(Hybrid) Peacebuilding in a
Stable Society
A case study of the Māori in New Zealand
Research Master Thesis
Research Master International Development Studies Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
Rozemarijn Anne-Lize Pieplenbosch 10758623
Supervisor: Dr. Courtney Vegelin
Second Reader: Dr. Mieke Lopes Cardozo
17th August 2020 Wordcount: 30,120
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i. Abstract
Peacebuilding missions are paying too little attention to those experiencing conflict first-hand. While the role of international and nongovernmental organizations continues to hold a strong footing, a focus needs to be brought on integrating local knowledge perspectives in the
implementation of peacebuilding. Hereby the proposed concept of hybridity, which entails a
combination of local-indigenous practices with a liberal or Western value system. Given that existing literature draws on the examples of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies, this research draws on the experiences of Māori in New Zealand, a stable society that still struggles to integrate local-indigenous practices into a European democratic system. Furthermore, it’s history of colonization has shown that a pattern of conflict remains through the under-representation and exclusion of Māori communities. A mixed method design that integrated interviews with Māori individuals, observations and an analysis of policy documents was used to explore how the concept of hybridity can enhance peacebuilding practices through integrating local-indigenous perspectives and voices. It found that while Māori individuals and communities still struggle to receive fair and equal representation, concepts such as participation and representation have enhanced the existence of hybridity which in turn has given Māori individuals a way in which they can be included in decision-making processes and negotiating spaces. Furthermore, new concept such as introducing local knowledge practices, the understanding of cultural context as well as the education of staff have further influence how local and/or indigenous peoples are included. Overall, this research has shown that the integration of both indigenous and liberal practices is pertinent for the well-being of all individuals within a society, particularly when it comes to addressing the root causes of conflict.
Key words: Hybrid peacebuilding, indigenous, local, representation, participation, Māori, New Zealand.
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i.i. Acknowledgements
In writing this thesis I have had the help and support of so many incredible people. I would therefore, like to share my appreciation for the brilliant
insights that have been given.
I would first and foremost like to thank my research participants for not only their time, the fascinating interviews but also for providing me with a better
understanding of the Māori people and the beautiful country that is New Zealand.
Thank you also to the people that I have met on my travels, for without them I would not have been able to discover the hidden gems spread throughout
New Zealand.
Moreover, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Courtney Vegelin, who has been wonderful in supporting me through the writing of this thesis by providing me constant feedback, encouraging me to
think outside my own scope and supporting me through difficult times. I very much appreciate my classmates, who I have had the most interesting
discussions with and have challenged me to think critically about my writing.
Finally, I would like to give the biggest thanks my close family and friends, who have without a doubt been a constant support these past two years
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i.i.i. List of Figures
Figure 1: Map of New Zealand, distribution of Māori Inhabitants per region... 32
Figure 2: Map of New Zealand, distribution of New Zealand European Inhabitants per region ... 32
Figure 3: Research Locations in New Zealand ... 38
Figure 4: Conceptual Model ... 43
Figure 5: Newly adjusted Conceptual Model ... 71
i.v. List of Tables
Table 1: Number of Māori inhabitants and New Zealand European inhabitants per region ... 31Table 2: Operationalization of Representation, Participation and Role of the Stakeholder ... 83
Table 3: List of Participants Interviewed ... 88
Table 4: List of documents obtained during the fieldwork research. ... 89
v. List of Acronyms
CS Conflict StudiesDS Development Studies IR International Relations LGD Local Government Act 2002 LEA Local Electoral Act 2001
PC United Nations Peacebuilding Commission RMA Resource Management Act 1991
UN United Nations
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v.i. Table of Contents
i. Abstract... 2
i.i. Acknowledgements ... 3
i.i.i. List of Figures ... 4
i.v. List of Tables ... 4
v. List of Acronyms ... 4
v.i. Table of Contents ... 5
Chapter 1: Building a Narrative ... 9
1.1. Introduction ... 9
1.1.1. Researching a Stable Society ... 10
1.1.2. Societal and Academic Relevance ... 10
1.2. Research Problem ... 10
1.3. Research Question(s) ... 11
1.4. Thesis Setup ... 12
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ... 13
2.1. Introduction ... 13
2.2. Peacebuilding Explained: The end of a liberal Peace Era? ... 13
2.2.1. What is Peace in the Liberal Peace Era? ... 15
2.2.2. The Failures of Liberal Peacebuilding ... 16
2.2.3. The Failures of Liberal Peacebuilding continued…with a focus on the local ... 18
2.3. Integrating Postcolonial Theory in International Relations ... 20
2.3.1. Postcolonial Development ... 20
2.3.2. Can other forms of knowledge be produced? ... 21
2.4. Hybridity ... 22
2.4.1. The Complexity of Hybridization ... 23
2.4.2. Local and/or Indigenous Practices in Peacebuilding ... 24
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2.5.1. Participation ... 26
2.5.2. Representation ... 27
2.6. Conclusion: A Reformulated Notion of Peacebuilding ... 28
Chapter 3: Research context, New Zealand and the Māori ... 30
3.1. Introduction ... 30
3.2. Putting the Māori in Context ... 30
3.3. Understanding the Māori in New Zealand ... 32
3.3.1. History: A Colonial Past ... 32
3.3.2. Historical Grievances ... 34
3.3.3. Political Representation ... 35
3.3.4. The treatment of Māori History ... 35
3.4. Reasoning Behind the Chosen Context ... 36
Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodological Considerations ... 37
4.1 Introduction ... 37
4.2. Research Location ... 37
4.3. The Transformative Paradigm ... 38
4.3.1. Researcher Positionality ... 39
4.4. Research Design ... 41
4.4.1. Unit of analysis & unit(s) of observation ... 42
4.4.2. Conceptual Model ... 42
4.4.3. Operationalization of Key Concepts ... 43
4.4.4. Type of Data Collected ... 44
4.5. Data Analysis ... 45
4.6. Quality Criteria ... 46
4.7. Ethical Considerations ... 47
Chapter 5: Empirical Findings ... 49
5.1. Introduction ... 49
5.2. Partnership (hybridity) ... 50
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5.2.2. Partnership on a Micro-level: Fostering Relationships ... 51
5.3. Participation & Representation ... 53
5.3.1. As Written in Legislation ... 53
5.3.2. Participation ... 54
5.3.3. Representation ... 55
5.4. Cultural Context... 56
5.4.1. Interpretations of New Zealand History ... 57
5.4.2. Whakapapa ... 57
5.4.3. Importance of cultural practices ... 58
5.5. Education ... 60
5.5.1. Primary and secondary education ... 60
5.5.2. Local knowledge ... 63
5.6. Conclusion ... 65
Chapter 6: Conclusion, A Reformulated notion of Peacebuilding ... 66
6.1. Introduction ... 66
6.2. Answering the Research Questions ... 66
6.2.1. Hybridity taking form ... 66
6.2.2. The role of stakeholders in facilitating hybridity ... 67
6.2.3. Local and indigenous perspectives about participation and representation among Māori communities and its implementation in practice ... 68
6.2.4. Local and/or indigenous perspectives as perceived by Stakeholders ... 69
6.2.5. Main Research Question ... 69
6.3. Theoretical Reflections ... 70
6.4. Limitations and Future Research ... 72
6.5. Policy Recommendations ... 73
6.6. Concluding Remarks ... 73
Works Cited ... 75
Appendix ... 83
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire version 1 ... 85
Appendix C: Interview Questionnaire version 2 ... 87
Appendix D: List of Participants ... 88
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Chapter 1: Building a Narrative
1.1. Introduction
“It’s always the same story told in a different setting. Violence breaks out, foreign nations are scandalized, interveners and million-dollar donors come rushing in, warring parties sign a peace agreement, but within months the situation is back to where it started. Sometimes worse.” (Autesserre, 2020, p. 1)
Unstable and prone-conflict societies have proven to threaten global security and stability (Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009), and as a result, peace interventions have increased drastically since the Cold War (Autesserre, 2017). As conflict continues to persist, the need for stronger conflict resolution practices is ever more dire. If the ideal is to create global security and stability, then the goal is to move away from conflict and towards the act of “creating, strengthening, and solidifying peace” otherwise known as peacebuilding (Autesserre, 2014, p. 21). However, building sustainable peace has not been easy and more often than not, peacebuilding missions have failed to achieve the necessary objectives (Paris, Peacebuilding, 2018). Some have criticised peacebuilding for its promotion of liberal ideals which is viewed as being uncoordinated, ineffective and unrealistic in assisting war-torn societies to reconstruct themselves from a state of violence to one of self-sustaining peace, with further critiques insisting that liberal peacebuilding initiatives are counter-productive in assisting the local (Hayman, 2013; Heathershaw, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2010; Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009; Paris, Peacebuilding, 2018; Richmond, 2006; Tom, 2017; Vogel, Richmond, Mac Ginty, Tellidis, & Kappler, 2014). Meanwhile others argue that peace has often failed to persist because international actors frequently fail to engage with local ones and the context in which these interventions take place since the main assumption is that the Western blueprint of installing peace was sufficient (Autesserre, 2020; De Coning, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2010; Heathershaw, 2013; Tom, 2017; Werner, 2010).
Institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and international peacebuilding are beginning to realize the limitations of adhering solely to a Western doctrine. In fact, recent debates have started to shift towards the notion of hybrid peacebuilding, which is described as a combination of international values with local or indigenous practices (Hayman, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2010; McCandless, 2014; Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013). Hybrid peacebuilding is perceived as an “alternative to the hegemonic liberal peace” (Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013, p. 139); however, most of the dialogue on this approach remains theoretical.
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1.1.1. Researching a Stable Society
Bonta (1996) argues that existing literature on conflict resolution practices focusses heavily on violent societies and thus a balance is needed in understanding the perspective of peaceful states in dealing with existing conflict. Given that one of the issues that humanitarian practices often face is the lack of institutional structures to allow for a peaceful transition. Having to invest numerous resources into setting up these institutions and ensuring local voices are heard is often time consuming and may not always lead to the desired result of peace. Nor does working in a post-conflict society entail that peace has been fully instilled, since violence in different forms may persist. With this Spelman (2013) argues there is a “need for a critique of the way the common life of people in communities is
conceived of and ordered” (p. 10) as a way of confronting conflict in peaceful societies.
Hence the focus on New Zealand and the Māori people. The island country was one of the last places to be settled by humans when the Polynesian explorers discovered the remote region in the 13th century and had developed a distinct culture known as Māori. Starting in the 1600’s, almost two centuries of colonization by various European powers, it was the British who had sat down with the Māori to sign a contract in 1840 known as the Treaty of Waitangi, and dictates partnership in the form of mutual benefit. However, the Treaty was not upheld and today the New Zealand Government is still addressing various long-standing Māori grievances. It’s history of colonization has influenced the development of a society whereby an indigenous worldview has had to coexist with that of a
European, Western worldview. Being a relative stable society, Māori in New Zealand still face discrimination, exclusion from decision-making and negotiating spaces as well as remain behind in development compared to its European counterparts.
1.1.2. Societal and Academic Relevance
Given that peacebuilding practices often focus on macro-level dynamics, hence neglecting the local, Autesserre (2017) has claimed that there is “an emerging consensus that local conflict resolution is crucial to building peace” (p. 114). Highlighting the need to include local and in this specific case Māori perspectives in peacebuilding is not only relevant for ensuring the rights of Indigenous peoples are upheld, but also contributes to the existing academic debate on peacebuilding which has largely focused on the dynamics of a post-conflict context. Therefore, researching a stable society that is filled with social injustice cannot be excluded from the understanding of peacebuilding practices. This thesis also adds onto the existing debate on conflict resolution practices by including knowledge practices that are constructed outside of the West, which can provide significant contributions to the Western discourse that has long been dominant in the structuring of world order.
1.2. Research Problem
The problem statement surrounding the research topic is two-fold. First and foremost, conflict resolution practices such as that of peacebuilding are still failing to achieve its initial goal, which is long-term, sustaining peace. While this is an issue that is being debated at both the policy and
11 academic level, international actors as well as scholars are unable to draw a boundary between what works and what doesn’t. One can argue that every context in which resolution practices take place varies significantly and while this is an aspect that can never be overlooked, classical (liberal)
peacebuilding practices remain ineffective in achieving durable peace. Consequently, there is also the pitfall to continuously support local and/or indigenous practices is the assumption that all local communities have similar intentions and therefore one needs to be cautious when working in conflict regions.
Secondly, there remains a gap in knowledge on what constitutes hybrid peacebuilding
practice. Hybridity, which aims to form a combination of international, western structures with that of local and/or indigenous knowledge practices, lacks any empirical research to support the theory behind it. Hybridity in peacebuilding is viewed merely an ideal-type situation with an absence of practical (often fieldwork) knowledge. Even within the debate on hybrid peacebuilding there is no clear consensus on how this can take shape in practice. Therefore, this thesis has proposed to
introduce the concepts of participation and representation to include the local in decision-making and negotiating spaces when discussing how one can achieve peace.
For the purpose of this study, a mixed methods design has been chosen, whereby interviews with Māori individuals, observations and an analysis of policy documents have been used to explore how the concept of hybridity can shed light on how the existence of a western governance system tries to coexist with the indigenous practices of the Māori population.
1.3. Research Question(s)
This thesis aims to contest the notion that peacebuilding practices should not only be done in (post)conflict societies. It also seeks to understand how (hybrid) peacebuilding practices can allow for a sustained form of peace when integrating local-indigenous perspectives and voices. Finally, the intent is not to find a solution to successful peacebuilding but merely build upon existence debates through the provision of the empirical evidence found during the fieldwork research. Therefore, based on the problem statement and the context in which this research has taken place, the following
research question has been devised: How does the concept of hybridity, enhanced by participation and
representation, facilitate sustained peacebuilding in the Maori context?
Based specifically on the research context to elaborate further upon the main research
question, the following are sub-questions aim to provide a deeper understanding on the problem stated in the initial research question:
a) How does hybridity take place in the Māori context?
b) What are the roles of the various stakeholders in facilitating hybridity in the Maori context?
c) What are local and indigenous perspectives about participation and representation among Maori communities?
12 d) How does participation in the decision-making process take place in the Maori
context?
e) How are local and/or indigenous perspectives perceived and considered in the Māori context by the various stakeholders?
1.4. Thesis Setup
The thesis is therefore structured as followed. Chapter 2 will provide a literature review on liberal peacebuilding and the concept of hybridity, followed by an overview of what participant and representation entails. This will constitute the literature framework that has guided the fieldwork research. Chapter 3 presents the research context, namely New Zealand, with a focus on the Māori, the history of colonization and their current status in society. Chapter 4 outlines the chosen research design, namely a mixed methods design, and the methodological considerations. This will include the epistemological and ontological principles of the research, how the collection of data took place and the ethical guidelines and quality criteria that were taken into account. Chapter 5 will summarize the empirical findings of the research by outlining the overarching themes that were found during the analysis of the data in relation to identifying and substantiating hybrid peacebuilding. Finally, Chapter 6 will provide a discussion on the research questions and sub-questions. It will also reflect on the theoretical implications and discuss the limitations of this research. Suggestions for future research and policy recommendations will conclude the thesis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical
Framework
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of this literature review is to understand the existing discussion around the failure of peacebuilding practices followed by what the increasing dialogue around the inclusion of local actors is in both the study and the practice of peacebuilding initiatives.1 The first section (2.2) of this review will explain how peacebuilding is perceived in the 21st century, followed by what a Liberal era of peacebuilding necessitates. This will also aim to provide a description of what peace entails and why peacebuilding initiatives often fail to achieve the objective of peace. The second section (2.3) uses a postcolonial critique to highlight the weaknesses of the field of IR. Its focus lies on how voice can be given to locals in development and peace interventions. Section 2.4 will provide a discussion on the term hybridity and how this can be conceived as a new form of peacebuilding whereby the local is put more into the forefront. The fourth section (2.5) of this chapter will
investigate the practical implementation of hybrid peacebuilding practices by understanding the role of political participation and representation as means to include the local. The final section (2.6) will provide an explanation for the given research question and the context it will be applied in, which will be expanded upon further in Chapter 3.
Literature on peacebuilding is often discussed within the field of IR; however, these fields have been criticized for being Eurocentric in origin (Seth, 2011), often failing to take into account it’s history of colonization (Grovogui, 2003). Hereby Development Studies (DS) plays a central in recognizing how “practitioners and westernized elites/intellectuals, are often complicit in a neocolonial knowledge production” (Kapoor, 2008, p. xiii). Moreover, this chapter aims to move beyond existing discourse in IR by bringing in postcolonial theory to highlight the need to integrate knowledge systems that exist outside the west and provide an understanding for how this can be done.
2.2. Peacebuilding Explained: The end of a liberal Peace Era?
The term, peacebuilding, first became officially recognized in the 1990’s, following the end of the Cold War when the UN adopted the Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This era also gave rise to a shift in how peace operations were being conducted, particularly regarding the norms1 It should be noted that there are various discussions around peacebuilding that extend further than the
‘failure of liberal peace’ and ‘lack of inclusion of the local’ argument. Heathershaw (2008) in his article on
Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses highlights the multiple
discourses that exist regarding peacebuilding theory. Autesserre (2014) in her work Peaceland: Conflict
Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention argues amongst similar lines. However, this
thesis has chosen to limit its scope due to the vast amount of existing literature on peacebuilding and to ensure a detailed analysis can be provided on the given arguments.
14 and practices by both state and non-state actors when dealing with violent conflict (Tom, 2017). Understanding the history of peacebuilding explains why locally based initiatives were largely neglected and sheds light on why external actors played a dominant role in implementing peacebuilding approaches.
Peacebuilding derived from the failures of peacekeeping missions (Newman, Paris, &
Richmond, 2009). During the Cold War, peacekeeping through UN missions focussed on establishing and monitoring ceasefire agreements between hostile states, such as through the creation of buffer zones (Newman, Paris, & Richmond, 2009). However, these missions solely paid attention to containing conflict rather than actively trying to resolve it. Therefore, it was needed to address the root causes of conflict, the understanding of state-building and the promotion of development practices in the desire for sustainable peace practices (Tom, 2017).
The pillars of peacebuilding were founded by the UN system whereby international and external actors played a prominent role in establishing peace agreements to achieve a doctrine of liberal peace (Vogel, Richmond, Mac Ginty, Tellidis, & Kappler, 2014). The liberal peace agenda is characterized by development interventions in post-conflict societies, with the aim to establish
market-oriented economies and democratic institutions (De Coning, 2018; Heathershaw, 2013; Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013). Hence the strong advocate for uprooting western models in the form of a liberal peace agenda, which has ultimately resulted in a one-size-fits-all template for peace (Paris, Peacebuilding, 2018; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). The UN followed a top-down model of peacebuilding practices and governance reform that included implementing a liberal economy as well as developing a liberal state and institutions (Richmond, 2006). It is argued that liberal states use the example of their own existing rights and status to justify “direct or subtle forms of colonialism, interventionism, and local depoliticization to occur” (Richmond, A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday, 2006, p. 565). The enforcement of these values is reflected in An Agenda for Peace where Boutros-Ghali (1992) expresses “Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice” (Boutros-Ghali, p. 54). This is further emphasized by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011) who argue that democracy is frequently linked with concepts such as development and conflict prevention policy.
However, taking a closer look at the agenda, there is no mention of the term local or working with local actors. Boutros-Ghali (1992) expresses that “the foundation-stone of this work [An Agenda for Peace] is and must remain the State” (p. 4), further acknowledging that any decisions made with the host country are largely done at the national level. It was only until later that there was an inclination towards a bottom-up approach that included social welfare and justice ideals (Richmond, 2006); however, Richmond (2006) argues that there remains a fine line between what external actors perceive to be necessary versus what the recipients of peacebuilding may want. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) emphasize this notion further by stating that peace agreements are predominantly established “in Western bubbles (geographically in the West or within a ‘green zone’ in the conflict
15 environment)” (p. 763). Ramsbotham et al. (2011) take this further claiming that hegemonic powers are what construct the pillars of liberal peace, whereby the rich and powerful dominate the
stabilization of world order. Should locals be involved, they are most likely to be elites or high-end officials, barely representing the voice of minorities (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) also argue that the upkeep of such an approach is harmful from both a normative and a strategic perspective, because “It is a recognition that peace building, state building and development should support their subjects rather than define them” (p. 769).
2.2.1. What is Peace in the Liberal Peace Era?
Peacebuilding cannot be discussed without understanding what peace is. Gultang’s argues that peace studies is “to save and promote life for all, to meet the basic needs for security, well-being, freedom, identity and a liveable environment” (Galtung & Fischer, 2013, p. 12). Gultang (1969, p. 167) states “peace is an absence of violence” and creating it means both preventing and reducing violence. Peace can be both negative and positive. Negative peace is the absence of personal violence, whereby there is no direct violence which is seen as inflicting bodily harm such as through war, terrorism, physical and psychological abuse (Galtung J. , 1969). Positive peace entails there is an absence of structural violence, meaning there is no indirect violence, which is viewed as inequality, predominantly in the distribution of power such as through discrimination, poverty or social injustice (Galtung J. , 1969).2
In IR, more attention is given to the study of negative peace, whereby peace is perceived as the absence of war (Galtung & Fischer, 2013). Pursuing this form of peace is often in the interest of state powers trying to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, states who advocate for this tend to focus on state institutions and their function in establishing a form of stability. Contemporary peacebuilding practices and their approaches to handling conflict and creating international stability and order is often perceived as reflecting a “liberal post-Westphalian world order” (Tom, 2017, p. 59). Roberts (2008) further describes this as a form of negative peace whereby international governance norms rest on ideals of liberal peace in that “democratization combined with economic liberalization represents political peace and economic prosperity” (p. 538). However, Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) suggest that positive peace should not be overlooked. They argue that focussing on welfare or the well-being of individuals in a society is crucial for achieving positive peace, because it is essential for the procuring of one’s identity, creating social cohesion and establishing legitimate social contracts or governance practices. Roberts (2008) highlights this as well by stating the creation of peace is
predominantly emphasized on “traditional Liberal security mechanisms” (p. 551), though it could be improved by focussing on aspects of positive peace such as enhancing state legitimacy and
eradicating social injustice.
2 Because a majority of the mentioned authors (such as Autesserre (2014), Newman, Paris and
Richmond (2009), Mac Ginty (2006) and Richmond (2008) to name a few) refer to Galtung’s definition of negative and positive peace, hence it’s central role in this literature review.
16 Tom (2017) argues, that the dominant form of peace that is constructed by international actors is liberal peace. This is echoed by Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) who state that contemporary peacebuilding projects “[…] reflect a liberal project: not just managing instability between states but seeking to build peace within and between states on the basis of liberal democracy and market economics” (p. 7). This to some extent is understandable considering how democracies or liberal states rarely engage in violent acts with each other and are more open to trade (Fukuyama, 1992). Kant (1903) and Paine (1975) have argued that republics are less likely to go to war, while Moaz and Russet (1993) state that it is not in the interest of democracies to engage in conflict due to a norm of compromise and cooperation. Mintz and Geva (1993) further found that instigating war or using force against other democracies is perceived as a failure of foreign policy by the public. More recently, Andrews (2017) has stated that liberal democracies and peace are symbiotic. Hence the argument from Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) claiming that contemporary peacebuilding approaches are to be perceived as liberal projects.
However, criticism on whether democracies and peace are interdependent have emerged. Rosato (2003) states the following “… liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect when their interests clash” (p. 599). Rosato (2003) further argues that the definition of democracy is continually reinterpreted to the interest and motives of those it benefits. The latter is echoed by Schwartz and Skinner (2002) who argue that democratic states have in fact been at war with each other, but
democratic leaders will disagree on the basis that they will not define the state they are at war with as a democracy. Moreover, Newman et al. (2009) have argued that while democracies themselves may not got to war with each other, democracies “have been aggressive to non-democratic countries” (p. 11). This shows that liberal peace in terms of its promotion of democracy does not automatically equate to the instalment of peace.
2.2.2. The Failures of Liberal Peacebuilding
While the response to rising conflicts by the international community has been met with occasional successes, their efforts at implementing legitimate and effective governance practices have seen great failures as well (De Coning, 2018; Paris, Peacebuilding, 2018). The US-led intervention in the Middle East post 9/11 further confirmed a Western concentrated effort on influencing
peacebuilding initiatives that relied heavily on the use of military forces (De Coning, 2018; Heathershaw, 2008). This was seen as the war on terror approach, that emphasized the idea of a “stability-order-statebuilding discourse and policy” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 232). Newman et. al., (2009) question hereby what or rather whose version of state-building is being implemented. This is echoed by Woodward (2007) enquiring “who should be in the driving seat, outsiders or the locals” (p. 147) and that the implementation of peace is still too often based on “generalized templates” that are “insufficiently tailored to local circumstances, and, in the end, will
17 fail to address the ‘root causes’ of that conflict” (p. 147). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2011, p. 230) argue that the “war on terror” approach in the early 21st century was heavily perceived as a framework which had led to numerous “catastrophic failures” such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. It therefore became questionable whether state-building and regime-change interventions could be perceived as a form of peacebuilding. Rogers (2007) was particularly concerned with this view due to the increasing overreliance on military force that came about in the early 21st century.
Several countries and numerous non-governmental organizations and institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank share a “liberal peace agenda” (Autesserre, 2017; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2008). This agenda usually encompasses objectives that revolve around “free and fair elections, the creation of a market economy, the separation of powers, the reform of the security sector, the rule of law, and the advancement of human rights and civil society” (Autesserre, 2017, p. 123). Regardless of the favouritism towards liberal peace, it has yielded few positive results, let alone achieved its initial goal. It is argued by various scholars such as Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) and Paris (2004; 2018) that these liberal interventionism policies should by no means be perceived as something “good” and political liberalization is more likely to instigate violence, often due to an increase in economic disparities. Newman et al. (2009) further claim that the liberal peacebuilding efforts and the “the manner in which it is promoted in fragile and divided societies are problematic” (p. 12) because those tenets are “not necessarily universal (or universally applicable) values” (p. 12). However, Paris (2018) has argued that if successes were to be measured by whether large-scale violence has not returned, then peacebuilding initiatives can be viewed as having a positive effect. This is why one clear indicator of peacebuilding failure is the return of armed conflict and hence, most interventions rely on implementing a ‘negative’ form of peace as Gultang has outlined (Call, 2008).
The World Bank has recognized that “on average a country coming out of civil war has a 50 per cent chance of relapsing into conflict in the first five years of peace, and that it can take a
generation to return to pre-war living standards” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 228). Most external actors claim that once the first elections have taken form, peacebuilding is no longer required, which can take roughly three years to achieve but does not always entail that peace becomes durable (Paris, 2018). Consequently, a ‘quick and dirty’ strategy, which Paris (2004) coins as “rapid liberalization and speedy withdrawal” (p. 208) has become prominent amongst UN actors, often neglecting the fact that resolving a conflict may take generations; thus, a fragile form of peace is often considered as good enough (Paris, 2018). One of the reasons why there is not a clear indicator as to whether peacebuilding initiatives have had an overall success rate is because there remains to be a disagreement on what constitutes those successes. Autesserre (2014) argues that the rate of success is so variably different across sources, and this also accounts for how the recurrence of armed conflict is measured, whereby it can oscillate “between 20 percent and 56 percent of all civil conflicts”
18 violence, there remains a question of durability, in terms of (liberal) peacebuilding initiatives having a long-term effect.
It therefore becomes understandable why Paris (2018) states that a possible solution would be to have the UN extend their mission time abroad. Haugerudbraaten (1998) questioned to what extent the UN should be responsible for upholding a long-term commitment six years after the term
peacebuilding had been introduced. His argument states that the UN should only take a leadership position in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, taking on short-term responsibility to set up peace agreements. Thus, long-term efforts should be held by local actors to ensure political and economic development is properly promoted, which in turn creates a sustainable solution to tackling the root cause of the conflict (Haugerudbraaten, 1998). However, Haugerudbraaten (1998) does not acknowledge what local participation entails and how this can be envisioned in practice. Overall, peacebuilding missions largely overlook local contextual matters (Tom, 2017) and focus solely on short-term successful implementation and outcomes, aimed at replicating a form of peace that would be reproduced from one post-conflict country to the next (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Austesserre (2014) claims that there is often a danger of external actors constructing their own knowledge of countries and relying solely on this narrative to engage in peacebuilding practices, which is often incomplete or misleading. This is because technical proficiency is valued more than county-specific expertise (Autesserre, 2014).
2.2.3. The Failures of Liberal Peacebuilding continued…with a focus on the local
In 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission (PC) to facilitate discussions and debates between local and international actors in peacebuilding operations. It was aimed to solve the existing limitations of peacebuilding to establish better coherence and coordination; however, Leite, Nascimento and Bezerra (2018) state that this cannot be considered as a final response from the UN. In fact, it soon became clear that a decentralization in power structures within the UN PC has led the UN to move away from important local actors. Leite, Nascimento and Bezerra (2018) argue that the Peacebuilding Commission was unable to establish a clear depiction of what the needs and concerns were of the individuals involved in the conflict beyond the existing government institutions.However, the debate on what constitutes success in peacebuilding is not just confined to scholarly debates, as Austesserre (2014) points out “External definitions of success are also frequently at odds with local ones” (p. 22). Peacebuilding should therefore, become viewed as a facilitation between multiple actors with a stress on diversity rather than on coordination with the central actor being the UN. Hayman (2013), Mac Ginty (2010), Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012) McCandless (2014), Millar et al. (2013) and Vogel et al. (2014) are some of the few to acknowledge the constraints being placed on certain ontological and epistemological approaches when invoking Western models. In fact, they advocate for including the perspectives of those experiencing the conflict first-hand and from practitioners living in conflict regions in the academic debate on peacebuilding. Up until 2012, a
19 donor nomenclature dominated international peacebuilding, which De Coning (2018) stresses had made initiatives more technical with a focus on resource mobilization, especially given that peacebuilding can only exist through “what internationals find, initiate or are willing to fund” (Heathershaw, 2013, p. 279). One of the consequences that Tom (2017) points out is that
peacebuilding practices often promote the interest of the powerful, therefore, neglecting those at the bottom supporting grassroots initiatives or the marginalized. Whereas Richmond (2006) argues that local perceptions of liberal peace and the notion of state-building are “ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects” (p. 558). Autesserre (2017) writes the following
“On the other hand, many instances in which international actors tried to support local initiatives have generated counterproductive consequences. For instance, they have
undermined domestic efforts to promote human rights in Malawi (Englund 2006) and resolve grassroots conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo—henceforth Congo—and
Tajikistan (Gallo and Vanholder 2015; Heathershaw 2009); at times they have even fueled violence, as in Afghanistan (Martin 2014), Congo (Autesserre 2014b), and Uganda (Branch 2011)” (p. 116).
It seems then that liberal peace has not been yielding the expected results. Millar, Van der Lijn and Ver (2013) reveal that international actors often view these conflict-ridden societies as a
clean slates whereby democratic institutions and liberal economies can be injected and reproduced.
However, advocates for liberal peace fail to take into account the existing historic structures and institutions that locals initially relied on and that “local actors are often unwilling objects of the peacebuilding agenda” (Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013, p. 137). Moreover, Millar et al. (2013) claim that those critiquing failed peacebuilding initiatives from a liberal peace perspective will argue that the fault lies with the recipient of peacebuilding. According to them, the locals ‘bad
behaviour’ and the corrupt practices of local elites result in a failure to allocate the necessary resources for development. Whereas from the stance of the intervener, only ‘minor’ technical problems regarding the implementation may be found.
While Mac Ginty (2011) acknowledges the limitations to international liberal peacebuilding approaches, he also highlights that indigenous approaches can be viewed as ineffective, counter-productive and even flawed. “Many indigenous and traditional approaches to peacemaking, dispute resolution, and reconciliation are conservative and reinforce the position of powerholders” (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 52). Likewise, allowing external interveners to hold a dominant position can be ineffective, inefficient and counterproductive (Autesserre, 2014). Nonetheless, there remains a need to include the voice of the local. The means by which this can be done is under debate, as it can be difficult to find a justifiable way in which those perspectives are properly incorporated. If autonomous local and external actors in peacebuilding initiatives are unable to yield the necessary results, to what extent can a combination of the two achieve long-term peace?
20
2.3. Integrating Postcolonial Theory in International Relations
Before discussing how a combination of both local and external actors in peacebuilding can take shape, it is necessary to understand how to integrate the voice of the local, not through the eyes of the external, but as independent producers of knowledge. Hereby a postcolonial lens will be applied to the field of IR for it allows “perspectives of knowledges, as well as needs, developed outside the west” (Young R. J., 2003, p. 6) to be included in the discussion on peacebuilding. A critique of IR is that it does not always critically engage with its history (Seth, 2011) which can result in a neglect of the complexity of international order (Grovogui, 2003). Postcolonial theory offers a lens to look at the relations between ideas and its practices rather than just the incorporation of static concepts (Young R. J., 2003).
The demarcation between western and non-western world views “was made fairly absolute in the 19th century by the expansion of the European empires, as a result of which nine-tenths of the entire land surface of the globe was controlled by (…) European-derived, powers” (Young R. J., 2003, p. 2). Hereby the argument that conventional IR tends to reproduce the existing status quo of the Western world view (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002). Western doctrines and their reaffirmation of certain power structures have been foundational for the construction of “international realities” and “international existence” and it has led the West to become the “sole legislator” of international norms and values (Grovogui, 2003, p. 33). Give that IR is Eurocentric in origin, its establishment of moral and legal perspectives cannot be perceived as universal (Seth, 2011). Moreover, scholarly debates have questioned whether peacebuilding is merely just a “cover for neo-colonial pacification projects” (Vogel, Richmond, Mac Ginty, Tellidis, & Kappler, 2014, p. 517). The process that allowed European powers to consolidate their legitimacy and become a benefactor and protector of territories abroad has also caused the dissolution of various social and cultural structures that existed prior to colonization and become replaced with a Westphalian ideal (Biswas, 2016). Additionally, there is a claim that the research processes within the field of IR is often filled with various intellectual and political biases due to the notion that many scholars do not engage in reflexive practices when engaging in the production of knowledge (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011). Postcolonial theory accentuates the narratives that have either been neglected or erased within IR, paying “particular attention to the stories of those who were left out of the telling of this dominant narrative” (Biswas, 2016, p. 220).
2.3.1. Postcolonial Development
According to Sen (2000) development is defined as “expansion of the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (p. 18). Therefore, under this process of development, individuals are entitled to a form of freedom that allows them to achieve
opportunities that meet their justifiable interests. But it becomes difficult to view development as a form of freedom when the infrastructure of global governance that is responsible for the
21 neglect the input from those who the policies of development are crafted for (Biswas, 2016). Existing discourses on “global justice” stem from the notion of moral universalism which forms a basis for explaining why wealthy nations invest more in the protection of human rights or the provision of humanitarian assistance in less developed nations (Kohn, 2010). However, under colonization this argument has been used to support interventionism that supports the military and economic interests of wealthy nations. Here postcolonial theory questions the concept of moral universalism, as the notion of universal is reflective of interests of powerful groups (Kohn, 2010).
Liberal IR, for example, does not look at making reparations for its exploitative history but rather aims to “‘fix’ the problem of the Third Worldism through the project of development” (Biswas, 2016, p. 225). Hereby, conventional theories of development argue that the basic capitalist structure is the ideal society whereby economic growth is perceived as development through the accumulation of wealth as a means for progress (Peet & Hartwick, 2015). Biswass (2016), however, states that “The entire pedagogy of development (…) was grounded on a set of colonial preconceptions about the Third World peoples as ‘deficient’” (p. 225). Hence, “development continues to be structured in hierarchies of race and place” (Pailey, 2019, p. 2) that “create and/or reproduce ‘structures of
domination based on racial significations and identities’” (Pailey, 2019, p. 4). Pailey (2019) coins this as the White Gaze of development whereby the argument is that white expertise remains to be a dominant force in development interventions. Postcolonial theory provides a “criticism of the key Western concepts of progress and development” and questions terms “that were previously assumed to be automatically good” (Peet & Hartwick, 2015, p. 238).
2.3.2. Can other forms of knowledge be produced?
Musial (2017) argues that there is a cost when only looking at one-dimensional knowledge practices, as it results in creating inaccurate conclusions on, for example, local communities. This has shaped the engagement between Europeans and the global South, in not only the assumptions that are produced of the Other, but also the means by which this assumption is further applied (Musila, 2017). Smith (2012) gives the example where imperialism had constructed knowledge about indigenous peoples, which was represented in particular ways in the West and “through the eyes of the West, back to those who have been colonized” (p. 1). Persaud and Walker (2001) argue that the colonization of indigenous peoples did not essentially lead to the discovery of a “New Word” but rather the reshaping “of that world in the image of the conquerors” (p. 375). Smith (2012) expresses how the perception of indigenous history through colonization has been altered to be perceived as oral
traditions and thus, becomes overshadowed by a Western view of history.
Spivak (1993) has proposed a means by which the “Other” or “subaltern” is given a voice in a narrative constructed by the dominant hegemonic, western worldview. This is not so much to say that history must be re-written, but it gives the opportunity for the discourse of the subaltern to be included in the understanding of history itself. It, therefore, gives voice to the reality of those that are
22 often oppressed, marginalized or discriminated and instead includes them in the production of
knowledge. Postcolonialism highlights the notion that those in the west, whether within academics or outside, should incorporate these other knowledges and perspectives, and take them “as seriously as those of the west” (Young R. J., 2003, p. 20). Questioning whether the subaltern can speak has drawn attention to the relationship between that of the researcher and the way in which the Other is being studied.
Hereby there is an acknowledgement of different kinds of knowledge systems as well as the awareness that there are multiple discourses of history. Radcliffe (2015) states that taking into account other productions of knowledge should not be seen solely as culture or ideology, but rather that it is to be perceived as “their intellectual production as thinking” (p. 25). Moreover, when documenting the experience of those who are marginalized, specifically in relation to social processes, emplaced meanings and the understanding of differences, it is best done through qualitative research such as ethnography (Radcliffe, 2015). Postcolonial theory, relies on the subjective experiences of
individuals, especially because colonization is rarely perceived by those who suffered from it (Young R. J., 2016). Biswas (2016) argues that postcolonial IR brings forth a narrative that is seen from a marginal perspective, which incorporates different priorities and concerns. Therefore, taken-for-granted concepts in IR are questioned and new insights are included that could benefit how world politics is both constructed and organized (Biswas, 2016).
2.4. Hybridity
“[P]eace (…) [should not be] legitimate and formalised in governmental, institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, or a social contract, but these must rest on consent and an engagement with difference and hybridity (…) Any viable concept of peace (…) must not displace indigenous legitimacy with
preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually obscure the indigenous. Interdisciplinary and crosscutting coalitions of scholars, policymakers, individuals and civil society actors can develop discursive understandings of peace and its construction in this context.” (Richmond, 2008, p. 163)
The discourse on peace is moving away from a static implementation of liberal peacebuilding, by emphasising the inclusion of the local through the concept of hybridization within peacebuilding (Heathershaw, 2013; McCandless, 2014; Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013). It is being recognized that “local ownership is essential for successful peacebuilding, but local stakeholders rarely feel included in the design of international programs” (Autesserre, 2014, p. 4). In a broader sense, the concept of hybridity “is understood as composite forms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the interaction of different groups, worldviews and activity” (Mac Ginty & Sanghera,
23 2012, p. 3). Werner (2010) states this requires a collaboration between both traditional and Western value systems, whereas Heathershaw (2013) perceive this as a contrast between international liberal values and local-indigenous practices. However, Heathershaw (2013) still advocates for a liberal form of peace, given the argument that interveners maintain a dominant position. Moreover, the hybridity of colonial and native knowledge is argued to be a means for reversing the “process of domination as repressed knowledge gradually enter[s] the picture subliminally, further enabling nativist subversion, intervention, and resistance” (Peet & Hartwick, 2015, p. 238).
According to McCandless (2014), hybridity remains to be a theoretical discussion but there is a need to understand what is happening on the ground and how it has influenced those who are directly impacted, rather than focussing on the top-down implementation by interveners. Hayman (2013) illustrates that peacebuilding missions should not only be carried out in local contexts but should be locally led as well. This can entail that local organizations determine the priorities and the type of approach while external actors provide the necessary resources and networks. It can also be the case that initially certain approaches come from external actors, but the goal is to transport these to a local organization that will take on the program themselves. Hayman (2013) also highlights that it can be more cost-effective to consider local perspectives rather than relying on highly paid experts from either non-governmental organizations or private sector companies.
2.4.1. The Complexity of Hybridization
While hybridization can be viewed as a ‘broad alternative to the hegemonic liberal peace’ (Millar, van der Lijn, & Verkoren, 2013, p. 139), Millar et al. (2013) state that it often tends to view interveners and the locals as purely static and singular units, while in reality it is far more complex. This is because the existence of groups and practices are “the result of a long history of interaction, fusion, competition, resistance and coalescence” (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 3). Hybridity should not be perceived as the combination “of two separate entities to create a third entity” (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 8) but the process in which both can co-exist. Beyond the presence of local
perspectives, the intrusion of global interactions within a local setting can lead to consequences that are both unintended and unplanned. This is because the context of these conflict regions is highly complex and introducing international forces to a local environment is not a simple process. Mac Ginty (2010) highlights that when it comes to a hybrid form of peace, neither actor in peacebuilding has autonomy regarding their peace agenda’s. While locals may grasp towards notions of
reconciliation, international actors may resort to norms and practices surrounding the implementation of liberal institutions (Mac Ginty, 2010). However, it is important to note that Mac Ginty’s (2010) description of hybridity is based on an ideal type situation with little input from fieldwork knowledge. Nonetheless, Mac Ginty (2010) argues that hybridization is a result of constant social negotiations and adaptation processes.
24 De Coning (2018) describes a new era of peacebuilding, namely sustaining peace in which peacebuilding missions move away from the use of templates or one-size-fits-all solutions. This is echoed by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) where the “social and historical struggles which give rise to legitimate institutions in each context through larger-scale mobilisation, according to a complex local–international mix of identities, values and norms, and of cultural, political and economic practices” (p. 770) and these practices “provides us with an understanding that the local—and the subjects of peace, intervention and the state—are essential for any viable, sustainable form of peace” (p. 770). De Coning (2018) argues that this form of peacebuilding, known as adaptive peacebuilding, is influenced by the theory of complexity, whereby societies are inherently multifaceted and have constant emergent properties with a wide array of social behaviours. However, complex systems can adapt to these differences through the combination of experimentation and a constant generation of knowledge through feedback. De Coning (2018) is not the only one to point out this concept of complexity. Paris (2018) acknowledges that current situations are far more complex for peacebuilding missions than they were in the 1990’s. Although it could be argued that conflict regions were always vastly complex, international actors have, however, either neglected this notion or were unable to account for it. This reflects Millar’s et al. (2013) claim that the complexity of conflicts and peacebuilding operations in local settings are rarely considered in Western models.
2.4.2. Local and/or Indigenous Practices in Peacebuilding
As Escobar (1995) has outlined the context of development practices, peacebuilding can also be perceived as the debate of culture and the existence of the other. Escobar (1995) argues that the way by which cultural and the specifically the portrayal of the other needs to be adjusted. Within IR there has been a danger to think in static terms whereby “reductionism, essentialism,
over-simplification and cultural bias” (Richmond, 2009) has shaped the implementation of liberal peacebuilding. This premise falls in line with Mac Ginty (2011), who warns that international practices of peacebuilding should not be put in binary, template terms, and nor should (local) indigenous practices be perceived as such, especially when it comes to interpreting these terms loosely and not fully understanding the context in which peacebuilding missions are taking place in. The urgency to embrace the local and/or indigenous is done so without being critical of existing conceptions of the ‘local’ or the ‘indigenous’ (Mac Ginty, 2011). In other words, the conceptions of the local and/or indigenous are done so through the lens of a Western world view, which Richmond (2009) coins as the romanticisation of the local, which has led the local population to be seen as the following four key types: “1. exotic (or indeed quixotic), informal, and unknowable: 2. unable to play a constructive role because they are effectively lack ‘capacity’ in building formal liberal order; 3. devious and uncivil; 4. or a repository of indigenous capacities that internationals can co-opt” (p. 153). These key types justify the premise of a top-down, blueprint-like approach where the agency and identity of the local is not included.
25 Werner (2010) claims that local values and traditions are often treated secondary to the priorities of international actors. As a result, external peacebuilders may lack the legitimacy to implement new approaches in local areas. However, indigenous practices have proven to be
successful to some extent in conflict reconciliation. The use of indigenous theatrical performances as a tool in peacebuilding initiatives in Kenya has led to a positive transformation of social reconciliation at the micro-level and has reduced existing violence (Magak, Kilonzo, & Miguda-Attyang, 2015). Werner (2010) gives the successful case of Mozambique, where grass-root approaches helped the reintegration of individuals into communities and family life which greatly influenced the
reconciliation process in the post-conflict society. Ramsbotham et. al., (2011) highlight the example of indigenous reconciliation in Somalia whereby there was “a mixture of unwritten customary law, Somali shari’a law within the Islamic Sunni Shafi’i school, traditional values, and local codes of social conduct, by clan elders, Muslim ulema and women’s groups” (p. 257) which has shown the variety of approaches available.
Even so there remains a divide on the discussion amongst scholars on how the inclusion of indigenous practices can be envisioned. Mac Ginty (2011) argues that international peacebuilding initiatives focus predominantly on material forms of power, whereas local and/or indigenous
communities are concerned with legitimate practices and moral values. However, Heathershaw (2013) claims that the peacebuilding actors within the international community have been known to promote impartial humanitarianism, advocating for soft power, while locals may enforce the need for market-mechanisms. Nevertheless, indigenous practices have considerable strengths in that they have been able to establish a “tradition of dialogue and community involvement, […] legitimacy and
trustworthiness derived from deep roots in the culture and fulfilment of the majority of agreements reached” (Werner, 2010, p. 71).
2.5. From Exclusion to Inclusion: Participation & Representation
Peace is a “dynamic social process” and the approach to conflict needs to be done“constructively and cooperatively” (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005, p. 304). To recap, hybridity is not the construction of a new form of peacebuilding, but rather it is the coexistence of two
structures, namely the international, often Western worldview and that of the local and/or indigenous knowledge systems. This does not entail that liberal peacebuilding is rejected in its entirety but rather there needs to be a stronger focus on the local. Firstly, because they are neglected in the design process of peacebuilding even though they are perceived to be the recipients of these development practices. Hereby the discussion on the subaltern adds value in terms of how the perspectives of the local can be considered. Secondly, local contextual matters are often overlooked, and peace
practitioners need to move away from a one-size-fits-all template given the complexity of the
historical struggles of local populations. However, there is no consensus on what hybridity is expected to look like in practice, namely also because it remains to be a notion heavily discussed in theory. For
26 the scope of this research, understanding hybridity beyond its broader terms has been narrowed down to the extent to which participation and representation takes place in the given context in order to include the local and/or indigenous in peacebuilding practices. It should be noted, however, that discussions on participation and representation are often done so under the umbrella of a democracy. In other words, participation and representation are often seen as inherent characteristics of what may be defined as democratic processes (Young I. M., 2000).3
2.5.1. Participation
“[P]articipation is one of the most important concepts in development cooperation because it is potentially a vehicle for different stakeholders to influence development strategies and
interventions” (Mikkelsen, 2005, p. 2). Mikkelsen (2005) has offered various meanings associated with the term participation in relation to development research and the role of the practitioner, under which falls:
“the voluntary contribution by people, but without their taking part in decision-making (…) an active process, meaning that the person or group in question takes initiatives and asserts the autonomy to do so (…) fostering dialogue (…) involvement of people in self-determined change” (p. 2).
In fact, McFarlane (2001) states that anyone is theoretically eligible to share their views about the “shape, pace, and location of a development project through a variety of participatory methods” (2001, p. 863). This falls in line with Uhlaner’s (2001) definition of political participation whereby there should be “the means for citizens to communicate their views” (p. 504) often in the form of mass public gatherings such as through elections or demonstrations. This, however, focusses
predominantly on participation on a grander scale whereby all individuals in society have the right to partake actively in what decisions governments take. When becoming involved in development practices, McFarlane (2001) states it is highly encouraged to include community participation in decision-making processes. Quick and Bryon (2016) define participation as the engagement in governance. This takes place through the direct (or indirect) involvement of various stakeholders in the decision-making process, whereby stakeholders are defined as individuals, groups or organizations who can either influence or are affected by various plans, policies or programmes or place a claim on an organization’s or other entity’s attention, resources or outputs” (Quick & Bryson, 2016, p. 1).
Participation involves a form of inclusion (whether direct or indirect) and inclusion as
expressed by Opotow, Gerson and Woodside (2005) entails that when establishing peace, it should be done in fairness, where resources are shared and the well-being of all is considered. When discussing inclusion and exclusion, it is often in reference to the “ethnic, racial, gender or socioeconomic
diversity of the people taking part in public participation” (Quick & Bryson, 2016, p. 5). If individuals
3 For the purpose of this thesis, the focus will remain on participation and representation, whereby
existing discussions on what constitutes a democracy or what can be defined as a democratic process will be excluded.
27 were to be morally excluded from creating peace, it would entail that they were being deprived of justice, exploited and would fall victim to being harmed (Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005). Opotow, Gerson and Woodside (2005) argue therefore, that peace is possible when public policies enhance life possibilities through circumstances that all can benefit from. However, Mac Ginty (2011) argues that one of the mistakes in accepting that liberal peacebuilding has been fully implemented is the acknowledgement of participating in elections. Moreover, the Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) states the in post-conflict settings the following should occur “monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation” (p. 15).
In research specifically, the promotion of participation takes place whereby power is shifted from the decision-makers to the section of society who are often the receivers of the decisions made, also known as participatory action research (Balakrishnan & Claiborne, 2017). Brydon-Miller,
Greenwood and MacGuire (2003) describe this as “a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes, grounded in a
participatory worldview” (p. 10). It aims to combine theory and practice to allow action and reflection to take place during the participation of others within the research process. Action research rejects this notion that knowledge is objective and value free. Instead it aims to include individual’s knowledge and their capacity to understand and address the underlying issues that exist within their community (Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & MacGuire, 2003). Lastly, it is rooted in coproducing knowledge through participating, making decisions and learning rather than purely understanding the meanings of an external researcher (Martí, 2015).
2.5.2. Representation
The notion of representation is known to overlap with participation because participation can, in part, exist through representation. Young (2000) states that “Representation is necessary because the web of modern social life often ties the action of some people and institutions in one place to consequences in many other places and institutions” (p. 124). Because it is inherently difficult for all individuals to take part in decision-making processes, the concept of representation ensures that people can still participate in some form. Quick and Bryson (2016) argue hereby, that the indirect involvement in public participation is done through representatives. More specifically, democracies allow individuals to participate through electing representatives who in essence are responsible for the “formation, adoption and implementation of the laws and policies” (Quick & Bryson, 2016, p. 2). This reflects what Wampler (2012) says, which is that representation takes place by representatives who are often elected into official positions by citizens who have participated in participatory venues.
Kohn (2010) argues that letting the subaltern ‘speak for themselves’ without the injection of an intermediary (such as an expert) does not necessarily create a space in which the experience of truth takes shape, for there remains the problem of representation. Postcolonial theory moves beyond
28 the concept of representation as a political entity but perceives it also as a construction of images through interpretation. Spivak (1993) draws attention to the use of vertretung and darstellung as a means for understanding representation. Vertreten refers to political representation whereas
darstellung implies the notion of ‘description’ (Kohn, 2010, p. 208). It constitutes the difference
between ‘speaking for’ someone, such as a political figure, and the ‘portraying’ of one’s experiences (that of the subaltern) outside the political (Spivak, 1990). Spivak (1993) does not privilege one over that other but highlights how language obscures these processes of representation causing one to replace the other. As inspired by Spivak (1993), the following interpretation emerges; while marginalized groups can be represented in the vertreten sense, the representation as darstellung remains flawed as it often lacks the inclusion of one’s lived experience as well as the integration of a narrative that exists outside the dominant world view.
Representation is a complex process and is not created by the action of a single individual but from the “functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people” (Wampler, 2012, p. 673). Taking this into account, there is need for increasing representation particularly for groups that are considered to be minorities or are “subject to structure inequalities” (Young I. M., 2000, p. 122). Quick and Bryon (2016) claim that is important to have those that are under-represented or marginalized in society be considered in decision making processes, or more specifically invite them to the table, particularly when it comes to the management of conflict and power.
2.6. Conclusion: A Reformulated Notion of Peacebuilding
This chapter set up the literary framework which will provide the basis of the methodological considerations and the conceptual scheme (Chapter 4), the analysis of the data collected (Chapter 5) as well as the discussion of the findings (Chapter 6). By critically questioning the implementation of liberal peacebuilding, it has examined the extent to which it has been successful in establishing sustained, long-term peace. The on-the-ground practice of peacebuilding with a top-down, one-size-fits-all template is proving to be inefficient and counterproductive. Moreover, the weaknesses of IR, in that it is Eurocentric in origin and its establishment of moral and legal perspectives cannot be perceived as universal. The postcolonial critiques have shown that while Liberal notions of peace may have been successful in the West, it does not equate to a justification for imposing these same values when engaging in peacebuilding practices in conflict-ridden regions.
Given that liberal peacebuilding frequently fails to engage with local actors and the context in which these interventions take place (Autesserre, 2017), it is becoming necessary to integrate local knowledge practices into peacebuilding talks. Especially given that the measures for peace are directed at those who are experiencing the conflict first-hand. The involvement of the local needs to be put on a balanced footing with that of international practices, since even local autonomous
