns induce people to engage in significant behavioral change. Weiss & Tschirhart (1994: 85) argue that this can be can be partly attributed to the methodological difficulty of isolating the impacts of information campaigns to behavior that is also influenced by other competing elements. First of all, it is difficult to compare those exposed to a particular campaign (either directly or indirectly) and those who are entirely unaware of the campaign message, as campaigns do not run in a vacuum. Moreover, many people fail to notice certain messages that they have actually seen or heard, and many people who have not been exposed to a campaign have heard the same messages from other sources. A third problem is the confusion created by officials who communicate more intensively only when the need for change is urgent, such as is the case with virus vaccination campaigns. But notwithstanding these problems, conditions that promote campaign effectiveness have been described. Aiming to fulfill these goals, information campaigns seem more likely to produce intended policy results: (1) to capture the attention of the right audience, thus, designers must (a) define the target audience, tailoring to their specific demands and interests; (b) select the appropriate channels of communication in order to reach that audience; (c) attract attention, at least sufficient to engage the notice of the reader, listener, or viewer, in addition to addressing the target audience's interests and concerns. Furthermore, campaigns need to (2) deliver a credible message that audiences understand, (a) the campaign should be undertaken and delivered by a source that members of the target audience find credible; (b) pretesting is often necessary to deliver clear messages that audiences can understand, as well as follow-ups and redesigning; (c) content is more understandable when it extends or elaborates what people already know, rather than introducing brand new language or material or contradicting established beliefs; and (d) it should be determined how long the campaign must run in order to be effective, and how many exposures the audience needs to a message before they understand it. Campaigns are aimed to (3) deliver a message that influences an audience, and therefore need to (a) provide new knowledge about the consequences of decisions that people are now making, or it may
raise new alternatives; (b) direct attention or shift the salience of different aspects of problems, leading people to think differently; (c) evoke norms and moral obligations; and (d) change underlying values and preferences. The final task underlines the important influence of social contexts. Thus, (4) supportive social contexts for desired changes in behavior need to be fostered. This requires policy theory, a diagnosis of the causes of the problem and the forces that constrain or promote the desired social outcomes. With such theory, campaigns may seek to influence behavior through an array of interventions that mobilize the individual and other members of his or her social world who may influence the individual (Weiss & Tschirhart, 1994: 85-92)
3.2 Effects on democratic values
The second question posed by the authors was whether public information campaigns undermine the democratic relationship between citizens and government. They found both negative and positive consequences of using campaigns for the competition of ideas, the integrity of democratic processes, equal access to information, and the role of the citizen. They argue that it is impossible to separate the positive and negative influences of information campaigns on the relationships between government and citizens. Public information campaigns have a paradoxical potential for democracy and citizenship: ‘To inform, educate, and persuade is, from another point of view, to distract, deceive, and manipulate.’ (Weiss and Tschirhart 1994: 92). Whether safeguards adequately deter negative consequences or whether positive steps adequately promote democracy and citizenship is impossible to say as a general matter. The authors contend that in some cases, the term propaganda is applied to describe the identical activity. They suggest the following criteria for the analysis of campaigns and to examine whether and how campaign designers have been sensitive to the normative implications of their work: (1) efforts to promote informed and effective choice by citizens, (2) are the messages free of deception, (3) are multiple perspectives on issues recognized, (4) are efforts made to help less-educated citizens benefit from information, and (5) are viable alternatives to information campaigns, in order to avoid abuse, considered.
3.3 Policy motives
Weiss and Tschirhart (1994: 97) questioned why the use of information campaigns is appealing to public officials. Is this because they appear to take action without making any
substantive changes, or for other reasons? The use of such campaigns may be politically attractive because they rather focus on individuals instead of institutions as the cause of policy problems, and positively portray government officials. They can evade the role of mediating institutions, because such institutions do not exist or because they do not work. Finally, policy designers may use public information campaigns because they are less expensive than other alternatives. It is thus argued that campaigns seem to be politically attractive enough to be used more often than might be indicated by their capacity to produce intended policy outcomes. The answer to whether or not this is the case should be found upon the analysis of the effectiveness of the campaign, and by reviewing the motives of policy makers.
3.4 Research questions
As described above, the campaign analysis framework as provided by Weiss and Tschirhart will function here to attain the aim of this research. The main question posed in this thesis is:
What is the rationality behind migration awareness campaigns and how effective are they expected to be in influencing potential migrants? In order to formulate a coherent
answer to this question, the following sub-questions are developed:
1. To what extent do migration awareness campaigns achieve their aim of decreasing migration flows?
2. Do public information campaigns undermine the democratic relationship between citizens and government?
3. What motives do policymakers have to design and implement migration awareness campaigns?
Now that the research question and the sub-questions have been identified, the research methodology to be applied, namely, a qualitative case study methodology, shall be elaborated in the following.
3.5 Limitations
It is crucial to mention here that it is challenging to analyze the effectiveness of a certain policy. The ‘gap hypothesis’ in migration studies argues that ‘significant and persistent gaps exist between official migration policies and actual policy outcomes’ (Cornelius & Hollifield, 1994: 4) . In line with this theory, several scholars are critical the ability of states to manage
migration. Others have questioned the basis of the argument and reasoned that, on a whole, states are in control of their borders and most migration policies have in fact been successful. Czajka and the Haas (2011) hold that this can be ascribed to the confusion around the different meanings of ‘effectiveness’, which is frequently used in migration policy studies. In quantitative analysis, this term is used to assess whether or not immigration control policies have led to a significant decrease in immigrant numbers. The term has also been applied as an antagonism of ‘policy failure’, thus, when a policy fails to reach its anticipated result of decreasing immigration flows. However, what is actually meant by the term itself is rarely explained. In the Oxford Dictionary of English, the term effectiveness is defined as ‘(..) the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result.’ (Eide, 2013: 6). There is often a range of various actors with different interests involved in the design of migration policies. In order to examine if the intended goals are met, one would have to know the different interests and intentions of all these actors within the policy, which in turn poses a challenge for researchers as it is likely that such information is hard to obtain. Moreover, although most policies have officially stated aims, one cannot exclude the possibility that there are other covert intentions, and it would thus prove even trickier for researchers to get a comprehension to all actors’ underlying or unofficial objectives. Another concerns how to measure the degree to which the desired result is produced. This leaves much space for individual judgment since there is no common rule of how to measure the level of effectiveness. Thus, in addition to the challenge of recognizing all the various actors’ different intentions, the degree to which these aims are met will depend on the subjective perspective of the researcher.
4. METHODOLOGY
Concerns regarding migration are prominent in many European countries and have stirred up major political and societal debates over the past decades. The challenge that migration poses features high on the EU’s political agenda. These debates address the imbalanced relationship between border security and human security, and migration issues have been extensively debated in the scientific arena, covered by disciplines ranging from law to anthropology. Most studies on migration have been conducted in the Western world, leaving the question of policing borders and the production of boundaries in other parts of the world relatively unexamined. Therefore, the current thesis will attempt to fill this gap by addressing how European border control has been externalized to other countries in ways that are more covert than forms of direct control, focusing on campaigns that aim to inform migrants about the risks of migrating, thereby having a deterring, dissuasive and discouraging effect. The research thus analyses the prevalence of such migration awareness campaigns, developed and funded by the EU and its Member States, and implemented in African countries. To this extent, studying the effects of the campaigns would of course contribute significantly to the interdisciplinal study of migration. However, besides the fact that it is difficult to measure a certain effect that has not (yet) materialized this is beyond the scope of the current thesis. Therefore, the focus is rather on the institutional rationale of such campaigns in a context of transnational discourses and migration politics. Namely, the explicit and implicit messages, as well as their expected aims will be analyzed, as well as how they produce and reproduce certain subjects and the degree of agency and subjectivity potential migrants are accounted to.
4.1 Qualitative case study methodology
Baxter & Jack (2008) have provided a helpful overview and explanation of qualitative case study methodology, which shall be elaborated here. Qualitative case study methodology provides tools to study phenomena within their contexts, making use of multiple data sources. It is considered a valuable method for research to develop theory, evaluate programs, and develop interventions. Within the field of case study research, there are two key approaches, namely Stake’s (1995) and Yin’s (2003, 2006). Both approaches fall within the constructivist paradigm, which is built upon the premise of a social construction of reality, thus, the recognition of the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning. Yin argues that
there are four circumstances in which a qualitative research is advantageous: (a) the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.
For the current study, Yin’s multiple case study will enable to explore differences within and between cases. The goal is to replicate findings across cases and the researcher can predict similar as well as contrasting results based on a theory. The selection of a specific type of case study design will be guided by the overall study purpose. Yin (2003) and Stake (1995) use different terms to describe a variety of case studies, which shall not be further elaborated here. Here, Stake’s instrumental case study is used to accomplish something other than understanding a particular situation:
It provides insight into an issue or helps to refine a theory. The case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else. The case is often looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and because it helps the researcher pursue the external interest. The case may or may not be seen as typical of other cases. (Stake in Baxter & Jack, 2008: 549).
Potential data sources may include, but are not limited to: documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observations, and participant-observation. In case study, data from these multiple sources are then converged in the study process, and source is one piece of the puzzle, contributing to the understanding of the whole phenomenon. This merging of data adds strength to the findings as the various data elements promote a greater understanding of the case. The type of analysis engaged in will depend on the type of case study, and both Yin and Stake briefly describe several techniques. It is imperative, however, that when analyzing the collected data, the researcher should make sure that the data are converged in an attempt to understand the overall case, not the various parts of the case, or the contributing factors that influence the case (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 548 - 554).
4.2 Case study selection
The cases to be studied in the current research, thus, in effect the unit of analysis, are particular campaigns focused on distributing migration awareness. In order to ‘bind’ the
cases, as both Yin and Stake suggest is necessary to ensure that the study remains within scope, the emphasis will be on campaigns launched within the past ten years by either IOM and UNHCR, EU or EU Member States or funded by one or more of these organizations, and focusing on potential migrant populations. Campaigns were retrieved from the database of UNHCR and IOM, as these contain campaign overviews as well as relevant documentation. By searching for keywords such as ‘awareness campaign’, ‘migration campaign’, ‘anti-trafficking’ and ‘mixed migration’, two campaigns focusing were retrieved from the campaign database. The first case study is a mass awareness campaign was implemented between 2007 and 2009 by IOM and UNHCR, in partnership with the Ethiopian government, local NGOs and Members of the Mixed Migration Task Force (UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR, UNAIDS, and other organizations). The second campaign was a 2009-2010 pilot implemented in Egypt, on both a national and a community level. It was co-financed by the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Policies and the European Union, and implemented by IOM in corporation with the Egyptian National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (“NCCM”). Both campaigns met the criteria set out above. Based on the summaries and evaluation reports that were provided, the campaigns are analyzed using the framework developed by Weiss & Tschirhart.
5. CASE STUDIES
5.1 ‘Raising awareness to combat trafficking and smuggling trough Bossasso’
The following analysis is based on the final report from IOM to UNHCR (Appendix 1) and ‘Pictures and Testimonies from Bossasso’ (Appendix 2). In 2007 and 2008, IOM and UNHCR, in partnership with the Ethiopian government, local NGOs and Members of the Mixed Migration Task Force (UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR, UNAIDS, and other organizations) set up a mass awareness campaign, with the stated aim of preventing human trafficking and smuggling: ‘Awareness-raising is (..) being conducted for the general public to sensitize them on the realities of human trafficking.’ (IOM, 2013b). Every year, tens of thousands of migrants and refugees embark from their place of origin through the north-eastern region of Somalia, Puntland, and across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, and in some cases onwards to Saudi Arabia. The main groups on the move are Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Yemenis (to Saudi Arabia only). The majority of migrants are from Ethiopia, accounting for 85% of the flows to Yemen while Somalis make up the rest (IOM, 2013b). The dominant causes to move are insecurity, economic hardship, fear of war and persecution, escape from poverty and in particular in 2011, and flight from drought (Somali Red Crescent Society, 2012: 3-8). In the case of Ethiopians, a significant proportion, mostly Oromia, claim political persecution as the cause of their migration. In 2013, there was a 30% decrease (65,219) in the numbers as compared to 2012, which recorded an all-time high of 107,532 (IOM, 2013b). Regardless of the political conf1ict in Yemen, the mixed migration flow into the country continues and increases while the return of migrants from Yemen back to Somalia has been relatively low. Though Saudi Arabia, another popular destination, has tightened border controls, the flows continue to increase, offering perhaps an indication of the extreme situations the migrants have fled (Somali Red Crescent Society, 2012: 3-8). They use the port of Bossasso in Puntland, in the Northeast of Somalia, from which they are smuggled in tiny boats to Yemen through the Gulf of Eden. Boats are made to hold a maximum of 30 to 40 people, but are usually crammed with 100 to 120 people, sometimes more. From Yemen the migrants proceed to the Gulf States and sometimes to Europe, usually again through a smuggler network. Reports indicate physical and sexual abuse of migrants, especially during the boat journey. In some cases migrants have been thrown off the stuffed boats and left to drown. Upon arrival in Yemen, some migrants report being held hostage by the smugglers demanding extra money. There are also reports of coercion, rape, murder, kidnapping,
