Understanding the
determinants of migration
A case study of Libyan Tuareg
Yentl de Lange (11287446) Dr. Maaike Voorhoeve
University of Amsterdam Dr. Liesbeth Zack
Faculty of Humanities 24.968 words
Abstract
The current political and socio-economic situation of a number of Libyan Tuareg could be perceived as a composition of reasons to leave Libya. Tuareg without citizenship suffer from a structurally marginalised position that becomes even more deteriorated as a result of the issuance of the digital national identification number system, the ongoing war and the outbreak of the corona pandemic. This study provides new insights related to the citizenship problems of Tuareg in Libya and examines what role factors such as the lack of citizenship and an ongoing violent conflict can play in decisions to migrate or to stay among Libyan Tuareg. By interviewing Libyan Tuareg about their general life ambitions and thoughts on migration, this study aims to gain a deeper understanding of crucial dynamics in migration decision-making. This study observes that the lack of citizenship and the ongoing violent conflict do play a role in migration decision-making, but interact with other migration determinants. This study points out that the general life ambitions of an individual are at the basis of a migration aspiration and that migration functions as a vehicle to fulfil personal ambitions. Statelessness is observed to be influencing an individuals aspirations and capabilities. The ambition to acquire a legal identity comes forth from the idea that statelessness is a problem respondents want to solve so that they can increase their capabilities and ultimately reach other life goals, such as education or the expansion of (future) job opportunities. This study observes that the connection to the homeland is another factor that influences migration decision-making, since respondents have expressed their preference to return or to stay.
Contents
Abstract ... page 2 Content ... page 3 Introduction ... page 4 Chapter 1 ... page 8 Connecting theory on migration determinants to the case of Libyan Tuareg
Chapter 2 ... page 17 Methodology: Interviewing sixteen Libyan Tuareg during corona
Chapter 3 ... page 28 Setting the scene: Marginalisation and migration
Chapter 4 ... page 52 Application of the aspirations/capabilities model
Chapter 5 ... page 57 Zooming out: Reflecting on additional factors on migration determinants
Conclusion ... page 64 Literature ... page 67
Introduction
Problems related to citizenship among non-Arab groups in Libya have come to a new level in the last decade. In 2012, the interim government of Libya announced the implementation of a digital national identification number system.1 Around 2013, the interim government finished the process of digitising the civil record. All Libyan citizens obtained their national identification number (raqm waṭanī) which became a necessity for basic aspects in life: to open a bank account, enjoy higher education, travel abroad, receive medical treatment and to be employed and receive a salary.2 However, to receive the raqm waṭanī, one has to carry Libyan citizenship. All Libyan residents without Libyan nationality received the raqm idārī (administrative number) instead of the raqm waṭanī.3 The raqm idārī was presented as a
temporary number, targeting to resolve citizenship problems in the near future and to issue the raqm waṭanī to all Libyan residents. Its been seven years, and a group of people who consider themselves to be Libyans, since they were born and raised in the country, are still excluded from the basis aspects of life.
Tuareg, as well as other non-Arab minority groups such as the Tebu and the Amazigh, have struggled under Gaddafi to obtain Libyan nationality and subsequently have faced marginalisation and discrimination. Some Tuareg were able to obtain the Libyan nationality when they had documented proof of themselves or their parents having lived in Libya for ten years before 1951.4 Others obtained citizenship after being employed in the Libyan army, for example, to fight in Gaddafi's war with Chad.5 Several Tuareg have not been able to obtain Libyan nationality in the last decades. There are no official records of the total number of this latter group. These Tuareg are legally not perceived as Libyan citizens, although many of them have been born and have lived in Libya for more than 40 years and do feel ‘Libyan’.
1 Sami Zaptia, “The new National Identity Number has been issued to over 6 million Libyans,” Libya Herald, 8
February 2013, https://www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/08/the-new-national-identity-number-has-been-issued-to-over-6-million-libyans-deputy-prime-minister-abdulsalam-al-gadi/.
2 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others, “Report Libya: Nationality, registration and documents,” 19
December 2014. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment1035.aspx?AttachmentType=1
3 akhbār lībiyya, “al-aḥwāl al-madniyya: ʿadad al-mutaḥaṣilīn ʿala al-raqm al-idārī 108 alf shakhṣ,” akhbār
lībiyya, 14 October 2018, https://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/772228.html
4 Ines Kohl, “Libya’s ‘major minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple narratives of citizenship, language
and border control,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 4 (2014): 431.
5 Delphine Perrin, “Tuaregs and citizenship: The last camp of nomadism,” Middle East Law and Governance 6,
The citizenship problem of Tuareg is also the result of the relatively recent transition of many Tuareg from a pastoral to a sedentary life. In the previous century, numerous processes took place that discouraged Tuareg to live as nomadic pastoralists in the Sahara, causing many to settle down in (new) cities in Libya. Many Tuareg do not have official documents proving their (family) connection with Libya before 1951. The current political instability in the country undermines the possibility that Libyan Tuareg will obtain citizenship in the near future. None of the two governments, the UN-recognised government in Tripoli or the elected government in Tobruk, has expressed any interest in the rights of the non-Arab groups in Libya, and the continuation of the war worsens the socio-economic status of Tuareg without a raqm waṭanī.6
The current political and socio-economic situation of a number of Libyan Tuareg could be perceived as a composition of reasons to leave Libya. This research examines what role essential factors such as a structurally marginalised position and an ongoing violent conflict play in decisions to migrate or to stay among Libyan Tuareg. By interviewing Libyan Tuareg about their general life ideas and thoughts on migration, this study aims to get a deeper understanding of crucial dynamics in migration decision-making. This study connects the stories of Libyan Tuareg to various migration theories.
Theoretical approach
Following the outdated but still often-used theoretical model of push and pull factors by Everett Lee, one could assume Tuareg to migrate, as the current situation of many Tuareg can be perceived as a composition of many ‘push factors’.7 Besides, the assumption that violence
and conflict are at the centre of migration within and from the continent Africa dominates the academic and policy literature on contemporary mobility in the region.8 However, research points out that it is crucial to understand migration on a micro-level from the personal
6 Austin Bodetti, “A quiet conflict is raging in Libya's desertic south,” The New Arab, 16 July 2019,
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/7/16/a-quiet-conflict-is-raging-in-libyas-desertic-south?fbclid=IwAR2Er8jQ8_aMUE3L7V5WXUHUNZAUd3Iyu2VWMUj1-j2CSNkpr3h187g12PU. ; Rebecca Murray, “Southern Libya destabilized: The case of Ubari,” Briefing paper ‘Security assessment in North Africa’
and ‘Small arms survey’ (April 2017).
7 Everett Lee, “A theory of migration,” Demography 3, no. 1 (March 1966): 47–57.
8 Oliver Bakewell and Ayla Bonfligio, “Moving beyond conflict: Re-framing mobility in the African Great
motives and aspirations of a migrant that reaffirm their agency.9 This study applies the aspirations/capabilities model to investigate what migration determinants play a crucial role in the decision-making of Libyan Tuareg.10 The aspirations/capabilities model enables not
only to understand why some Libyan Tuareg decide to migrate but also why some decide to stay.
Relevance
This research contributes to the academic fields of Area Studies and Migration Studies in three ways. Firstly, this research provides new insights by addressing the citizenship problems of Tuareg in Libya. Although the Tuareg as a nomadic group have been studied widely, the relatively recent settlement of many Tuareg and the problems this settled group is facing are understudied.11 Secondly, this research will add new empirical data on migration determinants, adding to the literature on migration motives and, more importantly, on aspirations to stay. Thirdly, this research investigates what role citizenship plays in migration decision-making.
Method
This qualitative study is based on semi-structured interviews with sixteen Libyan Tuareg. Respondents are defined as Libyan Tuareg because they either were born in Libya or because they consider themselves Libyan. After conducting the interviews, the respondents were divided into three groups: Tuareg with a raqm waṭanī in Libya (six respondents), Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Libya (six respondents) and Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Europe (four respondents). Most of the respondents were men between the age of 20 and 30 years old. I also interviewed respondents from other age groups, men between 30 and 50, as well as three women in their twenties. The interviews were conducted in April 2020. The respondents were found online through access into two private Tuareg Facebook groups: ṭuwāreq ghadāmes
9 Stephan Castles, “Theories of migration,” in The age of migration: International population movements in the
modern world, edited by Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark Miller (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2014):
37.
10 Hein de Haas, “The determinants of international migration: Conceptualising policy, origin and destination
effects,” International Migration Institute Working Papers Series no. 32 (March 2011): 21.
11 Literature that addresses this issue: Ines Kohl, “Libya’s ‘major minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple
narratives of citizenship, language and border control,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 4 (2014) ; Valerie Stocker, “Citizenship on hold: Undetermined legal status and implications for Libya’s peace process,” Policy paper
European Institute of Peace (July 2019) ; Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn, The Libyan revolution and its aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). ; Rebecca Murray, “Southern Libya destabilized: The
case of Ubari,” Briefing paper ‘Security assessment in North Africa’ and ‘Small arms survey’ (April 2017) ; International Crisis Group, “How Libya’s Fezzan became Europe’s new border,” Middle East and North Africa
and rābiṭa shabāb al-ṭuwāreq / lībiyā. The respondents were interviewed by a video call and through vocal and textual chatting, depending on the access to a stable WiFi connection and the preference of the respondent.
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter one outlines relevant theories and concepts from the migration literature and a short overview of the context of the Tuareg in Libya. In this first chapter an initial connection will be made between migration theory and the case of the Libyan Tuareg. In chapter two, the methodology of the study and its limitations will be described, including an elaboration on rapport, positionality, and the effects of the outbreak of covid-19 on this study. In chapter three, the outcome of the interviews will be presented. This chapter is divided by three paragraphs: Tuareg with a raqm waṭanī in Libya, Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Libya and Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Europe. Chapter four applies the aspirations/capabilities model on the in chapter three presented data. Chapter five discusses three insights related to migration determinants that appeared in this study.
Chapter 1
Connecting theory on migration determinants to the
case of Libyan Tuareg
This chapter starts with a discussion of theories and concepts from the migration literature that will be used to analyse the data. It continues with a short overview of the context of the studied group, the Tuareg in Libya, and will connect this context to the discussed theories and concepts.
1.1. Migration theories and concepts
There are several prevailing assumptions in European societies around migration and Africa, such as that it is directed towards Europe, that the number of Africans migrating is increasing and that migration within Africa is mostly driven by poverty and violence.12 However, research continues to point out that most migration in Africa is intra-continental and that the total intensity of migration in and from Africa has been decreasing in recent years.13 Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that most Africans migrate for family purposes, work or study, as is the case in other world regions.14
Wilbur Zelinsky critically observed the presumed relation between development and migration.15 Zelinsky categorised the economic, social and demographic transitions that take place in societies in different transition stages and connected these transitions with migration. An early transition stage is characterised by low immigration and emigration numbers. Individuals of societies in this type of transition do not have the resources to move. Besides, in this early transition stage, societies do not have strong industries that can attract immigrants. The more a country goes into a development transition, the more emigration numbers will rise. A crucial demographic transition that takes place during this stage is the downfall in mortality rates as a result of better health care. The new demographic number and composition causes many individuals to look for labour in other places. Another crucial
12 Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Hein de Haas, “African migration: Trends, patterns, drivers,” Comparative
Migration Studies 4, no. 1 (December 2016): 1.
13 Flahaux, “African migration,” 3. 14 Flahaux, “African migration,” 2.
15 Zelinsky, Wilbur. “The hypothesis of the mobility transition.” Ekistics 32, no. 192 (1November 1971): 337–
process during this stage is the improvement of infrastructure and financial and social resources that enable people to move. The transition stage that follows is characterised by an equal rate of emigration and immigration numbers. These societies tend to have built up strong industries that attract immigrants from other countries. The mortality rate has dropped, and fertility numbers generally tend to decrease at this stage. However, the effect of a decrease in fertility numbers takes time and is not only impacted by economic transition but also by social transitions. Social processes that contribute to a normalisation of birth control and small family formations are necessary for the demographic transition to continue. In late transitional societies, emigration numbers decrease and societies are characterised by high immigration numbers as a result of these demographic, economic and social processes. The widespread idea that if wealthy countries support economies and societies in ‘Africa’ - in order for these economies to develop - migration from these societies can be halted, is proven to be incorrect. Zelinsky has shown that in reality, the opposite is happening. When a society becomes wealthier, mobility increases as a result of better infrastructure to move and as a result of more availability to financial and social resources that enable people to move.16
Furthermore, the increase in resources also makes people more aware of different possibilities and therefore, generally influences their life aspirations and ideas of ‘the good life’. Aspirations to migrate depend on life ambitions and perceptions of ‘here’ and ‘there’.17 In understanding the development transition theory, it becomes clear that the dynamics of aspirations and capabilities are at the basis of comprehending migration decision-making and migration determinants.
Hein de Haas introduced the aspirations/capabilities model to the migration literature to understand migration determinants. This model examines the general life ambitions and how these intersect with aspirations to migrate. It examines the general capabilities in life and how these intersect with capabilities to migrate. Migration can be a vehicle to fulfil a certain ambition and life aspiration, such as the ambition to study. Besides, migration can be a vehicle to improve one’s capabilities. For instance, individuals can improve their livelihood, and ultimately their capabilities, by travelling to a place with better labour opportunities. The aspirations/capabilities model enables one to look beyond the juridical sections of labour,
16 Stephan Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, “Theories of migration,” in The age of migration:
International population movements in the modern world, Fifth edition. (New York: Guilford Press, 2014): 50.
17 Hein de Haas, “The determinants of international migration: Conceptualising policy, origin and destination
family, student or forced migration. In reality, these categories overlap and individuals move for multiple reasons.18 The division between non-economic and economic drivers for
migration can be useful, but often are aspirations found at the intersection of economic and non-economic drivers. Furthermore, the aspirations/capabilities model recognises both the agency of individuals as well as the social processes that shape migration.19 As discussed above, an individual’s enhanced aspirations and capabilities are subjected to various processes of development.
In conceptualising the aspirations/capabilities model, De Haas used Amartya Sen’s concept of human capability from his book ‘Development as Freedom’.20 Sen defined development as the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy. Human capability is defined as the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value. De Haas perceives human mobility to be an integral part of human development. He defines human mobility as the capability to decide where to live and where to stay. Development enlarges the capabilities of human mobility.
In the context of crisis and wars, the aspirations/capabilities model points out that conflict restricts human mobility. It is crucial to understand forced migration as the result of choices and freedoms of individuals becoming more restricted.21 Perhaps individuals have the desire to stay, but their ability to do so is limited. The aspiration/capabilities model debunks the assumption that conflict is the only driver behind forced migration. Multiple factors influence an individual’s aspirations and capabilities. When conflicts resolve, not all forced migrants return to their original homes, but many settle in their asylum country.22 Besides, not
everyone who is subjected to violence migrates. Conflict and crisis increase the risks and costs of migration.23 Therefore, those with insufficient capabilities become involuntarily immobile.
Oliver Bakewell and Ayla Bonfiglio acknowledge that conflict and crisis do have a crucial impact on mobility and migration decision-making but have challenged the idea that these are
18 De Haas, “The determinants,” 14. 19 De Haas, “The determinants,” 18. 20 De Haas, “The determinants,” 18. 21 De Haas, “The determinants,” 18.
22 Oliver Bakewell and Ayla Bonfligio, “Moving beyond conflict: Re-framing mobility in the African Great
Lakes region,” International Migration Institute Working Papers Series no. 71 (June 2013): 9.
at the centre of understanding forced migration.24 Bakewell and Bonfiglio designed a framework to examine other migration drivers that might be expected to remain when conflicts are resolved.25 This framework focuses on three dimensions: aspirations, norms and
practices. The dimension ‘aspiration’ examines an individual's ideas of the ‘good life’ and their life ambitions.26 The aspirations describe either an individual’s ambition to migrate or ambition that requires migration. In the dimension ‘norms’, one focuses on the norms of the community or society the individual is part of. It studies what customs, values or socially sanctioned rules exist linked to mobility in the society.27 The third dimension ‘practices’ examines what actions people have undertaken regarding migration. The actual migration practices may overlap with or contradict the norms and aspirations.28 These three dimensions help to understand the social processes that drive migration.
Besides the migrationdrivers framework, Bakewell and Bonfiglio proposed to focus on three social processes that have found to be strongly related to migration and mobility in different parts in Africa as well as the rest of the world: education, urbanisation and family formation. “Education may be part of an individual or family’s livelihood strategy, a socio-cultural norm and perceived part of life-cycle development or a part of an individual’s aspiration.”29 Migration is both a cause and a consequence of urbanisation. The emergence of new cities provides new opportunities that draw in new migrants. “Migration to cities may be part of providing for one’s livelihood through gaining employment, attaining higher forms of education, having an urban experience, and gaining access to new information networks.”30 A function of family formation as a driver behind migration can be the economic livelihood strategy.31 Family members migrate to find paid employment elsewhere, and with the
remittances they send back home, they provide for the expenses of their families. 1.2. Context of Libyan Tuareg
The term Tuareg is of Arab origin and has been integrated into German, French and English languages, while the Tuareg call themselves Imuhar in Algeria and Libya, Imajeren in Niger
24 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 10. 25 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 10. 26 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 11. 27 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 13. 28 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 16. 29 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 17. 30 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 19. 31 Bakewell, “Moving beyond conflict,” 22.
and Imushar in Mali and Burkina Faso. There is a lack of a term that encompasses all these groups. Some anthropologists use Kel Tamasheq, but this refers only to those who speak Tamasheq, one of the languages spoken by Tuareg.32 However, a large part speaks Tamahaq,
and therefore this term is not sufficient. Many Tuareg do call themselves Tuareg, perhaps adjusted to the societies that named them Tuareg. Acknowledging the latter and in the absence of a better term, the term Tuareg will be used in this thesis. The term ‘Berbers’, to refer to the indigenous groups of North Africa such as the Amazigh, Tuareg and the Tebu, will not be used. The origin and meaning of this term is considered problematic. The term ‘Berber’ is of external origin and considered derogatory since it derived from the Greek word for ‘barbarian’.33 Besides, the term suggests that Berbers are one group, while the people who are considered as Berber come from different language and ethnic groups. The term can easily be replaced with other language, such as indigenous groups of North Africa.
The Tuareg are a nomadic group of origin and for centuries have been living in North Africa, in the area that is now called Libya, Algeria, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Their history in North Africa goes back to the 4th century. Together with other groups that are now perceived as minority groups in North Africa, such as the Amazigh and the Tebu, they lived in North Africa during different empires. The conquest of North Africa by the Arabs in the 7th century made many Tuareg convert to islam. Until the colonial period, most Tuareg were able to live autonomously.34 The European colonial armies drew borderlines in the land of the Tuareg.35 With the arrival of nation states in North Africa after independence in the 1960s, border controls were intensified. The intensification of border controls made it harder for Tuareg to move between these newly created nation states.36 The desertification of the Sahel and the
increasing drought in the Sahara in the 1970s made life for Tuareg as nomadic pastoralists more challenging. These developments discouraged Tuareg to continue to live as pastoralists resulting in many settling down in the 1970s.37
32 Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl, “Terminology and transcription,” in Tuareg society within a globalized world:
Saharan life in transition (New York: IB Tauris, 2010).
33 Abdelkader Cheref, “Don’t call us Berber, we are Amazigh,” The National, 16 January 2020,
https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/don-t-call-us-berber-we-are-amazigh-1.965334.
34 Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl, “Tuareg moving global: An introduction, in Tuareg society within a globalized
world: Saharan life in transition (New York: IB Tauris, 2010), 3.
35 Fischer, “Tuareg moving global,” 4.
36 Baz Lecocq, “Tuareg city blues: Cultural capital in a global cosmopole,” in Tuareg society within a globalized
world: Saharan life in transition, edited by Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl (New York: IB Tauris, 2010), 56.
The former president Gaddafi is known to have applied a strong assimilation policy that discriminated against the non-Arab groups in Libya.38 For example, non-Arab groups were
not allowed to speak their languages or to give their children non-Arab names.39 Besides, for
many Tuareg it has been difficult to obtain citizenship.40 Although Gaddafi himself came from an Amazigh tribe, he structurally produced a national Arab identity, denying the existence of other groups. In 1980, a new law was issued that changed ‘Libyan citizenship’ into ‘Libyan Arab citizenship’, which demonstrates Gaddafi’s arabisation process of Libyan society even more.41 At the same time, he carried out a pro-immigration discourse. For instance, Gaddafi invited Tuareg from Niger and Mali to move to Libya. He employed various men of the Tuareg in his army, promising to grant citizenship in return. He sent these young men to fight in different wars, such as in Chad and Lebanon.42 The majority of this group failed to obtain citizenship.43
Although in theory, Libyan legislation has offered formal pathways to citizenship, multiple hurdles were imposed through ever-changing laws and regulations that muddled the road for Tuareg to obtain citizenship.44 Gaddafi granted nationality and citizenship in the 1960s to the
majority of those residing in Libya at that moment. Tuareg who define themselves as natives of the land, needed to show documented proof of living in Libya ten years before 1951, Libya’s year of independence, in order to obtain citizenship.45 Under Gaddafi, every Libyan possesed a ‘family book’. The document contained all information on birth, death, marriages and divorces of the members of a household and was the most important document and proof of citizenship for Libyans.46 Many Tuareg were still living as pastoralists at these times and
lacked such documents. Naturalisation was often hindered by favouritism and discrimination
38 Ines Kohl, “Libya’s ‘major minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple narratives of citizenship, language
and border control,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 4 (2014): 427.
39 Kohl, “Libya’s ‘major minorities’,” 428.
40 Murray, Rebecca. “Southern Libya destabilized: The case of Ubari.” Briefing paper ‘Security assessment in
North Africa’ and ‘Small arms survey’ (April 2017).
41 Valerie Stocker, “Citizenship on hold: Undetermined legal status and implications for Libya’s peace process,”
Policy paper European Institute of Peace (July 2019) 7.
42 Delphine Perrin, “Tuaregs and citizenship: The last camp of nomadism,” Middle East Law and Governance 6,
no. 3 (2014): 305.
43 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 6. 44 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 7. 45 Kohl, “Libya’s ‘major minorities’,” 431.
46 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others, “Report Libya: Nationality, Registration and Documents,”
on tribal and ethnic grounds.47 Some tribes were privileged through personal connections with the ruling system. The regime left non-Arab groups sidelined.48
The new digital system that the General National Congress implemented in 2013 deteriorated the situation of Tuareg with undetermined status. The plans for this project started under former dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi.49 Digitising seemed to be essential since the previous system containing different documents was outworn. Besides, with the design of the national identification number system, Gaddafi aimed to expand its domination of border controls.50 The issuance of the new system ensured that those without registered citizenship obtained a raqm idārī (administrative number), which was originally introduced as a temporary number. When stories surfaced of a large-scale citizenship fraud that had taken place in 2011, naturalisation processes halted and left the issue unresolved. In the time of Gaddafi, people without citizenship could work in the public sector and therefore, were able to receive salaries, pensions, subsidised food items and free basic health care.51 With the new digital system, one could only receive these when holding a raqm waṭanī (national number). Especially with the ongoing war in Libya, the living standards of those without a raqm waṭanī have degraded. Furthermore, these people are barred from opening a bank account, owning property, setting up a business and travelling abroad. Since 2011, many cities that are dominated by a Tuareg population, such as Ghadames and Ubari, have faced ethnic wars. A fundamental cause for these wars has been the effect of the national number system on those without a raqm waṭanī.52
Regarding migration and Libya, a few trends should be mentioned to understand what role migration plays in Libyan society. Libya is mostly known as an immigration country with migrants coming in from sub-Saharan Africa and Middle Eastern countries. These migrants either work in Libya in low-skilled jobs facing extreme insecurity, or cross, motivated by the arbitrary conditions they face in Libya, the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.53 UNHCR has not registered Libyans as a group that have crossed the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, UNHCR
47 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 8. 48 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 8.
49 Zaptia, “The new National Identity Number.” 50 Zaptia, “The new National Identity Number.” 51 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 8.
52 Stocker, “Citizenship on hold,” 17.
53 International Organisation of Migration, “Libya,” Countries, accessed on 4 May 2020.
has been registering other North-African citizens, such as Algerians and Tunisians.54 Some Libyans might be migrating by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, but the numbers remain relatively low since UNHCR has not identified ‘Libyans’ at the European Sea border in one of their five past annual reports. Regarding emigration through legal channels, middle and upper-class Libyans are mostly known as ‘medical tourists’ in Tunisia.55 The bilateral government agreement between Tunisia and Libya facilitates Libyans to visit Tunisia without a visa for three months. Furthermore, Libya is known for sending university students abroad to study in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.56 Lastly, as a result of the war that started in 2011, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) identified 348.372 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Libya. IOM states that for most IDPs there is no immediate prospect for a return to original neighbourhoods or cities.57
The war in Libya continues to limit human mobility. It is a complex conflict in which multiple (international) actors are involved. This thesis does not focus on the conflict and will, therefore, not address its conditions and dimensions. However, the ongoing conflict will become visible through the lifes and stories of the respondents and through the unresolved citizenship issues that persist as a result of political instability.
1.3. Tuareg in Libya and migration theory
The aspirations/capabilities model is useful to understand what determinants are behind Libyan Tuareg who wish to migrate or who wish to stay. This model is particularly useful in the context of a group that is split into two different standards of capabilities as a result of citizenship problems. As became clear, Libyans with a raqm idārī have limited capabilities in Libya. Tuareg with a raqm waṭanī have access to legal migration channels and therefore ‘on paper’ have more capabilities compared to Libyans with a raqm idārī. A third group is formed of Tuareg with a raqm idārī residing in Europe. This third group also has restricted capabilities ‘on paper’, but did arrive in Europe, which points out that they had enough
54 See UNHCR annual reports, such as: “Europe refugees & migrant emergency response: nationality of arrivals
to Greece, Italy and Spain - Jan to Dec 2015,” UNHRC, December 2015.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/MonthlyTrendsofNationalities-ArrivalstoGreeceItalyandSpain-31December2015.pdf
55 Rouland, Betty, and Mounir Jarraya. “From medical tourism to regionalism from the bottom up: Emerging
transnational spaces of care between Libya and Tunisia.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (May 2019): 1–16.
56 Nick Clark, “Education in Libya,” World Education News and Reviews, 1 July 2004,
https://wenr.wes.org/2004/07/wenr-julyaugust-2004-education-in-libya.
57 “Libya,” Countries, International Organisation of Migration, accessed on 4 May 2020,
capabilities in order to migrate. The aspirations/capabilities model will be used in chapter four to examine migration determinants relevant to Libyan Tuareg. Chapter four will outline the various aspirations Libyan Tuareg have in life and what role migration plays in their ambitions.
The previously described migration trends in Libya, such as the ‘medical tourism’ or student migration, are of importance to understand what norms around migration exist in Libyan society. Norms are a crucial dimension that influence migration decision-making. Since travelling abroad for educational purposes is a common practice, it is likely that Libyan Tuareg with a raqm idārī who do not have access to study abroad in theory might still aspire to do so. Besides, education is identified as a broader social process that is linked to mobility and migration. Therefore, it would be likely that young Libyan Tuareg would like to move for study reasons. Likewise, as travelling abroad for medical reasons is a common practice among Libyans, it is likely that Tuareg with a raqm idārī aspire such practices. Furthermore, the ungoing war and the gruesome encounters the respondents have had with this war, is likely to play a role in their ideas about mobility and settelement. The study of Bakewell and Bonfligio lays out the theory that in the context of crisis and conflict other drivers play a role in migration decision-making. If Tuareg would like to move as a result of the ungoing war, it is likely that other factors are behind this aspiration.
Chapter 2
Methodology: Interviewing sixteen Libyan Tuareg
during corona
2.1. The inception of the research question
When I was doing fieldwork in Tunisia investigating a different issue related to migration in North Africa, I spoke with a UNHCR official in Zarzis. He stated that Tunisia is going to be an essential migration-related country in the coming decades for four different reasons.58 One was connected to the stateless tribes in neighbouring country Libya that are struggling to receive citizenship.59 He said that “the minute Tunisia is going to grant asylum to one of the Tuareg or Tubu people, that whole tribe is going to move here.” This quote is a perfect example of other prevailing assumptions on migration: an increasing number of people will move when legal migration channels improve. This conversation has been an inspiration to critically investigate the situation of the Tuareg in Libya towards migration.
In the process of understanding the situation of the Tuareg in Libya, I contacted the moderators of multiple private Facebook groups, of whom two replied and gave me access. The names of the Facebook groups made it clear that the members of these groups were Tuareg from Libya: ṭuwāreq ghadāmes (Tuareg of Ghadames) and rābiṭa shabāb al-ṭuwāreq / lībiyā (bundle of youth of the Tuareg / Libya). One moderator replied to my message, and he shared information that led to the formation of my research question. I formulated a research overview that I sent to different members of these two groups in private messages. This overview informed potential respondents on the topic of the research, that the participation was voluntary, and what questions they could expect when participating. When the number of respondents remained relatively low, I posted the research overview and the invitation to participate on the page of the two Facebook groups. The people who offered me their participation seemed grateful that I was interested in their issue and expressed their happiness to help. 60
58 15 March 2020, Zarzis
59 Ines Kohl, “Libya’s ‘Major Minorities’. Berber, Tuareg and Tebu: Multiple Narratives of Citizenship,
Language and Border Control,” Middle East Critique 23, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 423–438.
60 Within the context of colonialism and the continuous ideas of white dominance and white saviourism, this
2.2. Data collection
At the start, I had a specific objective regarding the identity of the respondents. I aimed to select Targi respondents of the same age category (20-30 years old) and a balanced mix of gender. The age category of 20-30 years seemed desirable, considering literature that describes young people as more likely to migrate.61 Young people tend to have less strong social and economic ties with a place, which influences migration outcomes. I was interested to learn if and how this generalisation would apply to young Tuareg in Libya. A balanced mix of gender was desirable, acknowledging that experiences often differ in societies that are structured according to gender. However, these objectives turned out to be unrealistic. It was hard to judge someone’s gender and age online prior to the interview. I perceived it as inappropriate to ‘cancel’ respondents during the interview when I had found out that they did not match my criteria. Furthermore, the data that the older age group presented turned out to be very useful to understand the issue of Libyan citizenship more profoundly and from multiple angles.
As it was unrealistic to select respondents based on predetermined categories, the selection of my respondents has been arbitrary. In total, 36 people sent me a private message after my Facebook post or replied to a private message I had sent them. These 36 people agreed to participate in the study. This study was subjected to a schedule and deadlines, as it is a master thesis. Consequently, I interviewed those who were available the soonest. This caused the selection of the respondents to be arbitrary. Considering the deadlines, I was able to interview 16 respondents in total. The arbitrary selection that led to a diverse group of respondents has been a good reminder that the Tuareg are diverse in civil status, socio-economic situation, and political ideas.
encountered. This reaction can derive from a feeling of being unheard. Human rights organisation such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch are not (yet) advocating for the situation of the Tuareg in Libya. Also, some respondents mentioned the UN as an organisation that has not recognised the problems of Libyan Tuareg, which connects to this feeling of being unheard. Additionally, the problematic idea of the West as a savior of Africa continuous to persist not only in Western societies, but as well in African societies, as explained by the concept of internalised racism. I do not wish to contribute to these problematic ideas, but aim to describe the attitude of the respondents towards the study.
61 Stefanie Kley, “Explaining the stages of migration within a life-course framework,” European Sociological
The idea that a researcher can fully control the selection of its respondents is false. In every study, researchers are dependent on and limited by their own networks. These networks are in itself arbitrary.62 Besides, every researcher is limited by the personal choices of those in the
networks. Even though a researcher would have access to the perfect selection of respondents for a certain study, the realisation of this selection depends on the choice of every respondent to participate.
The diversity of the group of respondents was also demonstrated through access to a stable WiFi connection among the different respondents. I realised that a stable WiFi connection is a privilege. My respondents were the ones who were privileged to have a stable (enough) WiFi connection to have an in-depth conversation and listen to their stories. Also, the respondents who I spoke to had the time to talk with me, which is another privilege not all Libyan Tuareg have. In some cases, the lack of time was the reason why I could not interview them more extensively. For example, two young men who are employed in the UN-recognised government’s army were online at occasional moments, often in the middle of the night. We were able to communicate through voice messages and text messages. Still, the extent of the interview and data remained limited.
The volume of the interviews, that I conducted in April 2020, differ between the respondents. Twelve respondents were interviewed extensively, which means either a video call of around one and a half hour or a chat conversation of more than five hours. The aim was also to interview the four remaining respondents as extensively as the other twelve. Due to different reasons, these interviews were less voluminous. I decided to include these interviews because of their valuable contents.
All interviews are conducted in a mix of dialectal Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic. Although this language is ambiguous regarding the Tuareg, as discussed in chapter one, it is a language all respondents speak and can express themselves in. Often code-switching to European languages, such as Italian and French, took place within the language of the respondents living in Europe.
62 Candea, Matei. “Arbitrary locations: In defence of the bounded field‐site.” Journal of the Royal
2.3. Method and research techniques
This study characterises a qualitative method since the research question focuses on the personal ideas and experiences of individuals. A quantitative method would not be appropriate because these personal ideas and experiences are not measurable in numbers and cannot be fully understood in a survey. A qualitative method can help to understand the profundity of ideas and experiences and how they relate to different topics, because with this method the researcher can ask follow-up questions. I used semi-structured in-depth interviews to get an understanding of these personal ideas and experiences. Semi-structured in-depth interviewing is the most suitable option for this research. First of all, this method enables deviation from the initial question and subsequently the gain of more information and understanding towards a respondents personal ideas and experiences. Besides, due to my intermediate level of Arabic, it is crucial to ask questions from different angles about a certain issue to make sure I understood without a doubt a respondent’s attitude towards a certain topic. I structured a topic list with different subjects and potential questions that I asserted during every interview. For instance, I asked all respondents to describe Libyan culture, what the effects are of the national number system, who are Libyans, if they ever considered migrating and what their ideas on the future are.
I recorded the video calls and translated all the interviews. I have anonymised the names of the respondents, using Arabic names for respondents with Arabic names and Targi names for those with Targi names. I transcribed the spoken citations I wanted to use in chapter three according to the Encyclopedia of Islam the Third Edition (EI3). The respondents articulated several dialectal phonemes, such as the g instead of the q in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) or the s instead of th. These phonemes remain in the transcription. Regarding the textual conversations, respondents seemed to make many spelling mistakes, if one considers the standards of writing in MSA. I have not corrected these assumed mistakes, because they could also be manifestations of dialectical Arabic expressed in Arabic writing.
2.4. Data analysis
I used qualitative content analysis to analyse the translated data.63 My approach was a combination of a conventional and a directive content analysis. A conventional approach is
63 Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah Shannon, “Three approaches to qualitative content analysis,” Qualitative Health
generally used to describe a phenomenon that appears from the data.64 A researcher does not employ a certain theory, but tries to understand what themes seem to exist. In this study this approach was crucial to write chapter five, where I describe three themes that appeared from the data. By applying a directive content analysis, a researcher uses an existing theory that exists about a phenomenon.65 This approach was employed to write chapter four, using the aspirations/capabilities model. I analysed the translations by first reading them from beginning to end, as one would read a novel. Subsequently, I read every translation more thoroughly and collected the sentences that applied to the aspirations/capabilities model, which I sorted in a document. For instance, if respondents would express any desires for the future, or express any ideas on their abilities in life, I would collect this sentence and put it in the document. I frequently returned to the data to understand the context of the selected sentences. Framing the different sentences and organising ‘profiles’ of every respondent was helpful to have a quick overview of the answers of the respondents, instead of having to go through the data that often was around nine pages per respondent.
Researchers who make case study generalisations have encountered criticism.66 It is
inappropriate to generalise the data of a case study as a universality. Using Karl Popper’s example of swans, one cannot state after observing a group of swans that “all swans are white”. When someone finds a black swan, this observation is prostrated. I do not generalise the stories of my respondents as representative for all Libyan Tuareg. I cannot determine the scope of the different discourses the respondents articulated. However, just as likely as it is that there will be a swan of a different colour, it is likely that another white swan will come across.67 In this study, I will make use of controlled generalisations. It is likely that the
discourses articulated by my respondents will be articulated by other Libyan Tuareg. 2.5. Rapport
There is a power imbalance between my respondents and me, of which I am aware. It made me realise that this research should have been conducted by a Libyan Targi(yya). Pertaining to the situation of the Tuareg in Libya, I am an outsider: I do not know how it is to live as a
64 Hsieh, “Three approaches to qualitative content analysis,” 1279. 65 Hsieh, “Three approaches to qualitative content analysis,” 1281.
66 Lee Peter Ruddin, “You can generalize stupid! Social scientists, Bent Flyvbjerg, and case study
methodology.” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 4 (August 2006): 806.
marginalised group in a country that has been facing a violent conflict for years now. I am a white European woman, living in the wealthy and stable Netherlands. This country is a relatively safe country towards me, since I am not part of a marginalised group but belong to the dominate group in Dutch society. Besides, regarding the problems around migration and the Tuareg, I am an outsider as well. As a Dutch passport holder, together with my whiteness, I can travel wherever and whenever I want. This power imbalance is something my respondents are well aware of and has influenced the level of rapport I could build up. I have asked my respondents about their personal stories that sometimes have been traumatic. I can imagine that the respondents would open up more to an insider than an outsider.
In order to create an online safe place to build up rapport between the respondent and me, I offered the choice of the interview options to the respondent. The respondent could choose to be interviewed by video call, voice call, voice chatting or textual chatting. While some respondents explained their preference for textual chatting as a result of their unstable WiFi connection, others did not explain why they preferred a certain interview option. On the one hand, conducting online interviews can be dire for building up rapport with respondents. On the other hand, there is a chance that respondents felt more ‘anonymous’ and ‘safe’ to communicate online instead of face to face. It is remarkable that respondents through chatting more often ended up in a situation of storytelling rather than simply answering the question. In contrast, respondents that were interviewed through a video call more often responded exclusively to the posited question. I assume two reasons why respondents seemed limited through video calling to narrate outside of the posited question. Within the video call, the respondents were faced to face with a stranger and felt less anonymous, since their face was also beamed. Besides, the level of my Arabic is relatively higher in reading/writing than in listening. Therefore, I was more often interrupting during video calls than during textual conversations, which obstructed a possible storytelling situation.
Every interview option required a different approach to build up rapport. In a video call, respondents were able to hear my voice and see my face, which contributed to building up rapport. I always started the interview with an informal conversation. I started with an introduction of myself as an Arabic student from The Netherlands who studies migration. I often asked about the situation of the coronavirus in the respondent’s place, as this is a topic that concerns us both and the exchange of our experience with the pandemic stimulated a connection. Throughout the conversation I made jokes if appropriate - for instance, I used lots
of self-deprecation regarding my Arabic with a Dutch accent -, expressed compassion if necessary and gratitude for the respondents time and effort to talk with me. As for respondents who were interviewed through chatting, I often sent voice messages in the beginning to connect the ‘stranger’ whom they met online to a voice, and perhaps, therefore, a feeling of trust. I hoped respondents interpreted this voice as friendly and safe. I have not asked the respondents if they experienced it as such. Although I expected online interviews to be arduous to build up rapport, I have detected some benefits of online interviewing and building up rapport. For example, within textual conversations in Facebook, a user can reply to messages with emoticons. I have aimed to use as many emoticons as appropriate to highlight my compassion and understanding. Besides, respondents often added me as a friend on Facebook and were able to see pictures of me with my family or friends, which might have encouraged rapport.
I have noticed that connecting to respondents who are similar to my age - I am 26 years old at the time of writing - was relatively easy compared to respondents in a different age group. Especially my identity as a ‘student’ was often a shared identity or something that connected me with respondents. These respondents often called me ‘my sister’, which I understand as something common to say in Arabic to women who are not necessarily your sister. However, if they would have experienced our conversation as highly formal and unsafe, I do not think they would have adressed me with this term. To me, at the moment respondents would call me sister, I felt that a certain level of trust had been established and I felt desexualised. Therefore, when a respondent would call me ‘sister’, it suggested that a safe place was established for both the respondent and for me.
I have felt that it was harder to make a connection with the respondents from an older age group. For instance, one of the respondents from an older age group asked me halfway during our textual conversation if I was working as a lawyer at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. It felt like he did not trust me. When I told him I was not, and just a student, he sent me a picture of the organisation Movement Against Discrimination: Libya Unites Us, of which one of my respondents is its spokesmen, and asked me what this is. I explained to him that this was the work of one of my other respondents and that I ask different Tuareg the same questions as I asked him. After this moment, this respondent told me that he is a supporter of Gaddafi. In light of the ICC prosecution of the son of Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, he might have felt the need to check who I really am. Whether or not
his question about my identity is related to his support for Gaddafi, this question pointed out a certain suspicion towards me and perhaps that he did not completely trust me.
2.6. Positionality
The previously discussed position as an ‘outsider’ to the research, has also influenced the interpretation of the data. As an outsider, I miss certain background knowledge that an insider does possess. This lack of background knowledge has affected the way I interpreted the data. On the one hand, I might have overlooked themes that arrived from the data that an insider would have noticed. On the other hand, as an outsider I might have considered the data from a perspective that an insider would not have perpended.
Although I am an outsider to the context of Libyan Tuareg, I do argue that in a way I am involved with the situation in Libya and around the Mediterranean Sea. The unstable situation in Libya is influenced by foreign actors, among them European actors. I have always presented my research question to potential respondents embedded in the argument that people in The Netherlands and Europe should learn about the situation of Libyan Tuareg. On the one hand, this argument was a way to build up rapport, by showing compassion to their situation. On the other hand, this argument shows my positionality towards this issue. After the colonisation of Libya, the establishment of the Kingdom of Libya was a result of efforts from foreign actors, among those the Dutch UN officer Adriaan Pelt. Gaddafi has tried to keep foreign actors out of the land and the continent of Africa but, since his ouster, foreign actors are interfering in Libya more than ever before. Besides, the European Union is partly responsible for the so-called ‘migration crisis’ that is taking place on the Mediterranean Sea and on the coastal countries. This crisis has been used as a fuel for anti-migration discourses to flourish in the European public debate. I have opposed this anti-migration discours for years. I have studied migration and consider migration as a ‘normal’ social phenomenon. Such as that the economy is regarded as a ‘normal’ social phenomenon, so should migration be considered. It is from this position that I have collected and analysed the data of this study. I can imagine that researchers who place themselves different within the ‘migration debate’ would have interpreted the data differently.
I have contemplated on how my gender has affected this research. Many male respondents have expressed their awareness of my gender which sometimes complicated the interview. Some male respondents considered it acceptable to discuss their marriage problems, their
sexual experiences or requested pictures of me. I have never tolerated this behaviour to secure the research relationship. A few male respondents replied to the question where to they would consider to migrate to by saying The Netherlands, knowing I live in The Netherlands. I discarded this answer and never took this answer seriously. My positionality as a Dutch woman may have provoked this response, rather than it being a genuine wish from the respondents themselves. Perhaps if I had been a man, I would have had different answers, or I would have felt secure to pose a follow-up question to such an answer.
There seems to be a tradition of researchers viewing and describing their informants as ‘friends’.68 Driessen has outlined this tradition and criticised this description and the relationship researchers have had with their informants. She claims that understanding the relationship as a researcher with an informant as friendship suggests wrongfully some sort of equality.69 While researchers need to employ a set of social skills, such as empathy, understanding, tolerance, patience, humour, friendliness and others, it is crucial not to mistake the relationship with a respondent as friendship. The power imbalance is, for instance, manifested in the fact that a study improves the researchers situation, while it does not improve the situation of the respondent. All the more: participating in a study can sometimes endanger a respondents situation. Besides, describing the relationship with a respondent as ‘friend’ unravels a definition of friendship as merely a connection of taken-for-grantedness the respondents are is not paid for their participation. It conceals the complexity of cross-cultural friendship and its intersection with race, gender, nationality, education, class and age.70
During this study, I have struggled and reflected on my contact with the respondents. Respondents shared personal stories to me and offered me lots of their time, so that I will acquire me my master title and help me to graduate. I have been aware of this power imbalance and tried not to mix up the level of trust built up during the study with friendship. However, some respondents confused my employment of social skills to acquire information as friendship. Some respondents asked me lots of details of my private situation, which seems fair since I asked a lot of the same questions to them. I have also received messages in where respondents, when the study was finished, expressed their disapointment in me for not
68 Henk Driessen, “Romancing rapport: The ideology of ‘friendship’ in the field.” Folk 40 (1998): 123–136. 69 Driessen, “Romancing rapport,” 129.
staying in contact. Besides, I have received a few messages from respondents regarding migration after the study was finished. I realised that for some respondents, I can be perceived as a capability. I am an extension to their social networks, and reasoning from this social concept, could be helping them to achieve their life goals. At the start of the research, I communicated that participating in the study is entirely voluntarily, and respondents cannot expect anything in return. However, although I presented myself as a master student conducting research, I am still human and therefore, part of the social situation the interview in essence was. This makes me sensitive to the needs of the respondents. I will continue to reflect on the relationship between my respondents and me.
2.7. COVID-19
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in February 2020 inspired the topic that I have studied. Originally, I had only gone through one week of fieldwork in Tunisia investigating a different issue related to migration when I had to return to the Netherlands due to the closure of Tunisian and Schengen borders. I did not acquire (enough) data to continue with my original plan. However, the conversation with the UNHCR official mentioned earlier encouraged me to investigate the issue of the Tuareg in Libya.
The COVID-19 pandemic affected what methodology I have used. Since I did not have any physical access to Libyan Tuareg respondents, I had to contact them online through the two Facebook groups. This had both positive as negative impacts on the data collection. On the one hand, online interviewing is not necessarily the best method. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic had forced many respondents to stay at home and stop working or studying. The respondents had time to chat with me. Therefore, the long afternoons of online chatting could not have taken place if the COVID-19 pandemic did not come about.
The timing to ask questions on migration motives, when many countries have closed their borders and the mobility of many people is dismissed, seemed a bit inappropriate. It is unclear in what way the increase of limited mobility as a result of the pandemic has influenced the answers. Perhaps respondents have answered more pessimistic regarding migration possibilities since human mobility worldwide has been restricted.
The COVID-19 pandemic has limited my access to literature on Tuareg available in the university libraries. All libraries have been closed for a few months in The Netherlands. This
has reduced the volume of background information that I was able to read. Especially regarding the context of Tuareg in Libya, most of the information was found in books that were not available online. However, I have been able to receive some crucial books in pdf from researchers I contacted. Regarding migration literature, many studies have online open access. This research finished after some libraries opened up, which allowed me to have access to some other literature.
Chapter 3
Setting the scene: Marginalisation and migration
This chapter presents the outcome of the interviews with the respondents. The respondents are subdivided in three groups: Tuareg with a raqm waṭanī in Libya, Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Libya and Tuareg with a raqm idārī in Europe. Quotes that were withdrawn from textual interviews are presented in Arabic writing, and quotes from video/voice calls are presented in transcription according to EI3. Many respondents were often both interviewed through video calling and textual chatting. Therefore, these two types of writing are intertwined in the text.
3.1. Tuareg with a raqm waṭanī in Libya
Mohamed
Mohamed is the moderator of one of the Facebook groups and was the first Targi I spoke with. He is 26 years old and studied political science. After the outbreak of an ethnic war in 2012 in his hometown Ghadames, Mohamed was forced to leave together with many other Tuareg. He settled in the valley of Awal. There were no buildings in this valley yet and they had to set up houses, schools and shops. When I asked him about the situation in Awal he answered: تﺎﻣﺰﻠﺘﺴﻣ ﺺﻘﻧ ﻦﻣ ﻲﻧﺎﻌﻧ ﻦﻜﻟ ﻦﯿﯿﺒﯿﻠﻟا ﺔﯿﻘﺑ ﺎﻛ ﺶﯿﻌﻧ ﻲﻨﻌﯾ ضﺮﺘﻔﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ يﺬﻟا ﺔﯿﺤﺻ ءﺎﻣ و ءﺎﺑﺮﮭﻛ و ﻖﻓاﺮﻣ ﺔﻜﺒﺷ ﺪﺟﻮﺗ ﻻ ﺔﯿﻣﻮﻜﺤﻟا تﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣ و ﯿﻏ ﺐﺒﺴﻟا ﺔﯾﻮﻗ حﺎﯾر ﻒﯾﺮﺨﻟا ﻲﻓ و دﺮﺑ ءﺎﺘﺷ ﻲﻓ و ةراﺮﺤﻟا ﺪﺘﺸﺗ ﻒﯿﺼﻟا ﻲﻓ بﻮﻨﺟ ﻲﻓ ﻊﻘﺗ ﺔﻘﻄﻨﻣ و ﺎﮭﯿﻨطاﻮﻤﻠﻟ ﻲﻋﺮﺷ ﻖﺤﻛ ﺔﻟود ﺎﻨﻟ ﮫﻣﺪﻘﺗ نا ﺮ ﺔﻨﺳ ﻲﻓ نﻻ فوﺮﻌﻣ 2013 ﻟا ﻦﻜﻟ ءﺎﺑﺮﮭﻛ ﻞﯿﺻﻮﺗ نﺎﺸﺑ ﺪﻘﻋ كﺎﻨھ راﺮﻘﻟا ﺖﻐﻟأ ﺔﻣﻮﻜﺤ
I mean, we live like the rest of the Libyans but we suffer from a lack of supplies and governmental institutions. There is no network of public utilities and electricity and healthy water, which the state is supposed to offer to us as the legitimate right to its citizens. The region located in the South gets in the summer very hot, and in the winter cold, and in the autumn there are strong winds. The reason is unknown, because in the year of 2013 there was a contract for an electricity connection, but the government cancelled the decision.
و ﻲﻔﺸﺘﺴﻣ و سراﺪﻣ و تﺎﺴﺳﺆﻣ و ﻦﻛﺎﺴﻤﻟ جﺎﺘﺤﻧ تاﺪﻋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ ﺮﯿﺜﻜﻟا جﺎﺘﺤﯾ لاوأ نﺎﻜﺳ ﮫﺸﯿﻌﯾ ﺎﻣ ﻦﻜﻟ ﻂﻘﻓ لاوآ ﺲﯿﻟ ﻲﻧﺎﻌﺗ ةﺮﯿﺘﻛ نﺪﻣ كﺎﻨھ ﺻ ءﺎﺑﺮﮭﻛ و هﺎﯿﻣ ﺔﻜﺒﺷ و تﻼﺋﺎﻌﻠﻟ تﺎھﺰﻨﺘﻣ و لﺎﻔطﻼﻟ ﺐﻋﻼﻣ و ةﺪﺒﻌﻣ قﺮط نوﺪﯾﺮﯾ ﻻ سﺎﻨﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ كﺎﻨھ ﺎﻤﺑر ﺔﺣاﺮﺻ فوﺮﻌﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ ﺐﺒﺴﻟا ﺔﯿﺤ
ﺔﻨﯾﺪﻤﻟا ءﺎﺸﻧإ There are a lot of cities suffering, not only Awal, but what the residents who live in Awal need, is a lot of support. We need housing, institutions, schools, hospitals, paved roads, playgrounds for kids, parks for families and a working water and electricity network. The reason is unknown. To be honest, maybe there are some people who do not want the formation of the city.
Mohamed has a raqm waṭanī that enables him to travel abroad. He would like to study or travel abroad to explore the world. However, the war has frozen all the grants the government gives to students that would like to travel abroad. He currently does not have a job, so he is
