Ethnic Self-Identification of Eastern-Ukrainian IDPs Throughout the Conflict and Associated Mobility Process
Master’s Thesis in Sociology Migration and ethnic studies track
University of Amsterdam By Mariia Shaidrova Student number 11128305 Supervisor: Apostolos Andrikopoulos Second reader:
Prof. Dr. H.G Hein de Haas
Date of submission 30/06/2016
2 Abstract
Eastern Ukraine (Donbas region) has been suffering from an armed conflict (May 2014 - present day). This conflict has led to the internal displacement of at least 1.5 million people and is characterized by an explicit ethnic component (Ukrainian-Russian; West-East). It provides an excellent case study for understanding the interaction between ethnicity and mobility in the context of a conflict. The goals of this research were twofold. Firstly, to study how ethnicities were affected throughout the conflict situation and associated migration flows. Secondly, to understand what role ethnic self-identification played in the mobility decisions of IDPs. My analysis combines multi-level mobility theories (e.g., Faist, 2000) with a constructivist approach to ethnicity (e.g. Nagel,1994; Chandra, 2006 ). My research illustrates how these theories intersect in the situation of Eastern Ukraine. The study has a qualitative design, based on in-depth interviews which were analyzed using thematic analysis. These were conducted with 22 respondents from Donetsk and Luhansk (currently living in Kiev and Kharkiv), obtained through snowball sampling.
All respondents reported that both the Ukrainian and Russian ethnicities had become more salient and more strongly linked to politics since the conflict began. This political perception of ethnicity redefined the existing ethnic boundaries. To resolve the resulting tensions, some IDPs separated their political views from their ethnicity, referring to themselves as “apolitical Ukrainians” or “Donbas people”. For other IDPs, the strong disappointment in the ruling elite (of both sides of the conflict) led to the experience of “ethnic limbo”, as they refrained from associating themselves with any ethnic group. The interviewed IDPs appeared to have formed a new, completely separate identity of being “Donbas resettlers”. The factors which contributed to this new identity were social exclusion and discrimination in the host cities, quarrels with relatives and friends, and experience of a border between Donbas and the rest of Ukraine.
Among my respondents, I observed notable cases of IDPs for whom ethnic self-identification played an important role during at least one of the stages of mobility. This influence was especially strong for those who practiced public professions (journalists, teachers, police) when their views were at odds with the new authorities in Donbas. At some point during the conflict, it became life threatening to publicly identify oneself as Ukrainian on the territory of the self-proclaimed republics. Therefore, safety reasons in case of public self-identification played a crucial role in migration decisions of IDPs. In the later stages of mobility, ethnic self-identification was involved in quarrels with relatives which could push IDPs to relocate or return to the conflict-affected region.
3 Table of the contents
Section 1. Introduction Section 2. Methodology 2.1 Preparation 2.2 Sampling strategy
2.3 Data collection and method of analysis 2.4 Researcher’s background
Section 3. Theory and Background
3.1 Internally displaced due to the conflict 3.2 Constructivist approach to ethnicity 3.3 Mobility theories
3.4 Background 3.4.1 General History
3.4.2 Ukrainian patriotic movements of the 19th century 3.4.3 The history of Donbas region
3.4.4 The conflict in Ukraine 2014-2016 Section 4. Results and analysis
4.1 The change of the experience of ethnicity as a result of the conflict and mobility process 4.1.1 Political and ethnic identities of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine
4.1.2 Emergence of “ethnic limbo” in IDPs’ narratives 4.1.3 The emphasis on Donbas origin
4.1.4 The change of ethnic self-identification among those who stayed in the conflict affected areas
4.1.5 Donbas “Resettlers” ethnic identity
4.1.6 Ethnographic notes from the field: “It is just Europe trying to atone for their sins”
4.2 The role of ethnic self-identification in the migration process of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine
4.2.1 The first stage of mobility
4.2.2 Social networks in the initial and relocation stages of mobility 4.2.3 The decision to stay in conflict affected-areas
4.2.4 Further mobility stages, consideration of permanent stay 4.2.5 The return stage
4.2.6 Conflict between imposed and real values among IDPs involved in public spheres Section 5. Discussion and Conclusion
Research question 1. Research question 2. References
4 Section 1. Introduction
The main focus of this research is the internally displaced persons (henceforth - IDPs) who are fleeing from conflict-affected areas. The research is based on the case study of Ukraine. Special attention is paid on (1) what ethnic identities became more salient in the beginning of the conflict; (2) how ethnic self-identification evolved during the migration process of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine; (3) the role of ethnic self-identification in the migration decisions of IDPs.
In 2014, protests in Ukraine developed into a serious international armed conflict which is still ongoing in the Eastern part of the country, namely in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In August 2015, up to 1.5 million people were officially recognized as internally displaced persons by The Ministry of Social Policy in Ukraine. Since not all IDPs have registered in official state services it is likely that the actual figure is even larger. Following the conflict, in two Ukrainian regions there were created self-proclaimed Luhansk1 (June, 2014) and Donetsk2 (May, 2014) “republics”, both were recognized only by Republic of South Ossetia that has very limited recognition itself. The self-proclaimed republics were created on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
According to the UNHCR, only 383.0003 people were seeking asylum in Russia (August, 2015)4. This figure points to the fact that majority of Eastern Ukrainians were migrating within the Ukrainian border. People who flee from the conflict could have different considerations, but taking into account the fact that the conflict had from the beginning bright political and ethnic component especially regarding pro-Russian and pro-Western views of South-Eastern and
1
Henceforth LNR - Luhansk National Republic
2
Henceforth DNR - Donetsk National Republic
3
This figure represents registered asylum-seekers only, it does not include people who moved to
Russia with different considerations such as, for instance, job offer.
4
UNHCR Map. Ukraine Internally Displaced People. 21st of August 2015. Retrieved
from:http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Internally%20Displaced%20People%20M ap%2021AUG15.pdf
5 Central-Western Ukrainians, ethnic self-identification plays its role in mobility process of IDPs (Metzger et al., 2016).
Ethnic self-identification is a dynamic process, that is constructed or reconstructed under specific historical, political, personal factors. Chandra (2012) argued that one person can possess several ethnicities, at the same time it does not mean people use all available ethnicities in their routine interactions. Although in this research I stick to the constructivist approach to ethnicity, I still argue that among ethnicities available to one person there are ones that are more difficult to reconstruct, and this reconstruction will take a long time, or it might be impossible to change. For instance, descent-based attributes of ethnicity such as place of birth, parents’ ethnicity. Often these descent-based attributes to ethnicity are available to people, but they are not used in daily interactions. Nevertheless, under some circumstances they might become activated. The conflict can become a trigger for such activation (Kalyvas, 2008). For example, people might never thought about the fact that their father is Russian, but in the beginning of the conflict they would decide to use this fact to justify their desire to become Russian citizens. I hypothesize that this evolution of ethnic self-identification or even situational use of several ethnicities can be triggered not only by the conflict, but the migration process and life experience in the host societies. The salience of one ethnicity in the beginning of the conflict might evolve in migration process.
I attempt to connect mobility theories with constructivist approach to ethnicity, looking at how the conflict served as a trigger for some ethnicities to become more salient and how further mobility process can affect these activated ethnicities and change the way people perceived themselves in the beginning. My thesis focuses on two main research questions:
(1) how does the ethnic self-identification of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine evolve in the development of an armed conflict and the following migration?
6 (2) what is the role of ethnicity in migration decisions of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine throughout different stages of mobility process?
My thesis will consist of five main sections and each section will include subsections. The first section consists of Introduction. The second one covers Methodology of the study. In the third section I discuss the theoretical framework and the necessary background information on the history of Donbas, political situation, and the conflict development. In the theoretical framework I describe in detail how ethnicity is being constructed. The background information is included to illustrate historical component of ethnicity construction in Donbas. Additionally, this subsection assisted in better understanding of IDPs’ narratives that included historical references. The fourth section is dedicated to the results and analysis of the study and divided into two main subsections according to the research questions mentioned above: (1) experience of ethnicity that is being changed as a result of the conflict and mobility; (2) the role of ethnicity in migration decisions of IDPs. Finally, I will present conclusions and discussion.
Section 2. Methodology
In this thesis I illustrate how two completely different theoretical approaches (mobility theories and constructivism) can be connected in studying ethnicity dynamics among those who fled from an armed conflict. As described in Section 1, the main aim is twofold. Firstly, to investigate how ethnic self-identification evolves during and after the conflict and associated migration. Secondly, I study how ethnic identity affects the mobility decisions of IDPs. For both aims, I performed a detailed analysis of the narratives of IDPs. It is obvious that in the scope of this thesis it is impossible to show all mechanisms of ethnicity construction and influences on mobility. I will highlight the most relevant insights into the migration process and ethnicity dynamics which I gathered from my twenty-two respondents.
7 Section 2.1 Preparation
The process of data collection, literature review, and analysis in my study underwent several stages. First of all, I researched existing literature on mobility theories with a specific interest in migration due to the armed conflict. At this stage I drew a broad picture of internal and external factors that might influence migration choices of IDPs, even though the final choice is never predetermined. During this stage of my research, I formulated research questions that guided my future fieldwork.
When I completed the literature review I decided to study in detail historical components of Donbas region. I also looked at geographical and political preferences of different Ukrainian regions, especially Western and South-Eastern ones. Since this stage of my research was going simultaneously with the fieldwork, it assisted me in understanding IDPs, especially when they were referring to some specific events in the history.
Section 2.2 Sampling strategy
Concerning the average age of respondents and sampling strategy used in the study, I used personal networks in day care centers, churches, among my acquaintances who volunteer with IDPs. These organizations recommended me to the IDPs they work with. After the first interviews were completed, I asked respondents about their friends and relatives who are also willing to help me (snowball sampling). The average age of my respondents varied from 30-40, but I also had interviews with the women who were over 50, and two young girls of 26. Since all interviews were strictly confidential, I preferred to change some names of the respondents. For the detailed description of respondents and their background see Table 1. As can be seen from the table, the majority of interviewed people are women. Most of the women had small children that made them available for the interview during the day. Sometimes, we met in the
8 house of the one woman and later her neighbors, also IDPs, came to visit and we had talks all together, while children were playing. There was also several interviews conducted on the playground. People whom I interviewed not only shared their own story but often described the experiences of whole families, telling about their husbands and children. Moreover, often I was in places where IDPs gather (day centers, houses) and we had informal interactions. The results of such interactions were also used for the purpose of this research.
Section 2.3 Data collection and method of analysis
My fieldwork was conducted during April and the beginning of May 2016 in Kyiv, Irpin and Kharkiv. The choice of the cities is explained by two main reasons: (1) Kharkiv is located in the Eastern part of Ukraine that makes it more familiar for IDPs. Also, it takes the third place concerning the number of IDPs that located there5. (2) Kyiv used to be an epicenter of the protests that partially fueled the conflict in the East and this makes it especially relevant to research identities of IDPs who located to Kyiv. Irpin is a satellite town next to Kyiv. Even though I am originally from Kyiv, it was much more difficult to arrange the interviews in the city. Since many IDPs have already settled down, they were busy and this created problems in scheduling the meetings. In Kharkiv I had a privilege to stay in the family who assists IDPs for already more than a year organizing a day care for children and humanitarian help for adults. Through this family I got an access to many IDPs living in Kharkiv. Almost in all cases in Kharkiv I was invited to the homes of IDPs and was able to see the families in their natural settings and make some ethnographic notes. In Kyiv I experienced such hospitality only during three interviews out of nine.
5
UNHCR Map. Ukraine Internally Displaced People. 21st of August 2015. Retrieved
from:http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20Internally%20Displaced%20People%20M ap%2021AUG15.pdf
9 The main method of my data collection was narrative interviews. During the meetings, IDPs shared their stories and during the talk, I often indirectly6 asked about their attitudes towards different ethnic groups and sides of the conflict. We also discussed their new life in the host city and how this life has changed their views on the situation. The main problem during the data collection process was the fact that ethnicity, attitudes of people represent a sensitive topic. Moreover, the fact that I am from Kyiv might push IDPs to hide their real attitudes. It is impossible to check this information, but in order to avoid misunderstandings, I spent some time discussing the cases with people who recommended me to the families: volunteers, church leaders, my close friends among IDPs. Usually, these people knew the families I interviewed well enough and shared more information about some specific views. Also, the recommendation of the assisting organizations, church leaders and volunteers became a great support in building trust in IDPs towards me. All interviews were recorded and analyzed using thematic content analysis. The themes will be further be presented. All interviews were conducted in Russian.
Section 2.4 Researcher’s background
Since I am from Ukraine myself, it can be questioned how I perceive the situation and myself in the situation that is currently taking place in the country. Even though, I identify myself as Ukrainian, my family is very diverse in ethnic terms. My great-grandfather was German and great-grandmother Jew from my father’s side. All my Jewish family moved to the United States and Germany when I was a small child. At the same time, my grandmother from the mother’s side was born in the Eastern part of Ukraine and originates from Polish high-skilled migrants. Moreover, she identifies herself as Soviet and does not consider a Ukrainian language as existing. Her husband, my grandfather was Russian and came to Ukraine to acquire higher education. Both of my parents’
6
10 families represented an intellectual elite in the Soviet Union being engineers’ inventors and doctors. Since the Soviet elite was highly Russified, I am speaking Russian with my parents and grandparents. Taking into account the ethnic diversity of my ancestors and the way the identify themselves (as Ukrainians, Jews, Russians, Soviet, and Ukrainian), I decided to refer to myself as Ukrainian. I studied in Ukrainian in both school and university. My diverse roots assisted in understanding better different points of view and I learned to accept it.
Considering my own position towards the situation my country is currently in, I do acknowledge that apart from constructed ethnic element in the conflict that there is an obvious aggression from Russia. I know that there are some differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, especially language ones, but for me personally, it did not really matter whether people speak Russian or Ukrainian. Still, the attitude to Ukrainian language changed throughout the conflict development, I started using Ukrainian more on the street of Kyiv. Since my best friend is from Eastern Ukraine and I have family there as well, it was easy for me to get in contact with IDPs. In my interviews I often emphasized that my best friend is from Luhansk and my grandmother was also born in the East – it always helped to make people feel more comfortable during our talks. Moreover, I purposefully decided not to use additional media sources while my analysis (both Ukrainian and Russian) for this not to affect my perception of IDPs.
11 Section 3. Theory and background
Section 3.1 Internal displacement due to the conflict
IDPs who flee from an armed conflict are an interesting research category and differ from those who are displaced due to the reconstruction or natural disaster. Moreover, the conflict often serves as a trigger for the ethnic identity reconstruction.
The problem of internally displaced people started being raised by scholars and policy makers in late 1980s. Only in the 1990s, this category became a part of an international agenda (Cohen, 2004; Brun, 2005; Mooney, 2005). The need of such recognition derived from the growing number of IDPs as a result of conflicts, disasters, and development programs. Consequently, the main purpose of such recognition was to address IDPs’ needs and develop necessary responsive policies.
Even though the term internally displaced people became quite prominent during last decades, there are still debates concerning its definition. IDPs are often perceived as those who have been forced to flee in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of human rights, natural disasters, but who did not cross an internationally recognized border. Nevertheless, it is not always clear what are internationally recognized borders, since there are cases when the divided in civic conflicts territories can be recognized by some states and ignored by others (e.g Abkhazia in Georgia). Some scholars (Mooney, 2003a; Brun, 2005; Van Hear, 2000) believe that the growing numbers of IDPs resulted from restrictive migration policies of potential destination countries. Furthermore, “forced to flee” does not exclude the element of choice. The choice is always present in IDPs decisions. As van Hear (2000) argued, economic and forced migrants have in their choices both freedom of choice and compulsion. Nevertheless, we can still argue that so-called “forced migrants” have narrower range of possibilities. In my research the IDPs will be perceived
12 as the ones who migrate internally, more precisely as those who stay under the jurisdiction of the state of origin.
As already was mentioned, there can be different causes of massive internal displacement, such as natural and human-made disasters, planned developments (mines, dams), and armed conflicts. The focus of this thesis is on the displacement as an outcome of armed conflicts. According to Muggah (2003), there is a clear differences between internal displacement as an outcome of planned development projects and conflicts. First of all, displacement as a result of the conflict usually is much more spontaneous and unpredictable. Contrastingly, the development caused displacement is usually better “planned” and in many cases is perceived as temporary by both migrants and policy makers (Muggah, 2003). To illustrate the specifications of the conflict caused displacement empirically, I will present findings of Velez & Ibanez (2008) who described Columbian displacement. The authors showed that violence in the place of origin modifies the migration incentives of education, social capital, and location assets. If we turn back to the Muggah’s (2003) notion of “spontaneous” displacement, it can be argued that these “spontaneous movements” were to some extent derived from violence. As was already mentioned, the process of displacement is not a mere movement from A to B, but can include initial location, relocation, return, and even international migration (see also van Hear, 2000). Consequently, in the armed conflicts the spontaneous movements can represent the initial location, when migrants might perceive themselves as temporary, and develop further plans for relocation and return. Even though the violence can influence the decisions of migrants, it does not determine them. Velez & Ibanez (2008) and van Hear (2000) argued that even in acute violent episodes there were people who preferred to stay rather than migrate, and moreover, in some cases the conflict brought especially acute danger for one group and was less damaging for another. According to Amnesty
13 international7, in Ukraine, openly identifying oneself as being Ukrainian in the conflict areas has become a life-threatening practice, while people are being forced to engage in identifying themselves with the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. As for the Colombian situation, Velez and Ibanez (2008) assumed that one of the reasons of such discrepancies in decision-making process can be caused by the effect of violence on different groups, especially if the conflict has presumably civic character as can be seen from the described example. They also mentioned that if there are police and army forces protecting the territory, the number of those willing to migrate can decrease.
From the described above, we can see that internal displacement due to the conflict creates a special case in mobility/migration studies. Moreover, considering Ukrainian case, we can see that in the beginning, the conflict had presumably civic character8 and shortly after – it grew into the international one. Conflict is usually shaping migration decisions of people who appeared to be in the epicenter of it. The effects of the conflict can also include the changes in how people view themselves, in case of civic and international conflict how they identify themselves in ethnic terms.
7
Annual Report on Ukraine, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/ukraine/report-ukraine/
8
14 Section 3.2 Constructivist approach to ethnicity
In this study I base my analysis on the constructivist approach to ethnicity. An important constructivist theorist Nagel (1994) defined ethnicity as: “a dynamic, constantly evolving property of both individual identity and group organization” ( p.1) Another relevant definition of ethnicity is given by Wimmer (2008), who based it on the classical works of Weber (1922). He defines ethnicity as “a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry” (p. 973) Ethnicity is experienced subjectively which means it can be rather unstable and under certain circumstances it can be reshaped and reconstructed. In contrast with primordialists who hold that each person has only one ethnicity which does not change, constructivists have an understanding of ethnicity as a dynamic process. Furthermore, the process of constructing an ethnic identity is complex and can be characterized in multiple ways. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2000) discussed that there are:
“Three ways to characterize what constructing an identity entails. These approaches differ in whether they see broad structural forces, discursive formations, or individuals as the agents that act to produce or reproduce a system of social categories. “Constructing an identity” may refer to either the content of a social category, such as making Serb believe that Serbs cannot live with Croats, and vice versa, or the boundary rules, such as making Montenegrins believe they are Yugoslavs, or peasants in Gascony believe they are French.”(p.850)
In the current study, I also adopt the term ethnic self-identification, by which I understand the way the person associates him/herself with a certain group. Ethnicity can be often politicized and coincide with non-ethnic categories. Moreover, commonly perceived non-ethnic categories can acquire new ethnic meaning. For instance, “Muslim” identity was formally associated
15 with religion, but currently we notice more tendencies towards more ethnic associations with “Muslim” identity (Chandra, 2006; Fearon&Laitin, 2000).
Ethnicity construction is often associated with ethnic boundaries. Fredrik Barth is a well-known social anthropologist who studied ethnic groups and ethnic boundaries. In the book Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1998) he argued that the ethnic boundary “defines” the group (p.15). Furthermore, he argues that when an ethnic group maintains its identity and interacts with the outside world – it determines the rules of membership and exclusion. Ethnic borders are not limited to a particular territory, but are rather a social formation (Barth, 1998). Ethnic boundaries can be revised, revitalized, and negotiated by ethnic group members themselves and by the ones who are outside the group (Negel, 1994). Following the ideas Barth (1998), Wimmer (2008) stresses that the boundary represents both categorical and a social or behavioral dimension. Consequently, the categorical dimension includes acts of social classification, collective representation. Social dimension is about everyday networks that result from individual strategies of distancing or connecting. If we come down to the individual level, mentioned categorical and behavioral dimensions can be seen as two cognitive schemes. The first one is dividing the social world in social groups of “us” and “others (them)”, and another group includes scripts of how to classify someone as “us” and the “other” under given circumstances. When two schemes merge, we are able to speak about an existing ethnic boundary (Wimmer, 2008) . Wimmer further emphasizes that ethnic borders are not necessarily fixed, there are different softening mechanisms.
“Ethnic distinctions may be fuzzy and boundaries soft, with unclear
demarcations and few social consequences, allowing individuals to maintain membership in several categories or switch identities situationally.” (p.976)
According to Kalyvas (2008) there are certain mechanisms that can make the ethnic border softer. First of all it is about the replacement of certain ethnic attributes that enable individuals to “pass” into new ethnic identity. Secondly,
16 the introduction of new non-ethnic dimensions that can make it easier to join an ethnic category, without specific qualifications (Kalyvas, 2008). Such mechanisms are often present in conflicts, and especially in civic conflicts.
In the broad political and social sense the boundaries can be shaped considering context the groups are in. In different societies the group might be identified differently. For instance, Asian American might be identified as Asian in America and as American in France (Wimmer, 2008). Following this line of reasoning, we can see that individual can possess several identities that might become salient in different circumstances or can be reshaped under these circumstances. Even though it might seem that ethnicity can be easily reshaped reconstructed, it is not always happening promptly. Chandra (2006) identifies so called “constrained change” and visibility properties. The former underlines that even though ethnic identities do change in short term, the pattern of and the mechanisms behind such a change can be constrained by a set of attributes, and the latter means that information about an individual’s ethnic identity categories is usually obtained from observations (e.g skin color). Mentioned properties are first of all characterizing those categories in which membership is associated with descent-based attributes. A bright example would be Jewish ethnicity. To be identified as Jew by Jews, the person has to have a Jewish mother. At the same time for non-Jews, any other descent-based attribute, such as parents, can serve as an ethnic marker. As for visibility properties, here it is meant common associations/myths considering the appearance of one or another ethnic group.
Ethnicity can be perceived differently by the person and the surrounding. This difference can also trigger the tensions between groups and individuals. As an illustration can serve “Moroccan ethnicity” in the Netherlands. Not all Dutch people will identify second generation Moroccans as Dutch, even though Moroccan second or third generation can identify themselves as Dutch, since they have spent all their life in the country, speak the language and possess the passport. It illustrates how the self-identification might differ from perceived
17 ethnic identity. In the long term, the conflict between self and perceived identities can influence one or another. Consequently, the self-identification will be based on how people are perceived and vice versa.
As was already mentioned, there can be several ethnicities possessed by individuals, Chandra (2012) proposes such descriptions as nominal and activated ethnic identities. Nominal identities describe identities that all individuals in a population possess, even when they actually do not identify them, and usually it is connected with descent-identity (region of birth, parents). Whereas, activated identities are those that are actually used by individuals in any given context. Despite the fact that the individuals choose among several identities, this choice can be limited to socially and politically defined ethnic categories. The external opinions that influence the formation of ethnic identities might be immigration policies, ethnically-linked recourse policies, political policies and institutions. For instance, official ethnic categories and policies can also strengthen ethnic boundaries since they become a basis for discrimination and repression (Negel, 1994). This can reconstruct the meaning of particular ethnicities.
The salience of one ethnicity among others possessed by individuals becomes especially interesting in the conflict situations, where the pressure of self-identification with different groups becomes higher. Moreover, the conflict can serve as a trigger for the creation of a new ethnicity. Violent conflicts, both domestic and international influence self-identification of people. This influence can be planned by elites, then violence can be seen as elite manipulation of mass public. Also, another constructivist approach presents cultural systems as agents that construct ethnic identities. This approach stress that specific ways of thinking and behaving can drive ethnic reconstruction. Considering the first notion of elites and individuals being a driver for ethnicity reconstruction (Fearon & Laitin, 2000).
18 Toal and Dahlman (2011) argue that political entrepreneurs can play on fears about security through framing insecurity and instability in terms of ethnic divisions.
Although many conflicts in the world did not start as ethnic, but almost all included ethnic element (Nagel, 1994). Moreover, in case of ethnic violence people might not be aware which side to blame for the failure of negotiations. Furthermore, these people might not know what side to blame. Consequently, observations of such events can push people to trust leaders who represent a particular side of the conflict, even though these leaders might have provoked this conflict. Also, leaders inside the group create a demand for protection from the out group. Nevertheless, not always people take part in ethnic violence following the elites, but also by following their own agenda (Fearon & Laitin, 2000).
Section 3.3 Mobility theories
In this section, I will analyze some of general mobility theories and attempt to apply them to research of the phenomenon of IDPs and the place of ethnic identity in mobility dynamics.
According to van Hear (1998), to be able to represent migration decisions in general terms, it is the best to place such decisions on the axis ranging from “choice”/ “few options” on one end to “little choice”/“no option” on the other end. He cites Richmond (1994) who argues that migrants with more opportunities are “proactive” and with less opportunities are “reactive”. Richmond (1994) further shows that the line between two extremes: proactive and reactive is usually blurred. Developing Richmond’s notion, van Hear emphasizes that it allows to include different categories of migrants and their mobility: internally displaced, tourists, labor migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and others. He also includes “stayers” in the scheme, specifying their degree of choice. According to van Hear the mobility is a complex process,
19 where people can move within the borders of a certain state before crossing the international border. Migrants can be displaced and then return. Legal tourists can overstay their visas and then became automatically illegal. This means that by changing categories, people can have different opportunities that shape their migration biography. According to van Hear, IDPs have limited opportunities concerning their choices. However, this choice is always present, and as was already mentioned, migrants can be in different categories with different range of choices in their lives. Therefore on each stage of their migration biography, the opportunities can either decrease or increase. Even though the model of van Hear is useful to understand general mobility picture, causes of such range of possibilities, choices are not depicted and are in need of further elaboration. Ethnic identity can also serve as one of such causes.
In his book The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration, Faist (2000) criticized existing migration theories and proposed a more systematic and dynamic approach to studying mobility. Faist presents the notion of a multilevel migration system approach. He argues that the analysis should include three scales: micro-, meso-, and macro-scales. The micro-scale covers the freedom of choice of the migrant, it is all about individual expectations, wealth, status, comfort, and stimulation. The meso-scale includes people within the network and ties. This level of analysis includes different types of ties, for example, strong family ties, weak ties that include brokers, intermediary agents. Finally, macro-scale considers economic characteristics, politics, cultural setting, and demography/ecology. Economic characteristics include income and unemployment differences. Politics covers regulation of spatial mobility, repressions, conflicts. Cultural setting is about dominant norms and discourses. Finally, the demography/ecology checks on the population growth, availability of arable land and the level of technology. On each level of analysis he described different theories. According to Faist, micro-, meso-, and macro-scale divisions are not necessarily about separate categories, but rather the
20 interaction of such categories. We can hypothesize that ethnic identity can shape IDPs destinations on all levels that were discussed by Faist. First of all, in the situation of the conflict it can represent micro-scale individual self-identification with one or another conflicting sides. Moreover, considering Chandra’s (2012) notion of nominal ethnicity, the individual can activate the ethnicity according to the side it the conflict that is being supported by IDPs, and this can shape the mobility choices. Considering meso- level, we can see that, for instance, ethnic identity can also weaken social networks. From my encounter with Ukrainian IDPs, I noticed how both ethnic identity and ideology broke family ties and people who considered themselves Ukrainian chose not to maintain relationship with their pro-Russian relatives. On macro-scale, we can see that social policies concerning IDPs, different social initiatives can not only raise attention to the IDPs from Eastern Ukraine, but also create a new identity for them, that can further influence their mobility and self-identification. Furthermore, on the macro-level the border policies, and restriction to access to the separatist controlled towns and cities for the ones who hold Ukrainian passport and do not have a special permission can also strengthen the division of ethnic identities among IDPs.
Section 3.4 Background
This section contains a concise analysis of the historical setting of Eastern Ukraine. This should aid in understanding the circumstances under which ethnic self-identification of Donbas residents developed and where the narratives of the East-West dichotomy began.
Section 3.4.1 General History
Discussions concerning the ethnic differences between Eastern and Western Ukrainians have become increasingly relevant ever since the Soviet Union
21 collapsed. However, the history of this dichotomy extends much further back in time. As Karacsony et al.,(2014) argued:
“In Ukraine the dichotomic socio-economic framework reflects not only ethnic and religious differences but also such factors as urbanization, economic development, and even natural elements. ”(p.100)
In order to understand such divisions, it is essential to take into account the political preferences, and relevant historical events in Ukraine (Karcsony et al.,2014). These characteristics were often used to stress the difference by political forces in the Soviet Union and by political leaders of independent Ukraine (Osipian & Osipian., 2012; Kuromiya, 2015). This accommodated the construction of beliefs regarding the differences between Western and Eastern Ukrainians, or between South-Eastern, Western, and Central Ukraine. Each region in Ukraine has a unique history. Regions near the Carpathian mountains experienced Hungarian, Romanian, as well as Austrian rule. Large Southern territories including Crimea have been governed by the Crimean Khanate9. A significant part of central Ukraine was under the Duchy of Lithuania. The Ukrainian history was affected the most by Russian Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Soviet Union.
In this study I use the terms Central, Western, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. However, different scholars make different divisions. For the sake of clarity I adopt a purely geographical approach which assists in avoiding unnecessary discussion around the divisions. When there the need arises to single out a certain part of Western, Southern, Central or Eastern Ukraine, the necessary specifications will be made. Western Ukraine covers: (1) Galychyna (Galicia) which includes the three modern regions of Ternopil, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk; (2) Volyn – situated in the north west of which Lutsk is the capital; (3) Transcarpathia – geographical center of Europe, major cities Uzhgorod, Mukachevo; (4) Pollisia – major cities Kovel, Sarny, and Bukovyna.
9
22
Central Ukraine covers the regions of Podillia, Kyiv, and Poltava. The South-Eastern part of Ukraine is located in a steppe terrain. The region is characterized by a strongly developed industrial component, especially the cities of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kryvyj Rig, and Mariupol. In the Russian Empire, South-Eastern Ukraine was often called “Novorossia” (New Russia).
Map 1.Geographical divisions of Ukraine. Retrieved from:
http://www.kiis.com.ua
Map 2. Geographical divisions of Ukraine. Retrieved from:
23 Section 3.4.2 Ukrainian patriotic movements of the 19th and 20th century
In the 19th century a significant part of Ukraine (Central, South and East) was under the rule of the Russian empire. At the same time, Western regions, such as Galicia were governed by the Austria-Hungarian empire. Often Galicia and Donbas/Central Ukraine are placed in contrast with each other in terms of their nationalistic movements and cultural differences (Himka, 2015). These differences were especially emphasized during the Soviet times. In this subsection I illustrate under what circumstances and how the nationalistic movements developed.
Although it is common to associate strongly nationalistic movements with Western Ukraine, and especially with the region of Galicia (Himka, 2015), such movements were also present in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Kappeler (1991) demonstrated that in Galicia the nationalistic movements of the 19th century were strongly influenced by local aristocracy. This aristocracy was mostly represented by highly educated elite and Greek-Catholic priests. Priests and elites were able to build the bridges between peasants and nobility, constructing a common understanding of “the Ukrainian nation” under imperial rule. Consequently, the movements were supported by the representatives of different social strata. The tolerant policies of the Austro-Hungarian empire concerning local political expressions allowed for further establishment. Additionally, the fact that slavery was abolished earlier in Western Ukraine and the overall education level was higher compared to the rest of Ukraine also influenced the development of Ukrainian nationalistic movements. The rest of the country was characterized by the Russian language, the situation of cultural oppression, shared Eastern Orthodox doctrine, and hypocrisy of Ukrainian noble families, all of which was detrimental for the Ukrainian patriotic movements (Kappeler, 1991). The working language in the region was predominantly Russian, especially in the cities (Himka, 2015). The majority of Ukrainians were peasants (Yekelchyk, 2007). Furthermore, the priests and elites were often
24
Russian or they communicated in Russian (Himka, 2015; Kappeler, 1991). These circumstances did not lead to the complete disappearance of the nationalistic movements, but gave them a different form and suppressed their growth. In the parts of Ukraine that were under the Russian empire, the movements had a cultural character. For example, local elite were restoring Ukrainian writings and novels. Literature unions were organized and published the first Ukrainian novels. The working language of the intelligence was Russian (Kappeler, 1991). However, there were successful attempts of promotion of Ukrainian literature and culture. Despite the governmental, cultural and ideological separation, both Galician and Dnieper elites had a common goal in creating a political body for Ukraine in order to acquire independence.
Considering the development of patriotic and nationalistic movements in the 20th century, the most famous movement was led by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN; founded in 1929), located in the Western part of the country.The more radical part of which was led by Stepan Bandera. That part had a military unit named the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Although their main goal was to fight for independence (from Soviet rule), they were also quite aggressive towards Polish, Russians and Jews who lived in the Western part of the country. Moreover, when overpowered by the grip of the Stalin regime, the OUN chose to side with Hitler’s forces (Rudling, 2006; Katchanovski, 2010). These militants were called Banderivtsi (in reference to Stepan Bandera) as well as “Nazis” in the Russian narrative. Nowadays, it has become an integral part of the pro-Russian propaganda to refer to all Ukrainian nationalists Banderivtsi and associate them with the Nazis (Hutchings & Szostek, 2015).
Section 3.4.3 The history of Donbas region
To understand what contributed to the construction of the ethnic identity of the population of Donbas, we will now focus on the history of the region. This
25
subsection is based on the works of Hiroaki Kuromiya, a Japanese historian, who has been researching Donbas for over twenty years. In 2015, Kuromiya published a book titled “Understanding Donbass” in which he combined several of his works about Donbas. Also, information is used from lectures by Ukrainian professor Oksana Mikheeva10, an Eastern Ukrainian sociologist and historian who has been researching the Donbas region for decades.
For a very long time, Donbas was a part of the Russian Empire. The name “Donbas” was derived from the basin of the Donets river. The Donets basin covers the South East of Ukraine and South West of Russia. This region has always taken a significant place in the history of Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. The part of the Donbas land in Ukraine was termed “the Wild Steppe”, a symbol of freedom. Since this territory was not assigned to any country for a long time, the Wild Steppe was attracting people who were unemployed, especially peasants without land, former criminals, former slaves and others who wanted to make use of the uncontrolled and free territory. Although the Eastern part of Donbas was largely populated by Russians and the Western part by Ukrainians, the overall ethnic composition was mixed. The emergence of modern industries (mining and steel production) contributed to the growth of the ethnical diversity in the region. An essential event for the industrial development of Donbas was the establishment in 1870 “Novorussian society for coal, iron and rails production” by John Hughe (Friedgut, 2014). This organization was guiding the production of coal, iron and rails. At this time Donbas had become an important industrial center of Russian Empire and it attracted many migrant workers. Unsurprisingly, the majority consisted of Russian migrants, but there were also, for example, English, Polish, and Jewish laborers (Kuromiya & Friedgut, 1993). The workers who came to Donbas from Russia were often peasants who did not possess land in their home villages.
10
Mikheeva, O., (2014). "A person from the Donbas" - the main components of the social construct :[video lecture]. Retrieved from http://uamoderna.com/videoteka/mikheeva-lecture-donbas-ucu
26
This transition from the work on the ground to the work underground was quite difficult and painful for Russian workers. According to Mikheeva (2014), this contributed to the problem of alcohol addiction becoming prevalent among workers. According to her, this gave rise to the image of “Donbas alcoholics” which is quite common in Central and Western Ukraine. As a result of ethnic differences, there were often clashes between groups. Especially notable are the massacres of Jewish people by Donbas miner workers (Friedgut, 1987; Wynn, 2014). Because of the developed systems of underground mines, Donbas region became the best hideaway for former prisoners and revolutionists. As a result of its predominantly business orientation Donbas was quite separated and was not strongly influenced by political agenda of Russian Empire. It has got the reputation of important, but difficult to organize region (Kuromiya, 2015).
In Soviet times Donbas was called: a “union’s stronghold”. It was one of the most essential centers of metal and coal industries. Kuromiya (2015) suggested that in Soviet time Donbas continued serving as a useful hiding place for many people. This was one of the reasons why Moscow did not consider Donbas a trustworthy region. Even during the period of the Russian Revolution it appeared to be difficult for Bolsheviks to organize Donbas workers for an action, since many of them were used to anarchy and did not necessarily have strong political preferences. As a part of the Soviet Union, Donbas inherited a reputation of being an essential industrial center with “uncontrolled workers”. The special concern of Kremlin was about engineers and representatives of “educated workers” who gave rise to the “Shachty Trial”11
in 1928. Unfortunately this case triggered the mass exportation and liquidation of educated workers in Donbas as well as the collectivization in agrarian sector. During the process of collectivization12 the industrial cities of Donbas became a
11 A show trial of three engineers accused in collaboration with former mines’ owners in Shachty
town.
12 Stalin’s policy concerning the collectivization of agricultural sector in the end of 1920s and the
27
shelter for many peasants who were deprived of their land. Kuromiya argued that the region suffered the most in the period of Stalin’s Great Purge (1936-1938) because of Stalin’s suspicions of Donbas as a region with its reputation of being a hideaway.
After World War II, many Russian teachers and doctors were forced to move to Western Ukraine by the Soviet rulers in order to Russify the Western population (Kordan, 1997). In the 1960s-70s Donbas was not serving as a “shelter” anymore, but was still attracting migrants. The region continued being the most urbanized among other Ukrainian regions (Kuromiya, 2015). In his work, Kuromiya (2015) described that the difference between Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity was blurred at this time. Cultural similarities and language closeness made it difficult to distinguish Ukrainians and Russians. Even the surnames were adjusted in order to be accepted in the Soviet society (many surnames became Russified). However, there were still structural differences in language preferences: in the traditional agrarian sector the working language was Ukrainian, while in industrial cities most people spoke Russian.
Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the 24th of August, 1991, Ukraine received independence as state (with Kyiv as its capital). In 1991 the majority of Donbas residents voted for Ukrainian independence. However, the following economic crisis and inability of Kyiv to reform economics sharply changed the moods of Donbas inhabitants. In 1991-1998 miners organized multiple massive strikes (Horban & Kotsur, 2012). They protested against economic policies of the ruling government. Workers were not satisfied with the growth of prices and were demanding certain economic benefits. The laborers demanded not only economic and political benefits, but regional autonomy of Donbas. At some point the strike was taken over by the local elite of Donbas (usually mine directors) and an agreement was reached, although it turned out to benefit the elite instead of the workers. These strikes strengthened the idea of Donbas being “against” the rest of Ukraine (Borisov, 2000). The second
28
president of Ukraine, Kuchma was pretty much supported by Donbas. In the period of his rule, the unity of workers’ unions was broken and many industries were privatized. This lead to the appearance of the so-called “Donbas clan” or business and political elite which dominated the region (Kuromiya, 2015).
The tensions between East and West were mainly due to economical and political differences. However, it also had an ethnic dimension which further amplified the division between East and West, especially the emphasis on nationalistic West. The narratives about East and West were the most actively used by politicians during the Orange Revolution of 2004 (Kuromyia, 2015; Kuzio, 2010). Political preferences are very often regional in modern Ukraine. Moreover, as a result of East-West political narratives – people were more secure about voting for their “own candidate”. For instance, the candidate of one region is usually receiving the highest number of votes. As Osipian & Osipian (2012) described that from the elections between 2004 and 2010 (both presidential and parliamentary) there is a clear tendency towards the locality of the candidates, the “own” candidate received 65-80 percent of all votes, while the “alien” candidate from different region received only 35-20 percent. The same authors also observed that election managers and politicians often used strategies that emphasized the contrast of West-East concepts.
In summary, Donbas represents a region with high ethnic diversity as a result of labor migration in the 19th-20th century, although the main ethnic groups represented in the region are Ukrainians and Russians. As Kuromiya (2015) described, it is difficult to differentiate Russians and Ukrainians in the region. As a result of active Russification policies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and the high frequency of mixed marriage, it has become rather difficult to draw a clear border between these two ethnic groups. On the other hand, the agrarian sector has been less Russified (Karacsony et al., 2014). A bright illustration of this would be that villagers are communicating in either the Ukrainian language, or “Surzhyk”, a mix of Ukrainian and Russian
29
(Karacsony et al., 2014). The unique history and circumstances of Donbas development contributed to the separation of the region, giving rise to a specific “Donbas ethnic identity”. The narratives of political elite emphasizing the ethnic differences of Western and Eastern Ukrainians, contributed to this evident separation.
According to Karacsony et al. (2014), the ethnic divisions in Ukraine exhibit a “multilevel regional structure formed in the course of a long historical development and reflecting the nation-forming attitudes of Ukrainians” (p.130). In local and international conflicts, elite have been observed to utilize the complex ethnic history of regions as an instrument for obtaining power and resources. Furthermore, the actions of the elite can reshape and restructure the way people ethnically identify themselves. The case of Ukraine is not about clear international ethnic divisions, but rather about specific local ethnic identities. These were formed throughout the complex history and were often strengthen by political actors, who used the differences in their election campaigns. Due to the complex history, political divisions, Soviet past and mixed marriages, many of the citizens of Donbass are actually able to activate any of several identities, depending on the situation.
Section 3.4.4 The conflict in Ukraine 2014-2016
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine was fueled by the protests in the end of 2013. The protests were first of all against the decision of Yanukovich to withdraw to sign the Association with the EU in a week before the planned meeting. The demonstrations were initially located on the main square of Kyiv. This narrow area at the main Kyiv square Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence square) was hosting the Orange revolution in 2004 and after this Maidan started being associated with all kinds of demonstrations (Metzger et al., 2016). The demonstrators were mainly pro-European young people. They were prepared for a long and difficult, but peaceful struggle for the European future. In the end of
30
November, the authorities made a decision to end the protest using special police forces. The attempts to end the demonstration only increased the number of protesters. This confrontation between government forces, opposition and demonstrators fueled armed interventions and death of more than hundred people, thousands became wounded. As a result, protesters and opposition won the fight and the former president Yanukovich left the country.
During these developments, anti-Maidan protests were organized in support of the ruling power of Yanukovich. People who supported the anti-Maidan protest had mainly pro-Russian views. There is a strong evidence that Russian people participated in the protests. Similar pro- and against- European movements took place in many major cities of Ukraine. The movements against EU direction of Ukraine and Maidan protests were prevalent in Eastern and Southern regions. I have mentioned earlier that there was always local aspect in political arena that influenced general public. Yanukovich was representing Eastern part of the country and when he was gone, the tensions and distrust towards the former opposition was even more strengthened in Eastern and Southern parts of the country.
In April 2014, Mikheeva (2014) conducted a survey in Donetsk which showed strong ambiguity of public opinions. It was revealed that people were more trusting of Ukrainian than Russian media. However, the Russian narrative of “banderivtsi” was also quite popular. Often, in the blanks of the survey Oksana and her team noticed references to banderivtsi, to be precise 60% of respondents were afraid of nationalists in Western Ukraine. Another interesting finding was the fact that the same respondents supported both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian demonstrations. This is also reflected in the analysis of Kuromiya (2015) who described ambivalence of Donbas political preferences.
The survey mentioned by Oksana Mikheeva (2014), took place in April, right after the Russian-supervised referendum in Crimea and its annexation (16th
31
of March 2014). Following Crimea referendum, in two of Eastern regions (Donetsk and Lugansk oblast) there were also organized referendums. In Donetsk, the Donetsk People’s Republic was proclaimed on April 7 and Luhansk People’s Republic on the 27th
of April. Contrary to what happened in Crimea, Russia did not aim to annex regions. Consequently, the future of the self-proclaimed republics was either to become an autonomy as a part of Ukraine, or to proclaim independence. The confrontation between newly formed government and separatist forces in Donetsk/Lugansk regions turned into armed conflict in April 2014.
The conflict has been characterized differently by various sources: as a purely civic conflict by Russian and pro-Russian sources, or as an international Ukrainian-Russian armed conflict by Ukraine, the US and others. In this thesis I would regard the conflict as the one that comprises both characteristics of a civic and an international one, since there are certain facts that support both statements. The conflict in Ukraine does not resemble ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians in Donbas, even though many people from Russia moved to there from Russian Empire and later Soviet Russia. On the later stage, especially in summer 2014 the protests and clashes turned into aggression of Russia. At the same time, many local Donbas people were fighting on both sides: Ukrainian and as it is called in the East of the side of “levy”. The most acute conflict became in summer 2014 when the majority of the IDPs were moving.
32 Section 4. Results and analysis
Section 4.1 The change of the experience of ethnicity as a result of the conflict and mobility process
In this section I will explore how my respondents experience ethnicity, how they describe their surrounding and what changed in their views as a result of the conflict. I will also focus on how one ethnicity among others available becomes activated during the conflict or mobility process. I describe how this change was experienced by people with different views and migration trajectories. Furthermore, I look in what way the life in the new surroundings influences the experience of ethnicity.
Throughout centuries different regions in Ukraine were experiencing diverse cultural and historical influences. This is one of the aspects that was used by elites in constructing the difference between Western and Eastern Ukraine, Donbass and other parts of Ukraine. These “East” and “West” constructions became one of the main drivers of the conflict. During my fieldwork, I did not directly ask my respondents about their ethnic identity, but I did ask them about their views on the conflict, about their experiences of living in new surroundings, and how the relationship with their relatives and friends who stayed is being developed. Later in the talk, some of them shared how they perceived themselves and whether it changed during the conflict. I am not able to present all twenty two narratives in detail, but I will rather attempt to show the most representative cases among them.
Section 4.1.1 Political and ethnic identities of IDPs from Eastern Ukraine
In this subsection I will discuss how in the beginning of the conflict and in following mobility process, the political attributes of the IDPs’ self-identification evolved. In the Background section I emphasized that often political identity is coupled with ethnic self-identification in Ukraine. Moreover, voting preferences often have regional character. Nevertheless, since the
33 conflict is directly linked to political agenda, it affects the view and consequently self-identification in ethnic terms.
Tania, housewife from Donetsk, openly identified herself as Ukrainian. “The problem is that people in Donetsk13
were mixed. They spoke only Russian, no one was obliged to speak Ukrainian. All Russian was cultivated, everything was mixed. People did not identify themselves as Ukrainians. I remember that when I was a child, we had people originated from different countries in our house. On the third floor lived – Moldovans, on the first – Kazakhs. For instance, the grandma of my husband was sent to work to Altay (Russia) and she stayed there. Her daughter, my mother in law, left Russia in her student age and started living in Luhansk. She spoke Russian in Russia, here everything was Russia as well, no one forced her to speak Ukrainian, how can she identify herself with Ukraine? No one speaks Ukrainian. For instance, in our district, for 100 000 inhabitants there were only 2 Ukrainian schools. I decided to put my children in Ukrainian school, I also can easily speak Ukrainian. My mom was Ukrainian, she came to Donetsk to study and married here.” Despite the Russian origin of her family, Tania perceives herself as Ukrainian. Having several available identities in the beginning of the conflict, the Ukrainian ethnic identity became especially relevant not only for her personally, but for her husband as well. Moreover, she indicated that was politically active. During one of elections14, she was an election monitor from Yulia Timoshenko’s party15. When the conflict started, Tania decided to migrate to peaceful Ukrainian regions, she did not consider the variant of moving to Russia. She found some contacts of people (unknown) who organized the housing for IDPs. She went to Kyiv and then to a small village in Chernigiv region where there was organized
13
Historical reference: she is talking about migrants who came to Donbas to work at mines (see the Background section).
14
She did not specify parliament or president
15
Yuliya Timoshenko represent a famous political figure of independent Ukraine. In 2004, during Orange Revolution – she was in coalition with Yushchenko that opposed Victor Yanukovich “Party of Regions”
34 a camp for IDPs. Her husband joined the family later. “I do not support the government now. The social help is small, the attitudes in the governmental organization towards us are not respectful as well. They do not care about us at all” – shared Tania. Although her position is Ukrainian, it is not pro-governmental. To be more precise, it rather became apolitical in the process of migration. The center for IDPs she lived in was sponsored by the nongovernmental foundation and the founder of the organization had openly pro-Russian position. Tania identified herself as Ukrainian from the beginning, and in her descriptions there was clear that she did not separate political and ethnic identities. Moreover, she was politically active. Nevertheless, from her narrative it is evident that this politicized self-identification shifted towards the definition of “Ukrainian” ethnicity that is fully separated from the government support. This separation was especially emphasized during her life in the IDPs center and in Kyiv.
If in Tania’s story the change of ethnic self-identification or rather reconstruction of Ukrainian identity emerged during her life in the center for IDPs and in Kyiv, for Lidia it began in the beginning of the conflict. Lidia is a history teacher. Lidia described that: “I have always considered myself Ukrainian, and my parents” .She stayed during the acute stage of the conflict in Lenine, her home town. Lidia describes that for a long time their town was under Ukraine: “Ukrainian army hold quite a big part of Luhansk region, but there still was a small isthmus, and instead of thinking about how to get this isthmus, the Ukrainian commanders just decided to leave this huge territory, we felt betrayed. We were waiting for Ukrainian army to free us, but they left.” She further states that:
“For me it is surprising how local authorities allowed it to happen. Why in Kharkiv they stopped? Why everything here was covered by someone? I do not understand. Still, as for the ordinary people, I feel that everything appeared as a reaction to Maidan. People wanted to show off. Local officials started
35 spreading the gossips that banderivtsi are coming to kill you all. It was so extreme, that once we got a call in our school from the city council and were ordered to put children in the school bus because there will be “clean up” soon.’’
Lidia described that although the majority of people she knew had a pro-Russian position, there were still “normal people”, who supported Ukrainian army. They understood that the “war is between high officials, not between people”. Lidia tried to separate the government, politicians, businessmen and ordinary people. She calls “normal people” the ones who supported Ukrainian army, even feeling disappointed in high commanders. She attempted to separate Ukrainian ethnic identity and trust in political officials.
In described above cases women had Ukrainian and pro-governmental position that was changed in the process of migration, as Lidia stressed “we were waiting until the Ukrainians would free us”. At the same time some of the IDPs I spoke with became disappointed in their “Donbas clan politicians” such as, for instance, Yanukovich. We were sitting in a small kitchen and chatting with three IDP women. As mentioned in the background section, Donbas identity and West-East dichotomy became especially emphasized during the Orange Revolution of 2004. At some point, Natalia from Stachanov, 33 (Luhank region) quite emotionally stated: “Girls, you know what?! I am mad at Yanukovich”. I did not expect such a confession, so I asked her why she is mad on the former president.
- (Natalia) Well, I spoke with people who know very well the abilities of riot police, they could have just drive them (protesters) out from Maidan. - (Me) But they tried, and it even strengthened the protests.
- (Natalia) They did not try hard enough.
This sudden confession of Natalia shed a light on how people from Donbass perceive politicians from Donbas as “their people”. Natalia got disappointed in Yanukovich, but at the same she was quite negative towards the new
