Communication and command in times of crisis
An analysis of command and communication practices by Dutch fire brigade
officers during real life incidents
.
Nathalie Scheffer 1449222
Supervisor: Dr. J. Wolbers Master Thesis
Crisis and Security Management Word count: 13966
Tabel of content
1. Introduction 3 2. Theoretical framework 6 2.1 Styles of incident command 6 2.2 Communication in incident command 7 2.3 Elements of command 8 2.4 Rational decision-making theory 9 2.5 Recognition primed decision-making 10 3. Method 12 3.1 Research method 12 3.2 Sample 13 3.3 Operationalization 13 4. Setting the scene 17 5. Analysis 18 5.1 The reality of incident command 20 5.1.1. Hierarchical command 21 5.1.2. Swarming 23 5.1.3. Specialistic command 25 5.2 Communication in command 27 5.2.1. Voicing concern 27 5.2.2. Purpose of communication 30 5.2.3. Communication of intent 33 6. Discussion 39 6.1 Active vs passive officers 39 6.2 Recognition over rationality 40 6.3 Communication with or without purpose 40 6.4 Limitations and suggestions 42 7. Conclusion 43 8. References 451. Introduction
On the 9th of may in 2008, the fire brigade of Tynaarlo was called out to an industrial fire. The fire was situated in a company specialized in aquatic sports and therefore it was expected that there were at least a few risky substances present in the building (Dutch Safety Board 2009). One of the first assessments was that the fire seemed to be relatively under control. It is this assessment that ended up being a vital aspect in what would follow. Four firefighters went into the building to explore the situation, but three of them quickly got trapped: a sudden and unexpected surge of fire engulfed the part of the building they had just entered. As a result of the initial miscalculation, all three of the firefighters were asphyxiated and died. Several reports have looked into why and especially how this tragic event could have happened. The Dutch Safety Board (2009) found that the wrong assessment of the situation was founded in ignorance, not in carelessness. The commanding officers (in Dutch Officier van Dienst, hereafter officer) acted upon their existing knowledge of similar fires, they had never studied this special type of explosion before. They simply did not know it could have happened. By acting upon their instinct and knowledge of past incidents, the officers were engaging in recognition primed decision making (Klein et al 1985), one of the models that guides this thesis. The report by the Committee Helsloot (2009) indicates other flaws in the management of the fire at De Punt. The researchers found that the command team did work on the incident together, but they did not function as a proper team. The overlap in assigned tasks within different functions of commanders caused confusion, while at the same time the lack of communication also led to wrongful proceedings. In short, it was not only the decision making that erred, but a broader process within the chain of command which caused a lack of good situational awareness. Situation awareness is the extent to which an individual
understands the situation and the ability to make predications for the future based on this perception (Endsley 1995)
As the fire at De Punt shows, to react based upon intuition is not always the most effective way of incident command. Groenendaal and Helsloot (2014) found that some firefighters may lack experience and cannot as easily make decision based upon recognition, or the situation is not assessed properly and the wrong assumptions are made when choosing an approach. This is why, amongst others, Groenendaal and Helsloot (2014) advocate for a naturalistic decision model, namely the FADCM model. The FADCM model is based upon five steps: Fact finding, analysis, communication, decision making, and monitoring. One of
combatting the incident. This is easier in smaller incidents, with big scale incidents situational awareness is more fragmented (Brandweeracademie 2014). This model is now also being incorporated by the Dutch Fire Brigade in trainings, as they aim to improve the incident command of their officers (Brandweeracademie 2014). The goal is to make officers more aware of the option of different approaches and encourage them to be more active in
information seeking. This has become especially pertinent after the Chemie-Pack fire in 2011. Chemie-Pack was specialized in the packaging of chemicals, making the fire extra dangerous. Because the fire escalated very quickly and the cloud of smoke became widespread, the fire affected multiple parts of the country. The fire became so big, existing command structures did not perfectly fit the situation: it diverged from what was taught (Brandweeracademie 2015). A later study by Groenendaal and Helsloot (2018) attempts to measure the
effectiveness of these different command and control practices. Focusing on training exercises, the authors find that there was no correlation between the type of incident
command and response safety and efficiency. They claim that this is the case because officers rely on information from their crew commanders, which often does not lead to any new information. Groenendaal and Helsloot (2018) advise against this type of leadership and argue that officers should proactively search for clues in the environment, because these might have been overlooked by first responders. These findings are shared by Rake and Bohm (2019). They find that officers made few decisions and only a small sum went out looking for additional information. Moreover, their responses were mainly reactive. One of the reasons the authors state for this, is that officers arrive on the scene when many premises are already in place. Rake and Bohm (2019, 4) suggest that it would be more correct to view the officer as “a passive, but important, supervisor, important for maintaining the communication flow.”
As indicated, in both decision-making models (the rational FADCM model and the recognition primed model), communication plays a big role. Naturally, it is a vital part of incident command. How do officers relay a message and how is it received? Not a lot of research has been done into the topic, with most of it focusing on communication in a military or business environment. Barton and Suttcliffe (2009) claim that good communication (or voice) was key in the outcome of wildlife firefighting incidents. Incidents where individuals not only noticed cues and warning signs, but also voiced their concern about these to others, generally had a better outcome. Voicing concern, as they label it, “is important even when others in the system have seen and recognized the same cues” (Barton and Suttcliffe 2009, 1339). This is what makes the concern actionable. This also has consequences for leadership. What the authors suggest is, that when a concern is voiced, it becomes property of the
collective. As a consequence, less is required of the leader, as everyone understands the situation.
As a result of the debate around the most effective style of incident command and the experiences at the Chemie-Pack fire, the Dutch Fire Academy launched a pilot. Goal of this pilot was to find out whether incident command would benefit from leadership which adapted itself to the situation: situational command. The preliminary findings from the pilot are that this is indeed the case: one kind of incident command is not enough during big incidents. The constantly changing circumstances during big incidents calls for a constant re-assessment of the chosen approach and therefore multiple styles of command and communication will be deployed. Thus, it is difficult to determine exactly what kind of command matches the
behavior of fire ground commanders and what influences their decisions and communication. Therefore, the research question for this thesis is: How do fire brigade commanders employ different styles of incident command and communicate the intent of their decisions?
This thesis will first give a brief overview of the existing literature in the fields of incident command, decision making, and communication in command. This is followed by an explanation of the research and operationalization of the codes used to analyze the data. In the analysis the findings are presented and explicit examples are given to make these findings tangible. Furthermore, in the discussion these findings are connected to the existing literature in an effort to come to new insights. Lastly, in the conclusion a brief overview of the research is presented, together with recommendations for future trainings of fire brigade officers.
2. Theoretical framework
There is a relatively limited set of scholars who have chosen to study incident command and decision making, especially in high risk operations (Klein et al. 1986; Cohen Hatton et al. 2015; Groenendaal and Helsloot 2016; Rake and Bohm 2019). One of the reasons for this could be the accessibility of data and the sensitive nature of operations such as that of the fire brigade. This theoretical framework will explore and define the main concepts in the field of decision making and communication. The framework aims to guide the research in answering the following questions: How do fire brigade commanders make decisions based on different styles of incident command? And: How do they communicate the intent behind their decisions to their crews?
2.1 Styles of incident command
Within the professional field of firefighting, three distinct types of incident command are discussed: hierarchical, specialistic, and swarming (Brandweeracademie 2015). Hierarchical command acts on the principle that central management, based upon a prioritization of the most effective and efficient matters, is the best way to solve an incident. This is often top-down, with the highest commander being in charge independently of what his or her
knowledge of the incident may be. This is what is taught by the Dutch fire brigade, however, this is not often followed (Brandweeracademie 2015). Incident command based upon
specialization means that the incident is led by a commander with the most knowledge about the type of incident. This happens when dangerous substances become involved in the fighting of a fire. The last type of command is swarming. This is used within highly complex and quickly evolving incidents. Since a lot of things are happening at once, the incident benefits from decision making on a more decentralized level. Problems are solved separately by different groups of people, making the problem of decision making less complex. The role of a commander is completely different from the other types of command
(Brandweeracademie 2015). The lead commander/officer is predominantly involved with processing information and connecting people, while lower level commanders instruct their units with direct orders. Tests by the Brandweeracademie find that swarming is the most effective, even in easy cases. However, at times it is experienced as being chaotic. It is found that most of the firefighters believe that central command is essential in firefighting, yet they do agree that this is at times inefficient.
2.2 Communication in incident command
Communication holds a special place in all three styles of incident command. Whereas in hierarchical command it may be more clear cut, with the officer being the lead in
communication, in swarming, as firefighters indicated, communication can become chaotic due to different groups making different decisions (Brandweeracademie 2015). Straight (1996, 2) discusses how commanders communicate their intent in these hectic situations. This term, “Commanders intent” is a “description of his vision of the operation’s general form, purpose and what he intends to achieve. (…) Without providing detailed instructions on how to execute this.” Shattuck and Woods (2000) look at the communication of intent in military systems and found that this practice is harder than assumed. Most of the time, company commanders were not able to match their battalion commanders’ intent. Thus, somewhere along the line, perhaps during a stressful situation, miscommunication occurred and the purpose or aim of a message got lost. The message could not be translated to specific actions. The authors do not elaborate on the positive or negative effects of this miscommunication. Newer research by Ziegler and Degrosky (2008) actually uses a case study about a wildland firefighting program to discuss leadership as communicating intent. In this program, leaders are taught that communication is an important part of being a good leader. The task, purpose and end state of an action should be communicated in a clear and concise manner. This will enable a leader to give away responsibility and grant his or her subordinates more flexibility. In doing so, leaders can actually increase their own influence, because they can focus on other tasks. This is a good example of communication when swarming is applied during an
incident. Looking specifically at communication of intent in firefighting, Groenendaal and Helsloot (2016) find that this type of communication is not yet well developed within the fire service in the Netherlands and were not able to support the findings by Ziegler and Degrosky (2008) and Shattuck and Woods (2000). Incident commanders rarely included a purpose in their statement, and if there was a specific purpose, it was often too vague. Groenendaal and Helsloot (2016) advise that more time should be devoted to training exercises specifically focused on communication and formulation.
Schraagen and Rasker (2001) emphasize the importance of communication, or the lack of it, in command and control teams. They claim that communication only has a positive effect on team performance in a new situation. Thus, when teams encounter routine situations, there is no necessity for communication as it does not add to their performance. Schraagen and
Such a model “allows team members to generate explanations and predictions about task and team demands. (…) This is supposed to be especially beneficial during conditions of high workload, because there is no need for team members to request information constantly or to communicate extensively to coordinate.” Therefore, in newer situations it is necessary to have proper communication to create and maintain an up-to-date shared mental model of the situation. This up-to-date mental model can be compared to situational awareness, which will be explained further on in this thesis. Schraagen and Rasker (2001) provide a categorization for all the purposes of communication during teamwork in incidents: exchanging information, performance monitoring, evaluating and analyzing performance outcomes, determining strategies, maintaining up-to-date team knowledge, and maintaining up-to-date situation knowledge. It is this situation knowledge that is also very important in what Barton and Suttcliffe (2009) call voicing concern. By voicing concern “individuals provide critical information to the organization about what is happening, why problems may be occurring and even what might be done about it” (Barton and Suttcliffe 1339, 2009). In their research on wildlife firefighting, the authors find that in incidents which ended badly, this often occurred because individuals notice the indicators, but did not speak up about it. Through actively discussing the situation and sharing thought processes and cues, a team creates a base for itself to work with.
2.3 Elements of command
Central to this research are two models of decision making. Both incorporate (some) of the following elements: Situational awareness, plan formulation, and plan execution (Cohen Hatton et al. 2015).
In the first phase of situational awareness (SA), the decision maker (or officer in this case), aims to understand the situation by fully taking in all the information available. This is the foundation of the planning process. “Situation awareness involves the completeness and accuracy of an individual’s (or group’s) perception of a situation and the extent to which the individual can predict the consequences for the near future” (Endsley 1995, 36). It is
comprised of three levels, which together form a coherent picture. First of all, in level 1 there is the perception of the elements in the environment. This includes all basic information such as location, number of people involved, weather conditions etc. What follows is level 2: Comprehension of the current situation. This level integrates all the obtained data from level one to create a clear picture of the scene. Lastly, the highest level of situational awareness,
level 3 is all about the future status of the incident. Reaching this level gives the incident commander the ability to make a decision about the incident. Thus, situational awareness goes a lot further than just obtaining information about the incident. “It includes comprehending the meaning of that information in an integrated form, comparing it with operator goals, and providing projected future states of the environment that are valuable for decision making” (Endsley 1995, 37). It is claimed that situational awareness is easier to gain at a smaller incident. When fires increase and more trucks and people join the scene, situational awareness tends to become fragmented due to the sudden influx of information (Brandweeracademie 2014).
Then, Cohen Hatton et al. (2015) state, during the plan formulation (PF), the problems and objectives are identified, and a course of action is chosen after carefully deliberating the pros and cons. Lastly, the plan execution (PE) is the implementation of the plan. The officer communicates his or her vision to those that need to carry out the actions.
When looking at operational decision making in situ, Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015) found that decisions were often not made according to the much suggested normative models (Groenendaal and Helsloot 2016). Whereas usually situation assessment (SA) would be followed by plan formulation (PF) and then plan execution (PE), in reality the formulation of a plan was negated. Under dire circumstances, commanders would quickly grab onto what they already knew and suggest actions that they had known to be successfully applied in similar incidents. Thus, incident commanders were very reflexive and procedural. In a similar study, Cohen Hatton and Honey (2015) look at fire brigade trainings, where they found that groups that were given standard training did indeed tend to move directly from information gathering to action. However, groups which had been giving a goal-oriented training, which discussed the importance of risk/benefit analysis and evaluating goals, did shown signs of plan formulation and more situational awareness. It is important to note that both studies by Cohen-Hatton do not measure the effectiveness. They do not aim to claim that a more reflexive or a more planful approach is better in these high risk incidents.
2.4 Rational decision-making theory
The first, and most commonly used model in training manuals for firefighters, is the rational decision making model, which is based upon the existing research in the field of naturalistic decision making. It is characterized by deliberate, thoughtful and planful decision making. The decision is most often based on three phases: Situation assessment, plan formulation and
plan execution (Cohen-Hatton et al. 2015). Groenendaal and Helsloot (2016) provide a useful conceptualization of this rational model, built upon five primary functions of incident
command and control: Fact finding, analysis, decision making, communication, and monitoring. This is better known as the FADCM model. The element of fact finding is important in all proposed models and involves creating situational awareness, although as earlier indicated, this is very hard to obtain during large scale incidents. The development of the incident will develop negatively when the perception of the incident does not match reality. Therefore, this first stage is very important. Following is an analysis, where firefighters are trained to analyze the situation and form a plan. It is this step that is
fundamentally different from the recognition primed decision making model. Officers base their analysis on reason instead of intuition, and although this is a good option when the situation is not immediately recognized, it does require more time and mental effort
(Groenendaal and Helsloot 2016). Naturally, decision making follows. As the authors state, officers should limit the amount of decisions they make during incidents, taking into consideration their own capabilities and that of their crew. During the fourth part of the model, incident commanders should focus on a consequent and clear line of communication. They should communicate their intent and to whom the message is directed. Lastly, to find out whether the order was well received, the commander should monitor the situation and provide feedback on its execution.
2.5 Recognition primed decision-making
The counterpart of the rational decision making model is the recognition primed decision making model. This model is best described by Klein et al. (1986). The RPD model finds that people do not tend to make plans before the make decisions. On the contrary, the model claims that the decision is made based on a recognition of a pattern. Experiences are very important in building this pattern. The more experience the actor has, the easier they
recognize a pattern and choose a course of action. In short, the situation assessment is based on intuition. Another aspect of the decision making model is that of mental simulation. This occurs after the recognition and involves making a mental picture of what it would look life if a certain course of action is taken (Rake and Nja 2009). If the mental simulation convinces the actor enough, a decision is finally made. This decision making model is thus more reflexive in nature. Whereas the rational model assumes that discussions involve situation assessment (SA) and plan formulation (PF) followed by plan execution (PE), the RPD model
transitions immediately from the situation assessment (SA) to the plan execution (PE) (Cohen-Hatton et al. 2015). Kahneman, Lovallo and Sibony (2011) discuss the main
disadvantage of relying on your intuition: confirmation bias. Confirmation bias often leads to people ignoring clues and evidence because they contradict their preconceived notions. While most of the time these notions are correct, they do not take into consideration the exception to the rule. Kahneman et al. (2011, 52) state that it is very hard to overcome these biases: “We have no way of knowing that they’re happening; we almost never catch ourselves in the act of making intuitive errors. Experience doesn’t help us recognize them.”
There is no consensus in the existing literature about which decision model functions best, or which is most often used. On top of that, only a fraction of the literature has studied these models in real life incidents instead of training exercises. This research aims to fill that gap by studying decision making in real life incidents. Moreover, even less is known about
communication during these incidents, while communication is a vital aspect of decision making. Without proper communication a decision is useless regardless of its effectiveness. Thus, this thesis will focus on this specific aspect of decision making, in an effort to
understand it better, but also to provide insights for future incident commander trainings.
3. Method
3.1 Research method
To answer the main research question How do fire brigade commanders employ different styles of incident command and communicate the intent of their decisions? a qualitative content analysis will be conducted. “Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff 2004, 18). With this method, I aim to grasp the full meaning of the
communicated messages. As Rose et al. (2015, 1) state: Content analysis “can be used to examine both the manifest and the latent content of a text. Manifest content refers to the visible, countable components of the message. Latent content refers to the meaning that may lie behind the manifest content.” Thus, content analysis can be both qualitative and
quantitative in nature, yet due to the processes of decision making which I want to test, I have chosen to perform a qualitative analysis. Prasad (2008) discusses some of the benefits of content analysis. First of all, it is a relatively objective way of analyzing data, where the numbers provide a solid and statistics based outcome. Moreover, it is non-obtrusive and will therefore lead to a more realistic outcome. A weakness of content analysis is potential bias in the coding process. Since coding a video will be performed by a single person, there may be trace of coding bias. To overcome this, bi-weekly sessions were held in which the coders compared their codes for the incidents. Each incident was coded by two students and possible discrepancies were discussed.
As indicated before, this research will be based on a video analysis. This method was chosen because this is a relatively new way of studying this subject. Previous studies into incident command were mostly based on retrospective accounts, meaning that interviews or other types of evaluations were used. One of the biggest methodological issues with this is that looking at a performance in hindsight could lead to bias, self-justification, blame, incomplete recollection and remoteness in time (Groenendaal and Helsloot 2018, 54). Thus, commanders may paint an incorrect picture of themselves, which would severely distort the data. Hence, this research will take a different approach, namely that of video analysis. This type of research is a challenge and mostly understudied. Luff and Heath (2012) discuss the limitations, but also the best practices of this method. First of all, it is easy to run into technical issues, where audio or images possibly get lost and thus, losing valuable data. Because the data is collected for us, this is not something we can control and we will have to find a way to work around this. One of the biggest advantages of video analysis is that it gives
researchers a unique opportunity to view, review and evaluate social interactions over and over, leading to a better analysis (Heath 2016).
3.2 Sample
This research is built upon 20 videos that were selected from a set of videos recorded by 50 Officers of the Dutch Fire Brigade in the period of July 2017 - December 2018, in an effort to understand their situational incident command. The four students working on this project each analyzed 10 incidents which overlapped, so each video was analyzed twice. The general selection of the videos was made based upon the characteristics of the incidents. The chosen incidents reflect typical cases which fire fighters run into during their shifts and are a good representation of the different incidents. Cases include fires in industrial buildings, residential homes, spillage of radioactive materials, and gas leaks. Hereafter, a selection was made based upon the focus of the thesis. For this thesis 10 videos were chosen which best highlighted the different kinds of communication and contained enough information to build a thesis on. The officers who participated in this research operated in 4 different regions, in cooperation with the Instituut voor Fysieke Veiligheid (IFV).
Naturally, a study of this nature raises some ethical concerns due to the human factor. On the one hand, there are the possible victims which are visible in the videos. On the other hand, the officers have offered the outside world a look into their judgment and decisions, while they could be scrutinized for some of them. Therefore, all data in this study will be
anonymized and a privacy statement will be signed in order to keep the sensitive data secure. The videos are numbered (e.g. Incident 1) so they cannot be traced back to specific incidents and the names of the officers will not be mentioned in this thesis. Due to the versatile
environments in which the officers act, at times data will be missing because it was simply inaudible or missing due to human error or technical failure.
3.3 Operationalization
Based on what was found in the existing literature and a preliminary view of an incident, the following codes were created to look at decision making and communication. The codes largely follow the phases of the SA – PF – PE model as explained by Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015). These were developed into a codebook to guide the analysis of the chosen videos.
Situation Assessment (Cues):
The code SA Cues will be given when there is evidence of an officer gathering information when he initially arrives on the scene. Does the officer recognize when he is misinformed? Example: “Officer communicates with the EMT. Indicates that there are multiple people inside, but does not know how many. ‘I have no clue how many people are involved in this incident’” (Incident 18).
Situation Assessment (Assessment):
A text will be coded with assessment if it shows traces of the officer trying to explore the scene, when he analyzes risks or if the officer takes time to ask questions about the incident. Example: “Officer arrives at the scene of the incident. Approaches the police officers for more information about the scene, this does not satisfy him. Recognizes that the building (a home for the elderly) is a nightmare with regards to its lay out. Tries to find one of his crew commanders to get a better assessment” (Incident 18).
For all text coded with SA, there is an extra layer to the coding based on the levels of
situational awareness as posed by Endsley (1995). The most basic level, which encompasses the perception of elements will be coded by 1. Then, the second label will be coded with a 2: comprehension of the situation. And the last level will be coded with a 3. This label will only be given when there are signs of future projection.
Plan Formulation (Goal Formulation)
To measure goal formulation, as part of manufacturing a plan, this thesis will assess whether the officer communicates goals (and how many), when he is constantly being exposed to new information. Thus, this formulation may be affected when he is put under stress.
Example: “Officer wants to find out how many people are still inside the building, proposes a structured way of searching the premises” (Incident 18).
Plan Formulation (Expectations)
For the code expectations, this thesis will look at whether the officer communicates any expectations, whether these get modified in the process of incident command, and if the assumptions are validated.
Example: “Officer indicates that he believes that the fire is largely under control, does not expect it to spread anymore. However, he thinks that there are new threats: gas leakages and a collapse of the house” (Incident 17).
Plan Formulation (Option Awareness)
The last aspect of plan formulation is option awareness. Does the officer recognize all
possibilities? Does he communicate them? Moreover, does he receive any suggestions/options from other responders at the scene? And lastly, does the officer realize the consequences of his options?
Example: “Officer has a meeting with the head officer, advisor hazardous materials and public relations officer. Officer explains his course of action. Discusses the possibilities of fighting the fire, but also just letting the building burn down in a controlled manner” (Incident 19).
Plan Execution (Decision)
Perhaps the most obvious code is that of the decision. It looks specifically at which decision is being taken by the officer. Part of this can be whether the officer decides to ask for extra support. Here it will also be noted how long it actually takes for the officer to make a decision.
Example: “The fire is rapidly spreading at the back side of the house. Officer is still waiting on a new TS to start extinguishing on that side. Decides to quickly instruct a group of firefighters (who are there purely for the water transport) to head over to the back and start extinguishing (Incident 17).”
Plan Execution (Monitoring)
Logically, the code of monitoring follows after the decision making. For this thesis it will be of interest to see whether the officer monitors if the decisions are in fact executed. Good monitoring will also lead to the officer changing his decision when he notices the approach is not working. Moreover, monitoring also includes the officer keeping track of the task load of his men and safeguarding their health.
Example: “Officer realizes that there are too many tasks for his men. Discusses with the 120 whether they need an extra car to lighten the load. This would mean they could let each team search their own floor” (Incident 18).
Plan Execution (Communication)
The code of communication and the many aspects to it are very important for this thesis. The analysis will focus on several aspects of communication. It will look at the intent of the message and the purpose for communication. Moreover, it will be used to analyzed what information the officer chooses to share. Lastly, non-verbal communication will also be taken into consideration.
Example: “Officer starts his meeting with the crew commanders. One of them starts blurting out suggestions. Officer is not happy with this and instructs him to calm down. He wants to have a structured meeting and build his SA. ‘I need to get this right the first time’ (Incident 4).
Plan Execution (Organizing)
The category of organizing encompasses communication by the officer about role division and deliberation. A text is coded with organizing when it truly shows the officer in a coordinating role.
Example: “Officer comes back with multiple tasks from his meeting. Divides these under his crew commanders. Instructs every one of them on their specific task” (Incident 4).
Emotions
Emotion is the only code that does not fit into the SA –PF – PE framework, however it is important to include this into the codebook. The code aims to encompass whether officers are stressed or relaxed, whether there is a formal or informal sphere, and how officers show their emotions during setbacks. Lastly, and maybe more importantly: how do they communicate these emotions.
Example: “Officer is frustrated because he asked a crew commander to meet him but it is taking a while. ‘G*******, where are you?’” (Incident 16).
4. Setting the scene
This thesis concerns itself with incident command, decision making and communication by the Dutch fire brigade. The fire brigade is built up out of almost 80% volunteers, with the bigger cities having access to professional firefighters and the smaller villages relying on volunteers who fill at least one day per week with firefighting activities. These voluntary firefighters have received the same training as the professional firefighters. The fire brigade is used in several types of incidents: fires, technical aid/first aid, water incidents and incidents involving hazardous substances. When called out to an incident a firetruck always contains six persons: one crew commander, one driver, and four basic firefighters. There are five fire classifications which are used to indicate the size of the fire: 1) A small fire. This only
involves one firetruck and its personnel; 2) A medium fire. Two trucks are called to the scene, including an officer who takes command over the standard commander on a fire truck; 3) Large fire. At this stage three trucks and an officer are called out to the incident; 4) Very large fire. This involves four trucks, an officer and a head officer who then takes command (except in the region Haaglanden, here a head officer arrives at classification three). Such a fire happens, on average, once every week in the Netherlands (Brandweeracademie 2014); 5) Huge fire. It is at this stage that the large amount of trucks is divided into platoons. Here, four trucks and one officer form one platoon. More officers and trucks are added and the head officer holds the main command. A special advisor is called to the scene when there is
suspicion of the involvement of hazardous materials. This thesis focusses on the actions of the officer and therefore incidents starting from classification 2 and upwards.
The officer is the link between the crew commanders and the head officer. He has three main roles during an incident: being responsible for fixing the incident, coordinating
multidisciplinary deliberations, and in larger incidents he also advises, informs and supports the head officer (Veiligheidsregio 2017).
5. Analysis
After the process of coding the available videos according to the conditions set in the
codebook, several claims can be made regarding incident command styles, decision making, and communication. To demonstrate the findings, fragments from the footage are used as examples.
From reviewing the existing literature, it was expected that officers were active decision makers during incidents. However, the data has shown something different. What has become apparent from the footage is that officers hardly make decisions, but are more often present in the role of a passive observer/coordinator and information exchanger, while the crew
commanders who are closer to the fire actually instruct their men. The behavior by the officer in incident four is an excellent example of this:
Incident 4: Fire in a middle school
Incident 4 concerns a fire in a middle school on new year’s eve. The officer arrives quickly after receiving the call. What he encounters upon arrival is a fire that is rapidly spreading within the school, accompanied with a lot of smoke. Several fire trucks have already come to the scene and have started watering down the fire, however, the fire does not yet appear to be under control. The officer immediately tries to build his situation assessment by not going into a discussion with the crew commanders and prioritizes gaining his own impression by walking around the building. After assessing the scene, the officer does not immediately show intentions to take the lead and make decisions. He is observing the situation from a distance when he is approached by a police officer.
17:32 Police: Will we be working with aerial platforms?
17:32 Officer: Just one, not more.
17:32 Police: When it arrives, where do you want it to be stationed?
Within these two interactions it is visible that the officer does not take the lead or make any decisions. His crew commanders, who are closer to the fire, make up their own plans to control the fire. The officer appears to be a rather passive bystander, only receiving and passing on information, leaving decisions to others. Nearly an hour later, the same trend continues. The officer coordinates, but hardly ever decides. What he does do is run around and pass on information. He is the main source of information for all stakeholders in this incident (e.g. principal of the school). This reaches its peak when the officer takes time to hold an information meeting with all the employees of the school who have come to the scene of the incident, while the crew commanders are still busy with managing the incident.
While there are incidents in this study where the officer takes on a more assertive role and orders around the crew, this is only true in a couple of the cases or only portions of the
incident. In general, the officers followed the trend illustrated in example 4 where they were a more passive bystander, present at the scene to connect, coordinate and communicate instead of deciding what course of action to take. Table 1 shows the frequency in which officers engaged in decision-making (PE: Decision), coordinating (PE: Organizing) and
(…)
17:35 Crew commander: My guys took a quick look, there is no smoke visible. There is a partition which we will be keeping closed to stop the smoke from spreading.
17:35 Officer: Sounds good
17:35 Crew commander: We could go… We ... As long as they keep their part under control I think it will be fine.
17:35 Officer: Understood
17:35 Crew commander: We will also be monitoring the roof and then I will get back to you
Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4 Incident 5
Decision -making 2 3 1 3 2
Coordinating 7 5 4 7 4
Communicating 2 3 4 5 2
Incident 16 Incident 17 Incident 18 Incident 19 Incident 20
Decision -making 6 2 2 1 0
Coordinating 13 6 9 19 5
Communicating 9 4 5 7 2
Table 1. Roles of the officer
5.1 The reality of incident command
In the professional field, three types of incident command are defined to characterize the ways in which officers take the lead during incidents: hierarchical, specialistic, and swarming. When an officer was clearly the lead in command, the text was coded with hierarchical, when the officer diverted command to a crew member specialized in hazardous material the text was coded as specialistic, and when the officer instructed crew commanders to take the lead the code swarming was given. The data has shown that most of the time, swarming is used and not hierarchical command as is expected when thinking of the officer in a more
traditional manner (as demonstrated in table 2). This ties in with the finding that officers are more passive coordinators than active leaders.
Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4 Incident 5
Hierarchical 2 3 2 3 1
Specialistic 3 2 0 0 0
Swarming 1 1 2 5 3
Incident 16 Incident 17 Incident 18 Incident 19 Incident 20
Hierarchical 2 3 2 1 0
Specialistic 0 0 0 0 3
Swarming 7 0 3 6 0
5.1.1. Hierarchical command
Hierarchical command is the traditional, top-down approach which is taught by the Dutch Fire Brigade to aspiring officers. An analysis of the data shows that some officers follow this model more than others. Incidents 2 and 17 are especially characterized by the use of hierarchical command. The fire in a home (incident 17) is a simple example of hierarchical command:
Incident 17: Fire in a home
Incident 17 concerns a fire in a town house. When the officer arrives the fire is already very large. The streets are filled with smoke and multiple fire fighters have already entered the house. The officer immediately notices the biggest risk in this fire: the potential spread of the fire to the neighboring houses. Preventing this is where he decides to focus on in the first phase of his command. Because he is so focused on this he overlooks the fact that the back side of the house is completely burning down. At the same time, he is still waiting for extra trucks to arrive. When the head officer arrives the officer acknowledges that the fire is hard to control.
16:36 Head officer: Do you have some water on the back side?
16:36 Officer: Not yet, that’s why I have called in a fourth truck
16:36 Head officer: That might still be a while. What about the water transport truck over there?
16:36 Officer: Yeah they still need to build more water pressure. But I will instruct them that when they are finished they can start watering the fire if the fourth truck has not arrived yet.
In this example the officer has come to the realization that the backside of the house is rapidly going down in flames. Although he had previously chosen to wait for the fourth truck to arrive, he decides that they cannot wait for that to happen. In that moment, he takes the lead and makes a decision. He communicates this decision to one of the crew commanders ensuring that the order is placed in the right hands. There is a clear hierarchy visible and everyone adheres to it.
Within hierarchical command, decision-making is in the hands of the officer. As the leader he clearly takes control of the situation. However, how he makes this decision varies. The
analysis aimed to determine whether officers rely on the models they are taught in trainings and therefore are planful, or whether they rely more on their reflexes and their experiences in other incidents. The reviewed incidents contained examples of both of the models. When the coding scheme showed the process of SA – PE it was coded as recognition primed decision making and when a conscious plan was made SA – PF – PE the text was coded as rational decision making.
Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4 Incident 5 Recognition primed decision-making 1 2 1 3 2 Rational decision making 1 1 0 0 0 (…)
16:36 Officer (to crew commander): Can you communicate to the other crew commander that a fourth truck is coming. However, if it has not arrived by the time they stopped building pressure, they should start watering the fire. If the truck has arrived by that time, they can stand down. But getting water on the backside is now priority number one, okay?!
Incident 16 Incident 17 Incident 18 Incident 19 Incident 20 Recognition primed decision-making 5 0 0 0 0 Rational decision making 1 2 2 1 0
Table 3. Decision-making strategies
Although both models appeared within multiple incidents, the data in table 3 shows that the majority of decisions were made based on recognition and reflexes, instead of plans. Officers appeared to prefer this model in times of stress and their experience weighed heavier than their trainings. However, no correlation can be made between hierarchical command and decision-making strategies. For example: when an officer practiced swarming as a style of command, the frequency in which he used either decision making models did not differ from when he practiced hierarchical command. Thus, officers did prefer to reason based upon reflexes, but this was not directly dependent on their command style.
5.1.2. Swarming
The practice of swarming is what we see happening most often in the reviewed incidents (with incidents 5, 16 and 19 as prime examples). These incidents are so complex and rapidly evolving that the situation benefits from decentralized decision-making. The officer often chooses to relay command to the crew commanders so he can focus on processing
information and coordinating the incident. This is exactly what was found in the first stages of this analysis: the officer is more often a passive observer and communicator and decisions are made by the crew commanders. An example of swarming can be found in incident 16:
Incident 16: Fire in a large industrial building
Incident 16 concerns a fire in a large industrial building. When the officer arrives on the scene, several crew commanders have already started exploring the site. The officer first attempts to build his own situational awareness by taking a walk around the perimeter of the building. It quickly becomes clear that there is a lot of smoke present on the first two floors, but the fire has not yet been found. As a consequence of the uncertainty and building smoke, the officer soon raises the incident level to “very large fire”. For a long time during the incident, it remains unclear where exactly the fire is situated, at times making the officer feel tense as he has to maintain control and ensure the safety of his men.
20:34 Officer: It’s a tricky situation. Take water inside, if you notice the smoke building, then you should start thinking about getting more water
20:34 Crew commander: Okay, but then I need low water pressure
20:34 Officer: That’s okay, I’ll leave that up to you
20:34 Crew commander: Then we should already start prepping, I would prefer that
20:34 Officer: Again, that’s up to you. It’s your side of the building. I’ll take a look at the other side.
(…)
20:35 Officer: We’re going to create exit points, and if those are finished, then we will turn on the ventilators. That means that you have command on that side, so if you see it starting to burn, immediately go in, your call.
This example shows the officer diverging command to the crew commander. He
acknowledges his expertise and lets him take the lead on a certain side of the building. During this phase of the incident the officer has the command over eight teams of firefighters,
switching to swarming is the only possible option for the officer to remain control of the incident. In essence, he has to diverge command to retain his command. Because the decision-making process has been largely shifted to the crew commanders no real conclusion can be made about the relation between using swarming as command strategy and a preference for a decision-making model.
However, what is interesting to note when looking at swarming, is that this can be closely linked to commander’s intent. This type of command falls outside of the three styles that are proposed in the professional field, but it appears to be a mix of these styles. In its essence, commander’s intent is the officer describing ordering what needs to happen, in a hierarchical manner, but not providing instructions in how to achieve this goal and leaving those decisions with the crew commanders, and thus applying swarming. Examples of commander’s intent and how they communicate this intent is what will be discussed in the second part of this analysis.
5.1.3. Specialistic command
Specialistic command is an outlier in the field of command, because it is only applied in very specific situations. The data set included three incidents (1, 2, 20) where specialistic incident command was explicit. These incidents revolved around gas leakages, radioactive material, or an environmental waste dumping. Based on the footage it can be claimed that during incidents involving hazardous materials, the officer takes a step back and hands command to the
advisor hazardous materials. Thus, the chain in command changes and is ordered based on expertise. The following example shows how specialistic command functions:
Incident 1: explosion involving radioactive material
An explosion has caused the spread of radioactive material in an industrial area. Upon arrival at the scene the officer is very careful in his actions and prioritizes the safety of his men and all bystanders until he gains a better understanding of the situation. Company specialists inform him about the dangers of the hazardous material involved with the explosion. The specialists believe that the victims are not harmed and the area can be cleaned relatively easily, after the fire brigade has checked if the fire is not still smoldering. While the officer trusts the company specialists he does not want to make any decisions until his advisor hazardous materials arrives. After half an hour the advisor hazardous materials and head officer arrive at the scene and starts discussing the incident with the officer. From this moment on the officer loses command to the advisor hazardous materials and the head officer.
21:37 Officer: I need advice on the incident. They do not measure any radioactivity. It is possible for the company to clean the waste themselves?
21:38 Advisor hazardous materials: Well that is their job…
21:38 Officer: And I want to go to the neighbors and explain the situation… Do you have anything to add to that?
21:38 Advisor hazardous materials: No I think it is important to ensure that the fire is completely out, and then the company has the task to clean the area and what went wrong. It is their challenge
21:38 Officer: So, you advise me, to tell them, that they can start cleaning the waste?
21:38 Advisor hazardous materials: Yes, if you have checked the scene, then that is fine with me.
After securing the scene, the officer hardly makes any decisions on his own. He states that he is relying on the judgement of the advisor hazardous materials who has specialized
knowledge on dealing with dangerous substances. The advisor hazardous materials has the lead in the situation, as the officer acknowledges that he does not have the knowledge to make the decisions. Thus, command shifts based on knowledge of the situation, primarily in
incidents with a special nature. As a consequence of this shift in command, there is no role for the officer as decision maker during these special incidents. The only decision an officer makes is to relay command to the advisor hazardous materials, who then makes the decisions based on his expertise of these incidents. Thus, during incidents where specialistic command is practiced, the officer is passive observer without any decision-making tendencies.
5.2 Communication in command
As has become apparent from this analysis, communication is very important in incident command and decision making. It appears that officers are more passive coordinators, vital in maintaining a good line of communication between different stakeholders at the incident, instead of decision makers. However, when they do make decisions it also remains important how they communicate this and what the purpose of their message is. The findings in this thesis focus on voicing concern (Barton and Suttcliffe 2009), the categorizations of purpose by Schraagen and Rasker (2001), and the communication of intent.
5.2.1. Voicing concern
Before decisions are made, it is important for the officer to gather a good overview of the situation. Prominent in the analyzed footage was the element of concern. During most of the incidents, officers tended to voice their concern to those around them in order to make them aware of the situation and work on a common mental model/situational awareness (SA). Incident 18 is a good example of how this concern is voiced to share responsibility.
Incident 18: Fire in a special care home
Incident 18 is a fire in a special care home. Upon arrival the officer immediately notes the difficulties with the lay out of the building: it is divided in multiple sections, consists of several layers and is hard to access from multiple sides. More pressing is the issue that no one knows how many people reside in the building, or who has already been evacuated. The fire is already practically extinguished from the start, however the amount of smoke and damage to the building is extensive. The main task of the officer is therefore to evacuate everyone and ensure there are no victims. Throughout the incident this remains the issue. While firefighters are removing the elderly and ventilating the building, the officer is trying to establish whether there are missing persons. The lack of situational awareness leads to a lot of unclear situations, making the incident a real communicatory struggle for the officer. The officer expresses his concern about the unclarity multiple times during the incident
00:56 Officer: I have just arrived, do you already have an assessment of the fire?
00:56 Police: I do not know anything about the fire yet
00:56 Officer: I have noticed one person covered in smoke, he is sitting with some of your men
00:56 Police: Yes, that’s right. I have agreed that the ambulances will be set up over there. There are multiple on their way.
00:56 Officer: Okay, good to know. The location and building are a disaster to work with…
(…)
01:13 Officer: I’m focusing on exploring the building, and everyone we run into will be taken outside and handed over to you.
It is clear from the start of the footage that the officer’s main concern is the lack of clarity regarding the lay out of the building and the number of people residing it. He voices this concern multiple times, to crew commanders, the head officer and to other stakeholders. By voicing it he engages other individuals to help him with a solution: the other fire fighters are now also attempting to create a map of the building and coming up with plans to count its inhabitants.
01:13 Paramedic: Yeah I just dealt with two residents
01:13 Officer: Just so you have a complete assessment of the building … Multiple people are still being evacuated. And I hope it will all be okay in the end, but with buildings like this it almost never is…
01:14 Paramedic: We will wait and see
(…)
01:29 Head Officer: What do we have here?
01:29 Officer: It’s a home for the elderly, are you familiar with the location?
01:29 Head Officer: Not really
01:29 Officer: The elderly home has been turned into housing units, but with the same type of inhabitants… There was a scooter on fire on the ground floor. This was extinguished pretty quickly, but this has caused the spread of black smoke
throughout the whole building. People were coming out with black faces. So for now, our main issue is ventilation. But it appears now that smoke has spread more and thicker than we thought. That is why I asked for an extra fire truck to help out. I need an extra set of hands. It appeared to be an easy job, but it turned for the worse. There is an undetermined amount of people evacuated or still in the building. I do not have any numbers, no drawings of the building…
The element of voicing concern is of vital importance in all of the command styles, but especially during swarming. Voicing concern is necessary to create a proper shared mental model of the situation. When the officer engages in hierarchical command, the crew
commanders do as they are told and it is most relevant for the officer to have good situational awareness. However, as the fire grows, more trucks get involved and command is relayed to the crew commanders (swarming), it is necessary for these crew commanders to have the same mental model as the officer does. When this is lacking, it becomes unclear for crew commanders who is exactly doing what and where, impacting their work. While the officer cannot properly communicate and coordinate the incident when he has a different situational awareness than the crew commanders.
5.2.2. Purpose of communication
Voicing concern was important for officers in order to share the burden of command. When communicating with their crew commanders or other important figures, exchanging
information, determining strategies, or maintaining up-to-date situation knowledge were the main purposes for communication by officer during incidents (Table 4).
Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4 Incident 5 Exchanging information 7 4 3 7 3 Performance monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 Evaluating and analyzing 0 0 0 0 0 Determining strategies 5 10 5 8 5 Maintaining up-to-date team knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 Maintaining up-to-date situation knowledge 7 6 7 7 8
Incident 16 Incident 17 Incident 18 Incident 19 Incident 20 Exchanging information 5 6 6 6 2 Performance monitoring 0 0 0 0 0 Evaluating and analyzing 0 0 0 0 0 Determining strategies 11 7 6 10 4 Maintaining up-to-date team knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 Maintaining up-to-date situation knowledge 7 8 9 9 3
Table 4. Communication purposes
Examples of all these purposes were visible during the fire at a club.
Incident 19: Fire at a club
When arriving at the fire in a club, the officer immediately determines that the building is doomed and that the plan is to let it burn down, while protecting the surrounding buildings. The officer must deal with three main issues during the incident: protecting the other clubs, finding out if someone is still inside, and assessing whether there is a risk of explosion due to the gas bottles present.
The officer functions as a coordinator. He guides the commanders throughout the incident and involves them in his decisions. Moreover, he attempts to maintain a good overview of the scene by frequently writing things down and sketching the situation.
05:15 Head Officer: Hi!
05:15 Officer: Hi, welcome, shall I show you my sketches at the truck? I have a problem with water at the moment. I have let the water transport put down hoses on that side and I am going to add an extra truck. They are going to help out.
05:15 Head Officer: We were missing a person, right?
05:15 Officer: Yes, but we have solved that problem. It was the night guard: he is with the police now.
05:16 Officer: (While drawing) I have four trucks present. 2 on his side, two on that side. The incoming truck will cross the boulevard in order to get water, the other water points are too far away…
(…)
05:18 Head Officer: Now what I was wondering is whether you have some tactics with regards to extinguishing the fire, or the bottles of gas at the scene?
05:18 Officer: Yes, we are looking at that. We have some bottles at the front… For now, the tactic is to secure the gas bottles, avoid the spread of the fire, and then we will make further plans.
05:18 Head Officer: I understand. It is good to plan, especially with the lack of water available.
(…)
07:33 Officer: (…) just so you know… There is a chance that you guys will be send back very quickly, because the fire is out. We’re going to scale down to a middle fire, but I will let you know!
Within most of the incidents, communication is used to share knowledge on the situation, to discuss strategies and to exchange information. The communication during the fire at the club shows how these three frequently used purposes are utilized by officers. They are almost vital to the development of the incident. The officer is constantly exchanging information with those around him in order to maintain up to date situation knowledge, which in turn leads them to have an easier time when discussing strategies. Within the assessed incidents it was not found to be common to monitor performance or analyze performances during the incidents.
The purposes of communication as defined by Schraagen and Rasker (2001) are interwoven with the multiple phases of incident command. There is no clear correlation between the purposes of communication and specific styles of command, with for example determining strategies almost always presupposes the decision-making phase (especially during rational decision-making. On the whole, there was a relative balance between the use of purposes in combination with command styles within the incidents. However, something can be said about the necessity of the chosen communication purposes. Maintaining up-to-date situation knowledge is, just as voicing concern and creating a shared situation model, very important when it comes to swarming. It is only then that officers and crew commanders know what they are both working on. As a mean of communication, determining strategies is important in all of the command models. In hierarchical command the officer still convenes with crew commanders to talk about the strategy for fighting the fire, it is after this that he makes the decision by himself. In swarming or commander’s intent, they all gather to discuss strategy too, but the officer only communicates a goal and leaves the crew commanders to decide their actions with this strategy to achieve the goal. Lastly, exchanging information remains necessary in all of the command styles and fits in well with the conclusion that the officer is more a passive observer who coordinates and communicates information, instead of a decisive commander.
5.2.3. Communication of intent
The analyzed footage showed that officers make decisions less often than was assumed. When they do make decisions, there is a need to make this message as clear as possible. The intent of their message should be evident: it should include a task, purpose and end state. If this is lacking, the situation can quickly become unclear. Incidents 16 and 18 illustrate what happens when communication of intent is applied properly and when this is not the case. In general, it
was found that when officers did make a decision, they had a hard time communicating the intent of their decisions, specifically the end state.
The officer makes the decision to get more clarity about the fire. The fire fighters are allowed to go in and demolish the building to create a better view of the fire. The officer clearly states to his men what the end goal is of their actions: locate the fire in order to extinguish it and secure the building by demolishing it. However, the exact steps are not spelled out, only the conditions: be careful and in case of danger, leave the building.
Incident 16: Fire in a large industrial building
During the fire in an industrial building, the officer communicates his intent during decisions. An example of this is shown later on during the fire, when the officer thinks the fire has stopped spreading, yet still does not know where it is situated. In his communication, the officer is quite clear as he states that he wants to start demolishing the building to locate the fire.
19:03 Crew commander: (via porto) 120 for the 100
19:03 Officer: (via porto) Come in
19:03 Crew commander: (via porto) I think we need an aerial platform on this side because there is still smoke emanating from the roof. Over.
19:04 Officer: (via porto) Yes, perfect. I think you should start demolishing it (the roof), to determine where the fire is situated. I’m going to send an extra fire truck your way. Consult with him and then I will see you guys in a bit at the gate to make further plans.
19:04 Crew commander: (via porto) Understood.
19:04 Officer: (via porto) Great. And again: Everyone please be careful. It is an empty building. If we see the fire spreading, we will leave the building and that is it.
The incident in the elderly care home shows the consequences of the lack of intent in a message uttered by the officer.
The officer has proposed a plan and discusses this with the police. However, as he does not explicitly state how to do this or who should do this or communicate it to his crew
commanders, the plan remains vague. As a result, nothing concrete happens in the next 10 minutes and the situation becomes even more chaotic.
Incident 18: Fire in a special care home
From the start of the incident it is clear that it will be difficult to solve quickly due to the complex lay out of the building. In the first half hour after arriving, the officer is loaded with questions and he largely follows the actions which have already been set into motion by the crew commanders who arrived at the scene earlier.
However, at a certain moment it is expected of him to make a plan while still struggling with the lack of good situational awareness.
01:19 Officer: For now, we have focused on clearing the smoke, then we have tackled the biggest problem. I have three trucks inside with men carrying oxygen devices. With the fans in there it is clearing out very quickly. There are extra fans coming. The idea is to keep the residents inside their houses, because each apartment is their own fire compartment. If the doors are kept shut, they won’t notice anything. That’s the trick of the building and it will enable us to clear out the smoke. (…) But I have no idea how many people have already come outside. We need to check all the apartments in a structured manner to determine the head count.
01:29 Head Officer: What do we have here?
01:29 Officer: It’s a home for the elderly, are you familiar with the location?
01:29 Head officer: Not really
01:29 Officer: The elderly home has been turned into housing units, but with the same type of inhabitants… There was a scooter on fire on the ground floor. This was extinguished pretty quickly, but this has caused the spread of black smoke
throughout the whole building. People were coming out with black faces. So for now, our main issue is ventilation. But it appears now that smoke has spread more and thicker than we thought. That is why I asked for an extra fire truck to help out. I need an extra set of hands. It appeared to be an easy job, but it turned for the worse. There is an undetermined amount of people evacuated or still in the building. I do not have any numbers, no drawings of the building…
(…)
01:33 Crew commander: There is a lot of smoke in the hallways. We are knocking on people’s doors, but they are not responding. Can we kick down their doors to evacuate them or are we going to break the windows in the hallway in order to let the smoke out?
01:33 Officer: It is important to put the fans in order to clear out the smoke. We need to do whatever necessary to ensure that. Then we should search all the apartments in a coordinated manner.
01:33 Crew commander: Can we do this by damaging the doors on the upper floors?
01:33 Officer: Yes… (Becomes distracted) Do whatever you think is necessary.
Crew commanders come up to the officer with different suggestions on how to perform his plan, ask for permission to smash open windows and doors, in order to get certainty about the number of residents. This unclarity remains for at least 20 more minutes, until a crew
commander forces the officer to enunciate his plan and give an exact order.
02:10 Crew commander: I think we should make a new plan
02:10 Officer: Yes yes, that’s what we are going to do now
(…)
02:10 Crew commander: Every apartment that we clear, we leave the key in the lock and write down on the door what exactly we did. However, we are running into apartments where no one is responding. Can we kick down those doors?
02:10 Officer: and the master key I gave you?
02:10 Crew commander: That one is not working. It only suits the mechanical rooms.
02:11 Officer: Do you know if there are people behind those doors? Or smoke?
02:11 Crew commander: I want to start measuring the toxicity…
02:11 Officer: I haven’t found the manager of the building yet
02:11 Crew commander: No, I just want to know: what do we with those apartments where we do not get a response?
02:11 Officer: If you think you should go in, you can go in
