Working title: Wisdom comes with ages? A research about the Dutch asylum policy over the last twenty years and the effects on the lower levels of administration.
Name: Kirsten van Adrichem Student number: 11064854 Supervisor: Doomernik
Course: Politics of International Migration and Asylum Date: 24-06-2016
2
Preface
What can change in twenty years? This research answers this question with: a lot. In the last twenty years the Dutch asylum policy made some big changes. Not only because of the influence of Europe but also from the influence of lower levels of administration. On the different level there was a restriction of the policy, while on the other level there was an opening up of the policy. Central in this research is the effect of these changes on the lower levels of administration (provinces and municipalities: did they got more tasks? Or did they lose some? This effect is being researched with a liberal paradox: is there more Europeanization or decentralization? Another theory used in this research is a paradox between the restriction of the asylum policy and an opening up of the policy. With a timeline from 2006 till 2015 the author describes the changes of the asylum policy on three four levels: the European level, the national (Dutch) level, the level of the Dutch provinces and the level of the Dutch municipalities. The choice has been made to research the asylum policy in the Netherlands because these lower levels of administration.
This research concludes that Europeanization actually only happens on a national level. Europe has (almost) no effect on the lower levels of administration. The role and influence of the lowest level of administration, the municipalities, has become bigger in the last twenty years. And that while the province has a minimal task in the Dutch asylum policy. The opening up of the asylum policy can mostly be found on a European level, while the national level restricted the asylum policy.
3
Table of contents
1. Introduction 7
1.1 Definition of the problem 7
2. Literature review 9
3. Theory 10
3.1 Europeanization versus decentralization 11
3.2 Restriction versus opening up 12
4. Methodology 15 4.1 Conceptualization 15 5. 1996 – 2000 18 5.1 Europe 18 5.2 National level 25 5.3 Province 29 5.4 Municipalities 30 5.5 Conclusion 32 6. 2001 – 2005 33 6.1 Europe 33 6.2 National level 37 6.3 Province 46 6.4 Municipalities 47 6.5 Conclusion 52 7. 2006 – 2010 52 7.1 Europe 53 7.2 National level 56 7.3 Province 61 7.4 Municipalities 62 7.5 Conclusion 63 8. 2011 – 2015 64 8.1 Europe 64 8.2 National level 66 8.3 Province 80 8.4. Municipalities 81 8.5 Conclusion 85
4
9. Concluding remarks 86
9.1 The future? 87
10. References 89
5
Abbreviations
Ama Alleenstaande minderjarige asielzoekers – single minor asylum
seekers
CD Centrumdemocraten – Extreme right party
CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl – Christian Democratic Party
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COA Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers – Central organ for the
reception of asylum seekers
CU ChristenUnie – Christian Union, Christian party
CRvB Centrale Raad van Beroep – The Administrative High Court
D66 Democraten ’66 – Democrats ’66, social liberal party
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECSR European Committee of Social Rights
EP European Parliament
ESF European Social Fund
ERF European Refugee Fund
EU European Union
FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging – Federation of Dutch
unions, largest labour union in the Netherlands
GL GroenLinks – GreenLeft, progressive environmental party
IMA Informatie- en Meldpunt Asiel – Information and Hotline for
Asylum
IND Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst – Immigration and
Naturalization Service
INLIA Internationaal Netwerk van Lokale Initatieven voor Asielzoekers – International Network of Local Initiatives for Asylum seekers
IpO Interprovinciaal Overleg – Interprovincial Council
JHA Department of Justice and Home Affairs
HLWG High level working group
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn – List Pim Fortuyn
MP Member of the Dutch Parliament
MEP Member of the European Parliament
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid – Dutch Labour Party, socialist party
PvdD Partij voor de Dieren – Party for the Animals
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid – Party for the Freedom, populist party
RPF Reformatische Politieke Federatie – Reformed Political
Federation, protestant-Christian party
RvS Raad van State – The Council of State
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij – Reformed Political Party,
reformist and Christian party
SP Socialistische Partij – Socialist Party, socialist (and Eurosceptic)
party
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UvW Unie van Waterschappen – Union of Water authorities
VDG Vereniging Drentse Gemeenten – Cooperation of Drents
6
VFG Vereniging Friese Gemeenten – Cooperation of Fries
Municipalities
VNG Verenigde Nederlandse Gemeenten – Cooperation of Dutch
Municipalities
VROM Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer – Ministery of Housing, Spatial Planning and
Environment.
VVD Volkspartij voor de Vrijheid en Democratie – Party for the
Freedom and Democracy, liberal party
VWN VluchtelingenWerk Nederland – Refugee Help Netherlands
VZG Vereniging van Zeeuwse Gemeenten – Cooperation of Zeeland
Municipalities
WODC Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum –
Scientific Research and Documentation Centre
7
1. Introduction
Currently Europe is facing a large stream of migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea. According to FRONTEX, the EU external border control agency, approximately 1.8 million refugees crossed the European borders, often in danger of their own life1. Since the previous big stream of migrants there were made a lot of changes in (asylum) policy on the European mainland. This last big stream of migrants lasted from approximately 1988 till 1997. In this period there were almost 2.3 million asylum applications in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom alone (Schuster, 2000: 122). This stream finds its origin in the Bosnian conflict, the Kosovo crisis and the war in Afghanistan (Thielemann, 2004: 49). Since that time there were a lot of changes in laws and policy to contain the numbers of migrants that were travelling to Europe. These changes occurred as well on the European level, as the national level of the European states.
In this thesis one European state will be researched: the Netherlands. The reason for this choice is that the Dutch asylum policy can be one of the strictest asylum policies in the EU.2 In this particular case I will look at the reason why the asylum policy has changed in one European state: the Netherlands. Currently in the Netherlands (and actually whole of Europe) the inflow of asylum seekers is a big issue, not only in politics but also in society. Lower levels of administration are getting more and more tasks in the Netherlands in different areas due to decentralisation. But on the other hand there is Europeanization, tasks are being transferred from a national level to an European level. For this thesis I have chosen to research the lower levels of administration because they not only have to deal with the national policy, but also with the European policy.
1.1 Definition of the problem
There is a huge gap in the literature when we are looking at the current stream of migrants. A lot literature focuses on the stream of migrants between 1988 and 1997, which led to a huge number of publications from 2000 till 2006. The current gap can be partly explained with the facts that the current stream is still ongoing and there isn’t a very good overview of exact numbers and data on the stream of migrants traveling to Europe. But still, a comparison can
1 BBC, 18-02-2016. Available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911> (checked on
09-03-2016)
2
Nu.nl, 04-02-2016. “Asielbeleid Nederland hoort bij strengste van EU-landen. Available at
<http://www.nu.nl/algemeen/4208989/asielbeleid-nederland-hoort-bij-strengste-van-eu-landen.html> (checked on 21-06-2016)
8
be made between the current stream in migrants and the one between 1988 and 1997, especially when we are looking at the changes that happened between the current stream of migrants and the stream of 1988-1997. This change in asylum policy is having a huge effect on the national policy and politics in the European states. If we look to the Netherlands, this effect goes all the way down until the lowest level of administration, the municipalities. There is some literature about the effects of the change of asylum policy on the national level and the level of the municipalities, but almost none on the level of the provinces. One of the reasons to write this thesis is to identify these changes and how the role of these actors has changed since the migrant stream of 1988-1997. Central to this subject is to identify the reasons why this policy has changed.
The changing role of politics is also playing a part in this effect. Since the large big stream of migrants there was (and still is) a rise of populism, not only in the Netherlands, but all over Europe. This populism in politics often changes the debate about refugees and migrants, not only on the national level, but also on the lower levels of administration. There is some literature by Van Selm about the role of politics and government on the changing asylum policy in the Netherlands (Van Selm, 2000). Also some specific cases that are looking into the asylum and migration policy in the Netherlands underline the role of politics in this debate. Especially the rise of politician Pim Fortuyn with his new political party Lijst Pim
Fortuyn (LPF) has a central role in the debate about politics, but also the rise of Geert Wilders
(Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011: 147; Fekete, 2005: 70; RMO, 2011: 21).
There is not only a gap of literature in the current gap, but there also isn’t an overview of what happened since the previous inflow of asylum seekers. Since that time a lot has changed but there isn’t a clear timeline of what happened where, when and why. With this thesis I want to establish a clear timeline of the changes made in the Dutch asylum policy. I hereby use the European level, the national level, the provincial level and the level of the municipalities.
The main question in this thesis is:
“Why has the asylum policy changed in the Netherlands in the last twenty years and what was the effect of these changes on the different levels of administration?”
Through the use of secondary data, such as news articles from Dutch newspapers and information from different institutions, this research question will be answered. Next to that I will conduct interviews for extra information. This thesis will follow the next planning. In
9
chapter 2 there will be a literature review that focuses on the way different authors see restrictive measures taken in the field of asylum. In chapter 3 the theory will be presented. The used theory will be two paradoxes. The first paradox is the one between Europeanization and decentralisation. The second paradox is the one of the restriction and opening up of the asylum policy. In chapter 3 the first five years, from 1996 till 2000 will be researched. In chapter 4 the next five years will be researched, from 2001 till 2005. In chapter 5 the years 2006 till 2010 will be researched. In chapter 6 the last five years will be research, from 2011 till 2015. In chapter 6 I will place my concluding remarks on the research question and how I and others are seeing the future of the asylum policy of Europe, the Netherlands, and the lower levels of administration.
2. Literature review
In the last twenty years there were a lot of different measures in the asylum, immigration, and integration policy. For most parts, these measures can be found in three areas: (1) the area of
access control policy; (2) the area of determination procedures; and (3) the field of integration policy. The access control policy refers to the rules and procedures that are
governing the admission of foreign nationals. Measures in this field are the tightening of visa policies, regulations for carriers and safe third country provisions (Thielemann, 2004: 54). The rules of the determination procedures have also been made more restrictive. Measures in the area included the operation of countries’ refugee recognition system, appeal rights, and rules concerning subsidiary protection. The integration policy has been tightened to toughen up the asylum regimes in the European states (Thielemann, 2004: 54). This meant that rules concerning the rights and benefits given to asylum seekers inside a country of destination have been made restrictive. Examples of this rights and benefits are work and housing conditions, rules on freedom of movements, welfare provisions and educational opportunities (Thielemann, 2004: 54). These policy responses have their own effect on the European states and lower administrative levels.
Koser (2001) makes another distinction in the restrictive measures taken. First of all, a distinction can be made between policies that impact indirectly upon the migration of asylum seekers (Koser, 2001: 90). According to Koser there is a range of policies aimed at preventing the arrival of asylum seekers, like the demanding of a visa, the promotion of “safe-havens”; and carrier sanctions. But, at the same time, other policies have resulted in increasing
10
restriction upon asylum seekers once they have arrived in Europe, for example, concerning access to the refugee procedure, or access to state welfare. The aim of these measures is to make the receiving countries less attractive (Koser, 2001: 90-91). A second distinction can be made between policies that are aimed to affect the scale of asylum migration and other policies aimed at changing the spatial distribution of asylum migration. For example, the shifting responsibility for dealing with asylum applications to other countries, or the closure of channels for resettlement (Koser, 2001: 91).
Hatton uses three dimensions for the tightening of the asylum policy. The first was the tightening of border controls through measures such as carrier sanctions, border patrols, and the introduction of special airport zones (Hatton, 2012: 7). These measures were backed by the escalation of visa requirements. The second dimension was in the procedures that were used to determine whether or not an applicant would gain refugee status. Third, there was a toughening in de conditions asylum seeker faced during the process of their application (Hatton, 2012: 7-8)
While there were restrictions of the asylum policy in Europe and Members States, there was also an opening up of the European asylum policy. To achieve a more stable and equal distribution of asylum seekers, European policy makers have turned to policy-harmonisation to achieve these objectives (Thielemann, 2004: 47). The sources of possible gains to cooperation between states are reducing costs and uncertainty, minimising the deflection of asylum applicants, and honouring international obligations (Hatton, 2012: 3) Because of the European integration most European countries have lost the significance of their territorial borders. Mobility in the Schengen area (the European Union’s Member States minus the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Romania and Ireland and plus Norway and Switzerland) had practically no bound (Doomernik, 2014, 259). Moving in and between European countries has been made easier (RMO, 2011: 15). The locus of asylum policy has shifted away from national governments and towards the EU as the Common European Asylum Policy has developed (Hatton, 2012: 1)
3. Theory
In this theory part two important paradoxes will be treated. The first one is a paradox between Europeanization and decentralisation, Europe is becoming one of the biggest policy players, but lower levels of administration also got more tasks from the central governance. The other
11
paradox is the one of the restriction and opening up of the asylum policy, which fits in the liberal paradox. The first paradox can be seen on a vertical line, the second paradox on a horizontal line. The idea of the Europeanization versus decentralization focuses on the why part of the research question: has the policy changed because the EU got more power in the field of asylum? Or did the policy change because many roles and tasks went to the lower levels of administration? Or is this Europeanization or decentralization one of the effects of the change policy? The restriction or opening up of the policy can be seen as the changes that are made on the different levels and how this affects the European level or the lower levels of administration.
3.1 Europeanization versus decentralisation
The policy of lower levels of administration is becoming more and more influenced by European policy and laws. It is become more Europe, and less national level, that influences policies on the level on the province and municipalities, on different policy terrains like environment, nature, and immigration (ROB, 2013: 7). The Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG), the Interprovincial Council (Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO), and the Union of Water authorities (Unie van
Waterschappen, UvW) stated that: ‘Europe has become interior for lower levels of
administration, the arena of The Hague has been extended with the arena of Brussels’ (ROB, 2013: 9; VNG, IPO & UvW, 2013: 6). An important concept for these lower levels of administration is Europeanisation. The political scientist Peter John defines Europeanization as ‘a more fundamental transformation that goes beyond short-term instrumental behaviour, whereby local policy-making becomes an aspect of the EU, and European ideas and practices become transferred to the core of local decision-making’ (John, 2001: 73; ROB, 2013: 22). John makes a distinction between minimal, financially orientated, networking and fully Europeanized (figure 1). Activities from A to C are minimal, this are activities such as responding to compulsory regulations (John, 2001: 72). The lower levels of administration don’t follow what is happening in Europe, the idea these levels of administration have is that they are ‘too small’ to be actively in European developments (ROB, 2013: 23). Steps A to E are associated with a search for European funding. According to John, money is one of the most important reasons for lower levels of administration to engage themselves with Europe (John, 2001: 72; ROB, 2013: 23). The stage of networking (steps A to G), is closely associated with the stage of the financially orientated one, but involves more exchanges of ideas (John, 2001: 72). The different levels of administration find contact with others and
12
participate in international networks and projects (ROB, 2013: 23). When councils start to incorporate European ideas in their own policy they are completely Europeanized (step A to I) (John, 2001: 72). However this idea of ‘Europeanization’ is an older one, it is still applicable to this moment. While the Europeanization idea is a more centralized version of the effects of policy, or the opening up of policy, decentralisation goes the other way around. In this way it is more of a top-down approach.
An important part in the flow of policy is decentralization: the distribution of tasks and duties. There are two forms of decentralization: territorial and functional decentralisation (Raijmakers, 2014: 18). With functional decentralization there is a transfer of duties to an institutional organ that is responsible for a certain function, like the Dutch waterschappen. Territorial decentralization happens when tasks are being transferred to a political or administrative organ that is responsible for a territory, like provinces or municipalities (Raijmakers, 2014: 18). One of these decentralized policies is the asylum policy, this decentralization fits in the territorial decentralization. Municipalities are seen as a ‘chain-partner’ and ‘cooperation ‘chain-partner’ when they provide space or land for e.g. asylum centres detention centres or expulsion centres that are owned by the state. The municipalities also have to ‘corporate’ when it comes to other aspects of policy implementation for which they take nog formal responsibility (Kos et al., 2015: 9).
3.2 Restriction versus opening up
The asylum policy has been restricted on a national level, especially in the Netherlands, but on the European level there is an opening up of the asylum policy, like the organization of a common European asylum policy. This paradox fits perfectly in the theory of liberalism. Liberalism is used to describe a broad political, economic or philosophic outlook. Liberalism is often described as a dominant or ‘hegemonic’ ideology. A ‘liberal democracy’ is particular used to describe the states in the modern western world (Leach, 2008: 68). The liberal
13
democracy has three key features: (1) the right to rule is gained through success in regular and competitive elections, based on universal adult suffrage; (2) constraints on government imposed by a constitution, checks and balances and protections of individual rights; and (3) a vigorous civil society (Heywood, 2011: 185). The most essential principle of liberalism is the importance of the freedom of the individual. In this way there is a belief in the importance of the moral freedom – the right to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects (Doyle, 2012: 55). Gibney states that over the last twenty years, till the publication of his book The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees in 2004, asylum has become one of the central issues in the political arena of liberal democratic states (Gibney, 2004: 1).
In his book he shows the conflict between two liberal concepts: partiality and impartiality.
Partiality
In the view of partialism the states see themselves as a distinct cultural community which possesses a right to self-determination which justifies the priority for the interests of their own citizens over those of refugees (Gibney, 2004: 23). Gibney defines partialism as ‘the right states have to distribute membership as they please because without this right people could not protect and reproduce their cultural identity, and therefore would be unable to express an aspect of themselves that is essential to their sense of who they are’ (Gibney, 2004: 21). The approach, largely defended by communitarians, conservatives and nationalists justifies the right of states to decide admissions according to their own criteria. This is by appealing to the importance of political and cultural autonomy for communities (Gibney, 2004: 19). For partialists, the right of states to self-determination grows out of a claim about the entitlements of men and women give to public expression to their shared culture. There is a strong link between identity and culture, the consequence of this link is that people’s self-regard is usually bound up with the esteem of their national community. New members of this community can profound changes in the character and internal environment of a state (Gibney, 1999: 172).
The question Gibney asks is: ‘Where do foreigners fit into the partialist picture of the state?’. Foreigners, such as refugees, are not a part of the bond that unites members in a culture, but partialists are not ignorant of the fact that all states has been shaped over the course of history by immigrants and refugees. New members are not only changed by the cultural community, but change the community in turn through their presence and
14
contribution (Gibney, 2004: 27). Foreigners can disturb the state’s current way of life and the commitment that the citizens share. A large flow of entrants can and would lead to racial violence and tension, undermine the liberal democratic institutions and jeopardise law and order (Gibney, 2004: 28). These foreigners might threaten the ‘functional’ requirements of liberal democratic societies: the ability of this state to fulfil their responsibility to meet the basic needs and security requirements of their citizens. Partialists are conscious about the way refugees and immigrants might change the cultural environment of their political community (Gibney, 2004: 28).
When the focus lays on partialists and refugees, the partialists share the belief that in order to be legitimate, a refugee policy must reflect the value and interests of the state’s members. Partialists differ on the way how these values and interests are to be interpreted (Gibney, 2004: 32).
Impartiality
The view of impartialism works with an ideal of states as moral agents, and argues that the only legitimate admissions policy is the one and only policy that takes into equal account the interests and rights of foreigners (refugees and asylum seekers) and citizens (Gibney, 2004: 23). Impartiality is the idea that all humans matter and that they matter equally (Gibney, 2000: 316) The impartialism view characterises global liberal and utilitarian approaches and argues that states are obliged to listen to the interests or rights of the human community in its entirety in decisions on entry (Gibney, 2004: 20). The view of impartialism is often linked to the idea of universalisability – the belief that if a particular action or policy is genuinely impartial it must be a moral appropriate choice for anyone to make who faces the same set of circumstances (Gibney, 2004: 59-60).
But impartialists do not fully believe in open borders at all costs. The global liberals do see states as justified in restricting entrance if additional entrants (like refugees) would jeopardize public order, national security, of the maintenance of liberal institutions. The utilitarian approach sees constraints on entry legitimate when the costs to the state of admitting one more individual would be greater than the benefit to this concerned individual (Gibney, 1999: 171).
15
4 Methodology
This research composes the use of secondary data and embraces a qualitative approach. The secondary date used consists of two parts. The first one is the use of scientific literature in the field of asylum, Europeanization and decentralisation. Next to that the information of institutions, like provinces, municipalities and European institutions has been used. The second part of the secondary data consists of the analysis of news articles of almost primarily Dutch newspapers. For this research a number of 940 news articles have been researched between 1996 until 2015. These news articles were retrieved from Lexis Nexis with research terms like Europe, the Netherlands, province, municipalities and asylum. There is much known about the changes of the asylum policy on the European level, and in less ways, on the changes of the asylum policy on the national level of the Netherlands. There will also be a qualitative approach through interviews. For this research two interviews have been conducted, one with a former Dutch minister of Asylum and Integration and a member of chosen board in the province. These interviews were conducted to support the current data, or due a lack of literature (in the case of the province). Through the use of different research methods there can be triangulation, which can help to underline the conclusions of the research in this thesis.
4.1 Conceptualization
For this thesis there are some concepts that need some explanation.
Policy
Colebatch (2009) sees policy as ‘an idea that we use in both the analysis and the practice of the way we are governed. It gives both observers and participants a handle on the process, a way of making sense of the process of governing’ (Colebatch, 2009: 1). According to Colebatch the definition of policy is unambiguous: (1) ‘policy’ may be used to mean a broad orientation; (2) it can be an indication of a normal practice; (3) it can be a specific commitment; of (4) a statement of values. For this thesis the definition of Colebatch is being used: ‘it is part of a framework of ideas through which we make sense of the way in which, in different dimensions of our lives, we are governed. Governing does not happen: it is constructed out of an array of shared ideas categories practices and organizational forms. Policy is a way of labelling thoughts about the way is and the way it might be, and of justifying practices and organization arrangements, and the participants in the governmental
16
process seek to have their concerns and activities expressed as policy’ (Colebatch, 2009: 7-8). In this thesis the Dutch asylum policy is the central object.
Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis here is the Dutch asylum policy. The policy will be researched on a national level. The most important issue here is the effect of the policy on the lower levels of administration and how the policy changes. This will be researched through the use of news articles and evaluations of different acts.
Levels of administration
In the Netherlands there are different levels of administration: the national level, the province, the municipalities and the waterschappen. The last level of administration won’t be used because this level doesn’t have a role in the current research. The national level is the level where the Dutch policy has been made for all the levels of administration. The biggest actors on this level are the government, the cabinet and the parliament. The level below the national level is the province. According to the IpO the twelve provinces have seven tasks3:
1. Sustainable spatial development. 2. Environment, energy and climate. 3. Countryside and nature.
4. Regional accessibility and regional public transport. 5. The regional economy.
6. Cultural infrastructure and monuments 7. Quality of the public administration.
The last levels of administration are the municipalities. The municipalities implement national policy, but also their own policy. The 390 municipalities have a huge range of tasks, such as providing official documents (like passports and driving licences), roads and who lives where. Unit of analysis. In this thesis the units of analysis for the levels of administration are the national level, the province and municipalities. Through secondary data the effects of the Dutch asylum policy are being measured on these levels. With this data the opinions of members of the parliament, members of the province, mayors and alderman can be measured. The expectation is that the policy will have a large effect on the level of the municipalities and in a lesser way on the level of the province. The national level is the level where the policy is being made so will only affect the other levels of administration.
3 IpO. De zeven kerntaken van de provincies. Available at <
17
Asylum seekers
Asylum seekers are people who have crossed an international border in search of protection, but whose claims for a refugee status have not been decided yet (Castles et al., 2013: 222). The asylum seeker category is in one respect narrower than the category of the refugees (see below). Asylum seekers include only those refugees who arrive at its own borders (Gibney, 2004: 9).
Unit of analysis. The unit of analysis in this thesis are the asylum seekers who arrive in the Netherlands. This will be measured through the number of applications for asylum (see also appendix 1). Within this group there is a distinction between accepted and denied asylum seekers. Accepted asylum seekers are those who get a permit because they are being prosecuted because of his or her race of social group, religion, nationality or political beliefs.4 Denied asylum seekers are those who don’t get a permit because they don’t comply with the rules of the asylum procedure. When an asylum seeker is denied he or she has to return to their country of origin.
Refugees
According to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees a refugee is Article 1: “[Any person who] … owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence … is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it …” (Hatton, 2004: 38). Another important Article 33, the prohibition of expulsion or return (‘refoulement’): “No contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any matter whatsoever to the frontiers of the territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion …” (Hatton, 2004: 38).
Refugees aren’t a central part in this thesis, but you can’t have asylum seekers without refugees. Often the newspapers use both concepts in their news articles, and sometimes only refugees when they mean asylum seekers – or the other way around.
4
Rijksoverheid. Wanneer krijgt iemand asiel in Nederland? Available at
< https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/asielbeleid/vraag-en-antwoord/wanneer-kan-ik-asiel-aanvragen-in-nederland> (entered on 21-06-2016)
18
5. 1996-2000
From 1996 the number of asylum seekers started to rise in Europe and the Netherlands. On European level huge steps were done in the field of asylum and migration between 1996 and 2000. The first was the implementation of the Dublin Convention. The second one was the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 under presidency of the Netherlands. This agreement between the European Member States secured that the field of asylum and migration moved from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar. The third step was made with the agreement in Tampere, Finland.
In the Netherlands there was a cabinet for the first time without the party CDA, leaded by PvdA MP Kok (from 1994 till 2002). One of the biggest problems the cabinet faced was the large inflow of asylum seekers and connected with that, the reception of these people. This often led to a clash not only between the coalition parties PvdA, VVD and D66 but also between government and the lower levels of administration, and in particular the municipalities.
5.1 Europe Dublin Convention
In 1997 the Dublin convention came into force. This came together with the implementation of the Schengen Implementation Convention. The refugee section in this convention was superseded by the Dublin Convention (Guild, 2006: 636). These two treaties provided for three principles as regards asylum applicants (Guild, 2006: 636-7):
1. Member States are entitled to pool their responsibility towards the asylum applicants as regards their rejection. This means that if one Member States considers the asylum application of an asylum seeker and rejects it, that rejection is valid for all the Member States.
2. Member States have to determine in which of their number as asylum seeker is entitled to have their application for asylum determined. The fact that an asylum seeker might have family links or job prospects in one Member State but not in another and thus want to apply for asylum in that Member States is irrelevant to the allocation of responsibility among the Member States.
3. The responsibility for determining asylum application and the body that goes with the application is treated as a burden and punishment for the Member State which permitted the individual to arrive in the European Union.
19
Right after the Dublin Convention there was a meeting of EU immigration ministers that was empowered under the Maastricht Treaty to develop an EU wide asylum policy. This meeting produces three key, but non-binding, principles that are known as the London resolutions (Guild, 2006: 638-9):
1. ‘Manifestly unfounded’ asylum claims could be rejected without right of appeal. 2. The creation of a common definition of a safe third country: a country that is not the
country of origin but though which the asylum seeker has passed on to his or her way to the Member State.
3. The creation of a definition of a safe country of origin of an asylum seeker. An asylum seeker coming from a country that fulfils the requirements to be safe would have his or her allocation for asylum dealt with in a summary produce.
Amsterdam Treaty
At the end of March 1997 the Netherlands presented her plans for the Treaty of Amsterdam5: - The Schengen Convention should count for every country in the EU.
- The Schengen Convention should be a part of a new European Treaty
- The field of immigration, asylum and cooperation between police and customs should be an integral part of the EU.
- More unanimity in the field of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. - A clause against discrimination.
On 2 October 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam was singed and came into force on 1 May 19996. The underlying idea of the Amsterdam Treaty was the incoherence of measures regarding the borders, the movement of third country nationals, immigration and asylum at the European level (Guild, 2006: 640). The Amsterdam Treaty inserted the asylum policy into EU law by removing it from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar. This marked a shift towards more centralised decision-making (Hatton, 2008: 15). The objective of the Treaty of Amsterdam was attached to the internal market as one European area without controls on movement but through the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice (Guild, 2006: 640). This area required the adoption of a series of measures on asylum, according to article 63 of the treaty. Article 63(1) says that all the measures must by ‘in accordance with the Geneva Convention
5
ANP, 21-03-1997. “Nederland wil dezelfde visa voor heel de Europese Unie”.
6
Europa-nu: Verdrag van Amsterdam. Available at: http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vh7douqsttzm/verdrag_van_amsterdam
20
of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties’ (Guild 2006: 640).
The action plan for implementing the Amsterdam Treaty derived a number of implications from the treaty on the ‘external aspect’ of the JHA. The first implication was the potential for a stronger international role for the EU. The treaty expanded the competence in the field of JHA. This can be found in the shift from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar (Boswell, 2003: 627). Second, under a list of ‘measures to be taken within two years’, the action plan included an ‘assessment of countries of origin in order to formulate a country specific approach’. This plan was adopted at a meeting of the European Council in Vienna, Austria in December 1998 as part of the programme for implementing the treaty (Boswell, 2003: 627). Within the JHA the Member States had to agree with each other on the different directives. They were also looking for solutions to solve dilemmas that were caused by conflicting interests of the Member States. On the one hand the Member States wanted to stop illegal immigration from outside the EU, but had to accept migrants (refugees and asylum seekers) on ground of international duties or national interests. According to Strik (2011) the other dilemma was that the EU wanted less family migrants, but agreed on an EU level to strengthen the rights on migrants, like family reunion (Strik, 2011: 1). The Council also agreed that in five years, there will be rules concerned with freedom, safety and justice. One of those rules was a directive with minimum norms for the asylum procedure and family reunification (Strik, 2011: 41).
With the Treaty of Amsterdam the European Commission got a bigger role in the area of asylum and migration. The Commission can now consult the Member States, NGOs and other experts in the draft phase of a proposal (Strik, 2011: 44). Before the ratification of the treaty the Commission was often dissatisfied with the progress made by Member States with asylum and migration. This enlarged role of the Commission can also been seen in the growth of the part of the organisation: in 1998 there were 46 working at a task force, four years later, in 2002, there were 283 placed in the newly formed DG Justice, Freedom and Safety (Strik, 2011: 44).
Tampere Programme
In October 1999 the European Council came together in Tampere, Finland, to set out two principles to motivate the drafting and adoption of secondary legislation in the area of freedom, security and justice. These two principles were: the harmonisation of asylum law at a minimum standard level, and the principle of mutual recognition of acts of states (Guild,
21
2006: 642). The European Council meeting reaffirmed that the common EU policies would be based on a ‘full and inclusive’ application of the Refugee Convention whereby the principle of non-refoulement would be honoured (Hatton, 2008: 15). The European Council states within paragraph 13 of the Conclusions: “The European Council reaffirms the importance of the Union and Member States attach to absolute respect to the right to seek asylum. It has agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 32)”. In the Tampere conclusions there was also an clear signal of the extension of the European Union visa regime: “A common active policy on visas and false documents should be further developed, including closer co-operation between EU consulates in third countries and, the establishment of common EU visa issuing officers” (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 37). The Tampere Programme can be seen as the first stage of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Hatton, 2012: 8)
Until Tampere the so-called ‘external dimension’ of the European immigration and asylum policy was not formally embraced by the European Council. The conclusions of this Special European Council of JHA stated that justice and home affairs concerns should be “integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities”, including external relations (Boswell, 2003: 620).
Other policies
In October 1996 the European Union adapted a rule in extra-territorial border enforcement – that of Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs). These officers are immigration staff posted to embassies and consulates of participating Member States to advise airline staff. They advise this staff about the authenticity of specific travel documents (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 42). This rule focuses on border controls against irregular migration and information-gathering to support anti-trafficking measures. Such activities can prevent refugees from leaving their country or a neighbouring state in which they are still unsafe (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 42).
In January 1998 the Council adopted an action plan on the ‘influx of migrants from Iraq and the neighbouring region’. This plan was a response to the increase in the arrivals of Kurdish and other Iraqi asylum-seekers into the European Union (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 44). Even by the standards set by the Member States many of these asylum-seekers were Convention status refugees. But the thrust of this plan was not to ensure reception in the
22
EU but rather to bolster effort to keep as many Iraqi refugees within ‘the region’, also called as regional containment (Morrison & Crosland, 2000: 44).
The Netherlands in Europe
In the end of February 1996 VVD MP Rijpstra said that the Netherlands should make a list of third safe countries, but that this should be done on a European level. According to Rijpstra consistency is needed because the European countries don’t agree about the part which country is safe or unsafe.7 In April State Secretary Patijn (European Affairs) presented his plans to his European colleagues about the future of the EU. His aim was to strengthen the European cooperation in the field of JHA, which finds much support with the European partners. The Netherlands was to have a visa, asylum and migration policy on a European level. 8
On January 1, 1997 the Netherlands became the one to lead the European presidency. In March different Dutch MEPs had critique on the way the Netherlands is hosting the presidency of the EU. CDA MEP Pronk said the way the Netherlands presides the presidency is much “too timid”. He saw “much critique” in the EP on the Netherlands and their presidency. Keywords Pronk used were “a lack of leadership” and “not energetic” to underline his ideas about the Dutch presidency. PvdA leader d’Ancona reacted that the initiatives done by the Netherlands are “lean”.9
In September 1998 the EU proposed a plan under the presidency of Austria. The plan said that refugees should only come to the EU when they are invited by one of the Member States. The individual right to asylum should be abandoned with this plan. PvdA MP Van Oven reacted that State Secretary Cohen should take a stand against this proposal. CDA MP Verhagen said that with this proposal “many people will fall outside the proposal, while they need help”. GL believes that the proposal isn’t tolerable: “when the individual right to asylum is abandoned the refugees will be surrendered to the politics in the Member States”.10 A week later State Secretary Cohen reacted that there won’t be a common European asylum policy on the short term. He also reacted on the proposal presented by Austria a week before, he said that he “was happy that Austria came with the plan”.11
In the winter of 1998 the Netherlands came with a proposal to organize a special division – a HLWG – that should promote an unanimous European asylum policy to “prepare cross-pillar Action Plans for
7 ANP, 29-02-2996. “Rijpstra: ‘veilige landen’ Europees bepalen”. 8
ANP, 02-04-1996. “Nederland krijgt steun in Europees toekomstdebat”.
9
De Volkskrant, 08-03-1997. “Nederland krijgt forse kritiek in Europarlement’.
10 Het Parool, 04-09-1998. “Nederland wijst EU-asielplan af”. 11
23
selected countries of origin and transit of asylum seekers and migrants”. This proposal got support from all European partners in the Council of Ministers. The plan was that the EU, in cooperation with embassies and the UNHCR, maps the political and human rights situation in different countries that are home to many refugees and asylum seekers. On base of that the EU members could respond better through the use of emergency aid, reception in the region and plans to stop the inflow of refugees and asylum seekers. With this the Netherlands hoped to stop the deadlock in the organization of a common European asylum and migration policy.12 This proposal was adopted in December 1998 by the General Affairs Council, which agreed to prepare action plans on six countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka (Boswell, 2003: 628).
In March 2000 State Secretary Cohen said that he hopes the EU can accomplish all the action points in the field of asylum policy. These action points were set during the meeting in Tampere. Cohen reacted that he “worries about some points, but I hope that they will make it”.13
In January 1999 VVD MEP Wiebenga said that the Netherlands should get money from the ESF for the reception of asylum seekers. According to Wiebenga this idea was justified because the Netherlands was spending more money on the reception of asylum seekers than other European countries. He also said that the Netherlands wasn’t getting enough money from European funds, and not only from the ESF.14 A month later Wiebenga reacted that the VVD wanted to abolish the veto on asylum policy on an European level. According to Wiebenga this was the key to organize a common European asylum policy.15 Two weeks later Prime Minister Kok insisted on an European asylum and migration policy. He said that “the problems are urgent and we have to solve it together”.16
In April different MEPs reacted to the lack of a common European asylum policy. VVD MEP Wiebenga said that he “hated the many years of deadlock” and PvdA MEP D’Ancona reacted that he hated the ‘inability’ of the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs to make a deal.17
In May Prime Minister Kok said he wanted a special European Commissioner for the field of asylum and migration. This person would be responsible for an European asylum and migration policy: “from the causes of migration, to reception in the region, to the return policy”. Kok reacted
12
ANP, 04-12-1998. “Brede steun voor Nederlands initiatief Europese vluchtelingenaanpak”.
13 ANP, 27-03-2000. “Cohen betwijfelt of Europa asielafspraken snel kan nakomen”. 14
ANP, 23-01-1999. “VVD wil Europees geld voor opvang asielzoekers”.
15
ANP, 14-02-1999. “VVD wil afschaffing vetorecht asielbeleid EU. “
16 ANP, 26-02-1999. “Kok dringt aan op Europees asielbeleid”. 17
24
that asylum policy isn’t only a task of the JHA anymore. Asylum policy also touched the “political and economic relations of the EU with third countries. The appointment of such a commissioner is also needed to ‘stop the negative causes of the disappearance of European borders”.18 In September was made clear that the Netherlands puts much pressure on the other European member states to organize a common European asylum policy quickly. The Netherlands argued that Member States should close deals with other countries (in and outside the EU) and that asylum seekers should be treated equally everywhere. The Netherlands said – in the words of State Secretary Cohen – that the EU should do more than coordination: “separately the Member States don’t have enough measures to influence the developments in this field”. Cohen made a plea for a common European asylum procedure. There should be clear rules on reception, the duration of the asylum procedure and legal assistance. Next to that the EU should decide who is a refugee and who isn’t.19 At the end of the month this plan was also underlined by State Secretary Benschop (Foreign Affairs). He said that when the EU doesn’t organize a common asylum policy, the field of asylum is a ‘race to the bottom’.20
In October the coalition parties in the Dutch parliament reacted on the deals made in Tampere. PvdA MP Middel said that the deals were a good start. Middel agreed that there should be common agreements about the reception of asylum seekers: “only then the pull-effect of North European Member States will disappear”. The VVD saw “some points for improvement”. The VVD concluded that there were some steps in the rights direction. According to the liberals the European deal about minimum reception of asylum seekers meant that the norms of Netherlands about the reception of asylum seekers should be lowered. VVD MP Niederer reacted that “when there is consensus, the Netherlands should be prepared to lower their reception to a lower standard”. The VVD also said that it is unfortunately there wasn’t a deal about a quota of asylum seekers.21
State Secretary Benschop (Foreign Affairs) reacted after Tampere that he “wasn’t convinced” that there will be proposals on a stricter asylum policy in Europe.22 Prime Minister Kok wanted to see some proposes within a year for a more harmonized European asylum policy because “the adjustment of procedures and rules to one other is needed. There has to be policy in Europe that protects asylum seekers”.23
18
ANP, 11-05-1999. “Kok wil Europees Commissaris voor asielbeleid”.
19 De Volkskrant, 08-09-1999. “Cohen maakt zich sterk voor een Europese asielprocedure”. 20
ANP, 27-09-1999. “Tampere moet ‘race to the bottom’ asielbeleid stoppen.”
21
ANP, 17-10-1999. “Regeringspartijen gematigd positief over resultaten asieltop”.
22 ANP, 15-10-1999. “Benschop twijfelt aan haalbaarheid strakkere EU-afspraken asielbeleid”. 23
25
In March 2000 State Secretary Cohen said that the ERF should be established quickly. He reacted that a common European asylum fund is “a common responsibility of all Member States, even when there isn’t much money in the fund”.24 In November Minister Korthals of Justice called out to the Dutch parliament to agree with a European system for finger prints of asylum seekers. The so called EuroDac-system keeps track of the finger prints of asylum seekers. Every time an asylum seeker wants to start a procedure for a permit their finger print is copied.25 In December the national parliament accepted the EuroDac.26
5.2 National level
In June 1996 the CDA came with a resolution to change the period of validity of a temporarily permit. The CDA wanted to change this period from three to five years. State Secretary Schmitz was a large opponent of the idea. Opponents of the motion, next to the CDA, were the VVD, the Ouderenunie, the CD and some smaller Christian parties.27 In September the cabinet presented her plans for a right to appeal for denied asylum seekers. Not only opposition parties, like the RPF and CDA, disagreed with the presented plans, also coalition partner VVD disagreed. The plan of the cabinet was based on an advice of the High Court. The VVD and CDA were afraid that this plan extended the duration of the asylum procedure. Coalition partners PvdA and D66, and opposition parties GL and Groep Nijpels were proponents of the plan.28
In February 1997 the VVD called for a revision of the Aliens Act. According to VVD MP Rijpstra the recent problems with the refusals of municipalities to evict denied asylum seekers showed that the act needed to change. In the new law there also needed to be a possibility for a right to appeal for asylum seekers when they are denied. State Secretary Schmitz said she hopes that coalition partner D66 and VVD agree with the creation of a higher appeal. PvdA and D66 were supporters of this higher appeal, VVD said they would accept the higher appeal, but under some circumstances.29 In the same month the parliament accepted the implementation of a work obligation for accepted asylum seekers. Asylum seekers with a temporarily permit will get the change to follow an education in the first six to nine months to familiarize them with the Dutch culture. In the second period there is a
24
ANP, 27-03-2000. “Nederland loopt voorzichtig warm voor Europees vluchtelingenfonds”.
25 ANP,30-11-2000. “Korthals roept PvdA op tot snel akkoord vingerafdrukken asielzoekers”. 26
ANP, 07-12-2000. “Korthals drukt Europees vingerafdruksysteem door Kamer”.
27
De Volkskrant, 25-06-25. “Kamer houdt vast aan verlenging asiel
28 Trouw, 12-09-1996. “Vorm van hoger beroep voor asielzoeker vindt geen genade bij CDA en VVD”. 29
26
possibility to follow a professional education and after two years the asylum seeker gets access to the labour market.30 In May 1997 the cabinet said she wanted a more active return policy. This will be done through special ‘return teams’. The intention was that the team actively works and don’t awaits problems. This return team should lower the number of tasks for municipalities. This plan was introduced in the Return policy paper of State Secretary of Justice Schmitz. Starting point for this notice was an integral approach for the return of denied asylum seekers.31 In June the parties VVD and CDA agreed with each other that they are against a new temporary permit for denied asylum seekers. Both parties were also unsatisfied with the policy for forced return of denied asylum seekers. This plan was part of the Return policy paper. Schmitz wanted that denied asylum seekers who cooperate in their return to their home country, but can’t return because they can’t get papers or identification, can have a special, temporary permit to stay in the Netherlands. VVD MP Rijpstra says “it is a typical Schmitz policy paper that breathes the personal philosophy of the State Secretary”. D66 was also one of the parties that wasn't happy with the policy paper of Schmitz. D66 MP Dittrich concluded that “there are a lot of words on paper, but there is not a word said about non-voluntary return”. Only the PvdA agreed with the plan of Schmitz.32
In that same month VVD MP Rijpstra said he wanted to see that airline companies make a scans of the identity papers of asylum seekers when these asylum seekers wants to flee to the Netherlands.33 In October 1997 a majority of the representatives agreed that they don’t want that the cabinet puts milder actions on denied asylum seekers who don’t want to return. According to D66, PvdA, CDA and VVD these asylum seekers don’t earn any reception when they don’t want to return.34
Next to that, the parties were also concerned about the increase of asylum seekers that come to the Netherlands. State Secretary Schmitz thinks that the total of asylum seekers in 1997 will be between 32.000 and 35.000.35 A month later the parties in the parliament agreed on a plan to immediately return asylum seekers who lost their documents on purpose.36
The cabinet stands for a big problem in April 1998: the large inflow of asylum seekers and the concerns about the reception of this people. Minister Dijkstal of Home Affairs said that “we are at the maximum reception capacity”. Together with State Secretaries Schmitz
30
ANP, 26-02-1997. “Kamer eens met arbeidsplicht asielzoekers”.
31
ANP, 30-05-1997. “Kabinet wil actiever terugkeerbeleid afgewezen asielzoekers”.
32 ANP, 03-06-1997. “VVD en CDA tegen nieuwe verblijfsvergunning”. 33
ANP, 03-06-1997. “VVD en CDA tegen nieuwe verblijfsvergunning”.
34
ANP, 07-10-1997. “Meerderheid Kamer tegen opvang afgewezen asielzoekers”.
35 ANP, 07-10-1997.”Kamer maakt zich zorgen over stijging aantal asielzoekers”. 36
27
and Tommel he tried to find ‘creative’ solutions for the short term.37 Two months earlier, in February, State Secretary Schmitz of Justice said she was positive about the idea of permanent reception centres spread across different municipalities. She thought this will end the moving of asylum seekers within the Netherlands. This idea originally came from VVD MP Rijpstra, with the support of other parties.38 In April 1998 D66 presented a policy paper with the name ‘A decent asylum policy’. This policy paper stated that the asylum procedure should not take more than three and a half years. When it takes longer, the asylum seeker should get a permit. With this policy paper D66 wanted to maintain the strict asylum policy because asylum seekers won’t get a chance to go to court for a second or third time and those who are denied should leave the country. According to D66 MP Dittrich the asylum policy is very fragmented and thus needed to change.39 In June the coalition parties made a temporary agreement about the asylum policy. The PvdA, VVD and D66 agreed that asylum seekers can make an appeal when their permit is denied, but in a more limited way. A week later the VVD reacted that she strongly disagrees with the plan for this appeal, because it was already decided in 1994 to abolish the appeal for denied asylum seekers. Next to that the VVD also had problems with maintaining of two statuses for asylum seekers, a temporary one and a permanent one. The party also came with a plan to set a quota on the number of asylum seekers.40 In the summer of 1998 the second cabinet Kok took office. A large part of the coalition agreement on international affairs and defence was about the Dutch migration and asylum policy. The coalition wanted to maintain the restrictive policy on entering The Netherlands, but there was a need for a better and faster procedure for asylum seekers. The coalition wanted to make changes in the Aliens Act, the reception of asylum seekers, the return of asylum seekers to their home country and international cooperation41. When we focus on the reception of asylum seekers in the coalition agreement it becomes clear that the cabinet wanted that the asylum seeker takes care of his own: some groups have to find their own place to sleep; when an asylum seeker fills in a second or third request for a permit he or she isn’t allowed to stay in a reception centre; and temporarily reception centres will be more gloomy than permanent reception centres. In the coalition agreement there was also a part about Europe and the asylum policy. The coalition wanted a more extensive and good harmonisation of a common European asylum and immigration policy, but also wanted to focus more on the protection of
37 ANP, 03-04-1998. “Toestroom asielzoekers blijft voor opvangproblemen zorgen”. 38
ANP, 12-02-1998. “Schmitz positief over permanente opvang asielzoekers”.
39
Het Parool, 02-04-1998. “D66 wil besluit asiel in 3,5 jaar afronden”.
40 Het Parool, 30-06-1998. “VVD wil toch weer morrelen aan ‘deal’ over asiel”. 41
28
human rights through European treaties. The coalition agreement stated: “the Dutch policy will focus on a better use of the possibilities made by the Amsterdam Treaty to better cooperation in the areas of CFSP and JHA. Important thing here is the fighting of crimes and the development of a common European migration and asylum policy”.42
Within this cabinet PvdA MP Cohen got control over the Dutch asylum policy as State Secretary of Justice. In January 2001 he was succeeded by PvdA MP Kalsbeek as state secretary. On the first day of October State Secretary Cohen said that he wanted a temporary stop on asylum seekers. This meant that new requests won’t be taken in consideration. Asylum seekers were put on a waiting list and should provide for their own shelter. Cohen reacted that the ‘straightforward’ asylum policy only can exist when we act ‘strict and restrictive’ to unwanted asylum seekers.43 In that same month the cabinet made clear it needed one billon gulden extra for the reception of asylum seekers in 1999. This one billion came on top of the already reserved 1,6 billion. This extra money was needed to place extra tents and to extend the IND with six hundred employees. According to Cohen the IND had too much work, whereby there is not enough time to check the asylum applications in a short matter of time. This resulted into positive decision, which caused full reception centres. To stop the inflow of asylum seekers Cohen needed more information about the political situation in Iraq, Iran, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Somalia. He said: “who can return safely, doesn’t get reception in the Netherlands”.44 The use of these tents caused some criticism from the coalition parties. Coalition partners PvdA and D66 were having great objection against these tents. According to PvdA MP Middel the reception in tents was inhumane: “I agree that the reception has to be sober, but you can’t let children sleep in a tent without anything on the floor and with pools of water in the ground for a few weeks.” D66 MP Dittrich called the reception very minimal. PvdA MP Middel and Duivesteijn submitted a plan to make the reception in tents costly, to stop this way of reception. They saw a bigger role for housing corporations to provide reception for asylum seekers. Coalition partner VVD and opposition party CDA didn’t had much trouble with the use of tents as emergency reception. They insisted on more structural measures to stop the inflow of asylum seekers.45 In November 1998 Cohen said he wanted to intensify the ‘removal policy’. He focused especially on Dublin claimants, because these asylum seekers don’t have a right on reception and are designed on the humanity of organisations and
42
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 26024, nr. 10
43
De Volkskrant, 01-10-1998. “Cohen wil met wachtlijsten asielzoekers afstoppen”.
44 De Volkskrant, 19-10-1998. “Asielopvang vergt een miljard extra”. 45
29
individuals. Fifteen organisations, which include VWN and the Red Cross, thought this plan of Cohen is inhumane and socially unacceptable.46
In September State Secretary Cohen got some comments from different parties in the parliament. A majority of the parliament wanted that Cohen inquires them more often about the implementation of the new Aliens Act.47 In October 2000 the PvdA and D66 said that smaller municipalities can’t organize ‘large’ reception centres (minimal four hundred asylum seekers). Earlier, in March 2000, State Secretary Cohen said he didn’t want to follow this plan, but in October he agreed with the PvdA and D66. He also said that the return policy will not work better on a short term. Almost all parties were concerned about the return policy. The Department of Justice couldn’t get al rejected asylum seekers out of the country. Cohen said that “the next time the number won’t be any better”. VVD MP Kamp reacted furious, because the VVD plans to toughen the asylum policy were being denied every time, and when a plan is accepted, the plans weren’t made practical and workable.48 In November the parties VVD, CDA and D66 reacted dissatisfied with the results of the asylum policy of State Secretary Cohen in his first half year. The VVD said that the efforts made by the cabinet were inadequate. VVD MP Nicolai reacted that “during this period the inflow of asylum seekers hasn’t lowered and the occupied places in reception centres had been doubled”. The CDA concluded that the cabinet presented much plans, but that the implementation of this plans lags.49
3.3 Provinces
In January 1999 the Commissioner of the Queen Houben (Noord-Brabant) said that provinces should play a bigger role in the reception of asylum seekers, especially in the organisation of this reception. Houben wanted a more ‘directing’ role for provinces in the asylum policy.50 This call for a bigger role also came from the parties PvdA and VVD. PvdA MP Middel and VVD MP Rijpstra thought it was time to coordinate the reception of asylum seekers on a provincial level. According to the PvdA and VVD there was a need for a regional agreement on the replacement of asylum seeker centres with provinces, municipalities and the COA.51 The mayor of Groningen, Wallage, also agreed with this plan.52 In April 1999 the province of
46
ANP, 12-11-1998. “Gemeenten zorgen voor huisvesting asielzoekers zonder status”.
47
Trouw, 30-09-2000. “Kamer zet Cohen onder zware druk”.
48 ANP, 12-10-2000. “Cohen wil toch kleinere asielcentra”. 49
ANP, 07-11-2000. “Kamer ontevreden over resultaten asielbeleid”.
50
ANP, 17-01-1999. “Pleidooi om provincies meer te betrekken bij opvang asielzoekers”.
51 ANP, 31-01-1999. “PvdA en VVD willen asielzoekerscentra provinciaal regelen”. 52
