Abstract: English-language newspapers in Hong Kong have played a historic role in

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Abstract: English-language newspapers in Hong Kong have played a historic role in

developing media freedom in Hong Kong. Since Hong Kong’s handover from the British, there has been much research on the growing social and economic influence of Chinese

powerholders on Hong Kong media. But how about the English newspapers? Hong Kong is still a

transitional society, and as the 2017 chief-executive election draws near, Hong Kong is facing

one of its most turbulent periods of political instability. During this period, freedom of the press

becomes an important concern for Hong Kong locals. Hong Kong’s journalists are put in a

difficult position where one wrong step could risk either their credibility or their jobs. Using

Foucauldian discourse analysis, the study aims to analyse how power affects Hong Kong’s

English language media discourse. The study identifies the various discursive practices that

journalists in English newspapers of Hong Kong use to maintain their credibility amongst

readers while also appealing to pro-China powerholders. How do the journalists position

themselves and others in their media discourse and what does this reveal on how they react to

power? The study finds that journalists who defend the powerholders and those that choose to

criticise them, use the same strategic rituals, but use them in different ways. Ultimately, these

strategic rituals affect the ability of both of these journalists to write critically on important

political issues, a problem that will come with long-term consequences.

2 2017

How the position of the journalist affects self-

censorship: a discourse analysis of English-language media in Hong Kong

Angela Min-Jung Kwon

Student Number: S2895935 University of Groningen

Graduate Thesis: MA Journalistiek 2015-2017 (International)

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to show my deepest gratitude to my amazing thesis supervisor and MA Journalism professor, Dr. Robert Prey. He devoted a lot of time and effort during the past few months to develop my ideas and to organise my thesis. He always gave me incredibly detailed and valuable

feedback, feedback that has helped me greatly in completing my thesis. He pushed me when I was stuck

and assured me when I was anxious. I couldn’t have done it without him. I would also like to thank my

wonderful friends who have supported me and the amazing Hongkonger friends who have given me

great insights into Hong Kong politics. Finally, thank you to my parents in Seoul, who have always

supported me in all the decisions that I have made.

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Table of Contents

Page

Chapter 1: Introduction 5

1.1 Introduction 6

Chapter 2: Background

2.1 History of Hong Kong’s press freedom 2.2 Beijing’s pressure on Hong Kong media

10 11 13 Chapter 3: Self-Censorship

3.1 Self-censorship as a strategic struggle 3.2 Self-censorship and objectivity

17 18 25 Chapter 4: The case study: South China Morning Post and the Missing

Booksellers

4.1 Press freedom and the English newspapers in Hong Kong 4.2 History of the South China Morning Post

4.3 The case study: The Missing Booksellers 4.4 Research questions

33

34 35 38 40

Chapter 5: Hypothesis and Method

5.1 Categorisation: Journalist A and Journalist B 5.2 Sample

5.3 Using Foucauldian discourse analysis and Positioning theory

42 43 46 49 Chapter 6: Analysis

6.1 Strategy 1: Alternating choice of pronouns 6.2 Strategy 1: Journalist A

6.3 Strategy 1: Journalist B

6.4 Strategy 2: Balanced reporting and the usage of contrasting conjunctions

6.5 Strategy 2: Journalist A

55

56

56

58

59

60

4

6.6 Strategy 2: Journalist B

6.7 Strategy 3: Positioning China as an authoritative figure when advising or criticising

6.8 Strategy 3: Journalist A 6.9 Strategy 3: Journalist B

6.10 Strategy 4) Relying on quotes, sources and facts 6.11 Strategy 4) Journalist A

6.12 Strategy 4) Journalist B

6.13 Strategy 5) Centrist position: taking no sides 6.14 Strategy 5) Journalist A

6.15 Strategy 5) Journalist B

61 63

64 66

67 68 70

71 72 73 Chapter 7: Discussion

7.1 Limitations

7.2 Discussion and Conclusion

75 76 79 Bibliography

Journalist A Sample Journalist B Sample

89

93

95

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Chapter 1: Introduction

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1.1 Introduction

On June 2012, journalists at the South China Morning Post, a highly-acclaimed English- language newspaper in Hong Kong, put down their pens to protest against an event in which they believed had eroded the integrity of the paper. An email exchange between sub-editor Alex Price and head editor Wang Xiangwei revealed Price’s concerns about Wang’s pro-China editorship. Wang Xiangwei was South China Morning Post’s first mainland-Chinese editor at the time with great many connections to Chinese powerholders. The sub-editor claimed that Wang had downplayed and moved the coverage of the recent death of Tiananmen dissident Li

Wangyang

while other newspapers were ‘splashing’ on the subject (Greenslade, 2012). The Tiananmen Square Massacre is greatly remembered in Hong Kong with a vigil held annually to honour the many lives that were lost. Despite this, head-editor Wang had replaced what was supposed to be a front-page article on Li Wangyang with a short brief that was pushed deep in the back of the paper. When sub-editor Price objected to his decision he was harshly rebuked.

Price, along with thirty or more journalists of the paper, signed a petition demanding answers regarding the incident. Although South China Morning Post eventually published a full-length of the story in response, the incident left many readers concerned.

It is important to note that Hong Kong’s freedom of speech is protected by Article 27 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. This means that Hong Kong’s media is not officially censored by any

1 The Tiananmen Square ‘massacre’ refer to a 1989 pro-democracy student protest in which over hundreds and perhaps even thousands were killed by military forces. Li Wang yang is a Tiananmen Square dissident, and a strong contender for human rights in Mainland China. He was found hanged in his hospital room, an incident that was first ruled as a suicide and later on revised as ‘accidental’. He is a role model for many Pro-democratic Hong Kong locals. The Tiananmen Square incident is heavily censored and is one of the ‘taboo’ subjects in Mainland China.

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governmental power including that of the Chinese Communist Party. So this begs the question:

If Hong Kong is indeed free from Mainland Chinese censorship laws

, why did South China Morning Post’s journalists believe Wang’s actions were influenced by China? The answer lies in

the power relations between China and Hong Kong: China is able to influence Hong Kong media through ways that do not require direct censorship─ this is called “Self-Censorship”.

Self-censorship is a set of ‘strategic rituals’ that media organizations may practice in their newsroom in order to appease political pressure while also upholding their credibility as a news provider (Lee, 1998). Self-censorship is not governed by law─ journalists and news

organizations censor themselves for their own social or economic benefits. Self-censorship can come in many different forms. Journalists can use discursive strategies to present information on sensitive topics in a way conventional for powerholders. Newspapers can also move the report to a less conspicuous part of the paper. They can also simply avoid sensitive topics completely. There are various different ways, but ultimately self-censorship refers to the various ways in which newspapers react to the external powers that pressure them.

Self-censorship is prevalent in societies where powerholders hold significant influence over the resident Fourth Estate

. In authoritarian governments such as in Mainland China, self- censorship is known to have fully institutionalised in the newsroom of Mainland-Chinese

2 The mainland Chinese government officially censors political material in the press as well as on the internet.

3 The ‘Estates’ refer to the division of people into social hierarchies. The Fourth Estate generally refers to the traditional press as an institution of societal and political power. The press is a professional force that can check the decisions made by powerholders. Edward stated that printing, or the ability for anyone to speak and spread their ideas, was an equivalent to Democracy, and that the Fourth Estate was more powerful than the first three estates [The Clergy, The Nobility, The Commoners]. Therefore print was to become the Fourth Estate that could check the ideas of the first three (Ward, 2005).

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newspapers (Lin & Lee, 2006). In these newsrooms where self-censorship has occurred for many years, journalists have come to accept self-censorship as a newsroom routine.

However studies have shown that even in democratic countries where the press is not legally

suppressed, self-censorship can also occur (Cook & Heilman, 2010; Lee & Lin, 2006). In

particular, more complex forms of self-censorship may be found in transitional societies such as Hong Kong - where a ‘tradition of press freedom’ meets a ‘tradition of self-censorship’. It is in these societies where commercialized news organisations face great political and economic pressure to abide to powerholders, while also facing great pressure to maintain their credibility to readers (Lin & Lee, 2006). Hong Kong has a particularly politically-diverse society; this means that those who work in media are equally diverse. When faced with pressure, how do these different journalists react? Different journalists are faced with powerholders whose political agendas are becoming increasingly uniformed—towards the benefit of the Chinese

government. Even if journalists are socialised with new newsroom norms, that does not mean the journalists themselves can change their political agenda abruptly; if this is so, how do they react with the new environment? How do these journalists with different agendas, different political ideals, and different political backgrounds socialise themselves into the current media environment that wishes to uniform them? One can predict that not only complex, but various different strategies of self-censorship may occur in response.

Language plays a major role in analysing these ‘complex’ forms of self-censorship. By understanding how self-censorship occurs in news media, one will be able to identify hidden

4 Local journalists face heavy prosecution such as imprisonment or even bodily harm if they do not self-censor sensitive topics. Foreign journalists may face similar prosecutions or may find their visas revoked.

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political agendas and decipher the reasoning behind their usage. This study will therefore focus on how self-censorship is actualized in the language of Hong Kong English-language newspaper.

How do Hong Kong English newspapers maintain their journalistic integrity in a politically transitional society? What kind of discursive strategies are utilized to maintain this? And how do the differing agendas of different journalists affect how these discursive strategies are used?

The paper aims to contribute to the current existing literature on the role of language in placing

and displacing the political positions of media in a transitional society.

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Chapter 2: Background

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2.1 History of Hong Kong’s press freedom

After more than a hundred years under British rule, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997 under the premise that it would remain a Special Administrative Region (SAR). This was coined “The Handover”. Hong Kong would follow a “One-Country Two-Systems” policy, which meant that Hong Kong would be able to enjoy a high degree of autonomy from China’s laws, political systems, or regulations. This also meant that Hong Kong would have an unrestricted Fourth and Fifth Estate

. Despite this, survey-based studies

(HKJA, 2014) have shown that many Hong Kong journalists as well as citizen readers have increasingly felt Beijing’s presence over the local media. Many feel that news credibility and Hong Kong’s “tradition of press freedom” has declined since the Handover, and that China’s growing influence is gradually changing Hong Kong’s journalistic culture towards the Beijing model (Chan & Lee, 2007; Yeung, 2000; Lee & Chan, 2009; Fung, 2007). The issue of self-censorship is especially significant during the past half-decade, as Hong Kong’s political environment have vastly changed during this period.

Since the Handover, Beijing has designated the chief-executive of Hong Kong who would govern the region. During the early 2010s, council talks of universal suffrage for the upcoming 2017 elections arose great expectations from the Hong Kong public. However Beijing

announced that the coming elections would involve the Chinese central government choosing three candidates themselves, before putting them on a popular vote in Hong Kong. The

5 The Internet and forms of communication other than the traditional press that can work as a means to ‘check’

the other four estates, and is thus sometimes considered the “Fifth Estate”.

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decision added on to the growing political discontent towards China within Hong Kong’s pro- democratic public. In 2014, the fear of a declining press freedom, the pro-democratic political sphere, the growing anti-Chinese sentiment, and the frequent violent incidents─ such as the attacks on prominent journalists who have written critically on Beijing in the past─ eventually brewed a student pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong that became coined as ‘the

Umbrella movement’ or the ‘Occupy Central’ movement

. The movement exposed many of Hong Kong’s insecurities about their identity as a democratic SAR under the hands of

authoritarian mainland China. Their fears of losing their cultural identity, and their fears of losing Hong Kong’s traditions of democracy and freedom of speech fuelled the movement.

Media organisations during this time was very much on alert. The period brought upon even greater pressure on Hong Kong’s traditional media to provide reliable and credible news, reports that the Hong Kong pro-democratic locals would trust. Information on Hong Kong independence was also heavily sought out by scholars, the expatriates in Hong Kong and the international audience. Accordingly, there was also great pressure from the Chinese

government, the pro-Chinese advertisers, and the pro-Chinese media owners who wished for the journalists to maintain a pro-China or at least a ‘neutral’ stance towards China in their editorials. In this kind of political environment, any change in the freedom of speech in Hong

7 Beijing announced that the coming 2017 Hong Kong elections involved Beijing choosing the candidates beforehand. The announcement brought discontent within Hong Kong citizens, amounting to the many other issues of identity and culture that had already accumulated anti-Mainland sentiment in Hong Kong. From

September 2014 onwards, tens of thousands of suffragists, many of which were young liberal Hong Kong students gathered to protest against the new Hong Kong electoral reforms: a demonstration that would later be coined as the ‘Occupy’ movement, or ‘Umbrella’ movement of Hong Kong.

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Kong does not go unnoticed. Any social, economic or political harm on a Hong Kong journalist directly from the Chinese Communist Party can lead to public outcry.

2.2 Beijing pressure on Hong Kong media

Under the “One country Two Systems” principle, censoring Hong Kong journalists arbitrarily would be unconstitutional. This means that Beijing is forced to use different means to control the Hong Kong media indirectly. Many scholars (Lee & Lin, 2006; So & Chan, 2007;

Lee, 2007) have claimed that Beijing’s pressure on Hong Kong media may be built on subtle and indirect methods of “domestication” (Lin & Lee, 2006). These indirect methods can be achieved through several different ways:

First, the Chinese government can control the media through alliances and through guanxi. The guanxi are businessmen who are closely associated to Chinese authorities or who

have huge investments in China (Fung, 2007). Many of Hong Kong’s papers such as Ming Pao Daily, Sing Tao Daily, Sing Pao and most recently the South China Morning Post, have been bought by huge guanxi business tycoons (Fung, 2007). New owners have the power to decide on the hiring and the firing of personnel including that of those in chief editorial positions.

These new editorial positions can be given to those that may suit Beijing’s interests more

favourably. This was the case of Ming Pao. When Chong Tien Siong replaced popular Kevin Lau,

as chief editor, journalists voiced concerns on press freedom under Chong’s editorship. Chong

was known to be well-associated with the pro-Beijing owner of the paper, Tiong Hiew King, and

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a high position, such as the chief editor, meant there could be a vast change in the direction of the newspaper. A year into his post Chong replaced the front page article of the 1989

Tiananmen massacre with an interview of Jack Ma, a Chinese business tycoon. Media reports reveal that the incident ignited concerns of self-censorship, and Ming Pao’s journalists led an hour-long protest in response (Cheng, 2016). In this way, a change of ownership often leads to a change in editorship. The power to set the agenda goes to the chief editor, and if the chief editor can be chosen by the powerholders, the power to set the agenda can indirectly go to the powerholders themselves.

Second, the Chinese government may try to domesticate the Hong Kong media through economic means, by urging China-funded or pro-China companies to stop placing

advertisements with a certain paper. This can be a way to penalize newspapers that are regarded as subversive or critical towards the Chinese government (Lau, 2008). In the 1980s, during Sino-British negotiations, pro-China or China-funded organizations boycotted the Hong Kong Economic Journal (Lau, 2008). And in 1989, amidst the confusion of the Tiananmen Square massacre, many pro-China or China-funded companies stopped placing advertisements in any newspapers that were critical of China’s actions (Lau, 2008). More recently, in 2014, HSBC and Standard Chartered ended advertising in the liberal newspaper Apple Daily

. Newspaper spokesman Mark Simon, claimed that this was a political move to punish the newspaper for its pro-democracy views (Forsythe & Gough, 2014).

8 Considered a tabloid, it is one of the most highly-distributed Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong.

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Third, the Chinese government may influence the language of the newspaper by inducing journalists to self-censor their material. For example, journalists may be induced by organisational superiors to present China in a positive light, or to downplay any criticism towards them. This is different to the first point of guanxi, in that it is not only the company heads, but the journalists that work under them that are influenced. Therefore as it is the journalists who write the articles, China’s influence will show in the language and linguistic devices used in these articles. Journalists may adopt certain norms, or ‘strategic rituals’ (Lee, 1998), to abide to the current pro-China atmosphere of the newspaper they work in. Newly hired journalists may abide to the newspapers’ stance as part of their socialization as a

journalist, or they may have been chosen in the first place for their pro-China nature. However, for senior journalists who have been in the company for a longer time, and who may or may not be pro-China, these journalists may acquire new journalistic norms to follow, and they may accordingly and gradually adjust their practices to the new environment (Lee, 2007; Chan &

Lee, 2007). Journalists that are not influenced by this socialization, may also still write favourably towards China for fear of risking their jobs, political connections, or even their safety.

On September 2016, five Hong Kong journalists were detained and questioned, while reporting on a violent protest that saw rubber bullets and tear gas aimed towards civilians. The journalists claimed that they were treated violently by the Chinese police (SCMP Staff Reporter, 2016). Incidents such as these may prompt Hong Kong journalists to be more wary when

writing on sensitive topics regarding China. The Chinese government strategically make their

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acceptable boundaries for Hong Kong journalists especially ambiguous. This ambiguity make it harder for journalists to challenge the status quo, in fear of crossing those ambiguous

boundaries. As violent incidents regarding Hong Kong journalists become more frequent,

journalists may have more to fear than just their job. It is these journalists that my research will

focus on.

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Chapter 3: Self-Censorship

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3.1 Self-censorship as a strategic struggle

Earlier works on self-censorship reveal variously differing definitions and characteristics.

Noah Chomsky and Edward S. Herman claim that most of the censorship found in all media around the world is actually self-censorship, and that it occurs regardless of level of democracy or freedom of expression. According to their book, Manufacturing Consent, ‘self-censorship’ is when reporters and commentators adjust to the realities of their sources, their (media)

organizational requirements, and their market, government or media authorities (Chomsky &

Herman, 1988).

But self-censorship is not only prevalent in news media. Other works have discussed self-censorship in entertainment, in religion, in science, in art and in daily political discourse (Akbar, 2013; Zara, 2013; Loury, 1994; Habermas, 2005; Rose, 2006; Cook & Heilmann, 2010;

Gomez, 2000;). These studies are similar in that they all deal with the political struggle between a publishing actor’s right to express, and the various struggles that stop them from publishing their material completely in their own terms. In other words, the studies all focus on how the publishing actor may edit their produced material accordingly, if a certain topic is deemed sensitive for any reason. But each study differs in what they consider as sensitive, that is, studies disagree on which editorial actions are considered self-censorship and which are not. In 2006, Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten was heavily criticized for disrespecting the Islam religion when they published a series of twelve cartoons caricaturing Prophet Muhammed. The publication ignited fierce protests from the Muslim communities around the world. The

journalist, Flemming Rose, defended his decision by explaining that the cartoons had been a

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response to the growing self-censorship in Europe regarding the subject of Islam. He had wished to challenge the boundaries of what could be written on Islam. Rose claimed that the European media was failing to exercise its rights of free speech by avoiding to publish negative material on Islam and by doing so, newspapers have weakened their responsibility as a Fourth Estate (Rose, 2006). Cook and Heilmann (2010) in response to this incident proposed that there were two distinctive types of self-censorship: Public and Private. Public self-censorship is the self-censorship described by Chomsky and Herman earlier, a censorship that required pressure or incentives from a powerholder. Private self-censorship is the censorship that exists

independently without a censee. Cook & Heilmann (2010) argued that the self-censorship described by Flemming Rose was in fact private self-censorship─ a type of self-censoring

derived from moral values, from a feeling of respect towards people’s religious beliefs or from a desire to avoid hurting the feelings of their readers (Klausen, 2009).

However other scholars believe that only public self-censorship can be considered self- censorship. In Elaine L. Ho’s research on Singaporean newspapers, Ho (2008) explains that self- censorship is different from the deliberate omissions used on conventionally sensitive topics regarding societally vulnerable beings such as children and illegal migrants. She also does not consider self-censorship to include the omission of sexist, racist, or other socially taboo discourse. Self-censorship in Ho’s terms do not include the omitting or editing of certain discourse in the media that may greatly offend the surrounding cultural ideas of gender,

sexuality and race. This type of ‘censoring’ can be enforced without any external influence, they

are restrictions created from the individual’s moral guidelines. Ho explains that these omissions

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do not count as self-censorship, as they are easily identifiable and enforced implicitly by either the media organisation or by the journalist themselves. Actual self-censorship according to Ho’s definition, is more silent, secretive and purposeful. It is a power play between the

powerholders and the journalists. Self-censorship is only self-censorship when it is prescribed by powerholders who are not implicitly identifiable and constructed from purposes that are not entirely clear. But one thing that is clear is that the purpose of self-censorship is to gradually and quietly reproduce ideological beliefs, assumptions and habits (Ho, 2008).

To clarify the definition of self-censorship that will be used, this study will follow Ho’s identification of self-censorship as a self-censorship that involves a powerholder and carries a political purpose. Therefore self-censorship in this study also does not include editorial actions that are made in response to topics that are conventionally considered sensitive or socially taboo in the cultural margins of the resident traditional media.

Self-censorship, as defined in this study, is the act of editing one’s journalistic material to (1) avoid social, monetary, political consequences and/or to (2) earn social, monetary, political awards from a power structure (Lee, 1998). Chin-Chuan Lee explains that by power structure, he refers to the powerholders of a society. Powerholders may refer to the

government, political actors, major advertisers, and those who own the media organisations (Sun, 2014). Powerholders put immense political or economic pressure towards newspapers and journalists, ultimately forcing them to avoid writing against the powerholders’ interests.

This means that they are able to influence the agenda setting of the newspaper and the

political discourse of the newspaper. Basically, powerholders can indirectly change what and

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how topics are presented in the newspapers that they influence. Any topics that are politically sensitive to powerholders can be downplayed or completely omitted. Lee (1998) claimed that any editorial action such as the omission, dilution, distortion and/or change of emphasis on any journalistic material can be considered self-censorship if it was done in a deliberate attempt to respond to external pressures. When journalists implement any particular change in their newsroom to appeal to these powerholders, this can be considered self-censorship. In this way, self-censorship is ultimately a strategic and political struggle between the press, and the

entities that try to control them.

As explained earlier, there are two motives for self-censorship. Accordingly, the first motive - fear-induced self-censorship - is most prevalent in countries where the government has significant political control over the press. Self-censorship of this sort has therefore

predominantly been associated with authoritarian governments that do not have a high degree of press freedom, such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Chinese government puts much importance in the control of information, inside and outside the country (Shirk, 2011).

Journalists are considered “mouthpieces” of the governing party and therefore have historically

played the role of fostering propaganda (Shirk, 2011). On paper, Mainland China’s constitution

grants citizens and the press complete freedom of speech. But media laws in China are left

ambiguous enough, allowing powerholders to censor sensitive news stories by claiming that

they are a danger to state security (Xu, 2016). Journalists who publish ‘state secret’ material

may risk losing their job or position in their media organisation. They may also receive personal

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threats that extend towards their families and may even find themselves imprisoned (Branigan, 2010).

Fear is the essential ingredient in the mechanics of self-censorship. In Gomez’s book Self-censorship: Singapore’s Shame, he explains that Singaporean citizens generally chose to

avoid speaking out on political topics due to the underlining climate of fear that exists in Singapore’s political culture. (Gomez, 2000). He found that Singaporean citizens self-censor themselves daily─ by only expressing politically conservative opinions and by avoiding sensitive topics─ in order to stay within the political ‘safe-zone’. The boundaries of this ‘safe-zone’ are however unclear, and this obscurity cultivates the fear that fuels self-censorship. For example, the Chinese government keeps its regulations on media tolerance purposely ambiguous and open to circumstances. The ambiguity of what is considered media taboo creates an

atmosphere in which citizens are afraid of speaking out at all on any political topics. This

‘strategic ambiguity’ (Cheung, 2003) make it particularly difficult for journalists to understand what is acceptable and what is not. Lee (1998) calls this ambiguity an imagined boundary. These imagined boundaries are the result of an internal struggle within journalists who must

constantly ask themselves whether they are reporting within the safe zone of their journalistic boundaries, or whether they have crossed it and therefore endangered themselves. If

journalists are given clear ‘real’ boundaries and consequences, journalists will naturally try to

stay right under the boundary, reporting on sensitive topics to a level that is close to the very

edge of their limitations. If they were to cross these ‘real’ boundaries, they would do so

knowing the risks and expecting the consequences (Lee, 2007). However, if a boundary is not

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clearly drawn, this boundary can only be imagined by the journalist. This imagined boundary is more intimidating because journalists cannot fathom what consequences must be faced if they were to pass a boundary they can only be imagined based on their own fears (Lee, 1998). This uncertainty causes the fear that eventually influences journalists to stay in the safe zone when analysing sensitive topics. Journalists become passive beings that lose the power to challenge the status quo (Ho, 2008).

The second motive for self-censorship, one that seeks to earn social, monetary, and/or political awards, is mostly market-driven. While this kind of self-censorship also exists in less democratic countries, it can exist in more democratic countries as well, where journalists do not have to face harsh consequences directly from the government. Instead, any consequences that come their way would be indirect and would come in the form of economic or

organisational pressure. During Japan’s early coverage of the Fukushima nuclear plant incident,

most journalists avoided being critical to the Japanese government or the Tokyo Electric Power

Company, the company that managed the nuclear plant. Takeda explains that this was due to

the journalists being members of press clubs called kisha kurabu, that give them access to

sources and information. These clubs are highly associated with governmental and market

powerholders who pressure the journalists to self-censor their articles to gain or to maintain

their press club memberships (Takeda, 2011). Journalists in democratic countries such as

Japan, are generally expected to have a high degree of social power and to have complete

freedom of speech. This means journalists cannot simply omit sensitive topics without losing

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their journalistic integrity. When faced with politically sensitive issues, they must rely on editing their language-use, bias and tone to self-censor their material instead.

Hong Kong is a particular case that encompasses both the first and second motives of self-censorship. Hong Kong is neither a full democracy nor fully part of Mainland China’s

communist regime. Hong Kong exists in the threshold between the two, and therefore provides an interesting case study on the politics of self-censorship in a transitional society. Hong Kong’s media rely heavily on advertisers and investors to make a profit. This means that if Beijing has power over these advertisers, they have the power to influence Hong Kong’s media as well.

However the Hong Kong media cannot ignore the public’s demands either. The Hong Kong

public has historically regarded the press as a credible and independent platform for public

debate, and a Fourth Estate instigator who can check the actions of powerholders (Lee & Lin,

2006). If the press was to begin explicitly siding with China, they may risk their credibility as a

news provider and therefore may risk losing their readership. To prosper as a business, Hong

Kong’s media have to follow journalistic norms of professionalism, and therefore must

condemn self-censorship if they wish to defend their credibility (Lee & Lin, 2006). This means

that the Hong Kong media is put in a vulnerable position: if they robustly promote China’s

interests or repeatedly defend their actions, they will be accused of self-censorship. If they

completely avoid Chinese coverage, especially during politically sensitive news regarding China,

they will also be accused of self-censorship. However on the other hand, if journalists were to

publish information or convey political ideas that angers the pro-Chinese powerholders, they

may risk losing their jobs or their positions in the news company.

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There may be situations in which journalists may wish to write an article that may not appeal to powerholders. There may also be situations when journalists may wish to write an article that sides with the powerholders. There may be situations where by not writing on a certain sensitive topic, the media may be subjected to accusations of self-censorship. This is a situation where the media cannot ignore either the pro-Chinese powerholders or the public (the readership). In response to these external pressures, media organisations need to adopt a more reticent type of self-censorship ─ a special type of self-censorship, one that allows the media to avoid consequences from the powerholders while also staying within the professional norms of journalism. In the case of more democratic countries such as Hong Kong, scholars (Lee

& Lin, 2006; Lee, 1998; Lau, 2008; Chan & Lee, 2007) have frequently linked self-censorship with the professional journalistic norms of objectivity

3.2 Self-censorship and Objectivity

Writing about objectivity, Michael Schudson (1978) references American journalist Walter Lippman, who claimed that if journalists were to professionalize their craft, they had to take a moral responsibility to be as scientifically accurate as possible in their news stories. The idea was that a scientific style of reporting, one that required a comprehensive investigation and a non-opinionated stance, would accumulate and eventually bring out the truth. Lippman claimed that if journalism was to be considered a professional occupation, it had to be

completely credible, and in order to be completely credible, objectivity had to play a central

role. If all journalists in ‘professionalized’ newspapers were to follow this objectivity norm, it

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would help differentiate traditional and non-traditional journalism. It would serve as a divider between ‘professional’ newspapers that were reliable and non-biased, and ‘non-

professionalized’ newspapers that were untrustworthy and biased (Lippman, 1910). From the mid-20

century onwards, professionalism has become intrinsically linked to objectivity in newsrooms around the world.

However recent studies on objectivity have focused less on the positivist ideal of objectivity, no longer perceiving objectivity as a normative endpoint for journalism or as solely a market response to reaching a broader audience. By the end of the 20

century, scholars perceived objectivity as a core part of the ‘occupational identity’ of journalists working in traditional media (Schudson, 1978; Chalaby, 1996; Schudson & Anderson, 2009; Dolan, 2005).

Jean Chalaby (1996) sees objectivity as an ‘Anglo-American invention’, a fact-based discursive practice performed by Anglo-American journalists who adjust their writing to fit the ‘objective’

identity of a news organisation. Chalaby also explains that the influence of objectivity in the world is partially due to the central and dominant position American and British culture had in the world (Chalaby, 1996). Schudson in Discovering the News associated journalistic

professionalism with group cohesion, the politics of professional powerholders, social conflict and the ‘cultural resonance of claim to authority’ (Schudson & Anderson, 2009). This means that objectivity is a part of news socialization. News socialization is the practice of

institutionalizing certain norms in order to homogenize the group and therefore to create a

group organisational identity. Objectivity in this way, can be seen not as a journalistic ideal, but

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as an institutionalized norm, a human-made discursive practice that may be utilized for the profit of a journalist or a news organisation.

But what does this mean for the role of objectivity and self-censorship? Studies (Lee &

Lin, 2006; Lee, 1998) have shown that journalists from professionalized newspapers could report on sensitive topics by using certain editorial actions that emphasizes the journalists’

commitment to objectivity. By writing a report in an objective manner, journalists can avoid writing in an emotional or in a critical way. By doing so, they may be able to avoid

consequences from the powerholders who may not want a certain topic to be analysed in the media. The journalists can also protect the credibility of their report by denying their biases─ by claiming that they have only followed the norm of objectivity and therefore have only provided neutral facts. Journalists can defend their ‘objective’ writing as a stylistic choice socialized in their news organisation. Tuchman (1978) identified this type of objectivity as a ‘strategic ritual’

that journalists can utilize to allow them to change their material in a way that maintains the

expectations of those that have power over them, while also maintaining their journalistic

integrity. These strategic rituals are methods that journalists can use to protect themselves

when reporting on politically sensitive topics. These strategic rituals can be discursive devices or

editorial decisions that help in making a news story appear ‘objective’. If a journalist conveys

two different views of a sensitive topic, but chooses to be less critical of the powerholders, they

may be faced with allegations of self-censorship. Or if a journalist chooses to stay completely

fact-based on both sides without properly analysing the existing social issues concerning the

powerholders, they may also face allegations of self-censorship. In these cases, journalists can

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defend their neutrality by claiming that they have only followed professional journalistic norms of objectivity (Tuchman, 1978; Lee, 1998). And because they have not strongly sided towards one side of the debate, they do not have to face the consequences from either side. They can claim that their objectivity is a stylistic choice from the professional organisation in which they work in. As they stayed within the zone of objectivity, their credibility, and the credibility of the newspaper can be defended from allegations of self-censorship.

However objectivity and credibility are not the same (Gutman, 2012). By staying completely objective, the journalist have stayed in the ‘safe zone’; and by doing so the

journalist has succumbed to a society where basic structures of power privilege are not being fully examined (Schudson, 1978). By being completely objective, a journalist may have failed to critically access a sensitive and important topic and therefore may have failed the newspaper’s role as a Fourth Estate (Dolan, 2005). By staying objective, the journalist can stay in the “safe”

zone but by doing so the journalist has created a society that is unable to properly examine the basic structures of power and privilege (Schudson, 1978). Objectivity in its own way, is a type of self-censorship, and in a way, it constitutes less freedom of the press than of advocate

journalism from either sides of a political spectrum.

Dolan (2005) explained how a journalist can be “blinded with objectivity” and how by only reporting what can be seen and what is factual, journalists may fail in critically accessing

sensitive topics. For example, in 2001 there was a controversy in Santa Fe, New Mexico in

regards to a photo montage made by Los Angeles artist Alma Lopez. The art piece featured a

photo rendition of Saint Mary wearing nothing but flowers over her underwear and standing

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tall with her hands on her hip─ vastly different to the original Virgin Mother’s image. While it was originally a feminist statement, it was met with great protest in Santa Fe due its link to the Virgin Mary. However the predominantly male protest against the artwork revealed many underlying social issues in Santa Fe, such as the growing role of feminism in the society, the changing views of a woman’s body in Hispanic culture, the societal anxiety over such social changes, and the low tolerance towards the gay and lesbian community. But Dolan in his research into this controversy, claimed that news coverage on the artwork did not fully analyse the artists’ original purpose, or shed light on the social issues underlying the controversy. Dolan found that journalists stuck to ‘safe’ and ‘objective reporting’ (Dolan, 2005) to avoid any

backlash from the predominantly male protestors. By staying objective, they could also defend their lack of opinions in the subject by claiming that they have followed the professional journalistic norms of objectivity.

In the case of Hong Kong, self-censorship in Hong Kong newspapers has been predicted long before the Handover, and has been a great focus for Hong Kong-related journalism studies (Lee, 1998; Fung, 2007; Lau, 2008; Sun, 2014; Lee, 2007; Chan & Lee, 2008; Lee & Lin, 2006).

Chin-Chuan Lee found several strategic rituals that Hong Kong newspapers used to defend their integrity. Firstly, newspapers can shift the blame to individual journalists rather than towards the whole news organisation by creating a special space for columnists who are more critical towards the establishment or the powerholders. Secondly, for articles with critical views,

9 This incident is not considered fully as self-censorship at least in the definition of this study. As there were no powerholders trying to control the media, but rather it was the result of market-driven decisions with a purpose to appeal to the masses.

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newspapers juxtapose pro-government views in the same article to balance or defend their partiality. Thirdly, newspapers stick to fact-based narratives when writing on political topics (Lee, 1998; Lee, 2007). Francis L.F. Lee (2008) elaborated on this by explaining other stylistic techniques. Similar to Chin-Chuan Lee, Francis L.F Lee found the frequent juxtaposition of positive and negative views of a sensitive topic, the increasing use of polls as scientific indication of public opinion and the practice of quoting academics while presenting them as politically ‘objective’ actors (Lee, 2008).

In Francis L.F Lee and Angel Y. Lin’s research (2006) on self-censorship, they found that the discourse of political articles in ‘professional’ newspapers and ‘tabloid’ newspapers were different. While the professional Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong used several discursive practices to intensify the ‘objectivity’ of their editorials, tabloid newspapers used stronger, more aggressive discourse. Lee and Lin compared two newspapers ‘Ming Pao Daily’ and ‘Apple Daily’. Ming Pao Daily and Apple Daily are both popular newspapers in Hong Kong. Ming Pao Daily is a widely distributed Chinese newspaper that was known for its credibility in the past.

Apple Daily is an equally popular tabloid-style pro-democracy newspaper. Since these are two very different newspapers, Lee and Lin were able to identify the contrasting ways these

newspapers analysed Chinese-Hong Kong topics. Lee and Lin found that Ming Pao attempted to defend its credibility through various discursive strategies. Firstly, they used certain words to lessen the intensity of the discourse. For example, they chose to avoid words such as ‘interfere’

when referring to Beijing action in Hong Kong. They instead posed Beijing as a medicine-giver,

or a doctor. Secondly, they stuck to ‘he-said she-said’ journalism to show their impartiality on

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certain subjects. If an article was to criticize the Chinese officials, the same article would also criticize the Hong Kong democrats. Thirdly, sometimes Ming Pao focused on only left-right factions of Hong Kong and omitted Beijing from the storyline completely. By doing so they do not have to be in the position to blame Beijing directly. Fourthly, they emphasized ‘hard facts’, by using statistics and opinion poll findings. They treated ‘public opinion’ as a scientific fact, emphasizing their surveys as evidence. Fifthly, they emphasized the ideals of ‘centrist’ thinking and created a reality in which the Hong Kong public as a whole was centrist. The most

interesting finding in Lee and Lin’s research was Apple Daily’s results. Although Apple Daily is a tabloid that has been considered to be less credible than Ming Pao, it was more successful in directly and fiercely criticizing the Chinese government on sensitive topics. Lee and Lin claim that Ming Pao’s failure to criticize the government when needed confirms their claim that the norm of objectivity could often intentionally or unintentionally lead to a bias towards

conservative values and to the advantage of the powerholders.

While these studies focus on Hong Kong’s Chinese-language newspapers, there is very

little research on English-language newspapers in Hong Kong. Most of the research on English

newspapers in Hong Kong either focuses on the British-colonial period (Chan, 2000; Scollon,

1997; Zou, 2015) or does not mention self-censorship. But English language media plays a

prominent part in Hong Kong media and politics. English newspapers have also played a major

role in the history of press freedom in Hong Kong. There is a need for more academic studies

based on these English newspapers and this is especially important for the hyper-transitional

period of the last ten years. English newspapers have been an important participant in the

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delicate tension brewing between the media and the political powerholders of Hong Kong.

However, while there has been research on the variety of ways Hong Kong’s Chinese language

newspapers have hidden self-censorship in their reports (Lin & Lee, 2006; Lee, 1998) there is

little to none discourse analysis on the self-censorship of recent English newspapers in Hong

Kong. English newspapers have different purposes, different power struggles and different

clientele, a study on them can reveal different strategies used for a different kind of self-

censorship. The next section will analyse the social, political and historical dynamics of Hong

Kong’s English newspapers to fully analyse its current role in Hong Kong’s current political

sphere.

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Chapter 4: The Case Study and

Research Question

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4.1 Press Freedom and the English newspapers in Hong Kong

English newspapers in Hong Kong are different to their Chinese counterparts, as they are not only read by the Hong Kong locals and expatriates, but also by the international audience of journalists, businessmen and politicians abroad. Hong Kong’s English newspapers have often been the most reliable source of information regarding China—a window for those who look for information other than those available from China’s mouthpiece news

organizations (Shirk, 2010). Even before the Handover, under British rule, Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong suffered various degrees of censorship, while English newspapers in Hong Kong were left relatively free (Zou, 2015). Generally, the English newspapers that first commenced in the British colonies of Asia, primarily aimed in providing information for British readers living in the area. However the English newspapers in Hong Kong, in particular the South China Morning Post (SCMP), had both Chinese and English readers. This was mainly because Hong Kong was an

important cosmopolitan trade point where business-related information was paramount to the British and Chinese bourgeoisie (Wiltshire, 1997).

As explained earlier, Chinese newspapers were faced with much more censorship than their English counterparts. South China Morning Post could provide information that Chinese newspapers could not provide (Zou, 2015). Because of their dual readership, South China Morning Post became a platform through which the Hong Kong locals could communicate their

opinions and pleas towards the British public. These English newspapers became a fundamental

stepping stone towards growing freedom of speech for the Chinese public in Hong Kong (Zou,

2015). The British public became more aware of the social or economic problems of the Hong

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Kong locals. And accordingly, the growing political voice of the Hong Kong locals allowed the ideals of democracy and press freedom to gradually establish itself in Hong Kong’s constitution.

4.2 History of the South China Morning Post

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) is now the most distributed English-medium newspaper in Hong Kong with over a hundred years of print. Its historic role in cultivating press freedom in Hong Kong has embellished the newspaper with a respected reputation of

journalistic integrity. It has had frequently showcased itself as a medium ‘for the people’ with robust editorials on Taiwanese independence, Hong Kong independence and on the Tiananmen Square massacre─ topics that are considered taboo by the Chinese government. For their international audience, the South China Morning Post has been an important and reliable window for political and business news regarding Mainland China, Hong Kong and Asia in general. During the years up to the Handover in 1997, many locals feared China’s future influence on Hong Kong’s press freedom at the time (Cheung, 2003). In 1993, the South China Morning Post was bought by Pro-Chinese Malaysian tycoon Robert Kuok igniting concerns over

the newspaper’s independence. However SCMP continued to prove itself as an independent and free press, constantly serving critical reports on topics sensitive to Beijing.

However during the past few years, local and international political commentators as

well as staff journalists of the paper have increasingly argued that SCMP’s coverage of China

has become less critical than it had been in the past, and that self-censorship may be the cause

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(Chen, 2012). In 2012, the SCMP hired their first mainland-born editor Wang Xiangwei and dismissed award-winning journalist Paul Mooney who had been actively and critically writing on Chinese politics for over two decades. Mooney claimed that this was a political, not an

economic move, as Wang hired dozens of novice young reporters from the mainland soon after (Mooney, 2012). Other reporters said that the editor has long had a reputation of choosing stories that were favourable to China (Restall, 2012).

South China Morning Post is increasingly relying heavily on Mainland Chinese investors and advertisers with owners that have Chinese backgrounds or have large business interests in China. In January 2016, South China Morning Post was bought by Joseph Tsai, a mainland Chinese business tycoon and owner of internet giant ‘Alibaba’. This change of ownership has alarmed many Hong Kong locals, including journalists working at SCMP themselves. Alibaba’s executives claimed that they wished to use the paper to counteract the negative portrayal and the growing negative sentiment towards China in the western media. This has caused many Hong Kong citizens and political commentators to question the future of South China Morning Post’s journalistic integrity. In March 2016, over thirty journalists resigned their post at the

SCMP.

From 2014 to 2016, newspapers in Hong Kong were pressured more than ever. The

Umbrella Revolution, the Missing Booksellers, and the Panama Papers, these are some of the

many topics during this period that have been censored by the Chinese media. With pressure

from the Chinese government on one side, and pressure from local Hong Kong readers in the

other, the SCMP was put in a difficult position. If the salience of all important topics is

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important to the Hong Kong public, while the silence of sensitive topics is important to the Chinese powerholders, then language becomes the crucial element in shaping SCMP’s position between the two. This means that it is important to analyse how self-censorship occurs within the language of these news reports to identify how self-censorship affects the media

environment of Hong Kong. But it is important to note that while journalists in the same

newspaper, in this case the South China Morning Post, may follow similar journalistic norms,

they would not necessarily have the same political views. So editorials written on sensitive

topics such as the Missing Booksellers, can reveal interesting results about how individual

political views affect newsroom socialisation and vice-versa.

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4.3 The Case Study: The Missing Booksellers

The study will focus on the particular case study of the Missing Booksellers. The Missing Booksellers case refers to the 2015 disappearance of five Hong Kong-based booksellers: Gui Minhai, Lee Bo, Lui Bo, Cheung Jiping, and Lam Wing-kee. All five booksellers were associated with the bookshop “Causeway Bay Books” which was linked to the company “Mighty Current”;

a publishing company that was known to print books that were politically sensitive to the Chinese government. While two booksellers were taken within Mainland China’s borders, the other three were not. Swedish national Gui Minhai was last reported in Thailand. British citizen Lee Bo, and founder of Causeway Books Lam Wing-kee was last seen in Hong Kong before being reported as missing. Chinese authorities confirmed in February 2016 that all five booksellers were taken into custody over a traffic case involving Gui Minhai. Also In January 17

2016, a televised video footage showed Gui Minhai confessing to have caused the death of a student whilst driving under influence. He confessed that he had ‘returned’ to the mainland on his own choice to shoulder the responsibilities (Zeng, 2016). This explanation was not sufficient to explain the secret abductions across international borders, and ultimately the incident ignited great international concern over the safety of Hong Kong citizens and the stability of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. This was followed with televised confessions from the rest of the booksellers (Lai, 2016).

British citizen Lee Bo was last seen in Hong Kong, and so his disappearance was reported

to the Hong Kong police by his wife. In January 4

2016, Lee Bo sent a handwritten fax to a

Taiwanese news agency that he was safe and sound, and that he had gone to the mainland

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voluntarily. Because Lee Bo was last seen in Hong Kong, local protests began in January 10

demanding answers on Lee’s possible abduction. On February 29

2016, Lee Bo first appeared in public on a televised interview, in which he denied being kidnapped and requested for Hongkongers to drop the case. Many Hong Kong locals found Lee’s ‘confession’ to be scripted and forced (Yeung, 2016; Cheng, 2016).

In June 2016, Lam Wing-kee, the last bookseller to return to Hong Kong, gave a press conference revealing the details of his eight month detention. He claimed that he had been blindfolded and handcuffed in Ningbo, a city in the east of mainland China. He was kept in solitary confinement without mention of what offences he had committed to be there. He described how he and the other booksellers were denied lawyers and were forced to do a scripted confession. He claimed that all the televised confessions were scripted. During his detention, he was interrogated for long periods of time in which he was continually accused of selling banned books in mainland China

. He described the involvement of the Central

Investigation Team, indicating that the highest of Beijing authorities were involved. The other four booksellers involved have disassociated themselves with Lam’s statements and have asked the Hong Kong police to drop their case (Cheng, 2016). This kind of situation is incredibly sensitive as it deals with cross-border kidnapping, illegal detention (forced denial of lawyer protection), and the non-Chinese nationalities of two of the booksellers.

The Missing Bookseller case was chosen for this study as it involves both Hong Kong and China.

As the topic also deals with freedom of speech, cross-border kidnapping and Hong Kong-China

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relations one can expect a variety of different opinions from South China Morning Post’s editorialists. The topic concerns several actors: The Hong Kong government, the Missing Booksellers, the Chinese government, and the specific Chinese authorities involved with the case. By comparing how the South China Morning Post journalists present these actors in their writing, we can analyse how the journalist uses discursive strategies to construct his own opinions on the issue.

4.4 Research questions

Credibility and professional integrity is paramount for commercial media organisations to maintain their reputation with their customers. If a ‘professional’ news organisation avoids sensitive topics altogether, readers may no longer trust the legitimacy of the news organisation.

On the other hand, journalists may risk their job or even their safety if they choose to actively

report sensitive topics against the wishes of the powerholders. Although journalists by nature,

may seek complete autonomy and freedom of speech, for some journalists, self-censorship may

be the only safe option when covering topics that may be sensitive to powerholders. It is in

these situations that news organisations create more subtle forms of self-censorship to handle

political pressure without compromising their professionalism (Lee, 1998). These subtle forms

often reveal themselves through the language used by journalists when analysing a sensitive

topic (Lin & Lee, 2006).

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To study this more intricate type of self-censorship, it becomes important to analyse the different ways language is used by journalists. What kind of discursive strategies do journalists use to self-censor their material? How do journalists use these discursive strategies, to defend themselves from social, political and organizational pressures, when criticizing powerholders?

How do journalists use these discursive strategies, to defend their credibility from allegations of

self-censorship, when writing favourably of powerholders? What are the social and political

consequences of these discursive strategies?

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Chapter 5:Hypothesis and

Method

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5.1 Categorisation: Journalist A and Journalist B

The study will entail a discourse analysis of several editorials from the English-language Hong Kong-based newspaper South China Morning Post. My study aims to show that even in the same newsroom, journalists use strategic rituals differently depending on the type of article they are writing. Journalists themselves have varying positions, and they may not fully adopt these strategic rituals in the same way. Not all articles that support the Chinese government are automatically government mouthpieces. Similarly, not all articles that criticise the Chinese government are pro-democracy. Not all journalists are the same; some are new reporters freshly trained from the mainland, some have high editorial positions with strong pro-Chinese contacts, some are senior journalists who have worked in Hong Kong for decades, and some are international journalists working in Hong Kong. In transitional societies, especially in the

particular case of Hong Kong, these strategic rituals cannot be abruptly enforced, but must be gradually and slowly normalized within the journalists.

In a case study such as the Missing Booksellers, there are going to be a variety of different

opinions. Some editorials are going to criticise the actions of the Chinese government while

some may defend them. Regardless of which perspective, if both sides have the same superiors,

from the same newspaper, both sides are likely to adopt the same strategic rituals. But since

the articles support different positions, in this case, for the Chinese government or against the

Chinese government, the way they use these strategic rituals may differ depending on which

position they take. I hypothesize there are two types of categories that editorials discussing

sensitive topics can fall into. Depending on the category, the way a discursive strategy is used

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differs. While similar discursive strategies are used by both categories, since the political perspectives of the journalists may be different

the way these strategies are used may differ as well. I will call these two groups “Journalist A” and “Journalist B” to make it easier to distinguish them in my study.

First, ‘Journalist A’ is someone who may have been socially, politically or

organisationally pressured to write favourably about the powerholders. This journalist may also

genuinely have similar political outlooks as the powerholders. Whichever the case, Journalist A

cannot altogether avoid writing on sensitive topics that concern the powerholders, as the public

(the readers) may see it as a sign of self-censorship. Additionally, if Journalist A writes articles

that strongly defends the powerholders, Journalist A may still be subjected to allegations of

self-censorship. The journalist therefore may have to use discursive strategies to dilute or de-

radicalise their opinions to avoid these situations. Journalist A may write favourably towards

the powerholders, or may defend the actions of the powerholders involved. It is important to

note that they may not be self-censoring for any social or economic benefit, they may simply

agree with the powerholders and side with them on a certain situation. Even if it is their own

opinions, they must write in a certain way if they wish to be credible to readers. In this Missing

Booksellers case study, Journalist A may defend the actions of the Chinese government or

criticize the actions of the booksellers themselves. But when they are defending China’s

response, they must show that their decisions are purely logical and not related to self-

censorship. In fact, they use strategic rituals to seem less biased, less pro-China, and to seem

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‘objective’ instead. Therefore Journalist As use strategic rituals to defend themselves from allegations of self-censorship from their reader’s.

Second, ‘Journalist B’ is someone who may wish to write critically on sensitive topics but may find themselves unable to do so completely freely. This may be due to pressure from an external power structure, from their news organisation, or from their own personal fear of retaliation. These journalists may write editorials that either defend local opinions or criticise the actions of the powerholders. They may also choose to write about a completely ‘taboo’

topic for powerholders, for example, on Tibetan or Taiwanese independence. They may have personal opinions unpopular with powerholders that they wish to express in their editorials. To avoid retaliation from powerholders, these journalists can use certain discursive strategies that lessens the radicalism of their material. Journalist B, in this case study, may wish to criticize the Chinese government on their involvement or on their response to the missing booksellers.

Journalist B articles may wish to urge the Chinese government or the Hong Kong government to

respond in a certain way. Journalist B wants to write on topics that may not sit well with those

who have authority over them in the news organisation. Journalist B articles may see the

Missing Bookseller case as a breach of the “One country, Two Systems” law, and may focus

their editorials on ‘checking’ the governments’ actions or on analysing the witness accounts of

the booksellers. Journalist B wishes to challenge the status quo, but knows the current political

environment makes it difficult for him or her to do so. If an organisational superior such as the

head editor is pro-China and the other journalists are writing more and more pro-Chinese

articles, Journalist B may follow suit, by adjusting their language to fit the political atmosphere