The Power and Powerlessness of
Nonviolent
Social Movements
A Comparative Case Study of State Reaction against Nonviolent Social
Movements, between Iran’s Green Wave and Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution
Baharan Andishmand Master’s Thesis
6135358 Post-Colonialism and Development
27 June 2014 Political Science
Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan International Relations Second Reader: Dr. Luara Ferracioli
The Power and Powerlessness of
Nonviolent Social Movements
A Comparative Case Study of State Reaction against Nonviolent Social
Movements, between Iran’s Green Wave and Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution
Master’s Thesis: International Relations 27 June 2014
Baharan Andishmand Studentnumber: 6135358
E-mail: Baharan.Andishmand@student.uva.nl Supervisor: S. Rezaeiejan
“In the 17th Chapter of St Luke it is written: “the Kingdom of God is within man”- not one man nor a group of men, but in all men! In you! You, the people have the power – the power to create machines. The power to create happiness. You, the people, have the power to make this life free and beautiful, to make this life a wonderful adventure. Then – in the name of democracy – let us use that power, let us all unite. Let us fight for a new world, a decent world that will give men a chance to work, that will give youth a future and old age a security. By the promise of these things, brutes have risen to power. But they lie. They do not fulfil that promise.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements………...7
1. Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Context and Research Question………...8
1.2 Relevancy Academic and Public Debate………10
2. Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 2.1 Introduction………12
2.2 Disruption vs. Moderation Debate……….12
2.3 Change by Social Movement………….………14
2.4 Power Access……….19
2.5 Pillars of Support………..…..21
2.4 Popular Discourse and Authoritarian Regimes………..26
3. Chapter 3: Methodology 3.1 Introduction……….………...……....32
3.2 Comparative Case Study and Critical Discourse Analysis ………...32
3.3Method and Periodization………...34
3.4 Data………...………..…...36
3.4.1 Top Down………36
3.4.2 Bottom Up………...39
3.5 Dependent and Independent Variables………...40
4. Chapter 4: The Green Wave and Government Crackdown 4.1 Introduction………43
4.2 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei ………..…...43
4.3Friday Prayer June 2009………..45
4.4 State Media...…..……….……...53
4.4.1 Pre-Election period..………….…………...………..………..53
4.4.2 Post-Election Period………...………..……...56
4.4.3 From Non Violence to Violence.………...…...59
4.4.4 Conquer Green...……….……….……...65
4.5 The Green Wave…….………..………..68
4.5.1 From the Reformist Movement to the Green Wave…...……….68
4.5.3 Mousavi and the Pillar Skills and Knowledge ...………..……..72
4.5.4 Systematic Violence………75
5. Chapter 5: The Jasmine Revolution and “the Family” 5.1 Introduction………..………...79
5.2 President Ben Ali Speeches………79
5.2.1 First Speech of President Ben Ali ………...………...80
5.1.2 Last Speech of President Ben Ali.………...………...…….85
5.3 State Radio Tunsia………..………..………..91
5.3.1 Together We Meet Challenges………91
5.3.2 Denial and Reframe……….95
5.3.3 State of Emergency……….97
5.4 The Jasmine Revolution………..……...99
5.5 New Challenges with Moncef Marzouki………..102
6. Chapter 6: Synthesis 6.1 Introduction………..109
6.2 Clash of Social Movements and State Reaction.………..109
Conclusion ………...………..113
Attachments 116
Acknowledgments
Political science has been an unusual form of therapy for me. Something I had been
struggling with from a young age has been unjust practicalities from the state, an organ that must protect its people but too often attacks them instead. International Relations, however, has brought the most intertwined conflicts in wider perspective. For my thesis, I still had the biggest challenge ahead of me, not because of the pile of work, but because of my desire to seek a balance between maintaining objective while being critical at the same time.
In this process I would like to thank my supervisor Said Rezaeiejan. It has been an honor for me to write my thesis under your guidance. You have the most important and unique quality that any teacher can have, overwhelming students with your wealth of knowledge while convincing them that they can handle it by transmitting a believe that anything is possible. You have been an inspiring figure for me. I would also like to thank Luara Ferracioli for having taught me a new philosophical element of political ethics and not hesitating when I asked you to be my second reader.
Finally I would like to thank my mother, to whom I owe my idealistic and humanitarian spirit; by keeping me politically conscious, I have not taken living in freedom for granted. This thesis is for those who are continuing the fight against dictatorial regimes, injustice and oppression and have not lost hope that, one day, freedom, an universal right, will be equally practiced.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and Research Question
It is the twentieth of June, 2009 in Teheran when Neda Agha Soltan, a 26-year old
philosophy graduate from the Islamic Azad University, says goodbye to her mother. On the streets of Teheran Neda witnesses unusual scenes of nonviolent demonstrations in reaction to the alleged presidential election fraud. At 5 PM, an Iranian asylum seeker in the Netherlands receives a video from an acquaintance with the request to publish cellphone footage of a young woman collapsing on the street, bleeding, while clashes between demonstrators and the Basij1were taking place.2 What makes the film exceptional is the intimate connection that millions of viewers could make with the fading eyes of a young woman a second before her death. With CNN releasing the video her name had soon been discovered: Neda.
Subsequently she becomes a symbol of the remaining victims of killings, arrests, rapes3 and floggings in a period called the Green Wave.Despite the claims made by witnesses who saw the gunman fatally wounding Neda, appearing to be a member of the Basij, the Iranian government has denied any accusations; therefore, no legal charges could ever be made (Gyori, 2013: 485). However, this approach seems to have had a paradoxical effect: the more the Iranian government refused to acknowledge the existence of Neda, the more Neda
became present: she was made Person of the Year by Time Magazine and the University of Oxford created a Neda Scholarship for philosophy students.
On 17 December 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, at the age of 26, leaves his house. Mohamed lives in Sidi Bouzid, an impoverished town with dusty streets, 190 miles south of the capital
1 The Basij, a paramilitary militia and belong to the popular resistance mobilization army (Bayat, 1994: 11).
They function as a voluntary paramilitary force under the control of the Revolutionary Guards (Amnesty International, 2009).
2 There have been various resources about the background of Neda Agha Soltan. Only the similarities of her
story have been portrayed in this introduction.
3 A series of dramatic letters written by prisoners and families of imprisoned activists allege that authorities
are intentionally facilitating mass rape, using it as a systematic form of punishment. The rape has been documented inside Iran’s prisons and victims, both male and female, have been interviewed for a 2010 report of Amnesty International. Many of the victims had been detained for taking part in post-‐election protests and have been tortured without receiving fair trials.
Tunis. Despite Mohammed’s degree in computer science, he sells fruit and vegetables in order to make ends meet for his eight family members. When Mohammed arrives at his stall his livelihood becomes threatened when a policewoman confiscates his supposedly
unlicensed vegetable cart and goods. After local municipality officials refuse to offer any help at the police station, Mohammed publicly sets himself on fire. This ordeal causes massive outrage among Tunisians. As a response, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali decides to visit Mohammed in the hospital. Ben Ali’s effort, however, is taken as neither legitimate nor sincere. On the fourth of January, Mohammed dies of his wounds and, only ten days later, Ben Ali orders the imposition of the state of emergency4 followed by him fleeing Tunisia (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011: 6; Day, 2011: 1).
Neda and Mohammed have become symbols for ordinary citizens in a period in which people collectively resist the political structure they have long lived under. Both were part of
nonviolent social movements who confronted the suppression by injustice practices of authoritarian states. The Tunisian government recently lifted the state of emergency, after establishing a democratic chosen government, and implementing a new constitution.5
Meanwhile, the demands of demonstrators in Iran have led to a brutal government crackdown with an increase number of prosecutions and death sentences.6
This contrasting outcome between Iran and Tunisia brings the following research question: Why did nonviolent protestors in Tunisia during the Jasmine Revolution in 2011 succeed in achieving a regime transition, whereas the nonviolent protesters in Iran during the Green Wave in 2009 failed to achieve any political reformation?
This study will comprise of a comparative case analysis between the Green Wave in Iran (2009) 7 and the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia (2011). 8 Initially it will provide an
4 State of emergency reflects the transitional nature of post-‐revolutionary moments (Ishay, 2013: 378). The
orders that fall under the state of emergency will be discussed in chapter 5 (p. 78).
5 President Mocef Marzouki, announced to run for presidency in 1994 but was arrested. After return from exile
he was installed as president of Tunisia in December 2011 as part of a power-‐sharing deal between the Islamist Ennahda party and two smaller secular coalition partners, Ettakatol and Marzouki’s, Congress for the Republic.
6 According to Human Rights Watch (2012) Iranian authorities have carried out more than 600 public judicial
executions and imprisoned more journalists and bloggers than any other country. This process is also being referred to as ‘show trials,’ unfair trials that are not functioning by correct judiciary implementation.
7 The Iranian ‘Green Wave’ refers to a time period over the summer of 2009 with the main event of the
presidential elections on June 12. Followed with Mir Houssein Mousavi stating ‘blatant violations’ over the vote counting after Ahmadinejad had won with 62.63 percent of the vote, while Mousavi received 33.75 percent (Afshari & Underwood, 2009: 6; Lee Anderson, 2010: 1).
8 The Tunisian ‘Jasmin Revolution’ began 17 December with the self-‐immolation by Mohammed and ended the
understanding of the interrelation between nonviolent social movements and the counter reaction by the state. This study is divided in six main chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter presents the theoretical framework that forms the base of this thesis. The second chapter presents the methodology of the investigation strategy that will consist at two different levels and by six independent variables. The third and fourth chapters separately present the research results of the two comparative cases starting with the Green Wave in 2009 followed with the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. The fifth chapter presents the synthesis of both cases and will answer the research question. Finally, the conclusion will be presented. 1.2 Relevancy Academic and Public Debate
Within the field of political science there are two important overlooked elements that are being integrated in this study. Firstly, in contrast to the Machiavellian understanding of power, it exemplifies the overlooked element of nonviolent action. Iran and Tunisia are both cases representing the effect of nonviolent means by ordinary citizens that have been taken as an equal threat by the state as it would have with violent means. In addition to the inclusion of the asymmetrical relation between citizens and the state, nonviolent action contributes to a more pluralistic definition of power. This pluralistic element presents that power lies not just at the physical level by violent means; therefore, this study will contribute to a new dialogue within the classic one-dimension of power and mostly violent understanding of resistance. Secondly, studies assume that authoritarian states have had full control over all segments of the political landscape and its subjects, which has led to an insufficient representation of oppositional politics. More importantly, there is a lack of acknowledging that repression invites dissent (Chomiak, 2011: 76). Therefore, this study will investigate the oppositional politics in great detail along with its relation to the governmental politics.
In the public debate, 2011 is politically known for the demonstrations by ordinary citizens, referred to as the Arab Uprisings, the Arab Awakening, and the Arab Spring. All insufficient concepts when considering that the existence of a political culture of dissent, rather than obedience and quiescence had already existed before (Chomiak, 2011: 71). Therefore, it is not exactly an uprising more so than a peak of an already existing awakening, something that has been overlooked within the public debate. Besides, it is apparent that the debate has been dominated by a one-dimensional focus on a possible liberal democratic development, that has been the narrative running in the Western press (Mohseni, 2013: 1). In order to investigate this, one should step out from the public discourse that is portraying the Jasmine Revolution
along with the Arab Uprising as a plea for a new wave of democracy (Mohseni, 2013: 3). This study will provide a pluralistic understanding with a deeper content in comparison of what the latter debate has offered. Not only will the demands of the nonviolent participants be taken in consideration; however, it will be brought in relation with the reaction by the state. What is exceptional about the two cases, Iran and Tunisia, are the similar nonviolent movements that have led to two complete different outcomes.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework highlights five key aspects that form the theoretical foundation of the comparison of nonviolent social movements in Iran and Tunisia. Firstly, explaining the disruption and moderation debate, this section will discuss whether violent or nonviolent resistance tactics are more effective in social movements. Secondly, this chapter engages with the theoretical conceptualization of social movements and with what kind of change it strives for. In addition this section will discuss the manners in which social movements can get access to power by discussing different manners of political activity by activists. Finally, the ‘pillars of support’ that will also function as the bases of the research design will be
discussed.
2.2 Disruption vs. Moderation Debate
The acknowledgement of the importance of social movements in the academic literature developed from 1954 to 1968. In this period, the biggest march in history had taken place that is still memorable, partly due to the iconic speech given by Doctor Martin Luther King, and partly due to the demands of the social movement that actually came to fruition when the Civil Rights Act was passed by the United States Congress on July 2, 1964.9 Social movements have shown to exist out of complex sets of groups, organizations, and actions, where in order to reach diverse aims multiple strategies can be used (Giugni, 1999: 20). For example, this complexity was very well visible during the Iranian revolution in 1979. Here, multiple groups, advancing a wide range of ideologies such as Marxism, Islamism,
liberalism and feminism, were competing to take over state control (Ghorashi, 2003: 2). These groups used different techniques and tools to reach their goal in which some have succeeded more than others.
9 With the passing of the Civil Rights Act racial discrimination became outlawed in education, employment as
In the academic literature, there has been a divide between the ‘disruption’ and the
‘moderation’ technique. The disruption technique entails that the use of violence, or more generally the use of disruptive techniques, could maximize the chances of success for social movements in achieving their expressed goals (Gamson, 1975: 43). Hereby the use of strategy and violence is not prepared in advance, on the contrary, strategy in the form of violence arises out of impatience and hubris rather than desperation (Gamson, 1989: 458). Thus, violence is a property of an interaction, it is not a conscious strategy of a social movement. The study by Shorter & Tilly (1974: 28) is in support of Gamson by presenting how the combination of strikes and violence, has been an effective instrument to force the intervention of the state in labor relations.
On the contrary, a study based on nonviolent strikes has shown a higher probability to success in comparison with violent techniques (Snyder & Kelly, 1979). Remarkable enough, both studies do not question the definition of disruption in relation to strikes. It would seem as though nonviolent strikes do not fit in the moderation technique, due to the damaging effect that strikes can cause through the stop of productivity. Here it becomes questionable whether any form of damage such as economic decline, should be considered as disruptive. In Tunisia, the general nonviolent strikes have been organized by UGTT, the Tunisian labor Union, which had a significant impact on revolt of the Jasmine Revolution.10 Strikes are often accompanied by labor organizations that presents the advanced organization. This advanced consultation about the realization of a successful strike, presents that acts of resistance do not take place organically.
Sociologists Piven and Cloward (1979 and 1993) argue that the success of the disruption technique does not stand on its own; it is mostly directed to replace limited access to much-needed institutional resources. Political parties and interest groups who do have institutional access stand an incredible lead compared to ordinary citizens. Thus, this asymmetrical accessibility between state organs and citizens makes activists use disruptive techniques foremost to replace their disadvantage for limited institutional access. It seems that the disruption technique is mostly focused on competing against an already existing autonomous existence of power. Consequently, this competition will not bring any difference in what is
10 UGTT, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, the Tunisian General Labor Union began organizing rallies and
launched a general strike. Besides, 8000 lawyers were on strike to demand an end to what they said were beatings by security forces (McNally 18 January, 2011; Al Jazeera 6 January, 2011).
understood under power. Hereby, activists actually adapt themselves to the manner that the state uses power against citizens.
With the state having all of the access to institutional tools, the Iranian and Tunisian states have both used these tools in different ways. For instance, the Iranian state began giving house arrest to the most threatening opposition leaders11. From the very beginning the Iranian state was very clear by not siding with the activists in any way. On the contrary, Ben Ali firstly tries to react in favor of the activists by bringing a visit to Mohammed in the hospital after the self-immolation. However, with the cameras capturing every moment of the visit, the whole ordeal seemed staged. When this gesture did not make any difference for the Tunisian demonstrators, the state reaction changed into violent performances against the Tunisian activists. This difference shows that the moderation and disruption debate almost seems insufficient when the political and social circumstances are not taken in consideration. Thus, the debate is between those who consider social movements capable to succeed through nonviolent manner and those who believe a disruptive technique is more effective. However, both sides of the debate overlook the political and social context as well as to what extend institutions can limit or stimulate the act of resistance.
2.3 Change by Social Movement
Social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or existing ideologies (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613). Initially, social movements exist out of what they are aiming at out of their mobilization. Foremost, social movements aim at changes in the social order. Dissatisfaction arises when individuals no longer consider the values and norms, on which the order is based on, to be in their best interest. To join a social movement, people must mentally, spiritually, and physically prepare themselves. This process where the subject becomes enlightened by resisting the social order is called ‘voluntary resistance’, (Watner, 2006: 41). Despite their supposed enlightenment, the mood of people may not lead to action unless they are able to mobilize the necessary resources (Bayat, 1998: 139). The
demonstrations during the Green Wave and the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution could be considered the peak of the mobilization of a social movement.
11 Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, former presidential candidates in Iran’s 2009 disputed election
have been under house arrest after claiming the results were rigged. Also Mousavi’s wife Zahra Rahnavard has been under house arrest due to her participation that has been considered as a leader role in the ‘Green Wave.’
Political sociologist Asef Bayat (1998: 139) argues that in order to achieve collective ‘voluntary resistance’ a social movement must be developed out of popular discontent that, regardless of its cause, can be distinguished into two types of mobilization. Firstly, protest or insurrectionary movements aims solely to negate the existing order. Hereby the social
movement is less pursuing to build an alternative structure. The Green Wave and the Jasmine Revolution were demanding a fair and transparent practice of democracy. A similar
characteristic of Iran and Tunisia is that both leaders have framed their countries as democratic countries, however, the political reality has proven otherwise. Therefore, both social movements do not belong to the first category. Secondly, social movements aim to alter the dominant arrangements but also attempt to establish alternative institutions and value systems before a total structural transition (Bayat, 1998: 139). The social movements in Tunisia and Iran both present such a pattern with their aim to develop accessibility and transparency within the political structure that should consist out of fair democracy.
In order to produce change, it requires a relatively large number of participants; therefore, it is called ‘popular’ as it is a dominant symptom of discontent with the existing social order (Heberle, 1951: 51-54). In Iran, the activists of the Green Wave were foremost supporters of the opposition group by reformist Mousavi. The popular discontent existed of criticism against President Ahmadinejad and his hardline policies that opposed the reformation by Mousavi’s party. Similarly, the Tunisian activists were against their President Ben Ali. Despite his refusal for being called president for live, he had ruled Tunisia for twenty-three years.12 There was no political party representing the Jasmine Revolution. Although this may
seem as a disadvantage, it turned out not to be.
In order to make a distinction between power-seeking political parties and social movements, political sociologist Rudolf Heberle uses football teams in his analogy. Political parties can be compared with football teams: each of them certainly want to win, both have the common purpose of playing the game, and therefore they are bound to observe certain rules and standards of fairness (Heberle, 1951: 450). Thus, it could be said that in Tunisia and Iran, the leading parties are being used to present that indeed there is a team that is playing on the field. However, this is a façade as not every player is equal because only one person decides the rules of the game. For instance, in Tunisia there was only one football team that was in
12 Former Tunisian President Bourguiba had named himself president for life in order to remove the term limit
to rule as president. Ben Ali argued he would distance himself from Bourguiba’s rule, therefore, rejected the assigned title, decreeing he would serve no more than three terms in office (Spencer, 2011: 1).
the lead for twenty-three years, as voters had no other option than to choose for Ben Ali. As for Iran, the football field seems a façade of recruiting players and teams that all fall under one person who holds all the cards: Ayatollah Khamenei. Currently, Tunisia is in the face of reconstructing the football field, by introducing the new constitution, a new referee is entering the field. While in Iran, the field seems even more controlled as some teams, ‘opposition parties’, have even been excluded. Thus, social movements do not desire to take control over the field, however, they do demand a change of rules.
Political scientist Hannah Arendt (1963: 125) looks beyond the practice of violence in order to understand the power that can realize violent practices and lead to a revolution. The outcome of a revolution eventually depends not on the practice of violence, but on the power behind the violence: usually, the government still in power will be superior in terms of the means of violence, however, this prevalence will only be to its advantage as long as its power structure remains intact (Arendt, 1972: 147-149). This resembles with the Tunisian army that, in contrast to the police security, decided not to obey the order to strengthen police security (Anderson, 2011: 3).13 This has most likely contributed to the ousting of Ben Ali.
Consequently, the Jasmine Revolution became a fact.
A revolution can be understood as a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure,
leadership, and government activity and policies (Arendt, 1972: 148). Similarly, according to political scientist Chalmers Johnson (1966&1982), revolutionary change is a special kind of social change, one that involves the intrusion of violence into civil social relations. Thus, social movements do not aim at a revolution; it is a consequence of their act of resistance. On the contrary, Johnson’s argument may not count for the Jasmine Revolution, where the slogan of “Ben Ali Dégage,” (Ben Ali Get Out) had been chanted continuously (Schraeder & Redissi, 2011: 7). In Iran they already endured a revolution in 1979, which could be of influence that the social movement explicitly did not desire another one. Perhaps the most challenging aspect in defining a revolution is the periodization that finds generalizations about stages, patterns, processes, and dynamics of revolutionary momentum (Kraminick, 1972: 27). According to sociologist Crane Brinton, a revolution is never a desired stage,
13 On November 28, 2011 the trial against Ben Ali, four generals of the Public Security Force and fourteen other
commanders and lower-‐ranking officers, had begun. They have been charged with complicity as facilitating the commission of a crime by aiding, abetting, assisting, or giving instructions to commit a crime, or conspiring with others to fulfill a criminal purpose (Human Rights Watch, 11 June, 2012).
however, under certain conditions of change a relative disequilibrium may arise, in what is called a revolutionary outbreak (1936: 15). In order to clarify this process Brinton presents the analogy of fever that undergoes three phases. The first phase consists out of the emerging signs of a crisis.
“We shall regard revolutions as a kind of fever. The signs are described as prodromal signs, indications to the very keen diagnostician that a disease is on its way, but not yet sufficiently developed to be the disease. Then comes a time when the full symptoms disclose themselves, and when we can say the fever of revolution has begun.” (Brinton,
1936: 16)
Social movements function within a longer span of time, during which people can ask questions, debate key issues, and be clear about the aims of the movement (Bayat, 1998: 140). In this regard, people have investigated the treatment of a fever over a longer span of time which has led to the preparedness of the disease through medicines. In this regard, the first phase of the revolution is an emerging disease that can be transmitted from one person to another, until it reaches an outbreak. This outbreak is the seconds phase of the fever, also referred to as the crisis (Brinton, 1936: 17). In addition, this phase always consists of violence or involves some other kind of skullduggery. Thus, Brinton argues that revolutions are
inherently violent.
“After the crisis comes a period of convalescence, usually marked by a relapse or two. Finally the fever is over, and the patient is himself again, perhaps in some respects actually strengthened by the experience, immunized at least for a while from a similar attack, but certainly not wholly made over into a new man.” (Brinton, 1936: 17)
Thus, Brinton argues that societies which undergo the full cycle of revolution are can become stronger despite of it as they have built some new factors that are immune for a recurrent attack. Nevertheless, revolutions are not exact similar, as there are different forms of attack, a society can never build a full immune system. Therefore, Iran could experience a second revolution, however, due to their Iranian Revolution in 1979, their society is more immune for a radical change.
Within the first and last phase there are contradictory aspects within the analogy of fever. According to Brinton a revolution would be an organic occurrence that is rather avoided, however, eventually it cannot always evade the crisis (1936: 15). On the contrary, it takes systematic organization and preparation, before mobilization and a radical change can take place. Therefore, a revolution is not an organic occurrence, but is systematically organized (Dabashi, 1993: 38, 355). In the final phase, the aftermath of a fever makes it possible for the
human body to continue its daily life and tasks. Brinton refers to the concept of disequilibrium, where the adjustments tend to re-establish themselves, and produce
restoration (1936: 15). Thus, the last phase of a fever consists out of continuing according the rules prior to the fever, whereas, the last phase of a revolution consists out of an adaption to structural changes and new rules. In addition, Arendt and Brinton both consider revolutions as inherently related towards violence. Despite this still being correct, their perspective is outdated, as it overlooks on elements of power through nonviolent action. Consequently, this one-dimensional perspective on the practice of power overlooks on the demands of social movements that are often of more pluralistic nature, consisting out of political, social and economic mechanisms. For instance, when the social-economic cleavages reinforce rather than overlap, the potential for political conflict is more acute (Huntingon, 1981: 91). This is particularly the case when the segments of a society are hierarchically arranged, that is, when one distinct group (or coalition of groups) dominates others (Huntington, 1981: 106). This has been taken place in Tunisia where the unemployment rate has been higher in rural areas, especially in the north-west of the country, which is exactly where the social movement of the Jasmine Revolution emerged (World Bank, January 2014).
On the other hand, political scientist Alfred Cobban argues that the most important and decisive factor for a social movement to resist the power by the state is actually a conflict of principles that is defined as “struggle for the hearts of men” (1968: 20). Hereby,
revolutionary events play out due to indifference about political ideas and ideals. This is similar to philosopher Aristotle who argued that revolutions have been the result of
conflicting interpretations of justice (2000: 120). They are about freedom, equality and self-government. Especially self-government has a laden meaning because the social movements are not given a fair chance to participate in the political system, without a fair democracy. In addition, ‘democratic aspirations’ are basic rights and freedoms such as people’s individual civil and political rights, including the right to assemble, the right to free and fair elections, the right to rational governance, the right to participate freely and equally in the political process and the right to be equal before the law (Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010: 79). These demands should be considered as internationally common, regardless of origin. Thus, democracy should not be brought in line with Westernization; it should be brought in line with universal and international human rights.
2.4 Power Access
Sociologist Max Weber (1921) was one of the first to define the state as an institution, more importantly an institution that enjoys a monopoly of legitimate force. Weber should be considered as a pluralist thinker of power, as he has conceptualized different institutions that all have access to a different element of power. For instance, the state possesses the
monopoly of violence, whereas the church, mosque or synagogue sought a monopoly of spiritual power. Sometimes this plurality comes together such as in Iran, where the spiritual power originally has formed the base of state power. At the same time, religion can be used as a tool of legitimacy. It is this set of relations and interrelations where Weber has been helpful by offering a structural picture and more importantly present the functioning by the state.
Similarly, political scientist Lisa Anderson argues that, for non-democratic states, the patterns of functioning are important to be fully aware of because it is in that regard that a possibility of ‘break-down’ becomes visible (2011: 2). These possibilities of fractions offer the prospect of a post-breakdown regime such as current Tunisia. However, before a state arrives at the post-breakdown face there must be some sort of access to one of the institutions described by Weber, similarly, nonviolent strategist Gene Sharp has systemized these institutional tools into so called ‘pillars of support.’ These pillars must be accessed in order to stabilize the asymmetrical power between activists and the state. The idea that ‘violence can effectively be met only with violence’ is false (Sharp, 1973: 109). Thus, activists should not compete with the existing power, but they should compete with the accessibility of power.
This strategic thought, about invading in institutional tools and take over the space in possession by state power, has made Sharp highly controversial in the Iranian politics. According to Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of state media broadcast Kayhan14 and adviser to the supreme leader of Iran, the Green Wave was part of a grand conspiracy where Gene Sharp aimed to overthrow Iran’s government. In addition, Shariatmadari believes that the Green Wave protests along with Sharp’s ideas have foremost been against the whole system that Iran has functioned on ever since the Iranian revolution (Lee Anderson, 2010: 6). On the contrary, the initial demands of the Green Wave activists have been fair and
transparent elections; the whole system had not been attacked more so fair procedures of the
14 The daily newspaper controlled by the state; therefore, the statements by Shariatmadri are a reliable
current system. More importantly, opposition leader Mousavi had no ambitions to overthrow the state if he would have become president. Despite the demands of fair elections on a nonviolent manner, Shariatmadari seems to victimize the position of the state by targeting the credibility of Sharp’s work. Despite these allegations, Sharp has only expanded his work as being known for the author of ‘198 methods of nonviolent action’ and even established the Einstein Institution, which is fully devoted to the investigation of nonviolent action all over the world against suppressed rulers. By making a specialization out of nonviolent action, the attack by non-democratic state rulers has become more the rule for Sharp’s work then the exception. More importantly, the reaction by states and authoritarian figures such as Shariatmadari, presents that states do take nonviolent social movements and nonviolent resistance as a serious threat.
Sharp has introduced an alternative perspective on power by approaching it in nonviolent terms, instead of physical force, power consists out of the possession of knowledge. Political anthropologist James Scott has conceptualized this as ‘metis;’ that is the essential practical knowledge that the state lacks of which consequently leads to failure of policies (1998: 311). Scott has argued that the state needs to get access to ‘metis’ in order to be successful, whereas Sharp has argued it reversed: For activists to be successful, they need to conceive the
knowledge and skills of those people who work for the state. Therefore, those people who possess the skills must not be overthrown, but used in order to succeed in any reformation (Sharp, 2010: 67).
Interestingly, in both cases in Iran and Tunisia, the legitimacy was at an extreme fragile point. For instance, in Iran the government was being accused of fraud during the presidential election, whereas, in Tunisia people were accusing Ben Ali and his family of corruption happening at the top level of the government. The family of Ben Ali, with eight siblings on Ben Ali’s side and ten siblings at his wife’s side, all received their own cut of Tunisia’s national income. There was very little law and regulation to restrict the manner of living by Ben Ali and his family. Economists call this crony capitalism, where one small group of people with certain political ties becomes very rich (James, 2013: 58-59). Highly family-dominated economies are associated with an increased prominence of family business and bad governance, corruption and inefficiency (ibid.). Little jurisdiction and regulation has been a main factor to keep crony capitalism sustainable. When the situation of Ben Ali and his family had been compared with the living standards of the Tunisians, especially in the rural areas, the stratification turned out to consist out of an wide gap. Thus, the social movement of
resistance mobilized in the rural areas and grew its support reaching the urban center as end stadium.
On the contrary, the social movement in Iran had begun in the capital Teheran and spread wide over the smaller cities. Here also the accusation was related to a form of corruption, the accusation of fraud during the Presidential election of 2009. The most likely winner,
opposition leader and reformist Mousavi who ended in second place, had been put into house arrest together with his wife. Besides, reformist candidate Karroubi who was considered a more conservative reformist and had ended on third place, had also been put under house arrest after the approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Incumbent President Ahmadinejad had claimed victory.
In both cases, the political activists are physically in a disadvantage by being nonviolent. In addition to Weber’s description of power through institutions, the nonviolent activists who are entering a new field of power do not have the access to these institutions that should be perceived as tools of power. Thus, this asymmetrical relation has to be compensated with different empowering techniques that are defined in the ‘pillars of support’ (Sharp, 1973: 13).
2.5 Pillars of Support
“Far too often people struggling for democratic rights and justice are not aware of the full range of methods of nonviolent action; wise strategy, attention to the dynamics and careful selection of methods that can increase a group’s chances of success.” (Sharp,
1973: 16)
The power of states is characterized by pluralistic elements, it is within this plurality that the nonviolent actionists can play upon through systemized pillars of support. The pillars of support could be best perceived as a strategic well-organized ‘weapons of the weak’ directed to the access of power. In non-democratic states, people are not given the room to express themselves in any form; therefore, in order to comply, people use alternative ways of resistance that are in such a way subtle that it becomes invisible to the state yet effective. In this regard, Scott (1985: 137) has also defined the ‘weapons of the weak’ as ‘invisible power’, a form of resistance that requires little coordination or planning, and has been used by both individuals and groups to resist without directly confronting or challenging elite norms. The integrated element of resistance in this regard could be best understood as a form of contesting public transcripts, also referred to as the public discourse framed at top-down level by the state. As an example, Tunisians would cultivate alternative political identities in
soccer stadiums, a space where acts of resistance were less noticeable, whereas in Iran the common illegal use of satellite television in order to receive international broadcasts had been a common practice (Chomiak, 2011: 71). Thus, despite close surveillance by authoritarian regimes, people always manage to find opportunities to compete with the rules of restrictions. Even though these acts are quite unnoticeable, to act upon the pillars of support cannot
happen without automatically limiting the functioning space used by the state. Infiltrating one of the pillars of support causes high risks for the activists, mainly because these pillars are supervised by the state. These pillars that are considered the main sources of power by the state have been schematically presented in Figure 1a according to Sharp’s classic model (p.22). Although these pillars are breakable according to the pluralistic-dependency theory, this is not the aim of nonviolent action (Sharp, 1973: 8). Before an actual reconstruction can take place, these pillars must be sustained and reconquered through nonviolent action.
The first pillar, authority and legitimacy, is the basis for claiming the right to rule and for demanding obedience from the ruled. As Weber has discussed, institutions legitimate their power in diverse manners from religion to physical force. In order to collectively take the power away from the ruler, the subjects have to be dissatisfied with the ruler’s prestige. This pillar depends intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects that is called the consent theory of power, where obedience represents submission of the subjects (Sharp, 1973: 12). The loss of legitimacy could become a major factor for the legitimization of political opposition (Helvey, 2004: 4). For instance, both in Iran and Tunisia the Presidents Ahmadinejad and Ben Ali had been losing the support by the majority of the population or, in the case of Ahmadinejad, never had the majority support in the first place due to his disputed presidential win.15 Thus, in order to limit the popularity of opposition parties, it is important to represent the majority in order to rule on legitimate basis.
The second pillar, human resources, indicates the number of people and groups who obey ‘the ruler’ that is in command of the state (Helevey, 2004: 147). This is similar to the theoretical concept of popular discontent, where there must be a sufficient amount of resentment in the population in order to mobilize (Bayat 1998: 138). The human resources could be considered a barometer for possible change, the bigger the discontent is among the population, the more chance there is for change. Especially in a nonviolent struggle for democracy, numbers are important (Helvey, 2004: 5). In order to reach a sufficient amount of collective support, the social movement must interpret the concept of imagined communities in a manner that becomes beneficial.
“I propose the following definition of the nation: it is in an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”
(Anderson, 2006: 6)
Thus, nationalism is a cultural artefact, that masquerades under false pretenses that Anderson assimilates to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’ (1997:56; 2006: 6). This ‘imagining’ has
contributed to the empowerment of social movements, by not being aware of the exact
15 Although the ‘Green Wave’ has based its social movement in favor of reformation and against the
presidential win by conservative hard-‐liner Ahmadinejad, the accusation of fraud had been surfacing during Ahmadinejad’s previous presidential win in 2005. The Interior Ministry issued results that differed from those released by the Guardian Council, and appointed panel controlled by hardliners (Slackman, 25 June 2005: 1).
number of participants, the ‘imagining’ made the Green Wave and the Jasmine Revolution seem as they were being supported by the majority of people within the nation.
In addition, the number of participants depends on whether they act in support of the opinion by the general public, as this constitutes a large part of the population. Besides, if the social movement represents a large part of the population, it will be less vulnerable cause at individual level they will be less exposed. The chances of any participant being singled out for punishment may be disproportionately reduced (Sharp, 1973: 110). Nevertheless, the nonviolent actionists must be willing to risk punishment as a part of their price of victory. Thus, it can occur that not every participant can even witness their success, as it has been the case for those activists who have been killed before the Tunisian revolution took place.16 Even leaders can get arrested, which reveals that the nonviolent movement can carry on without a recognizable leadership (Sharp, 1973: 112). On the contrary, it is questionable whether this is correct in every case. For instance, in Tunisia there was not one explicit leader; however, the Green Wave did initially have a leader who eventually had been
excluded due to Mousavi being forced under house arrest. Consequently, this was one of the multiple factors that most likely had contributed to the decrease of power of the social movement.
The third pillar, skills and knowledge, supports the ruler’s power by the possessing knowledge. Subsequently, the third pillar is highly depended on the amount of the second pillar, and the obedience of the first pillar. In order to access these skills, it is important, as Scott has argued with the ‘metis’, that these skills are not removed, however, they must be taken over. For instance, the approved opposition parties in Iran and Tunisia are the groups who are most likely to access the third pillar, because they were already trying to find some form of cooperating with the ruler.17
16 In June, right after the disputed presidential election, security officials were responsible for at least 30
deaths and detained 4,000 people, mostly in the street protests that were largely peaceful. During the Tunisian Uprising, the commission has identified at least 240 civilians who have been killed by police gunfire (Human Rights Watch Report 2010 & 2012).
17 Most opposition parties have been excluded in Iran and Tunisia. However, in Iran reformist Khatami had won
the election and had tried to increase the president’s powers and limit the power of the Guardian Coucil, a 12-‐ member council half appointed by the Supreme Leader and half selected by parliament, but was blocked by the body that possess veto rights (Al Jazeera, 1 March 2012). Whereas in Tunisia tailor-‐made laws have prevented candidates from stronger opposition parties from running, and severe constraints on freedoms of expression, the press, and assembly have deprived challengers from making their case to the public (Human Rights Watch, 23 October 2009).
The fourth pillar, intangible factors, includes factors that affect the relationship between the ruler and the public. For instance, religion, attitudes toward obedience and submission, a sense of mission, or cultural norms could be possible factors (Helvey, 2004: 6). The
monopoly of spiritual power by Weber would take place in the fourth pillar. Oftentimes these factors are intertwined as religion influences the lifestyle that likewise has an influence on cultural norms. Thus, this pillar has a wide reach of influence. In addition, the intangible factors are the social constructive elements that realizes the ‘imagining’ of the imagined community, by a complex of mediations and representations, through visual symbols such as flags, maps, national anthems, national history museums, statuary and microcosmic
ceremonials (Anderson, 1994: 319). Similarly, social movements have used symbols, for instance, the green color representing the Green Wave, whereas the Jasmine Revolution consisted out of demonstrators using a baguette as an attribute to symbolize the struggle to make ends meet.
The fifth pillar consists of material resources that are foremost controlled by the state, such as the economy, property, natural resources, technological communication and transportation. For the state, these material resources offer them financial support that consequently contributes to the maintain for the other ‘pillar of support’. Oftentimes these material resources integrate in the lives of people. For instance, controlling communication through state media and the spread of propaganda limits the availability of possible alternative perspectives for the subjects to be informed of.
The final pillar, the ability to apply sanctions, consists of violent or nonviolent punishments. These reprisals are imposed after an act of failure or deviation compared to the desired or correct way of acting. In Iran and Tunisia, both states have been known for their suppressive regime and violent punishments against disobedience. Hereby, the space to debate is
relatively restricted in non-democratic states as there is no room to disagree; either you are inside the party or you are intrinsically disloyal. Thus, a loyal opposition does not exist. This has been visible in Tunisia where opposition leaders were either detained or in exile.
Although these pillars are portrayed as separately holding up the roof, the collective power of the state is actually intertwined as they influence one another. If the counter reaction by the state goes by the principle of jiu-jitsu, a special process that may operate during a nonviolent struggle in order to change power relations, it can actually be an advantage for the nonviolent activists. During this process, the violent repressor reacts to nonviolent activists; however, it
does not weaken but strengthen the position of the nonviolent activists (Scharp, 2003: 32 & 39).
For instance, in Iran and Tunisia the restriction of social media by the government brought a counter effect by contributing to the construction of alternative ways of access to
communication. In Iran, there was even a double occurrence of jiu-jitsu when foreign journalists were banned and the political activists received even more attention. This conceived the unusual practice by international media broadcasts to broadcast captured images and verify it afterwards. This unusual practice presented the flexibility of adapting to a new formula that included citizen-journalism. Thus, it could be said that the restriction on communication tools brought more attention internationally. In Tunisia, the restriction on social media created alternative ways to get access, more than half Tunisians have said that Facebook had been a platform of information to mobilize newcomers, which consequently contributed to strengthening of coherence (Huang, 2011: 2).
The digital activities offer an effective means of participating in communication discourse and mobilizing the population in their struggle for a just and fair society (Shirazi, 2010: 45). This is presented in the number of text messages exchanged during the election campaign in Iran in the summer of 2009 with a record of 110 million messages per day (Tehran Times, 2009). Moreover, jiu-jitsu should not only be perceived in unwanted consequences; it can also be part of the nature of authoritarian states. For example, the restriction of freedom of speech not only limits people from freely debating political issues; it results in less of an understanding of the macro-level political environment. In a report dated May 3, 2002, the Tunisian Journalists Association revealed the stark discrepancies between theory and practice in government communication policies (Miladi, 2011: 9). More importantly, this led to uncertainty among people, which in turn led to illegitimacy of the actual political structure (Campbell & Kwak, 2011: 263). Thus, in order to prevent this kind of estrangement between citizens and the political scene a form of open dialogue must be offered, however, an open dialogue is practiced different in democratic and non-democratic states.
2.6 Popular Discourse and Authoritarian Regimes
According to Lisa Anderson (2011: 2), one important characteristic of non-democratic states is the scarcity of information about material resources. There are two different ways in which non-democratic states control their material resources. On the one hand, states collect
restricted and only shared at top down level mainly by the National Intelligence Ministry. On the other hand, the information does not exist because it is not being collected.
For instance, the allegations of corruption by Ben Ali and his relatives also known as “the Family,” a broad network of which more than half of Tunisia’s commercial elites were personally related to President Ben Ali or the first lady, Leila Ben Ali.18 This form of corruption was unusually personalist and predatory even for authoritarian standards
(Anderson, 2011: 3). In Iran people had disputed the Presidential election outcome, these are both allegations of which the information has been restricted for the general population. Thus, any allegation that has been made cannot be verified because it is not being tested and therefore, the problem does not exist. Both scenarios have in common that the information is being restricted from the general public, thus, whether the information actually exists or not becomes irrelevant if the people are excluded from access. The very essence of restricting information consists out of strategy; if there is no data about possible allegations or criticism over their rule, the authorities are not accountable and will not risk losing their power and position. Any accusation by the ruler himself cannot be tested either. For instance, when the Supreme Leader claims that the Islamic Republic is superior in its manner of governance, it cannot be actually tested against an alternative governance structure, because there is no room for reformation and contestation.
Most people assume that greater exposure to information technology leads to increased activism in authoritarian states (Kedzie, 1997: 45). The diffusion of digital media does not always have democratic consequences especially under networked authoritarianism, a form of Internet control common in former Soviet states where manipulation over digitally mediated social networks is used more than outright censorship (Pearce & Kendzior, 2012: 283). Hereby the government has successfully dissuaded frequent Internet users from supporting protest and average Internet users from using social media for political purposes. What happens with outright censorship in Tunisia and Iran actually becomes a self-defeating proposition with even those people who initially are not involved with politics becoming aware of it due to the fear of freedom of speech on the platform that the Internet offers. This is illustrated by media scientist Ethan Zuckermann in the “cute-cat theory of digital activism” (2013: 1). Here, non-activist Internet users who only want to watch movies of cute cats are
18 The people in the network were related to Ben Ali through his three adult children, seven siblings, and his
included in the limitation of the government crackdown on the Internet. Take for instance the social media site Facebook, which is a threat for the state due to the political discourse that it can be used for. However, not only are political activists getting restricted from using
Facebook, but also those non-political activists who are interested in watching videos of cute cats. Thus, censorship of the Internet by authoritarian regimes takes over a wide spectrum, which leads to non-activists subsequently getting aware of the limitations of freedom to express or freedom to watch something as harmless as cute cats. Although authoritarian regimes seem to be facing a dilemma regarding the use of Internet, they really do not have much of a choice.
“Totalitarian societies either try to stifle these technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial revolution, or else they permit these technologies and see their totalitarian control inevitably eroded. In fact they do not have a choice, because they will never be able entirely to block the tide of technological advance.” (Shultz, 1985:
48)
In this statement, economist and former American politician George Shultz is partly correct; however, he is over-simplifying the choice of authoritarian states to handle technological advances. The theoretical concept ‘networked authoritarianism’ illustrates this contestation, where authoritarian states adjust to the technological changes brought by digital
communications (MacKinnon, 2011: 33). States that practice networked authoritarianism do not strictly censor online dissent; there is an actual interaction between the Internet users who acts are being considered as illegal, and the state who is competing with the users and are making an example out of online dissenters in order to affirm the futility of activism to a disillusioned public. Although Iran and Tunisia have both been strictly censored since 2011, both countries have undergone two different paths. After the massive demonstrations were only growing, Ben Ali had promised free access on the Internet. Indeed, this access soon came as Ben Ali even sooner fled the country. In Iran however, the crackdown on the Internet perhaps became even stricter by criminalizing it for ordinary citizens. Remarkably enough, there is a form of networked authoritarianism due to the new interactive path that has started since 2012 by Khamenei’s office. For instance, Ayatollah Khamenei has launched his own Facebook account Khamenei.ir that updates any speech, announcement, event or picture.19 This illustrates the complexity of the Iranian regime fully condemning and criminalizing any use of social media, however, joining the platform themselves. This could mean that the state
19 The Facebook account has currently 84,820 followers. He also has a Twitter and Instagram account and has
is aware that social media cannot be fully diminished either way it is a remarkable contradiction in their own hardline policy.
The abstract meaning of discourse is intricately related to beliefs and other cognitive representations (Van Dijk, 2009: 81). Besides, the discursive acts accomplished in the discourse can hardly be separated from the social acts that define social situations. Thus, discourse is inherently part of both cognition and situations. For instance, holding a
presidential speech can involve a sequence of acts such as assertions, questions, accusations or threats, as well as conversational moves and strategies by responding to a certain critique. This form of critical discourse analysis (CDA) investigates the manner in which discursive acts and structures are deployed in the enactment of broader social and political acts. The presidential speeches along with state media represent the ‘system of dominance’, whereas the opposition parties and nonviolent activists are ‘resisting against dominance’ (ibid.). Critical discourse analysts are less interested in the account of specific discourses,
interactions and situations. Rather, they focus on the more general ways specific discourses may be instances of more general discourse properties and how such discourse may
contribute to social inequality, for instance by the formation of biased models and ultimately by the formation or confirmation of ideologies (Van Dijk, 2009: 80).
The word ‘revolution’ has often been used in a regular form such as the media portraying the Green Wave as the Twitter Revolution or the Arab Uprising as the Facebook Revolution. On the contrary, Twitter cannot be an actual revolution as it only offers a platform of ‘micro-blogging.’20 The people are the ones who establish a revolution; they can use social media as a helpful tool. However, a revolution does not take place in the virtual space eventually it takes place on the streets.
The collaborative study by the University of Washington concluded that one of the main causes of the Arab Uprising has been the manner in which social media has brought a human face on political oppression as is has done for Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation. The study further presents that social media has been used heavily to conduct political
20 ‘Micro-‐blogging’ consists out of a maximum of 140 characters in length, one can also ‘re-‐tweet’ a message
conversations before and during the revolution, which has put pressure on their governments (PITPI, 2011: 2).21
According to sociologist Mark Granovetter, the kind of activism associated with social media is built around weak ties; therefore, people can follow others of which they otherwise would not be in touch with (1973: 1361). It can also occur that users who are in each other’s
network never actually meet or personally know each other despite the Internet. This network of weak ties should be considered a strength for transmitting new ideas and information. Thus, according to Granovetter weak ties should be considered as a positive element that social media offers. However, journalist Malcolm Gladwell (2010) argues that despite this strength, weak ties do not lead to high-risk activism, which is the only form of activism that can lead to an actual revolution. Thus, it is important to make distinct low-risk activism that takes place through ‘weak-ties’ and ‘high-risk’ activism that can only take place through ‘strong-ties.’ The differences in both types of activism lies at the sacrifice that people go through (Gladwell, 2010: 3). For instance, if someone only retweets a political message, which is similar to literally repeating a message while sharing it with others, it does not undergo any life threatening risk. Journalist and social media expert, Barnaby Feder has termed this as ‘slacktivism’, or the tendency to passively affiliate ourselves with causes for the sake of peer approval rather than taking real, high-stakes action to support them (May 29, 2002: 8). However, what this concept does not take in consideration is that slacktivism takes place in countries where social media is not criminalized. Consequently, in authoritarian states, any post that has political context does not take place passively due to the high-risk that is attached to it. On the other hand, Gladwell does make a fair point in arguing that it are the strong ties that create high-risk activism.
The overlooked element in the theory by Granovetter is the element of physicality. The Green Wave and Jasmine Revolution have been consisted out of massive demonstrations. Thus, people have physically gathered and held peaceful marches to express their demands. It is with the presence of physical contact that collective effervescence can be created and stimulated.22
21 PITPI stands for Project on Information Technology & Political Islam and has been conducted by the
University of Washington and the American University.
22 Collective effervescence has been conceptualized by sociologist Emile Durkheim (1912) and is expanded by
