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Universiteit Leiden – Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs.

MSc Crisis and Security Management.

Master Thesis.

Fractal Theory and the Time invariants of a crisis; a case study approach.

Student: Hannah Wren

Student Number: s1826557

Supervisor: Wout Broekema

Second Reader: Ruth Prins

Date of Admission: 09/01/2018

Word Count (Excluding Bibliography, Appendix and Front pages): 19,964

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Wout Broekema, for guiding me and all the support

provided throughout this thesis writing process.

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Contents

Chapter

Page

Introduction

4

Theoretical Framework

9

Methodology

20

Analysis

33

Summary of findings

48

Conclusion

50

Bibliography and sources used

53

Appendix

60

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Introduction.

With the nature and frequency of crises constantly changing, crisis management needs

to adapt to deal with the new challenges that are presented. ‘Best practices’ have been created

and used over the recent years to react to the outcome of crises (Fink 1986; Ten Berge 1990).

However, these practices no longer hold true, “the need for a decisive breakthrough appears

crucial in the present world, where crisis is no longer the marginal but the core engine”

(Topper and Lagadec 2013: 5). “Crises are our new reality. ‘Black Swans’ are increasingly

becoming our norm” (Topper and Lagadec 2012: 21). The need for a change in perspective

and attitude to crisis management has become evident. Modern crises do not limit themselves

to a specific category or area of policy but encompass many aspects, to create “Unforeseen

mega-threats” (Boin 2004: 166). With the changing nature of crisis management, a

fundamental aspect from traditional crisis management remains “our planet has become ‘a

world at risk’” (Rosenthal, Charles and T’Hart 1989: 3).

The problem that this research aims to tackle, is that of how best to respond to crises

and to determine whether there are any aspects of crisis response that repeat. This would

enable a better prepared, structured response when a crisis does strike. This research will be

an explorative study to determine whether there are repeating patterns of actions in Time

(Fractals) that appear in all of the nine cases that have been selected across the three crisis

types; Man-made, Natural and Technical Failure. Topper and Lagadec (2013) are the first

academics to apply the notion of fractals to crisis management. They are key pioneers for

Fractal theory and therefore their previous research is the main foundation for this research.

Fractal theory is relatively new in its application to crisis management. Therefore,

there is opportunity to utilise the ideas and notions suggested by Topper and Lagadec (2013)

to determine its relevance and usability within crisis management. Topper and Lagadec

(2013) are the first crisis management theorists to implement or suggest this shift in

perspective to one of fractals within crises. Consequently, this is the first time Fractal theory

has been used within Crisis and Security Management. No other academics have applied or

utilised fractals and Fractal theory within the field of crisis management, therefore this

research focuses solely on Topper and Lagadec’s (2013) theory. Topper and Lagadec (2013)

aim to “initiate new thinking, innovative perspectives for the field of crises” (Topper and

Lagadec 2013: 10). The overall goal being to “renew crisis management theory” (Topper and

Lagadec 2013: 10). With crises becoming increasingly complex, the need to adapt and

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change crisis management theory from its traditional setting to a more current application is

required. The use of fractals outside of a mathematical or economic context is relatively rare,

even more so within crisis management. Therefore, this use of fractals by Topper and

Lagadec (2013) to underpin a crisis management theory, provides a new opportunity to

research and better understand the structure of crisis response. Fractals are not commonly

known outside the sphere of mathematics and economics, so it is important to have a clear

understanding of what a fractal is prior to the research commencing. Fractals are repeating

patterns that increase and decrease in size and are identical no matter the size. Fractals can be

defined as

“A curve or geometrical figure, each part of which has the same statistical character

as the whole. They are useful in modelling structures (such as snowflakes) in which

similar patterns recur at progressively smaller scales, and in describing partly random

or chaotic phenomena such as crystal growth and galaxy formation” (Oxford English

Dictionary 2017).

Topper and Lagadec (2013) utilise this notion of identical repetition and apply it to

crisis response and crisis management. Within their Fractal theory there are four main

invariants/aspects which are highlighted as key features that are prevalent in all crises and at

all levels/scales of the crisis response. These are Space, Time, Rank and Sense-making. Due

to the limited conceptualisation provided by Topper and Lagadec (2013), this research will

only focus on one of these invariants: Time. This is to increase the feasibility within the time

frame permitted for this research, whilst also including the most amount of aspects from

Topper and Lagadec’s (2013) theory framework. This enables a more structured and accurate

examination of time within crisis management. Once this structure is created it can be

applied to future research into the other three invariants. Limiting the research to the study of

Time also increases the detail in which Time can be analysed as an invariant within multiple

case studies, increasing the opportunity to determine the legitimacy of the Fractal theory

within differing types of crises. Time has been isolated within this research as the invariant to

be analysed as it is a physical construct which is measurable. Similarly, Time is easier to

conceptualise than Space, Rank and Sense-making enabling the process of creating a

structure with which to analyse the invariants less complex. In future research the structure of

this research will be applicable to the remaining invariants. Equally Time will be less

complex in identifying repeating patterns, which will increase the validity of the research as

the components will be more visible within the case studies. This use of just one invariant

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analysed in depth “allows for more powerful tests to establish generic mapping of crisis”

(Topper and Lagadec 2013: 12) which creates a structure for the three other invariants to be

analysed against.

The scientific relevance of this research has its foundation in the limited use of Fractal

theory in any prior crisis management research. Fractal theory has not been applied to crisis

situations in a real context before. There are numerous reasons for this not being applied

before with the main one being the vagueness of the terms provided by Topper and Lagadec

(2013). This will be remedied by applying specific interpretation, with clear and explained

definitions, determined prior to advancing further into the research. The research will seek to

add to the theoretical debate surrounding crisis response, especially regarding the similarities

between crises and crisis response. This research will be academically relevant as it will

increase the knowledge surrounding crisis management and add to the understanding of

fractal theory when hindsight is applied to crisis situations. As traditional crisis management

is becoming less applicable, and the nature of crises is changing, a more modern method of

crisis management is needed. As Fractal theory was only applied to crisis management in

2013 the theory is relatively new. This research will increase the understanding of Fractal

theory and its practical applications in a crisis setting. Topper and Lagadec (2013) go so far

as to acknowledge the shortcomings in their theory “we are only at the beginning of the

intellectual brainstorming required by the age of mega crises” (Topper and Lagadec 2013:

15). Therefore, it is important to proceed with caution due to the limited availability of

further information on Fractal theory. This increases the importance, value and academic

relevance of this research. Topper and Lagadec (2013) even call for further research into

fractal theory within their own research; “on the research agenda, we will modestly plead for

launching research projects” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 15). Creating an understanding of

the Time fractals within crisis response will be scientifically relevant, as it will contribute to

filling the knowledge gaps surrounding patterns within crisis response and the best course of

action that is required to achieve the most effective outcome of crisis response. This research

is in response to Topper and Lagadec (2013), adding data to the niche gap within crisis

management, and increasing the applicability of Fractal theory in practical crisis situations

and analysis. This new perspective on crisis management provided by Topper and Lagadec

(2013) will potentially provide different and creative ways to respond to crises.

With new types of crises on the rise and the prevalence of transboundary crises on the

increase, a form of managing new types of crisis can improve and adapt management of

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future crises. The research will be socially relevant as it will highlight new ways of

understanding crisis response and may impact the practical aspects of crisis management,

including preparedness. Understanding common occurrences during a crisis will increase the

practical aspects which can be put into procedure, response and recovery. “In crisis situations

decision makers have great difficulty in redefining the situation and thus tend to stick to a

dominant course of action” (Rosenthal, Charles, T’Hart, Kouzmin and Jarman 1989: 467).

As the nature of crises change so do the needs and skills of responders; “We must visit the

new frontiers with confidence, improve our intelligence about them and acquire brand new

skills – vision and an entire strategy logic. In order to remain actor of our particularly

turbulent period of history.” (Lagadec 2006: 507). Therefore, increasing the understandings

of the patterns and invariants within a crisis can change the options and actions of responders

and decision makers. This research will challenge the norms and supply a new perspective in

crisis response. The exploration of the Time fractals within a crisis will improve the

understanding of the structure of crisis response, which can potentially impact policy strategy

and preparation for the planning crisis response.

This research aims to apply the Fractal theory put forth by Topper and Lagadec

(2013) to case studies, to determine the Time aspects of the crises that have remained

constant at all levels of the response and recovery. The cases used in this research will be

grouped into Man-made, Natural and Technical Failures. Within these groups three of each

type of crisis will be analysed. All the cases selected occurred during or after 2000, which fits

with the ideology of Topper and Lagadec (2013). Modern crises need a modern crisis

response and management style. As all the crises occurred within the last 18 years, relevant

documents are easily accessible. All the crises occurred in developed countries, which

increases the validity of the results for developed countries. Further research will be needed

to determine the validity within less developed countries. All the cases occurred within

countries which have the means and economy to provide an acceptable crisis response, and

provide investigations and reports following the crisis. They also cover a wide variety of

cases within each type category allowing for an increased validity in the finding as the range

of crises is greater. Similarly, as the cases are from four different continents the results should

provide a clear example of whether fractals are an integral part of crisis response for crises in

developed countries. As the nine cases are from a variety of countries, the culture of crisis

management and how the crisis is responded to will be different. Using cases from different

countries mitigates the potential for culture as being the driving factor in fractals rather than a

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universal fractal within crisis management. The cases selected cover a wide selection of

crisis events within each typology of crisis. Therefore, this spread of cases provides a

variation in responses needed for each case, enabling a more accurate determination of the

applicability of Fractal theory on all crises. All the crises have high quality and reliable

documents to support the research and uphold the integrity of the research. Alongside this, all

the documents are easily accessible and in English, increasing the feasibility of the research.

This provides a better chance of understanding the role and impact of fractal theory in crisis

situations and its applicability to differing type of crises.

The research question that this research aim to answer is: To what extent do different

types of crises, individually and collectively, demonstrate Topper and Lagadec’s (2013)

Fractal theory, specifically with reference to the concept of Time?

The research will seek to understand the Time invariants of the crisis from a Local,

Regional and National viewpoint based on Topper and Lagadec’s (2013) Fractal theory. The

emphasis will be on the Time invariant of each crisis case study. Therefore, the research

question is supplemented with 2 guiding sub questions:

- What are the types of crises (Man-made, Natural and Technical Failure)?

- What are the Time invariants/fractals present in the crisis?

These sub questions will contribute to the research question and will increase the clarity of

the results. The sub questions will be applied to increase the understanding of fractal theory

and enable the Time invariant to be clearly isolated within the crises. Similarly, the sub

questions provide a background of information which will support the main research

question.

In the coming chapter, the theoretical framework and background for Fractal Theory

(Topper and Lagadec 2013) will be discussed, alongside a detailed systematic breakdown of

crisis management and crisis response. After starting with the broad context of traditional

crisis management, the following theoretical aspect will be discussed; types of crises, fractals,

response levels and invariants. This is followed by the methodology which will be used to

analyse and observe Fractal theory in crisis situations. The analysis will follow, including a

brief background to each case, explaining what occurred in the immediate aftermath of the

crisis event. The analysis will detail the Time invariants within each crisis response and a

discussion of the findings and concluding remarks.

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Theoretical Framework.

Crises are times of instability and vulnerability where actions and responses are often

necessary (Devlin 2007). Crises are difficult to define with many definitions provided, and

covering a range of different situations. They can be defined as “sudden, unexpected,

surprising and unpredictable” (Roux-Dufort 2007: 107). Roux-Dufort and Lalonde (2013)

describe crises from a psychological perspective of the individuals involved: a “crisis is seen

as a discontinuity from a previous dismantling equilibrium to another emerging one”

(Roux-Dufort and Lalonde 2013: 2). This is a vague definition and can be applied to many

situations. Whereas Topper and Lagadec (2013) describe a crisis as a “wild and maverick

reality, impossible to understand and grasp within frameworks shaped, built and stamped to

contain stable and repeated phenomena” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 8). This understanding

of crises as an unexplainable singularity highlights the randomness and unpredictability of

crises. Current crisis theories focus on response strategies and the situations surrounding

crises with a top down command and control perspective of communication (Moynihan

2009). A top down approach to crisis management can be problematic due to lack of ground

level understanding in relation to the situation and the actions that are necessary, a new

perspective is needed to improve crisis response. Topper and Lagadec (2013) argue that the

current paradigms within crisis management are no longer adequate in creating understanding

of and theoretical frameworks for crisis management. “Crisis management cannot be a series

of fixed, easy to teach and apply ‘best practices’” (Topper and Lagadec 2012: 22). The use of

‘best practices’ has become a common tool in analysing and responding to crises (Topper and

Lagadec 2012). The nature of crises and crisis response is changing, which impacts the policy

process and emergency response in dealing with crisis management (Boin 2009). “Crisis

operations are multiorganizational, transjurisdictional, polycentric response networks. They

demand lateral coordination, not top-down command and control” (Boin and T’Hart 2003:

547). This lack of structure to crisis response is a contributing factor to how successful or

unsuccessful a crisis response is managed. Also, the locations of crises are becoming

increasing international and across multiple borders and effecting people from different

countries to that of the epicentre of the crisis (Boin 2009). As globalisation has increased the

mobility of individuals, the international impact of crises is becoming more prevalent. The

more traditional ways of crisis management may no longer be applicable to a multinational

crisis, and therefore “Development and management of past crises may have limited value for

improving the management of tomorrow’s crises” (Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001: vii) as

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the nature of crises have changed. It is important to find and use new techniques for

managing crises. Boin and McConnel (2007) argue “the established ways of organising for

critical decision making will not suffice in the case of a catastrophic breakdown” (Boin and

McConnell 2007: 50) therefore a paradigm shift in crisis management theory needs to occur.

Traditional Crisis Management.

Traditional crisis management falls under the sphere of disaster sociology, with the

aim of conceptualising ‘disaster’ (Quarantelli 1998). Whilst a singular concept of disasters is

problematic there are characteristics which equate to a disaster; “core conceptual elements of

threat, urgency and uncertainty” (Boin 2009: 368). A traditional definition of a crisis is “a

serious threat to the basic structure or the fundamental values and norms of a social system.

Which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making critical

decisions” (Rosenthal et al. 1989: 10). The inclusion of norms and values under threat has

become less obvious in more recent crisis management theories and definitions. Tierney

(2007) argues that disaster sociology originated from a realist perspective and that “disasters

represent the juxtaposition of physical agents (earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, industrial

accidents) with vulnerable places and populations” (Tierney 2007: 506). This is a basic

definition of crises and is quite limiting in factors that both cause and are affected by crises.

Similarly, “Crises were viewed in functional terms as facilitators of long awaited change;

crisis management was interpreted as a mechanism towards the restoration of normalcy”

(Rosenthal, Boin and Comfort 2001: 5). Crises within traditional crisis management are

perceived as abnormal and unique events that disrupted the normality of everyday life. Also,

crises were “easily demarcated in time and space, and if necessary, easy to hide from the

outside world” (Rosenthal et al. 2001: 5). In a world where there was limited international

fall out from crises, limits were placed on the spread of damage caused. As the world has

become more globalised and internationally interdependent, shifts in crisis management and

paradigms of crises has had to adapt. A change in the paradigms surrounding disasters and

crises can be described as a change in consequences; “threat agents will look familiar (E.G.

natural forces, violence, and technological failure), but the consequences play out very

differently” (Boin 2009: 367). Crises have become increasingly transboundary, which brings

about new challenges. Transboundary crises extend beyond geographical borders, “jump

functional boundaries … from one sector to another ... transcend traditional time boundaries”

(Boin 2009: 368). Rosenthal et al. (1989) argue that the role of crisis management is

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7). Whilst crises are now increasingly transboundary (Boin 2009), the notion of a changing

nature within crisis management can be seen in the description of a ‘modern’ crisis portrayed

by Rosenthal et al. (1989). A ‘modern’ crisis is an event “where the action of one country can

have a dramatic impact on the populations outside the contiguous borders of a singular

nation” (Rosenthal et al. 1989: 3). The definition of a crisis has changed and adapted from a

traditional crisis management perspective to one that is more open and with a lesser focus on

the social impacts and more towards the international and physical impacts.

With crises on the increase, new methods of management are key. “Crises are no time

to reorganize adequately operating response systems, much less try to implement wholesale

organizational changes” (Van Wart and Kapucu 2011: 509). However, we can learn from

crises and implement the lessons during the response to the next crisis. Furthermore, crises

are perceived as abnormal, even though they actively shape and dictate our daily lives. A new

approach to crisis management is necessary, one that considers the constant similarities and

non-varying aspects of a crisis (Topper and Lagadec 2012). “In a world where complexity

and crises have become so dramatic and so frequent that they cannot be excluded as simply

marginal” (Topper and Lagadec 2012: 23) it is now important for crises to be treated as the

norm to identify features that do not vary so that they can be prepared for and counter actions

planned. The actions and aspects related to responding to crises can be transferable, with

aspects of crises remaining the same or at least somewhat similar (Othman and Beydoun

2010). These similar, repeating and non-varying aspects can be called invariants. Invariants

are aspects which do not change, “what is invariant from one state to the other and what can

be undertaken to better prepare and manage upcoming crises” (Topper and Lagadec 2013:

11). The search for invariants involves looking for and identifying “elements that are

common in different crisis events, it also means being able to understand what remains

unchanged” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 11).

Types of crisis.

Applying typologies and classifications to crises can be seen as attempting to maintain

a measure of control over the situation through the ability to identify the threat (Gundel

2005). Traditional crisis management provides two typologies of man-made and natural

(Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993). These distinctions are quite basic in their definitions and

assumptions of the crisis. Separating all crises into just two categories is quite limiting. In

contrast, if too many distinctions are made between types of crises the outcome is somewhat

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abstract and can overcomplicate crisis management (Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993). The use

of common characteristics and features to categorise crises provides a useful framework in

separating and determining types of crises (Gundel 2005). Gundel (2005) suggests four

categories of crises all of which are centred around the notion of predictability and

influences; unexpected, intractable, fundamental and conventional. Whilst these

characteristics can help identify aspects of a crisis, they are subjective and can

overcomplicate the identification and organisation of crisis types. Similarly, Rosenthal et al.

(1989) argue that the type casting of crises is dependent on three aspects; crisis creation,

crisis preparation and crisis aggravation, which ultimately leads to six categories of crisis:

unimaginable, neglected, unavoidable, compulsive, wanted and wilful. These offerings of

grouping and categorisation are all highly subjective with limited clarity. The vagueness

surrounding these groupings do not provide much clarity, increasing the difficulty in

determining crisis type. Therefore, these categories will be used to further the understanding

surrounding crises but not used further within this research as a more practical determination

of crisis type is necessary. Lauras, Truptil and Bénaben (2015) take a different perspective on

crisis categorisation; providing four categories of crises; “by nature, by hazard event, by

speed of action or by intensity” (Lauras et al. 2015: 693). Whilst these categorisations are

clearer than the previously mentioned division, there is still a need for a more concrete form

of categorisation. Therefore, a closer examination of man-made and natural crises is

important.

“Traditionally, the two types of disaster have been (1) natural, i.e. an act of God and

(2) man-made” (Weisæth, Knudsen, and Tønnessen 2002: 34). Man-made crises can be

defined as “the result of a failure of human hand or in human made products” (Weisæth,

Knudsen, and Tønnessen 2002: 34). Park (2011) loosely describes Man-made disasters as

involving “human factors such as poor judgment, poor working condition, poor maintenance

of equipment and/or the negligence of the operators” (Park 2011: 466). From these

definitions man-made crises can be considered as; an event whereby human influence has

caused, or not prevented failure or damage. Contrastingly, Natural disasters are considered as

“unavoidable and to a large extent beyond human control.” (Weisæth, Knudsen, and

Tønnessen 2002: 34). The notion of beyond our control for natural disasters is an important

characteristic of natural disasters (Park 2011). Another definition is supplied by Alexander

(1993) a “rapid, instantaneous or profound impact of the natural environment upon

socio-economic system” (Alexander 1993: 4). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red

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crescent (2017a) societies provides the most practical, clear and concise definition of a

natural disaster; “Natural hazards are naturally occurring physical phenomena caused either

by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical, Hydrological, climatological,

meteorological or biological” (IFRC 2017a). As this definition has the most clarity and

conceptual provision, it will be the working definition for this research.

It can be argued that a third form of crises is increasing in prevalence, which is

Technical Failure as a disaster. “Technological hazards arise from various components of

transportation, infrastructure, industry, and building/structures” (Coppola 2007: 32). As

technology increases, adapts and improves the scope and scale of crises involving technology

is likely to increase (Coppola 2007). The International Federation of The Red Cross and Red

Crescent societies links technological and man-made disasters as synonymous, providing the

following characteristics; “complex emergencies/conflicts, Famine, displaced populations,

industrial accidents and transport accidents” (IFRC 2017a). Whilst this pairing by the IFRC

appears logical there is still a distinction between man-made and technological failures with

regards to typing crises. Technological Failures are somewhat preventable in comparison to

Man-made and Natural crises, as protocol and planning should be in place for the prevention

and protection against such events occurring. The United Nations (UN) has a role in

International unity, includes three forms of crises within their rhetoric; natural, Man-made

and technological. Whilst defining a disaster as a

“combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that are

present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the potential

negative consequences. Disaster impacts may include loss of life, injury, disease and

other negative effects on human physical, mental and social well-being, together with

damage to property, destruction of assets, loss of services, social and economic

disruption and environmental degradation” (United Nations 2012: 9).

The UN as a leading international organisation, supplies a definition which is applicable to

each country that the cases originate in, as they are all members of the UN. Similar arguments

for these three types of crises (Man-made, Natural and Technical Failure) are mentioned

within other scholarly literature. Therefore, the three main forms of crisis that are most

prevalent in the practical application of crisis management and in crisis management

literature are; Man-made, Natural and Technological Failure. Hence, these forms of crises

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will be the foundation for determining the types of crises which will be used within this

research.

Fractal theory.

For an understanding of fractal theory in the context of crisis management it is

important to understand the origin of fractals. Fractals are a mathematical principle

discovered by Benoit Mandelbrot through his work exploring economic market prediction

and price variation (Mandelbrot 1963). Fractals when defined simply are;

“A never-ending pattern. Fractals are infinitely complex patterns that are self-similar

across different scales. They are created by repeating a simple process over and over

in an ongoing feedback loop … Fractal patterns are extremely familiar, since nature is

full of fractals. For instance: trees, rivers, coastlines, mountains, clouds, seashells,

hurricanes.” (Fractal Foundation 2017).

“Fractals such as the Mandelbrot set are commonly associated with the study of complexity”

(The Economist 2003). Be it in art, finance, science, mathematics or engineering, Fractals are

universally present (The Economist 2003). Fractals are more commonly known through their

use in economics, whereby Mandelbrot noticed similarities between differing price charts and

market fluctuations (Mandelbrot 1997). This understanding of price changes, enabled

Mandelbrot to determine repeating patterns and create a level of knowledge surrounding

predictions for the future financial market. Fixed points within the financial market and the

use of scaling are key features of fractals within the economic sphere (Mandelbrot 1999).

To understand fractals, it is important to first understand the principles upon which

fractals were built. In a generalised form, fractals “bring together under one heading a large

class of objects that have certain structural features in common” (Dyson 1978: 677). Whilst

Mandelbrot does not provide a clear definition of a fractal, there are plenty of characteristics

shown throughout his work. Fractals are “a mathematical set or a concrete object whose form

is extremely irregular and/or fragmented at all scales” (Mandelbrot 1977: 294). Fractals are a

repeating pattern within mathematics which can be “brought usefully to bear not only on

microscopic phenomena but also on phenomena on or above man’s scale” (Mandelbrot 1977:

1). Fractals are also characterised by their statistical nature, of chance and irregularities. The

notion of fractals can be described as shapes which “tend to be scaling, implying that the

degree of their irregularity and/or fragmentation is identical at all scales (Mandelbrot 1983:

1). Fractals in and of themselves comprise of a “simple mathematical feedback loop to

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produce an astonishing variety and complexity of results” (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2010:

145) which can be used to identify repeating patterns within phenomena. Fractals are

constant, repeating patterns that are the same whether they increase or decrease in

scale. “The simplest fractals scale the same way in all directions, hence are called

self-similar” (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2010: 127). This notion of being identical or ‘self-similar’

is not just limited to mathematics and economics; “self-similarity methods are a potent tool in

the study of chance phenomena … very similar considerations apply in the study of

turbulence, where the characteristic sizes of ‘features’ are also widely scattered” (Mandelbrot

1967: 636). In a rudimentary form, self-similarity can be used within differing contexts

whereby repetition at different levels of scale can be perceived and viewed. Mandelbrot and

Hudson (2010) argue that fractals “accurately describes some fundamental principles of how

people often think and behave: in hierarchies, with repetition and scaling” (Mandelbrot and

Hudson 2010: 133). Fractals also use the principle of invariance (Mandelbrot 1983), a

mathematical principle which relies on the idea that nothing has changed, there is no variance

or variety. Invariance revolves around the notion that the element remains unchanged

regardless of the surrounding actions, events and elements. These unchanging elements are

known as invariants.

Topper and Lagadec (2013) supply a new theory, based on identifying invariants in

crisis situations and linked with Mandlebrot’s (1983) notion of fractals. Mandelbrot (1983)

identified repeating identical patterns throughout nature, known as fractals. Topper and

Lagadec (2013) argue that Mandelbrot’s fractal pattern can be applied to crisis situations. The

Fractal theory is impacted by the invariance principle, most commonly used in mathematics

or physics, “Finding an invariant means finding a key to grasping the way the system is

behaving” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 10). An invariant is something that does not vary and

is self-similar. Looking for what has not changed after a crisis alters the way actions and

responses are determined and can impact the response. “What is invariant from one state to

the other and what can be undertaken to better prepare and manage upcoming crises” Topper

and Lagadec 2013: 11). By “considering what is common in universes where crises happen

on different scales” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 11) we can determine which action to be

taken are predictable. “The elegance of fractals is also a function of their self-similarity”

(Seeger 2002: 334). By looking at key aspects of crises, invariants become apparent and

patterns identified. In the fractal theory Topper and Lagadec (2013) promote they suggest,

space, time, rank and sense-making as the four dimensions that impact the crisis response

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most. Likewise, different levels of response from local to national will also have a pattern and

a fractal imprint. “Crisis events themselves may also exhibit fractal pattern by repeating

across different organizations and different scales” (Seeger 2002: 334) Once these fractals

have been identified, actions can be implemented to promote improved crisis response

measures. Similarly, the nature of crises has changed from being an isolated event to a

“multifaceted challenging situation mixing hyperlocal and hyperglobal dynamic” (Topper

and Lagadec 2012: 22) which impacts on the response to crisis situations.

A clear understanding of what is a fractal within the context of this research is key,

however it is equally important to understand what is not a fractal. A fractal is: a repeating

action/event/idea/characteristic that is identical and occurs at each level (Local, Regional and

National) to the same degree of occurrence. Therefore, an event/action/pattern is not a fractal

if: the nature or type of event/action/idea/characteristic is not identical. This statement is not

dependant on scale. If the event/action/idea/characteristic occurs at all levels (Local,

Regional, and National) but is not identical or at least self-similar then it is not a fractal.

These guidelines for what is or is not a fractal originate from the Mathematical principle and

standard set out by Mandelbrot (1983).

Crisis Response and levels of response.

The response to crises can be both preventative, corrective or a combination of both

(Lauras, Truptil and Bénaben 2015). The need to be prepared to face any risks or crises works

in tandem with the need to correct and change the response when previous failures do not

give the desired result. The “response to a crisis is linked to the notion of ‘measures taken’”

(Lauras et al. 2015: 697) during the response to a crisis, decisions will have to be put into

effect with the hope of gaining the best outcome, the measures taken will impact the

outcome. Priorities within the response to a crisis can affect the outcome, the most common

goal within “emergency response efforts are to provide shelter and assistance to disaster

victims” (Rawls and Turnquist 2010: 521). Whilst this is an important aspect of crisis

management response, there are other tasks which are key to increasing the success of the

response; “relief, emergency shelter and settlement, emergency health, water and sanitation,

and tracing and restoring family links” (Wex, Schryen, Feuerriegel and Neumann 2014: 698).

The mobilization of resources, such as water, power and medical services and the restoration

of the infrastructure enabling the resources to be mobilized is key (IFRC 2017b).

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Within the context of this research three levels of response will be analysed; Local,

Regional and National. These levels will be used as indicators for determining the actions and

responses taken during the crisis. The Local level can be defined in its most basic

geographical form as “restricted to a particular area or one’s neighbourhood or community”

(Oxford living dictionaries 2017). This definition can then be used to create a working

concept for this research; the local people’s involvement within the epicentre of the crisis

both as responders and victims to the crisis, during and after the crisis event occurs. The

Regional level can be defined as “relating to the regions of a country” (Oxford living

dictionaries 2017). With a working concept of; the regional influence by the authorities and

the people living in that region, which could be a county or state, and their actions taken

during and after the crisis event. The National level can be defined as “Relating to or

characteristic of a nation; common to a whole nation” (Oxford living dictionaries 2017). With

a working concept of; actions taken on a national level to counteract the effects of the crisis,

with directions originating at the head of state and state departments.

Invariants.

Invariants are aspects that do not change. Independent of the surrounding context, an

invariant does not change or adapt; they do not vary.

“the idea behind fractal geometry and its use of ‘invariants’ is, instead of asking

ourselves what is being dislocated, what is falling apart, what is being torn to pieces,

to suggest a new set of questions and a new set of actions to find out what has not

changed, what is invariant from one state to another and what can be undertaken to

better prepare and manage upcoming crises” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 11).

Within Fractal theory, Topper and Lagadec (2013) supply four aspects of a crisis by which to

measure the similarities and invariants of a crisis; these are Space, Time, Rank and

Sense-making. These aspects are important as this new perspective on crisis management has been

put forward by Topper and Lagadec (2013) and as the theory is relatively new these aspects

are a good starting point for further research. Topper and Lagadec (2013) provide

explanations for all four aspects, however they are extremely vague and do not provide

sufficient detail that is required to effectively observe these aspect within the context of a

crisis. As a result, the concepts have been expanded and influenced using theoretical views

from other authors within the sphere of crisis management.

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The concept of Space is defined as the shift from a localised event to a global event

because of modern day interdependence and movement of people (Topper and Lagadec

2003), mainly referring to geographical space, and often the crisis affects many ‘spaces’ at

the same time. “Modern crises are no longer confined to their site of origin” (Boin and T’Hart

2003: 545). The chain reaction across the globe as crisis events unfold and the response

begins, known as the “Domino effect” (Körnert 2003: 188), changes how crisis events unfold

in terms of geographical spaces. There are “multiple levers of action at the same time”

(Topper and Lagadec 2013). Therefore, the approach to crisis management needs to be both

aware of the events at the epicentre of the crisis but also the far-reaching implications

worldwide. Indicators of space include; the origin of the victims, the origin of the response

workers, the geographical space and the social media impact.

The concept of Rank is defined as the interaction of individuals which impact the

event, through their level of authority and understanding of the situation (Topper and

Lagadec 2003). Rank can impact the response and the chain of command during a crisis.

“Everyone has different information, different perceptions of the same information” (Topper

and Lagadec 2013: 13). Communications and interactions of actors within the response can

impact the outcome and understanding of the situation. Likewise, “preparedness for critical

breakdowns requires rapid and flexible decision-making authority” (Boin and McConnell

2007: 56). This is a complex dynamic which can affect the progression of the crisis response.

The use of authority to dictate action, or overrule another responder’s action or decision

making can also be an aspect of rank. The indicators of rank that will be analysed include; the

type of responders present at the event, the level of authority of the individuals in charge, the

level of respect/priority the victims and fatalities held, the communication between victims

and responders.

The concept of Sense-making is explained as the sharing of information and

understanding about the situation. Differing individuals may have a different view on the

situation causing further complications in sense-making of the event. “Sense-making is,

importantly, an issue of language, talk, and communication. Situations, organizations, and

environments are talked into existence” (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005: 409). As

events, actions and ideas are socially constructed, the influences behind decision making

affects the outcome (Weick et al. 2005). “A collective understanding of the nature,

characteristics, consequences and potential scope and effect of an evolving threat” (Boin,

Kuipers and Overdijk 2013: 82) is extremely important, especially when large numbers of

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personnel are involved. Sense-making of the actions by individuals during a time of crisis is

to “render the subjective [crisis] into something more tangible” (Weick 1995: 14). The

indicators of sense-making include; actions and opinions of responders, authority and who

gives the directions during the event, the individuals whose ideas and opinions are listened to

during the event.

The concept of Time encompasses the “short term event to the long-term impacts”

(Topper and Lagadec 2013: 12). Both instant and long-term dynamics impact the response

process, from immediate reactions on social media to the clean-up process towards the end of

the event. The time frame in which actions occur in the immediate aftermath can work to

prevent the loss of life, but also when actions are not organised or planned for, further

damage can occur. Crisis management in general focuses on the short-term impacts of the

initial crisis event however long-term issues also need to be resolved as society returns to

normality (Van Wart and Kapucu 2011). Both instantaneous consequences and long-term

consequences overlap during a crisis response. The crisis event “is not limited to a single

timeline approach … overlapping timelines that have different dynamics and fundamental

building blocks” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 13). Actions in time are identified through the

responses of the emergency services, victims and citizens. Time constraints and actions in

time can affect the resources available and how emergency services respond in a time of

crisis (Van Wart and Kapucu 2011). Indicators of the actions in Time include; the responders,

the victims, the physical time and the aspects of the event themselves; response time to the

initial event, social media response, government announcements and reactions, emergency

services and clean up time.

All four of these concepts within Fractal theory need to be operationalised to become

understandable in the context of case study analysis. The operationalised definitions of Space,

Time, Rank and Sense-making are summarised below.

Space: The environments affected by the event, in which fatalities, victims and

responders interact. The locations in which interactions take place during and after the event

which impact the response and outcome of the event. The understanding of the progression of

events from the epicentre spreading worldwide through media and communication.

Rank: The use of authority in making decisions, leading actions and attitude taken

with other responders and victims. The actions and event are interpreted by responders in

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their actions to authority and victims of the event. The use of authority to dictate action, or

overrule another responder’s action or decision making can also be an aspect of rank.

Sense-making: The opinions and actions of individuals, both victims and responders,

and how this impacts the actions taken. The use of language during the response and how

interactions take place in relation to the crisis.

Time: The time scale by which aspects of the crisis occur, between the initial event

and the concluding clean-up of the event. The actions in time can be separated into action of

the responders, actions of the victims, the moments of the events within the crisis and the

physical timeframe of the crisis. Also included is the physical time it takes for the response to

occur at all level of service response. This includes the time taken for news of the event to

spread across the globe through social media and communication between witnesses, victims

and families. Time includes the physical time events and time between components of the

crisis response, how time impacts the victims, responders and when aspects of the crisis

occur.

Whilst all these aspects of fractal theory are important, only Time will be researched

further. This is to increase the feasibility within the time frame permitted for this research,

whilst also including the necessary aspects provided within Topper and Lagadec’s (2013)

theory framework, enabling a more structured and accurate examination of time within crisis

management. Time is the most effectively identified within the reports and will yield a

respectable level of results that can be analysed enabling a more valid and reliable result.

Methodology.

The objective of this research is to determine whether Topper and Lagadec’s (2003)

theory on fractal crises is applicable to real cases and determine whether looking at the

normal rather than the abnormal can impact crisis management. This will be a comparative

case study analysis, enabling Fractal theory to be implemented in differing types of crisis to

determine whether it remains effective and applicable. A comparative case study is being

used as it enables specific aspects of a crisis to be examined in detail, whilst also allowing for

comparison between cases. “It [Comparative case studies] sharpens our power of description,

and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities

and contrasts among cases” (Collier 1993: 105). This understanding of comparative research

highlights the advantages of using this method to compare crises and the applicability of

fractal theory when looking at time invariants. As this is an explorative study, it aims to be

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the first indication for the application of fractals within crisis management and crisis

response. It will indicate whether being the first application of fractal theory is considered a

desirable trait for research. As the research is explorative, the results will not be perfect but

will provide a new and deeper understanding of fractals within crises. Whilst this research is

new and potentially opens new, exciting ways of dealing with crisis management and crisis

response, it is important to understand that “Exploratory research rarely yields definitive

results.” (Neuman 2014: 38). However, the research will aim to open up the field of research

into a more detailed study of fractals within crisis response.

The time aspects of each case will be analysed at each response level; Local, Regional

and National. This will then be compared to the other cases and will enable a distinction to be

determined regarding the Time invariant of crises according to Fractal theory (Topper and

Lagadec 2003). The research will be conducted using qualitative methods within the context

of a case study. The hypothesis of this research is; Time invariants will be observable as

a fractal within all types of crisis.

The advantages of using case study analysis are numerous. Case studies provide a

heuristic impact (Neuman 2014) enabling further learning and discovery for pushing

boundaries and new theories. Which, as Fractal theory is relatively new, is extremely

appropriate for this form of research. Case studies have the “ability to capture complexity

and trace processes” (Neuman 2014: 42). Case studies enable the researcher to look at the

bigger picture whilst also focusing in on key elements. Case studies within this research will

allow for the complex nature of crises to be clearly organised, structured and provide a deeper

understanding of the events and circumstances within each case. Similarly, case study

analysis allows for a deep dissection of the crisis enabling an increased understanding of the

results and a more valid and reliable way of tackling a difficult subject. Case studies allow for

multiple cases to be compared, which allow for any potential generalisation surrounding

fractal theory, time invariants and crises. The use of case studies is also reflective of the data

sources that will be used. As the data is from evaluation reports about the crises, using a

qualitative research method fits with the data. Using case studies allows for in depth analysis

of events that happened in the past. Similarly, it allows for a wide variety of cases to be

analysed and compared, creating a bigger picture of the real, practical crisis response process.

There are disadvantages to using case study analysis which need to be addressed.

Conducting case study analysis may be considered not rigorous enough if a systematic

procedure has not been followed (Yin 2013). This disadvantage will be overcome with the

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use of a clear process for analysing the data. Generalisation of the findings whilst preventing

subjectivity from impacting the results is challenging.

This research uses case study analysis as it allows many different types of crises to be

scrutinised against Fractal theory, whilst also looking to identify patterns that occur in a

practical form within crisis management. The practical nature of crisis response requires the

use of a form of research method that can be applied in the real world.

The data sources used will be the government reports, commissions, recommendations, and

plans and protocols pertaining to each crisis. Specifically, evaluation reports of the crisis

response for each crisis will be used, as they provide an independent, unbiased perspective of

the crisis response, increasing validity and reliability. These documents have been chosen as

they are clear, and explicit accounts of the event with information regarding the response at

all levels (Local, Regional, and National) and over the time frames of the events including

before, during and after. They are high quality documents that are accessible to the public,

and produced by governments, governing bodies or accredited associations. The reputation of

these bodies increases the validity and reliability of the sources and hence the research.

Unit of Analysis The Crises – crisis response actions at each level, specifically related to Time.

For example, the actions of the Police will be analysed at all levels, Local, Regional and National, with Time invariants being isolated. Unit of observation The reports provided post-crisis.

For example, the 9/11 Commissioners report.

Observation The Time invariants at all levels: Local, Regional, and National For examples, when evacuation of citizens/residents occurs.

Score The invariants that remain the same during all types of crises and at each level of response during each type of crises.

Table 1 Elements of analysis

Case selection.

Below are the cases that have been selected to represent each type of crisis (See Table 2).

Only three of each type of crisis has been selected due to the limited time scale for this

research. As this research is exploring the potential of Fractal theory, this number of cases

will give a sufficient indication of the applicably of the theory. Each case should offer a

different form of each type (Man-made, Natural and Technical Failure) to have a varied and

wide range of cases, increasing the validity of the results. This also allows for the potential to

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get an understanding of the generalisation associated with Fractal theory, Time invariants and

crises. Each type of crisis should be represented through the three cases selected for each

type, with respect to the accessibility of reports and data sources. Each case has an

availability of evaluation reports that are used within this research (See Figure 6).

Collectively, these cases were selected as they offer a variety of events and the necessary

documentation and reports were accessible. However, there are also specific reasons as to

why each case was selected to represent the type of crisis they are being used for.

Man-Made Natural Technological Failure

Case 1

9/11 Terror attack 2001 (United States of America)

Case 4

Hurricane Sandy 2012 (United States of America)

Case 7

Flight 1549 Hudson River crash 2009

(United States of America) Case 2 7/7 Bombings 2005 (London) Case 5 Sheffield Floods 2007 (London) Case 8

Hatfield Rail Crash 2000 (London)

Case 3

Costa Concordia Shipwreck 2012 (Italy) Case 6 Christchurch Earthquake 2010-2011 (New Zealand) Case 9

Fukushima Nuclear Plant 2011 (Japan)

Table 2 Cases to be analysed

These cases were selected for a variety of reasons, which will now be individually discussed.

Case 1 – Man-made – Terror Attack - 9/11. This case was selected as the crisis was deemed a

changing point in the war on terror. The location of the World trade centre towers, being in

such a high-density area, made for a challenging crisis response. The locations over multiple

states demanded a variety of responses.

Case 2 – Man-made – Terror Attack - 7/7. This case was selected as there were difficulties

with the locations of the bombs. Three bombs were on three different underground trains and

one was on a bus in a different part of London. Communication issues and slow emergency

responses were key aspects in the response to this crisis. This crisis is like 9/11 in that they

are both terror attacks, however this one is different as the locations were scattered around the

city and all individual victims involved have been identified and the search officially

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ongoing, with individuals still missing. The Bombs on the underground trains were exploded

simultaneously, whereas on 9/11 the planes that crashed into the buildings were not at the

same time, but spread across the morning of 9/11.

Case 3 – Man-made – Human Decision Making - Costa Concordia. This case was selected as

human failure and decision making caused the event. The intent to cause harm was not part of

the captain’s decision, which differs from 9/11 and 7/7 where the intent to harm was an

integral aspect of the crises. Also, as the event occurred on a boat in the sea, the dynamics

surrounding response is different to both 9/11 and 7/7. The location of the event, off shore

from the Italian coast, also allows for a developed country providing the response and

evaluation of the response which fits with all the other cases that will be analysed.

Case 4 – Natural – Hurricane - Hurricane Sandy. This case was selected as the hurricane

affected many states, with the worst hit being New York. The determination of the

emergency services, the city residents and businesses to reopen the city post crisis, affected

the crisis response. It is also interesting to analyse the response in relation to 9/11 and

potentially compare the response, as the same city was affected but 11 years apart and both

crisis type are different.

Case 5 – Natural – Flood - Sheffield Floods. This case was selected as the flooding was not

due to any other natural weather event, but is purely because of large volumes of rain fall.

The case is also considerably smaller than both the other natural crises, enabling a better

overall representation of natural crises analysed in this research. This will increase the

validity of the generalisation that will be made about natural crises as different sizes of crises

have been analysed.

Case 6 – Natural – Earthquake – Christchurch Earthquake. This case was selected as an

earthquake of this magnitude and devastation in a developed country has not previously

occurred to this scale. Also, the area that was struck by the earthquake has been declared no

longer hospitable and the local council has relocated, with most residents moving elsewhere

in New Zealand, even to Australia. The change in location of the council potentially affected

the response as the area was deemed unsalvageable due to future potential earthquakes.

Case 7 – Technical Failure – Engine Failure - Flight 1549. This case is interesting due to the

plane landing in the river, making accessibility difficult and challenging for first responders.

The plane landing on the water adds a different element for the response teams to tackle. This

crisis response was also marginally prepared as the pilot was able to give warning to air

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traffic control, enabling an alarm to be sent. This affects the response speed and planning

surrounding the approach to the aircraft and how best to deal with the passengers and crew on

the plane.

Case 8 – Technical Failure – Rail Fault - Hatfield Rail Crash. This case was selected as there

is no question that the crisis was a technical failure. The drivers were cleared of any

responsibility, with faults and a crack being discovered in the rails the train was traveling

over. The drivers followed correct protocol and proceeded with following on the protocol for

such an event. This case is also small in comparison to Flight 1549 and Fukushima as the

location was limited, and the victims were those on board the train with no external personnel

injured or adversely affected.

Case 9 – Technical Failure – Reactors unable to function - Fukushima Nuclear Plant. This

case was selected as the health implications of this crisis make it interesting. Nuclear power

and the dangerous side effects are known but little protection protocol was in place,

increasing the damage caused by the crisis. The danger of radioactive leaks and nuclear

power stations are known, however minimal protocols were in place to protect workers and

residents. There were no protocols for wider impact of such a disaster. Also, this crisis

occurred in Asia, providing a different cultural aspect to the response. The implications of

differing culture to the other cases my affect the outcome of the response.

Time – conceptualised.

Actions in Time will be analysed as this provides a range of events and actions that

responders act upon. Actions in Time has been selected instead of actual moments in time. As

moments in time are difficult to determine through reports without physically seeing the

event and it is difficult to maintain meticulous recordings for every minute. Not all the reports

contain such detailed recordings and therefore comparisons between cases would not be

appropriate, reliable or valid. Within the Invariant of time, four subsections will be used to

clearly conceptualise and identify the time fractals in the crisis event; specifically, those

relating to actions in time. These are: the event itself, the numerical/physical timeline, the

actions of the responders and the actions of the victims. Whilst there will be some overlap

between the subcategories, ever effort will be made to clearly define the subcategory the data

fits into. These four subcategories have been selected as they cover a wide base of actions in

time within crisis management and are relatively simple to identify and isolate within the

context of documents and reports.

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The event itself relates to the factors beyond the control of the responders and victims,

the factors that elicit a response from either victims or responders. This subcategory will be

adaptable depending on the type of crisis, a Man-made crisis will have different aspects than

a Natural or Technical Failure crisis. For example: aftershocks of an earthquake, fires

continuing after the initial event, technology failing and creating a chain event of failure to

other locations etc.

The numerical/physical timeline is the chronological structure of the event, a clinical

linear line of the events. For example: exact references to time, at 9.00am the police arrived.

The time difference between the event and the arrival of services etc.

The action of the responder relates to when any action or decision is made by

responders, be it immediate search and rescue or government policy. For example: when the

emergency services decide to withdraw from the scene of the crisis, when shelter and

temporary housing becomes available etc.

The subcategory of actions of the victims relates to when the victim acts and reacts to

the event and the support they are provided with post-crisis. For example: calling the

emergency services, helping with the clean-up of debris, decision to evacuate etc.

Concept Topper and Lagadec’s (2013) Definition

Concept operationalised. The physical time parameters for

each crisis

Time The time from “short term event to long term impacts” (Topper and Lagadec 2013: 12)

The time scale by which aspects of the crisis occur, between the initial event and the concluding clean-up of the event. Also included is the physical time it takes for the response to occur at all level of service response. This also includes the four subcategories of time; the event itself, the Physical timeline, the actions of the responders, and the actions of the victims (See Figure 4).

The research will include anything from the moment at which the crisis occurs, for example when the Bombs exploded on the London underground. Up Until the point at which the reports stop detailing the event, for example when the commission determines that the response to the event is over.

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Operationalization.

Figure 4 Diagram of the operationalisation of Time

The case study approach that will be used aims to analyse each case individually and

then compare the cases to determine the universality of fractal theory amongst the cases,

using a deductive approach. Answering the question: To what extent do different types of

crises, individually and collectively, demonstrate Topper and Lagadec’s (2013) Fractal

theory, specifically with reference to the concept of Time?

Each case will be analysed for the Time invariants and fractal patterns. The Time

invariants once isolated will be examined and analysed at three levels of response; Local,

Regional and National. A generalised picture of Time invariants at each level will be

composed and a detailed analysis of each aspect will be completed using data gathering and

information from the official crisis reports. This will increase ease and availability for the

creation of generalisations and comparisons which can be used to determine an overview for

answering the research question. The research will be conducted using open systematic

coding. The parameters for the coding that will be used originate in the operationalised

definitions of actions in Time. Every isolated function of time within the documents relating

to the Time invariants at any of the three levels; Local, Regional and National, will be

analysed to create a bigger picture of the situation. If there are any discontinuities within the

documents that are not covered by the parameters set above or keywords below, they will be

isolated and then judged on their relevance in helping or hindering the research. As the Time

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invariants are based on actions in Time and not physical/literal timeframes it is important to

have a good understanding of what will and will not be included within the searches.

Firstly, key words have been identified based on the operationalisation of time as

shown in the Diagram above (Figure 4). The words that will be searched for in the reports for

each crisis are shown below (Figure 5). Each document will be searched automatically for

these keywords. These words, once found, will be entered onto an excel spread sheet with the

corresponding quote and location within the document, even if the quote is nothing to do with

time but includes the searched for word (See Appendix). Once all the words have been

searched for they will be coded on the spreadsheet; for the level of response that they

correspond to (Local, Regional or National). Then they will also be coded for relevance

relating to time. Green for highly relevant, Orange for potentially relevant and Red for not

relevant. This narrows the invariants to a manageable amount and prevents any invariants

from being identified that have a weak claim to time and have been isolated only as they have

a key word in the quote. This also decreases the volume of unnecessary data and increases the

understanding of the key elements within the crisis. Next, all the quotes and key words that

have been identified as highly relevant will be separated from the rest of the searched for

words. These will then be studied further to identify any reoccurring features, which will

indicate invariants that are potentially fractals. These reoccurring features will be put into

tables based on crisis type (See Appendix) and repeating aspects highlighted to show the final

invariants that are common within each crisis type. These tables for each crisis type will then

be compared to determine whether there are any fractals, that have repeating patterns within

all crises across all crisis types and at all levels.

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