Similarities and differences between actors and their actions in the conflicts in Serbia (1999) and Georgia (2008).

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Similarities and differences between actors and their actions in the conflicts

in Serbia (1999) and Georgia (2008).

Tomas Brogan

MA Thesis East European Studies Faculty of Humanities

University of Amsterdam July 2017

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Abstract

The thesis aims to fulfil three objectives. Firstly, it is a case study of the histories between different nationalities (firstly, Serbian and Kosovar, secondly, Georgian, South Ossetian and Abkhazian) that attempts to find similarities between the relationships that preceded the war in Serbia in 1999 and the war in Georgia in 2008. Secondly, it is a case study of the moral and institutional context in which major geopolitical actors (firstly, NATO and secondly, Russia) went to war in Serbia and Georgia, respectively. Thirdly, through the method applied to the case studies, the thesis attempts to expose common themes in local histories that may indicate a potential future conflict, and, through methodological innovation, suggests a new way of conducting research that exposes researcher bias and offers a method to correct this bias.

Research Question

Can direct comparisons between similar actors across different conflict zones give insight into the sources of conflict? The cases of Serbia in 1999 and Georgia in 2008.

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Chapter 1: Methodological considerations

Principal methodological inspirations

The paper, in seeking new insights on the conflicts in Serbia in 1999 and Georgia in 2008, is open to new theoretical approaches and ways of thinking that will provide insight into the conflicts and into the foreign policies of Russia and NATO. Accordingly, theoretical inspiration is taken from various sources and new methods of analysis are used that are influenced by diverse schools of thought. The project is designed as an exercise in critical thinking that seeks to give insight into the subject matter at hand by building a new theoretical perspective around case studies. In the following subsections, the main fields of knowledge that inspire the project and their relevance to the project will be explored, followed by a description of the method used in the paper.

Theoretical frameworks

This section details the theoretical underpinnings and inspirations for the paper.

Interdisciplinary approach

The research aims at an interdisciplinary approach, using methods inspired by historical and social scientific frameworks to assess historical information. Both historical analysis and methods of a more deductive nature (i.e. that seek to develop testable hypotheses) are used. Another major focus of the research is the development of a framework used to

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analyse foreign policy actions of NATO and the Russian state. However, in this area, rather than presenting an exhaustive review of previous studies, the research paper suggests its own framework and executes it.

Discourse frameworks

The paper takes note of the many articles on foreign policy discourse analysis that seek, among other things, to understand how and why public discourses propounded by leaders do not match foreign policy practice1, how journalistic practices and other mechanisms work to legitimise sovereignty2, and how discursive practices maintain the social world and its cultural structures3 (Critical Discourse Analysis). Given that one function of the thesis is to present different narratives of the events that took place in each conflict, it might be thought that a discourse analysis approach would follow. However, though the project draws inspiration from this field, other studies have adequately explored this approach4. Further, it is already known which biases are broadly present in the descriptions of the two conflicts. The thesis attempts to use inspiration from previous research on discourse analysis in tandem with historical research methods to rewrite an account of the conflict in a targeted fashion that puts the onus on the researcher to find comparable instances in each conflict. This lends an almost quantitative nature to the research conducted - indeed, it is not unthinkable that a further piece of research would involve ‘quantities of importance’ being allocated to each factor in order to produce visual correlations. At the same time, there is a distinctly qualitative output, as the tone of the writing will be of the utmost importance, particularly in the sections assessing the ‘unstated aims’ of the main geopolitical actors.

1

Wayne McLean, “Understanding Divergence between Public Discourse and Turkish Foreign Policy Practice: A Neoclassical Realist Analysis,” Turkish Studies, 16:4, 2015, 450, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2015.1096205

2_{Jason Dittmer and David A. Parr, “Mediating sovereignty: a comparative latent semantic analysis of US}

newspapers and conflicts in Kosovo and South Ossetia,”Media, War and Conflict, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2011, 124-141.

3

Senem Aydin-Düzgit, “Unravelling European Union Foreign Policy through Critical Discourse Analysis: Prospects and Challenges,” Cooperation and Conflict, 2014, 49:3, 135.

4_{See, for example, James Dittmer and David A. Parr, “Mediating sovereignty: a comparative latent analysis of}

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The methodological approaches used in the thesis

The geopolitical approach of the thesis

The thesis attempts to ‘map out’ the geopolitical aspects of two wars in Serbia and Georgia in such a way that, firstly, the actors in the two conflicts can be compared at a glance at different ‘levels of analysis’, before specific aspects and actors are chosen for in-depth analysis. The objective is to start with the assumption that a comparative analysis of two conflicts that appear to be similar in some way will yield advances in the way that we conceive of the actors and their actions, in addition to producing case studies that build knowledge of the conflicts in themselves. The appendix contains a visual guide to the different levels of analysis of the conflicts, as considered in the thesis.

The comparative method used in this thesis

The comparative method used in this paper seeks to identify similar traits among actors, and ask the same questions of these actors. For the most part, the comparative method used is straightforward, seeking to describe the history of relations between local actors (Chapter 2: Serbia and Kosovo, and Chapter 3: Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia). However, whilst the same questions are asked of the evolution of relations between the state in question and their ‘breakaway’ provinces, the narratives built up in describing one territory (e.g. Serbia, including Kosovo) are explicitly excluded from the discussion in of the evolution of relations in the other territory under discussion (Georgia, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia). This is because the method applied in the paper relies on asking the same questions of the same aspect of different conflicts, in an attempt to ‘get past’ or overcome the prejudices of the researcher, who will have been influenced by background, education, nationality, and media, and, it is further surmised, is likely unaware of his prejudice. The comparative method is used in a slightly different manner in Chapters 4 and 5, concerning the major geopolitical actors in the two conflicts (NATO and Russia, respectively). Firstly, the

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evolution of the moral and institutional context of international politics in the years before the respective conflicts is outlined, giving essential background information for the subsequent application of the method. At the end of Chapters 4 and 5, the comparative method is used in its most ‘pure’ version, taking the arguments used to build up a picture of the ‘unstated aims’ of NATO in 1999 (as formulated in the paper) and applying them directly to Russia in 2008. The objective is, again, to ascertain whether the historical facts that are known about the second conflict can bear interpretation through the lens of the arguments in the first conflict. If the experiment is successful, then new ways of comprehending the conflicts under consideration and the motives of the geopolitical actors should come to light, at the same time as reinforcing the need for strong factual arguments to be made if moral superiority can be claimed for either side.

It is hoped that the comparative method, especially in its purest version, will give the researcher space to explore the impact of attempting to use equivalent linguistic devices in a different context (occasionally whole words, phrases and sentences will be adapted to the conflict in comparison). The ultimate aim of this linguistic experiment - that is also inherently analytical and factual, and seeks to describe events in a fair and impartial manner - is to root out the bias of the researcher by carefully considering the impact of the language used in each case. For example, is ‘intervention’ favoured more often in relation to one geopolitical actor, whereas another actor is said to have committed an ‘invasion’? Having separate, yet comparable texts that describe similar conflicts with different actors will, it is hoped, force the researcher to consider and reconsider his bias in each case.

The comparative method: a further example

The thesis is, in addition to being a case study of two conflicts (the NATO operations in Serbia in 1999 and the Russian operations in Georgia in 2008), an attempt to find a method of working that exposes the researcher’s own bias and provides an opportunity to correct it. This is accomplished by resisting the combination of two apparently similar situations in the same chapter, and instead exposing the different situations to the same questions. By isolating the narratives and, afterwards, comparing them, bias in the use of words and of

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ideas are exposed. To demonstrate the method (for example only; this argument does not appear in the paper), if the question of sovereignty in Abkhazia were to be compared to the question of sovereignty in Kosovo, instead of discussing the differences of legality between the full sovereignty of Kosovo and the full sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the same chapter, great effort is made to avoid this approach in favour of discussing the two cases separately. The idea is that the ‘pure principles’ extracted from the first situation can be put into contact with the second situation. The second situation - here, the legality of the full sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - may result in illogical or untrue arguments, in which case either a) the situation is different or, b) the principles are misguided, and should be revised. If the principles of the argument must be revised, this will have an effect on the first text (i.e. bias is corrected). If the situation is different, the method offers an opportunity to show the exact differences outside of a narrative that must cast judgement on both cases at the same time (as would be the case if the two cases were addressed in the same chapter). The desired end result is that statements that are overly reliant on accepted wisdom are ‘flushed out’ from the first text and held to a higher standard. This satisfies one objective of the thesis, which is to reach a higher level of analysis that holds two similar situations to the same standard by innovative means. The advantage of the method is that two situations are forced into contact with the same ideas and arguments - and with the accompanying language - without being overburdened by constant reference to the situation held in comparison. It is hoped that this will lead to clarity of language and of argument.

Answering the research question: a guide to the chapters

The paper approaches the research question in two ways. Firstly, case studies examine the role of history between ‘local actors’ in Chapters 2 and 3, before building case studies of the history of ‘major geopolitical actors’ in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 2 and 3 build up the historical differences between the local actors, inviting the reader to note the similarities between the various histories and narratives. Chapters 4 and 5 are more explicitly comparative, focusing first on the history of the organisation under discussion (NATO, Russia considered as a foreign policy actor) before describing the moral and institutional context on

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the international scene under which the respective wars began. Finally, three questions are posed at the end of Chapters 4 and 5 that attempt to hold the narrative that is evident from answers to these questions in Chapter 4 (NATO) to account by applying the same questions and searching for an equivalent narrative in Chapter 5 (Russia). Chapter 6 assesses the findings of the paper.

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Chapter 2: The role of local history between Serbia and Kosovo

Purpose of this section

This section of the thesis traces the reasons for which history in Kosovo is contested and asks why violence broke out in the 1990s. Within the analysis of escalating violence, the section details the changing demographic and economic situation of the region in the latter half of the 20th century, providing a basis for comparison with the situation in South Ossetia that will feature later in the thesis.

Kosovo facts

Kosovo and Metohija cover 10’887 km sq., when considered as part of Serbia constituting 12.3% of the total area of the country. The population in 2012 was almost two million, or around 20% of the population of Serbia5. Islam and Christianity are the major religions, and Albanian is spoken, in addition to Serbian6.

Contested narratives

This section will argue that the highly contested historical narratives and inability of the Serb and Kosovar Albanian factions to agree on historical facts or the significance of those facts increased the likelihood of conflict throughout history. Further, in Yugoslav times, the lack of agreement on historical narratives both drove and was driven by economic and political inequality, adding to the potential for violence.

5_{BBC, “Serbia Country Profile,” 8 June 2017,}_{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17907947} 6

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The history of Kosovo is much disputed, both in terms of whether particular events happened and the significance of those events to the historical narrative and thus to the present day. For example, a difference of emphasis can be discerned between arguments relating to sovereignty. The common Serb view that the population of Kosovo was Serbian until a few generations ago, for instance, does not necessarily conflict with the claim of Albanian historians that their ancestors - ancient Illyrians and Dardanians - were present in the region before the Serb invasions of the sixth and seventh centuries7. However, both narratives are used to legitimise claims of sovereignty in Kosovo through different emphases, namely the right of ‘first possession’8 on the Albanian side and the right of longevity of occupation on the Serbian side. As regards factual arguments, conflict remains, for example with reference to the above argument, Serb historians claim that there is no continuation between Illyrians and modern day Kosovars9, whereas Albanian Kosovars reject the argument of Serb historians who point to the Serb Orthodox churches built in this period and documentation of Serbian families as proof that only Serbs resided in Kosovo under the rule of Serbian kings10, instead asserting that Serbs used the church as an administrative resource to forcibly Slavicize Albanian families11. The contestations of historical narrative resulting from the inability of the Serb and Kosovar Albanian sides to agree on historical facts and the significance of those facts arguably increases the likelihood of conflict by aiding the polarisation of views in Serbian and Kosovar society.

The mobilisation of historical facts and the significance of these facts for the legitimisation of sovereignty are arguably boosted by the profound nature of the historical connection felt by the Serbs and Kosovars towards the Kosovo territory and the internal unity of the two polarised narratives12.

7_{Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002, 2.} 8

Judah, Kosovo, 2. Cf. Bataković, Dušan T. Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, a historical perspective. Belgrade: igoja, 2012, 19. Ramet mentions how Kosovars see the Serbs as ‘guests’. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias,

The Three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center

Press, 2006, 299.

9

Dušan T. Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama: a historical perspective. Belgrade: igoja, 2012, 20.

10_{In the 400 years before the Serbian defeats in the 14}th_century. 11

The 1455 Ottoman census shows only 80 of 600 villages had household heads with typical Albanian names. See Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 33, and Judah, Kosovo, 3-4.

12_{Heather Rae, State identities and the homogenisation of peoples, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,}

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The depth of the connection felt to a historical land of Kosovar and Serb ancestors, coupled with a propensity to interpret events through long-standing myths and narratives, arguably increases the potential for violence.

For many centuries before the advent of Yugoslavia, deep historical relationships existed between Serbs and Kosovo, and, separately, Kosovar Albanians and Kosovo. In the Serb case, one reason for the depth of historical feeling towards Kosovo is that the granting of autocephalous status to the Serbian Orthodox Church (in 1219) and the subsequent failure of the Ottoman invasion to end the operation of the church resulted in the commingling of the ideas of resurrection and the Serb administration of Kosovo13: the province took on a mythical significance as a an ancient Serbian land where Serbs were systemically oppressed for their religious beliefs14. In this narrative, the Serbs see themselves as victims, longing to free themselves from the ‘Turkish yoke’15. The second class reaya citizenship that the Christian population was subject to after the Ottoman conquering of Serbia and Kosovo in 1459 exacerbated this feeling of communal suffering16. The Kosovar Albanians also process historical facts through a victim narrative17, which holds that Kosovo is Albanian through the right of first possession, and through the continuing presence of Albanians in the province throughout history18. The amount of suffering on both sides provides much material to evidence the respective victim narratives. For example, both Serbs and Albanians have been forced to flee the province at various times in history, for instance many Albanians emigrated after the emergence of Serbia as a autonomous entity in 180419, and a million Albanians and a million Serbs are thought to have fled the lands of their respective oppressors in the Serbian-Turkish wars of 1876-78. At the same time, it is worth noting that

13

Judah, Kosovo, 3.

14_{Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 17.} 15

Judah, Kosovo, 8.

16

As reaya, Orthodox Christian Serbs were, according to Serb historians, reduced to landless peasants, obliged to dress differently and had no rights to bear arms or ride horses, in addition to seeing their children converted to Islam and trained to serve in the Turkish army. See Dusan T. Bataković “Kosovo and Metohija - A Historical Survey (1),” available at

http://www.spc.rs/sr/kosovo_and_metohija_a_historical_survey1_prof_dr_dusan_t_batakovic

17_{“The common self-percep on of Kosovo Albanians is that of the greatest vic ms of Balkan history.”}

Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 19.

18

Judah, Kosovo, 9.

19_{Some evidence, such as the testimony of the English traveller Sir Paul Rycaut on the wars fought between}

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the same fact can be used to increase the claims of both sides. For example, a Serb exodus from Kosovo can be used by Albanians to claim their rightful possession of Kosovo, on the grounds that Kosovar Albanians outnumber other ethnic groups. Mehmet Hoxha20 made this argument when he forwarded that, if 370’000 Montenegrins were permitted republic status, then 1.2 million Kosovar Albanians should also enjoy this right21. The Serb narrative would, however, likely emphasise the oppression that led to the exodus in terms of a victim narrative.

Arguably these two opposing narratives, both equally strong in terms of depth of feeling, result in the potential for violence, if not the outbreak of violence itself. For example, it may be that proponents of the Serb ‘victim narrative’ interpret what a disinterested observer may regard as Serb oppression as resistance to Albanian dominance in Kosovo. In this way, the Kosovar brand of ‘diaspora nationalism’ is alleged by Serbs to claim that Albanians desire complete ethnic control over Kosovo22. Facts such as the high birth rate of Kosovar Albanians23, which is typical of poverty-stricken societies24, are then interpreted in the Serbian narrative as a means of boosting Albanian claims through the ‘diaspora nationalism’ narrative. Such interpretation of facts is likely to increase the number of areas in which the two groups cannot come to agreement, and, therefore, given their geographical proximity, increase the potential for violence.

The unification of Serb and Albanian societies around singular historical narratives may also play a role in increasing the potential for violence. For example, the supposed Illyrian origin

20

A Kosovar Albanian politician, and first leader of the province in 1944-45. See World Statesmen, Kosovo, retrieved 15 June 2017, http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Kosovo.html

21_{Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 295. Ethnic Albanians have constituted a majority of the population of Kosovo}

since the late 19th century. See Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Kosovo, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011, 26.

22_{Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 19.} 23

The high birthrate in Kosovo, combined with the emigration of 30’000 Serbs and others between 1971 and 1981, almost doubled the Kosovar population in the province between 1961 and 1984. See Hugh Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” in Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992, ed. Dejan Djokić, London, Hurst and Co., 2003, 130 and Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 275.

24

The correlation between poverty and high birth rates is often strong, however other factors, such as education and culture should also be considered. See Mikra Krasniqi, “The Origins of Poverty in Kosovo,”

Kosovo 2.0, March 19, 2014, available at http://archive.kosovotwopointzero.com/en/article/1101/the-origins-of-poverty-in-kosovo. For further discussion see e.g. Steven W. Sinding, “Population, Poverty and Economic Development,” Bixby Forum Paper, The World in 2050, delivered at Berkeley, California, January 23-24, 2008, available at https://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/04.07.09/Population_Poverty_and_Econ_Dev_Sinding.pdf. In the 1980s, Kosovo Serbs alleged that Albanian nationalists supported “as high a birthrate as possible”. CIA, “Yugoslavia: A Growing Albanian Minority,” Directorate of Intelligence, 9 August 1985, available at

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of modern Albanians connected diverse clans and religious groups in the late 19th and early 20th centuries25. The advent of Serb nationalism in the same time period can be seen as a corollary of Albanian nationalism26. Regardless of how the two narratives initially came into operation, there is evidence that the growth of one narrative encourages the growth of the other, opposing narrative. For example, in 1966 the LCY found that ‘Greater Serb’ nationalism was present within its ranks and acted as a stimulus to Albanian nationalism27. Again, the rise of nationalism does not necessarily entail violence yet arguably serves as a possible justification for violence and thus makes the outbreak of violence more likely than if a singular narrative or a plurality of narratives were accepted in Kosovo and Serbia28.

The above paragraph has attempted to demonstrate that the depth of historical feeling has had the potential to facilitate the escalation of conflicts in Kosovo throughout history. However, this potential cannot by itself explain the increasing violence in Kosovo from the 1950s until the 1980s that foreshadowed the conflicts in the 1990s. The next paragraph will consider to what extent intensifying violence in the decades after the 1950s can be attributed to inequality within political and economic structures in Yugoslavia and, later, in Serbia and Kosovo.

25

Bataković, Serbia’s Kosovo Drama, 19.

26

Anderson finds that print languages were important in the growth of “nationally imagined communities” Perry Anderson in Richard Lachmann, States and Power, Cambridge: Policy, 2012, 83, whilst Lachmann argues that “conscription, more than any other governmental action, turned subjects into citizens” ibid., 81. The first Serbian newspaper, printed in Vienna, dates from 1791, and from 1834, the first Serbian newspaper was published inside the country, whilst military conscription was prsent from the attempts by the Habsburg Empire to establish a Serbian standing army. See Katrin Boveza-Abazi, The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian

National Identities, 1800s-1900s, February 2003 PhD Thesis, Department of History, McGill University,

Montreal, 172.

27

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 295.

28

Several scholars have argued that the prevalence of nationalism can increase the probability of conflict , through producing interest groups that favour aggressive policies and creating the conditions for “nationalist bidding wars,” much like the behaviour present in Serbia and Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s. Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson, “The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of interstate War,”

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56:5, 2012, 826. For an account of the connections between nationalism and

violence using Charles Tilly’s and Michael Mann’s work on collective violence and ethnic cleansing, respectively, see Andreas Pickel, “Nationalism and Violence: A Mechanismic Explanation,” Centre for the Critical Study of

Global Power and Politics, Working Paper CSGP 07/1, available at

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Political and economic inequality: a cause of violence in Yugoslavia?

It is difficult to analytically separate cause and effect between the (mis)governance of Kosovo between the 1950s and the 1980s from the regular outbreaks of violence in the province. However, this section will argue that there is a strong case that deficiencies of the day-to-day and long-term governance of the province increased grievances and led to continuing violence in Kosovo.

That violence was prevalent in Kosovo throughout Tito’s rule is uncontroversial29. Continuing Kosovar Albanian agitation, which was anti-Serb at the same time as demanding the right of self-determination for Kosovo, may be partially attributed to Serb oppression. For example, from the 1950s to the late 1960s, Ranković, the head of the secret police, made extensive use of surveillance in the province, using police and security forces that were dominated by Serbs to terrorise the Albanian population30. In contrast to Belgrade, in Kosovo verbal ‘offences’ against the regime were often prosecuted and resulted in long prison terms - illustrative of unequal treatment31. As part of the oppression, an alleged espionage ring was uncovered, resulting in prison terms for several Albanian leaders32. Ramet suggests that the fact that Albanians in general were not supporters of the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha suggests this was an attempt by Ranković to stymie Albanian political power33. The overturning of the convictions in February 1968, after Ranković was found to have fabricated evidence and otherwise rigged the trials34, indicates that federal authorities were not completed biased towards the Serbs. However, this episode likely strengthened anti-Serb feeling amongst Kosovars, already strong due to the continuing Serb dominance of security apparatus35. The next section will consider whether methods of the Serb-dominated security

29_{Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 294.} 30

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 294. In 1956, the police and security forces in Kosovo were composed of 60.8% and 58.3% Serbs respectively, despite a Serb presence of only 23.5% of the province.

31_{David Matas and Dennis Mills, No More: The Battle Against Human Rights Violations, Toronto: Dundurn}

Press, 2008, 34.

32

33_{As evidence, Ramet points out that the Albanian regime was a source of out-migration to Yugoslavia, rather}

than vice versa. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 294.

34

35_{In general, the dominance of the security apparatus was, especially at the mid- and higher levels, due to}

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forces and police in oppressing the Kosovar population were reinforced through discriminatory economic policies.

The feelings of injustice caused by the politically motivated actions of the police were exacerbated by the failure of the Yugoslav regime to find a solution to economic underdevelopment in Kosovo, heightening the prospects for conflict. Kosovo’s few developed industries had been destroyed in the war and the province was the poorest region of Yugoslavia with least developed infrastructure and lowest educational attainment of the federation36, yet was not included in programs for underdeveloped regions from 1947-5537. That there was a large developmental gap between the Yugoslav regions which was not seriously addressed is evidenced by several measures. For example, between 1947 and 1962, per capita investment and economic growth rates in Kosovo were well below the Yugoslav average38. In all-important comparative terms39, Kosovo’s per capita income shrank from 42% of that of the developed republics to 28% from 1953 to 197140. The province also had amongst the highest rates of unemployment41: whilst there were 97 Serbs seeking work out of 1000 employed, the equivalent figure for Kosovo was 310, whilst the Yugoslav average was 83 during the period 1965-198042. In the government apparatus, as in the security forces, Kosovars were also at a disadvantage. For example, in 1967, the Tenth Session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) found that Serbs had much a greater chance of obtaining employment in party and government apparatus in Kosovo than Albanians43. Again, the federal authorities were not completely insensitive to Kosovar demands. For example, after requests from Kosovar leaders, Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK) credits from

Yugoslavia., Thomas S. Szayna, Identifying potential ethnic conflict: application of a process model, Santa Monica: Rand, 2000, 87-88.

36_{In reference to the period between the end of WWII and the 1970s. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 273.} 37_{Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 274.}

38

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 266, 274.

39

Ramet states that “Even small differences [in income] can spark resentment, nationalism and violence”. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 263. Studies of relative deprivation suggest that felt and actual deprivation may strengthen or weaken in-group identity in diverse ways. For example, Goeke-Morey Et Al., found that relative deprivation was linked to stronger in-group identity in Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, a similar zero-sum political environment. Marcie C. Goeke-Morey, Ed Cairns, Laura K. Taylor, Christine E. Merrilees, Peter Shirlow, E. Mark Cummings, “Predictors Of Strength Of In-Group Identity In Northern Ireland: Impact Of Past Sectarian Conﬂict, Relative Deprivation, And Church Attendance,” Journal of Community and Applied Social

Psychology, Vol. 25, 2015, 290.

40

41

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1970 were written off as grants and Kosovo gained direct representation on the FADURK board44. However, problems remained. In 1990, for example, young people counted for 70% of the unemployed45. To sum up, despite federal intervention, ongoing inequalities in the economic sphere likely fed resentment and contributed to potential for violence at the same time as hardening nationalist narratives46.

This section has argued that political and economic inequalities between Kosovo and the Yugoslav republics and discrimination against Kosovars, together with a deeply held connection to the territory of Kosovo resulted in increased conflict. The next section will argue that not only did these concessions did not go far enough to placate the Kosovar population, but that there is strong evidence to suggest that Kosovar nationalist feeling was strong enough by the 1970s that it would be very difficult to stop.

Kosovo: nationalist sentiment

This section will forward several arguments to demonstrate that nationalist sentiment in Kosovo (and Serbia) was self-perpetuating by the mid-1970s. The central argument used to justify this thesis is that newly empowered Kosovar society and institutions did not regard nationalistic claims as satisfied and continued to contest the remaining Serb - and Yugoslav - influence in the province.

Against the backdrop of increasing anti-Serb demonstrations and inter-ethnic violence throughout 1968, culminating in riots across Kosovo on the day before Kosovar Liberation Day and the anniversary of the Yugoslav state on 29 November, measures to remedy Albanian concerns were taken at the federal level. As would be expected in a police state, the demonstrations of 1968 were suppressed. However, in 1969, important constitutional concessions were made that included the discontinuation of the Serbian name “Metohija” from “Kosovo-Metohija”, the enactment of a “Constitutional Law” which enabled the

44

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provincial assembly to pass laws without reference to Serbian legislation, and the creation of a Supreme Court47. Although some of these measures appeared to be merely cosmetic, for example the changing of the name of the autonomous province to “Kosovo”, they were highly symbolic. The creation of a Supreme Court brought the region into line with Vojvodina, which had made use of one since 194648. Taken together these symbolic and concrete concessions arguably only added to the formation of a national consciousness and strengthened the legitimacy of calls for full republic status. However, ongoing violence continued to aim at coherent political goals, such as the ever-present demand for republic status within the Yugoslav Federation and the creation of an independent university in Pristina49. In this context, the granting of constitutional concessions and a free university arguably contributed to the creation of self-generating mechanisms that would over time increase nationalist sentiment.

In addition to increasing the formal powers of Albanians Kosovars over the province, arguably the misuse - understood in terms of the Yugoslav system in operation at the time - of some newly gained institutional powers also increased long-term divisions between Serbs and Kosovars. For example, the failure of the provincial government to share information on subversive activities with Belgrade, a problem compounded by a similar neglect of duty at the district level50, meant that unrest was not suppressed at an early stage, likely a factor in the outbreak of large-scale violence in the province in March and April 198151. Here, autonomous powers that were granted to Kosovo took the region away from the oversight of Belgrade and arguably increased the likelihood of violence by letting resent continue unchecked by repression52. This inaction likely increasing division by leaving Kosovar

47

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 296-297.

50

51_{Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 300-301.} 52

Researchers are divided on where the line between when repression reduces political participation and when repression will have the effect of increasing political participation. Siegel, using a mixed methods approach, finds that the structure of the social network in question is critically important to outcomes. Factors to be taken into account include the behaviour in networks in repressive societies and psychological responses to repression. See Pamela E. Oliver, “Rational Action,” The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, eds. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, 2015, 257-258 and David A. Siegel, When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks, The Journal of Politics, 73:4, August, 2011, 993-995.

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nationalist agitators free to preach, intensifying anti-Serb sentiment53. This in turn may have contributed to the atmosphere that led to the exodus of Serbs from the province, an important factor in the fall of Serbs in the province from 20.9% in 1971 to 10% in 198754. Migrants from Kosovo arrived in Belgrade with stories of mistreatment, increasing Serb hostility towards the government and people of the province that was expressed through the media55 and, later, by politicians such as Milošević, who in 1989 would speak with a banner reading ‘Only Unity Saves The Serb’ as a backdrop56. The issue was not just a lack of repression, but the inconsistent application of repression, for when suppression was tried, it also inflamed tensions57.

The inauguration of the independent University of Pristina58 also demonstrates how newly won institutions were the catalyst for ever-greater nationalist demands. The ethnic lines drawn in the university likely led to the desertion of Serbs and Montenegrins, who started to leave Kosovo59. The fleeing of many highly educated professionals likely ensured the debate in Kosovo was further polarised, as alternative bases of argument would not be present, arguably an especially important aspect of future peaceful relations in a university where political opinions are formed. At the same time, books with subversive overtones, flooded in from Albania, and close relations were kept with the university in Tirana60. Pristina University, with its abundance of graduates overqualified for available positions61, also acted as a focal point for separatist organisation. The violent demonstrations of 1981 started there, supposedly because of poor conditions in the canteen, but quickly turned political62, with speakers insisting that undesirable Serb influence was continuing in the autonomous administration, and again calling for full republican status63. The protests, which cost up to

53

See Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 305.

54_{The other central factor being the high birth rate of Kosovar Albanians. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 306.} 55

(in 1987) Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias,, 305.

56

Heather Rae, State identities and the homogenisation of peoples, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 188.

57

58

59_{Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 297. Figures see 306 Ramet. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 303.} 60

Judah, Kosovo, 38.

61

62_{Judah, Kosovo, 39. Cf. Ramet 301.} 63

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1000 lives64, were suppressed by special police units and long prison sentences for up to 1200 persons65.

In constitutional terms it is also possible to make a strong argument that hard-won ‘privileges’ were made the most of by an ever-advancing tide of nationalism. Judah notes that by 1974 Kosovo possessed almost every prerogative of a republic apart from the name. From this point on, Kosovo could be said to be what Roeder calls a “segment-state”, providing the conditions for increasing hegemony of political identity within Kosovo and a favourable situation for politicians who wished to press the nationalist case66. Ramet notes that the demand for full republic status for Kosovo deeply affected inter-republican relations in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo itself, this was partly the consequence of ever-expanding cohesion in national consciousness on a territory with defined borders, in addition to more concrete arguments67.

This section has attempted to demonstrate that the strong nationalist feeling in Kosovo was only increased in the decades after the 1950s. Hard-won concessions to Kosovar nationalism that did not quell nationalist sentiment but were instead used to further the nationalist cause. The next section will examine how Serb nationalism also increased after 1980.

The Serbian “Awakening” and Milošević’s rise to power

Tito’s death, in May 198068, marked the end of the relatively prosperous period of the 1970s69 and of a system that was to a large extent held together by a man elected “without limitation of mandate”70. In his place, Yugoslav society, such as it was, increasingly

64

The actual figure is likely in the several hundreds. See Judah Kosovo, 40, and Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 301.

65_{Judah, Kosovo, 40.} 66

Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation States Come From: Institutional Change in The Age of Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 16-18. For detail on the measures of the, 1974 constitution, see Ramet, The

Three Yugoslavias, 326-7.

67

68

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questioned the federal system. Perhaps especially for Serbs, this questioning often drove national issues to the fore.

Serb nationalism was as prevalent as Kosovar nationalism in the 1980s, and in some ways similar. In the first instance, Kosovar discontent that rested on the lack of republic status was mirrored by Serb anger at the concessions of the 1974 constitution, which were, first in within the Central Committee of the Serbian party71, and later in a 1985 Memorandum portrayed as a tragedy for Serbian sovereignty72. The inevitable revision of the Titoist system started with the revision of his personal history73 and, through the 1980s, gradually turned towards accusations and actions along ethnic lines being taken in the political sphere.

For several years, party officials fielded an unyielding defence of the constitutional order laid out in 197474, yet the criticism continued and was well-publicised. For example, a 1984 book by Jovan Mirić arguing that the Constitution provided only for the sovereignty of the republics - and not for that of the Yugoslav federation - was serialised in a magazine75. Repression of nationalist sentiment continued, for example of the poet Gojko Djogo for penning a verse about Tito as “the rat from Dedinje” in 198176, and of Vojislav Šešelj, who was later to become the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, for producing a map of an enlarged Serbian republic77. However, in time the undercurrents of anger and bitterness, above all galvanised by the perceived depletion of Serbian power in Kosovo78 found their expression in political life.

The end of Yugoslavia 1987-91

Throughout the 1980s there was a concerted attempt by regime politicians to hold back nationalist sentiment. So-called ‘recentrists’ and ‘decentrists’ attempted to tackle the

73

76

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political and economic crises whilst claiming to represent Tito’s legacy and fight off their opponents79. Pressure for reform could not hide the breakdown in federal power - the federal party structure became powerless to carry out policy, passing 322 acts between June 1986 and June 1988, yet those without a security element were never enacted in practice80. From 1987, expressions of nationalism increased markedly in Serbia. Milošević, president from May 1989, recast the recentralist approach as promoting Serbian nationalist interests in the place of supranationalist, and the battles over constitutional questions continued81 along national lines82. Milošević’s rise in Serbian and Yugoslav politics has been well documented83, and shall not be explored in detail here.

Milošević mobilised Serbian society around the “reconquest” of Kosovo and Vojvodina84, the province to the north of Belgrade that, equal to Kosovo, also enjoyed quasi-republic status. The Serbian Orthodox church was embraced, and the press curtailed85, and the supposedly anti-Serb nature of federal decisions - such as the removal of industry to Croatia in the middle of the century86 - exposed. The bitterness of Serbs at the loss of Serb control in Kosovo, which was previously exposed at events such as the 1983 funeral of Ranković, attended by 100’000 Serbs87, was systematised in the form of the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins. This organisation, powered by Milošević’s populist appeal88, organised almost 100 demonstrations between its beginnings in 1988 and spring 1989, attaining an average turnout of 50’000 per demonstration89. The depth of feeling could be seen in these popular mobs that were encouraged by Milošević in his infamous comments that ‘no one should beat you’90. The annexation of Kosovo (together with Vojvodina) lost its autonomous status on 24 March 198991, after local representatives

79

80

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 338-339.

83

See for example Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 341-362.

Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 345, 357, 359.

86

89

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were twice forced to resign, only made the problem more acute92. Direct control of the province was enacted in July 199093.

Conclusion

This section of the thesis has argued that a clash of historical narratives, bolstered by economic and political inequalities that were themselves in part driven by zero-sum narratives, led to demands of autonomy for Kosovo. The partial satisfaction of these demands, for example through allowing more representation in the political apparatus in Kosovo, and through the 1974 Constitution, only increased the hegemony of discourse in Kosovo, partly through the exodus of Serbs who found living conditions in the province to be newly hostile. Once these conditions were established, attempts by Belgrade to reassert control were manifestly more difficult, as each action to re-establish control - even without the divisive rhetoric of Milošević - would be subject to a particular manner of interpretation.

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Chapter 3: The role of local history between South Ossetia and Georgia

Purpose of this section

This section of the thesis traces the reasons for which history in Georgia is contested and asks why violence broke out in the 2008. Within the analysis of escalating violence, the section details the changing political, demographic, and economic situation of the region in the latter half of the 20th century until 2008.

Abkhazia facts

Population: 550’000 (1991), 178’600 (2004 est.), circa 250’000 (2011)94. 4-5% of Georgia’s population.

Area: 8’600 sq. km95. When considered as part of Georgia, constitutes 12.3% of the Georgian territory96.

The ethnic make-up of Abkhazia has changed greatly over time. Thousands of Georgians were expelled in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict (1992-1993)97. It should also be noted that

94_{Barry Turner, The Statesman’s Yearbook 2015, The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World,}

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 506. BBC, “Abkhazia profile,” 7 December 2015, available at

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18175030. In 2003, an Abkhaz government survey declared a population total of as 216’000, of which Abkhazians (43.8%), Mingrelians (21.3%) and Armenians (20.8%) were the main groups. However, the actual ethnic make-up is likely roughly equally split between the three groups. See Kimitaka Matsuzato “Transnational minorities challenging the interstate system: Mingrelians, Armenians, and Muslims in and around Abkhazia,” Nationalities Papers, 39:5, 2011, 816,

DOI:10.1080/00905992.2011.599376

95

Turner, The Statesman’s Yearbook, 506.

96_{BBC, “Georgia profile,” 18 May 2017, available at}_{http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17301647} 97

States that there was ‘no significant’ Georgian population in Georgia after the war, although by 1998 30’000-40’000 had returned. Carter Johnson (2015) Keeping the Peace After Partition: Ethnic Minorities, Civil Wars, and the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma, Civil Wars, 17:1, 32. DOI:10.1080/13698249.2015.1059566

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Abkhazia is multi-ethnic, and includes important Mingrelian, Armenian and Russian populations98.

South Ossetia facts

Population: 98,527 (1989)99, 49,200 (2004 est.), circa 52’000 (2013)100. 1.1% of Georgia’s population.

Area: 3’900 sq. km101. When considered as part of Georgia, constitutes 5.6% of the Georgian territory102.

South Ossetia is today largely mono-ethnic103. However, before the war in 2008, about 30’000 of the estimated 98’000 population in South Ossetia were Georgian104.

98

Matsuzato, “Transnational minorities,” 811.

99

Of which, 66.2% were Ossetian, 29.0% Georgian and 2.7% ‘Slavs’. 1989 Soviet census figures. Felix Corley “South Ossetia between Gamsakhurdia and Gorbachev: Three documents,” Central Asian Survey, 16:2, 1997, 269, DOI:10.1080/02634939708400987

100_{Turner, The Statesman’s Yearbook, 507.BBC, “South Ossetia profile - Facts,” 7 December 2015, available at}

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18269214

101

Turner, The Statesman’s Yearbook, 507.

102_{BBC, “Georgia profile.”} 103

Matsuzato, “Transnational minorities,” 813.

104

Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History Since Independence, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013, 239. Monica Dufy Toft, “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building: the Failed Transition in Georgia,” Regional

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Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia: a shared history

This part of the thesis will examine how the clash of historical narratives in Georgia, had often resulted in violence, particularly when the country and its various peoples were not integrated into a larger state. The actions of Georgian leaders in particular will also be considered as sources of violent potential, particularly from the late 1980s.

Contested narratives

This section will argue that the competing mythologies of the Georgians, South Ossetians and the Abkhazians has been a source of conflict throughout history.

Georgian mythology centres on claims of Georgian dominance of the region, which is said to date from 2000 B.C. when the Western Caucasus was dominated by a “Colchian” culture, which was linguistically - and therefore ethnically - Kartvelian (Georgian)105. Other Georgian myths exalt the Golden Age of unity under David the Builder (1089-1125), who is said to have made the Ossetians into vassals (referring to North Ossetia)106. Often, Georgians emphasise the sovereignty of these ancient kingdoms, discounting the frequent subjugation of Georgian lands to empires based in Persia and Rome107, and disregarding popular myths among other nationalities by reversing them. For example Georgians claim that the Abkhazian kingdom that ruled Georgia in the 11th century was Georgian108. In relation to Abkhazia, Georgians claim it was merely part of Georgia109, and was previously part of the Colchis, whilst in the 20th century, the legitimisation of the rule of Georgia over Abkhazia in the years of independence (1918-21) by representatives of the Abkhaz people is seen to

105

Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2001, 91.

106

Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 91.

107

108_{Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 92.} 109

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legitimise Georgian rule today110. One Georgian narrative is that both the Ossetians and Abkhazians are ‘guests’, and not indigenous to their respective territories111. Georgians reportedly see Ossetian uprisings as linked to foreign interventions (from Russia) and hence as oppressive112.

The (South) Ossetians descend from Alan or Sarmatian tribes who settled in the Caucasus in the beginning of the Christian era113. The linguistically Iranian roots of Ossetian differ from many of those of the surrounding tribes, such as Cherkes and Turkic languages114. Ossetian mythology frequently emphasises the oppression experienced at Georgian hands. For example, some Ossetian historians say South Ossetians have lived in the region for 400 years115, since Georgian landowners brought Ossetians from the Northern Caucasus as serfs in the 16th century, whilst others emphasise Ossetians’ intermittent autonomy and frequent fighting with Georgian kings in the 18th century116. The South Ossetian narratives do not seem to be able to claim as strong a connection to the land as compared to the two other nationalities. Even the name “South Ossetia” is disputed, with Ossetian myth claiming it came from the 18th century, while the Georgians say it was a Bolshevik invention117. The narrative of oppression continued when the 1920 rebellion - claimed as Ossetian, not Bolshevik - was bloodily suppressed118. Interestingly, South Ossetians argue that Georgia’s border had been drawn ‘arbitrarily’ by Russia, and should therefore not be respected119. Finally, both South Ossetians and Georgians are Orthodox Christians120.

110

111

Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 94. For Abkhazian claims, see Toft, “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building,” 129.

112

113_{Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 97.}

114_{Fridrik Thordarson, “Ossetic Language i. History and Description,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, July 2009,}

http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ossetic. Toft places Ossetians in the Caucasus from the 13th century. Toft, “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building,” 130.

115_{Raymond Bonner, “Separatists in Georgia Look to Russia for Protection: Ethnic Conflict and Russia’s}

Southern Flank,” New York Times, 12 June 1994.

116

South Ossetians remember the suppression as “genocide”. See Raymond Bonner, “Separatists in Georgia Look to Russia for Protection: Ethnic Conflict and Russia’s Southern Flank,” New York Times, 12 June 1994. See also Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 97.

119

Raymond Bonner, “Separatists in Georgia Look to Russia for Protection: Ethnic Conflict and Russia’s Southern Flank,” New York Times, 12 June 1994.

120_{Raymond Bonner, “Separatists in Georgia Look to Russia for Protection: Ethnic Conflict and Russia’s}

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The Abkhaz mythology emphasises the indigenous nature of their ancestors, whom they trace to Hurrians and Hattians of the Middle Eastern second and third millenniums B.C. 121. Abkhaz narratives could be summed up as a combination of the pride felt by Georgians and the oppression of a ‘smaller’ nationality, as felt by South Ossetians. For example, Abkhazians claim that the Abkhaz dynasty was, for a period around the eighth century, rulers of all Georgia - taking the Georgian unity myth for their own122. Abkhaz scholars also allege, reversing the Georgian argument, that Georgians are the ‘recent arrivals’123. The Abkhaz stress that they gained their independence in the 17th century under the Shervashidze dynasty, until an 1810 union with Russia124, after which the Abkhaz continued to resist in mountain territories125. After some Abkhaz converted to Islam the 17th and 18th century, half of the Abkhazians - and all Muslims - were expelled from the region in response to Russian suppression of a rebellion in 1866, and in 1877 at the time of the Russo-Turkish War126. The expulsions of Muslims by Russia are also remembered for the foreign settlers who took the best land127.

The strongly felt connections between the three nationalities and their lands are apparent from their respective mythologies, and arguably increase the likelihood of conflict when competing claims for the same areas are added, which is precisely the case in Georgia.

Shared history: Georgian ‘inclusiveness’?

The history of Georgia and the Caucasus in general is known for its complex national, religious and tribal loyalties and related wars, kept current by the need for decentralised

123

Toft, “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building,” 129.

Edward Mihalkanin, “The Abkhazians,” in De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty eds. Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, Henry Srebrnik, London: Taylor & Francis, 2016, 144.

126_{Toft, “Multinationality, Regional Institutions, State-Building,” 129.} 127

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policies due to the mountainous territory128. Despite the evidence available, some researchers argue that, over the long term, Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian relations have been largely peaceful129. If this was the case, it is perhaps because these territories have been governed by empires for long periods, most recently the Russian (throughout most of the 19th century) and the Soviet (1922-1991). Degoev has argued that the Russian empire personified an ideology of “arbiter, peacemaker and unifier” in the Caucasus130. Whether imposed or not, long periods of relative peace occurred, and the many nationalities and national minorities of the region, among which Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Greeks, South Ossetians, Adjarians, and Abkhazians feature131, intermingled in an environment that often encouraged tolerance, a quality of which the Georgians are proud132.

Georgian inclusiveness can perhaps be demonstrated through the lack of evidence of jingoistic Georgian nationalism in this period, though this could equally be due to the presence of the Russian state. Under the surface, Georgians did bemoan the strongly multi-ethnic make-up of Tbilisi and actively attempted to defend their ‘cultural rights’, yet further evidence of ‘inclusiveness’ can be seen in the fact that by the end of the 19th century many Georgians saw their future in socialism, not nationalism, and none of the Georgian political parties supported independence from Russia before 1917133. In addition, there were no major wars recorded between Georgia and other Caucasian peoples at least from 1800 until 1900, if one discounts the wars fought to protect Russia’s interests134. De Waal adds a different view of nationalism that could lead to a contrasting view of inter-ethnic relations. By arguing that stable national identities in Georgia and surrounding countries only materialised in the Soviet era, when Tbilisi became overwhelmingly Georgian for the first time135, De Waal seems to suggest that loyalties along nationalist lines were not as strong as

128

Thomas De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 14.

129_{Jones, Georgia, 219. However, the literature is sparse on any mentions of belligerent qualities of Georgians,}

Ossetians or Abkhazians, should they exist. Perhaps Rival clans as pre-national? See King, History of the

Caucasus, 5.

130_{See Vladimir Degoev, “The Diplomacy of the Caucasus War as a History Lesson,” Russian Social Science}

Review, 31.

131

See, for example, De Waal, The Caucasus, 14-16.

132_{Jones, Georgia, 219.} 133

Jones, Georgia, 220.

134

In parts of the Caucasian War, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Turkish War, Georgian principalities fought on Russia’s side, excepting the switching of Abkhazia to the Ottoman side in the Crimean War.

135

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they later became136. To be sure, this has been the case in general as nationality requirements became increasing rigid, often against the backdrop of exclusionary cultures and policies. In the Caucasus, for example, one can contrast the multi-ethnic cities of Tbilisi and Baku to their later, more homogenous iterations that were subject not only to tax collection and other feudal means of controlling the population by a far-away imperial power centre, but to more intimate means of control by the dominant local nationality with the full capacities of modernised bureaucracy at their disposal. In the beginning of the 20th century, the signs of Georgian nationalism were increasingly evident, driven by intellectual Georgians who continued to perpetuate the national culture through the promotion of Georgian language and literature, and who often pursued a moderate degree of independence from Russia137. Despite the longevity and strong historical narratives of the Abkhazian and (South) Ossetian peoples, however, the strength of the signs and symbols of their respective national cultures and imagined communities were relatively less developed. Where national feeling was evident was through conflict, for example in South Ossetia in the 1918 peasant uprising, the Ossetian rebellion of October 1918, and the short-lived Soviet republic declared in South Ossetia in May 1920, to which Georgia responded by razing villages138. In Abkhazia there was a similar story, and the region spent the years between 1918 and 1921 under different rulers after a pro-Bolshevik administration was replaced by Mensheviks in May 1918. After the fall of Menshevik Georgia to the Bolsheviks in 1921, Abkhazia was briefly a de facto independent republic before being absorbed into the Transcaucasus Federation as a “Treaty Republic”139.

The next section will argue that Soviet institutions and structures were an important factor in increasing the viability of all three nationalities in Georgia.

136_{This argument rests on the state-building prevalent in Georgia from the mid-19}th_{century, and makes no}

claim on the progress or otherwise of other loyalties, such as monarchistic or religious loyalties. For an overview of the growth of Georgian nationalism, see Natalie Sabanadze, “Globalization and Georgian Nationalism,” in Globalization and Nationalism: The Cases of Georgia and the Basque Country, ed. Natalie Sabanadze Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010, 67.

137

Sabanadze, “Globalization and Georgian Nationalism,” 67.

138_{Tuathail, “Russia’s Kosovo,” 674.} 139

Similarities and differences between actors and their actions in the conflicts in Serbia (1999) and Georgia (2008).