Chechnya and the North Caucasus
Russian Crisis Management from 1994 - 2015
Master thesis
Leiden University, Campus The Hague Public Administration
Crisis and Security Management M.Sc. submitted by
Theresa Caroline Winter Den Haag, 06/09/2016
First Examiner: Dr. Marcel de Haas Second Examiner: Dr. Edwin Bakker student number: s1724886
© Theresa Caroline Winter 2016
Chechnya and the North Caucasus
- Russian Crisis Management from 1994 - 2015 Theresa Caroline Winter
Foreword
This thesis addresses crisis and political and economic instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus region in post-Soviet Russia. The Russian crisis management from the beginning of the 1990s until today is analyzed in order to assess the effectiveness of Russian crisis mitigation and to then provide an overall assessment of national crisis management strategies, their internal and external influences and potential in reducing and dissolving domestic crises. The crises in Chechnya and the North Caucasus are of particular interest due to their diversity: extremely poor socio-economic conditions, political instability and ethnic clan rivalries and clashes are accompanied by high levels of violence and frequent terrorist attacks. From the beginning of conflict in the early 1990s, the Russian government implemented a variety of crisis management measures which seem with regard to ongoing instability at first sight only marginally successful. However, this study aims at addressing both the crises and their contexts as well as the different objectives pursued by the different Russian governments to draw a more differentiated picture of the situation in the North Caucasus as well as of crisis management in general.
This research has been conducted in the context of Leiden University and the master degree course Crisis and Security Management (M.Sc.). The research is part of the capstone project Terrorism in the North Caucasus under the supervision of Dr. Marcel de Haas.
Abstract
The North Caucasus, a region in the south of the Russian Federation, is marked by enduring political and socio-economic instability, inter-ethnic rivalry and violent conflict within the region and with Russian security forces. Two wars in Chechnya and national terrorism recently also affiliated to the Islamist movement ‘Islamic State’ displayed constant military presence of Russian federal troops in the republic and the entire North Caucasus during the last twenty years. Initially gaining substantive international attention due to the inexorable use of military force by the Russian army, since the official ending of the second Chechen war in 2002 the public interest in the region decreased despite the continuing of conflict. Since the early 1990s, the Russian government engaged in Chechnya to mitigate the flaring crisis, however tensions between republic and government prevailed and conflict spread to neighboring republics. Russian crisis management initially consisted primarily of military measures which however proved ineffective; thus, with the inauguration of Putin as President of Russia in 2000, increasingly also political measures amplified crisis management approaches. Over time, crisis management strategies of the Russian government adapted to the persisting crisis, however always relying strongly on military operations.
Main objective of this thesis is to analyze the different crisis management approaches and to connect them to changes in government and in crisis context to then assess their effectiveness. For this, the framing strategies of the different Russian Presidents are analyzed to identify key objectives pursued. Together with the analysis of measures undertaken for crisis mitigation and the assessment of external influences on the Russian crisis management, main conclusion of this thesis is that overall, crisis management in Chechnya and the North Caucasus was successful because it achieved the remaining of the region within the Russian Federation. However, the persisting political and socio-economic instability as well as flaring conflict prove the Russian crisis management to be ineffective in restoring order and normality of life. Main finding of this research is that failures of crisis management are not necessarily linked to bad governance and wrong interventions, but very likely to the Kremlin’s prospect to capitalize from a continuation of the crisis (thus unwillingness to find political solutions). While for Yeltsin’s political survival a quick suppression of conflict in Chechnya was crucial, Putin utilized the conflict to bolster political support for his centralization policy. Under Medvedev, the goal of modernizing Russia necessitated a stabilization of the region which made way for a change in strategy to include also socio-economic measures. In the current presidency of Putin there is no political benefit in focusing on crisis in the North Caucasus which is why in the last three years, crisis management in the region became quiet.
Content
List of Tables ... iv
Abbreviations... v
1. Introduction ... 1
1.1 Scientific relevance and link to the academic field of public administration ... 5
1.2 Questions and objectives of the research ... 6
2. Theoretical framework ... 8
3. Methodology ... 11
4. The Russian crisis management in the North Caucasus ... 13
4.1 History of the North Caucasus crises ... 13
4.2 Framing strategies of the Russian governments ... 23
4.2.1 The era of Boris Yeltsin (1991 – 1999) ... 23
4.2.2 The first era of Vladimir Putin (2000 – 2008) ... 27
4.2.3 The era of Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012) ... 34
4.2.4 The new era of Vladimir Putin (2012 – today) ... 39
4.2.5 Résumé of the framing strategies of Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev ... 43
4.3 Crisis management measures ... 47
4.3.1 Military measures ... 49
4.3.2 Political measures ... 50
4.3.3 Economic and socio-economic measures ... 54
4.3.4 Résumé of the crisis management measures applied by the Russian governments ... 56
4.4 External influences on Russian crisis management in the North Caucasus ... 64
5. Conclusion ... 69
6. Discussion ... 74
References ... 76 Appendices ... I Appendix 1: Map of Russia and the North Caucasus Federal District ... I Appendix 2: Russian crisis management in Chechnya and Chechen feedback reaction ... II
iv List of Tables
Table 1: The framing strategy of President Yeltsin concerning the first Chechen crisis and its aftermath, from 1994 until 1999. ... 26 Table 2: The framing strategy of President Putin concerning the Chechen crisis, from 2000 until 2007. ... 33 Table 3: The framing strategy of President Medvedev of the Chechen/ NC crises, from 2008 until 2011. ... 38 Table 4: The framing strategy of President Putin of the Chechen/ NC crises, from 2012 until 2015. ... 42 Table 5: Summary of the framing strategies of Presidents Putin and Medvedev of the
Chechen/ NC crises, from 2000 until 2015. ... 43 Table 6: The Chechen/ NC crises vis-à-vis Russian CM types of intervention, actors, and execution level as framed by the presidents. ... 45 Table 7: CM measures, key policies and their effectiveness. ... 57 Table 8: Adapted overview of Russian CM types of intervention, actors, and execution level. ... 62
v Abbreviations
ASSR – Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic CM – Crisis Management
FD – Federal District FP – Federal Programs
FTP – Federal Targeted Programs IS – Islamic State
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organozation NC – North Caucasus
NCFD – North Caucasus Federal District
RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic RTP – Regional Targeted Programs
SFD – Southern Federal District US – United States
1 1. Introduction
Located in Russia’s Southwest, the North Caucasus (NC) is one of the most densely populated regions of Russia, demarcated by the Caspian and the Black Sea and neighbored by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia (including the disputed regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Azerbaijan. Since 2010 its seven republics Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Circassia, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechnya, and Stavropol Territory belong to the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), one of nine federal districts in Russia1 (Meeting with Alexander Khloponin and Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, 2010; Hill, 1995, p. ii). Before 2010, the NCFD was subsumed under the Southern Federal District (SFD) which was then split in two, the NCFD and SFD2. However, in most literature the North Caucasus is understood as the seven NCFD republics and in addition the two republics Krasnodar and Adygea which however politically belong to the Southern Federal District. The NCFD alone is a smaller part of the former SFD and surrounded by the Caspian Sea, Georgia and Azerbaijan.3
The region is very poor and marked by enduring socio-economic and political instability, extreme poverty, and inter-ethnic rivalry and conflicts, expressed in clan feuds and persistent struggle for influence, power, and survival. Religious radicalization and extremism and clashes between the various ethnic groups as well as with Russian security forces (Kuchins, Malarkey, & Markedonov, 2011, pp. 2; Blandy, 2005, pp. 2) persist and are signs of a most volatile situation.
In the international media, the North Caucasus is mostly known because of the two Chechen wars of 1994 – 1996 and 1999 – 20024 highlighting conflicts persisting for more than two decades. What initially had started with a nationalist and secessionist movement (in Chechnya) later turned into a steady stage of constant conflict characterized by a constant flare of violence and aggression infrequently erupting, embracing the entire region and persisting until today. The crude quarrel and battles within the NC gradually escalated
1
The Russian government counts nine federal districts. Moscow however includes the highly disputed Crimean Federal District which was established in the course of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the concomitant annexation of Crimea by Moscow. Other literature excludes this region and refers to eight federal districts in Russia.
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The republics Adygea, Astrakhan Oblast, Kalmykia Republic, Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast, and Volgograd Oblast belong to the SFD (South Federal District, Russia (Southern)).
3
See appendix 1 for a detailed map.
4
The duration of the second Chechen war is controversial. Russian President Putin officially declared the end of the second Chechen war in April 2002 (Foxall, 2014). The European Union disagreed with this statement and argued in their Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 on the Russian Federation that the status of the conflict remained that of low-intensity armed conflict (Brouwers, 2007, p. 6). The Russian military counter-terrorist operation only ended in 2009 (Foxall, 2014).
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also to transfer the conflict into Russia’s heartland. Several terrorist attacks, the hostage taking inside a Moscow theater in October 2002; the explosion of two Russian airplanes in August 2004; a school siege in Beslan (North Ossetia-Alania) in September 2004 ending in over 350 dead; the bombing of the Moscow Metro in 2004 and 2010; the 2009 bomb attack on the Nevsky Express train between Moscow and St. Petersburg; the suicide attack at Moscow Domodedovo Airport in 2011; or the two suicide bombings in Volgograd prior to the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, killing 34 people (Matveeva, 2012, pp. 3 - 5; “Islamic group claims Volgograd attacks”, 2014; Melvin, 2007, p. 28) provide grim evidence for the fact that the militant attacks were targeted to hit hard also to reach high visibility worldwide. This characteristic of this Russian conflict which escalated from regional unrest, increasing violence followed by trans-regional terrorist attacks, makes the North Caucasus an example of modern warfare in an intrastate conflict which duly finds its equivalence and progression in the outburst of the terrorist movement of the jihadist group Islamic State (IS), a terrorist group active in Syria and Iraq since mid-2013 (Al-Tamimi, 2014, p. 5), which further seeks to escalate the conflict into neighboring countries and to Europe (Paraszczuk, 2015; MacFarquhar, 2015). Despite the allegiance several Islamic militant groups in the North Caucasus have pledged to the IS which alarmed Russian authorities and the international community alike, terrorism in the North Caucasus has diverse origins and forms unrelated to the IS. It is rather the protest against the occupation by Russian “infidels” (Pokalova, 2015, p. viii) that is driving force behind the flaring up of terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus and in other Russian territories.
The outbreaks of violence in the North Caucasus are economically, politically, and religiously motivated. The long-lasting region’s economic, social and political instability also as a result of poverty from lack of jobs, limited or no access to education and missing social and medical infrastructure is the driver of it. The Russian government is faced with a difficult task to stabilize one of its most fragile regions. It responds to this challenge with various multi-sector management approaches, however, with only limited long term effects and still mostly emphasizing military means as main tool for crisis mitigation. The key questions as to why the North Caucasus cannot be pacified and still endures such a persistent instability and where the origins of the tensions with the Russian government lie are crucial to our understanding of the North Caucasus situation at large. Among all, religious differences, ethnicity and dissimilar historical trajectories inherent to the region are vital elements and constant drivers of the ongoing crisis. Moreover, social inequality, corruption, failing social services, and extreme poverty within the North Caucasus region
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nurture the conflict and add to the complex web of reciprocally stimulating conflict triggers (International Crisis Group, 2015, pp. i; Kuchins, Malarkey, & Markedonov, 2011, p. 12; Hill & Gaddy, 2003, pp. 123). And, the political influence and interventions of the Russian government in the North Caucasus and the feedback reactions of the region towards its crisis management further contribute rather than deescalate to the ongoing perpetual crisis level. All these elements need to be considered in an analysis of origins, causes, persistence and radicalization followed by escalation of the conflict.
For Russia, the North Caucasian region is of particular interest because of its highly critical geostrategic position. Major transport routes connecting Russia to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan traverse the North Caucasian mountain range; the republic Dagestan hosts a pipeline transporting Azerbaijani oil from the offshore terminals in the Caspian Sea to the Russian port of Novorossiysk; and oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Turkey and western markets transit the adjacent politically fragile South Caucasus (Sagramoso, 2007, pp. 683). The already threatened Russian monopoly on Caspian oil transit by Western oil companies (Trenin, 2009, p. 9) would be completely undermined by a breakaway (or break-apart) of the North Caucasus republics. Moreover, besides the economic interests, geopolitics is the keyword to define the Kremlin’s interest in the region. Regaining its status as world power by maintaining unity (which would be endangered by a Chechen or general NC separatism) and keeping the “privileged interest” countries5 close by is top of the country’s 21st century agenda (Trenin, 2009, pp. 4). Moreover, great fear of potential “domino-effects” exist that based on the precedent-setting success of one republic to part with Russia, other provinces in the region seize the opportunity to also part (Brouwers, 2007, p. 3).
To shed more light on the conflict it is of interest to look at the North Caucasus from a historical perspective. Inter alia, the extreme ethnic diversity (about 40 different ethnic groups of Turkey, Iranian, or Caucasian origin) in the North Caucasus has continually presented a challenge to Russia’s territorial integrity and already during the Soviet regime, ethno-national groups in the North Caucasus demanded administrative powers within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (Sagramoso, 2007, p. 684). In order to address these claims while at the same time maintaining Soviet-Russian predominance, the creation of autonomous republics or districts was granted (as part of the RSFSR) for
5
Privileged interest countries are those in close proximity; neighbors, former Soviet republics, and former allies (Hill & Gaddy, 2016, p. 9).
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Adygea, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Circassia between 1921 and the beginning of World War II. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these administrative units were able to maintain their status as separate republics within the succeeding Russian Federation. It was the Chechens as the only nationality that demanded explicit secession from Soviet Russia rather than administering to Soviet rule. However in 1936, the Chechens were subsumed with the Ingush Oblast6 under the Chechno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) (Sagramoso, 2007, p. 684; Melvin, 2007, p. 10). In the course of World War II, the Chechno-Ingush ASSR as well as other republics were dissolved and re-established – albeit with partly new territorial divisions – in 1957. The end of World War II then was marked by massive deportations of entire ethnic groups in the North Caucasus (such as the Balkar, Chechen, Ingush, or Karachai). Fifteen years later, this was followed by the consecutive and mal-administered return of these groups which consequently gave rise to bitter disputes over land ownership. Substantial inter-ethnic tensions due to resettlements and subsequent discrepancies over border adjustments provoked ethnic violence and an escalation and clash in 1992 between Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The continuous political suppression by Moscow led to radicalization of the youth and religious extremism (Melvin, 2007, pp. 11) and ultimately paved the way for insurgency in the North Caucasus and the violent conflict flaring from the early 1990s until today.
The Russian government already at the initial phase of the conflict, in 1991, exerted a crisis management that ultimately resulted in the first and second Chechen war. Nevertheless there was no appeasement and pacification, and the conflict persists today. Because of government changes, major international crisis such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States (affecting crisis and counter-terrorism strategies worldwide) or the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the crisis mitigation strategy changed. Despite continuous efforts, the North Caucasus in its social fabric and political and economic framework is a most fragile region.
Despite a good number of analyses and research dedicated to the North Caucasus conflict, for example of the International Crisis Group, CSIS, or SIPRI (from a historical/ ethnic/ political point of view), a comprehensive overview and a detailed classification also with regard to the effectiveness in particular of the Russian approach to the crisis management over the past twenty years seems to be missing. It is the intention of this thesis to fill the
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gap. In particular, an overview of measures undertaken besides military force and the distinction between different government approaches of different presidents linked to different contexts of the crisis (Chechen separatism, North Caucasus terrorism, socio-economic instability, inter-ethnic violence) and to the situation of the Russian Federation itself (economic and political restructuring after the collapse of the Soviet Union, financial crisis in the end of the 1990s and in 2008/2009) will be compiled in the following.
1.1 Scientific relevance and link to the academic field of public administration The North Caucasian crisis is relevant both from a scientific and from a societal point of view because the region is still highly instable with a high unemployment rate, weak economic output, and a precarious political situation and thus flaring conflicts are likely to escalate and explode at every moment. It appears that the region proves resilient to stabilization programs and defies control from Moscow despite of being top priority for Russian crisis management. An analysis of the progression of the conflict as a consequence of the governmental interventions may provide valuable insights for further analyses in particular concerning crisis management across the country.
More specifically, the value of an analysis of the Russian crisis management with regard to the North Caucasus crisis lies in the peculiarities of the crisis itself: its long duration (over two decades) and persistency of participants, as well as its diverse nature – the coexistence of various different motives of a variety of different actors that are the different ethnic groups in the region having own clan structures and justice systems and apart from their conflict with the Russian government, engage in inter-ethnic conflicts at a local level. Thus the challenge for crisis management is to tackle the conflict between region and government as well as addressing inter-ethnic rivalries that may have nothing to do with the government. Crisis management in this context is about the improvement of living conditions of the North Caucasus population by advancing the level of social welfare, adjusting legal structures, providing economic security and infrastructures for education and medical care. The economic system, political leadership, education level, and infrastructure have to be likewise adressed as violent outbreaks and insurgences. Successful crisis management is of benefit for the Russian government but most essentially for the population itself. This proves the societal relevance of this research.
Embedded in the narrower field of crisis and security management, the subject matter of this thesis is strongly linked to public administration by approaching questions of effective
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and efficient organisation and governance of a policy problem – the problem of handling a domestic crisis which has high impact on the public at large: the national economy, politics, and security (considering the acts of terror exerted by North Caucasian terrorists within Russia, or for instance the effects a ‘losing’ of the region could potentially imply economic-wise). Public administration in itself is a multidisciplinary scientific field and concerned with governance-related challenges and political decision-making. This research addresses decision-making of the Russian government (hence public administration) towards conflict in one of its regions. The Russian CM approaches problems related to the social, economic, and political field which are all relevant in the realm of public administration.
1.2 Questions and objectives of the research
The following central research question is guideline for this thesis:
What has been the crisis management approach of the Russian government in the North Caucasus crisis from 1994 (the first Chechen war) until today, and was it effective?
Consequent sub-questions are:
1. How did crisis in Chechnya and the North Caucasus develop?
2. Did the change of Russian government (Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev) also have an influence on the crisis management?
3. What objective(s) did the Russian governments pursue with their crisis management approaches?
4. What other factors independent of the situation in the North Caucasus affected Russian crisis management?
Objective of this thesis is to analyze the North Caucasian crisis over the past two decades in perspective to the crisis management of the Russian government also including the intent to identify particular security actors involved (ministries, police, army, local elites). Moreover, the approaches followed since 1994 by the Kremlin to deal with the Chechen/ North Caucasian unrest shall be analyzed by evaluating public statements and speeches of the respective Russian presidents as well as official instructions/ regulations aimed at stabilizing the region. This compiled information will then be confronted with the reality of de facto operations by the government. The analysis is structured to depict a chronological and intensity-level progression of the government’s crisis response, thus reflecting the changing crisis (Chechen wars, spreading of the conflict to neighboring republics,
socio-7
economic and political situation) and considering influences from changing governments (Yeltsin/ Putin/ Medvedev/ Putin). The analysis will then attempt to link the crisis management approaches of the Russian government to the development of the conflict itself and also will provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of the chosen crisis management practices.
Lastly, this thesis shall provide a detailed overview, evaluation, and outlook of the Russian crisis management in the region of the North Caucasus.
8 2. Theoretical framework
An analysis of the Russian crisis management in the North Caucasus assumes the notion that the situation in the region is to be characterized as a ‘crisis’. Definitions of the term and concepts of ‘crisis’ however vary widely in academia and therefore the meaning of its use in this thesis needs further precision. Moreover, until now a coherent theory fundamental to ‘crisis management’ (and measurement of its effectiveness) does not exist and in fact, the question remains whether a consistent theory to provide guideline and options for actions of crisis mitigation (or emergency situation; disaster; catastrophe; …) would be of benefit for political leaders and policy makers. Nevertheless, in the following I will develop a brief working definition for this thesis.
‘Crisis’ is commonly perceived as a state of emergency, the exception to a ‘normal’ state of being. Thus, crisis is often regarded as a specific event that disrupts normality in a defined time and space (Roux-Dufort, 2007, pp. 105). This event-centered view of crisis narrows the duration and the reactions in response (the management of the crisis) down to a rather limited (and defined) period and thus would not apply for Chechnya and the North Caucasus case. However, Roux-Dufort suggests not to reduce a crisis to its triggering event (the symptom of it), but to include in the definition all founding and contributing elements, the political developments, the socioeconomic framework etc. that lead to this situation. Crisis would thus be seen as a “process of incubation” that refers to origin, development, and impact of a situation that disrupts order and normality (Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 106). In addition and for the purpose of this research, a crisis shall be viewed as a condition in which a pursuance of ordinary life (living without fear for survival, having the possibility of obtaining a steady job or accessing school (university) regularly) is not possible. While crisis is often considered as a particular disruptive event like the outbreak of war, the pre- and post-event situations still have to be considered and thus the term ‘crisis’ has to be used in a broader sense also comprising critical elements leading to a destabilization of normality and peak events persisting as long as normality of life is not ensured. By this definition, the North Caucasus endures a crisis with the entire region plagued by political and economic instability and violent conflicts that prevents normality of life. The beginning of the current crisis dates back to the early 1990s, escalating in the Chechen wars from 1994 to 1996 and later from 1999 to 2002. Then further escalation of violence and insecurity was brought by the terrorist attacks taking place mostly between 2000 and 2005 and again in 2010 and 2011 (Matveeva, 2012). There is no foreseeable end to the crisis although indications for normalization processes can be seen with a reconstruction of
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the public infrastructures and a recovery of the economy in Chechnya (Matveeva, 2007). Despite that the situation in the North Caucasus remains politically and socio-economically fragile. Violent clashes within its republics and terrorist acts on Russian territory by North Caucasus (mostly Chechen) fighters are regularly taking place (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 3) and provide evidence that the region is in unrest. In this thesis, the situation in the North Caucasus region therefore is considered as a state of crisis.
‘Crisis management’ (CM) is highly dependent upon the type of crisis it is supposed to tackle (economic crisis, political crisis) and entails all efforts and risk reduction options to mitigate the crisis and to re-establish a state of normality. Prior to CM, risk assessments have to be undertaken to identify the parameters, causes and origin(s) of the crisis to determine extent and direction of interventions to dissolve the crisis. On a state level, when the crisis is considered to affect larger areas and a larger proportion of the population thus carrying a (perceived) potential of threat to state security, crisis management is undertaken by the authorities. However, as Arjen Boin pointed out, CM concerns public administration, policy-makers, citizens and institutions alike. It poses political challenges and demands resilience (adaptability and perseverance) from citizens und public institutions (Boin, 2009, pp. 370). According to Boin, CM includes five consecutive phases: crisis preparation (training, simulation), sense-making of an evolving crisis (understanding what is happening), managing large response networks (interagency and intergovernmental coordination), offering credible answers to the public (framing), and defining lessons learned (Boin, 2009, pp. 371).
In this thesis, crisis management will be approached from a governmental perspective and all government actions aiming at solving the crisis in Chechnya and the North Caucasus will be analyzed. This includes an analysis of the Russian government’s framing of the situation in the North Caucasus over time which should reveal sense-making and meaning-making attempts. The latter is used to provide answers to the (Russian) public and all measures (financial, political, military) to tackle the crisis. The actions of preparation in anticipation of the actual outbreak of the crisis and the lessons learned by the Kremlin will here to a large extent be left aside with a consideration on the lessons taken from a scientific (outsider) perspective.
In order to analyze how the different Russian governments, or the Russian Presidents respectively, portrayed the situation in Chechnya and the North Caucasus to the Russian public, their ‘framing strategies’ shall be identified. Framing of a crisis or any political
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issue by a political leader, that is the deliberate presentation of an issue for a specific purpose, reveals two essential elements of political decision-making. First, the analyst gains insights into the leader’s (and his political elite’s) interpretation of the facts and second, what he intends to do about it. The first part entails both definition and diagnosis of the problem, and in addition a moral judgment. The moral judgment serves to attach a positive or negative connotation to the problem for influencing the public on an emotional level to gain support for specific political measures related to the problem. The second part demonstrates suggestion of remedies, which, as Robert Entman describes, is the proposal of solutions/ actions to be undertaken to tackle the problem and the predictions about their likely effects (Entman, 1993, p. 52). In this study of Russian crisis management of the North Caucasus/ Chechen crisis, the framing strategies of the Russian Presidents Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev will be assessed to reach insights into their different stances towards the North Caucasus region which might then explain their CM approaches. When assessing the effectiveness of the Russian CM, the differentiation among different strategies should allow a general judgment about the success of specific CM practices. Thus, not only the crisis management as a whole, but indeed each different measure receives evaluation which then allows for a differentiated picture about Russian CM in the North Caucasus. The analysis of the framing strategies of the Russian Presidents is essential for understanding how Chechnya and the North Caucasus were portrayed in Russia and how especially the extreme use of force by the Russian governments in the region was justified to the (Russian) public.
The following assumptions underlie the analysis:
(1) The Kremlin’s crisis management pursued different objectives during different presidential terms;
(2) And thus, the continuation of crisis in the North Caucasus is not merely based on bad governance, but on different approaches to and capitalizing on the crisis.
11 3. Methodology
In social research both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis can be followed. Quantitative approaches seek to depict numerical characteristics of a phenomenon, whereas the objectives of qualitative research are to understand the context and correlation of a phenomenon (often from the perspective of the involved entity). The epistemological interest is decisive for the choice of methodology. Qualitative research often is chosen if the object of investigation is a new incursion and barely studied or to explore the research area and develop hypotheses and theories. In contrast, the quantitative approach is mostly chosen to verify/ falsify already established hypotheses but may also be used to generate hypotheses (Quantitative vs. Qualitative Methoden, 2008).
For my research question a qualitative research design will be adopted because it is related to a specific case (the North Caucasus crisis) and involves a complex study as a basis to draw comparative conclusions (for crisis management studies). The Russian CM in its entirety (not limited to counterterrorism and warfare but including for instance socio-cultural, socio-economic, and political measures) from the beginning and during all phases of the crisis are set in correlation to the developing crisis, thus are subject of the analysis and for this, qualitative approaches are better suited. The research is designed as a holistic single case study. The intrastate conflict in the North Caucasus including the Chechen wars and the spread of the unrest to the neighboring republics (from 1994 to today) is the case to be analyzed. The unit of analysis (spatial coordinate) is the North Caucasian region itself, while the unit of observation (time frame) is the development of the conflict between 1994 and 2015. The crisis management of the Russian government is framed within these coordinates. All information necessary for conducting the analysis will be obtained by searching the available literature but in particular through internet searches for appropriate information on the governmental homepages of the Russian Federation, policy papers available and statistical analyses for instance of government spending for the region. The analysis comprises mainly an assessment of documents, mostly presidential speeches and public statements of the Russian government and of officials for the North Caucasus Federal District. For understanding the evolution of the crisis and especially the policies of the Russian government, a direct juxtaposition of crisis and crisis response poses an interesting approach and provides a new perspective on the conflict. To prove causality, dependent (outcome) and independent (explanatory) variables have to be determined. The co-variation to be proven would be the persistent and changing crisis as a dependent variable and the Russian crisis management as the independent explanatory variable (with
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more variables to account for, such as for instance the ethnic diversity, a strong Muslim tradition, historic reasons, etc.). To verify causality, the hypothetical reverse simulation (what would have happened/ would the situation be different without intervention by the Russian government) is taken to elute if the situation in the North Caucasus would be distinctly different. This will be part of the last part of this thesis, the discussion of the research.
Furthermore a general classification of the crisis management approach to the North Caucasus by the Kremlin will be undertaken. This means that categories for each intervention shall be developed in form of a register, connecting the specific phases of the crisis to policy changes/ initiations. These categories are a broad division in sections (socio-economic/ political/ military measures) and include all actors and their types of participation (local, national; governmental, nongovernmental; voluntary, mandated).
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4. The Russian crisis management in the North Caucasus
The following analysis has two aims: first, a descriptive overview of the historical development of the crises in the North Caucasus republics will be given. This gives an introduction to the topic and provides the necessary context and background as to better understand the crises and consequently the management of the situation in the region by the respective Russian governments. Secondly, the crisis management of the governments will be analyzed. The analysis of the framing strategies of the different Russian Presidents (Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev) shall elude whether a changing government also resulted in an alteration of the CM strategies towards the North Caucasus and especially Chechnya (second sub-research question). This is also essential to address the main research question on the effectiveness of Russian crisis management in the North Caucasus. The analysis of the framing strategies shall also reveal intentions of the governments and their perception towards their own crisis management and that of previous governments (third sub-research question). The fourth sub-research question reflects on potential influences on Russian CM approaches from the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 or the September 11 attacks on the United States (US) in 2001 leading to a ‘global war on terror’. This will be dealt with in a subsequent paragraph following a review of all crisis management measures undertaken by the Russian governments. This review will be approached via a synopsis especially of articles of the International Crisis Group, the Jamestown Foundation and other scientific studies. A scenario of a hypothetical alternative development of the crises on the basis of hypothetical different management approaches will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis.
4.1 History of the North Caucasus crises
This paragraph addresses the first sub-research question of this thesis: How did crisis in Chechnya and the North Caucasus develop?
The North Caucasus is stigmatized by imperial conquest and a centuries-long history of concomitant insurgency and fierce resistance against its suppressors. Especially during the Soviet era, in part arbitrary ethno-territorial arrangements and recurrent population relocations stirred ethnic conflicts and rivalry. Inter-ethnic violence and rivalry is a common phenomenon of the clan structures and multi-lingual populations in the NC region (Blandy, 2005, p. 3). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the initial developmental phase of the Russian Federation, disputes among NC republics, ethnic groups and federal authorities unfolded over political power as well as access to resources in the North
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Caucasus. Demands for territorial border amendments and structural reforms were accompanied by a leadership crisis at the regional level and the continuing resentfulness between the republics and Moscow. Among all, the structural legacy of the Soviet regime with its imposed administrative divisions, population displacements and the implementation of a new law fortifying these legacies (the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples) (Melvin, 2007, p. 15) triggered territorial discordancy. The law which became legally binding in 1991 regulated land claims and land ownership of former deportees (ethnic groups that were displaced in the course of the Second World War). In the NC republics this law was commonly perceived as the justification for a redefinition of territorial borders and the structure status of administrative units. Strives for regional sovereignty, leadership and governance were also provoked by explicit stimuli from the new Russian government led by Boris Yeltsin demonstrating an “initial” laissez-faire attitude. His exclamation in the early 1990s to regional leaders in Russia to ‘take all sovereignty they could swallow’ unleashed a ‘parade of sovereignties’ in which autonomous republics, oblasts and districts throughout the North Caucasus – led by Republics such as Chechnya (1991) – declared sovereignty (Melvin, 2007, pp. 15 - 16). Notwithstanding, these developments hardly followed any regulation and were chaotic to the extent that the Russian government itself had to sort out its internal political and institutional character due to the collapsing Soviet Union. A governing of political transition and re-organization of NC republics was moved much further down on the priority list. The rather chaotic situation is exemplified by the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The Chechen part of the republic declared sovereignty in November 1990 and pronounced itself Republic of Chechnya in May 1991. Subsequently, the Chechen-Ingush Republic was formally divided into the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic. However, the new demarcation between the two republics was not determined by law which thus evoked disputes between Chechens and Ingush and Ingush and North Ossetians over territory. The dispute soon evolved into violent conflicts between Ingushetia and North Ossetia in autumn 1992 after Moscow failed to clarify territorial borders (Melvin, 2007, p. 16). Almost 600 dead and tens of thousands of refugees were the result of the conflicting issue which continued to flare throughout the 1990s.Likewise, the neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria also struggled with ethnic independence claims almost ending up in a division of the republic. The entire Balkar ethnicity, constituting around 8% of the population, were deported under Stalin (in the course of the Second World War) and on their return, fierce disputes over land and the character of the republic continued into the 1990s. Encouraged
15
by the new law of 1991, the Balkars voted for independence from the Kabardins which was rejected by the Russian government leading to a perpetuation of the tensions between the two ethnic groups (Melvin, 2007, p. 16).
Claims for sovereignty and the redistribution of administrative power were shared by all republics in North Caucasus of the 1990s. However these were the only similarities and the only attempt to create a unified organizational entity, essentially to create a state independent from Russia, was the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, an organization destined to represent a sovereign state. It only existed however in the first years of the 1990s and ultimately dissolved due to internal discordance over the Confederation’s future (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 21 - 25). Beyond this, there was no consensus about a direction of territorial and political aspirations and as such, the republics all fought for their own cause. Most of the North Caucasus territories indeed followed the call for administrative sovereignty, while at the same time expressing loyalty to Russia. As such, the territorial disputes and political power plays were intended to achieve a change of status rather than secession from the Federation. Only Chechnya stood out in its strive for complete independence and consequently, violent clashes between republican and governmental forces as a result of Chechnya’s insistence on independence continued. In 1992, the Federal Treaty on the division of power between center and federal subjects was signed by all Russian republics – except for two, Chechnya and Tatarstan (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 18 - 21). Despite contrary intentions of the Kremlin, the Chechens voted for Dzhokhar Dudayev as their leader and President of the (sovereign) Chechen Republic, the latter of which they proclaimed without Russian consent. In response, Yeltsin declared Dudayev’s inauguration and the declaration of an independent Chechnya as illegal and announced a state of emergency. This was the beginning of a first military intervention in post-Soviet Chechnya which took place in the beginning of November 1991 (Pokalova, 2015, p. 26). Although the military action was promptly repealed due to the objection of the Supreme Soviet7, the Chechen response was a radical alienation from the center: Dudayev called for a holy war (jihad) and terrorist acts against Russia8. A considerable amount of weaponry left-behind from the short (two day) military operation by the Russian army circulated freely within Chechnya also since possession of firearms and drugs were legalized under
7
The Soviet Union was not dissolved until December 1991. At the time of military entry into Chechnya, in November 1991, the Supreme Soviet’s vote was still obeyed.
8
The first terrorist attack was carried out already in 1991: an airplane was hijacked to enforce a press conference to inform the world about the situation in Chechnya – all passengers were released unharmed. Hijacking and hostage taking became a popular tactic of Chechen separatists. Generally, hostages were released unharmed against ransom or else negotiated exchange (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 33).
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Dudayev. Crime and drug abuse rates escalated and by 1994, over 10,000 people were estimated to either have been killed or disappeared in Chechnya. The Yeltsin government, occupied with internal concerns related to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, considered the Chechen case as negligible and this permitted Chechnya a status of quasi-independence which lasted until the beginning of the war in 1994 (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 26 – 27).
Under Dudayev, the socio-economic situation in Chechnya deteriorated dramatically and 80 percent of the population was living below or near the poverty line. The high unemployment rate (around 75% by 1994) and the decrease of gross national and gross domestic production by around 70% led to the establishment and flourishing of a shadow economy, mostly based on illegal oil deals, money laundering, and counterfeit currency (the latter of which represented 40% of all counterfeit money circulating in Russia) (Pokalova, 2015, p. 28). To consolidate his position vis-à-vis an increasingly dissatisfied and seditious population and belligerent political opposition, Dudayev established a dictatorial ruling, dissolved the Parliament and the constitutional court. His persistent refusal to integrate the opposition led to mass protests in Chechnya’s capital Grozny and open, violent clashes between opposition forces and Dudayev’s followers (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 28 – 30). By the end of 1994, neighboring NC republics expressed their concern about the situation in Chechnya and explicitly appealed to Moscow in November 1994 in a mutual letter to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. Only the leaders of Dagestan and Ingushetia did not sign the letter as they opposed military actions (Pokalova, 2015, p. 21). Before applying military force in Chechnya and engaging into the first Chechen war, Russia attempted to regain control by supporting Moscow-loyal opposition groups, financially and by delivering military equipment. Failing to topple Dudayev, a first direct Russian involvement in the internal Chechen conflict was a covert operation in support of anti-Dudayev forces trying to storm Grozny on November 26, 1994. When this was successfully countered by Dudayev’s forces, the Yeltsin administration then decided for a military intervention. After an ultimatum to lay down arms lapsed unheeded by fighting groups, on New Year’s Eve 1994 Russian military divisions entered Chechnya to begin the siege of Grozny. The beginning of the first Chechen war then ended Chechnya’s de facto independence (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 29).
Contrary to the initial anticipation of a quick victory on Russian side, the military operation lasted almost two years: notwithstanding an overwhelming Russian force, the
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Chechens managed to adapt their “partisan” tactics and shifted the battlefield also to Russian territory via terrorist attacks which ultimately forced Moscow to enter into peace negotiations. Unforeseen circumstances such as civilian protest in Ingushetia and Dagestan (blocking streets for the passing Russian troops), the complexity of urban warfare, heavy resistance in the mountainous areas of south Chechnya, strategically planned terrorist attacks on Russian cities, and the support of Afghan mujahedeen9 fighters to Chechen fighters (training them in partisan warfare, assisting in recruiting foreign mercenaries) prolonged the war and ploughed the way for a bilateral political solution, rather than a unilateral (Russian imposed) military one (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 38). A first round of negotiations was agreed in June 1995 directly following a Chechen raid on a city in Russia’s Stavropol region (today one of the seven NC republics) as revenge for Russian attacks on Chechen cities. However, the ceasefire agreement and a half-hearted proposal for new elections adhered to not for long. Russian forces remained in Chechnya and a new, Moscow-imposed political elite was – briefly – appointed in parallel to the Dudayev regime (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 41). As a fierce response, Chechen fighters exerted one of the first nuclear terrorist attacks in the world, placing a radiological container in Moscow. Although the attack was unsuccessful and was subsequently downplayed by the government, it proved readiness and ability to act on Chechen side. It further highlighted the very serious security problem inherent to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) in the hands of terrorists (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 49). Fighting in Chechnya continued in defiance of the attacks. Moscow proceeded to regain control by organizing new elections regardless of the Dudayev leadership. Terrorist attacks on Russian soil (also on other NC republic’s territory, for instance Dagestan in January 1996) by Chechen fighters pursued and were countered by the persistent use of force on the Russian side. The Presidential elections in Russia, the re-election of Yeltsin in June 1996and subsequent elections in Chechnya with 68% of the votes in favor of Yeltsin provoked another series of terrorist attacks and the successful take-over of Grozny by the newly mobilized Chechen forces. This ultimately led to peace agreements finally signed end of August 1996. The assassination of Chechen leader Dudayev in April 1996 albeit a major military success of the Russians did not weaken the separatists. And the final verdict over Chechen sovereignty was postponed for another five years, until December 2001. While it is arguable that pressure from members of the Parliament and of a Russian public widely opposing further military operations in
9
Mujahedeen (or mujahidin) refers to jihad fighters; Muslims committed in defending Muslim lands or engaged in contributing to fight against the oppression of the state or foreign invaders consider themselves mujahidin (Tristam, 2016).
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Chechnya (which was about to raise its voice in the elections) led Yeltsin to agree on peace negotiations (Pokalova, 2015, pp. 57 - 59), terrorist attacks directed towards Moscow and the spreading of violence to neighboring NC republics had their share likewise in ending the war.
The post-war period after 1996 and until 1999 was marked by struggles for political power among the fragmented Chechen elite, clashes between local clans and fights among organized criminal groups. Moreover, the Chechen government was divided over the question of how to interact (or integrate) with Moscow and furthermore on the role of the Islam in the politics of the state. Radical islamists called for an islamization of the North Caucasus, and sharia law and an implemetation of an Islamic council were established to counter the radical’s monopoly over Islam by the ruling authority. In an attempt to push for a single Dagestani-Chechen Islamic state, Islamist militants (led by a group of Chechen army commanders) invaded Dagestan on August 30, 1999 and fought against Russian troops before being driven back after one week. In addition, further bombings in Moscow in September 1999 which were blamed on Chechens, and the claim that local terrorism was financed and armed by international Islamic militant groups (inter alia al-Qaeda) provided the justification for a second Russian military intervention in Chechnya in October 1999 (Melvin, 2007, pp. 22 - 23) which was ordered by the new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin10 (Melvin, 2007, p. 28).
The second Chechen war, starting shortly before the turn of the century, was toned and encouraged by a change in political leadership in Russia. Other than the first Chechen war, the second war was justified as an act of counter-terrorism to eliminate domestic and international terrorists (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011). With Vladimir Putin appointed as Prime Minister in August 1999 and soon taking over presidential functions, the strategy to tackle the North Caucasus problem and in particular Chechnya was adjusted to the new agenda of centralizing federal power and strengthening the state (both internally and especially externally). Stabilizing Chechnya and the North Caucasus in accordance with Russian interests (maintaining internal unity) was key to Putin’s political campaign, and the attack in Dagestan by Islamist militants in 1999 provided the pretext for demonstrating his ‘power vertical’ and introducing a set of federal reforms regarding state-region relations. In
10
By the time Putin was assigned Prime Minister of Russia in August 1999, Yeltsin’s health and alcohol problems severely limited his capacity to govern the country (“Boris Yeltsin: Master of surprise”, 1999; Mendelson, 2007). According to Russian constitutional law, in case of serious illness of the president his prime minister temporarily assumes his duties (The constitution and government structure, US Library of Congress). This is why Putin and not Yeltsin ordered the second military intervention in Chechnya.
19
2000, seven Federal Districts (FD) were established in Russia with new executive and legislative structures aligned with the central government and its power to remove leaders of republics and regions who violated constitutional order (Melvin, 2007, p. 24). The republics of the North Caucasus were subsumed with a handful of largely Russian regions to the Southern Federal District (SFD). However, the reforms implemented by the Putin administration hardly reached the North Caucasus region (and the SFD government). The violent conflict persisted and the political, economic, and social instability in combination with the still dominant regional power structures prevented modernization and establishment of federal structures. New tactics for regaining full control over the area were followed by merging smaller regions with other republics which was however instantly thwarted by intense protest of the respective population. A next government strategy was to replace local elites and to adjust the legislation to empower the Russian government to directly appoint regional leaders without regional elections: between 2005 and 2006, Dagestani, Kabardino-Balkar and North Ossetian leaders were all replaced by Putin appointees (Melvin, 2007, pp. 24 - 27).
In the meanwhile, the second Chechen war developed to one of the bloodiest military conflicts in the world (Melvin, 2007, p. 28). Russian troops invading Chechnya in October 1999, together with pro-Russian Chechen paramilitary forces, attacked Chechen separatist and by February 2000, the Russian side managed to seize Grozny. Despite the ending of the full-scale offensive and Putin’s declaration of Chechnya being under direct presidential rule in June 2000, armed conflict including heavy Chechen guerrilla resistance11 continued. Terrorist attacks by Chechen fighters, such as the Beslan school siege in 2004 in North Ossetia or the hostage-taking in a Moscow theatre in 2002, both claiming a high number of casualties, challenged Russian political control over Chechnya. Further attempts to consolidate federal power in the region included new political and administrative measures (for instance a new Chechen constitution, institutionalized in 2003) and the use of brute military force to eliminate Chechen resistance killing thousands of civilians. In the course of the Kremlin’s ‘Chechenization’12 policy during Putin’s second presidential term, Akhmad Kadyrov (and after his assassination in 2004 his son Ramzan Kadyrov) was appointed president of Chechnya mid-2000 (Melvin, 2007, p. 28): the combination of
11
Guerrilla warfare refers to the tactic of often small, mobile groups of irregular forces to use ambushes, hit-and-run raids, sabotage, and sometimes terrorism as means to counter larger and stronger enemy forces. The tactic is “harassment through surprise” (John Whiteclay Chambers II, 2000).
12
With ‘Chechenization’ the placing of Moscow-loyal Chechens in administrative and government positions by the Russian government is meant. This is done via strong federal support in the election campaigns and, in theory, should guarantee that the appointed person would act in favor of the center rather than according to the dominant clan of the republic (Blandy, 2005, p. 5).
20
being of Chechen origin and Moscow-loyal made him an ideal candidate in the eyes of Moscow. By 2006, the Russian government had succeeded in installing a pro-Moscow Chechen regime and reconstruction efforts were underway (Melvin, 2007, pp. 28 - 29). After the election of Ramzan Kadyrov as President of the Chechen republic in March 200713 (Melvin, 2007, p. 29), the centralization of power reminiscent of an ‘autocratic fiefdom’ (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 2) has led to a decrease in terrorist activities. This in turn prompted the Russian government to officially end its counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya in April 2009 which can be viewed as the final end of the second Chechen war. However, the level of societal security in Chechnya did not improve significantly (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 2).
One side-effect of the “normalization” process in Chechnya (entailing for instance the transfer of administrative control to a Chechen Republican leadership, or the withdrawal of parts of the Russian troops) gradually enforced by the Russian government since mid-2000 was the expulsion of Chechen insurgents to neighboring, predominantly Muslim, NC republics. Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria were mostly affected by the influx of these rabble-rousing groups and violence across the whole region escalated. This added to already weak political governance, extreme poverty, and repressive security services in the area (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 2).
The recent instability in the North Caucasus is not rooted in secessionist endeavors, but in the blending of general socio-economic instability and Islamist extremism. One consequence thereof is the foundation of a pan-North Caucasian “Caucasus Emirate”, an amalgamation of Islamist groups throughout the NC aiming at the creation of a single Islamic state. However, each republic has its own context for internal violence: Dagestan is primarily caught in religious division, mostly manifested in clashes between differently cultivated Islamist groupings; Ingushetia struggles with societal discontentment with the Moscow-appointed leadership; and Kabardino-Balkaria is divided over ethnic conflicts between the Kabardins and Balkars (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 2).
Recently, in the North Caucasus there is much less armed dispute happening. According to an estimation by the Jamestown foundation, a global research and analysis institute specialized on China, Eurasia, and terrorism, the figures on insurgent violence are around
13
At the time of his father’s death, Ramzan was too young to be elected president (minimum age to run for presidency is 30 years). Until 2007, Alu Alkhanov was formally president of Chechnya, although Ramzan already acted as most powerful man (Brouwers, 2007, p. 4).
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50 percent lower in 2015 compared to previous years (Vatchagaev, 2016a). The numbers of victims of armed conflict continuously declined since 2011, however the juxtaposition of numbers of people slayed and those wounded show a higher probability of Russian government forces to kill rather than to arrest militants (in 2015, 36 leaders of criminal groups have been eliminated by government forces, according to Moscow) (Vatchagaev, 2016a). Overall, the violence level in 2015 as in previous years seems to have been highest in Dagestan, followed by Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, and Ingushetia (Vatchagaev, 2016a). Thus, though Chechnya, with its Chechen wars, was the starting point of unrest in the North Caucasus, other republics replaced its role as troublemaker of the region. Moreover, an underground Islamist movement evolved in the last decade, leading to the creation of a Caucasus Emirate, officially proclaimed in 2007, and the forming of alliances of several North Caucasian jamaats14 with ‘Islamic State’-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2015. Particularly the massive numbers of North Caucasus-Russians going abroad to join the war in Syria were acknowledged by the Russian government as alarming, and fierce measures in order to tackle the problem of their return announced – a development which is projected to lead to a further destabilization of the region (Vatchagaev, 2016a). According to a recent publication of the Jamestown Foundation (Vatchagaev, 2016b), Russian military exercises in mountainous areas in Chechnya and Dagestan have resumed since the beginning of 2016. Although designated as exercises, the operations occur under real fighting conditions linked to new counter-terrorism operations ordered by the Russian government. The operations are conceptualized to search and arrest (or kill) rebel leaders and to track down any illegal armed groups: However, civilian casualties frequently occur due to local resistance against the Russian military presence or as ‘collateral damage’ in the course of these operations. As Dagestan is central to the armed Islamist underground movement in the North Caucasus, Russian military forces focus their actions increasingly on Dagestan rendering the republic increasingly into a war zone (Vatchagaev, 2016b). In sum, first conclusion to the sub-research question of how the crisis in Chechnya and the North Caucasus developed is that the crisis started as a separatist movements in Chechnya and was nurtured by economic and political instability also due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Military force deployed by the Russian government to mitigate the crisis did not solve the conflict, but instead increased tensions and led to an escalation of violence
14
A “jamaat” is an Islamic council or assembly; the word originates from the Arabic jama'at which means group or congregation (jamaat, n.d.).
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also to neighboring republics which hence explains the development of the crisis from being a Chechen crisis to evolving into a crisis of the entire North Caucasus.
The last twenty years of insurgence in the North Caucasus, besides separatist, religious extremist and economic elements, seem to be a reflection of different government stances and backgrounds. Yeltsin was faced with post-Soviet re-development of the new Russian Federation; Putin claimed strength and competitiveness of the recovering Russia, and Medvedev pursued a modernization policy for the country (Snetkov & Möckli, 2011, p. 2). Each political program displays a different crisis management strategy towards the North Caucasus and certainly has had its impact on the situation in the North Caucasus as a whole. Crisis management thus shall not be assessed as an “impartial” approach to merely restore political, economic, and social stability within a region but rather should be treated as a highly subjective endeavor to accomplish (state) goals. This implies that for analyzing Russian CM in the North Caucasus and evaluating its success/ failure, the (changing) perception of the Russian government with regards to its achievement goals and its respective management approaches need to be determined. The following paragraph hence addresses framing strategies of the last three Russian Presidents regarding Chechnya and the NC region in general by examining the President’s annual addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation15 during the last twenty years. The annual addresses have been chosen for reasons of comparability. Twenty-one speeches are to be analyzed which provides a solid base for defining the strategy each president pursued for Chechnya and the NC. Due to the spatial limits of this thesis, other speeches such as addresses in international conferences or speeches from other politicians of the same government are omitted. To maintain comparability, the analysis would have to be proportionally increased which however would be un-proportional in comparison to the purpose of this thesis in which the framing strategies only constitute half of the research. The analysis of the framing strategies of the presidents will be conducted solely on the basis of these annual addresses because the consultation of further literature distorts the picture of the framing strategies by adding alien (external) interpretations. Further studies, interpretations and research on the topic are included in the following paragraph. This should provide adequate proof for the findings.
15
The Federal Assembly of Russia is the Russian Parliament; the legislature of the Russian Federation which consists of two chambers, the Federation Council and the State Duma (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation).
23
Full transcripts of the annual addresses in English from the year 2000 onwards are available for analysis with the annual addresses of Yeltsin however only available as summaries. These synopses of Yeltsin’s annual addresses are primarily provided by the Russian news portal Sputnik which could arguably be biased and only very brief highlights of the respective speeches are enumerated which makes an interpretation difficult. Therefore, emphasis will be put on the speeches of Putin and Medvedev from 2000 to 2015.
The roughly one-hour16 annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation is a yearly update on the respective state of the country and its domestic and foreign policy priorities presented to the Assembly and appointed prominent guests. The address is broadcasted in Russian national television (“History of President Putin's Annual Address”, 2014).
4.2 Framing strategies of the Russian governments
This paragraph addresses the second and third sub-questions of this thesis: Did the change of Russian government (Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev) also have an influence on the crisis management? And what objective(s) did the Russian governments pursue with their crisis management approaches?
During the past twenty years, the situation in the North Caucasus experienced turning points that forced an adaptation of crisis management strategies and government attention focus. Conversely, the crisis in the North Caucasus also was shaped by Russian CM provoking strong responses and thus crisis and its management stimulated each other reciprocally. While during the 1990s, the government focused predominantly on the Chechen strive for independence, from the beginning of the 21st century onwards, unrest in other regions, economic instability and (religious) radicalization of young people and the international terrorism became priority and the ‘Chechen case’ became a secondary issue.
4.2.1 The era of Boris Yeltsin (1991 – 1999)
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the first President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin institutionalized the annual addresses to the Federal Assembly. His first speech was delivered in February 1994 under the title “On the Consolidation of the Russian State (the main directions of domestic and foreign policy)”.
16
The speeches of President Yeltsin were exceptions of this rule; his last speech in 1999 for instance lasted only 18 minutes (“Yeltsin's state of the nation speech”, 1999).
