The Role of Vulnerability and Social Inequality in Climate-Induced Migration: a Case Study of the IPCC and the IOM

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2020

The Role of Vulnerability and

Social Inequality in

Climate-Induced Migration

A Case Study of the IPCC and the IOM

Author: Tim Goudswaard Supervisor: Dr. Robin Pistorius Second Reader: Dr. Mehdi Amineh Master Political Science: Political Theory Universiteit van Amsterdam

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the phenomenon of climate-induced migration. In recent decades, climate change has increasingly resulted in people leaving their habitable homes. The IPCC and the IOM are two organisations that deal with this problem, although through different perspectives. However, climate change is not the only factor that influences this form of migration. The material ability to move is often linked to the degree of social inequality in a community. The aim of this research is to identify the interpretation of vulnerability in the discussion on climate-induced migration by the IPCC and the IOM in order to assess their effect on social inequality. The approach of this thesis is two-fold. First, I carry out an extensive literature review on the relation between social inequality and the vulnerability of climate-induced migrants. Second, I conduct a document analysis to identify the interpretation of vulnerability of climate-induced migrants within the IPCC and the IOM.

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Acknowledgements

The majority of this thesis was written while the world came to a pause. COVID-19 has forced us to readjust our priorities and made us realise what jobs or activities are actually important in life. In the process of writing my thesis, I have, on several occasions, had my doubts about the relevance or the importance of what I was doing. There has always been somewhat of a distance between academics and the ‘real’ world. Writing a thesis about something as abstract as the interpretation of vulnerability of climate-induced migrants within two organisations whose mandate it is to advise decision-makers, barely touches upon real-life problems. Yet, I believe that even now, we have a responsibility to not forget that there is an even deeper and darker crisis looming over us all. With our current pandemic, the question is not if, but when we will find the solution. Unfortunately, this does not go up for our current climate crisis. I believe that it is of utmost importance that while we find our ways of dealing with our current COVID-19 crisis, we cannot forget that climate change has not disappeared, and still holds the potential to affect us in a way this pandemic never could.

Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to the people who made it possible for me to focus on writing my thesis during these unprecedented times. First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Robin Pistorius who has been extremely helpful in not just guiding me through the thesis process, but also helping me to get through this time without losing my focus. Second of all, I am grateful for my friends and family who helped me through countless hours of discussing all aspects of my thesis, especially the special one that was willing to read through this theoretical thesis.

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Introduction

In recent years, the fact that our planet’s climate is rapidly changing is indisputable. Climate change has and will continue to have a detrimental effect on both nature and human life. This rapid change in our climate has caused a significant rise in our sea-levels and increased the frequency of extreme weather events all over the world. Nevertheless, we, the human-species, are on a trajectory that increasingly contributes to, rather than stands in the way of, even more detrimental change. The effects of climate change are already visible and mitigation is often too late (Bierman and Boas, 2010, p60). Climate change has affected, and will do so in the foreseeable future, the livelihoods of millions of people around the world. Echoing the words of the UN (2018), ‘climate change is the defining issue of our time and we are at a defining moment.’

The impact of climate change will be noticeable in every part of the world. Besides direct impacts such as rising sea-levels, increasing temperatures, and extreme weather events, the biggest threat might be the indirect impact of climate change. Especially, the new influx of people leaving their homes because of climate change, hereafter called climate-induced

migrants. Although, human migration in relation to environmental change is not a new

phenomenon per se.—population displacement as a result of changing weather is a recurring theme in human history. However, human migration due to anthropogenic climate change is something we have only become aware of in recent decades (Marino, 2012, p375).

Experts have been giving out warnings for decades now. Due to rapidly changing weather conditions and extreme weather events, people will lose their homes and their livelihoods. This has resulted in millions of new climate-induced migrants—a number that will exponentially increase in the future. In their First Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (hereafter, IPCC) stated that ‘the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions are displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought’1. The estimates of people leaving their homes because of climate

change range between 50 to 250 million, depending on the author’s definition of what constitutes a climate-induced migrant (Meyers, 2001). Yet, this extremely significant aspect of climate change, has been largely overlooked by governments for years (Myers, 2001, p610).

1 This quote is actually taken from the 1992 Supplement (IPCC, 1992b, p103), which was an additional

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It was only after the 2008 ‘Migration and Climate Change’ report by the International Organisation for Migration (hereafter, IOM) that public and academic interest picked up on this new influx of migrants (Marino, 2012, p376). Media and scholars alike have been trying to understand and situate these new migrants. However, these efforts to try and find the ‘first’ climate-induced migrants has led to several vulnerable communities being misunderstood. The image portrayed by the media has been of flooded communities due to rising sea levels or abandoned farms due to extreme drought (New York Times, 2015; Semple, 2019). However, this might not be the whole story. Despite different narratives being used to tell their story, not many are accurate (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, p388). In the following section of my introduction, I will outline these different narratives on climate-induced migration and how the discourse has changed over time.

Climate-Induced Migration Discourse

Since the problem of future migration is inherently overflowing with uncertainties, the numbers predicted are often heavily influenced by discursive practices. Depending on the discourse, millions of people are being labelled as vulnerable due to their status of being (conceived as) a climate-induced migrant. Global narratives of climate change and different discourses on climate-induced migration heavily influence affected communities by, for example, upholding inequitable power relations (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, p382). Therefore, it is of utmost importance to analyse in depth the discursive practices used in the discussion on climate-induced migration.

One example of the impact a discourse might have can be found in a study on the people of Tuvalu, one of the first island nations to be severely affected by a rise in sea-level, by Farbotko and Lazrus (2012). They claim that the people of Tuvalu have been negatively impacted by the current discourse on climate-induced migration. Tuvaluans are often labelled as the first ‘climate refugees’ and have come to represent the crisis narrative. Putting the label ‘climate refugee’ on someone who is forced to leave their home seems harmless at first glance, but it brutally limits their autonomy. Calling someone a refugee, establishes some sort of dependence on external help for the person in question. Instead, if we call them ‘climate migrants’, they keep values such as ‘equity, identity, and human rights’ in place (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, p383). Besides, labelling them as ‘climate refugees’ might also give them a form

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of false hope, since they are conceived as ‘refugees’ and therefore should qualify for help from the United Nations (hereafter, UN). However, ‘climate refugees’ do not fall under the 1951 Refugee Convention by the UN since they do not fear persecution in their country of origin (McNamara, 2007, p13). Therefore, the terminology ‘climate refugee’ does not entitle them to any extra legality.

The way a certain issue is framed is crucial when thinking of solutions. Climate-induced migrants are often objectified and left out of the discussion. McNamara (2007, p17) argues that a frequently used discourse on climate-induced migration, namely labelling them as refugees, has shifted the focus from ‘environmental change responsible for environmental refugee flows, to environmental change caused by refugee flows’. This seems like a subtle change, but the impact is enormous for climate-induced migrants. When trying to solve the migration problem, the climate-induced migration is framed as a problem for the host country instead of the country of origin. Therefore, the problems in the country of origin, caused by climate change and other factors, resulting in people seeking refuge elsewhere are often neglected because of the discourse.

As previously mentioned in this chapter, vulnerable communities have often been misunderstood in their reasons to migrate. One of these misunderstandings has been the interpretation of their vulnerability. O’Brien et al. (2007) have identified two main interpretations, namely outcome and contextual vulnerability. O’Brien et al. (2007) argues that the interpretation of vulnerability by scholars and policy-makers can have an enormous impact on the individuals and groups that are labelled vulnerable and the way they can adapt to climate change. Although both interpretations have their merits, using only one might have disastrous consequences for the livelihoods of millions of people and, especially, on social inequality. Many scholars have warned of the effects a wrong approach to vulnerability might have on social inequalities (Cernea, 1997; Adger, 2003; O’Brien et al., 2007; Ford et al., 2010; Gaillard, 2010; Hartmann, 2010). Arguments range from the risk of social hazards becoming hard deprivation faced by some vulnerable populations (Cernea, 1997) to a lack of social capital that prevents vulnerable people from making good use of adaptation measures (Adger, 2003).

The idea that different interpretations of vulnerability in the climate change debate can impact vulnerable people differently is not a novel one. However, the link between the interpretation of vulnerability and climate-induced migration, remains, to the best of my knowledge, rather unexplored. There have been made efforts to study vulnerability in relation to development policy (Gaillard, 2010), climate disasters (Yamin et al., 2005) and climate change in general (Adger et al., 2004; Füssel and Klein, 2006; Ford et al., 2010; Eriksen et al.,

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2015). Yet, a study on how the interpretation of vulnerability affects social inequality in the climate-induced migration debate has been lacking from the extensive literature on vulnerability in relation to climate change2.

For the reason that the relation between the interpretation and social inequality has already been established in the existing literature (Cernea, 1997; Adger 2003; Gaillard, 2010; Nazrul Islam and Winkel, 2017), I will not reinvent the wheel here and conduct my own study on this social phenomenon. Instead, my research will focus on the interpretation of vulnerability in the climate-induced migration discourse and use the existing literature to assess how this interpretation affects social inequality. Furthermore, I will assess the interpretation of vulnerability in the climate-induced migration discourse of the IPCC and the IOM. As a result, I will be able to assess the relation between the interpretation of vulnerability within the IPCC and the IOM and their effect on social inequality.

IPCC and IOM

In the discussion on climate-induced migration, the IPCC and the IOM have been on the forefront of assessing the nature and the consequences of this phenomenon. For example, the IPCC (1992) set out one of the first warnings on the grave consequences of climate-induced migration and the IOM has sparked significant academic and media interest because of their influential reports. Even though both organisations deal with the same problem, namely climate-induced migration, their main focus is contrasting. The IPCC is mainly concerned with climate change, whereas the IOM is only focussed on migration. Therefore, their interpretation on the problem at hand might differ significantly, which in turn could have differing adverse effects on social inequality.

Research Question

2_{Marino (2012) has made somewhat of an effort to study this relation, but takes a slightly different approach in}

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The above discussion has led to a twofold approach in my thesis. First, I will analyse IPCC and IOM documents in order to establish the climate-induced migration discourse used by both organisations. I will do so by identifying which interpretation of vulnerability has been used in their reports. Second, I will establish the consequences of the results found in the first part of my thesis. This has resulted in the following research question:

How has the discourse surrounding climate-induced migration within the IPCC and the IOM in regards of their interpretation of vulnerability affected social inequality?

Moreover, I will answer three subquestions in order to support my main research question. The subquestions are as follows:

How does the interpretation of vulnerability of climate-induced migrants affect social inequality?

How is the notion of vulnerability of climate-induced migrants interpreted in the discursive practices of the IPCC and the IOM?

Climate-Induced Migration Terminology

Before turning to the theoretical framework of this thesis, it is important to discuss the terminology of climate-induced migration. The phenomenon of climate-induced migration goes by many names. Unfortunately, so far, experts have not been able to find a consensus on how to define this form of migration. Terms such as ‘environmental refugees’, ‘climate refugees’, ‘climate migrants’, and ‘environmentally displaced persons’ have all been used to describe roughly the same phenomenon. The problem lies in the fact that they are not identical. In what follows, I will give an overview of the different terms that have been used in the literature and why they differ. Subsequently, I will justify why I have chosen to use the term ‘climate-induced migration’ throughout this thesis.

The problem of climate-induced migration was first popularised by a UNEP paper from El-Hinnawi (1985) who defined these migrants as ‘environmental refugees’. El-Hinnawi defined ‘environmental refugees’ as

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‘People who are forced to leave their traditional habitat temporarily or permanently because of a marked environmental disruption (natural or human induced) that jeopardizes their existence and seriously threatens their quality of life’ (El-Hinnawi,

1985, p4).

However, it is widely acknowledged that this definition is highly problematic for several reasons. Most importantly, it is not in line with the widely used UN definition of a refugee. According to the commonly used UN Refugee Convention of 1951, a refugee is defined as:

‘A result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of

being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ (UN, 1951, p.14)

This definition of refugees poses a problem to El-Hinnawi’s definition of environmental refugees for two reasons. First, most climate-induced migration happens internally within states (Ionesco, 2019). These migrants are called Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), as opposed to Externally Displaced People (EDP’s) and often do not seek for international law or outside countries to protect them (Biermann and Boas, 2010, p74). El-Hinnawi’s (1985) definition of ‘environmental refugees’ might not, at first sight, differentiate between IDP’s and EDP’s, but according to the aforementioned UN Refugee Convention, refugees are only refugees when they are outside of the country of their nationality. Therefore, not all of El-Hinnawi’s ‘environmental refugees’ fit within the UN framework. Moreover, as mentioned earlier in this paper, labelling them ‘refugees’ might give a false sense of hope, since they do not qualify as ‘refugees’ within most legal frameworks. Often, they do not fear persecution of any form. Their movement is caused by anthropogenic climate change and has, at least directly, nothing to do with political persecution.

Secondly, the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 does not distinguish between forced or voluntary displacement, but this distinction is highlighted in El-Hinnawi (1985) definition of

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‘environmental refugees’. However, climate-induced migration is not necessarily forced— especially when thinking of the gradual change produced by the process of climate change, migration is not always caused by sudden natural disasters. Some climate-induced migrants might move because of unprecedented levels of rainfall and ruined crop yield, but others might move because of slowly melting glaciers. For the latter category, migration is still a choice. The other options might be unsustainable in the long-run, but they are not forced out of their home.

As an alternative, the IOM defined climate-induced migrants as ‘environmental migrants’ to avoid confusion about their refugee status. ‘Environmental migrants’ are defined as

‘Persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad’ (IOM, 2007, p1).

This definition does overcome the aforementioned problems, but remains problematic because of its focus on ‘change in the environment’. Climate change does not equal environmental change, it is merely a subset of it (Biermann and Boas, 2010, p62). Biermann and Boas (2010, p64) argue that migration can only be defined as climate migration if the movement is caused by the three main impacts of climate change, namely sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity. These boundaries are too narrow for ‘environmental refugees/migrants’.

In this thesis, therefore, I have used the term ‘climate-induced migration’ instead of ‘climate migration’ because of the emphasis placed on other aspects of the life of a climate-induced migrant. Causes of migration are extremely complex and depend on the context of the situation (Hartmann, 2010, p235). There are often other factors in play aside from just climate change that push these people to leave their habitual homes either voluntarily or by force. Therefore, climate change might be only one of the reasons to migrate.

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In this outline of the theory on vulnerability, I will solely look at the concept of vulnerability used in the climate debate and the impact it has on climate-induced migration. In this chapter, I will outline the theoretical framework used in this thesis.

First, I will discuss two popular interpretations of vulnerability, namely outcome and contextual vulnerability (Kelly and Adger, 2000; Ford et al., 2010; O’Brien et al., 2007). As schematically represented in Figure 1, outcome vulnerability solely focuses on the outcome of climate change and, mostly, mitigation, whereas contextual vulnerability is more concerned with the causes and adopts a more processual and multidimensional view of climate change (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76). It is important to note that both interpretations are extremely valuable in the combat against climate change. Therefore, it is important to see the distinction as not subtle semantics, but as different interpretations that affect the livelihoods of millions of people.

Second, I will outline the relations between social inequality and climate change, climate-induced migration, and vulnerability. I will discuss the impact of adaptation and mitigation measures on social inequality and outline how different narratives of climate-induced migration have the potential to influence social inequalities.

Vulnerability and Climate Change

Figure 1: Framework depicting two interpretations of vulnerability to climate change: (a) outcome vulnerability; (b) contextual vulnerability (O'Brien et al., 2007, p75)

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The outcome-oriented interpretation of vulnerability views climate change as its starting point and vulnerability as its end product (Kelly and Adger, 2000, p327). Vulnerability is considered a casualty of reducing the biophysical aspects of climate change (Ford et al., 2010, p376). An outcome-oriented vulnerability analysis would look as follows: first, future emission trends are predicted; second, climate scenarios are developed using these future emission trends; third, the possible adaptation measures are outlined; fourth, the level of vulnerability is established as a residual of said adaptation measures (Kelly and Adger, 2000, p327). This form of vulnerability assessment is especially beneficial if the aim is to summarise the net impact of climate change. Therefore, if we take the interpretation of outcome vulnerability as the leading interpretation, adaptation might lead to positive sectoral and technological changes.

Scientific Framing

O’Brien et al. (2007, p77) go more in depth and find that this interpretation of vulnerability is a result of a scientific framing of climate change. This framing of our climate problem mostly neglects the political structures or moral failings that have caused climate change related problems (Demeritt, 2001, p328). Instead, it solely focuses on the Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GHG) emissions and its physical consequences. Therefore, the results tend to have universal meanings (if the methodology is agreed upon) and can be measured and modelled by using mathematical methods. Research that uses the scientific framing of climate change can be traced back to the works of Arrhenius from 1896 in which he studies the influence of carbonic acid in the air upon the temperature of the ground. This line of thought has continued throughout the literature and has had an enormous impact on policy-making in recent years. Its legacy can be found in the frequently used General Circulation Models (GCM) that simulates the earth’s climate system by using mathematical models (Demeritt, 2001, p315).

Outcome vulnerability follows from this framing as it is interpreted as the negative outcome of climate change on any particular exposure unit (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76). These outcomes are often easy to put into a GCM and can be diminished through technical adaptation, the reduction of sectoral sensitivities and, simply, by reducing GHG emissions. In turn, this scientific framing of climate change in the existing literature originates from the biophysical

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discourse embedded in institutions, actors, and academic disciplines (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76).

Biophysical Discourse

The biophysical discourse surrounding climate change places emphasis on the dynamic system of the Earth and analyses the impact of human activity on this system (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, p15). It has similar aspects to the scientific framing, since it often relies on measurable aspects of climate change and uses mathematics to construct models that help explain climate change. Moreover, the features of climate change that are emphasised are temperature change, rise in sea levels, the size of the ozone hole, etc. This discourse finds some of its roots in the Gaia hypothesis (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, p16). This theory states that the world is one ‘living self-regulating bio-system’ (Connelly et al., 2012, p28). The biophysical discourse is concerned with the impacts that humans and human activity have on this bio-system.

According to biophysical discourse, policy responses based on scientific knowledge tends to get better as more scientific knowledge is made available. Therefore, its take on science is of a positivist nature. This is often reflected in the decision-making by international institutions concerned with climate change (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, p17). The biophysical discourse seems to be the path with the least resistance in the political realm, because of its focus on pure science.

Contextual Vulnerability

Kelly and Adger (2000, p328) use the etymology of the word ‘vulnerability’ to create an analogy that suits their definition of contextual vulnerability. They state that the origin of the word is derived from the Late Latin vulnerabilis, which was used by the Romans to describe ‘the state of a soldier lying wounded on the battlefield, i.e., already injured therefore at risk from further attack’ (Kelly and Adger, 2000, p328). In other words, vulnerability is defined primarily by prior damage. Therefore, it can be seen as a starting-point, as opposed to an end-point in outcome vulnerability.

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As seen in Figure 1, contextual vulnerability takes a multidimensional approach to the relationship between nature and society. In its assessment of vulnerability, it takes into account influences from the political, institutional, economic, social, and environmental sphere. What really distinguishes the contextual-oriented interpretation of vulnerability is the implementation of responses within the framework. These responses, as presented in Figure 1, make contextual vulnerability a dynamic framework in which climate change affects the way individuals and groups in society can respond to other sources of change (e.g. globalisation, pandemics), which, in turn, affects the context in which climate change occurs (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76). Therefore, contextual vulnerability is in constant motion interacting with both climate change and other factors that play a role in the daily lives of vulnerable people.

Human-Security Framing

Opposed to the scientific framing of climate change, the human-security framing does not neglect the consequences of climate variability on individuals and groups in society. It places emphasis on a more pluralistic understanding of knowledge related to climate change and argues for a more politicized understanding and focuses on the role that power and agency play in climate change (O’Brien and Barnett, 2013, p374). It contrasts with the scientific framing in its view on the relationship between nature and society. It conceptualises this relationship as a mutuality, rather than a duality (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76).

Contextual vulnerability follows from this framing because of its similar pluralistic view on climatic change. It acknowledges a variety of influences on society rather than merely being pinned to the biophysical impact of climate change. Within the human-security framing, power and agency play an enormous role in transforming social and ecological systems (O’Brien and Barnett, 2013, p386). Therefore, they are vital in the adaptation process to climate change.

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The critical discourse is, in contrast to the biophysical discourse, more concerned with the political, economic, and social aspects of climate change. Humans are viewed as agents with the power to impact and respond to climate change. In terms of solving the climate crisis, this discourse emphasises that environmental factors alone are not sufficient and that wider social, economic, and political issues must be addressed as well (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, p19). It is, according to this critical discourse, of utmost importance to open the discussion on the ‘natural authority’ of science and emphasise the role of the human domain within science (Wynne, 1994, p188).

Whereas the biophysical discourse of climate change is of a positivist nature, this discourse criticises this philosophy and adheres to a more postmodern theory of knowledge (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, p19). In other words, it views science as a social construct influenced by factors such as history or culture. The critical discourse does not agree with the cultural authority of science or the biophysical discourse, and argues against assumptions such as the rational choice model (Wynne, 1994, p186). An example would be the assumption that when public awareness of climate change increases, the willingness of the public to act on this would increase with it. However, this might not be the case, since such narratives might also paralyse people and prevent them from taking sufficient action (Kuthe et al., 2019).

To summarize, outcome-vulnerability’s view of vulnerability as a casualty of climate change and the adaptation processes originates from the scientific framing of climate change, which in turn stems from the biophysical discourse that solely focuses on the Earth’s system. Whereas, contextual-vulnerability’s take on vulnerability as a multidimensional starting-point comes from the human-security framing which in turn originates from the critical discourse and its view on science as a social construct.

Social Inequality

In the early days of climate change, the focus remained on the biophysical aspect of this emerging phenomenon. Scientists were mostly concerned with numbers that reflected the state of the Earth. However, during this time, a fundamental part of climate change was frequently neglected. This negligence is best explained in the words of Skoufias (2012, p2):

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“While the eyes of the world have been riveted on polar bears, Antarctic penguins, and other endangered inhabitants of the Earth’s shrinking ice caps, relatively few researchers have turned serious attention – until recent years – to quantifying the prospective long-term effects of climate change on human welfare.”

In this section, I will argue why understanding the societal impact of climate change is essential in dealing with climate-induced migration through an extensive literature review. The first part of this section consists of a general overview of the relation between climate change, climate-induced migration, and social inequality. Whereas in the second part, I will outline the relation between vulnerability to climate change and social inequality.

In this section, and throughout the rest of the thesis, I follow Nazrul Islam and Winkel’s (2017) definition of social inequality as ‘within-country spatial inequality’. This entails inequalities such as demographic characteristics, assets and income, and public-decision making (Nazrul Islam and Winkel, 2017, p2). Social inequality is defined as multi-dimensional and can refer to any marginalised group in society.

Climate Change, Climate-Induced Migration, and Social Inequality

In their study on the narratives surrounding the impact of climate change on the people of Tuvalu, Farbotko and Lazrus (2012, p384) claim that ‘the difference that climate change makes to vulnerable populations often involves deepening of an already complex story about the distribution of and access to resources (…)’. In other words, climate change has the capacity to enhance the already existing social inequalities of vulnerable populations. When people are already vulnerable because of their economic or social conditions, simple technological measures, such as mitigating GHG emissions, will only result in a temporary solution.

Moreover, in his work on the relations between social inequality and climate change, Adger (2003) argues that technological adaptations could even have inverse effects because of how it enhances social inequalities--through neglecting the poor. Adger (2003, p388) argues that poor households that live in high risk areas are often not taken into account when the infrastructure designed to reduce vulnerability is put in place, because of their already existing marginalisation. Consequently, the technological adaptation measures put in place, do not reach the marginalised people in society. Instead, Adger (2003, p400) suggests investing in

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social capital rather than relying on technological measures put in place by either governments or international organisations. In other words, Adger (2003) believes that it is better to enhance people’s capability to cope with climate change themselves instead of waiting for the government to build dykes or improve irrigation systems.

Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) argue that Adger’s problem is a result of a climate change discourse that portrays a unidirectional driver of migration and thereby often neglects the complexity of the situation. They outline that such narratives often use the term ‘climate refugees’ to describe the problem of climate-induced migration (Farbotko and Lazrus, 2012, p383). As mentioned earlier in this paper, labelling climate-induced migrants as ‘climate refugees’ focuses on a single factor, namely climate change, that drives people away from their homes. Besides misinterpreting the problem, it also triggers specific policy responses. This definition of ‘climate refugees’ leads to policies focusing on the prevention of migration without taking into account the welfare of the people involved and, therefore, it barely helps to diminish the pre-existing social inequalities (Hartmann, 2010, p235).

Moreover, according to Hartmann (2010, p236), labelling climate-induced migrants as ‘climate refugees’ falls under the notion of ‘crisis narratives’. These narratives, which often originate in the West, are used by both Western organisations to establish their presence and importance in vulnerable places as well as by sustainable development advocates to emphasise the environmental degradation issues (Hartmann, 2010, p239). Hartmann (2010, p236) argues that the ‘climate refugee’ narrative was partly invented to depoliticise the problem. By ignoring existing social inequalities and blaming only climate change as the cause of migration, states were able to work around the international political asylum rights, such as the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Saunders, 2000, p240). As a result, the existing social inequalities are not taken into account when climate-induced migrants are labelled as ‘climate refugees’.

Furthermore, Cernea (1997) has written an extensive work on the risks involved for involuntary population displacement. Cernea (1997, p1572) argues that before forced population displacement happens, there are eight forms of social hazards that have the potential to turn into impoverishment disasters if the displacement is not correctly executed. The eight social hazards are:

1) Landlessness 2) Joblessness 3) Homelessness 4) Marginalization

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5) Increased morbidity and mortality 6) Food insecurity

7) Loss of access to common property 8) Social disarticulation

To avoid the process of these social hazards becoming hard deprivation, the optimal response is to avoid the displacement in general. However, due to the inevitability of climate change, this might not always be possible. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that decision-makers are aware of these risks and implement policies that target every social hazard individually rather than one all-encompassing policy to reduce vulnerabilities (Cernea, 1997, p1577). Not only is this morally correct, but it might also be beneficial to regional and local economies. Cernea (1997, p1570) argues that we should look at social justice and planning with an equity compass in order to prevent lasting impoverishment and create situations in which vulnerability is reduced by mitigating these social hazards.

Vulnerability and Social Inequality

If we follow the aforementioned line of thought as set out by Adger (2003), it means that vulnerable populations are vulnerable because of a variety of factors—climate change being one of them—and solutions that solely focus on the effects of climate change will not be sufficient. In terms of the vulnerability framework outlined earlier in this chapter, O’Brien et al. (2007, p84) argue that the outcome-oriented interpretation of vulnerability leads to adaptation measures that are concerned with reducing sectoral sensitivities and implementing technological change. Although I am not arguing against the application of said measures, it is important to acknowledge that this approach neglects the broader context in which climate change affects vulnerable populations. Therefore, in the following section, I will take a contextual approach to vulnerability and outline how social inequality is linked to vulnerability in the existing literature.

Gaillard (2010, p220) argues that the degree of vulnerability is often linked to structural constraints imposed by external factors, such as unequal distribution of wealth and resources. In vulnerable communities, there is often a lack of social protection and limited solidarity networks (Gaillard, 2010, p222). This line of thought goes hand-in-hand with a contextual

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interpretation of vulnerability in which the root cause of someone or some group being vulnerable is an effect of social inequality. If we take a more scientific approach to vulnerability, the emphasis often lies in the natural disasters that impact vulnerable communities. However, when a history of inequality is not taken into account in the assessment of vulnerability, the adaptation measures that will arise from this are likely to ignore this inequality as well.

Douglas et al. (2008) use the same line of thought and argue that in big cities in low-lying countries, there is often a link between the level of income and living in high-risk areas. Through evidence collected from five African countries (Ghana,Uganda, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Kenya), they depict how low-income populations tend to live in areas that experience frequent severe flooding. This evidence is backed up by Adger et al. (2004, p72) who find that ‘poor people are more likely to live in hazard-prone locations such as unstable hill slopes and flood plains.’ This finding is taken from the ‘New Indicators of Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity’ Report by Adger et al. (2004). This Report contains an extensive list of factors that influence vulnerability in the context of climate change. Adger et al. (2004) test for 44 different factors, ranging from economic well-being to geographical and demographic factors. They find that the top 11 variables that have an effect on vulnerability can be divided in three different categories that are heavily affected by social inequality, namely health status, governance, and education (Adger et al., 2004, p92). Education in particular, has been thoroughly examined in the vulnerability literature.

Frankenberg et al. (2013) have conducted a study on the relations between education and the effect of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Sumatra, Indonesia. Their findings suggest that there was no link between climate-induced migration and the level of education after the tsunami. However, they did find a significant connection in the way people cope with a natural disaster depending on their level of education. People with higher educations had more access to resources to restore their livelihoods after the tsunami and speed up their recovery (Frankenberg et al., 2013, p15). A similar result is also found by Striessnig et al. (2013) who studied the effects of educational attainment on climate risk vulnerability. They argue that “education (and in particular female education) is the single most important social and economic factor associated with a reduction in vulnerability to natural disasters” (Striessnig et al., 2013, p21).

In their 2017 paper ‘Climate Change and Social Inequality’, Nazrul Islam and Winkel created an analytical framework that encompasses different effects of inequality on disadvantaged groups. They argue that multidimensional inequality leads to greater exposure

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to climate hazards, greater susceptibility to damages caused by climate hazards, and less ability to cope with and recover from the damages caused by climate hazards (Nazrul Islam and Winkel, 2017, p6). These three effects will in turn lead to disproportionate loss of assets and income, and increase inequality. Within this framework, inequality and vulnerability to climate change end up in a vicious circle, where social inequality increases climate change vulnerability and vice versa. It shows that simple mitigation measures are insufficient to break this cycle3. Instead, a more efficient way to eradicate social inequalities in order to break up

this vicious cycle and reduce vulnerability.

Methodology

In this chapter, I will outline the methodology used to answer the questions asked in the introduction of this thesis. This chapter is divided into two main parts: the first is data

3_{Here I assume that climate change will not disappear any time soon and is therefore not able to break up the}

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collection, and following that a diagnostic tool adapted from O’Brian et al. (2007). To assess the effect of the interpretation of vulnerability on social inequality in the climate-induced migration discourse, I use two case studies, namely the IPCC and the IOM. The contrast between these organisations, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, allows me to assess the differences and similarities between their approach towards vulnerability. In the second part of this chapter, I will outline the Diagnostic Tool used to identify the interpretation of vulnerability and briefly elaborate on all the subcategories used in this tool.

Case Study

A case study can be best described in the words of Gerring (2007, p65) as an “intensive study of a single case (or a small set of cases) with an aim to generalize across a larger set of cases of the same general type.” However, this leaves us with a rather broad definition and no guidelines for what a case is or should be. In his extensive work on social research methods, Alan Bryman (2012, p67) argues that the most common use of a case is when it is bounded as a location (e.g. community or organisation). These locations are often studied within a limited period of time, this can be at a single point in time or over a brief period. The reason why I have chosen the IPCC and the IOM for my research, is that their consistent output of reports can be systematically studied over time.

Another aspect of a case study is its external validity or generalisability. Although, one should not expect a case to be fully representative of the population studied, the case is supposed to be exemplifying the larger subject (Bryman, 2012, p69). Since both the IPCC and the IOM are prominent organisations in their respective fields, I believe that both organisations meet at least the basic requirements of generalisability to study the larger social phenomenon; namely the effect of the interpretation of vulnerability on social inequality in the climate-induced migration discourse.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

The IPCC is part of the larger network of the UN. Their main aim is to assess the science related to climate change in order to provide governments the necessary information to deal with the

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problem at hand. The Assessment Reports are a collection of the scientific papers that are published and provide as a summary of the current knowledge on climate change, including the drivers, the impacts, adaptation and mitigation measures, and future risks. The IPCC Assessment Reports (hereafter, AR) are published roughly every five years, starting in 1990. They consist of a summary of the latest scientific knowledge on climate change. Every AR consists of both a Scientific Report and an Impact Report. Depending on the year, different additional reports have been published, including the Response Strategies Report in 1990 or the Mitigation Report in 2007. In this thesis, I have chosen to disregard the Scientific Reports because of their irrelevance to my analysis. These reports are solely focussed on the hard science of climate change, and fail to paint a more all-encompassing discussion on climate-induced migration.

In terms of the debate on climate-induced migration, the IPCC has been on the forefront of warning government actors about the emergence of this phenomenon. In 1992, they already stated that the ‘greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration – with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption’ (IPCC, 1992b, p103). Since then, they continue to publish documents describing the growing phenomenon. The IPCC provides information that is relevant, but refrains from policy-prescriptive statements. As they are concerned with facts rather than political agendas, they make an interesting case study to review.

International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

The IOM is an inter-governmental organisation that helps to ensure the orderly and human management of migration. They aim to promote international cooperation on migration issues and help migrants in need, including refugees and internally displaced people. Therefore, they go beyond the limited scope of helping only refugees (as opposed to the UN 1951 Refugee Convention). However, in 2016, they joined forces with the UN and currently function as the ‘UN Migration Agency’. Yet, they remain broadly oriented on different aspects of migration, namely ‘migration and development’, ‘facilitating migration’, ‘regulating migration’, and ‘forced migration’. Climate-induced migration fits within this scope and they have been on the forefront of helping climate-induced migrants for years. Therefore, they are an ideal candidate to study their interpretation of vulnerability in the climate-induced migration discourse.

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Since 2000, they have been publishing an annual report, the World Migration Report, with the aim to contribute to an increased understanding of migration throughout the world. The early World Migration Reports (hereafter, WMR) were focussed around a theme that stood out that year, but over time, they have started to cover all aspects of migration. Climate-induced migration being one of the aspects covered extensively.

Data Collection

In order to get two cases that would represent organisations concerned with climate change and with migration, the method of purposive sampling has been used. This is a non-probability form of sampling that relies on the judgment of the researcher to choose a sample relevant to the research question (Bryman, 2012, p418). Because of the IPCC’s and IOM’s prominent position in the climate change and migration debate respectively, they qualify as a sufficient representation of these debates. The documents used for the analysis can be considered the main output by both organisations.

For the IPCC, the AR is their biggest publication and can therefore be considered as representative of the whole organisation. For the IOM, the data collection was slightly more complicated since they have an enormous output of documents ranging from specific reports on Libya to larger reports on youth migration. The WMR can be seen as an (almost) yearly publication that captures the general thought within the IOM. Therefore, only the WMR’s are assessed.

Most documents consist of over 1,000 pages, so a digital search was conducted in order to find the relevant sections. This gives the researcher the opportunity to systematically assess the documents. First, the table of contents was consulted to see whether a chapter was devoted to climate-induced migration. Second, within the IPCC documents, keywords such as

migration, migrants, refugee, and displacement in relation to climate, environment, or natural disaster. For the IOM documents, keywords included climate, environment, or natural disaster

in relation to migration, migrants, refugee, or displacement. Third, the sections that contained these keywords were judged on their usefulness by the context in which they were placed. Some sections were left out of the analysis for their limited discussion of climate-induced migration. Only sections in which there was significant information provided—to identify a clear discourse— was used.

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Reflection on Data

In this section, I will critically reflect on the data used for my research. Firstly, because the IPCC does not conduct their own research, the interpretations of vulnerability might have originated in external sources. However, this does not mean that the ARs do not reflect the discourse used by the IPCC. The AR is not merely a summary of external authors, but a collection of studies hand-picked by scientists working for the IPCC. Therefore, the ARs are still a sufficient indication of the overall rhetoric used in the discussion surrounding climate-induced migration by the IPCC.

Secondly, the IOM publishes not just the WMR, but also additional papers on climate change and climate-induced migration which are omitted from this research. The reason for this is that these climate-oriented reports lacked consistency over time. They were not published on an annual basis and were often based on a specific theme within climate-induced migration (e.g. migration from the Pacific). Therefore, it would have been too difficult to adjust every report for confounding variables.

Third, the documents analysed in this research do not align in terms of publication date. The IPCC started publishing the Assessment Reports in 1990 and have only published five reports so far, the last one being in 2014. Whereas, the IOM started in 2000 but has (almost) consistently published a new report every year. In my analysis, I have divided the IOM reports in four different time periods, the latest being 2018-2020. This is a time period that has not been covered at all by the IPCC since the Sixth AR will only be published by 2021. Therefore, the comparison might lack some internal validity between 1990 – 2000 and 2014 – 2020. However, this research is not solely focussed around this comparison. The aim of this research is to analyse the climate-induced migration discourse within two organisations. Organisations that deal with the same phenomenon, but have different aims and approaches to dealing with climate-induced migration.

Fourth, in 2016, the IOM joined forces with the UN and became known as the ‘UN Migration Agency’. This might have changed their view on certain issues since the UN runs a much broader political agenda on its own. Although It is beyond the scope of this paper, it could be interesting to assess the alignment between the IPCC’s and the IOM’s view on climate-induced migration before and after 2016--as both organisations are part of the UN now.

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Lastly, by using a simple, but extensive digital search, most sections on climate-induced migration are found. However, there might still be certain sentences or sections that have not been found. I believe that this does not significantly affect the quality of this research.

Diagnostic Tool

In order to systematically assess the data collected from the IPCC Assessment Reports and the IOM World Migration Reports, I have adapted a Diagnostic Tool from O’Brien et al. (2007, p79). This tool was designed to identify the interpretation of vulnerability in climate change-related vulnerability studies. Moreover, this tool was used to illustrate what consequences the different interpretations might have in real-life scenarios. Therefore, its overall aim is to provide an explanation on why different interpretations of vulnerability matter.

This Diagnostic Tool, as presented in Figure 2, identifies certain aspects in the discussion surrounding climate-induced migration and categorises these aspects within either outcome vulnerability, contextual vulnerability or both. Therefore, it functions as a tool to analyse how climate-induced migrants are framed in terms of their vulnerability to climate change. In the following sections, I will elaborate on this tool by briefly describing all subcategories that are used to identify the interpretation of vulnerability.

Vulnerability interpretation Category Outcome Vulnerability Both Contextual Vulnerability Focal Points Future

Climate-Induced Migration

Multiple Stressors Current Climate Variability

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Livelihood and Coping Strategies Identified Results Measurable Gains or

Losses

Relative Winners and Losers

Sectoral Impacts Institutional and

Socio-economic Constraints to Local Responses

Inappropriate Practices

Policy Responses Reduce Sectoral Sensitivities

Capacity Building Address Local Constraints to Response Technological Adaptations Adaptive Management Reduce Inequities Reduce GHG Emissions Address Power Structures

Figure 2: Adapted from O'Brien et al. (2007, p79)

Focal Points

Sectoral Sensitivities:

A good example of a study on sectoral sensitivities would be the assessment of the vulnerability of specific agricultural yields to climate change in 2050 (Lal et al., 1998). Studies on sectoral sensitivities will focus on the impact of climate change on a specific subject, such as agricultural yields in the aforementioned example. These studies often first assess the sectoral sensitivity using a scientific framing and mathematical methods, before analysing the degree of vulnerability created by climate change. Therefore, they tend to have a more outcome-oriented interpretation of vulnerability (since they view climate change as their end point, rather than the starting).

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Future Climate-Induced Migration:

Studies that use the future of climate-induced migration as the focal point, such as the aforementioned Lal et al. (1998) study on the assessment of vulnerability of agricultural yields to climate change in 2050, are also more likely to use outcome vulnerability since they are trying to predict the future impact of climate change. Both these categories (sectoral sensitivities and future climate-induced migration) often arise from a biophysical discourse in which they would approach climate change as a scientific issue and measure the outcome of climate change on any particular exposure unit (O’Brien et al., 2007, p77).

Multiple Stressors:

Studies that map vulnerability to multiple stressors are used to analyse a variety of influences, alongside climate change, on the degree of vulnerability. For example, one can study vulnerability in the context of both climate change and globalisation (O’Brien et al., 2004). An extensive paper on the methodology of identifying the relative distribution of the effect of multiple stressors on vulnerability in the context of climate can be found in O’Brien et al. (2004). Because of their ability to analyse multiple stressors, that are either outcome- or contextually-oriented, studies of this sort are often linked to both interpretations of vulnerability (O’Brien et al., 2007, p79).

Institutions:

An institutional approach would use institutions as the main focal point to address vulnerability. This could be, for example, a study on policy reforms to offset negative impacts related to climate change or a study on the effect of water privatisation on the ability within vulnerability communities to adapt (O’Brien et al., 2007, p79). Therefore, both interpretations of vulnerability can be found in such studies depending on the institution.

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Current Climate Variability:

Studies that focus on current climate variability are often interested in the coping mechanisms and the livelihood of people affected by the climate variability caused by climate change (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76). They are often linked to case studies since they allow a more in-depth analysis to grasp the entire context of the situation. An example of such a study would be the assessment of adaptation possibilities of rain-fed farming systems in sub-Saharan Africa— considering the imminent threat of increased rainfall variability (Cooper et al., 2008).

Political Economy (Social Capital, Entitlements):

If studies have political economy as their focal point, they often interpret vulnerability in a contextual manner. Research, such as Adger and Kelly’s (1999) paper on social vulnerability of the people in coastal Vietnam to climate change, analyses political economy factors that play a role in the construction of vulnerability. They are often concerned with the political and economic constraints in climate adaptation (O’Brien et al., 2007, p79). For example, if a certain group in society is heavily affected by climate change but lacks the resources to cope with the situation because they are not entitled to these resources, the degree of vulnerability is influenced by certain man-made (political, economic, or social) constraints.

Livelihood and Coping Strategies:

Livelihood and coping strategies in relation to vulnerability are often linked to the contextual interpretation because of their ‘starting-point’ approach. They often answer questions on why some regions or social groups are more affected than others (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). They study the possible adaptation options of certain groups in society affected by climate change. An example of this would be a study that assesses the change in livelihood and the possible coping strategies of farmers in the aforementioned situation in sub-Saharan Africa (Cooper et al., 2008).

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Identified Results

Measurable Gains or Losses:

Measurable gains or losses often answer questions on which sectors are negatively impacted by climate change. Such answers are often a product of mathematical models in which the negative outcome of climate change on any particular exposure unit is measured. The methods used to get these results can be, for example, dose-response models or integrated assessment models in which outcomes of climate change, such as rising sea-levels or temperature change are used as the variable that impacts the object of the study (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). The degree of vulnerability is only used in order to analyse the total net impact of climate change. Therefore, research that shows measurable gains or losses as an identified result is linked to the outcome interpretation of vulnerability.

Sectoral Impacts:

Similar to measurable gains or losses, results in the form of sectoral impacts often answer the question: ‘which sectors are likely to be negatively affected by climate change?’ (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). They are frequently outcome-oriented and tell the researcher where and how climate change would have an impact. For example, the aforementioned study from Lal et al. (1998, p112) identified that an increase in CO2 would contribute positively to rice and wheat production in NW India, but would also negatively impact the water security causing overall negative effects of climate change on said production. They measured the outcome of climate change on a particular exposure unit. Therefore, they are linked to outcome-vulnerability.

Inappropriate Practices:

Inappropriate practices are often found after one reviews certain adaptation measures or policies. One might find that the irrigation system of farmland has been highly inefficient and even working against the aim of conserving as much water as possible. In their study on why climate change is a problem for Mozambique, the Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA, 2000) identifies certain inappropriate practices dealing with the coastal

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erosion and salt water intrusion. These practices are often identified through measurements in a scientific framing of climate change. They focus on the measurable effects of climate change and are therefore more in line with the outcome-oriented interpretation of vulnerability.

Institutional and Socio-Economic Constraints to Local Responses:

Institutional and socio-economic constraints to local responses result from studies that try to look for why some regions and social groups are affected more than others (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). They show the factors in play that prevent certain coping mechanisms to take place. These results are often contextual and, therefore, have a similar interpretation of vulnerability. However, O’Brien et al. (2007, p80) argue that institutional and socio-economic constraints to local responses might also be found in some outcome-oriented vulnerability studies in relation to specific sectoral adaptations.

Relative Winners and Losers:

Relative winners and losers give answer to the question: ‘why some regions and social groups are more affected than others’ (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). They reveal why similar numbers attached to the biophysical impact of climate change can be interpreted differently and affect certain regions and social groups in different ways. This all depends on the context of the object of study. Therefore, they are placed within the contextual interpretation of vulnerability.

Policy Responses

Reduce Sectoral Sensitivities:

These responses are often suggested in outcome-oriented studies. They suggest certain adaptation measures after having analysed the sectoral impacts of climate change. The aforementioned Lal et al. (1998) study would be a good example of reducing sectoral

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sensitivities as a policy response, since it suggests room for improvement. They are often related to studies that have sectoral sensitivities and future climate change as their focal points.

Technological Adaptations:

Technological adaptations are also a result of studies concerned with outcome-vulnerability. They suggest new ways of reducing, for example, sectoral sensitivities and are frequently used in the scientific framing of climate change. These policies are often only a response to scientific aspects of climate change such as a rise in sea-level or increasing temperatures. For example, in the aforementioned outcome-oriented MICOA (2000) study, policy responses such as increasing efficiency of water use to increase water security are suggested to solve sectoral sensitivities.

Reduce GHG Emissions:

This policy is often a response to the conclusion that greenhouse gas emissions lead to dangerous interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 1992, p4). This is in line with the scientific framing of climate change in which the emphasis lies on GCM’s. Vulnerability is framed as a negative outcome of greenhouse gas emissions and a reduction in these emissions would positively impact vulnerable sectors or groups in society (O’Brien et al., 2007, p76).

Capacity Building:

Capacity building is often a policy to respond to multiple stressors and secure livelihoods (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80). Therefore, as mentioned earlier in the descriptions above, they occur in both outcome- and contextual-oriented vulnerability studies. They suggest policies focusing on the development of individuals or organisations to cope with certain aspects of climate change. For example, they might strengthen the capacity to incorporate technological

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adaptations or they strengthen the ability to respond to contextual stressors and secure livelihoods (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80).

Adaptive Management:

This policy response is a combination of local and scientific ecological knowledge in the co-management of resources and ecosystems (Olsson and Folke, 2001, p86). An example would be Olsson and Folke’s (2001) research in which they study the influence of local ecological knowledge and associated management practices in the institutions concerned with crayfish management in Sweden. Both outcome- and contextual-vulnerability are apparent in this study and both are needed to analyse the complex dynamics of nature and institutions.

Address Local Constraints to Response:

Addressing local constraints that prevent certain policy responses often take a contextual approach to climate-induced migration. Kelly and Adger (2000, p332) argue that such responses of defining the key characteristics of the threat and identifying geophysical constraints result from a contextual view on vulnerability. These constraints are not limited to only geophysical constraints, but can appear in many forms, such as a lack of institutions or social structures that enable people to migrate. However, similar to institutional and socio-economic constraints, these policy responses might also have an outcome-oriented approach (O’Brien et al., 2007, p80).

Reduce Inequities:

Policy proposals that aim to reduce inequities are the result of a contextual analysis since they take into account more than just the biophysical impact of climate change when assessing vulnerability. Therefore, reducing inequities is per definition a contextual-oriented policy response. An example could be reducing inequity in the way certain groups in society are entitled to partake in the local economy and others are not (O’Brien et al., 2007, p83).

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Address Power Structures:

According to Nightingale (2017), the socio-natural character of vulnerability should be addressed more frequently. More research is needed on how people seek to gain access to and control over change resources (Nightingale, 2017, p11). For example, if a marginalised group cannot partake in the local economy, and therefore miss out on possible adaptation measures, there are certain power structures in place that create this inequity. Therefore, addressing existing power structures is often a result of a contextual analysis of vulnerability.

Analysis

In this chapter, I will analyse the interpretation of vulnerability in the AR’s from the IPCC (1990 – 2014) and the WMR of the IOM (2000 – 2020). I will do so by outlining quotes found in these documents, in particular, in sections where climate change was discussed in relation to migration and vice versa. These quotes function as a representation of the discourse used by the two organisations.

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IPCC Analysis

The IPCC analysis is divided in five chapters, covering the five AR’s. In the First AR, climate-induced migration was a rather new phenomenon, but the IPCC was already aware of the gravity of the situation. They incorporate both interpretations in this AR by focussing on sectoral sensitivities (IPCC, 1990a, p5-9), but also local constraints that prevent certain adaptation measures from succeeding (IPCC 1990a, p5-11). In contrast, the Second AR shifts its focus to a more outcome-oriented interpretation of vulnerability by omitting most contextual factors as drivers of migration.

In the Third AR, the topic of climate-induced migration is barely mentioned throughout the report. Nonetheless, from the sections that did address this phenomenon, both interpretations of vulnerability could be identified. This integrative approach disappears in the Fourth AR, in which the IPCC devotes substantial attention to the problem at hand while using a more contextual approach to vulnerability.

It is the Fifth AR that really stands out in terms of its attention to climate-induced migration. There are extensive sections discussing relevant aspects including causes of migration (IPCC, 2014a, p767; 2014b, p1175) or possible policy responses (IPCC, 2014a, p767; 2014b, p1238). In terms of their interpretation of vulnerability, the Fifth AR takes a clear integrative approach by acknowledging both the biophysical aspects of climate-induced migration and the institutional and socio-economic constraints that affect adaptation measures.

Discovering Climate-Induced Migration

The IPCC’s First AR is widely seen as one of the pioneering reports, which foresaw the extent to which climate-induced migration would affect our everyday lives (IOM 2009; Marino 2012; Bettini 2013). Back in 1990, climate change was a relatively new phenomenon, so naturally there was very limited conversation around the indirect consequences, such as climate-induced migration. Yet, the IPCC already predicted that climate change held the potential to result in migration. This is evidenced by the following quote:

The Role of Vulnerability and Social Inequality in Climate-Induced Migration: a Case Study of the IPCC and the IOM