Programme: CSM Cohort: February 2017 Master’s Thesis
Student: Herman Kaljo Student number: S1829467 Supervisor: Dr. Jaap Reijling Jaap.reijling@gmail.com
2nd reader: Drs. H.J.M. Schönberger h.j.m.schonberger@fgga.leidenuniv.nl Word count: 16825
Development of Interagency Cooperation in the Emergency Response to the Northern Baltic Sea floods of January 2005 in Pärnu, Estonia.
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Abstract
This thesis explored the role that five network conditions – structure, culture, policy, technology, and relations, had on establishing a shared situational awareness in the emergency response network in Estonia during the January 2005 storm; and on the subsequent development of interagency cooperation. Analytical framework of Whelan (2012) was applied to analyze policy documents, observations, and expert interviews with crisis managers from Estonia regarding the case. The empirical findings showed that interagency cooperation in the emergency response to the floods of the January 2005 Northern Baltic Sea storm in Estonia developed off the book due to network structure and network technology not having been able to deal with the changing internal and external contingencies. The thesis illustrated that because the five network conditions were not all properly enabling the establishment of a shared situational awareness, much of the development of interagency cooperation during the January 2005 storm in Estonia happened on an ad hoc basis, thanks to the experience, knowledge, and relations of the key persons in the emergency response network. The development of interagency cooperation was also complicated because certain members of the emergency response network had no previously shared experiences through contact in routine work, and/or no training experience of the scenario, and subsequently had different opinions regarding how the work should be organized. For improved development of interagency cooperation in the future, frequent joint scenario-based training exercises are recommended, in addition to an evaluation of the configuration of the emergency response network. A future study on the capacity of joint scenario-based training exercises to check the ability of the network to establish a shared situational awareness could be conducted. Furthermore, a study of how the stability, age, and flexibility of networks affects the development of interagency cooperation could add an increment to the body of knowledge.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Jaap Reijling for his guidance and for helping me structure my thesis. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude to the crisis management experts from Estonia that contributed to this thesis by kindly taking valuable time out of their schedules to provide elaborate answers to my interview questions. Moreover, I would like to give thanks to all of the lecturers of the Crisis and Security Management programme for challenging my intellectual paradigms, and for making the classes interactive.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ... ii Acknowledgements ... iii List of Figures ... v 1. Introduction ... 1 2. Theoretical Framework ... 6 2.1. Analytical Framework ... 12 3. Methodology ... 14 4. Analysis... 184.1. General description of the case ... 18
4.2. Structure ... 21 4.2.1. Sub-conclusions on Structure ... 29 4.3. Culture... 30 4.3.1. Sub-conclusions on Culture ... 36 4.4. Policy ... 37 4.4.1. Sub-conclusions on Policy ... 42 4.5. Relations ... 43 4.5.1. Sub-conclusions on Relations ... 47 4.6. Technology ... 48 4.6.1. Sub-conclusions on Technology ... 52 4.7. Conclusion ... 53 5. Reflections ... 55 References ... 58 Appendices ... 62
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Structure of the Ministry of the Interior………2 Figure 2: Analytical Framework for Network Effectiveness………..13 Figure 3: Leading Emergency Response on different levels………..26
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1. Introduction
The need for having an effective emergency response network does not require much explaining – it is a matter of minimizing loss of human life, property damage, and lack of access to vital services. Emergency situations are often unexpected, unprecedented and unmanageable, due to their scale and need to achieve several objectives at the same time, in order to resolve the situation (Hewitt, 1983; Crichton et al., 2000:208, in McMaster and Baber, 2012:38). Hence, in order to manage such complex situations that are beyond the capacity of independent agencies, agencies need to rally together to garner interagency expertise, and apply their skills and knowledge collectively (Curnin et al., 2015:300).
The work of the agencies involved in emergency response is under constant scrutiny by the public and watchdog organizations to ensure that tax payers’ money is well spent (Dercole, 2006). A safe and less costly way for countries to develop their emergency response structures is through testing of various models by conducting joint crisis management exercises, and by adhering to best practices. Training together first ensures a smoothly-running interagency cooperation during an emergency response (Dercole, 2006). However, a more pressing need to improve structures appears when they worked inefficiently during a real crisis. Consequently, scrutinizing what worked, and what did not, after crises, is essential to learning from them.
In the beginning of January 2005 Estonia was badly affected by flooding of the Northern Baltic Sea – the government had difficulties responding to the emergency in several coastal regions, and several vital services were cut off due to the weather (Hellenberg and Visuri, 2013:18). Following the aftermath of the emergency, a broad national discussion ensued on emergency preparedness, warning systems, effectiveness of emergency response and interagency cooperation; as well as insurance issues (Hellenberg and Visuri, 2013:18).
In Estonia, the Ministry of the Interior has the ultimate responsibility in making internal security policy, coordinating emergency response activities between agencies that operate on the ground, as well as writing threat assessments and overseeing crisis management activities (Connolly et al., 2016). In emergency response activities, Ministry of the Interior supervises the Estonian Rescue Board, the Police and Border Guard, and a plethora of other agencies (Connolly et al., 2016).
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Figure 1: Structure of the Ministry of the Interior (Connolly et al., 2016)
At the current moment, Estonia’s emergency response network structure is still decentralised, as each ministry is responsible for crisis management activities within its own jurisdiction (Räim, 2015). In addition, passage 1 of §3 of the Emergency Act of 2017 states that emergency response tasks are carried out following the principle of subsidiarity – measures are taken at the lowest possible required level (Parliament of Estonia, 2017:2).
In 2012, Ministry of Interior recognized some drawbacks in the way the emergency response network was structured, and subsequently expressed the need to improve the way the leading structures for resolving emergencies function, claiming to be at crossroads: first way forward being continuing with the decentralised emergency response structure, and the second the creation of a central emergency response structure, where one agency with powers to command other agencies in resolving states of emergency would always be in charge (Laaniste, 2012). Analyzing the case of the January 2005 storm in Estonia retrospectively would allow studying of various components of Estonia’s crisis management and emergency response network, and development of interagency cooperation, as it was one of the few emergencies in Estonia in the 21st century that required a response on such an extensive scale.
3 Academic relevance
The situation in Estonia adds an increment of knowledge to Crisis and Emergency Management subfield through examining what kind of role do certain conditions of networks play in improving establishing a shared situational awareness in interagency emergency response and development of interagency cooperation. Various scholars (Whelan, 2012; Kenis and Provan, 2007) have claimed that determining what influences effectivness of networks is still very much up for debate in academia, and hence new studies investigating the phenomena of establishing a shared situational awareness during an emergency response, and how the latter affects the development of interagency cooperation, can add pieces to the puzzle and should be undertaken.
Societal relevance
Knowing how to enable the establishing of a shared situational awareness in the emergency response network benefits the citizens of Estonia, and other nations with similar configurations of emergency response networks, through a reduction in loss of human lives and property damage due to improved interagency cooperation in emergency response. Knowing how to optimize interagency cooperation in emergency response will lead to more public confidence in the capacity of the network to put public funds into excellent use in serving and protecting.
Link with public administration and CSM in particular
Being able to steer and coordinate the activities of designated agencies in emergency situations is one of the top priorities of governments. Public administration concerns itself with effective governing of public assets and institutions. Hence, from a public administration standpoint, it is paramount to figure out a proper configuration of emergency response networks and the conditions that enable its work, in order to improve interagency cooperation during crises. The objectives of the agencies part of the emergency response network are essentially providing critical services to the constituents, minimizing property damage and human casualties through emergency prevention, preparedness, a well-coordinated emergency response, and dealing with the consequences of emergencies.
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Crisis and Security Management deals with the prevention, management and resolution of crisis situations. Studying security networks, and emergency response networks in particular, will lead to improved capacity to plan for crises, to prevent crises, to properly respond to crises, as well as enhancing post-crisis learning.
Objectives of the research
The objectives of the research are to determine which factors and conditions contributed to the establishment of a shared situational awareness, and consequently, the development of interagency cooperation, in the emergency response to the Northern Baltic Sea storm of January 2005 in Estonia, and to examine how that knowledge could be put into use in the future, to improve interagency cooperation during emergencies further.
Central Research Question
Based on the aforementioned objectives, the perceived problem of ineffective coordination of cooperation between agencies in the emergency response in Estonia, as mentioned by
Estonia’s Ministry of the Interior, the academic debate on the matter, and a perceived knowledge gap, the following research question was formulated:
How did interagency cooperation develop during the emergency response to the floods of the January 2005 Northern Baltic Sea storm in Estonia – and how can possible discrepancies be explained?
Delimitations
In order to make studying this case feasible the paper will have a temporal focus from January 9th 2005 to January 13th 2005. The analysis will focus on the agencies officially part of the emergency response network in Estonia, and will not cover emergency response activities by third parties. A specific focus will be on Pärnu County as that was the area most damaged due to the storm, and was where the main emergency response took place.
5 Outline of the paper
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The introduction presents the perceived issue by authorities, the academic debate regarding the phenomenon, the perceived knowledge gap, and societal and academic relevance, with all the aforementioned leading to a central research question. The introduction also covers the temporal limitations of the paper and issues regarding feasibility. Last, but not least, the introductory chapter contains an outline of the thesis to guide the reader.
The second chapter presents the academic body of knowledge on the phenomenon that will lead to an analytical framework based on specific themes that will later be used in the analysis chapter.
The third chapter gives an overview of the methodology – addressing questions such as how is the study designed, how is the data collected and analysed, and how are reliability and validity strengthened. Furthermore, in the methodology chapter the choice for the case selected in the introduction will be elaborated upon.
In the fourth chapter an analysis of different sources is carried out using the analytical framework presented in the second chapter.
The fifth chapter addresses the results of the review, strengths and weaknesses of the current system, contribution to society and science, as well as recommendations for policy and suggestions for directions of future scientific studies.
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2. Theoretical Framework
Studying interagency cooperation means studying networks. Kenis and Provan (2007:231) defined the concept of a network as „groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals, but also a collective goal.“ Whelan’s (2012:11) definition of a network was more simplistic: „set of actors, or nodes, that are linked by various relationships or ties.
Emergency response networks have been usually set up with a government mandate for a specific purpose, and are hence what Kenis and Provan call „goal-directed networks“ – „networks that evolve largely through conscious efforts to build coordination“ (2007:231). Because the goal of this paper is to study how interagency cooperation evolved during a recent crisis in Estonia, the unit of analysis must be the network itself, not the „nodes“ or „relations“.
Kenis and Provan (2007:233) claimed that the effectiveness of networks depends on the way the governance of the network is configurated, and whether the requisite conditions for success for a particular configuration are in place. They identified three types of network governance: shared participant governance; lead organization governance; network administrative organization governance (NAO) (Kenis and Provan, 2007:237). Shared participant governed networks are highly decentralized, and have an equally distributed power and symmetrical relationships between network members (Kenis and Provan, 2007:234). Lead organization governed networks are coordinated and run by a single participating member who assumes the role of lead organization, hence such forms of network governance are highly centralized with asymmetrical power between network members; and the network-level goals may be matching the goals of the lead organization (Kenis and Provan, 2007:235). NAO model of governance differs from the two other forms, as an external administrative entity is selected to inform the network and its activities (Kenis and Provan, 2007:236). NAO model of governance is centralized, where the external entitity coordinates the activities of the network (Kenis and Provan, 2007:236). Kenis and Provan proposed that effectiveness of the network governance forms would depend on four structural and relational factors: trust, size of the network, goal consensus, as well as the nature of the task (need for network-level competencies) (2007:237). Their overall assessment was that:
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„As trust becomes less densely distributed throughout the network, as the number of participants gets larger, as network goal consensus declines, and as the need for network-level competencies increases, brokered forms of network governance, like lead organization and NAO, are likely to become more effective than shared-governance networks“ (Kenis and Provan, 2007:237).
McMaster and Baber (2012:39) identified four overarching categories of factors that influence the effective functioning of networks: 1) Organizational structures and practices; 2) Communication, information-sharing, and shared situational awareness; 3) Cooperation and Coordination of response activities; 4) Command, Strategy (Command Intent), and Decision-making.
McMaster and Baber looked into many studies of interagency emergency responses to floods and identified eleven most commonly occuring issues highlighted in the literature: 1) lack of coordination between agencies; 2) failure to communicate warnings and other information; 3) competitive practices; 4) lack of trust between agencies; 5) slow mobilization of response; 6) response systems overwhelmed by the scale of the emergency; 7) failure to share information between agencies; 8) poorly defined chains of command; 9) interoperability failures; 10) lack of awarness of the presence and activity of other agencies in the area; 11) failure to fully integrate military into the response (2012:39).
Whelan (2012) proposed that the effectiveness of networks is linked to five conditions: structure, culture, policy, technology, and relations. These five conditions will be further explained.
Whelan defined the structure of the network as „the ways which networks are structured and re-structured in response to particular contingencies“ (2012:42). Whelan claimed that network structure can be broken down to network design – the static conditions of a network examined at a given time; and network development – which focuses on networks as an ongoing dynamic process of organising (2012:42). Network design has an impact on the way information is shared in the network, as well as on the internal network governance (Whelan, 2012:43). Network development views the processes of how networks were originally structured in terms of selection of partner agencies, and why the latter decide to enter networks; furthermore,
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network development views how networks are restructured to address changing internal and external conditions (Whelan, 2012:53).
According to Whelan, when looking at the static conditions of networks, there are two common ideal-type designs for network structure: hub, and all-channel (2012:43). Hub network is based on one member in the network taking a central role in controlling the flow of information by receiving information from all members and then disseminating it out again in a collated form (Whelan, 2012:47). This helps with ensuring that all members share a common situational awareness on an ongoing basis (Whelan, 2012:47). The central actor in a hub network usually has the most knowledge, capabilities, as well as resources, so that it could could coordinate the network’s activities (Whelan, 2012:49). All-channel network connects every member of the network to each other without no single member having more control over the flow of information than any others (Whelan, 2012:30). All-channel design leads to maximum connectedness between actors in the network – however, according to Whelan, having reached maximum density does not necessarily mean that the network can perform at its highest efficiency (2012:44). One particular risk with the all-channel network is that in case of all members disseminating information to other members of the network, the network can be overloaded by information, and may experience issues around coordinating information (Whelan, 2012:46). Hence, the capacity of a hub network to collate information makes it more effective than the all-channel network due better coordination of information and establishing a common situational awareness (Whelan, 2012:47). Moreover, a hub network design is better suited for big and more complex networks, as required when responding to large emergencies (Whelan, 2012:49). As the demand for network level competencies increases the likelihood of the network being mediated through a central actor increases (Kenis and Provan, 2008 in Whelan, 2012:49).
Internal network governance in networks is linked to network design, and pertains to how particular activities are managed and coordinated within a network (Kenis and Provan, 2008 in Whelan, 2012:50). The hub network is more likely going to adopt a model of governance where a lead organization brokers the activities of the network (Whelan, 2012:50). On the other hand, the all-channel network is more likely to adopt a model of shared governance (Whelan, 2012:50).
The most essential function of governance according to Whelan is the coordination of roles of agencies concerning their respective areas of responsibility within policy and operational questions (Whelan, 2012:50).
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Governments can create networks between agencies, or give an individual agency a mandate to create their own network, with the goal of managing so-called wicked problems (Whelan, 2012:54). Naturally, in such cases the networks form around the aims of the actor who created it (Whelan, 2012:50). When the aims of a newly created network have a direct link with the particular mandates and goals of specific agencies, essentially it means that those agencies need to be included in the work of that network (Whelan, 2012:57).
Networks are dynamic and may need to change the configuration of the network to maintain their effectiveness, based on changing internal and external contingencies (Whelan, 2012:59). Certain actors might be either included or excluded in order to adapt to circumstances, and even the adopted form of network governance might be changed when the situation calls for it (Whelan, 2012:31). This inherent flexibility that networks have gives them an advantage over other forms of organizations in the fields of security and emergency management (Whelan, 2012:59).
Network culture was defined by Whelan as the beliefs, values, as well as attitudes that are shared by network members (2012:63). The strength of culture depends on a multitude of factors: length of its history, stability of membership, as well as the different types of experiences the members have shared (Whelan, 2012:63). Culture affects networks as an informal mechanism of network control, as it assists in members prioritizing common goals over own specific goals (Kenis and Provan, 2006 in Whelan, 2012:63). Culture in networks can be analyzed from two levels: first, the culture of the network as a whole, as group; and secondly, the various cultures of members part of the network (Whelan, 2012:63). Network culture might be engineered by design, or be emergent (Monge and Contractor, 2003 in Whelan, 2012:64). Part of the network culture is common language that promotes effectiveness through improving communication (Whelan, 2012:68). The expression „information sharing culture“ with regards to networks refers to the norm of reciprocity that encourages sharing of information (Whelan, 2012:68). Information sharing is of paramount importance in security networks where failure costs are high – this has led to a shift in network information sharing culture in recent times from „need-to-know“ to „need-to-share“ (Whelan, 2012:68). Merging of different cultures of members in the network happens by sharing experiences in the operational environment (Whelan, 2012:77).
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Whelan defined network policy as the documented formal procedures that prescribe particular courses of action to the members part of an organizational network (Whelan, 2012:81). When it comes to ensuring that network members will prioritize network goals over individual goals, network policy is a much more direct form of control than network culture or network governance (Whelan, 2012:81). Network policy helps to regulate the sharing of information and defining of the roles and responsibilities of members of the network (Whelan, 2012:82). Security networks are often founded on policy frameworks that set the types of information to be shared with particular agencies, however, these policies cannot possibly cover all forms of information and in which situation it should not or should be shared, creating possible tensions in the network (Whelan, 2012:92). Network policies can also be cumbersome, as bureaucratic measures can undermine the flexibility of networks, complicating adapting to changing internal and external contingencies (Whelan, 2012:94). On the other hand, network policies bolster the stability of networks through laying out the exact ways regarding how a network is expected to function, leading to improved consistency in network responses (Whelan, 2012:94).
Whelan’s (2012) fourth level of analysis – technology – focuses on information sharing in relation to information and communication technology (ICT). Information management is crucial to the effective functioning of networks, as information is a major foundation of networks (Whelan, 2012:99). The analysis of technology examines two polar effects of network technology: network enabling, and network disabling (Whelan, 2012:97). Network enabling focuses the various benefits of ICTs in managing information in general, and the specific manner they assist in other network dynamics (Whelan, 2012:97). Network disabling focuses on the various issues related to the design and utilization of ICTs in networks (Whelan, 2012:97). Some of the many benefits of ICTs include faster speed of communications; lower costs associated with communications; new forms of communication that expand the options for means of communication; improved connectivity of ICTs; as well as integration of ICTs that allow networks to store and disseminate information in ways that were unfathomable not long ago (Whelan, 2012:98). ICTs enable network structure to be effective, as they supply an infrastructure through which members can communicate and exchange information in a manner that adds to the strengths of a particular network’s design (Whelan, 2012:101). Moreover, because networks are also dynamic processes of organizing, certain situations can require the design of the network to change from all-channel to a hub network – and the ICT infrastructure needs to be in place and capable to handle such sudden changes (Whelan, 2012:102).
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According to Whelan, technological infrastructure of a network and its culture must be mutually supportive of each other, and merging and connecting different ICT systems of members to support networks aids in breaking down cultural barriers between members of the network (2012:104). When it comes to the disabling aspects of technology in networks the design of the technological infrastructure may complicate information management due to incompatible systems – so called interoperability issues between systems of members, as well as due to insufficient capacity of systems to process vasts amounts of data and information (Whelan, 2012:104). Interoperability of systems refers to the “ability to transfer and use information in a uniform and efficient manner across multiple organizations and ICT systems” (Australian Government Information Management Office, 2006:5 in Whelan, 2012:105). The usual risk with policies that make recommendations for interoperability between various government department and agencies is that they are supposed to be guiding, not governing agencies – hence it is up to the discretion of particular agencies to either follow those guidelines or not (Whelan, 2012:105). Another issue related to use of technological infrastructure in networks – information overload - happens when information processing requirements exceed information processing capacity (Whelan, 2012:108).
Whelan’s fifth level of analysis – relational – refers to the:
- „relationships between actors in networks and the ways in which such relationships shape the effectiveness of networks“ (2012:119).
Whelan claims it is important to study relationships in networks on two levels: first, social networks – based on informal connections and interpersonal relationships; and second, organizational networks – built on formal links, policies and procedures, and inter-organizational relationships (2012:119). The effect of relationships can either be beneficial or detrimental to networks (Whelan, 2012:119). Both interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships that are built on trust will certainly increase the effectiveness of networks, whereas relationships permeated by distrust will decrease the effectiveness of networks (Whelan, 2012:119). According to Whelan the strength of interpersonal relationships, as well as trust, in an informal network, are linked to similar factors connected to the development of network culture - such as length of its history; stability of its membership; and types of experiences its members have shared (2012:120). Informal networks based on interpersonal relationships are commonly utilized to hasten the processes layed out in formal networks (Whelan, 2012:123). Informal networks can also be essential in figuring out a cross-jurisdictional solution to an unanticipated issue (Whelan, 2012:123). Moreover, informal
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networks based on interpersonal relationships may be used as leverage by bypassing cumbersome issues in formal networks; as well as in getting connected easier with new people who can give you access to a particular agency (Whelan, 2012:123). Regarding the risks associated with informal networks Whelan mentions that the „serendipitous“ nature of them makes them less reliable, and in addition to that, accountability is not high due to the lack of transparency and formal procedures (2012:124).
2.1. Analytical Framework
In order to assist researching the evolvement of interagency cooperation in the fourth chapter, the following analytical framework for analyzing network effectiveness was developed based on Whelan’s (2012) five levels of analysis, due to it being most comprehensive out of the theoretical models introduced earlier in this chapter, and because Whelan’s model helps to analyze shared situational awareness in the network better than the other introduced models. Part of this analytical framework will hence be the following five subquestions.
Sub-Research Questions
1) To what extent did the structure of the emergency response network in Estonia affect the development of interagency cooperation and a shared situational awareness?
2) To what extent did the culture of the emergency response network in Estonia affect the development of interagency cooperation and a shared situational awareness?
3) To what extent did the policy guiding the work of the emergency response network in Estonia affect the development of interagency cooperation and a shared situational awareness?
4) To what extent did technology of the emergency response network in Estonia affect the development of interagency cooperation and a shared situational awareness?
5) To what extent did relations of the emergency response network in Estonia affect the development of interagency cooperation and a shared situational awareness?
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Figure 2: Analytical Framework for Network Effectivness (Adopted from Whelan, 2012), Source: author of thesis.
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3. Methodology
The research of this paper is situated within a holistic case study of a recent crisis in Estonia and is explanatory. According to Neuman (2014:40), explanatory research seeks to find causes and reasons for the occurrence of specific phenomena. It seeks to find out reasons why a certain relationship between two or more variables exist (Halperin and Heath, 2012:117). Moreover, explanatory research is used in order to build, elaborate, extent, or test various theories (Neuman, 2014:40). The unit of analysis of this paper is the emergency response network in Estonia during the 2005 Northern Baltic Sea floods. This particular case was selected, as the emergency response to this crisis required the active participation of the whole emergency response network, and it allows studying the conditions that influenced interagency cooperation in great detail.
Research Design, methodology and legitimation of this choice
Case study research investigates one or a small set of cases in-depth, truly analysing the details and context (Neuman, 2014:42). Neuman identified strengths of case study research as enabling us to have a clear vision of abstract ideas through detailed observations; good suitability for theory-building, as the evidence collected through case studies paints a comprehensive picture of „complex, multiple-factor events/situations and processes that occur over time and space (Neuman, 2014:42).“ Other strengths of case study research are improving conceptual validity; having a heuristic impact in discovering solutions and leading to future learning; ability to highlight the details of social processes and mechanisms by which one factor affects others; possibility of calibrating measures of abstract concepts to lived experiences and specific standards; ability to aid in holistic elaboration of a phenomena (Neuman, 2014:42). The main weakness of this choice of research design is that because the number of cases is very low (N=1), the external validity of this research will be low and may not allow for generalizing.
15 Data collection methods
This study uses triangulation – interagency cooperation during an emergency response in Estonia is studied through desktop research of secondary observations regarding the case, document analysis of policy and strategy documents, and interviews with people who have knowledge about the case, selected through convenience sampling. Triangulation of methods improves accuracy of research by observing a phenomenon from different points of view (Neuman, 2014:166).
Observation data gathered by others regarding the case during the 2005 Baltic sea flooding will be used for desktop research. As the observation data already exists, it does not need to be collected, but selected and interpreted in the analysis.
Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating printed and electronic documents for the purpose of eliciting meaning, as well as developing comprehension, and producing empirical knowledge (Corbin and Strauss,2008, and Rapley, 2007, in Bowen, 2009:27). The process of document analysis follows a temporal path of finding, choosing, interpreting, and synthesising data – excerpts, quotations, as well as passages - contained in documents, that are subsequently categorized by main themes (Bowen, 2009:28). Document analysis as a method suits qualitative case studies – studies with a deep focus on a single phenomenon, event, or organisation – as it helps to reveal meaning and explore insights pertaining to the problem being studied (Bowen, 2009:29). Document analysis is a more efficient research method than others, as the data does not need to be collected, only selected, saving time (Bowen, 2009:31).
Semi-structured open-ended interviews allow respondents to reply in rich detail and clarify their answers (Neuman, 2012:333). Moreover, they allow the logic and thinking process of the interviewees to be revealed, and aid in discovering unexpected findings (Neuman, 2012:333). The author conducted six interviews with senior-level experts: two people on policy level who are currently working for the Ministry of the Interior, who during the January 2005 storm worked for the Pärnu County Rescue Board, and were involved in leading the emergency response on the ground, and were also part of the Pärnu County Crisis Committee; one person
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who was a high ranking employee of the Crisis Management Department of the Rescue Board, as well as a member of the Government Crisis Committee during the January 2005 storm, and who currently works in the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences; one person who is currently working for the Rescue Board, who worked for the Ministry of the Interior during the January 2005 storm; one person who is currently working for the Government Office of Estonia, who worked for the Ministry of the Interior during the January 2005 storm; and one person who is currently working for Estonia’s Academy of Science, who was a leading scientist in coastal engineering during the January 2005 storm and heralded warnings prior to the emergency. After being offered the options of phone interview, Skype interview, and e-mail interview, the interview respondents all preferred to reply to the interview questions by e-mail, as it was the most convenient method for them due to time constraints and other preferences. Receiving the answers to the interview questions in writing also saved some time due to transcribing not having been needed. The interview data used in the analysis – excerpts focusing on the main themes of the thesis – also had to be translated to English, as the interviews were conducted in Estonian.
Data analysis and assessment
The coding schedule for connecting empirical data from the interviews to the research questions will be divided into three stages: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. First qualitative data will be assigned preliminary analytic categories or codes – that is open coding (Neuman, 2014:482). Following the open coding a list of themes will be generated, that will assist in seeing the emerging themes; moreover, it stimulates finding themes in future; and lastly, helps to build a universe of all themes in the study (Neuman, 2014:482).
Then, the data will be analyzed for a second time – what is called axial coding - by organizing and linking the codes, and discovering key analytic categories (Neuman, 2014:482). Axial coding helps to investigate causes and consequences, conditions and interactions, strategies and processes, and locate the axis of central concepts of the analysis (Neuman, 2014:483). Once the main themes have been recognized, all the data, as well as previous codes, will be scanned to selectively identify cases that illustrate themes and make comparisons between them (Neuman, 2014:484).
17 Reliability and validity
Internal validity of the research will be high due to triangulation of methods: semi-structured open-ended interviews, desk research of observations of others regarding the case, as well as document analysis of policy and strategy documents. Furthermore, as the interpretation of the data depends on the researcher in qualitative research, possible biases of the research will be addressed to strengthen internal validity.
Internal validity is improved due to adequate control questions for the respondents of the interview. The choice of methodology for answering the research question is appropriate, as semi-structured interview questions allow the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena being investigated by allowing the respondents to elaborate their agency’s perspective further on interagency cooperation in Estonia.
Reliability of the interview method is adequate, but there is a margin of deviance – other researchers may not arrive at the same results/interview data depending on their overall methodology and sources and respondents. However, reliability will be improved by documenting the procedures of the case study in as many steps as possible, as recommended by Yin (Yin, 2009, in Cresswell, 2014:252). Moreover, transcripts will be checked for mistakes; it will be also ensured that there is no drift in the definition of codes by comparing data with the codes.
Generalizability of the data gathered from the interviews would be low, as the N is very low, and the focus is on gaining a deeper understanding of a process instead of a general overview.
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4. Analysis
The analysis of the evolvement of interagency cooperation in Estonia during the January 2005 Northern Baltic Sea storm will be carried out using the analytical framework of Whelan (2012) that was elaborated upon in the theoretical framework chapter. The analysis is divided into five sub-levels affecting effectiveness of the network and interagency cooperation, more specifically related to the general question whether a shared situational awareness was strengthened among participating agencies: structure, culture, policy, technology, and relations. The chapter first gives a brief general overview of the case studied, and then proceeds to analysis of documents, secondary observations, and interview data. Because the Ministry of the Interior of Estonia has only translated legislative acts and regulations since 2012 some of the excerpts from the documents analysed had to be translated by the author himself.
4.1. General description of the case
The cyclone known as Gudrun in the Nordic countries was one of the most powerful storms in the last half century, reaching hurricane force on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale, with gusts of wind reaching up to 46 meters per second (Kont et. al., 2006:3). Water levels in Pärnu rose up to 275cm compared to the Kronstadt zero that is used to measure the mean water level in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea (Kont et. al., 2006:3). Approximately 39% of Estonia’s terrestrial area was affected by the storm (Kont et. al., 2006:40). The county that was affected the most was Pärnu County, and in Pärnu City around 400 people had to be evacuated, and 775 houses with 5097 inhabitants suffered damages from the flooding (Kont et. al., 2006:41). Unfortunately, only a small fraction of the damaged houses was insured (Kont et. al., 2006:41). In Haapsalu, a town belonging to the Lääne County, 103 inhabitants had to be evacuated, as 159 houses were affected by the flooding (Kont et. al., 2006:41). Out of all evacuees, 14 people were injured and required medical treatment, mainly due to hypothermia; in addition to the hospitalized, there was one casualty (Kont et. al., 2006:44).
Insurance companies reported the damage to personal property in Estonia as €11.08 million, households most affected in Pärnu, Saare, and Lääne Counties; with damages caused to households amounting to €7 954 147 in Pärnu County; €410 976 in Saare County; and €827 834 in Lääne County (Kont et. al., 2006:42). The total damage to the private sector was
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estimated at €28 223 651, and the damage to the public sector at €19 644 445 (Kont et. al., 2006:44).
In addition to the damages caused by the flooding, the storm gravely incapacitated the power grid in Pärnu, Saare, and Lääne Counties on the coast, and Viljandi County in the inland, resulting in complete black-outs on the morning of January 9th in 21 000 households in Pärnu county, 17 800 households, as well as the Viljandi hospital, in Viljandi County (Kont et. al., 2006:46). Telecommunications networks, highways, roads, and ports were also severely damaged (Kont et. al., 2006:46).
The January 2005 storm prompted an activation of Estonia’s crisis management system on several levels. An interviewee from the Estonian Rescue Board gave an account of the tasks during the emergency on the national level:
“The Crisis Management Team of the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia gathered on the night of January 9th and carried out its duties until January 13th, when Estonian Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (EMHI) cancelled the storm warning. The Chair of the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia participated in the initial start-up period of the Crisis Management Team. The main tasks of the Crisis Management Team were to collect information regarding damages, casualties, evacuated people etc; then processing and analyzing the collected information; and finally, giving an overview of the situation to the Chair of the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia, Government of Estonia, and the President of Estonia. An additional task assigned to the Crisis Management Team was acquiring the supplementary resources requested by the County Crisis Committees.“
Commenting on the tasks of Counties’ Crisis Committees, an interviewee from the Estonian Rescue Board said:
“On the County level Pärnu, Läänemaa, Saaremaa, and Lääne-Virumaa County Crisis Committees, as well as the Crisis Management Team of the City of Tallinn began their work. The Counties’ Crisis Committees coordinated the cooperation between the local governments on their territories, and government agencies, companies, etc. They coordinated the alleviating of storm damages, delivering aid to the victims, housing the
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evacuees, setting up electric generators, monitoring the weather conditions, setting up information lines for advising the population, giving local governments and inhabitants orders, and participating in informing the public.
The Pärnu County Crisis Management Committee consisted of Pärnu County government -represented by the County governor, Pärnu town government – -represented by the mayor of Pärnu, Pärnu Rescue Board, Estonian national energy company Estonian Energy, Estonian Boarder Guard, Medical Services, Local government press, and the Läänemaa Police Precinct (Teearu, 2010:13). During and in the immediate aftermath of the storm the Estonian Rescue Board reacted to 406 calls, with help coming from the Defence League, Border Guards, the Police, as well as the Estonian Defence Forces (Kont et. al., 2006:54). As a result of the directives from the Pärnu County Crisis Committee evacuation teams were formed, with the main objectives of spreading awareness regarding weather conditions and help, and evacuating those in need (Sieberk, 2010:5). The Pärnu County Crisis Committee was mainly preparing for the consequences of the storm, but not for the sudden raise of water levels above the critical line in Pärnu and the subsequent flooding (Teearu, 2008). Neglecting the prognoses for the raising water levels proved to have caused most trouble.
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4.2. Structure
First, the structure of the emergency response network in Estonia during the January 2005 storm will be analysed to see to which extent and how it affected the evolvement of interagency cooperation.
Network design
Looking into the design of the emergency response network at that time it is possible to see that the network was comprised of ministries and agencies and other operational parties on two levels: strategic and operational.
It is possible to identify from §12 of section two of Chapter two of the Ministry of the Interior regulation that was implemented on 15th May, 2004, laying out the role and tasks of the Ministry of the Interior, that the latter was tasked with a central coordinating role in crisis management, arranging fire- and rescue-works on the strategic level (Government of Estonia, 2004). It can be understood from the following passage that the Ministry of the Interior had the central coordinating role in the emergency response network on the policy level, as it directed and coordinated the work of other agencies in the field:
“In arranging crisis management, state reserve, as well as fire- and rescue-works, the Ministry, in its competency:
1) directs, coordinates and arranges collecting, processing, and analyzing intelligence regarding major accidents, for the purpose of predicting and preventing the latter, as well as for eliminating the consequences;
2) directs, coordinates, and arranges the development of national operative plans for resolving crisis situations, and for the functioning of the crisis management system; 3) directs, coordinates, and arranges crisis management as well as the designing and development of communication- and measuring systems in the areas of fire department – and rescue;
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4) directs and coordinates the activities of local governments and state agencies, as well as arranging training and extra courses in the field of crisis management
5) coordinates activities related to the state reserve.” (Government of Estonia, 2004:2).
According to the report of National Audit Office of Estonia to the Estonian Parliament the particular role of the Ministry of the Interior was unclear because the rights and obligations of directing and coordinating had not been elaborated upon in the Emergency Preparedness Act (EPA) (2007:9).
In general, leading an emergency response on a strategic level would have been the task of the ministry in whose area of governance and jurisdiction the emergency happened (Government of Estonia, 2002:4).
Looking into the operative agencies of the emergency response network in Estonia during the January storm of 2005, one can refer to the Rescue Act (*the version amended in 2004), that stated that the rescue agencies of the state were the Estonian Rescue Board, the local rescue stations of the Rescue Board, and the Estonian Emergency Response Centre (Parliament of Estonia, 2010:2). However, the National Crisis Management Plan of 2002, that was still valid during the January storm of 2005, stated that agencies that will be included in the emergency response shall be all agencies which based on their tasks set forth by law would be obligated to react operatively (Government of Estonia, 2002:5). Moreover, companies, legal persons, not-for-profit organizations, and foundations could also have been included in the emergency response (Government of Estonia, 2002:5).
Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior at the time were (and still are) the Estonian Rescue Board, and the Estonian Emergency Response Centre. According to the main regulation of the Estonian Rescue Board, implemented on January 1st, 2005 – just days before the events of the storm – the Estonian Rescue Board was tasked by the Ministry of the Interior with the primary executive/operative role in areas of crisis management and rescue, and carrying out national supervision and implementing obligatory measures according to the basis of the regulation and its extent (Minister of the Interior, 2004:1).
The Estonian Rescue Board was tasked to manage the Estonian Rescue Board’s local rescue agencies, militarized rescue units, as well as the Estonian Emergency Response Centre (Minister of the Interior, 2004:1). Although technically accountable to the Ministry of the Interior, as stipulated by §6. of Chapter Two of the main regulation of the Estonian Rescue
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Board, the latter had a lot of tasks in leading the emergency response network in Estonia operationally, and in executing the crisis management policy:
“1) analysing and developing the field of rescue; 2) leading and coordinating emergency response;
…//6) arranging crisis management related activities in the field of rescue;
…//11) coordinating the work of emergency response agencies, including cooperation with other agencies and organizations;
12) participating in developing and carrying out national and international crisis management policy;
13) presenting an opinion regarding risk analyses and crisis management plans to the Ministry of the Interior, and arranging the development of an early-warning system; …//16) gathering, analyzing, and disseminating domestic and international intelligence regarding states of emergencies or dangers that may cause them;
…//19) developing draft legislation and standards related to the field of rescue;
20) developing or taking part in developing national development concepts and programmes related to the field of rescue;
21) designing and carrying out the developing of ICT systems in the field of rescue; …//23) informing the public about operative events and other activities in the field of rescue;
24) arranging informing the public in a state of emergency; …//” (Minister of the Interior, 2004:2).
Under the management of the Estonian Rescue Board there was the Estonian Emergency Response Centre, that now is a direct subordinate agency to the Ministry of the Interior. According to the main regulation of the Estonian Emergency Response Centre the latter had a responsibility to report to the Estonian Rescue Board, which directed and coordinated the former’s activities; and carried out professional supervision in a manner stipulated by the law (Minister of the Interior, 2004b:1). The Head of the Estonian Rescue Board had the powers to name and fire the Head of the Estonian Emergency Response Centre (Minister of the Interior, 2004b:2). The §6. of Chapter Two of the main regulation of the Estonian Emergency Response Centre states that among the tasks of the latter are:
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„//...//3) devising a development plan for the ICT systems and developing the ICT systems of the structural units along with the Estonian Rescue Board;
4) flesh out the development paths of ICT systems; arranging and coordinating the functioning of ICT systems of the Estonian Rescue Board and other agencies in the latter’s jurisdiction;
5) Planning and coordinating cooperation between the Estonian Emergency Response Centre and other services, companies, and organizations; as well as with respective agencies and networks of other countries;
6) Developing action plans for responding to major accidents, and for organizing the exchange of information, in cooperation with the Estonian Rescue Board“(Minister of the Interior, 2004b:2).
Section four of the National Crisis Management Plan of 2002 pertaining to leading and coordinating an emergency response set out the concrete tasks on different levels. If the scene of the emergency was connected to the territory of the local government, then the primary emergency response was to take place on the level of the local government (Government of Estonia, 2002:5). In order to tackle the emergency resources necessary for resolving the emergency would be put into use based on either the parish’s or town’s emergency response plan, or based on the order of the scene commander (Government of Estonia, 2002:5). If the emergency happened on the territory of a county, the emergency response would have been led by the parish governor; and if in a town, then the mayor of the town (Government of Estonia, 2002:5). It is further stated in the policy document that in order to coordinate the emergency response on the territory of a parish or a town a crisis committee may be formed if needed (Government of Estonia, 2002:6). However, forming a crisis committee, with the parish governor or mayor of the town, respectively, being the chairman, was obligatory in case there were more than 50 000 inhabitants in a parish or a town (Government of Estonia, 2002:6).
In the case the scale of the emergency was large enough to affect the territories of several local governments; demanded the application of resources from several local governments, or other extra resources; or in case the emergency response measures utilized at the local government level were not sufficient, the coordinating of the emergency response took place at the county level – with the crisis committee led by the county governor (Government of Estonia, 2002:6). The county governor was also supposed to form a crisis management team, which, in addition
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to the crisis committee, had to primarily assist the scene commander in resolving the emergency, coordinating cooperation, facilitating communication, requesting additional resources for resolving the emergency, as well as restoring the functioning of vital services (Government of Estonia, 2002:6).
In case the extent of the emergency was vast enough it could prompt immediate emergency response and its coordination on the national level (Government of Estonia, 2002:7).
Figure 3: Leading Emergency Response on different levels, based on EPA and National Crisis Management Plan (2007 report of the National Audit Office of Estonia to the Parliament, translated by the author).
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In order to deal with the emergency in Pärnu, which was most affected by the storm, a County Crisis Committee was formed, chaired by Toomas Kivimägi the Pärnu County Governor.
Network development.
When questioned about the structure of the emergency response network, and its development during the January 2005 storm, an interviewee who was part of the Pärnu County Crisis Committee and now works for the Ministry of the Interior related:
“first, the territory of Pärnu County was divided according to agencies for organizing the response at the scene; with the members of the (Pärnu County) Crisis Committee themselves commanding the scene. As the emergency progressed the command structures were changed, with five different scene commanders appointed to different districts of the County’s beach area. The work of the Pärnu County Crisis Committee was also supported by the Crisis Management Team of the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia.”
Mentioning some hindering factors related to the structure of the emergency response network and how it affected interagency cooperation an employee from the Ministry of the Interior explained:
“…//…we did a lot of improvisation. At the time we were not prepared to resolve such an emergency…//…the crisis management structures on the level of local government were unprepared; the work environment of the (Pärnu County) Crisis Committee were unprepared; there was an inadequate overview of resources that were possible to mobilize, and the conditions for mobilizing them.”
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An interviewee from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences expressed his perception of the functioning of the structure of the emergency response network during the January 2005 storm:
“//…smaller local governments were unable to form those structures (crisis committees and crisis management teams). The forces of the (Pärnu) County and the town (of Pärnu) were combined during the January storm. On the strategic level the Rescue Board, Police, and Ministry of the Interior joined forces to form a united Crisis Management Team of the Government of the Republic (of Estonia).”
The aforementioned statements confirm the statements of other interviewees regarding inadequate preparedness and insufficient capacity of smaller local governments in mobilizing the work of Crisis Committees and Crisis Management Teams in the emergency response.
Toomas Kivimägi, who was the chair of the Pärnu County Crisis Committee, mentioned that the members realized during the emergency response when a second storm warning came out, that their work can last for days, and that all people and positions in the Pärnu County Crisis Committee have to be doubled because the members are only able to stay up and effectively work 24, perhaps 36 hours at a time (Kuusma, 2005). The number of staff on the Pärnu County Crisis Committee was then increased to cover the extra need (Kuusma, 2005).
Commenting on how the events of the January 2005 storm influenced the evolvement of interagency cooperation in Estonia further, an interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior put it this way:
“the importance and development of crisis management in every country is influenced mainly by the experiences that have been gained from resolving emergencies; through which it is possible to realistically evaluate the functioning of institutions that provide security, imposed regulations, and principles that applied till now. The event (January 2005 storm) was a good “wake-up-call” for the whole of Estonia, where after this event the need and importance of developing crisis management and command systems was sensed more, bringing out the origins and thorough links from the problems that appeared in preparing for emergencies and resolving them…//…the whole (crisis
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management/emergency response) network has been in constant state of change/evolvement (since 2005).”
Another interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior explained how the structure of the crisis management network changed in the years following the events of the January 2005 storm:
“according to the current Emergency Act the exercising of crisis management is spread between many relevant agencies. Even though the Rescue Board largely dominates in executing crisis management, there is currently no central agency in Estonia who is directly responsible for crisis management operationally…//…the Ministry of the Interior has the role to shape policy and develop regulations. Executing policy (crisis prevention, crisis preparedness, and crisis management) takes place through agencies of various fields. In order to maintain such decentralized network crisis committees – also called cooperation arenas, have been created on different levels: local government (79), regional (4), and the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia (1). The main role of the (crisis) committees is to coordinate interagency cooperation primarily in prevention and preparedness. The crisis committees lack a direct role and need in resolving crises.”
An interviewee from the Estonian Rescue Board explained how the structure of the emergency response network has changed in Estonia since 2005:
“agencies have become more centralized, tasks of various agencies’ command structures have become more precisely regulated. Back in the day there were too many of all sorts of crisis committees and – teams. At that time the regional level was completely lacking, currently it is found in the structure of the Rescue Board and Police.”
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4.2.1. Sub-conclusions on Structure
Based on the documented formal legislative acts and regulations it can be deducted that Estonia’s emergency response network at the time of the January 2005 storm essentially had a hub-structure with the Ministry of the Interior having a central coordinating role, possessing the most resources, and having the capacity to collate information. The emergency response network hence also had a lead organization governance, with the Ministry of the Interior at the helm, coordinating the roles of its subordinate agencies regarding their respective areas of responsibility within policy and operational issues. The Estonian Rescue Board had been designated by the Ministry of the Interior as the lead agency operationally, being tasked with executing the policy. Due to the principle of subsidiarity emergency response had to happen at the lowest possible level, territorially led by either Parish Governor or Town Mayor, or County Governor, chairing their respective Crisis Committees. If the extent of the emergency required it, response would have been coordinated at the highest level – the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia, and the Crisis Management Team of the Crisis Committee of the Government of Estonia. Hence, at the time of the January 2005 storm in Estonia the emergency response network structure that was in place, had public administrators in charge of the emergency response in a territory under their governance, despite often lacking crisis management and emergency response related knowledge and know-how; and despite the Rescue Board having been designated the lead agency operationally in emergency response. According to the experts interviewed the emergency response network comprised of too many levels. All in all, it can be said that the structure of the emergency response network during the January 2005 storm did not contribute well to the development of interagency cooperation, and to establishing a shared situational awareness.
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4.3. Culture
Firstly, it is important to see how the interview respondents perceived notions of interagency cooperation and effectiveness of networks.
An interviewee who worked for the Pärnu County Rescue Board during the January 2005 storm, and is now working for the Ministry of the Interior defined interagency cooperation as
“the will and capacity of different agencies to cooperate and make common contributions to achieving objectives that have been commonly agreed upon.”
That statement indicates that the emergency response network needs to have a culture that is built on shared values and common goals that have been designed by policy or through mutual social or organizational relationships between individual members of agencies and the agencies themselves.
A second interviewee who worked for the Pärnu County Rescue Board during the January 2005 storm, and is also now working for the Ministry of the Interior expressed:
“interagency cooperation in resolving crises means that the agencies which have one or another role in resolving the crises need to be involved in the efforts in resolving (the crisis). These days it is difficult to imagine a crisis that is resolved by one agency alone.”
The aforementioned statement by the interviewee indicates task-dependency in emergency situations, where no one agency can do everything by themselves.
Lastly, an interviewee from the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences explained what he finds important in interagency cooperation:
“according to traditional take on the matter one could think about plans and procedures that have been created through cooperation of different agencies, and where agencies have agreed upon the necessary action for preparing for a crisis, and resolving a situation…//…in my opinion what is even more important is establishing a shared situational awareness; knowledge of different agencies’ areas of responsibility;
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expectations; routines and behaviour; and reaching the goal of resolving a potential crisis through cooperation.”
Shared situational awareness is hence central and of paramount importance to interagency cooperation.
When asked about what he perceives as important for network effectiveness, one interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior expressed that the things he deems important are:
“work culture centred on cooperation – that different agencies would be able to communicate with each other, find common areas, discussing and contributing to the achieving of some deliberate goals.”
Once again, the aforementioned statement by an interviewee illustrates how important aspects of network culture are for interagency cooperation, as they remove barriers from information-sharing and putting network goals above goals of single agencies.
Another interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior commented on network effectiveness by saying:
“effectiveness is subjective, it depends on what is it measured by. In order for networks to function it is important that its members would be aware of the subjects, would take responsibility, and be decisive.”
It can be implied that the previous statement made by an interviewee highlights the need for having a common awareness of issues at hand; and the need for the right configuration of network structure that would enable quick action by the network.
An interviewee who holds an academic position expressed his opinion on network effectiveness as:
“specialists who are familiar with the dynamics of such quickly developing processes (crisis management) need to be included in decision making…//…for such inclusion to be effective, there needs to already previously existing mutual trust and common understanding of used concepts and consequences of decisions between the parties.”
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An interviewee from the Estonian Rescue Board expressed his perception concerning common objectives of the crisis management and emergency response network:
“the agencies of the crisis management network had a common main objective – to save lives and minimize property damages.”
An interviewee from the Ministry of the Interior commented on the awareness of common objectives between the emergency response network members during the response to the January 2005 storm, and elaborated on whether there were any disagreements:
“generally, there were no problems, however, the Defence League acted largely in an arbitrary manner and did not always obey the commands that the County Governor and the Scene Commanders (in Rescue Areas) gave.”
This indicated that cooperation in the emergency response went mainly well between different agencies and other members of the network, with some minor discrepancies.
Culture as a group as whole.
Members of the emergency response network in Estonia had approximately one decade of experience of working together at the time of the January 2005 Northern Baltic storm. Furthermore, the configuration of the network had gone through various changes throughout those early years of Estonia’s re-independence, possibly affecting network culture.
The culture of the emergency response network was not emergent, as it was designed by authorities to ensure common values, beliefs and attitudes across the network. The emergency response network in Estonia based its work on four principles: 1) decentralization – each ministry is in charge of crisis management activities in its own area of governance; 2) interagency cooperation – needs to be efficient, and is necessary for preparing for and resolving emergencies; 3) constant tasks – all agencies and people will also perform their tasks in emergency situations; 4) subsidiarity – all activities related to an emergency response will be carried out at the lowest possible level (Ministry of the Interior, 2017b).
