Kuhn’s Universal Theory of Scientific Revolutions: The Case of Biology
Julia van Doorninck, 10776117Wijsbegeerte, Universiteit van Amsterdam
BA-project: Philosophical perspectives on the sciences Supervisor: dhr. dr. L. M. Verburgt
23 June 2017 Word count: 7450
Abstract
Kuhn’s theory describes the structure of scientific revolution mainly by analysing physics. The question remains whether this theory is as universal as he claims. We will see that biology fits some aspects, but according to practising biologists Kuhn Structure of Scientific Revolutions is not able to describe the gradual transitions between theories, which is characteristic within the science of biology. Also aspects of theory formation and theory acceptance seem to differ between physics and biology and this discrepancy is used to argue against the applicability of Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions within biology. It is important to address the aspects of Kuhn’s theory and biology that cause friction and resolve those frictions with a detailed analysis of Kuhn’s initial theory, in which he discusses a lot of special cases that enables the theory to be applicable in a broader scoop of scientific practices. Kuhn himself tried to include, rather than exclude, the biological practice within his theory. I will analyse Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions within the practice of biology to understand whether the developments and practice of modern biology can be described by Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution.
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn is one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers of science. With his book The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) he established a theory that described the development of science through revolutions; the structure of scientific revolutions (SSR). Before Kuhn the structure of science was described as a cumulating process, but based on his experience in physics he started criticizing this process and finally replaced it with his structure of revolutions. In the first chapter I will elaborately discuss Kuhn’s theory and argumentation. In Kuhn’s theory of scientific development, a paradigm is a body of beliefs that enables the normal practice of science to conduct detailed
research. In the course of detailed research discoveries are made that cannot be described by the paradigm. If the paradigm is no longer able to sufficiently describe nature and there is a new paradigm that might describe nature more accurately, a paradigm switch occurs. This changes the scientific world and gives rise to new scientific inquiries.
Kuhn explains his theory mainly through physics, this raises some doubt about the universality of the theory. Physics is a science that is based on causal reactions that can be known and
universalized in a theory. In order to see if a theory resulting from physics can be universally applied, we need to analyse if the theory is also applicable to scientific fields that are faced with a more complex forms of causality. Biology is a science that mainly studies changing subjects that can rarely be reduced to physiochemical components. A reduction like this would refute a great part of the discipline and insufficiently describe the biological world of living organisms that change and interact with each other and the world around them. Ernst Mayr, Richard Strohman, Adam Wilkins and Stephan Gould have argued against the applicability of Kuhn’s SSR within biology. In the second chapter I will discuss their arguments to show the problems that present oneself if the SSR is used to describe the biological development and I will clarify the distinctions between biology and physics to gain a more profound idea of the possible mismatch between Kuhn’s theory and biology. Two cases will be analysed to display the discrepancies that have occurred between the actual development of biology and Kuhn’s description of this development. Not only within the development, but also in the practice of biology mismatches can be found between Kuhn’s SSR and biology. Within the biological practice, theory formation appears to be more complicated and maybe even impossible compared to physics. This theory formation plays a big part in the emergence of a paradigm and could be a crucial discrepancy, which makes the applicability of Kuhn’s SSR within biology impossible. All those discrepancies form a strong argument against Kuhn’s universality. Kuhn, however, has been very accurate within the physical sciences and I belief this makes it important to revisit the criticism and investigate the legitimacy of the arguments. If the theory of Kuhn is applied universally, we have to determine whether this application is legitimate and answers profoundly to criticism from the opposing group of scientists.
In the third chapter, I will analyse all these arguments, concerning the friction between Kuhn’s theory of scientific development and biology. In the defence of Kuhn’s universal applicability I will formulate a solution to the postulated problems. Kuhn describes a number of special cases that broaden the scoop of his theory. With the addition of those cases the fit between Kuhn’s theory and biology will appear more appropriate than the biologists make it appear.
1. Kuhn’s Theory
To say something meaningful about the universality of Thomas Kuhn’s theory we need to gain a profound understanding of his argument. Kuhn (1962, pp. 2-3) argues against the cumulative structure, within this structure science covers only the theories that contribute to the contemporary sciences. This would mean that a rejected theory cannot be categorized as science. In this cumulative structure is the prestige of a rejected the same prestige a myth, meaning that we cannot distinguish a myth from a rejected theory. Kuhn states that this would mean that a myth and science can be obtained in the same manner. He argues against this possibility and replaces the structure of accumulation with his structure of scientific revolutions (SSR).
Kuhn analyses the sciences historically and concludes that a paradigm is a requirement for the scientific practice. A paradigm commits scientists to the same set of rules and standards within the scientific practice. This provides the methods used in the analysis of a phenomena and determines a standard set of phenomena that have to be employed by the scientist. This is essential to scientific practice, otherwise, scientists would talk alongside each other (Hoyningen-Huene, 1990).Without this set of rules, there would be no agreement on the properties that form decisive argumentations. Kuhn (1962, pp. 48) states that a discipline becomes scientific when the first paradigm is adopted, before this paradigm a discipline is in a pre-scientific stage. Within this stage, the practice is not scientific and all scientists follow there own set of rules, meaning that there is no agreement on methods or phenomena that have to be employed. One scientist focusses on one phenomena and forms a conclusion, while another scientist might not acknowledge the importance that phenomenon. A pre-scientific stage produced as many theories as there are scientists. The pre-scientific debate in this period is not about content, but about the fundaments of the scientific discipline (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 201). This debate cannot be solved by facts, because there is no agreement on their meaning.
As describes above, the beginning of every scientific practice is initiated with the adoption of the first paradigm. Paradigms are the result of a scientific achievement that ‘was sufficiently
unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 10). In the beginning a paradigm has to be
explanatory power of the paradigm and with that convince the other academics to adopt this set of rules. This paradigm enables scientists to formulate a theory, which makes it possible to formulate a hypothesis. This hypothesis can be tested and the findings can be explained with the initial theory. The science that is based on at least one scientific achievement that was sufficiently unprecedented and open ended is normal science. Kuhn describes that, in the beginning a paradigm is not completely explanatory and is mainly a promise of a successful description of nature. “Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself.” (Kuhn 1962, pp. 24) Scientists are committed to the paradigm and devote their academic career to the actualization of that paradigm, this enables scientist to practice science in a more detailed manner and focus their research on a relatively small and predefined variety of problems. The paradigm enables the scientist to assume fundamental facts and this generates room and time to create more profound knowledge on detailed phenomena that are described or predicted by the paradigm. This detailed research would be unimaginable without the paradigm to surface those research cases and their essence because the understanding of those phenomena correlates with the resilience of the paradigm (Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 203).
During this more detailed investigation, novelties present themselves to the scientists and those novelties cannot always immediately be explained with the apparatus that the paradigm provides. If the paradigm appears unable to align the phenomena with the paradigm, a novelty becomes an anomaly. Within the normal scientific practice, scientist does not look for anomalies, but they often present themselves. Anomalies are often not discovered, because the scientists do not know what to look for. A paradigm enables the scientist to practice science, but also limits the possible perspectives that the scientist can adopt towards a phenomenon. These restrictions are caused because a paradigm does not only supply the research field with structure, it also influences the scientist's entire mental ability and worldview; it determines what one sees when looking at a phenomenon and it determines the explanation that can be connected to that phenomenon. This alteration of worldview means that, often, the scientist does not recognize an anomaly. The scientist places the anomaly in the world view and because of that world view, the scientist is unable to visualize all properties of the anomaly. This way anomalies accumulate within normal science, understood as a fact that can be described by the paradigm. Even if an anomaly is recognized, a practising scientist wants to stay loyal to a paradigm because that paradigm forms the foundation of the scientists work. The scientist will try to resolve the anomaly within the paradigm. If this proves to be impossible the problem will, often be set aside, to be revisited if there is more distinct knowledge or when there are more improved
techniques to research the problem within the paradigm. Only if this second option is no longer maintainable will the scientist be forced to deeply question the methods and theories supplied by the paradigm. At this point the anomalies often concern foundational facts or phenomena that are
unexplainable within the paradigm. The awareness of anomalies shows that the expectations of the paradigm do not match nature. Scientist needs to be aware of other anomalies and their world view needs to be slightly altered to start doubting the paradigms accuracy. In this case, a new theory or discovery can give rise to a new paradigm, which can lead to a discharge of the paradigm by a small group of scientist that start to favour the new one. The process of the replacement of a paradigm is a scientific revolution; a paradigm is never abandoned without a proper replacement. Most scientists will not be easily convinced to abandon their paradigm for a discovery without an equally, or better, suited new theory or paradigm. It is the task of a small group of scientists to investigate their new discovery, articulate a theory and broaden their explanatory scope of nature.
Kuhn specifies this period, during which normal science is replaced by revolutionary science, as a scientific crisis. Within a crisis two paradigm exist side by side. Kuhn states that two paradigms describe ‘different worlds’. Kuhn’s concept of changing worlds does not mean that the natural world we look at changes, but that the world that is examined by the scientist changes (Kuhn 1962, pp.121). This changing of the scientific world causes incommensurability between scientists from different paradigms, because both scientists refer to a different world. Often, different paradigms use the same concepts for a different phenomenon. Kuhn uses the concept of light to illustrate this
incommensurability that emerges between two paradigms. Light was previously seen as illuminating particles, but this concept of light was later described as a wave. Both theories use the word light for different things, which makes it impossible for scientists to understand and convince each other. Like scientists without a paradigm to guide them, scientists in crisis tend to talk alongside one another, because of the incommensurability between those two different worlds (Hoyningen-Huene, 1990). The problem of incommensurability makes it impossible to resolve a scientific crisis with factual
understanding, because there is no agreement in the meaning of specific facts. The paradigm shift is further complicated by the absence of knowledge regarding the new paradigm. In the beginning, there are a lot of undefined aspects within the new paradigm, because there has not been a period of detailed normal science to gain a more profound understanding of the world. The new paradigm might give a better explanation concerning some phenomena but in its early stages it will not be completely explanatory (Kuhn, 1962 pp.82; Hoyningen-Huene, 1990). The incommensurability and the absence of profound understanding of the paradigm, make it impossible to choose a theory based on logic, because there is no factual basis on which the choice can be established. It is, however, necessary that the paradigm choice occurs; otherwise science would fall back in the stage of pre-science. This choice often occurs after a new discovery, which confirms one of the paradigms. This will end the scientific crisis and complete a revolution. Kuhn states that even in the final case it is not a logical choice, and the opponents can never be accused of being illogical for staying loyal to the old paradigm.
In Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions disciplines are established by the adaptation of the first paradigm. After this adaptation a discipline is able to cumulate knowledge within normal science, which also will surface novelties that cannot be explained by nature. These novelties will alter the
world view of scientist and make the emergence of a new paradigm possible. Although, these novelties will never be strong enough to refute the paradigm without proper replacement. Based on new discoveries and amplifying acceptance of the new paradigm, a scientific revolution could be realized.
2. The Uncomfortable Fit Between Kuhn and Biology
Kuhn explains his theory mainly through physics. Due to this unilateral analyses, a few biologists have been hesitant to adopt Kuhn’s explanatory theory of the development of science (O’Malley &
Boucher, 2004). We need to clarify the distinctions between biological and physical disciplines and identify the consequences of those differences regarding Kuhn’s theory, to see if the theory can be universally applied. In the previous chapter, we saw that a paradigm shift causes our world view to change and gives rise to a new ‘normal’ scientific practice which legitimizes this more detailed normal science. In this chapter, I will discuss two cases in which a misfit between historical facts of major biological theory changes and Kuhn’s theory of scientific development is discernible. Furthermore, I will analyse the differences between the practice of biology and physics, to understand the emerging friction when a philosophy of science is applied to both biology and physics. These two cases and de investigation in practice will describe the criticism against the adaptation of Kuhn’s theory within biology. We need to know the exact criticism against Kuhn, to answer to those criticisms and defend Kuhn’s SSR in the final chapter.
I will discuss two major changes that determined the biological practice of today. Both those changes are not properly described by Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, according to Adam Wilkins (1996) who reviewed the biological development in accordance with Kuhn’s SSR. The first change occurred in the field of evolutionary biology and followed from Darwin’s investigation on the Beagle in 1838. Before Darwin, the prevailing notion of evolutionary biology was a linear progression of evolving organisms, assuming that every evolutionary step brought forth more complex organisms. Supposing that multiple lineages originated separately over the ages. The evolution of humans started before the evolution of bacteria, both will follow the same trend, but did not started simultaneously. This prevailing notion assumed two important things that were later refuted by Darwin: evolution moved toward complexity and evolution is a linear trend with multiple distinct origins of life.
Evolutionary Biology
Darwin stated that the evolutionary trend was branched instead of linear, due to external and internal condition the same species adapted to differed natural aspects and finally divided into two distinct species, causing an exponentially accelerating diversity of organisms. If this branch is traced back to the beginning, we can assume that there is one moment of origin from which all live arose, the Last
Universal Common Ancestor. Besides the assumption of life’s origin, Darwin’s theory differed from the previous notion concerning the direction of evolution. In the previous model, we saw that
evolution moved towards more complex beings, in Darwin’s theory evolution occurred randomly and without any form of direction, due to natural selection. Due to natural conditions, like the environment or predation, the best-fitted organisms were selected, this is natural selection. Natural selection causes the evolvement of species to be truly circumstantial; the best fit at that time takes advantage, which refutes a goal of complexity.
According to Wilkins and Mayr, two aspects of this transition do not fit Kuhn’s structure of scientific development; “In its dynamics, if not in its eventual impact, Darwin’s revolution does not fit the Kuhnian picture” (Wilkins 1996, pp. 696). I will fist consider the dynamics of this biological transition in relation to Kuhn’s SSR. The dynamic described in SSR is bound to be accompanied by a steady and rapid increase of adherent scientists, this aspect was missing within the transition towards Darwin’s theory of evolution (Wilkins, 1996). This could be deduced from Kuhn’s statement that “a transition between two paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. …, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instance) or not at all.” (1962, pp. 149). The biological transition did not occur accordingly. Wilkins (1996) states that the transition occurred more gradually, there was no division between scientists and only after profound
investigation was the entire theory accepted within the discipline of evolutionary biology. Ernst Mayr is a very influential 20th century’s biologists concerned with the modern theory of evolution. Mayr
(1998) states in his book, This is Biology: The Science of the Living World, that there are two explanatory theories that claim to describe the development of science, the Kuhnian structure of revolution and the Darwinian structure of evolution. Mayr (1998) argues that there is no room for gradual transitions within Kuhn’s conceptual framework, because Kuhn describes development as a fundamental shift that, although paired with resistance, is based on the scientists’ strong belief in the new paradigm. This strong believe leads to a choice of paradigm before a logic and neutral experience. This belief is drastic and reforms the entire world of the scientist. Again, the process of theory
acceptance within the evolutionary biology proceeded slowly and gradually. According to Mayr, the biological development is best described with an evolutionary notion. This notion means that the struggle between alternative views can advance sciences, characterised by variation and selection. The variation is caused by the reasoning of scientists who adhere to a theory and selection follows from the best fit to the scientific world. Mayr and Wilkins both argue that the transition towards Darwin’s theory of evolution did not proceed according to Kuhn’s SSR. The theory of evolution changed the view in two ways, as described above.
The second claim of Wilkins states that the impact of Darwin’s theory of evolution does not match Kuhn’s claim of fruitfulness. The aspect of natural selection has been ignored for a long time. Natural selection is distinctive for Darwin’s theory and also relates to the slow transition, described above. It refuted the goal of complexity and with that refuted our position of superior beings; humans
were no longer the final stage, but a merely random occurrence caused by natural selection. This aspect of Darwin’s theory was distinctive and critical for the revision of the evolutionary biological practice. Natural selection was, however, not adopted for a long time. In this period of time Darwin’s theory postulated no new research problems and did not form a fruitful base to biological science. If the discovery of natural selection is not appointed to Darwin, the transition to Darwin’s theory only contains the transition from a linear to a branched system. This transition is merely a rearticulating of the possibility of organism diversity, which can merely be appointed to normal science. The taxonomy of living things did not change and Mayr’s (1998) concludes that Darwin’s theory only served as a legitimization for the practice that was already practised. The mere impact of Darwin’s theory shows that one of the biggest changes in biology was not fruitful to normal science, in the way Kuhn’s theory of scientific development requires. Both the lack of fruitfulness and the mismatch between the
dynamics of biology and the dynamics described by Kuhn’s SSR result in a legitimate criticism against Kuhn’s applicability within biology.
Molecular biology
The second scientific change that I will discuss occurred in 1953, with Watson and Crick’s discovery of the chemical structure of DNA. This postulated an entirely new research program within
microbiology. This new DNA construction could explain many of the questions that remained unanswered before. Unlike the evolution theory, the chemical structure of DNA was accepted by an extended group of scientist, the theory was fruitful and the transition was fast. However, during this revolution, there was another discrepancy with Kuhn’s structure of development that caused the rejection of this explanatory theory of development within biology. The new theory of DNA could not refrain itself from a previous paradigm; “there was no clear theory of the gene’s inner workings; there was only a theoretical vacuum.” (Strohman 1997, pp. 194). Strohman emphasises on Kuhn’s claim of crisis and states that a paradigm switch is almost never without the resistance of scientists who favour a competing paradigm. The reason for this is that their entire scientific inquiry is based on this previous notion of the world, something that should not be refuted in an instance. Kuhn states that the strong belief enables the scientist to perform detailed investigations, if this belief could be refuted in an instance the entire scientific practice would not be able to gain profound knowledge about detailed subjects, which would make science impossible. In the case of Watson and Crick, scientists had no previous belief to hold on to and the theory was accepted without resistance. This also caused the absence of incommensurability, since there was no different world, only a new one, there were no concepts that had different meanings within different paradigms. Mayr (1998) elaborates on those arguments and emphasises that the lack of incommensurability is a critical mismatch with the Kuhnian theory because this incommensurability shows that there is a fundamental change that breaks with the world as it previously was experienced. Watson and Crick discovered something that had been beyond reach for a long time, but it was widely accepted that DNA had to be constructed from smaller pieces
that coded for characteristics of organisms. The discovery confirmed the prevailing thought and with that legitimised further detailed investigation.
Mayr, Strohman and Wilkins all conclude that Kuhn’s theory is of importance within the more mathematical disciplines, but state that biological development does not occur through revolutions; Kuhn’s theory cannot describe the structure of biology. Wilkins and Mayr argue for a separate philosophy of biological science to describe the practice properly, because Kuhn’s theory is not universal and cannot describe biological development. These historic facts show discrepancies between biological transitions and Kuhn’s SSR, other biologists state that the practice of biology and physics is fundamentally different, meaning that not one philosophy of science could possibly describe them both properly. Before I examine the differences between the two practices, it is important to state that Kuhn does not make a normative claim about the practice of science, so a distinction in practice would in the first place leave Kuhn’s theory unharmed. Nevertheless, these differences have further consequences that do relate to the applicability of Kuhn’s theory. Mayr (1998), states that the absence of universal laws makes it impossible to apply Kuhn’s theory of development within biology. In the first chapter, I have described that laws and theories can be essential to the formation of paradigms; paradigms, for their part, are essential to the development and practice of science. Within the practice of biology the theory formation appears more complex and this causes difficulties when Kuhn’s SSR is applied on the biological practice.
Theory formation
The problem we address here is not the manner of theory formation, but the possibility of theory formation. Biology is a science studying change, in the broadest sense the evolutionary changes and on a smaller scale the changes inside a population, species or individual. This changing character complicates theory formation and problematizes the discovery of underlying universal facts, which again is essential to the emergence of paradigms in Kuhn’s structure of science.
Based on the biological practice, Stephan Jay Gould and Mayr refute the entire possibility of theory formation within biology. They claim that biology differs from physics in the origin of the studied subjects which creates a fundamental difference between the practice of the two disciplines. Within physics, theories are postulated on the basis of causal relations (Mayr, 2004). This causality enables the scientist to constantly return to a former state and legitimately assume an equal reaction each and every time. From this repetition one can distinguish correlations. The identifications of these correlations can lead to the isolation of the components that are involved. Enabling the scientist to isolate the parts of a phenomena. This reversibility enables the scientist to isolate components and relations between components. This leads to the formation of theories and the possibility to test those theories. The biological practise studies changing subjects that interact with each other, leading to a research problem that always occurs in relation to something or someone. Gould and Mayr state that
the subject matter that is investigated within biology is more complex than within physics, but they define this complexity in a different way.
Mayr states that physical sciences are described with the answers to “what?” and “how?” questions. This is sufficient for the explanation of physical phenomena. However, biological explanations are not complete without the answer to the additional “why?” question. According to Mayr, biology is the science that describes the ultimate causality, and the why-question is necessary to describe the underlying causality of biological phenomena. Mayr (2004) describes the answers that follow from the question “why?” as teleonomic explanations. These explanations concern goal-directed processes that are caused by a subject that originated from evolution; teleonomic explanations are only appropriate regarding animate objects. The question “why?” is not meaningful regarding inanimate objects, like seasons. Seasons are used by humans to grow crops, but it is not the goal of a season to do so. The answer to the question why a season occurs is the movement of the earth, which is actually the answer to how seasons occur (Ayala, 2004). Contrary, a wing of a birth clearly evolved with the purpose to fly, the question how a wing occurred and why it occurred will generate a different answer. The additional question is meaningful because the animate objects interact with the
surrounding inanimate objects (Ayala, 2004). This interaction between animate an inanimate produces something, not a substance, but ‘the interaction’ itself. According to Mayr (2004), this emergence is an empirical principle, without a metaphysical foundation, meaning that there is no distinction of
relations possible to uncover the isolates components. All components compose each other and cannot be studied outside of the phenomena. This makes it impossible to unite all discovered data of
corresponding phenomena within a universal law, because the data is only meaningful within the phenomena itself. The complexity of the biological phenomena results from the emerging interactions, that cannot be described by a universal law.
Gould explains the complexity of biological study objects on the base of Dollo’s law. Dollo’s law focuses on evolution and concludes that complete structural reversal of complex forms is
impossible. This reversal is impossible because it requires an organism to retrace an extremely large number of steps in the same order and with great accuracy. All those steps belong to an individual and cannot be separated, according to the law of Dollo. Within biology the studied object is animated and is in constant interaction with its surroundings. The animate objects learns from situations and is able to alter the inanimate objects in its surrounding. This results in the requirement to retrace each and every step leading up to the phenomena of interest and this is required for each and every case. This collection of essentially unique phenomena cannot be translated into a universal law because no single cause can be appointed as the origin of resembling complex effects (Gould, 1970). Within physics however, the studied subject can be abstracted to expose the individual components of a phenomena, because the steps that occur during a reaction can be distinguished and retraced. Although, some reactions are equally irreversible within physics, all components can be known and the universal underlying facts can be discovered. Thus, Mayr argue for a separate philosophy of biological science
to describe the practice properly, because Kuhn’s theory is not universal and cannot describe biological development.
Gould states that the complexity within biology transpires from the untraceable amount of steps leading to the studied animate objects. Mayr describe the complexity of biology resulting from the emergence of interactions, that cannot be described by metaphysical laws. This complexity restricts discoveries to the phenomena itself and prohibits a broader understanding of those discoveries in different, but similar, phenomena. The discoveries lose their meaning beyond the time and place of the specific phenomena, meaning that they have no universal applicability. Discoveries are, however, only translated in a universal law is there is a universal underlying fact that can be appointed as the cause of all phenomena that follow from that law. Gould’s and Mayr’s argumentation leads to a biological science that describes as many laws as there are phenomena, and with that no meaningful laws at all.
As stated above the ground of physical theories is causality. This causality makes it possible to distinguish the individual aspects of phenomena from the intermingled phenomena. These individual properties follow from a universally applicable theory, vice versa the theory can be seen within the properties. The causal reaction that is found within physics has meaning beyond the phenomena itself, while within biology the causal reaction is only applicable to that specific phenomenon. Biology examines essentially unique subjects that cannot be described by a universal norm or theory. Thus, the practice of biology and physics is fundamentally different, meaning that not one philosophy of science could possibly describe them both properly (Mayr, 2004). Kuhn’s concepts of fruitfulness,
revolutionary dynamics and paradigm choice show discrepancies with the biological sciences, which make that the universal applicability of Kuhn’s SSR is an ambiguous claim. In the next chapter I will elaborately discuss possible responses against the criticism from the former biological scientists.
3. What Remains
If the theory of Kuhn is applied universally, we have to determine whether this application is legitimate. The criticisms of the biologists in the second chapter vouch for a separate philosophy of biological sciences. This division was argued for based on the concepts of fruitfulness, revolutionary dynamics and paradigm choice. The criticism also related to the differences between the practice of biology and physics, which problematizes the theory formation within the biological sciences. It is necessitated to formulate a proper response towards these criticisms. In this chapter, I will react to the criticisms postulated in the previous chapter to defend the universality of Kuhn’s SSR. Like chapter two I will start with the two cases in which the descriptive power of Kuhn’s theory was questioned and I will proceed to reply to the argument of theory formation.
Evolutionary biology
In line with Kuhn’s theory, two anomalous cases would probably not be sufficient to refute an entire set of beliefs that has been a good representation of the scientific development. The scientist that believes in the paradigm is bound to defend the paradigm by trying to explain the novelties within the paradigm. I will start with the discrepancy of dynamics, between Kuhn’s SSR and the transition within the evolutionary biology. The transition from pre- to post-Darwin developed in a gradual manner and became more profound and elaborate over the years. Darwin’s theory was postulated in its final form in 1872 within The Origin Of Species (Shettleworth, 2010). This started the debate with other theories of evolution. This debate is evident to the description of a crisis. A small group of scientist, Gray, Hooker, Huxley and Lyell, adopted Darwin’s theory of evolution and started explaining the world from this new perspective. The finalization of the paradigm shift, however occurred in 1942, when Huxley combined the theory of evolution with the discovery of Mendel (Shettleworth, 2010). This discovery explained the inner workings of genetic inheritance and confirmed Darwin’s theory. The confirmation of a new paradigm often occurs with a new discovery, this is both seen in practice and in Kuhn’s SSR. In the intermediate time multiple paradigms existed side by side, unable to communicate and convince one another which is also in conformation with Kuhn’s theory.
This transition was long lasting and Mayr and Wilkins correctly state that the dynamics described by Kuhn is an in instantaneously process. However, Kuhn also describes that a successful paradigm shift is a process that depends on the long slope leading towards that specific moment. In this period scientists need to become aware of anomalies and change their world view to cope with the new theory and alter their world view. “If awareness of anomaly plays a role in the emergence of new sorts of phenomena, it should surprise no one that a similar but more profound awareness is
prerequisite to all acceptable changes of theory” (Kuhn 1962, 67). Kuhn states that a paradigm switch is instantaneously, because of the incommensurability of paradigms, causing scientist to see different things when they look at the same place. Theories and phenomena are not joined and cannot be explained between paradigms. To communicate with each other the alteration of the perspective has to be accomplished, resulting in a conversion of paradigm. A paradigm shift has to be instantaneously, because there is no communication, one can only understand a theory if the paradigm joint with the theory is adopted. But this adaptation relates to a scientist and not to the entire practice. Kuhn states that often older scientist never adopt the new paradigm, because their live work and entire scientific believe is located within the old paradigm. Therefore, we can conclude that the dynamic of
instantaneous adaptation from Kuhn is compatible with the gradual transition of evolutionary biology; the claim of Kuhn relates to the individual scientist and does not exclude a long lasting period of scientific crisis.
Within the previously described transition within evolutionary biology two discrepancies were found; the previously described dynamics and the eventual effect of the theory. The eventual effect was claimed to be unsubstantial regarding the fruitfulness concept of Kuhn. Kuhn states that a new
paradigm has to provide the normal scientific practice with new research phenomena, perspectives and methods. Mayr stated that this was not the case with Darwin’s evolutionary theory in respect to taxonomy. Taxonomy is the science that investigates relations among species and tries to categorize those species. Mayr is right to suggest that this discipline should be affected by a new structure of evolution, in addition, I am convinced that it did. Before Darwin, the assumption was a linear line of evolvement, Basically this comes down to the evolvement of an insect from a bacteria and a human from an ape. The genealogy would be widely influenced by this aspect of Darwin’s theory. Genealogy in concerned with the descendants of species and for a genealogical tree and this discipline altered its entire practice. The fruitfulness of a new paradigm can differ in extent, it is not required that the entire practice of biology is influenced by a revolution. Subdisciplines can remain unchanged, if that part of the paradigm is not of essence to the scientific practice. Multiple disciplines could follow the same paradigm, but still each discipline has its own ‘interpretation’ or use for the paradigm and only a small part of the paradigm is essential to the practice of a subdiscipline. In the beginning, the theory of evolution might not contribute to the entire practice; for a fact it did influence the genealogical mapping of species and later, after Darwin and Mendel’s theories where combined it also influenced the taxonomy. This new insight in species emergence meant a revision of species specification and categorization. The presumed lack of fruitfulness can be refuted because first genealogy and later taxonomy were most definitely influenced. Thus, the instantaneous dynamics as well as the eventual fruitfulness can be captured within the transition towards Darwin’s theory. Therefore, the transition within evolutionary biology is perfectly compatible with the SSR of Kuhn.
Molecular Biology
The second major shift in biology showed a lack of crisis. The theory of Watson and Crick filled a vacuum within molecular biology. The critics could be correct by stating that it is scientific revolution, but they are incorrect if they claim that it forms a misfit with Kuhn’s SSR. The case of Watson and Crick just describes a different aspect of Kuhn’s theory. In the case of Watson and Crick, the notion of a coding chemically based molecule that determined the characteristics of humans was widely
speculated. With the discovery of Watson and Crick scientist gained a working theory that made theory formation and hypothesis formation possible. The discovery gave rise to a scientific practice where there had not been one before. The discovery of the chemical structure of DNA formed the first paradigm within the microbiology and made scientific inquiries in this discipline possible. Although it is no revolution, the case is described within Kuhn’s SSR and illustrates a special case all scientific discipline passed through at some point in history.
According to the biologist the major changes within evolution and molecular biology showed tree misfits with Kuhn’s SSR, the dynamics, the eventual fruitfulness and the necessary period of crisis. Aster a close analyzation of the cases and of Kuhn’s theory it turns that this misfit is not a
decisive argument against Kuhn’s applicability. All cases can be described within the theory and do not qualify as anomalies; the SSR describes them appropriately.
Theory formation
In the previous chapter Mayr and Gould formulated their objection regarding the applicability of Kuhn’s SSR on the biological practise on the basis of fundamental differences between the practice of physics and biology. This fundamental difference could still refute the universality of Kuhn. I will now elaborate on this difference. More specifically; the difference in theory formation. I will suggest that difficulty in formulating specific metaphysical rules that describe all complex and unique phenomena in biology is not necessary within Kuhn’s SSR. An understanding of abstract rules is enough to bind the scientists to a paradigm and prevent crisis.
Theory formation within biology is more complicated in comparison to physics, according to Mayr and Gould. Within biology the answer to “how?” and “what?” questions are not sufficient enough to explain the complete properties of a biological phenomenon. Mayr stated that it is necessary to additionally ask, and answer, the question “why?”. This question explains the goal-directed process and the underlying causality of animated objects. An important aspect of the animated objects that are studied within biology, is the interaction with each other and the surroundings. This interaction is an empirical fact without a metaphysical foundation. Universal theories have to address this metaphysical foundation to postulate a claim that is meaningful beyond time and place of a specific phenomenon. According to Mayr this interaction cannot be understood on the basis of a theory. Gould makes the distinction between biology and physics based on the possibility of reversibility. He states that biological phenomenon can never completely return to their former state, because an enormous amount of steps would have to be securely followed. Even if this would be possible, no single cause could be appointed as the origin of all complex effects and the discoveries would only be meaningful within this special case. It is impossible to collect data if discoveries are only meaningful within a specific circumstance. Without data collection, every circumstance would require an unique law that is only applicable to that circumstance. The irreversibility and impossible universalization make theory formation impossible within biology, this could mean that Kuhn’s theory in incompatible with the biological sciences.
We can state that biology is concerned with complex phenomena that have complex
intermingled components, unique phenomena and interactions that cannot be reduced to metaphysical laws. Mayr and Gould state that these distinctions between physics and biology make it impossible to assemble a philosophy of science that described both sciences. Previously we have seen two cases that can be described according to Kuhn’s SSR. However, In Kuhn’s SSR, theory formation plays an important role in paradigm conformation, elaboration and reformulation. Theories make it possible to formulate expectations, which fulfil the task of a hypnotises. A hypothesis is required for investigation and analysation within normal science. Within the SSR, a law or theory is postulated as a concept that
arises within a paradigm and enables a scientist to practice science, often by providing a set of rules. Within Kuhn’s SSR this set of rules is not necessarily a full set of rules. This gives room to a paradigm that is not substantiated by a metaphysical theory to subscribe strict universal rules.
Kuhn follows Wittgenstein’s argumentation of abstract categorizations to illustrate the possibility of abstract rules, instead of a full set of rules. He states that a scientists does not need to know what the rules are, the scientist merely needs to be equipped to use them properly. Kuhn refers to Wittgenstein’s argumentation that describes our understanding and use of words. If we are using the term ‘chair’, we do not need to know all the characteristics of the chair. “Wittgenstein, …, concludes that, given the way we use language and the sort of world to which we apply it, there need be no such set of characteristics. Though a discussion of some of the attributes shared by a number of …chairs… often helps us learn how to employ the corresponding term, there is no set of characteristics that is simultaneously applicable to all members of the class and to alone them.” (Kuhn 1962, pp.45). The difficulty of identifying a set of characteristics that belong to a world and that word only, shows that there is no full set of characteristics available. This difficulty also arises if a full set of rules within a paradigm has to be identified. Even without the profound knowledge of these rules science can be practiced successfully, like we can successfully use the term chair. ‘Paradigms could determine normal science without the intervention of discoverable rules’ (Kuhn 1962, pp.47). Another reason to assume the possibility of abstract rules is illustrated in the education of the scientific practice.
Concepts within science are never learned in the isolated form but always in relation to the application of the rule.
Within biology there is a difficulty in formulating specific metaphysical rules that describe all complex and unique phenomena. It is, however, possible to form a working theory to enable the practice of a scientist. This shows that although there is no full set of rules that subscribes the
biological practice, there is an understanding of the abstract rules. This understanding is discernible in the ability to perform successful scientific research.
The abstract rules do not demand metaphysical theory formation and could still sufficiently bind biologists to a paradigm and prevents chaos and crisis. Therefore SSR of Kuhn can also be applied within biology, a practice without metaphysical laws.
Conclusion
Kuhn’s theory has provided the scientific world with a profound understanding of the development of science. Even though the Structure of Scientific Revolutions is mainly focused on the practice of physics, it appears to be applicable to the biological practice as well. The theory is resilient against criticisms postulated from a biological point of view and repositions itself as a universal theory. Kuhn postulates a description of the scientific development, not a normative claim of this development. This makes the theory compatible to a broad scope of disciplines that practice science in a variety of ways.
The end of this prevailing notion has not been commenced by the biological scientists. Fortunately, because Kuhn saw great similarities between his theory and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Both scientist have explained the world as we know it and this world is still to be further explored; “-What must the world be like in order that man may know it?-…it remains unanswered. Any conception of nature compatible with the growth of science by proof is compatible with the
evolutionary view of science developed here. Since this view is also compatible with close observation of scientific life, there are strong arguments for employing it in attempt to solve the host of problems that still remain.” (Kuhn 1962, pp.172)
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