The Reforms of the Dutch Development Cooperation Policy

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29 May 2015

Heine Lageveen S1805932

University of Groningen Faculty of Arts International Relations & International Organization MA Thesis Prof. Dr. L.E. Lobo-Guerrero

The Reforms of the

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Declaration by candidate

I hereby declare that this thesis, “The Reforms of the Dutch Development Cooperation Policy: Increased Aid Effectiveness or Unbridled Economic Profit Making”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name Heine Lageveen

Signature

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List of Abbreviations

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DGGF Dutch Good Growth Fund

FDI Foreign Direct Investments

GNI Gross National Income

ICCO Christian Development Coordination Committee (Interkerkelijke Coordinatie

Commissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking)

IMF International Monetary Fund IO International Organization

IR International Relations

LDC Least Developed Countries

MFI Micro Finance Institution

NCDO Dutch Advisory Centre for Citizenship and International Cooperation

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PvdA Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) SME Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise SSDC South-South Development Cooperation TDC Triangular Development Cooperation

UK United Kingdom

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WRR Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad

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Introduction

Development cooperation started after the Second World War as a project executed by Western states with the objective to assist poor countries in their development process. Over the years that followed a whole range of new strategies was invented and applied and new actors – such as non-governmental organizations, non-Western states, and private philanthropists – reported to the scene. But the basic objective behind development cooperation remained the same: to reduce poverty and to promote development in poor countries. Unfortunately, it is now increasingly clear that the past decades of foreign aid, during which trillions of Euros, Dollars, Pounds, and other currencies (from 1960 till 2013 at least US$3.5 trillion to be more precise) were sent to the world’s developing regions, have not been utterly effective and did not bring overall development to recipient countries.1 To the contrary, multiple scholars convincingly argue that due to international development cooperation the economic and social situation in these countries has actually deteriorated.2

Dambisa Moyo is one of them. She is a Zambian-born economist who occupied senior positions at the World Bank and at Goldman Sachs. In 2009 she released her bestseller Dead Aid, in which she is highly critical about foreign aid to developing countries.3 The book combines statistics of development indicators with consequences of development cooperation policies, and the conclusions are both clear and distressing. Between 1970 and 1998, when aid flows especially to Africa were at their peak, the poverty rate in Africa rose from 11 per cent to 66 per cent. In addition, life expectancy fell to what it was in the 1950s, and adult literacy across many developing countries is currently below pre-1980s levels.4 The Dutch scholar Wiet Janssen sketches a similar image by concluding that the correlation between total aid and economic growth in developing countries since 1970 is reverse. Specifically studying the Netherlands, he found “the Dutch aid efforts to be largely ineffectual”.5

Based on these dreadful results, it is not surprising that both policy makers and academic scholars are eager to identify the reasons behind this dichotomy whereby development cooperation with the obvious intention to develop poor countries actually has zero or even the opposite effect.

Within international political economy, two meta-theoretical approaches can be distinguished that tend to identify such causes: those focused on the behaviour of individual states and those focused on the

1_{Nancy Qian, “Making Progress on Foreign Aid,” Annual Review of Economics 7, no. 1 (2014): 278.} 2

Amongst others: William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).; Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (London: Penguin Group, 2009).; Lodevicus Janssen, Management of the Dutch Development

Cooperation (Enschede: University of Twente, 2009).

3

Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (London: Penguin Group, 2009).

4

Ibid: 5.

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6 operations of social structures.6 The first group consists out of so-called individualistic approaches and looks at endogenous factors for explanations. A key assumption of this approach – of which Rostow’s modernization theory as well as theories informed by rational-choice frameworks, such as neoliberalism, are part –7 is that there is equality of opportunity.8 Inequalities are therefore explained by the individual choices made by states. In other words, poverty is largely self-induced and can be overcome by hard work and a revision of the national decision-making strategy.9 The second group, labelled structuralist perspectives, draws attention to the interconnected nature of development issues. Approaches such as Wallerstein’s world system theory and other dependency theories belong to this group.10 They highlight the ways in which more powerful states are able to impose their preferences on less powerful groups through the exercise of economic, social, and political power.11

Both approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. For instance, individualistic approaches have benefited from the precision with which they identify their units of analysis (individuals) and their behavioural models (rational choice). However, by pleading for developing states to ‘catch up’, at least modernization theory relies on certain value judgements about the desired ends of development and is therefore susceptible to ‘Westernization’-thinking.12 The latter approaches, on the other hand, reject a linear (Western) conception of development and instead believe there are multiple paths. This appears to be correct considering that most poor states adopted capitalism as their economic system – the driving force between Western success – without it bringing development. On the downside,

6

Alastair Greig, David Hulme, and Mark Turner, Challenging Global Inequality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 23-29.

7_{Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University Press, 1960).}

Rostow identified all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: (1)

traditional society; (2) the preconditions for take-off; (3) the take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; and (5) the age of high consumption. These universal stages could be read into the past and future of all societies. The ‘take-off’ metaphor suggests that modernization entails a sharp break between the more static social relations of

traditional (underdeveloped) society and the more fluid conditions of modern (developed) society.

8

Alastair Greig, David Hulme, and Mark Turner, Challenging Global Inequality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 24.

9

10_{Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York: Academic Press, 1974).; J.S. Valenzuela, and}

A. Valenzuela, “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Development,” Comparative Politics 10, no. 4 (1978): 544.

World system analysis defines ‘dependency’ as a “situation in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by the development and expansion of another”. Wallerstein and other dependency theorists argue that capitalism is not an economic phenomenon injected into individual states to promote modernity. To the contrary: capitalism was born as a world system of unequal states. This framework therefore turns modernization theory on its head. While Rostow maintains that any relationship between traditional, underdeveloped societies and modern, capitalist societies would result in mutual gain, dependency theory assumes that the possibility of poor states’ development is hindered by this relationship.

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7 dependency theories have been accused of falsely presenting the global economy as a zero-sum game, and for allowing scope for a ‘victim mentality’ to emerge amongst developing regions.13

Dominant International Relations (IR) theories that analyze the practice of development cooperation – mainly political realism, world system theory, and liberal institutionalism – largely fall into either one of these overarching approaches. This essay is however not using one of the dominant frameworks but instead embraces another approach to analyze the practice of development cooperation. The theory used here is informed by the findings on gift-giving of the French sociologist Marcel Mauss, and it is somewhat a mixture of the endogenous and the exogenous approach.14 It for instance accepts that relative power variations between states play a role in the significant developmental gaps between states, but it also adopts certain assumptions of rational-choice frameworks. The conclusion that Axelrod draws in his classical investigation of the evolution of cooperation, namely that a ‘tit-for-tat’ pattern leads to cooperative behaviour and the promotion of mutual benefit, is for example also recognized.15 Although Mauss’ theory has only rarely been applied to the realm of bilateral international development cooperation, it is used here because it is presumed to provide better explanations for development cooperation’s history of ineffectiveness, and – in contrast to most other theories – it offers a number of possible solutions to counter this detrimental situation.

The case study used in this thesis is the Dutch development cooperation policy. The Netherlands is an interesting case because the Dutch government started to profoundly restructure its national aid policy five years ago. The Dutch have a long history of development cooperation, and the country has been praised numerous times over the past decades for its good practices, commitment, and generosity – not so long ago even by Bill Gates, the world’s wealthiest philanthropist.16 But the recent changes reformed the policy drastically, and even revised these features that were praised most: first and foremost the inclusiveness, the budget, and the altruism. Not surprisingly therefore, the policy modifications have been severely criticized.

13

Alastair Greig, David Hulme, and Mark Turner, Challenging Global Inequality (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 88, 92-96.

14_{Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1966).} 15

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

Axelrod’s theory is a game theory that is founded on, or connected to, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Social Darwinism. Axelrod argues that the best strategy to gain personal benefit in a relationship is to cooperate. By promoting the mutual interest in a relationship rather than by exploiting the other’s weakness both sides benefited most. Tit-for-that means that one should cooperate on the first move, and subsequently reciprocate what the other player did on the previous move. Tricky strategies might gain a few points in the short term, but will be disadvantageous in the long run.

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8 It for instance stimulated the international community and civil society organizations to express their concerns about the future and the role of Dutch development cooperation. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) articulated its worries by stating that “development objectives [...] should not be confused with the promotion of Dutch commercial interests”.17 From inside the Netherlands, strong condemnations came from Professor Jan Pronk, former Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation and a highly-respected international diplomat. In an emotional letter to the Dutch Labour Party (Partij

van de Arbeid, PvdA), the political party that he served for almost fifty years, he argued that the

“foundations of a social democracy are at stake” now that his own party is responsible for the harsh modifications of the Dutch development cooperation policy.18 He subsequently decided to resign his PvdA membership.

These examples illustrate the general scepticism and mistrust with which the reforms were received, and they represent the prevailing conviction that the Dutch development cooperation policy changed for the worse with those reforms. But is this a fair judgement? Considering that the previous decades of development cooperation did not lead to meaningful improvements either, the Dutch reforms should at least be given the chance to prove their worth instead of being condemned beforehand. In order to determine this and to answer the main questions posed in this thesis, namely whether the reforms of

the Dutch development cooperation policy can be expected to enhance aid effectiveness, the

Dutch aid strategy will be analyzed based on an evaluation of the new ‘flagship’ development instrument of the Netherlands: the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF), which came into force in 2014. To narrow down the analysis further, the Fund’s application in the Caucasian country of Georgia will be evaluated. Although Georgia ceased being an official development partner country of the Netherlands in 2011, the DGGF is still available for the country and Georgia can therefore serve as a case study.19

In order to answer the main question, the thesis is divided into two sections that each answer two or three sub-questions. The first section introduces the to be-applied theory, accounts for the lack of success of development cooperation, and evaluates proposed solutions to counter this detrimental situation. Marcel Mauss’ reflections on gift-giving form the theoretical basis and will be augmented by the insights of anthropologists Marshall Sahlins and Pierre Bourdieu. In addition, because theorizing about gift-giving is not as common in IR as it is in sociology and anthropology, it is deemed necessary

17_{Development Assistance Committee, The Netherlands Peer Review 2011 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011): 12.} 18

Jan Pronk, “Afscheid van de PvdA,” Jan Pronk Weblog, 28 May 2013, www.janpronk.nl/weblog/nederlands/mei-2013.html (accessed 7 May 2015).

19

Rijksoverheid, “Betrekkingen Nederland – Georgië,” Rijksoverheid online,

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9 to stipulate how exactly development cooperation accounts as a gift-giving practice. The following sub-questions will be answered here:

1. What is The Gift? (explanation of theoretical framework)

2. What accounts for the lack of effectiveness of development cooperation? 3. What is the best method to increase aid effectiveness?

While in the first section the investigation remains at a high level of aggregation, the second section dives into the case study at hand. First, the Dutch development cooperation will be analyzed and a comparison will be made between different time periods – the contrast between the current policy and the approach before the latest reforms will receive most attention in this respect. After that, the DGGF will be examined. This second part will thus answer the following sub-questions:

4. How did the reforms change the Dutch development cooperation policy?

5. Will the new Dutch development cooperation policy, as represented by the DGGF, increase aid effectiveness?

To better explain the focus of this thesis, certain concepts have to be defined. Firstly ‘development cooperation’. What constitutes development cooperation is open to debate and is even a source of controversy. This essay takes Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a baseline.20 ODA is defined by the DAC, and as a member state of this Committee the Netherlands uses ODA as a foundation for its national foreign aid policy. Consequently, aid flows stemming from other sources than a governmental body – for instance private donations – will not be taken into consideration. Furthermore, ODA provided directly to recipient states by national, governmental institutions is the topic of this essay.21 Although ODA flows running trough multilateral institutions will be assessed, this is thus not the main focus. Lastly, in order to make this essay not too dreadful to read, the application of the term ‘development cooperation’ will be used synonymously with ‘foreign aid’.

20

Official Development Assistance is defined as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA

Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development institutions which are: (I) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (II) each transaction of which: (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective (thus excluding aid for military and other non-development purposes); and (b) is concessional in character and coveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent”. Source:

Development Assistance Committee, “Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage,” OECD

online, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (accessed 7 May

2015).

21

Bilateral aid is aid provided from one donor country to another recipient country. It is distributed by a

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10 Secondly, the difference between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ donors. Traditional donors have a longer history as aid-providing countries and they are assembled as the twenty-eight member states of the DAC.22 Traditional donors’ individual foreign aid policies have many similarities because of their binding commitments as DAC members. The Netherlands is a traditional donor country. Non-traditional donors is a more diverse group that have less in common: China and India are non-traditional donors, as well as the wealthy (Middle Eastern) members of the OPEC, and Brazil and South-Africa. Some of the more influential non-traditional donors have a colonial history, and they refuse to identify themselves as ‘donors’ for the term’s alleged association with neo-colonial interference.23 There is sometimes tension between traditional and non-traditional donors as both groups have adopted different aid strategies – this will receive more attention further in this essay and it explains the controversy over the definition of development cooperation. Because the Netherlands is the case study here, this thesis analysis the ineffectiveness of aid provided by traditional donors.

Thirdly, the effectiveness of development cooperation has to be defined. Since the reformed Dutch aid policy is scrutinized, the Netherlands’ definition of the concept is the best source to determine whether the new strategy will be beneficial for achieving effectiveness. In a recent policy document it becomes apparent that the Dutch see effective development cooperation as aid which reaches its developmental targets.24 These targets are defined in the policy paper A World To Gain.25 This document speaks of three important aims of the current Dutch development policy of which to first two specify what the Netherlands mean with effective foreign aid – namely: poverty eradication (in one single generation) and inclusive and sustainable growth all over the world.26 Consequently, these two targets are adopted in this thesis as the benchmark to determine foreign aid effectiveness.

To conclude, the thesis will be formed by a qualitative research in which academic writings (journals and books) are consulted and used to formulate an argumentation. These sources will be complemented with policy reports of the Dutch and Georgian governments and other (international) (non-)governmental organizations; articles in newspapers and other popular magazines; and my own experience as a trainee at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Georgia.

22

Development Assistance Committee, “DAC Members,” OECD online, www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm (accessed 7 May 2015).

23_{For practical reasons, this thesis will continue using the term non-traditional donors when referring to those}

aid-providing states. Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development

Cooperation,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37, no. 2 (April 2012): 257.

24_{Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Basisbrief Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (The Hague: Dutch}

Parliament, 2010).

25

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, A World To Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment (The Hague: Dutch Government, 2013).

26

The third aim of the Dutch development cooperation policy has little to do with development in poor

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Chapter 1: The Gift

The theoretical framework applied in this research is developed by the French sociologist Marcel Mauss during his visits to indigenous tribes in Polynesia, South America, and other parts of the world at the beginning of the 20th century. Mauss was one of the first anthropologist to explore the social relations of giving, when he was invited to join different ceremonies during which tribes exchanged gift with each other. During these ceremonies, Mauss made the important observation that once a present had been given away, the receiving party feels the absolute urge to reciprocate the gift. Since this was similar across continents during every ceremony he attended, he came to the key insight that the compulsion to reciprocate is a universal norm in human society.27

To understand where this norm to reciprocate came from, Mauss started to wonder what force resides in the object given that compels its recipient to make a return. He came to the almost mystical conclusion that the object received is never inactive. To the contrary, all objects have a spiritual power – the hau – that binds the identity of the giver to the given object. In other words, by transferring an object the giver also gives a part of himself away. And this hau wishes to return to its origin.28 Hence, once a gift is accepted, the notion of an expected return of the gift creates a social bond between the giving- and the receiving-side that lasts until the future moment of exchange. A key understanding of the Gift is therefore that every exchange cannot be understood in its material terms apart from its social terms. Or, as Rosalind Eyben puts it, a gift is a material expression of a social relation.29

The social relationship that it creates and reinforces makes gift-giving different from the two other forms of resource allocation: economic exchange and redistribution. Economic exchange refers to the simultaneous exchange of goods and services between two parties that is mediated through contractual agreements and enforcement procedures. Redistribution, on the other hand, is the allocation of resources through a central authority. It takes place on the basis of claims over rights or entitlements, and as such is informed by predetermined standards.30 In contrast to the other two forms, giving practices are characterized by a lack of socially sanctioned laws or rights. Gift-giving only creates a social obligation to reciprocate. This has led Mauss to conclude that the primary purpose of giving is not the allocation of resources itself but the creation and fostering of a social relation.31

27_{Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1966):}

8-12.

28

Ibid: 11-12

29_{Rosalind Eyben, “The Power of the Gift and the New Aid Modalities,” IDS Bulletin 37, no. 6 (2006): 89.} 30

Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 4 (2001): 635-636.

31

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12 What kind of social relation it initiates makes Mauss clear when he states that gift-giving is not only able to mitigate conflicts, but it also creates a sense of ‘common life’ among otherwise antagonistic and competing societies.32 That Mauss’ perspective of the world is close to structural Realist thinkers is demonstrated by his believe that the under structure of society is war.33 However, he disagrees with Realist thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes on how a ‘war of all against all’ should be prevented. While Hobbes insists that only a structure of submission, in which all parties capitulate to a absolute authority (the Leviathan) would bring an assurance of peace, Mauss believes that this assurance is laid down in the Gift.34 He maintains that through gift-giving societies have progressed in the measure that they themselves have been able to stabilize their relations by giving, receiving, and repaying.35 In other words, the exchange of gifts establishes and maintains relationships of solidarity while simultaneously reducing distrust.36

As such, Mauss’ original framework of the Gift presupposes that gift-giving is a way to advance social ties, equality, and solidarity. This is what Pierre Bourdieu calls the ‘cycle of reciprocity’ of giving, receiving, and reciprocating. However, and this is of key importance, Bourdieu also states that “the simple possibility that things might proceed otherwise than as laid down by the ‘mechanical laws’ of the cycle of reciprocity is sufficient to change the whole experience of practice and, by the same token, its logic”.37 In other words, he opens up the possibility that gift-giving actually provokes other – less benevolent – developments that negate the promotion of solidarity and equality. In addition to Bourdieu, Marshall Sahlins is also critical about Mauss’ framework for its failure to incorporate power relations. Both Bourdieu and Sahlins point to the time between the acceptance of a gift and the return of a counter-gift, and the ‘shadow of indebtedness’ that evolves over time between these two actions.38

32

Ibid: 17; Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 233.

33

Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1966).; Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974): 169-182.

34_{Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974): 169-182.; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan}

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).; Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, and Richard Devetak, Theories of

International Relations (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2009): 33-36.

Hobbes believed that conflict will prevail in society due to the understandings that (1) men are equal; (2) they interact in anarchy; and (3) they are motivated by competition, diffidence, and glory. The only manner in which the Hobbesian logic of conflict can be evaded is if one or more of these assumptions either does not hold or is counter-balanced. Such a counter-balance could be that all men agree to a social contract and be ruled by a strong, undivided government or ruler – the Leviathan.

35

Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1966)L 278-279.

36

Frank Adloff and Steffen Mau, “Giving Social Ties, Reciprocity in Modern Society,” European Journal of

Sociology 47, no. 1 (2006): 102-106.

37

Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): 99.

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13 To better describe the ‘shadow of indebtedness’ Sahlins introduces three typologies of giving according to different degrees of reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity is the type that best matches Mauss’ conception of giving: it reflects an affirms social relations between social equals. In generalized reciprocity, the second type, the norm to reciprocate is temporarily suspended through society or between generations. This type is common within societies that are characterized by a high degree of social cohesion, such as families or other patriarchal groups. Although the necessity to reciprocate is suspended, it has not disappeared. In the third type named ‘negative reciprocity’, to the contrary, the universal obligation to reciprocate no longer holds.39 The ability to suppress the norm of reciprocity introduces a new dynamic into the relation, one that is informed by the above-mentioned ‘shadow of indebtedness’: the recipient is constrained in his relations to the giver of things.40

Negative reciprocity is the main focal point in this essay.

In cases of ‘negative reciprocity’ the recipient is in debt and until this debt is discharged the relationship of the parties involved is in a state of imbalance. Sahlins defined this imbalance as a ‘social hierarchy’ between donor and recipient: the one who has benefited is held in a responsive position in relation to his benefactor. Furthermore, he even suggests that in some instances the formation of a social hierarchy becomes the objective of a gift-giver. To secure a higher rank and a leadership-position, excessive generosity is the key because social inequality is more the organization of economic equality.41 Consequently, under Sahlins’ category of ‘negative giving’ in which the norm of reciprocity is indefinitely suspended, the social relationship that is created and maintained by gift giving is one of superiority and inferiority, instead of being an interplay of honor, dignity, and equality.42

Picking up on the receiving side of this hierarchical giving relationship, Bourdieu introduces the notion of ‘symbolic domination’ to describe that, over time, the asymmetrical relationship created by unreciprocated gift-giving is accepted as the normal order of things and both sides start behaving accordingly. The previous paragraph already described that by giving one shows his superiority; his higher rank in a relationship. By the same logic, to accept a gift without having the ability to give in return, the receiving side is forced into other forms of reciprocity. As such, until he has given back, the notion of the Gift obliges the receiver to show his gratitude towards his benefactor, or at least to show his regards for him, to go easy on him, and to pull his punches.43 In other words, postponing the act of

39

Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London: Tavistock, 1974): 191-196.

40_{Ibid: 208.} 41

Ibid: 205-207.; Piere Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): 107.

42

Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation,” Transactions of

the Institute of British Geographers 37, no. 2 (April 2012): 259.

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14 reciprocity forces the receiver into submissive behavior; into a position of clientism. Or, as Stirrat and Henkel put it, “the pure gift becomes, in the end, the currency of a system of patronage”.44

Symbolic domination is therefore the practice that signals and euphemizes social hierarchies. It adds another feature to the status of a donor in a relationship: besides the dominant party he is now also the generous party. In addition, by accepting a gift that it is unable to return, the recipient not only takes the gift but by doing so it acknowledges and confirms the social order that it produces. Consequently, what begins as a simple euphemization of a social hierarchy becomes an active misrecognition over time, eventually naturalizing the inequality between donor and recipient as the normal state of affairs.45 The central idea is therefore that the giving of a gift, one that the recipient is unable to reciprocate, is a mechanism for the generation of asymmetries of power.46

Summarizing the findings so far, it becomes clear that the perception of the gift adopted in this essay underwent quite some changes. Whereas Mauss perceives gift-giving as a means to organize relations of solidarity and equality, Sahlins and Bourdieu call attention to the asymmetrical relationship that gift-giving creates and intensifies. Both therefore agree that giving is a deeply social act, but the consequences they attach to it are contradictory. The latter two argue that an unbalanced relation is created when a present remains unreturned. As such, two elements should be stressed. First, the answer to the question whether gifts are given freely or if they involve some implicit expectation is answered similar by all three theorists. Secondly, it is now clear that two different interpretations of gift practices coexist uneasily in today’s world: one emphasizing the unifying effect of gift giving, and the other stressing the ways that gifts can be used to acquire and exercise power.

Concerning the first element about the question whether expectations are attached to gift-giving, it is obvious that all three scholars believe that gifts are indeed burdened with obligations. Without it, a beneficiary of a gift would not feel the urge to reciprocate a gift and no relationship – either good or bad – would come into existence. Thus, gifts are not, and should not be, free. Nevertheless, there are scholars that disagree with this. Jacques Godbout and Alain Caillé, for instance, state that “any exchange of goods or services with no guarantee to recompense in order to create, nourish, or recreate social bonds between people is a gift”.47 As such, they stipulate that, for an exchange to qualify as a gift, there should at least be ‘no guarantee’ of a reciprocal act. Perhaps the most influential supporter

44_{Roderick L. Stirrat and Heiko Henkel, “The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World,”}

Annals – American Academy of Political and Social Science 554 (1997): 74.

45

Piere Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990): 98-111.

46_{Frank Adloff and Steffen Mau, “Giving Social Ties, Reciprocity in Modern Society,” European Journal of}

Sociology 47, no. 1 (2006): 104.

47

Jacques Godbout, Alain Caille, and Donald Winkler, The World of the Gift (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998): 20.; Alain Caille, “The Double Inconceivability of the Pure Gift,” Journal of the

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15 of this stance was Jacques Derrida, the 20th century French philosopher who argued that “if there is a gift, the given of the gift should not come back to the giving”.48

Derrida maintained that a true gift is totally altruistic – purely voluntary, unconditional, entailing no form of exchange or reciprocity. There should be no tangible reward, no prestige gained by giving, nor any penalties from failing to do so. His conception of the gift can therefore – oddly enough – be termed asocial for its unselfishness. However, this is also a fundamental weakness in Derrida’s conception: he defines actors as free-standing rather than the relational individuals that they are and he does not acknowledge that their behavior is part of, and informed by, a wider socio-political context.49 Derrida himself realized the impracticability of his approach as well by admitting that a free gift is probably impossible to construct: the moment someone conceives a certain transaction as a gift, it becomes weighted with obligations and therefore no longer qualifies as a pure gift.50

The second element, regarding good and bad gifts, is a major fault line in gift theorizing and lays at the heart of this essay. Mark Osteen dubs it a division between the ‘moral cement approach’ and the ‘Godfather Paradigm’.51

Mauss’ framework represents the moral cement approach: through gift-giving and reciprocity social ties are recognized and balanced social relationships are maintained. The Godfather Paradigm, which is in line with Sahlins and Bourdieu, is based on the premise that when I give more to you, I both enhance my prestige and engender deep obligations.52 It is believed in this essay that the difference in outcome is determined by the ability of the beneficiary of a gift to reciprocate. As Kowalsky put it: “in order for a gift to be a righteous act it must presume an ability on the part of the recipient to participate in such a relationship”.53 Reciprocity is therefore pivotal in gift relations: it determines whether gift exchanges are expressions of friendship, equality, and respect, or whether gifts lead to less noble outcomes such as manipulation, humiliation, and domination.

Altogether, it can be stated that the perspective of the gift adopted in this essay is close to an utilitarian view of the gift, for its focus on the instrumental rationality of gift-giving practices. The anti-utilitarian approach emphasizes that the gift has the theoretical potential to overcome a too economized view on society. Caillé and Godbout are proponents of this perception. For them freedom of the gift is a main characteristics, and reciprocity is not central. Instead, the gift has the ability to emphasize important

48

Jacques Derrida, “Given Time: The Time of the King,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 2 (1992): 166.

49

John Silk, “Caring at a Distance: Gift Theory, Aid Chains and Social Movement,” Social & Cultural Geography 5, no. 2 (2004): 232.

50

Jacques Derrida, “Given Time: The Time of the King,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 2 (1992): 167-172.

51

Mark Osteen, The Question of the Gift: Essays Across Disciplines, ed. Mark Osteen (New York: Routledge, 2002): 17.

52

53

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16 aspect of human relations that are downplayed in a modern society: forgiveness, love, and respect. In the utilitarian approach, on the other hand, assumptions of rational actors weighing their preferences according to some utility are predominant. Social preferences and context-dependent factors have to be taken into account, and reciprocal exchange is imperative.54

To conclude this chapter, the main findings will briefly be summarized. In the utilitarian perspective of the gift used in this essay reciprocity is of utmost importance. The exchange of gifts to each other creates a social bond between two parties based on solidarity, equality, and respect. This ‘balanced reciprocity’ is the concept of the gift introduced by Mauss: it reflects and affirms social relations between social equals. However, when a gift is not reciprocated the whole logic of gift giving changes. An unreciprocated gift lays a ‘shadow of indebtedness’ over its beneficiary: he is held in a responsive position in relation to his benefactor. Over time this situation creates a relationship of superiority and inferiority between the donor and the recipient. In other words, an asymmetrical relationship comes into being. The following chapter will subsequently elaborate how this theoretical framework of the gift can be used to analyze international development cooperation relationships.

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17

Chapter 2: Development Cooperation from a Perspective of the Gift

It is generally accepted that foreign aid as a practice started with the so-called ‘Point Four’-speech given by late American President Harry S. Truman in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949.55 Over sixty years later it unfortunately has to be concluded that the effect bilateral foreign aid has had so far is pitiable. Despite enormous amounts of money that have been spent on development cooperation, only a handful of countries unequivocally developed with the assistance of foreign aid.56 Most other recipients still belong to the group of poor states, and in some instances the situation even deteriorated. For example, Zambian-born economist Dambisa Moyo demonstrates that life expectancy of African people fell to what it was in the 1950s, and Dutch scholar Wiet Janssen concludes that the correlation between total aid and economic growth in developing countries is reserve.57 About Dutch development cooperation he said in 2009 that “the Dutch aid efforts [are] largely ineffectual”.58

The reason for this distressing outcome is a matter of debate in academic circles. According to political realism, foreign aid is nothing more than a policy tool that originated in the Cold War to influence the political judgments of recipient countries. The lack of success is attributable to the identification of foreign aid as a strategic instrument that will ultimately be used for selfish purposes of the donor instead of for the development of the recipient.59 In addition, world system theory recognizes foreign aid as a means of constraining the development path of peripheral states to a dependent role in the world market. According to this theory, the situation for recipient countries can only worsen as it was never the intention of donor countries to develop them in the first place.60 Liberal internationalism, on the other hand, thinks of foreign aid as a set of programmatic measures designed to enhance the socio-economic and political development of recipient states. This approach

55

Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address of US President Harry S. Truman (Washington: U.S. Department of the State Bulletin, 1949).; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Good Things Come To Those Who Make

Them Happen (The Hague: IOB Study, 2014): 31.

56

Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 234.

57_{Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (London: Penguin Group, 2009).; Lodevicus Janssen, Management of the Dutch}

Development Cooperation (Enschede: University of Twente, 2009).

58

Lodevicus Janssen, Management of the Dutch Development Cooperation (Enschede: University of Twente, 2009): 214.

59

Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 301-309.; Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).; Tomohisa Hattori, “Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid,” Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 4 (2001): 635-636.

60

Robert E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World

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18 generally embraces foreign aid and blames the lack of success on domestic errors in the recipient countries.61

Although the above perspectives are the most applied to analyze foreign aid, it is proposed here to adopt another approach. Namely, to perceive foreign aid as a Gift along the lines of the theoretical description of the previous chapter. It starts with the proposition that aid is intended as an act of ‘balanced reciprocity’ as Mauss’ theory prescribes.62

In other words, to identify foreign aid as a transfer intended to foster relations of solidarity between social equals. The aim of development cooperation would then be to boost shared prosperity. It becomes immediately clear on the basis of the previous paragraph that political realism and world system theory reject such a foundation for foreign aid. Namely that foreign aid may be provided as a noble act that embodies a vision of international peace and prosperity. Even liberals shied away from such claims, and instead prefer to view development cooperation as a technical expedient, facilitating what they regard as the real means of prosperity: commerce and trade.63 However, moral claims for foreign aid persist nonetheless.

For instance, from a theoretical perspective foreign aid has been identified as an ‘imperfect obligation’ from industrialized states to provide basic needs to their less developed peers.64 Grounds for engagement are also often religious in origin: many traditional donors refer to Christian values such as the movement towards an ethic of universal solidarity and love for one’s fellow human beings.65 Whereas secular motives for a collective solidarity are nowadays equally common and can be traced back to an Enlightened Humanism.66 In addition, many official donors make also explicit notice of a vision of peace and shared prosperity. For example, ODA is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective;67 the mission of the World Bank is to end extreme poverty and to boost shared prosperity;68 and the Netherlands has a development cooperation policy in order to promote sustainable economic growth in development

61

Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, “Foreign Assistance and Economic Development,” The American

Economic Review 56, no. 4 (1966): 679-733.; Oliver Morrissey, “Aid or Trade, or Aid and Trade?,” The Australian Economic Review 39, no. 1 (2006): 78.

62

Frank Adloff and Steffen Mau, “Giving Social Ties, Reciprocity in Modern Society,” European Journal of

Sociology 47, no. 1 (2006): 102-106.

63_{Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 230.} 64

Ibid.

65

John Silk, “Caring at a Distance: Gift Theory, Aid Chains and Social Movement,” Social & Cultural Geography 5, no. 2 (2004): 232

66

Ibid.

67

Development Assistance Committee, “Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage,” OECD

online, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (accessed 7 May

2015)

68

World Bank, “Ending Extreme Poverty and Promoting Shared Prosperity,” World Bank online,

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19 countries and worldwide.69 Consequently, it will not be boldly argued that donors give foreign aid with complete disregard of any surreptitious considerations or strategically motivated reasons. But it is maintained here that following a ‘hidden agenda’ is surely not the prime reason to provide foreign aid – as realists and world system theorists want us to believe. Instead, it is accepted that donors provide foreign aid with the benign intention to assist in the promotion of poor countries’ development and to boost shared prosperity on an equal footing.

As such, it is accepted here that official development cooperation is an exercise that commences from a standpoint of Mauss’ balanced reciprocity. Just like this approach emphasizes the unifying effect of giving, foreign aid is provided with the objective to forge and solidify social bonds for the larger benefit. Nevertheless, scholars such as Moyo, Janssen and many others have demonstrated that so far foreign aid has largely failed to do this. In order to account for the lack of success of development cooperation then, a reference to the two different interpretations of gift practices is in place: the moral cement approach and the Godfather Paradigm.70 The camp of the former corresponds with Mauss’ balanced reciprocity and thus with the original objective behind development cooperation. But the latter perspective is more in line with what currently takes place in the field of foreign aid. This approach makes notice of the dangers inhibited in giving if a gift remains unreciprocated. It argues that if the ability to reciprocate a gift is not respected, gift-giving causes a relationship to develop that feeds asymmetry and leads to ignoble outcomes such as domination and dependence.71 Asymmetry and dependence are indeed apparent in today’s development cooperation relationship between traditional donors and recipient states, and – instead of being a practice of balanced reciprocity – foreign aid of the past decades is thus better represented by the Godfather Paradigm and by Sahlin’s ‘negative reciprocity’.

Before this chapter moves on to an analysis of the source and the consequences of unreciprocated foreign aid, a short recapitulation of the standpoint of the Gift in relation to other IR theories is needed because to argue the ineffectiveness of aid is due to an asymmetry is of course not confined to Gift theorizing. To the contrary, asymmetry is a state-of-affairs that realists and world system theorists also observe as a key feature of foreign aid. However, the origin of it and the implications the latter approaches attach to it differ from the insights of the Gift. Political realists and especially world system theorists identify asymmetry as given and even desired by donors. As if the role and the intention of aid is to construct a moral ordering of the superior West and the inferior Southern

69

Rijksoverheid, “Ontwikkelingssamenwerking,” Rijksoverheid Online.

www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ontwikkelingssamenwerking (accessed 8 May 2015).

70

71

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20 recipients of its largesse.72 These theories therefore do not think the asymmetry can be reduced either, because to sustain inequality is the reason why aid is provided in the first place. The Gift, on the other hand, argues that the asymmetry is not desired by donors or recipients but that it develops due to the unreciprocated nature of present day foreign aid-giving. Although the Gift therefore acknowledges the detrimental state-of-affairs, it also endorses – in contrast to the other theories – that it is possible to change this situation: if the unreciprocated character of development cooperation can be reduced, foreign aid will be able to live up to its potential again. Consequently, the Gift has a more positive outlook about the chances to counter development cooperation’s lack of effect.

Another reason to apply the Gift is the simple conviction that the other IR theories fail to account for important features of foreign aid. For instance, in contrast to political realists, who predicted a sharp fall-off in foreign aid with the end of the Cold War, or world-system theories and liberal internationalists, who predicted an increase with the expansion of global capitalism, foreign aid as a percentage of traditional donors’ gross national income (GNI) has remained remarkably stable over the last decades.73 For the Netherlands, this percentage has fluctuated around 0.7-0.8 per cent since the 1990s, with a slight decrease only apparent in the last three recorded years.74 Another example is the observation that, with few exceptions, donors countries of foreign aid have remained donors, while recipients have remained recipients.75 This does not correspond with liberal internationalists’ logic which asserts that with an expansion of international trade the gap between rich and poor will decrease. But it is in line with the rationale of the Gift, which argues that unreciprocated gift-giving eventually naturalizes the inequality between donor and recipient as the normal state of affairs.76

Negative Reciprocity

While the above section of this chapter determined that foreign aid’s ineffectiveness results from a lack of reciprocity in development cooperation relationships, it has not accounted for the source of this unreciprocity nor did it fully elaborate on the consequences. That will thus be done here.

The lack of reciprocity can result from three sources: the recipients, the donors, or the design of the development cooperation strategy. To start with recipient countries; it is unlikely that they are the cause. “The compulsion to reciprocate is a universal norm in human society” – to quote Mauss – was

72

Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation,” Transactions of

the Institute of British Geographers 37, no. 2 (April 2012): 259.

73

Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral Politics of Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 234.

74

OECD, “Net Official Development Assistance (ODA),” OECD website, data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm (accessed 8 May 2015).

75

To the group of aid recipients that turned into donors include South Korea and Taiwan in the 1990s. China

and India, two major aid recipients, have also been donors. Source: Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral Politics of

Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 234.

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21 described in the previous chapter and proves that an intentional unwillingness on the side of aid recipients to ‘return the favor’ is for theoretical reasons not possible.77 Donors are equally implausible sources because it was earlier in this chapter established that they provide development cooperation as an act of ‘balanced reciprocity’, meaning that their intention is for foreign aid to succeed. This leaves as the only possible source of the lack of reciprocity the design adopted to provide foreign aid.

It is impossible to describe one single design that has been applied to provide bilateral foreign aid for the simple reason that there has never been one single method or strategy – the introduction already mentioned in this regard that “a whole range of strategies have been invented and applied”. However, an overarching feature is discernible that has influenced every aid policy from traditional donors over the past decades. Namely, charity (i.e. the unreciprocated giving for the generous rich to the needy poor) has constituted the dominant symbolic and performative regime for Western development cooperation.78 Charity means here that development instruments were constructed as one-way flows of financial and technical assistance, and that aid strategies never truly included incentives for recipient countries to contribute equally in a development relationship.79 There are of course plenty of good arguments in favor of a charitable regime and from a moral point-of-view it is perhaps even the desirable approach to foreign aid (think for instance of the ‘imperfect obligation’ argument).80 However, and this is of key importance, practicing development cooperation as a charitable undertaking forecloses – by definition – that an ability to reciprocity is included in an aid relationship. In other words, the lack of reciprocity and the subsequent asymmetry between donor and recipient is for a large part the outcome of the charitable style with which traditional donors have distributed their development cooperation.

The asymmetry that results from this is noticeable by observing the behavior both of donors and of recipients: while donors represent themselves as virtuous actors and praise themselves for the good work that they are doing, recipient states cultivate a feeling of humiliation for the continued aid flows that they receive but which they are unable to reciprocate. Revealing is for example that donor

77

Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Cohen & West, 1966): 8-12.

78_{Francesco Rampa and Sanoussi Bilal. “Emerging Economies in Africa and the Development Effectiveness}

Debate,” ECDPM Discussion Paper, no. 107 (2011): 9.; Emma Mawdsley, “The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37, no. 2 (April 2012): 264.; William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).; Dambisa Moyo, Dead

Aid (London: Penguin Group, 2009).

79

Lodevicus Janssen, Management of the Dutch Development Cooperation (Enschede: University of Twente, 2009).; Development Assistance Committee, “Untying Aid: The Right to Choose,” OECD online,

www.oecd.org/development/untyingaidtherighttochoose.htm (accessed 8 May 2015).

80

Untied aid is for instance a ‘one-way flows’ of financial assistance, and traditional donors have exchanged

tied aid for untied aid because the former reduces the ‘real value’ of aid by 10 to 40 per cent. Source: Ilan

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22 countries appear to be eager to be acknowledged as the most benevolent supplier of aid.81 The importance attached to positive media attention that highlights their virtuousness is eminent amongst donors, and in some instances this desire to be acknowledged has even led to a competition between donor states in order to determine who is the most benevolent.82 For recipients, the story is reverse. It has been noticed that they acquiesce into an inferior position vis-à-vis their donor countries – an acquiescence that Rosalind Eyben describes as follows in her study on donor-recipient relations: “[recipients] appear to slip quite comfortably into clientistic relations with donors”.83

There are a number detrimental consequences attached to this asymmetry that all contribute to the lack of aid effectiveness. For example the growth of antagonism between donors due to the aforementioned competition, and the advancement of ambiguous development cooperation strategies due to the emphasis on mediagenic results and superficial successes.84 The most serious consequence is however that the clientism of recipients has evolved into an utter dependency on foreign assistance.85 Even the World Bank recently noted that “aid can no longer be regarded as an adjunct to domestic investment resources but has become central to their economic management, and to the continued functioning of governments”.86 Consequently, dependency on foreign aid is one of the consequences of the charitable regime with which development cooperation is provided. And although dependency in itself is bad enough and is a major reason for the lack of aid effectiveness, an additional repercussion of the extreme reliance on external assistance is that donors have felt increasingly able to intervene in the internal affairs of developing countries in the name of improving (economic) well-being.87 For development cooperation this specifically means that donors have nowadays more and more taken responsibility for the identification and the preparation of aid projects within the sovereign borders of recipients.88 In other words, recipients have thus lost a major share of their ability and sovereign right to determine their own path to development.

81_{Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (New York: Routledge, 2008): 81-82.} 82

Kelly da Silva, “Aid as Gift: An Initial Approach,” Mana 4 (2008): 2-3, 12.; Mark Tran, “George Osborne Declares ‘Historic Moment’ on UK Aid Target,” The Guardian online, 20 March 2013,

www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/mar/20/george-osborne-historic-moment-aid (accessed 8 May 2015).

83

Rosalin Eyben, “The Power of the Gift and the New Aid Modalities,” IDS Bulletin 37, no. 6 (2006): 92.

84_{Kelly da Silva, “Aid as Gift: An Initial Approach,” Mana 4 (2008).; WRR, Less Pretension, More Ambition}

(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010): 158.; Arjan de Haan, “Development Cooperation as Economic Diplomacy?,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6 (2011): 203-217.; Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of

Development (New York: Routledge, 2008): 88-89.

85

David Williams, “Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions”. Review of

International Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 567.

86_Ibid. 87

Ibid: 567-568.; Lodevicus Janssen, Management of the Dutch Development Cooperation (Enschede: University of Twente, 2009): 90.

88

David Williams, “Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the International Financial Institutions”. Review of

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23 Consequently, two features stand out in this evaluation. First, foreign aid is constructed as a scheme of negative reciprocity and this is for a considerable part attributable to the charitable regime that traditional donors have adopted as a foundation for their national aid policies. Secondly, the outcome hereof is that an asymmetry develops between donor and recipients that has made many recipients dependent upon continued aid flows. Consequently, development aid is not able to live up to its aspirations and is troubled by a lack of effectiveness.

Conclusion

Summarizing the findings so far, it is clear that evaluating development cooperation through the lenses of the Gift draws a distressing picture of the foreign aid landscape. The current practice of foreign aid can be seen as unreciprocated gift-giving as described by Bourdieu and Sahlin in the previous chapter: it creates an asymmetric relations between recipient and donor that obstructs the realization of shared prosperity. Consequently, the impoverishment of the ability to reciprocate impinges on the nature of receiving and impedes the relationship of mutuality that the Gift seeks to foster.89 Nevertheless, not all is lost because the Gift also indicates that there is a chance for the good intentions of aid, whereas other theoretical approaches – such as realism and world system theory – argue this is not possible. Necessary is then that within aid systems opportunities are build that allow stakeholders to contribute according to their means. That way, reciprocation is assured; relationships of equality and shared prosperity can foster again; and the effectiveness of bilateral foreign aid increases.

Fortunately, scholars working with the Gift in international development cooperation have proposed solutions to move from the current practice of negative reciprocity and the Godfather Paradigm back to a situation of balanced reciprocity and the moral cement approach. The next chapter will evaluate four of the most promising alternatives and judge them on the basis of their merits.

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24

Chapter 3: Solutions to the Lack of Effect of Development Cooperation

The previous chapter described that Gift theory suggest that however benign the motivation and however generous the terms of aid, aid dependency between donor and recipient not only perpetuates but deepens if international development cooperation is provided in a manner that obstructs recipients from reciprocating.90 Unreciprocated aid giving creates an asymmetry between donor and recipient whereas their original intention was to cooperate as social equals. This accounts for the lack of success of foreign aid: donors become more preoccupied with their reputation at the expense of well though-out development policies, and recipients become increasingly dependent upon continued aid flows. If the aim of equity and prosperity through development cooperation is therefore to be realized, it is important to reduce the asymmetry by building into an aid system opportunities to contribute according to one’s means – i.e. to allow recipients to reciprocate.91

Scholars working with the Gift have fortunately proposed a number of alternatives methods to provide foreign. First, Ilan Kapoor suggests in his book The Postcolonial Politics of Development that multilateralization of aid and the channelling of development cooperation funds through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) might be a solution.92 Secondly, Cheryl McEwan and Emma Mawdsley propose that trilateral development cooperation (TDC) has the potential to help reconfigure and enrich the system of international development cooperation.93 And thirdly, Robert Kowalski proposes in his contemplation of the Gift that aid initiatives could be undertaken through an economic focus in which the nature of reciprocity is set out.94 Consequently, this gives us four alternative manners to distribute foreign aid which will be evaluated in the remainder of this chapter.

Multilateralization and Non-Governmental Organizations

The logic behind these alternatives is the believe that as long as aid is controlled by states, there is no getting away from issues like national interest and pride – and thus no getting away from the asymmetry issue.95 However, when funds are channelled through NGOs and multilateral institutions they act as mediating agents, which means that – in principle at least – the identity of donor countries and recipient states remains relatively anonymous and the donor’s control over the aid-gift reduces. Consequently, it appears that the social relationship of superiority and inferiority that develops during

90

91

Ibid: 237-238.

92

Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (New York: Routledge, 2008): 92.

93_{Cheryl McEwan and Emma Mawdsley, “Trilateral Development Cooperation: Power and Politics in Emerging}

Aid Relationships,” Development and Change 43, no. 6 (2012): 1185-1209.

94

Robert Kowalski, “The Gift – Marcel Mauss and International Aid,” Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 27, no. 3 (2011): 189-205.

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25 unreciprocated aid-giving no longer holds when the aid relation is not direct but negotiated by an NGO or a multilateral agency. Additionally, by reducing the donor’s control over the aid-gift, the recipient appears to have regained the ability to claim a leading role in setting development priorities and programs.96 Regarding NGOs, they are apportioned certain characteristics that make them even more promising actors. For instance, NGOs have nothing to gain in a national sense, and they are inclusive actors for their articulation of concerns that are widely shared by disadvantaged groups.97 Most importantly, Northern and Southern NGOs working together are said to present their alliance not as a relationship between giver and receiver but as a partnership between organizations bringing different but equal resources and skills.98 Consequently, channelling funds through NGOs and multilateral institutions seems a well-placed alternative to diminish the asymmetry between donors and recipients and the dependency issue.

Unfortunately however, on closer inspection NGOs and multilateral institutions appear not to be the egg of Columbus. For instance, NGOs are referred to as the ‘secular missionaries of the modern world’ for their susceptibility to advance donor loyalties and to promote donor interests.99

Key reasons for this compliance are the increasing dependence of NGOs upon governmental funding and the fact that they nowadays have to compete fiercely for the shrinking available funds – something that makes NGOs inclined to operate more with a business-minded attitude.100 This subsequently undermines the moral and ethical high ground NGOs claim to occupy and indicates that, how a-political they may try to be, NGOs are in the end just cogs that have to follow the rules of the game.101 Furthermore, developmental NGOs are in a very pragmatic sense dependent upon a continuation of inequality because without it they would face an existential crisis. Thus while, on the one hand, NGOs may be founded upon ideas of partnership and shared prosperity, their operations are, on the other hand, motivated and maintained by a recognition of difference and dependency.102

The same accounts for channelling funds through international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Tomohisa Hattori argues that the

Annals – American Academy of Political and Social Science 554 (1997): 72.; Tomohisa Hattori, “The Moral

Politics of Foreign Aid,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 234.; Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial

Politics of Development (New York: Routledge, 2008): 93.

97

99

Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (New York: Routledge, 2008): 93.

100_{Ibid.; Roderick L. Stirrat and Heiko Henkel, “The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO}

World,” Annals – American Academy of Political and Social Science 554 (1997): 70.

101

Roderick L. Stirrat and Heiko Henkel, “The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World,”