Resisting the West: What is the relationship between Putin’s ‘Eurasian’ Russia and Europe’s nationalist-right?
Student Name: Louis Osman Mackenzie Student Number: s1466100
Student Email: l.p.osman.mackenzie@umail.leidenuniv.nl Course: International Studies
Supervisor: Prof Andre Gerrits. Second Reader: Alanna O’Malley
Contents
1. Introduction. ……… 3
2. Methodology. ………. 7
3. Literature review: Nationalism, Russian policy and Eurasianism. ……….. 8
3.1. Chantal Mouffe: Against Universalism. ……… 8
3.2. Aleksandr Dugin: On the concept of Eurasianism. ……… 9
3.3. Vladislav Surkov: Alternative ‘sovereign democracy’ and civilisation. …….. 11
4. Eurasianism and its alternatives. ………. 14
4.1 Hungarian Turanism and Eurasianism ……….. 15
5. Case Study: France ……….. 16
6. Case Study: Hungary ……….. 19
7. Case Study: Greece ……… 22
8. Comparisons and contrasts ………. 26
9. The radical right and contemporary conflict ……… 28
10. Russia: A cause looking for an opportunity ……… 30
11. Conclusion ………. 33
12. Bibliography ……… 35
13. References ……….……. 40
1. Introduction.
The year 2014 was the year when a slowly simmering conflict between the West and Russia dramatically escalated. This conflict has been framed as a return to the hostilities of the Cold War; however the conflict has much older roots that pre-date the Soviet regime (1917-1991) by centuries. The relationship between Russia and its European rivals has been one of antagonism and grudging cooperation since the eighteenth century. Yet, it is not Russia’s historical foreign relations that are the focus of this study, but Russia’s current ambitions and the weapon it uses to undermine its Western rivals, namely encouraging the growth of nationalism and the far right in Europe, while Russia pursues an Eurasionist project with former Soviet states. Within the European Union anti-Western nationalism driven by the radical right and Russian influence is most visible in France, Hungary and Greece. This paper will analyse the extent and motivations of this relationship and how this relates to Russia’s Eurasian geopolitics.
Kissinger (1994) described Russia as “a cause looking for an opportunity” though in courting the radical-right the opportunity came before the cause. The Russian government astutely perceived a growing disillusion within the West since the end of the Cold War and has increasingly used this to its advantage. This new movement of anti-Westernism which can be better described as an opposition to globalism, capitalism and liberalism is not the exclusive territory of the far-left and has been joined by an emerging radical nationalist right. The reasons for this require a complex explanation, but for the sake of simplicity, this opposition can be reduced down to the dissatisfaction with the victory of Western liberalism after the collapse of European Communism in 1989-91. This was regarded at the time as a victory for capitalism and liberal democracy over Socialism and therefore radical leftism. It was the political left who were supposed to reform in the face of ideological defeat, re-defining what left-wing politics would be after the failure of Socialism. However the movement that is the political right has felt no reason to celebrate the supposed victory of
capitalism; it is far more concerned with what it sees as a new ideological foe that is neo-liberal capitalism and neo-liberal democracy.
The emergence of the new radical-right has produced explanations from some key theorists in the field. Chantal Mouffe (2011) argues that liberalism failed to win the ideological war but emerged the victor due to the failure of its more extreme Fascist and Communist opponents. Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann (2012), have argued that ‘denationalisation’ of the West has encouraged the growth of nationalism, while Dugin (2012) defines the tyranny of the American led unipolar world following the end of the Cold War as a contributory factor. These explanations broadly capture the essence of a combined grievance that has empowered nationalist forces but also radicalised them into turning right-wing nationalism into a form of anti-globalist resistance. While left-wing opponents generally oppose liberal-capitalist globalisation, the nationalist right is in total opposition to it in all its forms (Sommer, 2008).
Hugh Trevor-Roper (1962), describes nationalism as ‘the expression of wounded nationality: the cry of men who have suffered great national defeat, or whose nationality is denied, or who live insecurely on exposed national frontiers, surrounded, and in danger of being swamped by foreigners.’ It is a description that perfectly fits the new allies Russia has sought in its attempts at undermining the West. France is one such country where this nationalist sentiment has been felt. The Front National (FN) has articulated a message of dissatisfaction with modern France since being founded, but the causes of dissatisfaction have not been entirely consistent. Though a successful Western liberal democracy and European country which had been victorious in the twentieth century, the message that FN has argued is that France has been defeated in victory rather than achieving a victory in defeat.
2010 was a good year for Russia, the pro-Western governments of Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine had been removed from office, the European Union (EU) and the United States were reeling from the economic crisis and an election in Hungary had brought to power the first overtly pro-Russia government since the Cold War. Five years later Russia no longer holds such a strong international position, yet Russia’s Western rivals do not hold the upper hand. Russia has been increasingly successful in its aim of forcing a division amongst EU member states;
the change of government in Greece in January 2015 has effectively quadrupled the number of EU members supporting Russia and opposing Western sanctions.1 The sentiments of those nationalist opponents of globalisation who look to Russia for support have been best described by the leader of the Greek nationalist party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). "the demarcation of the political world into the Right Wing and the Left Wing is no longer relevant after the end of the Cold War. Nowadays, everyone in every aspect of his or her everyday life is either in favour or against Globalization".
Nationalist parties are growing in strength across Europe with big gains in the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Denmark and Finland (Ivaldi, 2012). However, it is in France, Hungary and Greece that radical-right-wing nationalism is identified as most politically important in relation to Russia. All these states are members of the European Union and NATO, but have all undergone profound changes in attitude towards Western institutions and have seen the development of favourable views toward Russia for varying reasons. These three countries will be used as case studies in this paper as they are identified as belonging to three different stages in radical nationalist development. Hungary is ideologically closest to Russia and in doing so has been accused of regressing into authoritarianism, despite not revising EU and NATO membership. Greece, since elections in 2015, has seen a radical left-right government in power that seeks to revise EU and NATO membership and is in the early stages of political opinion favourable to Russia. Including France as a case of potential ideological shift needs to be further qualified. The argument put forward here is that France is the original intellectual home of radical right-wing opposition to the West, despite having a secure liberal democratic government that is an integral Western ally. Le Front National is the fastest growing and most successful nationalist party in Europe and crucially the party stands on a platform of opposition to NATO and the European Union integral to its ideology (Mudd, 2004).
These parties seek varying forms of realignment with Russia, this has happened
simultaneously with the Russian state becoming increasingly illiberal and anti-Western in its foreign policy, and domestically. This now has very real implications for the West that has
begun to change the entire geo-political reality. Russia increasingly advocates the political-economic integration project of Eurasianism and uses the ideology of Neo-Eurasianism to give the project an ideological counterweight to Western Euro-Atlantic integration (Papava, 2013), as will be discussed below.
As a super-national union of states the European Union is dependent on the harmonious relations of its members; the points of weakness are national grievances directed at the core or other members. As the Soviet Union eventually succumbed to the problems between members states, the Russians had the experience of failed unions to be able to know how to undermine others. The vulnerability of the EU is seated in grievances of its members either towards the EU centre itself or what the EU stands for in its values and this has been the area of vulnerability that Russia seeks to exploit in undermining the European integration. The other face of Russian opposition to European integration has been its own integration project – the Eurasian Union which was founded in 2015 and was the defining factor in the Ukrainian crisis, where choosing a future meant the EU of Eurasian Union. The Eurasian Union is the part fulfilment of a Eurasian ideology that is passionately argued as the future of Russia and Europe by Russian theorists such as Aleksandr Dugin. Though not necessarily relevant to the nationalisms in the case studies discussed here, the concept of Neo-Eurasianism is an under studied ideology, it is also an ideology that may now come to dominate Russian geopolitics for the foreseeable future. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current nationalist and right-wing anti-globalist trends in these three cases and the Russian role in them. To further understand this new phenomenon it is vital to
understand the influence of Eurasianism on contemporary Russian foreign policy towards the West. The issue is how Eurasianism is interpreted by different actors and how this can be related to the nationalist movements outside of Russia and Russia’s relation to them.
2. Methodology.
This paper examines the influence of radical right-wing ideology and nationalism on the foreign and domestic policy of states through discourse analysis. It is vital to recognise that the Russian government and the ideologues with influence are not one and the same, and that deep divisions exist between the state and an ideology, despite areas of overlap. The case studies have been selected after a process of narrowing down reasons for why their nationalist nature is most relevant to Russian strategy in approaching foreign nationalist causes. The three cases selected and their relation to Russia ascertains theories for the relationship and how this is related to case-centred narratives about nationalism and how this related to the Eurasian theory more broadly. The background and discourse for this paper was compiled from the relevant literature and new media as the theme of this paper is current and ongoing.
3. Literature review: Nationalism, Russian policy and Eurasianism.
The resurgence of Russian power and the rise of European nationalist movements have produced a vast amount of literature on nationalism. But focusing on nationalism and limiting the understanding of modern Russia through the prism of the Cold War has
neglected the importance of an ideology that unites the interests of Russia under Putin and Europe’s radical nationalists. It is correct to recognise this alliance as having matured and moved on from the Cold War in its understanding of the world; while its adversaries have not. Reducing the nationalist right to mere racists extremists and self-isolators has
neglected a growing body of alternative or ‘fourth way’ political theory that is influencing the response to contemporary global issues.
3.1. Chantal Mouffe: Against Universalism.
Chantal Mouffe is one theorist who has discussed the issues that this paper will deal with, in her works The Democratic Paradox (2000), On the Political (2011) and Return to the Political (2005). She describes her understanding of ‘the political’ as the dimension of power and antagonism, a constructive dimension that differs from ‘politics’; which is an order created by methods and institutions. Mouffe is critical of the liberal idea that ‘the political’ should become a dimension of harmonious relations that has moved beyond the ‘irrational’ clashes of ideology that should belong to a bygone era (2011: 24). For Mouffe, the post-Cold War prediction of a new age of universalism - as argued by Francis Fukuyama - was premature idealism that was hastily disproved by the rise in both Islamic
fundamentalism and nationalist populism (2005: 117). Mouffe has stated that Western liberal-capitalism triumphed not by the strength of its ideals but instead by the failure of its adversaries. The durability of religious and nationalist identity as an ideology conforms to Mouffe’s belief in the impossibility of universalism (2011: 78). Mouffe’s thesis on political passions and the rejection of universalism has renewed relevance for the emergence of the nationalist right in Europe and how it is related to some of the thinkers behind Russia’s Eurasian concept, that will be discussed below.
3.2. Aleksander Dugin: On the concept of Eurasianism.
Likhacheva et al (2015), describe the three dominant ideas for the future of the Russian state, firstly, a neo-imperialist model that combines a nostalgia and inspiration for the pre-1917 empire and the former Soviet Union which replaced it. The declared aim of this project is to create a new Russian dominated empire by force, where the institution of the military will be elevated to the single most important source of national strength. The second and opposite path for determining Russia’s future would be to adopt the liberal democratic model of the West and orientate Russia’s social, political and economic future with the European Union and other Western institutions. However, the negative association with this model with the Yeltsin years of the 1990s, coupled with the European economic crisis and the deteriorating relations with the West, has only contributed to undermine this model for Russia. Lastly Likhacheva et al (2015), identify one remaining model for Russia’s future, the concept of Eurasianism.
The Eurasian concept rejects both Soviet Communism and liberal Westernisation as suitable for Russia, stressing instead that the country is an independent and self-contained
civilization. By examining the direction the Putin administration has taken since 2000, Eurasianism – or something approaching it - appears to be the model most attractive and feasible to attempt for Russia’s future. To Putin, while the neo-imperialist cause would appear unrealistic, unacceptable and doomed to disaster and the Western model equally undesirable, Eurasianism offers a compromise of smaller scale expansionism and the pretence of some of the institutions of Western multi-national unions like the European Union.
The most important radical-nationalist theorist is Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962). The tying together of greater Russian nationalism to the concept of Eurasianism as an ideology and political movement has been promoted most urgently by Dugin, an academic and political theorist with influence at the highest levels of the Russian government (Shekovtsov, 2015) and (Pryce, 2013).2 Dugin also identifies as a fascist (though not one in the Nazi model),3 his
2 Eurasianism as a geopolitical concept that promotes the continuation of the Russian Imperial and Soviet
space through integration of former Soviet states (and others) to form an alternative bloc to the American led West. This is the subject of Dugin’s book Eurasian Mission: An Introduction of Neo-Eurasianism (2014). However Dugin is not the ideological founder of Eurasianism which has older roots in Russian émigré intellectuals and also Soviet theorists. (Palat, 1993).
early work The Foundations of Geopolitics published in 1997 fortuitously hypothesised the nature of the present Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent conflict where Ukraine can be considered an Achilles Heel for Russian power (Dunlop 2001: 92). The centrality of Ukraine to the Eurasian movement and thus why Ukraine could never be allowed to exist
independently of Russia is a central belief of Dugin’s theory (2001: 109-110). For this reason and for the fervent anti-Atlanticism and anti-Americanism that his work espouses, Dugin’s influence has reached the highest offices of the Russian state and military. Dugin follows a long tradition of Eurasianists but he is arguably the pre-eminent theorist of Neo-Eurasianism – an ideology that incorporates National Bolshevist ideology4 and the ideas of the Italian fascist Julius Evola (Shekovtsov, 2009, 2015).
Dugin’s most important work is The Fourth Political Theory (2012). The use of ‘fourth’ as opposed to the ‘third’ politics describes Dugin’s own political philosophy that builds upon the foundations of the ‘third position’ (neither or beyond left and right politics). Simply put, this draws from Socialist and traditionalist values without modernism, materialism and racism. The Fourth Political Theory should be understood as a deconstruction of Liberalism, Marxism and Fascism, rather theorising unique ideological concepts, Dugin selects and forms his own vision from these philosophies. The book also details Dugin’s concerns for geopolitics and society. Dugin (2012) describes Western values (modernist and
post-modernist), globalisation and liberal capitalism as promulgating in the United States a form of ‘ideological aggression against the multiplicity of cultures and traditions’. Dugin (2012) further argues that American ‘ideological aggression’ working in tandem with US military power, combined with its former status as the world’s only super power, created a global dictatorship. For Dugin the United States empire is the greatest evil and should be
destroyed (2012, p191-192). From this, The Fourth Political Theory is also an ideology to justify Neo-Eurasianism, and this is where the ideology becomes problematic. As
Eurasianism is a form of Russian imperialism in a specific form, it will inevitably be alienating to other nationalisms. All radical nationalists and anti-globalists oppose American culture
3 Dugin’s analysis of Russian fascism after Communism is demonstrated in his 1997 article “Fascism –
borderless and red.”
4 National Bolshevism is an ideology that combines Russian nationalism, anti-Capitalism and anti-globalism.
Originally founded by Dugin and Eduard Limonov, the party split with Limonov’s faction founding the anti-Putin National Bolshevik Front opposed by Dugins National Bolshevik Party that has close links with the Russian government.
and power to various degrees, but merely replacing it or at least countering it with an alternative imperialism is not desirable. Thus Dugin’s ‘Fourth theory’ is open to becoming another set of ideological principles to be dissected, selectively applied and moulded to suit other nationalists narratives, rather than the ideological opposition.
3.3 Vladislav Surkov: Alternative ‘sovereign democracy’ and civilisation.
One other figure who took full advantage of Putin’s ‘revolution’ was Vladislav Surkov who has been able to apply his experiences in Moscow’s underground avant-garde scene in the 1980s to the ‘managed democracy’ of contemporary Russia. Surkov had gravitated from the underground to the world of oligarchic public relations in the 1990s; he is now one of the key figures in Putin’s administration, having joined the state against his former clients (Curtis, 2012). Adam Curtis (2012) has argued that Surkov “has turned Russian politics into postmodern absurdist theatre. In a way, just like (Eduard) Limonov, Surkov is adapting avant-garde ideas to this new political world.” Most importantly Surkov is believed to experiment with old and new political models to create something ever changing with the appearance that Russia is a dynamic new democracy with a wide variety of political parties and movements supported by corporate and alternative media. As Curtis (2012) argues, Surkov believes that the truth is that the idea of democracy will always be an illusion, that all democracies will always be "managed democracies" whether East or West. So the solution is for a strong state to manipulate people - so that they feel they are free, while they are really being managed. Amongst this confusion it has to be recognised that despite the actors there are many true believers who remain unaware or unconcerned that those around them are merely props. ?
Surkov (2008) articulated his imagining of what Russia’s concept of itself was and had always been in characteristically abstract and obtuse style.
Intrinsic to the Russian outlook, I would say, is a romantic, poetic longsightedness. It has an indistinct perception of what is nearby—a rickety fence, a bad road, the litter in the nearest gateway—but a detailed knowledge of what shines in the distance, of mirages on the
horizon. Paying more attention to the wished-for than to the real, this view of things leads to a quest for the sole truth, for supreme justice. It creates a sense if not of exclusivity then of being special, different from one’s neighbours. This sense of being different is both appealing and extraordinarily inspiring. This search for a special truth of one’s own, this need to live by one’s intellect, compels one to act with marked independence. The whole history of Russia since the reign of Ivan III [1462–1505] is a demonstration of intellectual independence and state sovereignty. (2008, pp-20)
Surkov’s conception of the nature of Russia and its place is exactly what Likacheva et al (2015) has discussed. Russia is a self-contained civilisation that has its own place in the international order without belonging and not wanting to belong to a Western model of the state. Surkov further clarified this position stating his belief that Russia and the West
resembled a family in their disputes that were more intense than those with strangers would be (2008, pp.20-21). Exclusionism is a necessary component of integration and constructing Russia as a hostile and dangerous other was merely something the EU and NATO needed to do to justify their integrated expansionist projects. In Surkov’s view, the Western understanding of Russia had been lost in translation, thus Russia was understood in a way that the West wanted to understand it, rather than as what it actually was. There is an element of truth to concede in Surkov’s analysis that “Negative information about Russia has always been more easily assimilated in Western Europe than positive information” (2008, pp.20). Demonstrably, Anne Applebaum (2014) had warned against treating Russia as a “flawed Western country” and the assumption that “the land of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, the home of classical ballet, would join what Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, so movingly called “our common European home.” This can be taken as being exactly the kind of Western mind-set Surkov was alluding to, written in an article titled “Russia will never be like us”. However, Russia not being like the West was exactly what Surkov had proudly described as being true. The differences in opinion began after the mutual acknowledgment of the existing divide; but how it should be responded to? Surkov’s view could be
interpreted as détente, Applebaum’s as hostility until Russia until Russia is forced into Westernisation.
4 Eurasianism and its alternatives.
Eurasianism in its current official manifestation is a political integration project between five former Soviet republics, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia.
Neo-Eurasianism as articulated by Dugin (2012), is an ideology created to be an ideological counterweight to Western liberalism and European integration. Although these have to be recognised as two separate actions, there is however an overlap that has become more acute since the widening split between the West and Russia. Dugin (2012) argues that Western liberalism needs to be opposed by a new ideology; he recognises that the failure of the previous illiberal ideologies of Communism and Fascism cannot be revitalised and repeated in their previous forms, as they have been repudiated. Whilst recognising these failures, Dugin identifies positive attributes in all these ideologies that can be combined to create a fourth ideology out of selective Communist, Fascist and Liberal theory to create an ideological opposition to liberalism. Though Eurasianism was a Russian ideology in its early incarnations, Eurasianium as a modern political construction (post-Soviet integration)was first advanced by the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazabayev in the 1990s
(Tüysüzoglu, 2014). In a similarly motivated idea, the Belarusian president Lukashenka advocated a state union between Russia and Belarus which was officially ratified in 1999 but has remained dormant, owing to disagreements. It has taken over a decade for Eurasian integration to have actually materialised, with Putin’s government appearing to have been the most reluctant, even in the face of willing potential members such as Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Armenia (Danilov, 2006). As Russia-West relations began to deteriorate in 2008 and more sharply since 2014, Eurasianism as an ideology and political project became more relevant. The Eurasian economic integration project needs the Eurasianist ideology and this ideology requires a physical territorial space. This explains the developing
relationship between the Putin regime and the Eurasianists, the more Russian geopolitical interests have been threatened by the shifting of alliances amongst the former Soviet states, Eurasianism has been disseminated throughout Russian society; evolving from a fringe movement to a mainstream ideology (Papava, 2013).
4.1 Hungarian Turanism and Eurasianism.
Hungary has developed an Eurasianist ideology centred on the theory of Hungarian civilisation as a separate tradition from the rest of Europe (Ehl, 2012). The concept of
Turanism positions Hungary as an integral member of a greater pan-Turkic civilisation; much like its Eurasian counterpart, this movement re-imagines the beginnings of Hungarian
history as distinct from other Europeans and regards the Hungarian civilisation being equidistant from Europe and Asia (Ehl, 2012). Turanism formed an important ideological movement for the Hungarian far-right as an alternative identification after the Trianon territorial losses (Moreau, 2012). The interest in Turanism has been renewed by Hungarian nationalists seeking new horizons to place Hungary deliberately eastwards towards Asia and away from the European Union. The Jobbik party was the original enthusiast for this
movement, with the claim that the Central Asians made for better allies than the Europeans. Manifestations of Turanism remain in the cultural realm having little appeal outside
Hungarian nationalist circles. Sensing that Turanism is politically useful, Orban’s Fidesz party has given official recognition to the Turanist festival that was once a far-rightist gathering of Hungarian and other Central Asian nomadic cultures that Turanists believe to be the true ancestors of the Hungarians; previously this was exclusive Jobbik territory (Ehl). Despite the political usefulness of Turanism to the Hungarian government as an alternative association, and that Turanism like Eurasianism, has transcended from the nationalist fringe to the mainstream, the movement lacks the momentum and sheer political force of the Eurasian movement to ever become a viable alternative for Hungarian nationalism. As of yet, there is no evidence of any political desire to gravitate Hungary to the Eurasian space for illiberal reasons or to realise Turanism via Eurasianism.
Case Study: France.
France has contributed an impressive philosophical tradition to European intellectual thought, and as the home of the first revolutionary society in Europe, France may seem to embody liberal enlightenment values. Despite this tradition an anti-liberal movement has always rejected the revolution and liberalism and France’s relations with the other
revolutionary state – America, has been complicated, leading to France being an intellectual centre of anti-globalism and anti-Americanism that also influenced the politics of the French government. Thought not a radical or right-wing ideology – Gaullisme characterised the stance of successive French governments from the Second World War to Jacques Chirac (with the exception of d’Estaing). The suspicion of the United States and distaste for American mass-culture by the French establishment has meant that anti-Americanism and anti-globalism from a non-leftist perspective has become more ideologically rooted than in other Western countries. Whilst remaining allied with the United States politically, the French state simultaneously promoted cultural anti-Americanism (Roger 2006, p-432). France had never reconciled with American dominance in Europe and France resisted Washington’s influence in the EEC by asserting French sovereignty and exceptionalism (Bernstein in Krieger, 2001). The last stand of traditional Gaullisme was France’s diplomatic effort to prevent the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompting responsive anti-French sentiment in the United States. Since this act of opposition to American foreign policy, the presidencies of Sarkozy and Hollande have abandoned traditional Gaullisme and re-aligned France more closely with NATO (Wallerstein, 2007). The main opposition to this has been Le Front National who has articulated a platform of radical globalisim and
anti-atlanticism.5
Before the rise of the FN one philosopher who came to influence their politics has been Alain de Benoist. Benoist founded his own philosophical school of thought, the Nouvelle Droite (New Right) which rejects the values of conservatism, Christianity and rationalism and also liberalism, social democracy, capitalism and globalisation. Though Benoist is not a
5 Lagadec (2012) has theorised that Sarkozy’s embracing of Atlanticism and pro-Americanism is in fact a
continuation of Gaullism by other means. As the Post-Cold War changes in Europe have favoured Germany and shifted ‘eastwards’ away from France, a multi-polar world now requires France to be closer to the United States to maintain its autonomy and influence where as it would have been marginalised by adhering to tradisional Gaullisme.
political leader and has been highly critical of FN he had actively exported his theories outside of France (Bar-On, 2012). One figure highly influenced by Benoist was Aleksandr Dugin (Bar-On, 2008).
Arguably the most successful nationalist party in Western Europe, the French Le Front National saw its greatest ever electoral success at France’s national assembly elections in 2012. For twenty years the FN redefined itself adapting to the political climate, and the party’s opposition to globalism has become one of its most prominent issues along-side immigration (Mudde, 2004). As Rydgren (2004) notes “It is always of strategic interest to political parties and social movements to link their pet issues to other issues of great and enduring political salience.” This is evidenced by FN’s strident opposition to the EU, NATO and the United States, all of which are regarded by FN as instruments of globalisation (Simmons, 2003).
In the first twenty years of its existence the FN focused exclusively on domestic issues – particularly immigration. Simmons (2003) observes that the FN and its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen embraced the term mondialisation - coined by FN member Bruno Mégret - in its
political vocabulary increasingly in 1990s (Simmons, 2003). Mégret argued that France was "contaminated with the virus of deracination," and “under pressure from four dangerous sources-- mondialisme, cosmopolitanism, materialism and hidden totalitarianism.” In his 1993 work 30 Mesures pour la Renaissance de la France, Mégret framed mondialisation as the biggest threat to France, which he likened to an “insidious barbarism” which would destroy the very characteristics of France that made it French. The globalists, he warned, were an “invisible minority” an oligarchy who wanted to create “a society without differences.” Mégret observed with satisfaction that his authored expressions had
“infiltrated the public discourse, with journalists, politicians and the man on the street using words such as ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘Lebanization’ and ‘latent totalitarianism’” (Fysh, and Wolfreys, 1992). Much of the success of FN has been its ability to make its lasting presence known - not only on France’s political scene – but in the public and cultural realm.
Having constructed a platform on resistance to the ‘enemy within’ domestically, the FN views France’s real enemies externally as the U.S. and the EU. The language of anti-Americanism had long been utilised by all ends of the French political spectrum, yet FN
remained consistently vocal declaring that “France is at war with the United States” as Franco-American relations warmed after many decades of French distancing (Mudde, 2004 p11, p151). Initially highly supportive of the EEC, advocating that France play a major role in the “community of culture and civilisation” as Mégret described it, the FN turned fervently against the EU in the 1990s in the same period as the party retreated from its support for the neo-liberal economics that Benoiste had denounced (Spektorowski, 2003).
Le Pen stated “Europe is not the future of France” and “we refuse to sacrifice the French on the altar of the European-‘Globalist’ utopia. (Mudde, 2004 p.150)” Rydgren (2004) suggests that the newfound opposition to the EU and the adoption of an anti-globalist platform is a development born from the end of the Cold War and a unipolar world and the EU
restructuring itself as an increasingly federal union. FN rhetoric describes the EU as being part of a globalist conspiracy, to destroy nations, open Europe’s doors to third world immigration and foreign products (Mudde 2004, p.151). The ethno-nationalism of the FN desires to reverse globalisation through protectionism that is not only economic but national and cultural by enforcing separation of peoples of different ethnicities and preventing the penetration of France by immigrants and ‘cultural commodities’ that threaten French national identity (2004, p.152).
The FN has capitalised on its revised message of ethno-nationalism and anti-internationalism and has managed to consolidate the party’s break through into
mainstream politics in the 1990s, remaining a significant political force. The FN owes much of its success to the embrace of the anti-globalist cause while toning down its extreme and anti-Semitic language to move more to the political centre and adopt many traditionally left-wing policies. In doing so it has managed to attract disgruntled moderate and left-left-wing voters alienated by the two major political parties (Goodliffe, 2012). Though French nationalism remains staunchly separate from pan-movements, instead believing France to be self-contained civilisation with a distinct culture, this does not rule out potential
alliances. The evidence of Russia financing the FN with a 9 million Euro loan suggests that Putin regards France becoming a Russian ally as something that would rupture Europe to its core and dramatically weaken the West (Harding, 2014).
Case Study: Hungary.
The election of Viktor Orban as Prime Minister of Hungary in 2010 began a process of regression and what the EU considers a return to authoritarian government (Lendvai, 2012). Hungary has thus become the first EU member to move closer to Russia ideologically as the Hungarian government has sought to apply the social and cultural values that Russia under Putin has started to represent. Russian-Hungarian relations have not been historically close, from this perspective the difficult relations between the two counties has meant that the recent re-rapprochement is surprising; Hungary was a most unlikely country to develop close cooperation with Russia. Russia’s involvement in Hungarian national affairs had been destructive from a Hungarian national perspective. Russia had twice intervened to prevent Hungary from asserting its independence in 1848 and in 1956; importantly though, Russian policy has not been the only source of grievance for Hungarian nationalism, despite being a notorious act that came to symbolise Soviet repression. The defeats (or rather being on the losing side) in both World Wars and the subsequent loss of most of Hungarian historic territory where three million Hungarians were made minorities outside their homeland, still resonates today and is the crucial victim centred force that stimulates Hungarian
nationalism (Puskas, 2009). The Treaty of Trianon that forced Hungary to recognise
territorial losses by the allies has left a long feeling of bitterness which has never dissipated and became a rallying cry for nationalism that mirrored what the Versailles Treaty meant to Germany in the interwar period (Varga, 2014). In the same period, regaining lost territories was a national priority for the right-wing government, after brief success the policy ended destructively and was reversed. After 1990, Hungarian irredentism was renewed, even moderate governments claimed to speak for and claim sovereignty over all Hungarians, including those outside Hungary (Puskas, 2009). Hungary therefore presents a problem for the EU: one of its members is still very much preoccupied by historic injustices, and the organisation has no effective way of dealing with them without jeopardising the
organisation.
The nationalist resentments within Hungary became a renewed source of political radicalism after the end of the Communism and not only grew stronger after EU accession, but became
part of the political mainstream. The nationalist party Jobbik and the more moderate Fidesz became dominant and directed their resentments against the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both accused of conspiring against the country and damaging economic interests. Jobbik bemoaned the liberalism that the EU came to stand for and claimed that Hungary was being used as a source of cheap labour for richer member states. Most salient off all, Jobbik published national programmes that attacked the “neoliberal pseudo-democracy”, the EU value of free movement of peoples and singled out treacherous politicians (2014: 798). Jobbik has focused its invective against Prime Minister Viktor Orban, yet in Orban, Jobbik’s policies have had a willing implementer (2014: 799). In an act
reminiscent of Putin’s coming to power a decade earlier, a new constitution was adopted in 2012 that described an end to an era of lawlessness and economic mismanagement. The constitution instantly drew the condemnation of the EU as being authoritarian. The
government’s handling of the EU criticisms of its constitution, and subsequent laws aimed at furthering state control over the economy, saw an interesting spectacle of counter protests in the form of “Peace Walks,” where hundreds of thousands marched in support of
government policy and in opposition to accusations that Orban was a dictator in the Putin model. Orban personally addressed the crowds with an indirect warning to the EU that “We will not be a colony, Hungarians won’t live according to the commands of foreign powers” (Pop, 2012 )During the Ukrainian crisis, Hungary further upset the EU by criticizing sanctions against Russia and noting the position of the Hungarian populated territory along its shared border with Ukraine.
The Fidesz’s rhetoric closely mirrors nationalist sentiment and Russia’s turn to the right in particular. As Bozoki (2011) has argued, Orban’s programme for Hungary revised the former non-ideological order and secular-liberal constitution replacing it with “majority rule” (2011: 651, 662) The granting of citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries was motivated by the concept of “National Unification” with the added impetus that it would secure the right-wing vote (2011: 662). With these policies, the nationalist right in Hungary have recreated Russia’s conservative social campaign where Hungary can be reborn as a socially and religiously conservative exclusionist and cooperative society where
everything is subordinated to ‘majority rule’, ethno-nationalism and Christian morality (2011: 660).6
The rise in nationalism and closeness to Russia alarmed the EU into issuing condemnations of the Hungarian government. This predictably only fuelled the claims that the EU was medalling in Hungarian internal affairs and conspiring against the country (Nagy, Boros and Vasali in Higgot, and Malbasic 2012). Hungary is not threating the current states of the EU or NATO, but Orban’s friendly relations with Putin makes it the most conspicuous Russian ‘ally’ within the West, a status that in fact serves Russian interests better than being outside.
Case Study: Greece.
Southern Europe was the most negatively affected by the European economic crisis that began in 2007. Sharing a common culture of unequal economic development, corruption
and miss-use of EU funds, the southern European nations presented the greatest challenge to EU economic policy and a potential trouble spot that could endanger the future of the Euro currency. In Spain and Italy the crisis resulted in secessionist movements and anti-austerity protests, but in Greece, an ethnically homogenous, small and relatively poor EU member, the continued crisis eventually led to the ousting of a government committed to EU policy, and a victory for political outsiders. The economic turmoil in Greece and the subsequent deterioration of relations with the EU’s leading member Germany was a welcome development for the Kremlin and a vital opportunity to reinvigorate involvement with the country which had long been the only eastern European and Orthodox Christian country within the EU. More than any other EU member the crisis contributed to the rise in political radicalism in Greece to the extent that it has transformed Greek political culture. As Ellinas (2015) has described, politics in Greece had a long history of instability, populism and corruption leading to high levels of distrust in political institutions. A lack of alternatives to vent frustrations and the disenfranchisement of the population massively contributed to hostile attitudes to the mainstream political parties. Violent political rioting during the crisis and even before it (such as during 2008) have contributed to the normalisation of violence in Greek political life which has only been exacerbated by the rise of radicalism.
Greece and Russia enjoy a trouble free relationship; but it was not until the presidency of Vladimir Putin that Russia moved closer to Greece after the Soviet period. Russia had had close relations with Bulgaria before 1917 and during the Cold War, but this had waned following the 1990s and Bulgarian membership of NATO, but Bulgaria was still suspected as being a potential Trojan Horse of Russian influence within the Western alliance, but these suspicions had failed to materialise (Blank, 2012). Greece could be described as a natural ally of Russia for cultural and religious reasons; Russian influence in Greece also had the benefit of not having any tainted association with Soviet occupation. It also had a rare quality of being almost entirely positive dating back to Russian support for Greek independence and sharing a common animosity with Greece’s enemies such as Turkey. The post-World War II period had a very dramatic influence on Greece’s relations with its Western allies which have always been difficult (Maragou in Higgot and Malbasic, 2008). Emerging from the war with a large and victorious Communist movement, Greece became one of the first battle grounds during the Cold War. The defeat of the Communists was
secured by the mostly rightist government’s reliance on the West and the United States, who took over from Britain as Greece’s foreign backer. The civil war of 1946-49 left a lingering feeling of resentment towards the West by the Greek left, the history of which is well known and culminated in various extremes of authoritarian government until a democratic government took over in 1974 and the country joined the EEC in 1981 (2008: 188). Greece once relied on close relations with Western Europe and the United States. The Civil War 1944-49 and the Cyprus conflict were the first manifestations of opposition to Western policy and were aimed at Britain and were then inherited by the United States. Though this is usually traced to the military junta period of 1967-1974, Cyprus was the original cause that sparked nationalist opposition to the United States (2008: 189). Russia was a disconnected onlooker for much of this period during which time Greece became a trouble spot for the West, and from the Greek public perspective the West did enormous damage to own reputation. As Russia sought to expand its influence, Greece was an ideal ground. The Greek radical left had always expressed negative feelings towards the United States and NATO, but crucially the nationalist right in Greece developed its own current of fervent anti-Westernism. Both left-wing and nationalists forces believed the West had thwarted Greek national aspirations towards Cyprus and then developed close relations with Greece’s traditional rivals Turkey and Albania. The final insult was the NATO
intervention against Yugoslavia over Kosovo which sparked enormous popular opposition in Greece, to the point that the Greek government openly defied the NATO war effort and collaborated with the Yugoslav authorities. Though played down by NATO and the US
government, it was one of the largest spontaneous incidents of mass opposition to US policy by a foreign country, 95% of Greeks opposed the bombing and had a negative view of U.S president Bill Clinton (2008: 193). The Kosovo war then became a pivotal moment when the left and right in Greece joined forces in a manner that went beyond protests to organised acts of civil disobedience and sabotaging of NATO actions in Greece, which the government was obliged to agree to. US diplomats were even forced to leave the country as the
authorities could not guarantee their protection. These scenes proved to be a pivotal moment for the radical forces on the right and the left in Greece, which united a seemingly incompatible variety of forces that included Communists, anarchists, extreme nationalists, intellectuals, journalists, the Greek Church and military and police forces (Riptis, 2000).
These scenes must have surely given the Russian government enormous pleasure as it helped destroy what was left of the United States positive image in Greece and was a small consolation in a conflict that Russia had been defeated diplomatically. The subsequent Iraq War in 2003 had an immensely far reaching negative impact on the image of the U.S globally to the extent that the Bush administration was never able to recover; in Greece however the damage had already been done. The subsequent economic problems the country has experienced has only dragged the West’s standing into such disrepute that a recovery appears to be even further away. Greek politics has become the only place in Europe where Russian interests could be served by either leftist or nationalist forces. One of the first acts of the eventually victorious radical nationalist SYRIZA party was to defy the EU over its sanctions against Russia in relation to Ukraine and make a foreign visit to Moscow to send a very blatant signal to the EU and Germany that Greece was prepared to break with EU policy and establish closer relations with the Russian Federation and defy Western interests. As well as Putin, whom the Greek Prime Minister chose to meet on his first foreign trip, another important figure was Aleksandr Dugin who had met with and given lectures on the invitation of prominent SYRIZA members Nikos Kotzias (now foreign minister) and Dimitris Konstantakopoulos in 2013. As Shekhotsov (2015) has argued, Dugin has used his unofficial capacity as an ‘ambassador of the right’ to liaise with potential Russian allies to test the water for Russian foreign policy. As Dugin (Shekhotsov: 2014) commented on a visit to Greece in 2013:
In Greece, our partners could eventually be Leftists from SYRIZA, which refuses Atlanticism, liberalism and the domination of the forces of global finance. As far as I know, SYRIZA is anti-capitalist and it is critical of the global oligarchy that has victimized Greece and Cyprus. The case of SYRIZA is interesting because of its far-Left attitude toward the liberal global system. It is a good sign that such non-conformist forces have appeared on the scene.
At the time of writing the SYRIZA led government has not gone as far as to seriously
jeopardise its membership of the Western alliance. Golden Dawn however has declared its stance which fully advocates the re-alignment of Greece with Russia against the West (Shekhotsov: 2014).
It is required to immediately reverse our geopolitical orientation and re-examine our alliances that have contributed nothing to our national interests. We should turn, for investments and energy at first, to Russia. A trade and defensive agreement with the Russians would rid our country from the deadly "call to arms" from the USA and their allies. (Statement from Golden Dawn 2012).
Comparisons and contrasts.
The selection of cases in this study has included three countries where the nationalist right has had the greatest influence. A more detailed explanation of how these movements have influenced their countries requires a greater understanding of the nature of each and how
the ideology relates to each other. All these parties can be accurately described as being more than just political parties, they are movements advanced by radicalism, yet the radicalism of each deployed differently onto the political scene in each country. In France, the FN began life as a right-wing anti-immigration party, but was not radical in that it did not upset the existing system until it reacted against the political mainstream and utilised
radicalism to reinvent itself as a movement to revolutionise French politics by rejecting and revising modern France. Along with the other parties discussed here, the contemporary radical-rights closely resembles what Hobsbawn (1994) described of the interwar Fascists as the ‘anti-revolutionary revolutionaries.’ FN has succeeded in simultaneously moderating its image whilst remaining radical. In Hungary, Jobbik has a unique position in that its ideology has influenced the whole of Hungarian society to a similar extent that Eurasianism has in Russia. Whereas the FN is considered a threat to the system and is held at bay by it, what Jobbik articulates has been processed by a centre-right ruling party (Fidesz) whose own message owes its influence to Jobbik and is disseminated as a moderated version. Jobbik has little to say about multiculturalism while FN is pre-occupied with it (Nagy et al, 2013: 231). Jobbik is uniquely radical and far more nationalistically uncompromising in comparison to other nationalist parties in Western Europe. Nagy et al (2013) have stated that Jobbik’s aggression is demonstrated by its openly illiberal, anti-democratic and anti-Western stance; Jobbik offers an alternative to the West by looking East to states that share these attributes (2013: 232-235).
Greek far-right nationalism has taken a slightly different course. Nationalism in Greece has long been part of mainstream politics where hostility to the West has been constant, the big change has been the evolution of radical nationalism away from ethno-religious populism of LAOS to the Golden Dawn party, which began as a marginal sect of extremist to a political challenger in a matter of years (Georgiadou: 2013). Broadly speaking, Greek nationalism more closely resembles the French nationalist tradition in that it interprets the idea of self-contained identity very directly and where no intellectual movement that conceptualises a grand union with others in a multi-national entity or space between opposing blocs. The attachment and importance of the ancient Hellenic civilisation in Greek nationalism necessitates a self-isolation to preserve the Hellenic heritage. Greek nationalism is also more easily defined by an opposition to Western globalism and Eastern/Islamic culture
which makes it incompatible with Eurasianism and it is unlikely that the Greek nationalist cause would explore that scenario beyond a preferred Russian alliance outside of
Eurasianism. Golden Dawn, lacks the enthusiasm for Eastern identification that Jobbik advocates but has proved itself to go even further with the use of political violence to make its presence felt in Greek society.
What Russia and these cases all share is a very specific view these nationalism place their states in the world and how that place cannot be imaged without a fulfilling the role. So Russia is unimaginable without being an empire destined to lead Eurasia (Papava, 2013: 62). Hungary has to be a separate Turanist, Eastern looking European country. Greece and France have to protect the national identity for reasons of historical significance.
The radical right and ongoing conflict
Two ongoing conflicts have acted as catalysts for the radical right that wanted an ideological struggle to take up arms against in pursuit of their cause. As the Spanish civil war of the 1930s became a great left-wing cause onto which all shades of the political left projected their ideological battles, and travelled to fight an equally varied alliance of the political right. The Syrian civil war and the Ukrainian conflict have acted as battle grounds for the radical right as conflicts combining opposition to Islamic extremism in Syria and Western influence in both. A realistic analysis of the Syrian conflict necessitates the view that the radical right has projected its own opposition to globalisation, Islamic fundamentalism and Western interference on to the conflict and Syria is no ideological bulwark against these actors as the country was of no real interest before the war (Monti, 2014). The Syrian regime has been perfectly ready to accept right-wing nationalists from Europe to bolster their war effort. The presence of European volunteers that have fought alongside Syrian government troops is even more ironic given that the very same fighters have belonged to groups responsible for attacking migrants, refugees and Muslims, yet volunteers from European countries have willingly joined Arab Muslims to fight Islamic extremists that do present a real threat. Strommen (2013) has identified that hundreds of volunteers from Italy, Greece, Russia and Poland were fighting on the side of the Syrian government for their own far-right cause which casts the West as just as much as an enemy as the Islamic fundamentalists. It should be remembered however that in the general sense of perspective of the Syrian conflict these fighters represent a minuscule force that is a fraction of those who support the cause in principle.
In the Syrian conflict radical nationalists are arguably confronting a force that most onlookers would agree is an ideological foe. The Ukrainian conflict is much more
problematic as it has pitted right-wing nationalists against each other (Jackson, 2014). Just as Dugin (1997) had predicted, the future of Ukraine became the pivotal moment Russian geopolitics in 2014 then its government turned west rejecting the Eurasian Union. The Ukrainian crisis has stirred something to all involved, it has provoked Ukrainian nationalism, Russian nationalism, Eurasianism, European solidarity to an extent and European divisions to another. As Dugin believes, and now evident in the behaviour Russian government,
Ukraine cannot exist independently within the West; as much as Russia needs Ukraine to secure Eurasianism, the West could be viewed as having recognised Ukraine’s importance in hindering Russia and the Eurasian project.
Russia: A Cause looking for an opportunity
The relationship the Russian government is establishing with Europe’s nationalists is not straightforward and carries risks for Russia. Putin is opportunistic in using nationalism as a divisive weapon and is not committed to nationalism. In continuing a trend of inscrutability, the Kremlin remains aloof from the phenomenon, wishing to be seen as reacting to it rather than leading it (Verkhovsky in Laruelle 2009). Nationalism in an inherently unstable force that Russia is unable to use against its enemies as Russia is itself a cause of nationalism amongst its own neighbours, such as Ukraine, which has led to the weapon being turned on Russia itself. However Russia has been shrewd in which groups it targets for its own benefit. The Kremlin has reason to fear its own domestic Russian nationalists as it governs an
extremely ethnically diverse nation and has close relations with other non-European ex-Soviet nations. The Kremlin therefore has no desire to be associated with a dangerous streak of Russian chauvinism that supports racism and neo-Nazism. The alliance between the Kremlin and nationalists from this point of view is not a real alliance but a relationship of convenience, where motives coincided with each other (Varga, 2008).
The culture of Russian political leadership has always been to depict the leader as a figure of strength and power that was beyond the standards of the European democracies and even the American presidency. This machoism necessitates the constant need to appear in a position of strength when confronting other countries, even in peaceful relations. The last years of the Soviet Union and the Yeltsin presidency are considered a period of
unacceptable weakness, where Russia’s strong image was made to appear feeble and helpless in the face of the transformation of the Soviet sphere; a transformation in which Russia was not leading but being passed by. The humiliation Russia believed it had
experienced not only had to be ended and reversed, it had to be avenged. This aim has led the Kremlin to inflate the powerful personality of Vladimir Putin, from the more moderate image he enjoyed in the early 2000s (Gill, 2013).
It appears that Russia’s aim after since the Ukrainian crisis has been to humiliate the West, the European Union and the United States as much as possible and to make their foreign and strategic policy appear unsuccessful, while being a force that provokes resistance
amongst Ukrainians. By moving closer the radical right-wing parties within the EU, the increasing influence of the anti-West message can be attributed to a selection of cause: the objection to European integration, mass emigration, the economic crisis, and the popular opposition, by the radical left and right alike, to US interventionist foreign policy.
The invasion of Iraq which became a demonstrable foreign policy failure for the U.S and its European allies, virtually handed an effortless victory to the Russian government as it enabled it to rebuild ties with former Cold War allies and establish new ones with countries who wanted to move closer to Russia. The anti-American atmosphere allowed Russia to present itself as the upholder of international law in the face of U.S led unilateralism and its circumventing of the U.N. The Iraq war itself did not have a serious effect on Russian foreign policy (Russia’s ally Iran was emboldened as a result), though the Syrian civil war has.
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 was the first major diplomatic dispute between Russia and the West. Officially opposed to this, Russia took the lead in arguing against Western
recognition of independence, (correctly) evoking violations of international law and the 1975 Helsinki Treaty. Russian opposition however was destined to diplomatic failure in the face of strong American and Western European backing for independence. Fully aware of this, Russia gained its own strategic victory by being able to exploit the inevitable precedent the Western actions would set and then be able to convincingly accuse the West of having made international law meaningless, clearing the way for Russia to exploit other
secessionist movements for its own benefit with the added benefit of retaining a foothold in the Balkans by supporting Serbia (Eytal, 2008). This materialised extremely quickly with the pro-Western Georgian government attempting to restore control over the break-away states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008. Russia was able to portray itself as the liberator after repelling the Georgian military and recognising the independence of the two states. The unwillingness of the West to involve itself in this conflict delivered a second victory to the Russian government. During the Crimea annexation six years later, the Russian position was more blatant, using Kosovo as a justification after Crimea declared
independence from Ukraine.
In securing a new role for itself Russia has been accused of, and has somewhat embraced the idea, that it is the central powerhouse of alternative ideology to the politics and moral values of the West. Russia, being the legal successor to the Soviet Union, has merely
changed ideology, becoming the new ideological core of illiberal nationalism whilst stressing the upmost importance of national sovereignty. Where Moscow had once exported,
financed and encouraged Communism and attempted to build cooperation with Soviet friendly states to counter the West, Russia has resumed the role armed with a different ideology against the same target.
Conclusion.
The Eurasian project is currently in the early stages, but has come into being after two decades of intrigue. This rival integration project may be the outlet that Russia and its neighbours need to found a Eurasian self-contained civilisation. Despite the dissatisfaction certain EU members have with the liberal-capitalist Europe, the Eurasian Union does not offer an attractive alternative to France, Greece or Hungary. However Eurasianism is not directed at all of Russia’s political allies, as Russian interests are served having them as friendly nations even within the European Union. Eurasianism is designed for former Soviet members and other states that conform to that model. At the time of writing it is too premature to fully evaluate what Eurasianism and the resurgent nationalist right means for Europe. What appears to be undeniable is that too different multi-national unions now exist on the same continent, which has radically changed the environment of European and Atlantic integration. This does not mean a new Cold War is happening even in light of the Ukrainian crisis. It would be safe to assume at this stage that Russia and the Eurasian project have nothing to be too concerned about in Ukraine becoming an economic and social model that can challenge the legitimacy of Eurasianism or Russia’s power in the region. As has been discussed in the case studies, the West has not been blameless in its troubled relations with Russia and others. While it remains a fact that Russia and the Russian nationalist cause never accepted an independent Ukraine, the Western
governments escalated the situation without any intention to find compromise, while Russia would inevitably have found a reason to intervene if necessary, the Western track record conveniently provided the justification that was needed.
The Eurasian Union was inaugurated with the shadow of the Ukrainian crisis looming over it. Just as Aleksander Dugin had foretold, Ukraine became the battleground in the Russian quest to rejuvenate itself through Eurasianism. Just as Western integration has proven to be divisive, Eurasian integration has been born into division and conflict. The ideology of Neo-Eurasianism offers endless scenarios for further anti-Western geopolitics, yet it remains to be seen to what extent the Eurasian Union shall continue to be influenced by
Neo-Eurasianism. Though the overlap between state actors and ideologues has been established, there limits to what the Neo-Eurasianist can expect from their government to the extent
Eurasianism can be realised. Just like all grand nationalistic ideologies,
Neo-Eurasianism can never be realised to the huge imperial goals it theorists like Dugin desire, because the ideology and demands of Neo-Eurasianism are so extreme and limitless. The Russian government clearly has its own interpretation of Eurasianism that will be
implemented to fit its own interests regardless of how consistently this fits with Neo-Eurasianism as an ideology.
Eurasianism and the radical-right wing movements in Europe are being used
opportunistically by Putin’s government. The explicit intention has been to further Russian influence. In the former Soviet ruled Central Asian territory, Russia is using Eurasianism to rejuvenate Russia as a Eurasian power between East and West. Unwilling to be forced from Europe by the EU and NATO integration projects, Russia has found a role for itself as the enabler of Europe’s radical right-wing. With Eurasianism, Putin’s Russia seeks to strengthen the unity of the Eurasian area, in Europe Russia desires disunity and disruption amongst the Western alliance and Europe’s nationalists are the willing agents of that cause. The
European Union’s trouble with its members Hungary and Greece and the crisis Russia has been drawn into in attempting to incorporate Ukraine, demonstrates the opposition to both integration projects is considerably more challenging than either had believed.
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