Putin's Politics and the Position of Women in Russia

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Putin’s Politics and the Position of Women in Russia

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Laura Nollkaemper

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Supervisor: Dr. Sudha Rajagopalan Second Supervisor: Dr. Carlos Reijnen July 2018

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Introduction

Remember when in 2012 the feminist punk rock collective Pussy Riot gained international fame with their protest performance in the Christ the Saviour cathedral in Moscow? Putin had just been elected to serve as president for a third term, prompting Pussy Riot to their guerrilla performance. The political message of the group’s ‘Punk Prayer’ included criticism of the regime’s efforts to push women back into their traditional roles, as well as of the growing alliance between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), headed by president Putin and patriarch Kirill, in constitutionally secular Russia. Pussy Riot gained global attention mostly for the way this affair was handled by Russia, generating worldwide indignation and support for the feminist collective. The three arrested members were nevertheless convicted for ‘hooliganism motivated by religious hatred’, and sentenced to two years in prison.1

Since Putin’s re-election, the regime has, in close harmony with the ROC, adopted a conservative ideology for Russia. The nationalist and social conservative course of the Putin regime especially affects and deteriorates the position of women, minorities, and LGBT groups. In Putin’s Russia, there is increasingly an erosion of women’s rights, threatening and restricting women’s agency and autonomy.

In this thesis, the focus will be on the politics of the Putins regime in relation to the position of women in Russia, and in particular on how and why the regime is restricting their rights. What are the forces and motives that lay behind this new course of Russia, and what are are the consequences and implications for the women in Russia, especially for their sexual and

reproductive rights?

I would like to shed light on how the Putin regime instrumentalizes traditional discourse, gender norms and conservative values for political purposes and state priorities, such as political legitimatization, building national unity and cohesion in society, to juxtapose against the liberal West, and to serve the pronatalist agenda. In order to explore this we will first need to look into the historical, political and cultural background of Russia with respect to morality, sexuality, and sexual and reproductive rights and behaviour. The president himself said that in order to

determine its path, Russia should turn to its history and traditional values.2_{The Putin regime has} been rebranding decades-old discourses, moulding cultural and historical elements into an ideology that is both marketable as well as catering to the regime’s needs and priorities. Russia knows a long tradition of political ideologies domineering both politics and society, dictating the country’s morality. This was certainly the case throughout the Soviet Union, when

1

"Pussy Riot found guilty of hooliganism by Moscow court". BBC News. August 17, 2012.

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together with moral restrictions, the state issued an official public silence on sexual issues. The communist state issued control over people’s private and sexual life, where heterosexual marriage with children was the imposed norm. When the reforms of glasnost and perestroika were introduced in Russia in the late 1980s, this created more openness toward sexual matters, and the end of communism marked a break with the past. Russia’s history of secrecy around sexuality, together with a mistrust of contraception, and a ‘culture of abortion’ (dependence on abortion for birth control), had brought about a disrupted relationship of Russians with sex, contraceptives, and family planning.

In the mid 1990s, a moral panic fanned around in media and politics, prompted by various conservative actors uniting in a morality-driven campaign. In the years following, reproductive and sexual rights have become increasingly politicized. In Putin’s Russia, the state is now making closer common cause with the ROC, especially since the regime’s open endorsement of a

nationalist and conservative ideology. The ROC, who opposes sex education, contraception and abortion, serves as an important marker of Russian identity and morality in Russia today. When Putin addressed the nation after his second presidential election, he called for the strengthening of “the stable spiritual-moral foundation of society,” with the aim of forming morally harmonious Russians.3_{Putin believes that the state and church together should mould} the morality of Russians, and has been reiterating the importance of common moral values. These values are traditional, conservative, and rooted in Russia’s political and cultural history and orthodox heritage. I posit that this is not because Putin wholeheartedly wants to see traditional moral values restored, but because of ulterior motives: the conservative ideology serves as a political legitimation strategy for Putin’s rule and system of governance. The teaming up of government and church has an impact on Russia’s sexual culture, as well as on people’s sexual and reproductive rights. The kind of nationalism and conservative values that the Putin regime promotes involves gendered narratives and moral anxiety, and is increasingly translated into legislative changes. What does this mean for the position of women in Russia?

I have used a wide range of sources to examine the topic of this thesis: the politics of the Putin regime and the women’s position in Russia. Primary sources such as policy documents, religious doctrines, discourse of political actors and media articles give insight into the changing political and social climate in Russia. The secondary sources I have used contain various scientific articles and books which illustrate the ways these changes in discourse in the primary sources have been interpreted. They picture and interpret the changes happening in Russia. In this thesis I want to put those changes in a broader historical, cultural and ideological perspective and show

3

Putin, as cited in Alfred Evans, “Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization vol. 23, no. 4 (2015) p. 424.

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how the ideology of the Putin regime serves several priorities of the regime and the state rather than that they are primarily driven by ideological conviction and beliefs. I want to demonstrate how this is affecting especially women’s rights.

This thesis links the derogation of women’s rights in Russia to the politics of the Putin regime. Putin, ever the pragmatist, has adopted a conservative, gendered nationalism to, through historical continuity, achieve the regime’s goals and consolidate his power base.

Literature on Russia’s new conservative course for Russia and the growing alliance between the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox Church offers insight into the underlying motives here. Much has been written on the impairment of women’s and LGBT rights in Russia. Several remarkable legislative changes in Russia have caused stirs in recent years, even making

international headlines. Examples are the ‘gay propaganda’ law, or, more recently, the removal of domestic violence from criminal law. These are examples of legal changes that demonstrate the changing climate in Russia, entailing serious consequences for (sexual) minorities and women. I started with a search in the library and online, for items on sexuality, sex education,

contraception and abortion in Russia, as well as looking into the country’s relation with political ideology and national identity. Taking note of Russia’s difficult history and problematic relation with sexuality, I needed to examine on a deeper level Russia’s cultural and historical contexts and legacies that have caused this. Collecting academic literature, journals, online sources, and newspaper articles, I have tried to find as many voices and narratives as possible, both on a political level, as well as the voices from within, incorporating the feminist element. A great kick-starter was the contribution of Valerie Sperling to the field, with her recent study regarding Putin’s politics, political legitimation and sex,4_{while Igor Kon’s work, as Russian pioneer in} sexuology and early advocate of sex education and contraception, gave a great insight in Russia’s (historical) sexual culture.

With this study I want to contribute to the insight on how and why women’s rights are being overruled and instrumentalized to serve state and regime purposes. By trying to explain how and why this can happen we might able to assess and recognize what the important factors are in this, not just in Russia, but universally.

Firstly the aims and the ideology of Putin regime will be examined, and how the latter is

construed from Russia’s historical, cultural and political elements and legacies. Then the events of the 1990s will be discussed, and the failure of the attempt at sexual education. Then we will turn to how these developments gave rise to a division in politics and society, based on moral and conservative beliefs, which, all together, provides the theoretical framework. Subsequently, 4 Valerie Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin: Politcal Legitimation in Russia, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

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the history and contemporary status of abortion in Russia will be addressed, as it relates to women’s agency and autonomy regarding their reproductive rights. Finally, a conclusion is drawn up, assessing the relation between Putin’s politics and women’s rights in Russia, also taking into account the global developments in regard to gendered nationalism.

Chapter 1 - The ideology of the Putin Regime

1.1 Background – ideology in Russia

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Under Tsar Nicolas I (1825-1855) the triad ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality’ (Pravoslaviye, Samoderzhaviye, Narodnost) was introduced as the official ideological doctrine

of the tsarist regime, constituting the guiding principle for its policy and population. With the triad, tsarist Russia for the first time adopted a political ideology, in order to ensure social stability, consolidate political power, and unify the nation by imposing national values. The Russian Orthodox Church, the autocratic regime (central power to one powerful ruler) and Russian ‘nationhood’ (suggesting patriotism) were presented as fundamental to Russian society, whereby it distinguished itself from the ‘morally corrupt’ West. As the state church of the

Russian empire, the ROC held a dominant position in society. Orthodox religion served as a marker of Russian nationality and identity, and was the main arbiter of morality in tsarist Russia. In Soviet Russia, this place was taken by the communist state, which subjected its people to communist ideology and morality up until its demise in 1991.

In August of 1996, the Washington Post reported that president Boris Yeltsin, just after his re-election, had launched a “public search for Russia’s soul”.5_{With the collapse of socialist ideology} and the subsequent chaotic years, Yeltsin saw the need for Russia to develop a new national ideology. Government-sponsored ideologies have century-long historical roots in Russia, and Yeltsin considered the lack of a defining ideology problematic. The president consequently called upon his supporters and aides to assist in uniting all Russians behind a single idea.6_Recalling tsarist and Soviet times, and the periods of monarchism, totalitarianism and perestroika that Russia experienced during the previous century, Yeltsin explained that: “Each stage had its own ideology, but now, we have none.”7_{For the defining of their identity and morality, the Russian} people have historically looked up to the institutions of state and church, that have been supplying them with ideologies and guidelines for the past century.

The fall of the Soviet Union brought about a state of demoralisation in Russia, and while the country sought a new direction after communism, ideology made way for radical changes as government and market reforms, leaving an ideological void, and a so-called ‘moral vacuum’. Baker and Glasser describe Russia’s situation at the end of the 20th_{century as follows:} “A humbled former superpower that was neither the prospering capitalist democracy of its perestroika dreams nor the powerful empire of its past propaganda”, and that by the time Putin entered the stage, “it had long been fashionable to say that Russia was suffering from an identity

5

James Rupert, “In Search of The Russian Meaning of Life”, The Washington Post, 4 August 1996,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/08/04/in-search-of-the-russian-meaning-of-life/5b5b5992-bcac-400b-bf50-8705358f81c0/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b7a6430061cf, accessed 3 September 2017.

6

Ibid.

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crisis.”8_{This held true for both the country and its citizens, as the end of communist ideology} and the subsequent moral vacuum (in which the old moral and ethical system have perished but not been replaced by a new one) resulted in division and a clashing of belief systems, baring a new need for faith and code of life.9_{A need that gave Putin the chance to strengthen his regime} by supplying the Russians with a new, or rather revived as we shall see below, ideology, or code of life; a neo-traditional, conservative, and nationalist one.

1.2 Putin’s ‘National Idea’ for Russia – conservatism to unify the nation

Since Putin’s accession, Russia has seen a revival of nationalistic, moralistic, and ideological rhetoric. The Putin regime wants to create an ideological framework to achieve national unity and domestic stability in pursuit of the goals and direction that Putin has envisioned for Russia, Those aims were directed at the resurrection of Russian as a united, strong and powerful nation, headed by a strong and powerful leader

.

The regime pursues its goals by invoking patriotism, traditional values and conservatism. It is also a strategy of legitimacy: nationalism and conservative values serve as an ideological

foundation for the legitimacy of Putin’s rule, in which the state is assisted by the ROC. President Putin, initially assessed as ‘non-ideological’ and a pragmatist, has since his 2012 return to presidency turned increasingly conservative, and the Russian regime now actively promotes a nationalist, conservative ideology; a ‘new’ national idea for Russia.10

The need for consensus in Russian society has always been one of Putin’s central themes, and nationalism and conservatism can serve as the instrument to achieve this, as it links to the history and roots of the Russian country and people. An early insight in Putin’s vision can be derived from an interview in 2000, in which Putin was asked what he thought Russia needed the most. Putin then said he felt it most important for Russia to clearly determine goals, goals that “should become understandable and accessible to everyone. Like the Code of the Builder of Communism.”11_{This Code was a set of 12 rules by the Communist Party, mostly concerning} devotion to the communist cause, the state, the system, and to society. In his vision for Russia, the first line of such a code, Putin added, would be made up of moral values.12_{On the eve of his}

8

Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005) p. 64.

9

Boris Yu Shapiro, “School-based Sex Education in Russia: The current reality and prospects.” Sex Education: Sexuality, Society and Learning vol. 1, no. 1 (2001) p. 89.

10

Alfred Evans, “Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory.” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization vol. 23, no. 4 (2015) p. 402, p. 408.

11

Putin as cited in A. Evans, , “Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin”, p. 409.

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presidency, when asked about his political program, Putin already announced that: “Any programme should start from the revival of people’s morals”, seeing the need for a core set of moral values.13_{According to Putin, the moral principles acquired by a Russian citizen in the} family, shall form “the very core of patriotism.”14_{Furthermore, Putin recognized the opportunity} to conceive a consensus in society based on common moral values.

When Putin returned to presidency in 2012 following his switcheroo with Dmitri Medvedev, he had lost considerable popularity. Since his first presidency Putin’s popularity has been closely connected to the state of the economy, which was stagnating by that time, making people more inclined to speak out against the government’s undemocratic power play.

The 2011-2012 elections sparked protests all over Russia, with people in Moscow and other major cities taking the streets to object Putin’s re-election and demonstrate against his rule. It became apparent that the Putin regime needed a new and stronger course. The influential pro-Kremlin think tank ‘Center for Strategic Communications’ presented a report in 2013, firmly picturing president Putin as the new world leader of conservatism.15_{According to the report,} “people yearn for security in a rapidly changing and chaotic world, and the overwhelming majority prefers stability over ideological experiments”, as well as “classic family values over gay marriage”.16_{“Putin, according to the think tank, stands for these traditional values.}17

In his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in December 2013, Putin expressed confidence in his regime’s conservative position, saying that the defending of traditional values, that have made up “the spiritual and moral foundation of civilisation” for thousands of years, is gaining support all over the world, and that conservatism “prevents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state.”18_{By means of such} discourse, Putin furthermore sets Russia apart from the West, which, according to the regime, has already drifted downward into chaos, decadence, and moral corruption. Deriding Europe as ‘Gayropa’, the Putin regime is presenting Russia as morally superior to Western countries, that

13 Putin as cited in Anatoly Vereshchagin, “Putin pledges to restore Russians' morals”, Reuters, 15 February 2000, http://www.russialist.org/archives/4109.html, accessed 7 January 2018.

14 Putin, as cited in Nina Tumarkin, “Russia's Moral Rearmament.” The Wilson Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (2000) p. 49.

15

Franklin Foer, “It’s a Putin World”, The Atlantic, March 2017,

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/its-putins-world/513848/, accessed 21 October 2017.

16

Christian Neef and Matthias Schepp, “How Putin Outfoxed the West”, Spiegel, 16 December 2013,

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-vladimir-putin-ruthlessly-maintains-russia-s-grip-on-the-east-a-939286-2.html, accessed 21 October 2017.

17

Ibid.

18 Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assemblee” (transcript), 12 December 2013,

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are experiencing an alleged crisis of moral values and fatal departure of their Christian

heritage.19_{Earlier in 2013, Putin said that many Western countries have abandoned their roots,} including the Christian values, “that constitute the basis of Western Civilization”20_{, while he has} been presenting Russia’s traditional family values as a bulwark against the West’s disintegration of moral standards, and its “so-called tolerance, neutered and barren”.21

Since Putin’s return to presidency, the regime has evidently launched a conservative ideology project that combines nationalism, faith and traditional values with “vehement

anti-Westernism”.22_{This juxtaposing against the West furthermore helps with the self-defining of} Russia, as contrasting against a ‘threatening other’ helps the building of national identity and social cohesion.

The semi-official ideology (as official ideology is unconstitutional in Russia) of the Putin regime is integrated with historic traditions, “with the goal of connecting past, present, and future.”23 Nationalism has always been an important part of ideology in Russia, and the orthodox faith has a historically strong tradition in Russia; as an expression of culture, and as an important pillar of national identity. After the ceasing of communism, there might have been a certain nostalgia for the moral certainties supplied by ideology present in the post-revolutionary Russia that Putin inherited.24_{Putin, so explains Shlapentokh, tries “to connect post- and pre-revolutionary history} in a synthesis which could provide a meaning for the post-Soviet state.”25_{With historical}

continuity, “the sense that “eternal” Russia, its meta-historical soul, has never perished and ensures the country’s ultimate revival”, the Kremlin provides legitimacy to the regime.26

Regarding the ideological efforts under Putin political science professor Alfred Evans notes that: “It is apparent that the version of conservatism that the Russian state is promoting is intended to provide ideological support for the current political regime in order to preserve the model of governance that Putin has created”, while another goal of the regime is to unite the Russian people behind a ‘national idea’, founded on conservative and nationalist values.27_{The ROC has} been assigned an important role in the new national idea for Russia.

19

Foer, “It’s a Putin World”.

20

Putin, as cited in A. Evans, “Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin”, p. 414.

21

Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, 12 December 2013.

22

Jadwiga Rogoża,, “Conservative Counterrevolution: Evidence of Russia’s Strength or Weakness?”, Russian Analytical Digest no. 154 (2014) p. 2.

23

Dmitry Shlapentokh, “Russian History and the Ideology of Putin’s Regime Through the Window of Contemporary Russian Movies”, Russian History, no. 36 (2009), p. 279.

24

Dan Healey, “Untraditional Sex” and the “Simple Russian”: Nostalgia for Soviet Innocence in the Polemics of Dilia Enikeeva”, in What is Soviet Now?: identities, legacies, memories, edited by T. Lahusen and P.H. Solomon, Berlin: LIT (2008) p. 190.

25

Shlapentokh, “Russian History and the Ideology of Putin’s Regime”, p. 279. 26 Ibid., p. 285.

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1.3 Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church - Align for legitimacy

In January 2015, in a historic speech to parliament (the first time that a religious leader addressed the Duma), patriarch Kirill called for restrictions on abortions and for Russians to embrace traditional, conservative values.28_{Further getting into politics, the patriarch stated that} taxpayers should not have to pay for abortions, that the procedure should be removed from health insurance, and that the aim was a complete ban on abortion, which he called “evil”, and “infanticide”29_{. Three years prior, Putin had already given notice to the growing ties between} state and church when he congratulated the patriarch with his name day, and said that under his leadership, the Russian Orthodox Church “exerts a great influence on the morality and

development of our society and performs a valued educational and social mission together with the state.”30

The Putin regime in recent years has made efforts to turn conservatism and traditional values into an ideological concept, and has received support in doing so by the ROC. By allying up and making common cause with the Church, Putin is boosting his popularity, while aiming to unify the nation and gain legitimacy for his rule. The historically dominant religion of the Russian majority is orthodoxy, and since the end of communism, Russia has experienced a religious revival, with a ROC that is ambitious in strengthening its position in society.

The Russian Orthodox Church might have been an important player throughout the Russian empire, but during Soviet times, religion was harshly suppressed. The early Soviet regime confiscated nearly all church property, prosecuted the clergy, and executed over a thousand priests. Today however, it is mostly conservative and religious values that are filling the void that socialism left behind, as Russia has become increasingly socially conservative under Putin, while the ROC has regained political influence. The Church has resurrected, and now plays an

important role in Russian society, as well as in politics. The ROC is employed in the shaping of domestic politics, acts as an actor in the policymaking process, and serves as an active supporter of Putin’s regime and the state. Over three fourths of the Russian population identifies as

orthodox, and while definitely not all are active church goers, the orthodox faith represents an

28

Tom Balmforth, “Russian Patriarch Calls for Abortion Curbs, Touts Conservative Values”, RFERL, 22 January 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-religion-patriarch-abortion/26807767.html,

accessed 7 September 2017.

29

Patriarch Kirill as cited in Fiona Clark, “Russia ponders restrictions on abortion rights”, DW, 14 June 2015, http://www.dw.com/en/russia-ponders-restrictions-on-abortion-rights/a-18509939, accessed 7 September 2017.

30

Putin, “Congratulations to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia on his Name Day” (transcript), en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15418, accessed 13 May 2018.

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important marker of Russian culture and identity. The ROC has become an increasingly visible part of the new Russian nationalist identity that the Putin regime is trying to construct. Both the president and the patriarch have been praising traditional conservative values, that need to be protected and conveyed. With the help of the ROC, Putin is presenting himself as a moral leader, the defender of faith and morality, and guardian of Russia’s cultural and social values, whereby he also distances and distinguishes himself and Russia from the amoral, and post-Christian West. In the turmoil of the 2012 re-election, patriarch Kirill declared Putin’s leadership to be a “miracle of God”, thereby expressing his loyalty to the regime, and boosting Putin’s legitimacy.31_The patriarch spoke about the 1990s, the troubled years before Putin, and compared those days with the invasion of Russia by Napoleon in 1814, and by the Nazi’s in 1941. But then came the 2000s, said Kirill, and under Putin’s leadership we managed “to exit this horrible, systemic crisis.”32 In a secular state with a constitutional division of church and state, these kind of open endorsements and outings of loyalty spark criticism, of which the most well-known example is Pussy Riot’s earlier mentioned performance at the Moscow Cathedral later in 2012. In their ‘Punk Prayer’, the feminist protest punk band expressed criticism to the growing political alliance between the state and the church. (“Patriarch Gundyay believes in Putin. Would be better, the bastard, if he believed in God!”)33_{The ROC and Patriarch Kirill, already of opinion that feminism} is dangerous and could destroy Russia, were not amused, and the Kremlin and the Church jointly condemned Pussy Riots actions.34_{The women were convicted and received two-year prison} sentences in labour camps. Putin later said that he thought the Pussy Riot members got what they deserved, because they “threatened the moral foundations of Russia”, and described Pussy Riot’s protest as “an act of group sex aimed at hurting religious feelings”.35_{Before all else,} Pussy Riot’s message was political, but the regime reframed the event as an issue of morality and faith, diverting attention from the substantive critique. In the aftermath of the trial, the state

31

Patriarch Kirill, as cited in Gleb Bryanski, “Russian patriarch calls Putin era “miracle of God’”, Reuters, 8 February 2012, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE81722Y20120208, accessed 28 October 2017.

32

Ibid.

33

Pussy Riot, “Punk Prayer”, as translated and explained in Jeffrey Tayler, “What Pussy Riot’s ‘Punk Prayer’ really said”, The Atlantic, 8 November 2012,

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/what-pussy-riots-punk-prayer-really-said/264562/, accessed 21 October 2017.

34

Miriam Elder, “Feminism could destroy Russia, Russian Orthodox patriarch claims”, The Guardian, 9 April 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/09/feminism-destroy-russia-patriarch-kirill, accessed October 2017.

35

Putin as cited in Michael Stott, “Pussy Riot got what they deserved: Putin”, Reuters, 25 October 2015,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin/pussy-riot-got-what-they-deserved-putin-idUSBRE89O1IV20121025, accessed 15 March 2018.

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further catered to the Church, when the Duma approved a new law criminalizing actions aimed at “insulting the religious feelings of believers” with jail sentences of up to three years.36

The current political alliance between the ROC and the Putin regime is beneficial to both parties, although the state’s instrumentalization of the Church is leading. The ROC holds close links with the Kremlin, and has a helpful role with boosting nationalism and conservatism, while providing political legitimacy for Putin’s regime on grounds of historical continuity. Under president Putin, the Church’s has strengthened its position in society and has received rights confirming this, increasing its role in public life. The ROC especially focuses on the moral health of the Russian nation, and the Church’s positions are increasingly reflected in state policy. The ROC under Patriarch Kirill has an agenda that includes support for religious education in school, opposition to LGBT rights and sex education in school, and the banning of contraception and abortion.37_{Putin in his turn has on multiple occasions called for the ROC to play a larger role in} people’s lives, and for better religion classes in schools.38

The ROC is an instrumental pillar of support for the Putin regime, and moreover, Putin desires a patriotic and unified society. According to Putin, the ROC has throughout history “inspired people to constructive action and heroic deeds for the Fatherland.”39

In his speech at a meeting of the Bishops' Council of the ROC at the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in December 2017, the Russian president declared that it was the Church that kept Russia together, serving as an important cornerstone during the social and economic transformations of the 1990s, giving hope and “moral guidance” to the people, “urging them toward harmony and unity”, which has led to the religious revival of Russia.40_{Furthermore, Putin warned that lessons} of the past must be remembered, and that restoring unity is necessary for society to advance in a “confident and harmonious way.”41_{At the same meeting, Putin said on cooperation with the} church that the government counts on continuing to work together in the fields of education, healthcare, the preservation of cultural and historical heritage, and combating “social ills.”42 36 The ‘anti-blasphemy law’ was accepted in June 2013 and can be found in art. 148 of the Russian Criminal Code (“Violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion”),

http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/3f061fb01a04145dc7e07fe39a97509bd2da 705f/, accessed 15 March 2018.

37 Nikita Lomagin, “Interest groups in Russian foreign policy: The invisible hand of the Russian Orthodox Church”, International Politics, vol. 49, no. 4 (2012) p. 203.

38

Clare Morris, “Vladimir Putin Vows to Defends Christianity Worldwide”, The Christian Post, 12 February 2012, http://www.christianpost.com/news/vladimir-putin-vows-to-defend-christianity-worldwide-69002/ accessed 26 March 2018.

39

Putin, “Speech at the meeting of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church”,

1 December 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56255, accessed 26 March 2018.

40

Putin, “Speech at the meeting of the Bishops' Council of the Russian Orthodox Church”,

1 December 2017

41

Ibid.

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The ROC thus has been presented by the state as a moral guide and marker of Russian morality. Conveniently, the Church has issued a document containing their basis teachings and moral guidelines, which can serve as a key document in understanding the Church’s positions and the church-state relations: The Social Doctrine.

1.4 The Social Doctrine

In 2000 the ROC delivered an actual handbook of guidelines on social questions, which also sets forth the Church’s position on social issues, including abortion, contraception, family life, and overall public morality. This document, called ‘The Basis of the Social Concept’, or ‘Social Doctrine’, could be regarded as a reaction to the social upheaval in Russian society since the demise of the Soviet Union, offering guidance for the developed moral vacuum, (or moral decline, according to the ROC) and the ceasing of the communist state as a moral compass.43

The Social Doctrine is preluded with the following text: “this document sets forth the basic provisions of the teaching on church-state relations and a number of problems socially

significant today. It also reflects the official position of Moscow Patriarchate on relations with state and secular society. In addition, it gives a number of guidelines to be applied in this field by the episcopate, clergy and laity.”44_{The document furthermore speaks of the narrowing of}

boundaries of legal regulation, resulting from the “erosion of public morality” and the

“secularisation of consciousness”, exemplifying this with the amusing example of how “today’s law treats sorcery, which was a grave crime in ancient communities, as an imaginary action not to be punished.”45_{Chapter XII of the doctrine deals with problems of bioethics, assessing} abortion a “grave sin” and equating abortion with murder. The chapter states that: “The Church sees the widely spread and justified abortion in contemporary society as a threat to the future of humanity and a clear sign of its moral degradation.”46_{Furthermore it is made clear that the ROC} wants the state to recognize the rights of doctors to “refuse to procure abortions for the reasons of conscience (according the ROC’s reasoning, doctors are guilty of murder when performing abortions).47_{This plea was answered with the 2011 law amendment deciding that, unless the} patient’s life is in danger, a doctor may refuse to perform an abortion.48

43

Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 53.

44

The Basis of the Social Concept, https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/

45

Ibid., IV.3.

46

The Basis of the Social Concept, XII.2.

47

Ibid.

48

2011 Law on Health: “On the fundamentals of health protection of citizens in the Russian Federation", Art. 70.

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The ROC also opposes contraception and emergency contraception, as from the moment of conception, “any encroachment on the life of a human being is criminal”, thus rejecting it. This position has also been translated into legislative proposals by the Duma, that would hamper access to emergency contraception. Regarding regular contraception, the Church’ s attitude reads: “The deliberate refusal of childbirth on egoistic grounds devalues marriage and is a definite sin.”49

In part X, that covers “personal, family and public morality”, the ROC’s negative position on sex education is set forth: “Aware of the need for the school, along with the family, to give children and adolescents the knowledge of sexuality and the physical human nature, the Church cannot support those programs of «sexual education» in which premarital intercourse and, all the more so, various perversions are recognized as the norm. It is absolutely unacceptable to impose such programs upon schoolchildren. School is called to oppose vice which erodes the integrity of the personality, to educate children for chastity and prepare them for creating solid families based on faithfulness and purity.”50_{The document leaves no room for doubt: the ROC opposes sex} education, abortion, pre-marital sex, contraception, and family planning in general. The church also actively campaigns against these issues. Over the last few years, many of their wishes have been answered with policy or law proposals by government and law makers.

In recent years the ROC has formulated a clear stance on public morality and (sexual) health, while obtaining strong ties with the Kremlin. An exemplifying manifestation of the alliance between state and church is the cooperation agreement between the Ministry of Health and the ROC. The document, that was signed on June 18 2015 by Patriarch Kirill and Health Minister Veronika Skvortsova, agrees on cooperation on the prevention of abortion and promotion of family values. The document also establishes cooperation and joint action with medical institutions on “the creation of crisis pregnancy centers at hospitals with the participation of psychologists and participation of representatives of religious organizations of the Russian Orthodox Church in advising women who are planning to terminate the pregnancy, in medical institutions”.51_{These church approved crisis pregnancy centres will not be providing unbiased} support and information, as they cannot support abortion, and specially serve to counsel women against it. This can be regarded as religious infiltration in medical care, institutions that ideally retain to impose value- and moral judgments.

The anti-abortion, anti-family planning, and anti-sex education standpoints of the Church (and its influential lobby against these issues) moreover link up very well with the demographic

49

The Basis of the Social Concept, XII.3.

50

Ibid., X.6.

51

The agreement between the ROC and the Health Ministry, 18 July 2015,

http://www.epfweb.org/node/359, and http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4124569.html> accessed November 2017.

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concerns and pronatalist agenda of the Putin regime: when sexual knowledge lacks and access to contraception and abortion is restricted, supposedly, an increase in births will follow.

1.5 Demographic concerns and pronatalism

The Russian population has been declining over the course of the last decades, and

demographers estimate that the number of Russians by 2050 could fall below 100 million, coming from 150 million in 1992.52_{In stead of trying to tackle the remarkably low life} expectancy of Russians (especially for men- set at 64.7 in 2011), the answer is sought with improving the birth rate.53_{Even though birth rates have somewhat improved over the 2000s, the} idea of a demographic threat is a feature of the Putin regime’s nationalistic rhetoric, and so is the assertion that the most effective cure can be found in a pronatalist agenda and a return to tradition.

Already in his first public address after becoming president in 2000, Putin warned of the threat that the country’s decreasing population posed “to Russia’s survival as a nation, as a people… We are really threatened with the prospect of wasting away as a nation.”54_{Several times Putin has} employed such “discourses of demographic doom”55_{, for instance again in his 2006 address to} the Federal Assembly. In this speech, Putin repeated his warnings, saying he wanted to talk about what is “most important to our country”, love, women, children, and about “the family, about the most acute problem facing our country today- the demographic problem”56

In his 2012 Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin again talked demographics and said that for a strong and sovereign Russian nation, there should be more “of us” and that families with three children should be the norm in Russia.57_{With such discourse, Putin is connecting love, women,} and the family to the solution for the regime’s demographic concerns, implying a patriotic task for the women of Russia and their wombs. Accordingly, the Putin regime has adopted a

demographic policy overtly dedicated to boost the country’s birth rate. The state has introduced

52

Cloe Arnold, “Abortion Remains Top Birth Control Option in Russia”, RFERL, 28 June 2008,

https://www.rferl.org/a/Abortion_Remains_Top_Birth_Control_Option_Russia/1145849.html, accessed 7 May 2018.

53

WHO, “Life expectancy and Healthy life expectancy”, Global Health Data,

<http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.SDG2016LEXv?lang=en, accessed 8 May 2019.

54

Putin, cited in Michele Rivkin-Fish, “Pronatalism, Gender Politics, and Family Support in Russia: Toward a Feminist Anthropology of "Maternity Capital", Slavic Review, vol. 69, no. 3, (2010): 712.

55

Michele Rivkin-Fish, “Pronatalism, Gender Politics, and Family Support in Russia: Toward a Feminist Anthropology of "Maternity Capital", Slavic Review, vol. 69, no. 3, (2010): 712.

56

Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”, 10 May 2006,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577, December 2017.

57

Putin, “Address to Federal Assembly”, 12 December 2012,

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programs to encourage women to give birth and have larger families; the most prominent is the Maternity Capital Program.

1.6 The Maternity Capital program

Putin has called upon women to return to their traditional role of childbearing, and has subsequently installed a ‘maternity capital’ program, a practice familiar from the Soviet era, that has been dusted off by the Putin regime.58_{In the post-war Soviet Union, when the country} had suffered a massive demographic loss following the war, the state actively began promoting and glorifying motherhood. Honorary titles like ‘Mother Heroine’ and the ‘Motherhood medal’ were created, together with accompanying financial rewards for big families and material assistance to mothers, in order to increase the birth rate and population.59

An unmarried father however, held no economic, legal, or moral responsibility for his children, and as such, reproduction increasingly became an affair between women and the state.”60 In Putin’s earlier mentioned 2006 demographic speech, as Rotkirch notices in her article “Who Helps the Degraded Housewife?”, the words ‘men’ or father’, as well, “were glaringly absent”.61 The in 2007 officially implemented subsequent maternity capital program, “arguably the most prominent measure of Russian family policy in years” and the first time that

“post-socialist gender politics have been so clearly outlined in Russia”, involves the awarding of financial bonuses and other benefits to women for having more than one child.6263

This state support for motherhood and multi-child families has been declared by Putin as an “unconditional national priority.”64

The drive to incite population growth, as Sperling in her study ‘Sex, Politics, and Putin’ notes, can be understood “as part of the Putin’s regime patriotic nationalist agenda”, which also includes the repressing of homosexuality, since it is incompatible with the traditional values, and does not lead to reproduction.65_{In reaction to the commotion following the anti-gay propaganda law,}

58

Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”, 10 May 2006,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577, accessed May 2018.

59

Ricky Solinger and Mie Nakachi, eds., Reproductive States: Global Perspectives on the Invention and Implementation of Population Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 304.

60

Solinger, Reproductive States, p. 304.

61

Anna Rotkirch et al., “Who Helps the Degraded Housewife? Comments on Vladimir Putin’s Demographic Speech.” In European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007): 352.

62

Ekatarina Borozdina et al., “Using Maternity Capital: Citizen Distrust of Russian Family Policy”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (2014): 61.

63

Rotkirch, “Who Helps the Degraded Housewife?”, 350.

64

“Putin says support for big families, mothers children priority of govt”, TASS (Russian News Agency), 2 June 2012, http://tass.com/archive/676588, accessed 8 May 2018

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Putin again pointed to the demographic challenges of both Europe and Russia (‘the death of nations’) and said that: “same-sex marriages don't produce children.”66

As women are still the main producers of children, pronatalist policies have gendered effects, employing women’s lives and bodies to serve national goals and state interests.

Even though Putin’s rhetoric on initiating maternity capital and support for mothers seemed to also address women’s inequality, Rivkin-Fish notes that “in ignoring the systematic structuring of gender relations in private and public spheres, his speech more closely reflected Soviet-style rhetoric about the burdens of women-mothers; the new policy further entrenched this gendered vision of caregiving rather than calling for an equitable re distribution of responsibilities.”67 The regime’s rhetoric on maternity capital and the family does not involve ideas on shared parenthood, and an understanding of a traditional division of roles prevails. Some conservatives do not feel that maternity capital is sufficient, and suggest more extensive measures. Sergei Mironov, leader of the Fair Russia party, in 2006 proposed the introduction of a ‘family salary’, arguing that such a measure would hopefully “strengthen the prestige of the father as the breadwinner of the family”.68

Monetary policies and state support for mothers might sound like beneficial to women, but in fact have the risk of negatively affecting women’s status in the workplace, society, and public opinion. Feminist researchers have criticized the maternity capital program, “stressing its gender insensitivity, its inefficiency and the consequences of drawing women out of the labor market.”69 Pronatalist policies can impair women’s chances for educational and economic achievement, even though women in Russia constitute half of the higher educated professionals, and are well represented in the labour force.The conservative course, therefore, could entail a degradation for Russia, its women and economy, now that the gender backlash has kicked off. Because of the politicization of gender in Putin’s Russia, women’s role in society is being reframed by the regime. This reframing is not conductive to the gender equality, as conservatism and traditionalism is not known for driving women forward. The leading authorities in Russia, church and state, are now both committed to conservative values, potentially involving a shift in the public thinking about gender issues.

The Putin regime’s commitment to traditional values serves to unify the nation behind a national idea in order to realise domestic stability, support for the regime, and to invoke patriotism. The conservative values moreover correspond well with the demographic concerns of the state. Russia’s firmer conservative course is the Kremlin’s strategy to restore the regime’s

66

Putin, sep 2013, Interfax - http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&div=10765

67

Rivkin-Fish, “Pronatalism”, 723.

68

Rotkirch, “Who helps the Degraded Housewife?”, 355.

69

Anna Temkina and Elena Zdravomyslova, “Gender's crooked path: Feminism confronts Russian patriarchy”, Current Sociology Monograph, vol. 62, no. 2 (2014): 10.

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legitimacy, especially since the 2012 protested election, but Putin has been building the

foundations since his ascend to the presidency. With the ROC, the Putin regime has found an ally instrumental in helping to build Russia’s national identity and unity, as well as in providing political legitimacy. The Church has in recent years strengthened its role in public life as well as in politics, and has a growing influence in areas related to the family, sexuality, and sexual and reproductive rights.

The Kremlin’s conservative stance is being increasingly translated into state policies and morality-driven laws, of which the ‘ban on gay propaganda’ and the ‘blasphemy law’ are blatant examples. The 2017 law that decriminalizes domestic violence is similarly conveying the patriarchal renaissance of the Putin era (“if he beats you, he loves you”).70

With its pronatalist policies, the state is imprinting it demographic interests onto women’s bodies. Women are being steered away from their right to make autonomous decisions about their lives and how to live it, with a regime that aims to instrumentalize their bodies and lives to accommodate its own goals. Unsurprisingly, the conservative path that Putin’s Russia has taken also involves consequences for sexual and reproductive rights, among them the right to abortion, which will be addressed later in chapter four.

But first we will look into the sex education pilot of 1996. During the nineties the Russian people seemed more or less ready for a cautious experiment with sex education. This education was among others meant to tackle the problem of sexual transmitted diseases and the high prevalence of abortion by offering information on contraception. However the failure of the pilot had profound effects on public and political opinion regarding sex education and led to a distinct division in proponents and opponents.

Chapter 2 – From the 1996 sex education pilot to the anti-sexual crusade

During a 1986 joint Soviet-American television talk show, a Russian woman famously declared that “there is no sex in the USSR.”71_{Although Soviets most likely had a more or less equal amount} of sex as the rest of humans worldwide, this statement represented the tabooing and censoring of the topics of sex and sexuality in the Soviet Union. As a result of which, many Russians were left sexually illiterate after the ceasing of communism. The Glasnost reforms involved the relaxing of censorship, and foreign media and pornography started entering the country in the late 1980s. The ultimate break-up of the Soviet Union ended the official silence on sexual

matters. Now that more discussion was possible, the lack of sexual knowledge and sex education programmes became vivid. In the early 1990s, many discussions were held in the Duma and the media debating (sexual) morality, family life, sex education, and demographic decline. This

70

Russian saying: ‘Бьёт значит любит, ’.

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period of transition and changes also led to division: “This new abrupt introduction into sex culture and media caused a clear split of morals and a “left” and “right” divide, which led the issue of sex to become more and more politicized. Many on the left saw glasnost as a chance to educate and change the way sex was viewed, and they soon became advocates of sex

education.”72

One of these early sex education advocates was Igor Kon (1928-2011) Kon was an

internationally renowned Russian psychologist and sociologist (lauded as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of Russian sociology) and one of the first sexologists in Russia.73_{In his position as a} researcher of Russian sexuality, Kon expressed concerns about the state of sexual knowledge in Russian society and subsequent health problems, leading him to become an advocate for the introduction of sexual education in the Russian educational system. On Igor Kon’s 50 years of work, Oxford professor of Modern Russian History Dan Healey has said the following:

“Kon’s work has promoted ideas that remain very much at odds with the medical mainstream: Scandinavian style sex education, an acceptance of teenage sexuality as normal and healthy (a view denied by vociferous Russian experts in a host of disciplines), a relaxed attitude toward same sex relations, and a view of human sexuality predicated on the individual’s rights rather than on the demands of the nation state.”74

In his 1995 book on the ‘sexual revolution’ in Russia, Kon notes that “one of the most disturbing consequences of the lack of sexual culture in Soviet society was the public’s astonishing

ignorance about contraception.”75_{Soviet sexual ignorance was due to a lack of information, as} well as to misinformation, especially concerning contraceptives like the birth control pill. This misinformation was fuelled by the government, who in the Soviet era helped spreading lies about contraceptives, presenting them as dangerous, and even perceiving them as an American conspiracy to weaken Russia. The myths and misinformation have since not been completely amended. Even though the Russian’s knowledge and use of contraceptives has improved over the last 20 years, misconceptions and mistrust of modern contraception remain present in Russia today. This might be one of the reasons that traditional contraception methods (like the calendar and withdrawal method) remain popular and much practiced in Russia, even though they are not very reliable.

72 Miriam Lipton, “Sex Education and Contraceptive Acceptance: From the Soviet Union to Russia” March 2014 (Thesis).

73 Borusiak, Liubov’, “In Memoriam Igor Kon”, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/lyubov-borusyak/in-memoriam-igor-kon-personal-view, accessed September 2017.

74 Healey, Dan. “Sexual Cultures in Russia.” In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, edited by George Ritzer (Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2007): 4234.

75

Igor Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia: From the Age of the Czars to Today (New York: The Free Press, 1995): 178.

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In the 2005 book Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, Kon commences his chapter ‘Sexual culture and politics in contemporary Russia’ with a pessimistic view of the current state of sexual culture in Russia. Kon points to “dangerous trends”, like the spread of sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV), and argues that the “only reasonable response” to these threats is sex education.76_{However, Kon notes that since 1997, there is what he has} labelled an “anti-sexual crusade” going on in Russia, managed by the ROC and the conservative political elite, who together make efforts to hamper and restrict sexual education and

information, as well as women’s reproductive rights.77_{In 1996, there was a serious attempt by} the Russian Ministry of Education to introduce sex education to Russian schools, starting with a pilot, but the project was eventually completely shut down.

The 1996 initiative for sex education ultimately turned the subject into a heated political issue. The project’s unfortunate execution, together with the contra-campaign and political response it evoked, only added fuel to the flames. The politicisation of the issue thus influenced the fate of sex education in Russia, and launched a clear division of morals between a conservative and a liberal camp.

2.1 Russia in favour of sex education

In the early 1990s, the general Russian public opinion seemed to be in favour of

systematic sex education in schools.78_{Kon points out that all national public opinion polls from} 1989 by the VCIOM, the Russian Public Opinion Centre, showed that between 60 and 90 per cent of people supported the idea of in-school sex education in Russia.79_{A 1994 VCIOM survey for} example, showed that over half the respondents would support the introduction of a sex education course for 14 to 16 years olds, while research from the same year confirmed that 70-80 per cent of the respondents believed that youth should indeed be informed about

contraception.80_{It was recognised that the effective method to educate Russian would be} through the implementation of school-based sex education. Next to a favourable public opinion, there were also many medical and public health experts who deemed sex education necessary to

76

Igor Kon, “Sexual culture and politics in contemporary Russia”, in Sexuality and Gender in Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, eds., Aleksandar Štulhofer and Theo Sandfort (New York) The Haworth Press, 2005): 111.

77

Kon, “Sexual culture and politics in contemporary Russia”, 111.

78

Kon, “Sexual Culture and Politics in Contemporary Russia”, 113.

79

Ibid, 114.

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combat the rapid spread of STDs and HIV in Russia, and to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies.81_{On the whole, it seemed that by 1996 Russia was ready for sex education, but the} initiative ultimately backlashed.

In his 2005 text on sexual culture and politics in Russia, Kon adopts a strong stance, stating that sexual freedom in Russia has been used as a political scapegoat for communists and nationalists.82_{A reference here can be made to the 1996 initiative for sex education, and the} commotion it has unleashed in post-communist Russia. The project’s early death can be attributed to the to the efforts of conservative and orthodox organizations (including the ROC), and conservative forces in parliament and government. An ‘anti-sexual crusade’, as described by Kon, has since then blocked all attempts for the implementation of sexual education.83 Kon explains this crusade as mainly being led by the Russian Communist Party and the ROC.84 The Communist Party, until 2003 a dominant faction in the Duma, crusaded with political goals in mind. By provoking moral panic, the party tried to divert attention from the government’s (economic) failures and the moral-ideological crisis, presenting itself as defender of morality. Today, the party associated with president Putin, ‘United Russia’ holds the largest faction in the Duma: 76 per cent of seats. In Putin’s Russia, the political goals in this on-going crusade are found with the government, parliament and president, as well as with the ROC, which is since 2009 headed by the new and more politically involved patriarch Kirill.

2.2 The 1996 project

In the second half of the 1990s, the Ministry of Education took the initiative for sex education at a federal level. The implementation in Russian schools seemed necessary, considering the high numbers of teenage pregnancy, and the increase in the spread of STDs that had been going on since the end of communism. The Ministry looked for support for the project, and turned to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and UNESCO. By receiving funds and aid in execution by the UNFPA (in cooperation with UNESCO), the project ensured international support. The envisioned purpose was to, over the course of three years, develop textbooks and materials, and to provide an overall model for a sexual education curriculum in Russian schools. Russian Professor of pedagogy and psychology Boris Shapiro notes in his article on school-based sex education in Russia that idea of the initiative was to help young people to “make informed

81

Peter Meylakhs, “Dangerous Knowledge vs. Dangerous Ignorance: Risk Narratives on Sex Education in the Russian Press” Health, Risk & Society, vol. 13, no. 3 (2011): 240.

82

Kon, “Sexual Culture and Politics in Contemporary Russia”, 115.

83

Ibid.

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decisions and to avoid health risks.”85_{Furthermore, the project was to take into account the} Russian culture and traditions while developing the sexual education. The project thus could not, as Kon has also stressed, be accused of ‘cultural imperialism’, as its introduction emphasized that the project, and the subsequent curricula and educational material would be developed by Russian experts, while supported and assisted by the knowledge, experience, and technical know-how from foreign experts, all in order to “ensure cultural acceptability.”86

The pilot was launched in the seventh to ninth grades (ages 12-14) at 16 participating schools, in 8 regions of Russia, with the consent of teachers and parents, and on a completely voluntary basis.87_{Early findings from the pilot showed first of all that the Russian teachers had some} shortcomings. Tatiana Pestich, who managed the project for the Ministry of Education expressed her criticism on this in 1996, noticing how the teachers they had were “brought up in the old atmosphere and were (…) part of the problem rather than the solution”.88_{Furthermore, it is} noteworthy that in one of the project’s surveys, 78 per cent of the teachers expressed the view that parents should have the main responsibility for sex education.89_{But parents, on the other} hand, although in favour of their children receiving sex education, hardly engaged in talks about matters of sexuality with them. Over 50 per cent of the parents never talked about sexuality with their children, 25 per cent had discussed it once or twice, and just 20 per cent of mothers had initiated such ‘sex-talks’ multiple times.90_{The teachers were not quite ready yet to teach the} subject of sexual education. They were part of the old system, while the role of education, its institutions, and society had changed. Additionally, Kon notes that “In Russian families, intergenerational taboos on sexuality discourse are very strong.”91

So parents neither, were ready to provide sex education. Having received little information during Soviet times, this generation was not very knowledgeable about sexual issues itself, and had to rely on their peers as main sources of information (often leading to the spread of myths and misinformation about sexual matters). Henry P. David in his work on sex and society in Russia identifies that a restraining “psychological and educational unreadiness” lay at the core of these issues.92_{However, parents did seem to be receptive to the topic of sex education, as a}

85

Shapiro, “School based sex education in Russia” 91.

86

87

Ibid.

88

Tatiana Pestich, as cited in Mark G. Field and Judith l. Twigg (eds.), Russia's Torn Safety Nets: Health

and Social Welfare During the Transition, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000): 142.

89

90

David, “From Abortion to Contraception”, 255.

91

92

David, “From Abortion to Contraception”, 255.

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survey showed that 75 per cent of parents favoured obtaining special textbooks that would explain the material to be told to their children, and how best to do it.93

The teachers then would obtain extra schooling and retraining in pedagogical institutes.94

But before any of this could be realised with the help of a programme exploring the needs for the implementation of successful sex education, the project’s curtain fell. Unfortunately, before the pilot was completed (or even had truly well kicked off), the Russian Ministry of Education announced their sex education plans to the public, “without any psychological or political preparation.”95_{In addition to this, the Ministry sent out poorly composed sex education} materials to 30.000 schools, which were unconnected to the UNESCO/UNFPA project, and not created in collaboration with the experts’ help the Ministry had bid for.96

2.3 Public outcry and resistance – moral panic

Right from this messy onset, the project gave rise to public outcry and indignation. The news about the intended programme impelled the sort of reaction that Kon has characterised as a moral panic.97_{The anti-sexual crusade consequently blew up at the rapprochement of sex} education, and a campaign of resistance against its introduction in Russian schools was launched. Resistance and condemnation came from opponents like the ROC, communists, conservative members of parliament, parental associations, groups concerned with morality, pro-life movements, and other orthodox or conservative organisations. These kind of groups see the real threat not in STDs and unplanned (teenage) pregnancies, but in sex education and contraception. The ‘All Russian Parents Assembly’, for example, is a fierce and powerful opponent of the introduction of sex education in Russians schools, which it considers it to be “contrary to the moral values of Russian society.”98_{Sex education was perceived by opponents as} a foreign concept, that would impose sexual education and family planning upon Russia, while it did not belong there.

Since the project’s impelled furore, the opponents of sex education have been strongly resisting its introduction, thereby also targeting the contributors and supporters to these initiatives. Shapiro seems to agree with what Kon calls a moral panic, recognizing that some oppositional arguments appear “paranoid” in character, and are often “politically tainted”.99 Others however argue that Kon might have overstated his categorization of a moral panic. In his

93

ibid.

94

ibid.

95

96

ibid.

97

ibid., 115.

98

Ulla Pape, The Politics of HIV/AIDS in Russia (New York: Routledge, 2013): 113.

99

Shapiro, “School-based sex education in Russia”, 93.

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article on risk narratives on sex education in the Russian press, sociologist Peter Meylakhs writes that: “Igor Kon’s statement about almost universal media (including liberal media) attack (‘moral panic’) on sex education seems to be exaggerated.”100_{As rationale, Meylakhs points to the liberal} newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, which published interviews with both opponents and

proponents of sex education, and to newspaper Izvestya, that “backed the sex education

adherents throughout the campaign.”101_{It seems though that Kon’s statement was not limited to} the media. Kon’s identification of a moral panic reflects the launch of a negative reaction to the topic of sex education, one that is also political. Kon’s observation refers to the wide and fierce campaign by conservative and religious forces, that targets “sex education, women’s

reproductive rights, and free access to sexuality-related information.”102_{This campaign has since} the 1996 pilot project also heavily attacked subsequent initiatives for universal in-school sex education, and all projects in this direction have since been shut down by the Ministry of Education.

Since the early 2000s, there has not been much media discussion of the topic, although the values and ideas promoting it (as well as the elements it contains), are continuingly being sieged by the current conservative political elite. 103

2.4 Sex education opponents

No Soviet models for a modern-sense sexual educational program existed, and the

changing role of schools, together with the changes in society and morality, posed a challenge. The idea was that the Ministry of Education, supported by UNESCO and UNFPA, would

develop a nationally appropriate sex education programme, in line with Russian culture and tradition. There was no question therefore, of the implementation of a standard ‘western’ model. The project however, was soon attacked, and accused of being a “Western ideological plot” directed against Russian children.”104

Proponents accused opponents of being radically religious, conservative and ignorant, while the opponents accused the proponents of corrupting the young, of being under foreign influence, and even of “acting as agents of international pharmaceutical corporations”.105_Conservative

100

Meylakhs, “Dangerous knowledge vs. dangerous ignorance”, 243.

101

ibid.

102

Kon, “From Abortion to Contraception”, 111.

103

Meylakhs, “Dangerous knowledge vs. dangerous ignorance”, 243.

104

Kon, “From Abortion to Contraception”, 117.

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groups warned that these ‘enemies’ wanted to implant “‘alien ideas’ in Russian society traditions”, and aimed to weaken and depopulate Russia.106_{Opponents spoke of the need to} ‘protect the children’, believing Russian children to be morally pure, with innocent souls, that should not be corrupted or seduced. According to the opponents, children “have a right not to know”, and they believe that sex education will only make them vulnerable to ‘sexual

perversions’.107_{Opponents fear that openness about the traditionally taboo topic of sexuality will} only lead to what they consider to be ‘sexual deviant’ behaviour among teenagers, like

masturbation, homosexuality and promiscuity.108_{These religious and conservative opponents} believe that STDs and unplanned pregnancy prevention should not involve information, but instead be realised by promoting chastity, abstinence, and monogamous marriage. Moreover, the whole idea of birth control and contraception, is “counter to the doctrines of the Russian

Orthodox Church.”109

Since the launch of the ‘anti-sexual crusade’ and the heated debate that the 1996 project instigated, the political climate has not changed into a more favourable towards sex education. On the contrary: the rise of Putin, and his return to traditional values and conservatism, has not improved the prospects of sex education, despite the liberalisation of society. Sexuality has been used to polarize and politicise, and an ideological hostility lies at the core of the Russian

government’s attitude towards sex education. This means that as of 2018, there still is no national programme of school-based sexual education in Russia. Alexei Bobrik, deputy director of an NGO running HIV education programmes has criticized this absence, considering it problematic that “not a single government-approved textbook uses the word ‘condom.’”110 Russia’s former children’s right’s Ombudsman (2009-2016) however, did not feel that children needed this kind of textbooks. Pavel Astakhov said in 2014 that for sex education, teenagers should turn to the Russian literary classics. In a television interview with the Rossiya 24 news channel, Astakhov underlined his opposition, saying that he was against any kind of sex

education for children, as he viewed it “unacceptable to allow things that could corrupt children”, and that “schools should raise children chastely and with an understanding of family values.”111

106

Ibid.

107

Shapiro, ”School-based sex education in Russia”, 93.

108

Ibid.

109

ibid.

110

Pavel Astakhov as cited in Anna Malpas, “Vow to Europe to Offer Sex Ed Angers Parents”, Moscow Times, 11 June 2009, http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2009/6/article/vow-to-europe-to-offer-sex-ed-angers-parents/378472.html, accessed 23 October 2017.

111 Astakhov, as cited in Shaun Walker, “No Sex-education Please, We are Russians, The Star Online, 20 September 2013,

https://www.thestar.com.my/lifestyle/family/features/2013/09/20/no-sex-education-please-we-are-russians/ , accessed 23 October 2017.

Putin's Politics and the Position of Women in Russia