Deadlocked or Moving Forward? Obstacles in the Development of European Defence Cooperation

Master Thesis

Track: Global Conflict in the Modern Era Dr. E. Cusumano

- 1 -

Index

1) List of Abbreviations Page 2

2) Introduction Page 3

3) Methodology Page 5

4) Literature Review Page 6

4.1) Incentives for EU Defence Development and Cooperation Page 6 4.2) Obstacles for EU Defence Development and Cooperation Page 9

5) Theoretical Framework Page 12

6) European Defence Cooperation Throughout EU History Page 15

6.1) European Defence Developments Between 1950 and 2018 Page 15

6.2) The EDC and WEU, CFSP and CSDP, EDA and PESCO Page 17

7) Analysis: Theories and Obstacles Page 20

7.1) Neorealism and the Influence of Growing Threats Page 20

7.2) Constructivism and Strategic Culture Page 23

7.3) Liberal Institutionalism and Institutional Issues Page 27

8) Conclusion Page 30

- 2 -

List of Abbreviations

EU = European Union

EDC = European Defence Community WEU = Western European Union

CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy CSDP = Common Security and Defence Policy EDA = European Defence Agency

PESCO = Permanent Structured Cooperation U.S. = United States

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization EC = European Community

USSR = Soviet Union

EDF = European Defence Fund

ECSC = European Coal and Steal Community

ESDP = European Security and Defence Policy (former name of the CSDP) TEU = Treaty on the European Union

EEAS = European External Action Service EUMS = European Union Military Staff U.K. = United Kingdom

PSC = Political and Security Committee ESS = European Security Strategy GDP = Gross Domestic Product

- 3 -

Introduction

Defence relations between the EU and the U.S. have taken a turn for the worse as President Trump has “questioned the alliance’s benefits for the U.S.” and has demanded that European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization increase their military spending (Meichtry and Norman 2018). In addition, events like the financial crisis, current complex threats and challenges, and the shift of the US towards Asia and the Pacific have increasingly led to statements by scholars and officials that if the EU wants to guarantee its own security, it has to “speak with one voice and bring its – combined – weight to bear” (Biehl et al. 2013, 7). Over time, increasing uncertainty and threats have prompted leaders of the EU Member States to ask whether the security of European citizens can still be guaranteed. Further, the idea of more defence cooperation and a potential European military force has been suggested by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron (Lough 2018; Chazan and Brunsden 2018; Stone 2018).

The idea for a European military force is not new. Ideas of a European military force had been considered a key priority soon after the EC had been established in 1952, then in the form of a so-called ‘European Defence Community’, but were set aside after multiple disagreements in the 1950s. However, since the shift in the international order in the 1990s after the fall of the USSR, the general but slow shift in world powers tilting towards a rising China, the increase in terrorism, and other continued military threats throughout the world, the EC/EU1 has revoked its former stance on defence and security and has taken a variety of steps to develop this field, such as common policy (e.g. CFSP and CSDP) and defence cooperation initiatives (e.g. EDA, CSDP missions, and PESCO). Although it seems that these have been quite successful, with new agencies being set up and several missions and projects including European forces worldwide, an official, entirely European military force has never been achieved.

Currently, the international community is facing a gradual but major shift in the balance of power. In particular, the EU is dealing with many problems, such as an unstable neighbourhood, continued national sovereignty proclamations and a European identity that has come under threat. By assessing continued developments of the European field of defence over mainly the last 30 years, and focusing particularly on the obstacles characterizing this period, the thesis will aim to analyze the ongoing evolution of European defence cooperation, including its successes and limitations, and why it has come ‘only’ to this point. For this, the following research question is key: why has the EU only

1 _{Due to name changes of the EU, the term ‘EC/EU’ will be used when talking about the years before 1993, for the}

- 4 - been able to come to the current level of cooperation and integration of EU defence and not any further? While strong developments of European defence cooperation have taken place between the 1990s and 2018, there have been no visible steps to create, for example, a potential unified EU military force. Are there perhaps obstacles that prevent this step?

Analysing the history and current status of European defence cooperation is particularly relevant, because some of the main EU leaders – that is, Merkel and Macron – have over the last few years expressed the desire for a fully unified European military force to be better equipped for the insecurity it currently faces and may continue to face in the upcoming years. Future actions regarding NATO are momentarily uncertain due to President Trump’s proclamations. Additionally, various regional threats in close proximity to the EU, such as those in Northern Africa, the Middle East and by Russia, continue to threaten EU defence and security. The necessity of maintaining military strength by itself in the international theatre is not unusual, but it seems the EU faces serious obstacles to achieve this. Therefore, by analysing what these obstacles have been or still are, it may be possible for the EU to work towards overcoming them to increase its own security by means of more ‘dense’ defence cooperation.

This thesis will try to add to the existing knowledge of EU defence cooperation by working in a qualitative way with both historical and recent defence documents and initiatives, as well as scholarly literature to point out the major challenges the EU confronted during the period of 1990-2018. First, the methods of research that have been chosen for the thesis will be mentioned; second, a literature review will be given and point out the ‘missing gap’ that will be broadly analysed in this thesis; third, a theoretical framework will state the hypotheses of the analysis; fourth, the thesis will give an overview of defence cooperation initiatives in the history of the EC/EU – that is, from 1952 until 2018; fifth, the topic of the thesis will be delved into by focusing on three major obstacles, which will be explained with three major theories – (neo-)realism, constructivism, and liberal institutionalism; lastly, the conclusion will summarize the thesis, refer back to the hypotheses to see to what extent these have been correct, and bring forward the answer to the research question.

- 5 -

Methodology

Data collection will consist of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources may consist of EU websites, reports, policies, and European states’ individual policies or decisions in the field of defence; secondary sources will consist of academic literature about e.g. the field of defence and the ideas and steps taken in the past towards a military force. The data analysis will consist mostly of qualitative research, because the thesis will look in depth into current state-of-the-art debates and defence documents to answer the research question. The thesis is structured and written in order to answer the research question from the ‘top perspective’ of EU institutions, committees, and ideas, and of national policies, documents and debates, instead of from the ‘bottom perspective’ of e.g. public opinion polls on the idea of a European military force.

In order to analyze data, two methods will be used: process tracing, which focuses on how X leads to Y through a causal-chain, and congruence analysis, in which theory will be put up against practice. A historical overview will be used to look at what ideas and/or steps the EC/EU has developed and/or taken in the field of defence during the time period of the 1990s until 2018. This overview will lead to the analytical chapter, which will explain three main obstacles that have been faced during the development towards a defence mechanism and defence cooperation and what this currently means and may mean for potential future progress – that is, why the cooperation has ‘only’ reached this point. This chapter will also discuss what is in theory possible for EU defence cooperation and what is actually possible in real-life. Specifically, three theories – (neo-)realism, constructivism and liberal institutionalism – will be put up against three main obstacles – those being the EU’s expected reaction to growing threats, its strategic culture, and its institutional issues. The analysis will demonstrate that in theory certain developments are possible, but in reality such progress in the EU remains difficult as a result of these three main obstacles.

- 6 -

Literature Review

Incentives for EU Defence Development and Cooperation

The focus in this literature review considers the main differences scholars claim to be the underlying incentives for EU defence development and cooperation from the 1990s onwards. All scholars acknowledge the major steps towards defence development taken by the EU from the 1950s through 2018, which will be explained in more detail below. In short, those steps include the following: the (problematic) creation of the EDC and WEU, the establishment of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersburg Tasks, the St. Malo meeting, the CSFP/CSDP, the EDA, the EDF, the CSDP missions, and PESCO. In contrast to overall agreement on steps taken by the EU, scholars do not seem to share consensus on what specific incentive has motivated EU defence development and cooperation. Instead, they bring forward a great variety of incentives. Some of these proposed ones can be linked to different schools of thought, whereas others are more related to events that have taken place in the past. The fact that differences exist, and that most if not all of the proposed incentives seem to be based on clear evidence, indicates that more than just one incentive can rightly explain why the EC/EU started developing its field of defence – that is, all can be considered important, but which incentive scholars choose to emphasize depends largely on the topic of scholars’ research. This is also true for the differences in obstacles that have been mentioned, which will be analysed in more detail in the thesis. Scholars also cite varying roadblocks for defence development and cooperation, which will shortly be touched upon in the literature review as well.

Dyson (2013) argues, on the basis of (neo-)realist ideas, that the key driving force for defence cooperation has been so-called ‘reformed bandwagoning’ on U.S. defence capabilities and materials. In his article, he states that the EU continues to bandwagon on its closest and vital ally – that is, the U.S. – for “opportunistic gain”, but is also developing its own field of defence – hence the term ‘reformed’ bandwagoning (Dyson 2013, 425). The CSDP is a pillar in the process of continued bandwagoning, but is set up as a response against the U.S. as well as to initiate the development of a fully European military field that could oppose the U.S. (Dyson 2013, 425). Two of the reasons for the decision of EU Member States to develop its own military field alongside U.S. and NATO alliances are abandonment and entrapment. Abandonment points towards one of the allies de-aligning from the other for any particular reason and perhaps aligning itself with the enemy. Entrapment, on the other hand, is related to a conflict situation in which one ally initially is involved, but due to the alliance made between several states, more states will be ‘dragged into’ the conflict – sometimes perhaps even against the latter’s will. Haroche (2017) presents a relatively similar finding linked to

- 7 - the relation between the U.S. and the EU, and European security guarantees. Considering the analyses of other (neo-)realists, Haroche argues that the development of the defence sector in the EU can be linked to U.S. unipolar hegemony, transatlantic frictions, and decreased predictability and reliability for U.S. actions – e.g. with the fear of potential disengagement (2017, 228).

On the other hand, Selden (2010) opposes the often mentioned idea of (neo-)realism that positions states’ actions in relation to threats, or the belief that states are expected to adjust their behaviour and expand their capabilities to guarantee security and survival (Stein 2015). Selden argues this does not (fully) explain the actions of the EC/EU in the 1990s, because the EC/EU never intended to develop its military field in order to balance or compete against the U.S. military (2010). Further, given that Europe’s biggest threat – that was, the Soviet Union – was gone by the time that the EC/EU started to develop its field of defence, hence the EC/EU was not acting in relation to threats and survival according to his argument (Selden 2010, 398). Meyer and Strickmann point towards the same conclusion, mentioning that “after all, the cold war was over, there was no direct and existential threat and most EU member States were sheltered under the umbrella of Nato” (2011, 63). Although scholars did recently start to support the survival and security arguments of (neo-)realism after the increase in EU talks and recent terrorist attacks, the argument that the EU did not act in relation to threats and crises in the 1990s seems to be confirmed by more scholars too (see Haroche 2017, 226).

Selden (2010) instead argues in favour of liberalist ideas of institutions to explain increased defence development in the EU. He argues the increased motivation for the EU to develop itself further in, amongst other areas, the field of defence is mainly because ‘it can do so’. The institutional development of the EC/EU had reached the point of solving previous internal issues and consolidating authority over internal affairs in the 1990s, enabling the EC/EU to increase its capacities and capabilities for events outside of its borders (Selden 2010, 398-399, 407). To be able to do this, the EC/EU had started to develop, for example, institutional mechanisms, military capabilities, and later CSDP missions. Arguing along similar lines of institutional incentives are Anderson and Seitz, who mention that the EU’s development of a foreign, security and defence policy in the 1990s can be linked to its aim of starting a “nation- or identity-building project” to find or create a European identity, which was necessary for further integration (2006, 25, 29). Howorth (2001), however, has argued that the EU may not have been ready, because institutional issues still persisted. It should be noted that there is a small difference in what years they refer to (one of approximately five to ten years, between 1993 and 2000). Howorth addresses three issues that needed to be resolved in order to improve defence development and cooperation: first, the relationship and friction between four institutional, mainly political, bodies/committees; second, the role of the High Representative of the

- 8 - CFSP, which coincides with the roles of two other positions within the EU; and third, the role of two of the most important bodies of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament (2001, 774-777).

In relation to the ideas of constructivism, Haroche has mentioned that European defence cooperation can perhaps be better explained by taking into account social interaction between EU Member States – that is, by looking at interdependence (2017, 231). He argues that states are more likely to act together when they are ‘mutually vulnerable’, when one state’s actions and interests can harm another state’s security, or because two states need each other’s assistance against a common threat (Haroche 2010, 231). Yet, because the EU has many states, each with their own interests and their own perception of what is threatening to them, it is argued that the EU is particularly vulnerable for ‘asymmetric crises’, in which a threat is greater for one state than for another (Haroche 2010). It has, however, been mentioned by several scholars that differences in perceptions may not necessarily mean that defence cooperation is impossible and that differences can also change on a short-term basis (Meyer and Strickmann 2011, 64-65). Biehl et al. (2013) have also argued along the lines of constructivist ideas of identity and culture by placing emphasis on differences between national strategic cultures. They dispute Meyer and Strickmann’s observation by arguing these differences may have, in fact, been the cause of a “slow and cumbersome” process of defence development and cooperation in the EU (Biehl et al. 2013, 7-8).

In contrast, scholars have also contended theoretical schools of thought fail to explain the underlying reasons for increased defence cooperation; instead, real-life events in the last decade(s) of the twentieth century can be considered incentives for European defence matters and policies. It is worth mentioning that both IR theory and key events could have served as motivating factors, rather than one or the other. Additionally, scholars may have placed more emphasis on one or a few of these potentially eye-opening events while neglecting others that may have been overlooked in the analysed literature, but were significant nevertheless.

Several real-life events have been mentioned by various scholars. Winn argues the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 transformed the ideas of security and defence and further encouraged the development of the defence sector in the EU (2003, 48-49). Violakis mentions the role of NATO as security provider for the EU declined after the Cold War, giving an incentive for EU Member States to cooperate to guarantee their own security (2018, 35). Larivé (2014) build on Violakis’ stance, arguing the end of the Cold War in general was critical for EU security and defence. The collapse of the USSR heavily influenced the creation of the CSDP (the first policy specifically on security and defence in the EU) and lead to a rethinking of what kind of security actor the EU wanted

- 9 - to be (Larivé 2014). Additionally, new conflicts were taking place throughout the world – for example in the Balkan, in Kosovo and in the Gulf – which further “contributed to the deepening of the integration process” of EU security and defence (Larivé 2014, 51, 58; Smith 2017, 25). Furthermore, Litsas has argued that an interplay of two, mostly internal and institutional, post-Cold War events can explain the new steps that were taken for a common defence and security policy: “bureaucracy in Brussels seemed more confident in adopting a new security role for Europe” and “many European politicians expressed their willingness to assist in taking the next step” (2017, 58). Like Litsas, Howorth also cites several of the aforementioned external events that have influenced (new) European security approaches:

“The end of the cold war, the advent of globalization, debates on Washington’s Capitol Hill about burden-sharing, US projects for military resource redeployment towards the Asia-Pacific theatre, the acceleration and intensification of European integration, and the concomitant perceived need for the EU to become a political actor commensurate with its economic and commercial clout” (2001, 767).

Commonly mentioned incentives are the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, in particular the Kosovo War in 1999 (Gordon 2000; Howorth 2001; Latawski and Smith 2003; Perruche 2014; Smith 2017; Allen 2012; McGiffen 2005, 51). For most scholars, the wars can be considered a very important turning point for EU defence perspectives, indicating that “something serious has to be done” (Howorth 2001, 771), because the EC/EU felt heavy reliance upon the U.S. for taking actions in the wars was humiliating. Further, the EC/EU wondered if the outcome of the wars could have been different should they have assumed a more involved role in the conflicts (Gordon 2000, 14-15). However, not all scholars cite the wars as an incentive for EU defence. The Kosovo War specifically may have arguably had a limited effect, given that the agendas of several EU Member States were already set on the development of EU defence despite the war (Latawski and Smith 2003, 137-138).

Obstacles for EU Defence Development and Cooperation

(Neo-)realist, liberal institutionalist and constructivist theories would have predicted the EU to have a more elaborately developed defence sector by now, but in reality, practice indicates various obstacles have prevented them from doing so. Therefore, in the case of the EU, it is needed to put theory against practice to see what is actually possible. Some of the obstacles are touched upon in the literature, but do not emphasise enough to what extent they have influenced or can influence the defence development and cooperation processes. First, issues such as the three mentioned by Howorth (2001) do count as some of the obstacles for EU defence development. Norheim-Martinsen touches

- 10 - upon similar problems in the early 2000s by stating the issue of policy- and decision-making in the EU, which seems to be in accordance with the issues of Howorth (Norheim-Martinsen 2012, chapter 3). Others argue issues that may hamper the development of EU defence are, for example, financial issues such as the lack of financial resources for defence matters, inefficient spending of the defence budget by the EU, and inadequate integration of EU defence matters (Heidenkamp and Akaltin 2012; Howorth 2019; Smith 2017). Thus, a wide range of institutional issues are mentioned, but to what extent do they influence defence processes, and how could they perhaps be tackled?

Second, while it is argued asymmetry can be an incentive for EU Member States to start developing a common defence, when one considers a threat to a single state could negatively impact the collective, asymmetry can also be an obstacle for EU defence cooperation (Haroche 2017). That is, an attack on or crisis in one EU Member State often will be damaging for the others due to the structure of the EU. If one Member State considers a crisis more threatening than another Member State, one may avoid or delay action, whereas the other will be asking for immediate action; this can lead to discussions and disagreements and will pose a problem for cooperation. Yet, this potential obstacle, as well as other issues due to these differences in strategic cultures and identity, do not seem to be touched upon enough in the case of EU defence development and cooperation. However, it is important to consider the differences in culture and identity as cause for fractionalisation among EU Member States, as the EU consists of so many different (strategic) cultures, values, and identities which influence national strategies and preferences, and consequently, EU cooperation perspectives.

Third, (neo-)realism can perhaps be considered the strongest school of thought to explain increased EU defence development and cooperation and seems to relate best to the practical events. Yet, two important concepts, which could undermine or challenge the mentioned arguments of closer cooperation on a supranational level, are not touched upon enough in the literature: national interests and sovereignty. The two concepts could be considered some of main obstacles and should be analysed better by positioning theory and the literature up against practice, as the EU – being an institution or organisation and not a state – has faced many problems due to these two concepts in the past and continues to face problems, e.g. for (foreign) policy making.

Obstacles faced by the EU in its defence development and cooperation have, thus, been brought up in the literature, but should be discussed and analysed more in depth, particularly in relation to (neo-)realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The obstacles, together with the defence development and cooperation process of the EC/EU until now, can better explain why the EU has only come for so far in its defence processes, especially since the ‘ultimate’ goal has recently been set on a united European military force. Moreover, by linking them to the schools of thought,

- 11 - the EU can observe better where the problems lie and how theory clashes with practice and reality. Further, they can start thinking about how to tackle or deal with these for the future. This ‘gap’ in research will be addressed through this thesis.

- 12 -

Theoretical Framework

It is known that the EC/EU has been particularly successful in the field of economics, where it has been able to create a relatively solid and unified union with economic rules and regulations compulsory for all Member States and with one common currency used in the majority of the Member States. Politically, it has also taken several successful steps to try to align foreign policies of Member States and to create one common foreign policy for external affairs of the EU. Could it be possible for the military field to reach this point as well – that is, to have a unified, common European military force? In theory, a unified military force initially seems possible, especially when taking into account what the EU has already been able to achieve, which will be explained in more detail below. However, in practice, the EU still seems to be struggling to get to ‘the next level’ of defence cooperation due to several obstacles. To understand what the EU has been able to achieve until now, but not further, and which obstacles have been most important during this whole process, the analysis will be based – as mentioned above – on three schools of thought, each with its own related obstacle. As such, before the analysis will be conducted, this theoretical framework will set out three hypotheses.

First, (neo-)realism focuses mainly on the distribution and balance of power. These are argued to be the main factors for how states behave, how they try to safeguard their own security, and how stability is created in the international system (Stein 2015, 26). The realist perspective emphasizes that states aim for survival and adjust their interests and power to what is needed to reach and guarantee this aim. For international politics, this means states would initially rely on self-help, but will have to cooperate and will expand their capabilities and power in times of common threats (Stein 2015, 26; Selden 2010, 398). In the case of the EU, therefore, it is expected that Member States will work together in the field of defence more than in the past, because of continuous and new developments and threats in its neighbourhood (e.g. conflicts in and threats coming from Russia, the Middle East, and Northern Africa). Increased cooperation is expected due to the fact that these developments are threatening the EU as a whole, not just particular Member States only. Additionally, Member States’ leaders are also aware of the tensions within NATO, particularly due to statements of President Trump and his shift of interests and suspicion towards China, which can bring back memories of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s and again increase doubts about relying on the U.S. for defence. Although there have been issues in the past regarding sovereignty and national interests – two very important concepts – (neo-)realism expects these will be set aside for the sake of creating and guaranteeing European security for all Member States against the many serious threats that the EU is currently facing. Therefore, in relation to (neo-)realism, the hypothesis is that EU Member States will work towards a unified military force to become (more) independent, to seek balance

- 13 - against the increasing number of common threats, and to guarantee the feeling of security of the EU for the future.

Second, constructivism is a theory based on concepts such as rules, ideas, language and knowledge, influenced by social environments and by history, which enable us to construct and make sense of the world around us while shaping our preferences, identity and behaviour (Barnett 2018; Fierke and Wiener 2001, 123). States are exposed to continuous interaction with other states’ norms or identities, which leads not only to the shaping of new preferences, identities, and behaviour, but can also lead to a change in them – a phenomenon named ‘social learning’ (Checkel 2001, 53). Additionally, interaction, identities and social communities are often different per state. Therefore, it is highly likely that differences exist, and will continue to do so, between the strategic cultures that states choose to follow. To clarify, strategic culture had initially been defined by Jack Snyder in 1977 – in relation to the strategic cultures of the U.S. and USSR in the Cold War (Biava et al. 2011, 1227). Due to the fact that the Cold War definition is too narrow to be applicable here, strategic culture is defined in relation to constructivist ideas, proposed by Meyer as

“comprising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals” (2005, 528).

In the case of the EU, it is expected to most likely continue struggling with establishing a common strategic culture due to issues with the European identity and differences in norms, habits, preferences and values in its Member States. With the rise of populist and nationalist parties and the crises that the EU is facing, the feeling of ‘belonging to the EU’ and feeling like a European citizen has come under pressure (European Commission 2018a; European Commission 2018b). As a result, it will be harder to come to an agreement on one common strategic culture. Furthermore, factors such as geographical location, norms and values can influence national strategic cultures, which appear to be very different throughout the Member States, and can also influence disagreements about one common European strategic culture. Therefore, the hypothesis in relation to constructivism is that the EU will have great difficulty to come to an agreement for one common strategic culture.

Third, liberalism generally supports the spread and preservation of concepts such as freedom, autonomy, rights, equality, democracy, liberty, justice and free trade. To incorporate the most important parts of what liberalism stands for, it is defined here as:

“the implementation of modern political practices in its method of governing as well as in its slow but steady drive towards a social inclusiveness that embraces individual recognition and

- 14 - participation, as well as in its resolute commitment to safeguarding fundamental human well-being” (Freeden and Stears 2013, 1-2).

In addition, one form within liberalism – that is, liberal institutionalism – highly supports institutions and their stability in order to preserve individual rights, equality, well-being, protection, outcome maximisation and economic regulations. In the case of the EU, it is expected that Member States will increase their defence cooperation, as by doing so they can get the maximum and best outcome for all parties involved. Cooperation is mutually beneficial – e.g. for sharing of knowledge, resources and money – and will enable the best outcome for all EU Member States, because they are all connected and an attack on one may cause harm to (all) other Member States. The EU may face some issues, but should be able to overcome these, considering the fact that it has been built upon institutions ever since it came into existence in the 1950s, and does have the experience of making and changing regulations where necessary. Consequently, once the adjustments have been made, the EU should be able to further the development of defence cooperation. The hypothesis is, therefore, that EU Member States will work together more in the field of defence over time. This will make the EU and its defence mutually beneficial and will enable a maximum outcome for all parties involved after tackling (potential) issues. This, then, can enable further developments for European defence cooperation and a potential EU military force.

- 15 -

European Defence Cooperation Throughout EU History

European Defence Developments Between 1950 and 2018

The idea of a European military force goes back to the 1950s, when it was attempted to create the EDC between the then six members of the ECSC (Trybus 2016, 3; Klemm 2016). This plan was created, but never went into effect and pushed ideas and talks of a European military force off the agenda for almost 40 years. After the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, ideas for a defence sector were brought up again for the first time. At this point, the EC/EU started to undertake the first steps towards the creation of plans for defence at the European level, instead of at the national level only. The meeting in Petersberg Castle in 1992, the St. Malo meeting in 1998 and the Cologne and Helsinki Summits in 1999 can be seen as the first ‘recent’ EC/EU meetings for the initiation of developing the field of defence and for increasing defence cooperation after the creation of two defence and security pillars in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, in which the idea for a European defence and a potential military force was brought up again (Gordon 2000, 1; Winn 2003, 52; Howorth 2019, 64-65; Cornish and Edwards 2001, 588; Violakis 2018, 122; Major and Mölling 2010, 12). Yet, transferring defence for a great part from only the national level to both the European and national levels, and creating an official European military force have been controversial topics due to the concept of, amongst other key issues, national sovereignty.

Revoking ideas of a European defence cooperation and military force after as much as 40 years can be explained by several historical occurrences. The position of Europe in the international theatre during the first decades of the second half of the 20th century was uncertain. After the end of the Second World War, Europe was shattered and many states needed to start rebuilding cities from scratch. The U.S. financially supported and helped rebuilt the Western European states by means of capitalism through the Marshall Plan, while the USSR exercised leadership and rebuilt the Eastern European states by means of communist ideals. From 1945 until the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, this led to the inability of Europe to come together as a unified, international actor. In addition to the inability to unify the continent, Europe remained economically dependent on the U.S. for quite some time after the Second World War and became militarily dependent on the U.S. – through NATO – until at least the end of the Cold War. During this period of uncertainty and U.S. dependence, Western European states nevertheless worked their way towards a cooperation of six states: in 1952, the ‘ECSC’ was created, which later expanded in rounds and changed its name into the ‘EU’ in 1993. It developed itself since the 1950s and became stronger economically and politically, but still remained divided on other fields. Especially in the field of defence, the EC/EU was nothing more than a

- 16 - cooperation of national defence policies; that is, during the Cold War it had no strategy for defence at the European level (Peterson 1996, 129).

However, the (near) ending of the Cold War in 1990-1991 and related occurrences during the 1990s led to a change in the EC/EU’s attitude on defence. It has been argued that the rise to power of Gorbachev in the USSR had been an incentive for new ideas for security and defence in the EC/EU, as the coming of a new Soviet leader improved the ideas of EC/EU strength and increased Western European openness towards Eastern European states (Peterson 1996, 42-43). Furthermore, the wars in the Balkans, specifically the one in Kosovo, in the 1990s played an enormous role in putting the idea of an European defence cooperation – and later perhaps an independent military force – back on the agenda (Gordon 2000, 14; Cornish and Edwards 2001, 588; Perruche 2014, 433; Violakis 2018, 152; Larivé 2014, 52). As previously mentioned in the literature review, the EC/EU felt humiliated due to its heavy reliance on the U.S. and questioned itself what would have happened if they could have been stronger and/or in charge in these wars (Gordon 2000, 14-15). Altogether, the events in the 1990s have been argued to have exposed the Member States’ military limitations, the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ between what the Member States want to achieve with defence cooperation and what is actually possible to carry out, and the U.S.’ lack of reliability as a military ally in the future as it may not want to get involved (again) in crises across the Atlantic if they were to happen (Hill 1993; Larivé 2014, 52).

Due to the political and economic successes of the EC/EU until the 1990s and the changing international order, it has been argued that “the increasing collective character of EU construction could from then on no longer leave out the security and defence aspects” (Perruche 2014, 433). This was the path that the EC/EU then decided to embark. Despite the knowledge that the EU was not strong enough to become a military power by itself at that moment – due to, amongst other issues, shortcomings on institutional, military and security, and foreign policy aspects (Peterson 1996, 40, 148; Klemm 2016) – the EC/EU revoked the ideas of a European defence cooperation and started the process of creating a stable field of defence. Some examples of the steps taken by the EU between 1990 and 2018 are: the Petersburg Tasks2, the EU Battlegroups3, the Common Security and Defence Policy4, the European Defence Agency5, the European Permanent Structured Cooperation6. However,

2 _{For more information, see https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/petersberg_tasks.html.}

3 _{For more information, see}

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/33557/EU%20Battlegroups.

4 _{For more information, see}

https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.

5 _{For more information, see https://www.eda.europa.eu/home.}

- 17 - despite what has been mentioned by some analysts, the EU does not want to replace NATO. Security and defence initiatives could rather be seen as efforts to increase the EU’s visibility and voice in the international theatre – or, as mentioned in relation to the ESDP, “for nation-building purposes” (Anderson and Seitz 2006, 29).

The EDC and WEU, CFSP and CSDP, EDA and PESCO

It is worth highlighting and reviewing four major steps in particular: the EDC and the WEU, the CFSP and CSDP7, the EDA and PESCO. These initiatives can be considered major steps, because the EDC was the first related idea for the EC/EU; the CFSP and CSDP were the first official defence-related initiatives that were created and implemented after 40 years of putting defence aside; the EDA was an initiative that oversees defence-related actions within the EU and aims to support Member States where needed; and PESCO is the newest EU cooperation initiative that is fully aimed at deepening EU defence cooperation and increasingly working together with binding commitments. Together, these four initiatives have shown that the EU is motivated to develop its field of defence, that it supports Member States in the development and cooperation processes, and that it is taking serious steps towards deepened cooperation and perhaps for the aimed unified, fully European military force.

At the start of the 1950s, Jean Monnet and René Pleven brought forward the ideas of a European defence program and a European army. Together, they would have formed the EDC, which would have been the first step in European defence matters. In the context of European insecurity due to the neighbouring communist threat and the start of European integration with the ECSC, the EC/EU aimed to integrate armed forces and defence policies from all six members involved and to rearm West Germany safely within strict boundaries; in particular, the French were very careful with West German rearmament and wanted to keep the latter’s armed forces as small as possible (Koutrakos 2013, 6; Cottey 2018, 126; Chappell and Mawdsley 2019, 18; Staab 2013, 153). In 1952, the official Treaty for the EDC was signed by all six ECSC members. Ultimately, however, it failed to be ratified in 1954 due to the rejection of the French Parliament, which then deemed the EDC too ambitious and was divided over its benefits – supporting European integration – and its risks – incurring a major loss of sovereignty to a supranational body, the simultaneous presence of a (weak) French army in Europe and Indochina, and rearmament of (West) Germany. (Larivé 2014, 60-61; Cottey 2018, 126; Staab 2013, 154). This failure led, however, to the creation of a similar but weaker EU defence-related

- 18 - cooperation in 1955, the WEU, which had no armed forces and served only as “an administrative and consultative organ that merely added a European perspective to NATO’s decisions” (Staab 2013, 154). With a strong ‘back-up’ alliance for cases of emergency, NATO, the WEU would be the sole, yet relatively weak, European body for defence until the end of the 1980s – a period until which the ECSC set aside military matters and mainly focused on economic (European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community) and political (European Political Cooperation) integration.

From the 1980s onwards, the EC/EU started developing the political and foreign policy field, which led to the creation of the CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht/Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1993. One part of the CFSP was attributed to defence in particular, but was not fully completed until the end of the 1990s. Several meetings had been held between 1990 and 1999, when the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and the ESDP was completed. The British-Franco St. Malo Joint Declaration of 1998, and the Cologne and Helsinki Summits of 1999 were all taken into account when drafting the Treaty of Amsterdam and for completing the ESDP. At the Nice Summit in 2000, the official institutions for this body were formalized: the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Staff, and the EU Military Committee (Staab 2013, 156). The full implementation of the ESDP/CSDP meant, among others, the following: the EU could from now on develop its aim for a common defence, including (armed) forces such as for the EU Battlegroups and CSDP missions from 2003 onwards; the WEU obtained more responsibilities in the military field, such as decision-making for any defence-related action and for the Petersberg Tasks; and the EU now had an official field dedicated to international military, crisis, peacekeeping, and security affairs and potential operations which could be acted out (McGiffen 2005, 52, 54; Bickerton et al. 2011, 4; Sweeney and Winn 2017, 4).

In 2004, another step was taken for European defence cooperation: the creation of the intergovernmental EDA. The agency was established to support EU Member States and the Council in order to improve EU defence capabilities for crisis management, to continue the development and aims of the ESDP, and to monitor and assist the process of the reforming of defence at national and European levels (European Defence Agency 2012, 8; Larivé 2014, 91-92). It brings together “capabilities, research and technology, armaments and industry and market experts”, and gives Member States the opportunity to develop defence capabilities through cooperation and ‘pooling and sharing’ (European Defence Agency 2012, 8, 11). Especially after the financial cuts in the field of defence in many Member States after the crisis in 2008 (Larivé 2014, 89), the defence sector was in need of organizational and financial stimulus, both in expertise, financial (for which the European

- 19 - Defence Fund is helpful) and material means. However, the EDA was not able to provide this stimulus, given its specific focus on research and training. Despite this shortcoming, the EDA’s mandate to support a variety of defence topics, such as maritime surveillance, space and air, emerging technologies, and defence procurement, ensures its importance as an advising body to the development of national and military capacity and capabilities (European Defence Agency 2012). This is important for potential future defence initiatives, because without the right capacity and capabilities, the EU could fail its operations and thus cannot become a real global military actor.

Last, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was initiated in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, but was only fully established in December 2017. It is linked to the EDA, the EEAS – including the High Representative – and the EUMS, because these are part of the PESCO Secretariat, which fulfil the functions of assistance to PESCO and the coordination and facilitation of projects (PESCO 2020). Currently, 25 Member States are part of PESCO and work together to ‘deepen’ the cooperation in the field of defence through “binding commitments to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities more together” (PESCO 2020). Moreover, PESCO has been set up as a voluntary cooperation initiative to “jointly arrive at a coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities available to Member States for national and multinational … missions and operations”, to define “the commitments concerning both operational objectives and capability development”, and to “create a capacity for autonomous action” for crises (PESCO 2020; Drent et al. 2017, 14; European Parliament 2017, 14). It is funded by the EDF, it supports and complements existing defence initiatives in the EU – mainly the CSDP – and currently also has 47 projects, including in areas such as land, maritime, air and cyber, that are being developed under its own name (PESCO 2020). Due to the fact that PESCO is relatively new and still has ongoing and in development projects, it is difficult to analyse its success up until this point. Before PESCO was created, it had been argued that for this EU body to add value to the field of defence in the EU, and to prevent falling into the trap of previous defence initiatives with relatively little success, it “has to deliver”, “needs to convince”, and “should be open to third parties” (De France 2017, 14-15). First results on the performances of PESCO have shown that it is, however, struggling to define its commitments and to turn decisions into practice (Zandee 2018, 3, 11). Yet, it is still too early to conclude that PESCO has been unsuccessful, and therefore, the upcoming years will be crucial in order to analyse and conclude this. The initiative to deepen cooperation itself is, however, a promising step towards future defence cooperation and perhaps a unified military force in the EU at some point.

- 20 -

Analysis: Theories and Obstacles

(Neo-)Realism and the Influence of Growing Threats

As mentioned previously in the thesis, (neo-)realism argues that states will cooperate in times of a common threat to ensure security. In the case of European defence cooperation, realists initially assumed that this would be impossible, because all EU Member States would have their own national interests and own strategy for survival, thereby making cooperation impossible (Mérand 2010, 345). The actual realization of European defence cooperation, however, seems to match this realist picture only partly, at least up until the 2000s. The EC/EU started to cooperate intensively with the U.S. during the threat of the USSR in the Cold War, but increased its own steps for defence cooperation within the EU itself only after the USSR dissolved – meaning that the most pressing threat was actually gone. Yet, while dissolution of the USSR eliminated the U.S. and EC/EU’s most urgent threat, the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc still posed challenges for the EC/EU specifically. The states in Eastern Europe were not yet a part of the EC/EU at that point, but the EU had started the integration processes with some of the states in the 1990s and early 2000s. Eastern European integration would, consequently, lead to more cooperation between these states, much to the displeasure of Russia which posed a slightly-increased threat to ‘EU territory’. Thus, in terms of defence cooperation and common threats, the realist perspective seemed to match the EC/EU’s actions during the Cold War, but not necessarily in the years after the dissolution of the USSR, in which many of the important steps for EU defence have actually taken place.

Taking into account that (neo-)realism can partly explain how the EC/EU acted in the field of defence cooperation until the 2000s, how, then, can the increase in steps, but decrease in solid defence cooperation in practice – and European integration in general – be explained in the current era of new and serious external common threats to European states? In theory, it would be expected that European states would or should cooperate more and take further steps for defence considering current incentives such as the migration-crisis, the potential decrease of U.S. support through NATO and shift of U.S. interests from Europe to Asia, and the ongoing conflicts and threats coming from its near surroundings – for example, Russia and the Middle East (Dyson 2013, 419). According to the realist perspective, it seems illogical if EU states would currently hold back from cooperation, but in practice, this seems to be the case in certain EU fields, such as politics and defence.

To clarify, cooperation in the EC/EU has, as mentioned in the previous chapters, developed since the 1950s in fields of economics and politics mainly up until the 1990s and early 2000s, when the field of defence also started to be developed. Additionally, troops from several European states,

- 21 - such as the Netherlands, Germany, France and the Baltic states, continue to train and work together both within the EU and outside of the EU. Therefore, the initial assumption of realists had rightly changed in the early 2000s (Mérand 2010, 345) and to claim now that defence cooperation has completely decreased despite common threats would be incorrect. However, the increase in ‘denseness’ of defence cooperation – that is, being drawn even closer together than before – has been stagnating for some years now, despite the many initiatives that have been offered in the field of defence. One could expect that the path towards a European defence sector would have begun with the improved aligning of national defence policies throughout all EU members (e.g. the CSDP), followed by initiatives of training and management in conflict areas with troops from several states together (e.g. the CSDP missions), and to be concluded by a final step of complete defence cooperation and integration, such as a European military force (similar to the common European currency in the field of economics). Yet, the latter has not happened and the EU seems to be stagnating in the second phase of training and sending troops together. Why have the first steps been able to be taken so rapidly, within approximately the years between 1993 and 2004, but the steps from the second to a potential final phase over almost 15 years?

Potential answers to this question lie with both national interests and the continued aim for sovereignty over decisions in national defence policies. First, due to the fact that national interests in the EU Member States differ quite a lot – with none of the Member States eager to set them aside for a greater, united European purpose – it has been argued that the EU is currently not ready to present itself as a global player in the field of defence (Litsas 2017, 58). Differences between national interests, the perception of threats and the ‘willingness’ to unite and participate emerged due to e.g. (neo)colonial ties, geographical positions, external resources, and trade and energy (Haroche 2017, 232; Dyson and Konstadinides 2013, 172). During the development of the EDC between 1952 and 1954, and now with the CSDP since the 1990s as well, Member States have not been able to properly unite for European military developments due to differences in interests. For the EDC, a ‘tension’ existed between the threat of communism in the East facing the whole of Europe – for which the EC/EU had the support of the U.S. through NATO – and the French interests and crises in its former colonies. The latter made French forces unavailable for European defence cooperation, which in the end seemed to be the main cause for the failure of the EDC (Haroche 2017, 238). Later, for the CSDP, national interest tensions mainly existed between France, the U.K., and Germany over the deployment of forces in Africa – due to e.g. former colonial ties and trade relations (see Haroche 2017, 239-245). A recent example of this – and a “missed opportunity to use CSDP to respond to an urgent crisis in Europe’s geopolitical neighbourhood” – is the conflict in Libya in 2011, in which energy resource

- 22 - dependency and security for EU Member States caused a difference in opinions between these three major European powers (Dyson 2013, 436).

Second, sovereignty is by many Member States considered “sacrosanct” and therefore aimed at being held on-to (Danjean 2018, 15; De France et al. 2017, 3; Dyson and Konstadinides 2013, 173). It was one of the key considerations, being also politically decided, why a European army was never created after the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Litsas 2017, 60). Sovereignty is a problem for a unified EU military force, because it gives Member States the right to individually decide allocation of defence budgets, deployment of forces, and capability developments. This inevitably leads to fragmentation of the field of defence and to (major) differences in expertise, skills and national strategies, which only worsen the desired European unity and equality in defence (Danjean 2018, 15; European Commission 2015, 6). Consequently, a unified military force will also not be able to be achieved.

Therefore, it can be said that from a realist perspective, theory suggests the EU should currently be working more densely together for its defence, but in practice, it seems that the EU is struggling with its defence cooperation developments due to the concepts of national interests and sovereignty. It seems that only at certain points throughout the whole process EU states have been able to be put aside interests and sovereignty to develop the European defence field – and with success considering how far the EU has come so far in the field of defence, e.g. with the CSDP missions, common training possibilities, and PESCO. Yet, for other crucial decisions like the potential final phase of defence integration of a united EU military force (instead of different troops combined from EU Member States), these core concepts of realism continue to be obstacles. There might, however, be more underlying problems for defence integration: that of different national identities and strategic cultures that can be influenced both by realists concepts of national sovereignty and interests, but also by constructivist concepts of interaction, social communities, identity, and norms and values.

- 23 -

Constructivism and Strategic Culture

At the core of what influences strategic culture are norms, which are viewed by constructivists as “shared, collective understandings that make behavioural claims on actors” (Checkel 2001, 56). Norms are argued to be the “least volatile” component, as they are “deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of what is appropriate behaviour” and therefore “do not change easily” (Meyer 2005, 529). Furthermore, the overall identity of a state or community can say something about what kind of strategy it wants to use – e.g. defensive or offensive – and what amount or kind of force it prefers – e.g. are they a soft power like the EU itself aims to be with diplomatic measures instead of military force, or are they a hard power like the U.S., which takes military action rather quickly instead of diplomatic measures? Additionally, strategic culture or general state behaviour can also be influenced, perhaps more indirectly, by geography. States who perceive themselves to be more at risk due to their position or geographical reach could be more likely to have a strategic culture that would guarantee their safety with hard power – e.g. Russia. This does, however, not necessarily need to be the case, because certain states do not have the size or capabilities to be a hard power – e.g. the Baltic states feel a continuous threat from Russia, but are not necessarily hard powers. Size is, therefore, another factor that can influence strategic culture. In Europe, for example, the biggest states have different, often stronger strategic cultures than the smaller states – e.g. Germany, France, and the U.K. versus Luxembourg, the Baltic states, and Switzerland. Six dichotomies have been proposed that could capture some of these and other important influences on and differences between states’ stance for their strategic culture: allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanists, power projection/territorial defence, nuclear/non-nuclear military/civilian instruments, large/small states, and weapons providers/consumers (Meyer 2005, 531; Howorth 2002, 89).

In the case of the EU, it is possible to observe different strategic cultures among its Member States. Overall, despite the fact that there may be some exceptions for certain security and defence topics, it has been argued that two dominant trends can be identified in the EU: first, small and non-aligned states prefer regional crisis management with cooperation, whereas large and often former colonial powers are more inclined to use military action and on both the regional and global level (Biava et al. 2011, 1232). More specifically, regarding the use of force in general, for example, Finland and Ireland only support the use of military force for defence “in very restricted circumstances … for defence against immediate attacks on the home-territory”, France and the U.K. “consider the use of force as legitimate to defend certain beliefs and values”, Austria and Germany highly support the avoidance of use of force and only consider this an option of last resort and “with maximum restraint”, and Sweden wants the use of force not to be a matter of alliances and

- 24 - supranational organizations whereas the U.K. and Germany do want this (Meyer 2005, 529). Hence, there is quite some divergence among European states’ ideas on the use of force, and consequently, also among national defence policies. This may, however, not necessarily be a harmful fact, because as Meyer argues, the most important matter is rather

“whether strategic cultures are converging towards are greater activism in the pursuit of security and value goals, a higher preparedness to use coercive means and accept risks, lower thresholds for the authorization of force, and a higher acceptance of the European Union as the legitimate vehicle for conduct of defence policies” (2005, 525-526).

As such, it is not about the differences per se, but more about creating the will and accepting the reality of the need for convergence of national policies if a European strategic culture were to succeed. Moreover, the resistance to change national strategic cultures is also making it harder to form the European strategic culture (Biava et al. 2011, 1232). Admittedly, though, these factors are not just matters of clashing identities or communities, which can be explained by different motives based on e.g. norms, values and ideas, as mentioned above. Due to the fact that national policies often are created on the basis of (neo-)realist ideas, different motives and national stances can be also be influenced by the concepts of national interests and sovereignty, which have in practice proven to be difficult to negotiate on for key matters of defence, but should in theory be possible to compromise when facing contemporary common threats. Therefore, it is acknowledged here that although it is clear that constructivist, cultural factors have influenced national security and defence policies, (neo-)realist concepts can also play a role for strategic culture (Meyer and Strickmann 2011, 64; Dyson 2013).

Furthermore, not only different strategic cultures may (have) influence(d) how Member States perceive the European defence cooperation. The feeling of ‘being European’ and the general ‘European identity’ has also come under pressure in the last few years, which makes it more difficult to unite Member States for the field of defence. Although the majority of the European citizens have indicated in 2018 that they still feel like a European citizen (approximately 71%), there are great differences between Member States (highest: Luxembourg 89%; lowest: Bulgaria 51%), and the increase of this feeling in 15 Member States barely balances the decrease of this feeling in 10 Member States (European Commission 2018a, 33). Moreover, a majority of EU citizens has indicated that they feel (fairly) attached to, first, the EU and, second, to Europe, but there is a striking difference between Member States for both questions (highest: Luxembourg 74%/80%; lowest: Czech Republic 29% and Greece 42% respectively), which means that there particularly seems to be an issue of attachment between Member States’ citizens and the EU itself (European Commission 2018b, 12-13).

- 25 - Does this, then, make it impossible to speak of a ‘workable’ common European strategic culture? Not necessarily. It is argued that, in theory, the inclusion of states in EU processes and institutions “can set in motion socialization dynamics”, which can improve trust among and perspectives of different states (Meyer 2005, 536); perhaps this change in trust and perspectives can help overcome the differences in strategic cultures in the long-run. It has, in fact, been argued that ‘ideational convergence’ has indeed taken place within the EU, despite remaining differences, which can foster the step toward a European strategic culture (Meyer and Strickmann 2011, 64). It is, for example, fair to say that in practice the EU has acted with a unified voice based on common norms and ideas in several cases in the last few years, such as by taking diplomatic measures (travel bans and freeze of assets for individuals), by imposing economic sanctions, or by deploying troops – e.g. on Russia for the Ukrainian Crimea-crisis, on Iran for the human rights violations, and in Lebanon for the conflict with Israel (EU Sanctions Map 2020; Norheim-Martinsen 2012, 72). Although these measures can be considered relatively indirect or ‘simple’ actions, any kind of force or instruments used for collective security interests by European states is “de facto within some kind of context or (a) strategic culture(s)” (Norheim-Martinsen 2012, 36). They were agreed upon by the Member States and based on common norms and ideas, and thereby constituting the strategic culture that the EU aims to pursue – that is, mainly as soft power, “based on an enlarged vision of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach”, and “through the use of military and civilian instruments, in an integrated manner” (Biava et al. 2011, 1235). Furthermore, the creation and developments of, for example, the first security and defence regulations in the Amsterdam Treaty, the ESDP, the PSC, the EU Military Committee, the EDA and the ESS – of which the latter has been argued to have been the start of elevating a strategic culture into a political objective (Norheim-Martinsen 2012, 34) – indicate a growing acceptance of defence cooperation at the EU level and growing power of the committees and initiatives over the years (Meyer 2005, 537).

It thus seems that the EU is moving in the right direction, but still has some obstacles to overcome in order to successfully create and secure a European strategic culture. Some of the issues that were already present in the period when the ESDP was introduced were the matters of ‘how far should defence cooperation go’ and ‘what does it mean for the EU’, as states in the EU had different ideas of how far to expand defence cooperation and integration based on their own national strategic cultures (Mérand 2006, 136; see Biava et al. 2011, 1231; Perruche 2014, 435). Although some Member States’ opinions seem to have converged over the years, as both Germany and France now talk about a European military force, other states may still be more reluctant due to the accessible capabilities, ‘preparedness’ of the EU and the continued favor of NATO instead of a European

- 26 - military force in certain countries – e.g. the U.K. and the Baltic states. Therefore, a convergence of a European strategic culture may be increasingly visible, but national cultures and ideas seem to pervade as an obstacle for key issues and developments in European defence cooperation.

This divergence or convergence in strategic cultures is important to understand and key for dealing with any future steps that can be taken for defence cooperation, because without a shared and unified strategic culture, there is little to no chance for the EU to become a major world power in (political-)military matters. Yet, a great part of the process for shared norms, the creation of a common identity and, consequently, the creation of a full, common strategic culture does not take place at the national levels, but at the institutional levels of the EU. Therefore, an evaluation of the institutional level of the EU might reveal more underlying issues than just the obstacles of national identities and ideas for the creation of a common strategic culture.

- 27 -

Liberal Institutionalism and Institutional Issues

The EU is one of the institutions/organisations that supports liberal institutionalist ideals and advocates for European cooperation – preferably in all fields – as a means of working towards the best outcome. As a result, liberal institutionalism can be considered a good perspective to analyse how poor or successful the EU is as an institution/organisation in relation to defence matters, and it can help to shed light on what obstacles may be present within the institution/organisation itself.

Many of the problems that the EU is facing can be captured under the term of so-called ‘collective action problems’, in which actors should be cooperating to have the optimal outcome or result, but are not doing so due to different interests or ideas. More specifically, although this seems to be a (neo-)realist or constructivist related issue, it can easily be linked to internal, institutional issues of the EU as well. Due to the fact that the EU is not a state, but rather an institution/organisation in which states voluntarily work together on the basis of liberal ideals, it is inherent to the structure of the EU that clashes between states will occur in any possible matter – especially in a field such as defence, where decisions rely upon intergovernmental collaboration and national decision-making. As a result, despite liberal aims of seeking to promote equality and cooperation as a method to achieve the most optimal result in theory, the EU has in practice faced several problems for the field of defence, such as shortcomings in capabilities and planning, disproportionality in relation to economics (including unequal burden-sharing and suboptimality), inequality in benefits and suppliance, and inequality and structural issues in decision-making processes.

First, The EU has been argued to fall short in its capabilities for “contingency planning, as well as the appropriate command-and-control framework to plan and run operations” (European Commission 2015, 10). In addition, certain Member States fell short by not meeting the capability goals set by the EU, and by not being able to provide sufficient qualified and trained personnel and equipment (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, 99; European Parliament 2012, 14). Also, operational planning, institutional mechanisms, and military capabilities to make European defence successful are also lacking or falling short (Dyson and Konstadinides 2013, 52-53). Partly, these issues can be traced back to the lack of financial resources, because many Member States had cut their national defence budgets in the years after the Cold War had ended (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2014, 87; Heidenkamp and Akaltin 2012; European Parliament 2012, 15). This has led to a reduction in money for the EU defence budget and to a reduction in research, expertise, development and technology for defence (Alfonso Meiriño 2018, 24; Fayolle and Stubb 2018, 21; European Parliament 2012, 17). Consequently, if there is less spending on training, personnel, innovation, research and material for the field of defence, the quality and capabilities to act and plan properly will decrease. However, it