Ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway: Objectively appointed or politically exploited?

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Word count: 21.420

Ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway:

Objectively appointed or politically exploited?

How political colour of governments affects the policy area focus of ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway between 1972 and 2013

By Gunnar Koehler

S1253352

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of

Science degree in Public Administration

University of Leiden

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Advisor: Dr. J. Christensen

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Abstract

Ad hoc advisory commissions, as collectives of experts and expert knowledge, are essential parts in the policy making process in numerous political systems, including that of Norway. As commissions supply knowledge and politicians demand knowledge, commissions might be influenced by politics and might be used as strategic-political tools for ideological purposes. This study aims to give insight in whether and how partisan influence in the form of the political colour of government affects knowledge utilization of commissions. The study specifically aims to answer the question to what extent the political colour of government affects the policy area focus of Norwegian ad hoc commissions between 1972 and 2013. A quantitative approach through binomial logistic regression was applied while checking for moderation effects of election imminence, economic growth, parliamentary support, and number of government parties. The results were mostly insignificant, but it was found that relatively right-leaning governments are more likely to install commissions in health depending on the level of economic growth. No significant results were found for the other moderators.

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List of abbreviations

CAP Comparative Agendas Project CMP Comparative Manifesto Project CPDS Comparative Political Data Set

DV Dependent variable

GDP Gross domestic product

IV Independent variable

NPIC Norwegian Public Inquiry Commissions OLS Ordinary least squares

ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic TSCS Time series cross-sectional

UK United Kingdom

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List of tables

Table 1. Models of knowledge utilization and corresponding motives ... 15

Table 2. Formulated hypotheses ... 25

Table 3. Concept definitions ... 26

Table 4. Policy area preferences on the left-right spectrum ... 30

Table 5. Summary statistics: dependent dummy variables of policy area focus of commissions ... 36

Table 6. Summary statistics: indepedendent variables ... 36

Table 7. Logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of the policy area of health ... 39

Table A1. Norwegian government overview ... 50

Table A2. Policy area focus categories and corresponding classification of manifesto policy categories ... 51

Table B1. Pearson correlation values for policy area focus of commissions model ... 52

List of figures

Figure 1. Conceptual model ... 27

Figure 2. Interaction effect between political colour of government and economic growth predicting the probability of the policy area of health ... 40

Figure B1. Histogram of standardized residuals of the number of academics in commissions ... 53

Figure B2. Average installed commissions by left and right governments ... 54

Figure B3. Average installed commissions by single-party and multi-party governments 54 Figure B4. Cumulative amount of installed commissions by election imminence for left-leaning governments ... 55

Figure B5. Cumulative amount of installed commissions by election imminence for right-leaning governments ... 55

Figure B6. Installed commissions per policy area (CAP) for left-leaning governments ... 56

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1. Introduction

Commissions are an essential part in the policy-making process of numerous political systems around the world, usually functioning as an advisory or inquiry institution regarding a specific public matter. Such commissions are commonly utilized in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries (Bulmer, 1981; Balla & Wright, 2001; Pallesen, 2006; Rowe & McAllister, 2006; Christiansen et al., 2010; Inwood & Johns, 2014; Christensen & Holst, 2017). Particularly Norway has a long-standing tradition of using ad hoc advisory commissions (Norges Offentlige

Utredninger) in the preparation and formulation of public policy. The use of commissions in

Norway has even been described as a central or fundamental part of their style of governance (Arter, 2008; Christensen & Holst, 2017). In the past half century, these commissions have partially consisted of experts who have played a valuable role as actors in the policy-making process. Experts include, but are not limited to, individual academics and professionals from various fields or collectives such as expert organizations, corporatist interest groups, and epistemic communities (Sabatier, 1987; Haas, 1992; Weingart, 1999; Fourcade, 2006; Christiansen et al., 2010; Rimkuté & Haverland, 2014; Christensen & Holst, 2017; Christensen, 2018). In Norway, as well as the other Scandinavian countries, predominantly corporatist interest groups supplying their own corporate experts have been involved in commissions to represent corporate interests – first in economic making, but later also in social policy-making – and are considered to be the prime example of corporatism in Scandinavia (Meijer, 1969; Buksti & Nørby Johansen, 1979; Johansen & Kristensen, 1982; Knudsen & Rothstein, 1994; Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; Blom-Hansen, 2000; Pallesen, 2006). Although some argue that this status quo of corporatism has never changed or only shifted in specific policy areas (Compston, 1998; Siaroff, 1999; Regini, 2000), others argue that corporatism in the Scandinavian countries has decreased in the past decades (Blom-Hansen, 2000; Christiansen et al., 2010; Öberg et al., 2011). Concurrently and more recently, scholars speak of a ‘scientization’ or ‘scientification’ of politics and policy-making, meaning a growing reliance of governments on scientific expertise (Weingart, 1999), and such has been shown in the case of Norway (Christensen & Holst, 2017; Christensen, 2018). While the prominence of experts within commissions and the broader political system may have shifted from corporate experts to scientific or academic experts, and while ´scientization´ or ´scientification´ is partly due to the purposeful influencing of the policy-making process by these scientific or academic experts acting as a supply of knowledge and information, it is mostly due to the rising demand for such knowledge and information by public decision-makers as policies need to address issues of

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7 greater uncertainty and complexity in modern societies (Haas, 1992).

Ideally, the demand for knowledge and information by public decision makers would be coupled with the intention of making effective and efficient, and thus better policies. Commissions could then either or both serve the purpose of rationalising policy by providing fact-based knowledge and expertise (Bulmer, 1981; Metz, 2013; Marier; 2009; Krick, 2015) or to accommodate key stakeholders and interest groups as has been the case in corporatist Scandinavia (Christiansen et al., 2010; Binderkrantz, Christiansen & Pedersen, 2015; Öberg et al., 2015). Over time, commissions would then increase government performance and accountability as well as its legitimacy and trustworthiness (Bulmer, 1981; Jennings & Hall, 2012; Head, 2016). The desire for such well-informed policy was promoted by the movement for ‘evidence-based’ policy-making which had momentum in the early 1970s and late 1990s, and has established itself within the policy-making literature (Head, 2016). However, as is discussed in the evidence-based policy literature, the path from useful information or evidence to better policies is inevitably hampered or even blocked by the obstacle of politics. Within the political arena, information and the keepers of such information are exposed to the influence of a great variety of factors, including greatly differing political actors, values, preferences, arguments, conflicts, among others (Head, 2016). This describes a symptom of a greater hazard or phenomenon that has been discussed extensively in various literatures of political science and public administration, such as the literatures on knowledge utilization, politicization, ‘politics matter’, policy agendas, policy advice, and party patronage, and which is especially relevant since governments are increasingly more reliant on experts and the information they provide. Although (partially) captured by numerous theories, terms and concepts within the different literatures, this hazard or phenomenon can generally best be coined as partisan

influence on knowledge utilization. The aim of this study is to give insight in whether and how

partisan influence in the form of the political colour of government affects knowledge utilization.

The literature on knowledge utilization has long discussed the possibility of politicians as well as civil servants using knowledge, information, or research as a political-strategic or tactical tool. The general thesis is that expert knowledge is cherry-picked for relevant information that can be used as political ammunition for gathering support and mitigating opposition, usually to attain predetermined goals in line with a political ideology or organizational agenda (Weiss, 1977, 1979; Weible, 2008; Boswell, 2008, 2009; Schrefler, 2010). Honing in on the specific political-strategic uses of information, the policy agenda literature explains how information is used to politicize or depoliticize certain issues to get on

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8 or off the agenda of their own party, that of the opposition, or that of the voters; particularly issues in policy areas that are favoured by party ideology (Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen, 2003; Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen & Jones, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2007). The policy advice literature suggests that expert knowledge is used to secure greater political control over the policy-making process (Craft & Howlett, 2012; Hustedt & Veit, 2017) while the ‘politics matter’ literature suggests that the use of expert knowledge depends on the power distribution between parties (Schmidt, 1996; Castles & McKinlay, 1979). Lastly, according to the literatures on politicization and party patronage, politicians use their discretionary powers to influence the composition of bureaucratic staff by favouring political criteria, such as party affiliation, party loyalty, and political ideology, over merit-based criteria (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Kopecký et al., 2016). In fact, the political-strategic influencing of public sector organizations by political actors is an increasing occurrence that has been observed across countries and administrations in various bureaucratic organizations, such as central banks and independent regulatory agencies (Thatcher & Sweet, 2002; Thatcher, 2005; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018).

Although scarce, studies show that commissions are also subject to political influence. In several studies on commissions in European countries, such as France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK), it was found that commissions are sometimes used by political parties to delay decisions, to avoid blame, or avoid an issue completely, and to gather support for new legislation or reforms. However, overusing commissions can be seen as a sign of governance incapability (Rowe & McAllister, 2006; Marier, 2009; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010). Ironically, in the case of Sweden, commissions have been increasingly used as policy instruments by governing parties (Petersson, 2015). The question that then remains is whether the political colour or ideology of governing parties influences commissions. According to Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald (2010) in their comparative study on party-position taking in policies, “parties are nothing if not ideological, policy-pursuing entities” (p. 804) and that only election results will sway parties away from their position on a certain policy issue. While academics remain conflicted about whether party ideology predicts policy focus or preference, several studies do show ideological preferences for welfare and economic policies as well as government size (Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001; Jahn & Müller-Rommel, 2010; Lipsmeyer, 2011; Potrafke, 2017).

Based on the discussed literatures and their respective studies it is reasonable to assume that commissions, as collectives of experts and expert knowledge, are also used as strategic-political tools and that the policy area focus of commissions is influenced by politics, including

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9 the political colour or ideology of governing parties. The following research question will therefore be studied: To what extent does the political colour of the government affect the policy

area focus of Norwegian ad hoc commissions between 1972 and 2013?

The study confines itself to the case of Norway for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, ad hoc advisory commissions are a central part of governing in Norway and have long been used throughout its modern history. Second, Norway has had governments of varying political colour or ideology as well as single-party, coalition and minority governments. Lastly, yet perhaps most importantly, a relatively new dataset consisting of over 1,500 ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway and over 17,000 commission members was made available. The so-called Norwegian Public Inquiry Commission (NPIC) dataset (Hesstvedt, 2019) is used in combination with data on Norwegian political parties from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset (Volkens et al., 2019). To answer the research question, the study will apply a quantitative analysis using binomial logistic regressions to explore the relation between the political colour of government colour and the policy area focus of commissions.

The scientific contribution and relevance of the study is twofold. First, to bridge the gaps between the literatures of knowledge utilization, ‘politics matter’, policy agendas, and policy advice. Second, the study will be one of the first to present empirical results on the relationship between partisan influence and knowledge utilization as relatively little attention has been paid to this phenomenon. Especially, the policy area focus of commissions with regards to knowledge utilization remains open to study (Christensen & Holst, 2017: 830). To elaborate, the previously mentioned literatures from the fields of political science and public administration have discussed the topic, but each in the context of their own theoretical framework with differing yet related concepts and only briefly. By synthesizing a solid theoretic framework and being one of the first studies to present empirical results on the influence of partisan politics on knowledge utilization, further developments can be made, both theoretically and empirically.

From a practical and societal perspective, the study provides a modest yet substantiated contribution to the normative debate on what role experts and their expertise should play in the policy-making process and political arena. That is, should experts be actively involved in policy-making and politics, providing expert knowledge, offering their own opinions, and arguing with politicians and civil servants for better policies? Or should experts remain more at a distance and only provide policy-makers, such as politicians and civil servants, with relevant knowledge, leaving the policy-makers to figure out the details? More specifically, this study sheds light on which experts and to what extent these experts are allowed, requested, or

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10 otherwise influenced by governments of various political colours to be involved in the policy-making process. Furthermore, the study could to some extent add to the discussion on political bias and misinformation – two issues that have become more prominent among the public as well as in politics in the past decade. Governments, politicians, academia, among others, are more than before scrutinized and criticized for being (too) politically biased, suspected of nepotism and patronage, and accused of sharing misinformation or so-called ‘fake news’. If left unaddressed, these issues could cause serious damage to the legitimacy and credibility of governments and politicians, but more so to that of academia – a community that is expected to be objective and truthful.

The study starts out with the theoretical framework in which the literatures of knowledge utilization, ‘politics matter’, policy agendas, and policy advice are discussed and incorporated to form a solid and encompassing theoretical argument, culminating in several hypotheses and a conceptual model. Next, in the methodology, the research design, operationalisation, and data processing are discussed. This is followed by a thorough analysis in which the statistical models are tested for their relevant assumptions and in which the results of the models are presented. In the discussion, the results are further examined and discussed in the context of the relevant theory. Furthermore, the study is evaluated in terms of its validity and reliability as well as its limitations. Also, some recommendations for further research are given. Lastly, in the conclusion the study is summarized and an answer to the research question is given.

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2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, several theories from various literatures will be discussed to produce a logical argument and theoretical framework for whether and how partisan influence in the form of the political colour of government affects knowledge utilization, particularly commissions. The first section consists of a rather broad discussion on what policy-making is, and how politics and knowledge are intertwined with policy-making. It conclusively states that political parties may indeed influence knowledge utilization, forming the fundamental premise of this study. Next, the theoretic models of knowledge utilization are discussed, followed by an overview of relevant empirical evidence concerning advisory bodies, including commissions. Thereafter, it is discussed how partisan influence affects the policy area focus of commissions agenda-setting and policy preferences. Based on the discussed literatures and studies hypotheses are formed. Finally, in the conceptual model concepts are defined and the relation between concepts is explained.

2.1 Policy-making, politics, and knowledge

Within the field of public administration, policy-making by governments has been extensively debated and discussed for well over a century; how it works and how it should work, especially in relation to politics. As Woodrow Wilson (1887) states in his essay ‘The Study of Administration’: “The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics; ... It is part of political life ... only as machinery is part of the manufactured product”. He continues, “... politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices.” (Wilson, 1887: 22). Likewise, the administrator or bureaucrat as described by Max Weber (1946) must not be susceptible to politics or any subjective influence for that matter. The administration is indeed the machinery and the individual administrator or bureaucrat is one of many cogs (Weber, 1946: 39-41). In the words of Frank J. Goodnow (1900: 22), the politician expresses the will of the state through influencing and guiding policy, the administrator executes that policy.

The aforementioned scholars all speak of these public institutions as perfectly demarcated, each staying in their own sphere. Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900) speak of a perfect distinction what later has been named the politics-administration dichotomy. Weber (1946) speaks of a perfect machine that is the bureaucracy. Similarly, within the literature of policy-making there is the perfect policy-making process: (1) the agenda is set, (2) policy alternatives are formulated, (3) a decision is made, (4) the policy is implemented, and finally

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12 but not necessarily (5) the policy is evaluated (Kingdon, 1984: 405). Each step of the process is straightforward, rational, and thus predictable. In addition, it is assumed that the power within the policy-making process is assumed to be held by a few central government actors. However, the process of policy-making cannot be captured by such an oversimplified model. Policy-making is a complex process in a rather chaotic environment where power is divided across various levels of governance as well as various types of governmental organizations, and even goes beyond the public sector when external actors hold a stake in the policy-making process (Cairney, Heikkila & Wood, 2019: 6). Policy-makers, whether they are elected politicians or unelected civil servants, thus have to manoeuvre themselves in an environment full of actors such as other politicians, other civil servants, political parties, interest groups, private companies, non-profit organizations, and of course experts, among others. These actors can act in the form of collectives such as networks, communities, and subsystems based on trust, shared resources and a shared understanding of the policy problem (Peters, 2010: 173-175). The environment is further dictated by institutions – the formal and informal rules, norms, and values that steer the behaviour of actors; the context – the relevant policy conditions or variables such as the political system, the economy, or demographics; and events – the predictable occurrences like elections or unpredictable occurrences like crises. Lastly, there are ideas, which encompass the broader worldviews, ideologies, paradigms, or core beliefs held by actors, but also the narrower yet often more flexible policy solutions that are based on these broader views (Cairney et al., 2019: 11-12). According to Stone (2012), these ideas “... are the very stuff of politics.” and are the ‘’... key forms of power in policy making.” (p. 36). Thus, the environment and process of policy-making is obviously not perfect. There is no perfect demarcation between politics and administration when it comes to policy-making. Instead, politics is inextricably intertwined with policy-making (Peters, 2010: 165-169).

Nevertheless, as Stone (2012) explains and what she dubs the ‘rationality project’, there is an aspiration to rid the policy-making process of politics and replace it with the rationality of science, because politics is irrational, chaotic, and unpredictable, unlike science. This aspiration was held by scholars such as Herbert Simon (1946) who called for a ‘science of administration’ and later Harold Laswell (1956) who called for a ‘science of policy forming and execution’. According to them, policy-making authority should not rest with politicians, but instead with expert commissions, or at least more so (Stone, 2012: 9; Cairney et al., 2019: 10). In the early 1970s and later in the 1990s the ‘evidence-based policy’ movement continued along this line of thought, promoting the use of objective evidence and scientific knowledge in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of policy as well as to improve the accountability,

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13 legitimacy and trustworthiness of governments (Jennings & Hall, 2012: 245; Head, 2016: 472). Though, as concluded in the previous paragraph, policy-making does not exist without politics. Therefore, policy-making conflicts with science, as policy-makers aim to gather support for their proposed policies while scientists aim to advance science (Strydom, Funke, Nienaber, Nortje & Steyn, 2010: 2). Due to this conflict there exists a social contract between policy-makers and scientists based on political norms. That is, policy-policy-makers demand reliable scientific or expert knowledge to make proper policy, otherwise it would be considered illegitimate (Head, 2016: 472); and scientists and experts supply only the relevant knowledge and do not interfere in the decision-making process as science must remain independent from politics (Pedersen, 2014: 547-548). However, since modern societies need to deal with issues of increasing uncertainty and complexity, the demand for knowledge by policy-makers grows (Haas, 1992: 1; Pedersen, 2014: 547); hence, the ‘scientization’ or ‘scientification’ of policy-making and politics (Weingart, 1999). It seems that policy-policy-making cannot do without science, but as stated before; policy-making is also inextricably intertwined with politics. So in the context of modern day policy-making, science and politics will inevitably collide and science can certainly not replace politics. Though can science stay independent from politics?

Ideally, science should stay independent of politics; similar to how Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900) implied there should be a distinction between politics and administration; how Weber (1946) stated that the bureaucrat should be unaffected by politics; or how policy should be straightforward and rational. Of course, this study is not concerned with such normative issues. It is not about what should be, but about what is. And what is, is that policy-making, politics, and knowledge are all intertwined. So to answer the question of whether science can stay independent from politics in the context of policy-making: no, it cannot. As Stone (2012) further agues, policy-making is about the struggle of ideas and “Ideas are ... a mode of influence even more powerful than money and votes and guns.” (p. 13). So it seems highly unlikely that science can stay completely independent from the influence of politics, especially from the influence of political parties as they are the embodiment of ideas. To repeat the words of Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald (2010), “parties are nothing if not ideological, policy-pursuing entities” (p. 804). In the context of this study, it therefore can only be assumed that actors in the policy-making process, especially political parties, will try to utilize knowledge for political ends; perhaps not always, but definitely sometimes. Ad-hoc advisory commissions are no exception. In the next section, the relevant theories of knowledge utilization are discussed to give insight into how and why knowledge is utilized; specifically, how and why commissions are utilized.

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2.2 Knowledge utilization

The concept of knowledge utilization is one that fits in several different types of literatures on expertise in making. In the previous section, the literatures of ‘evidence-based’ policy-making (Jennings & Hall, 2012; Head, 2016) and ‘ideas in public policy’ (Campbell, 2002; Stone, 2012) have been discussed, and how these two concepts conflicts with each on the basis of science versus politics. Moreover, as discussed by Cairney et al. (2019), the environment of policy-making is complex. Apart from ideas, which form the core of politics, there are actors,

institutions, events, contexts, and networks, communities, and subsystems that can all disrupt or

prevent the utilization of knowledge in ‘evidence-based’ policy-making (Cairney et al., 2019: 11-12). Thus, with regards to knowledge utilization, ‘evidence-based’ policy-making focusses primarily on when knowledge is used or how it should be used. Then there are the literatures of ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1992) and ‘professions’ (Wilensky, 1964; Fourcade, 2006) that focus on how networks of expert knowledge and expert professions influence policy-making and politics, respectively. Though for the purpose of this study, the literature on ‘models of knowledge utilization’ (Weiss, 1979, Boswell, 2008, 2009; Weible, 2008) is of greater interest as it focusses on how and why knowledge is used in policy-making, offering a theoretical basis for understanding how and why partisan influence affects knowledge utilization.

2.2.1 Models of knowledge utilization

In a review of the literature, Weiss (1979) and later Weible (2008), Boswell (2008, 2009), and Schrefler (2010) identify several models of knowledge utilization. Starting with the

knowledge-driven model and problem-solving models of Weiss (1979, 427-428), these two models

describe, respectively, the practical use of natural science and social research knowledge in the development and application of new technologies, and the use of knowledge in a decision-making process to offer policy solutions. ‘Evidence-based’ policy-decision-making could be seen as fitting in these models. Another model offered by Weiss (1979: 428-429) is the interactive model which posits that not only social research knowledge but also knowledge from other sources, such as administrators, politicians, interest groups, media, among others, is utilized in decision-making, but in a disorderly rather than linear fashion. Weible (2008), Boswell (2008, 2009), and Schrefler (2010) combine these three models into an instrumental model which simply describes the rational use of any knowledge for problem-solving in the policy-making process. The instrumental model probably best describes the intended and fundamental purpose of advisory commissions. Similarly to the enlightenment model of Weiss (1979: 429-430), Weible (2008: 619-620) identifies a learning model which implies that knowledge indirectly

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15 though gradually seeps into the policy-making process, changing the beliefs systems of actors in the policy-making process. Yet, more relevant to this study, there is also the political model which describes how decision-makers often have predetermined political or ideological interests that usually remain unaltered on the short-term by relevant social research knowledge. Rather, due to partisan motives, decision-makers cherry-pick knowledge for ammunition “... to neutralize opponents, convince waverers, and bolster supporters.” (Weiss, 1979: 429, Weible, 2008: 620). In the tactical model, it is explained that governments could commission research to present themselves as responsive to a certain issue or to delay and possibly even to avoid acting on an issue. Also, governments could use the generally perceived legitimacy of research knowledge to deflect criticism or to improve their own legitimacy and image by employing academics who will support their actions (Weiss, 1979: 429). According to Schrefler (2010: 320), the latter would be an example of strategic-political knowledge utilization. Boswell (2008, 2009) captures the political and tactical use of knowledge in a symbolic model in which knowledge can serve, respectively, a substantiating function and a legitimizing function. Table 1 provides an overview of the different models of knowledge utilization and the corresponding

motives.

Table 1

Models of knowledge utilization and corresponding motives

Model Motives

Instrumental

Knowledge-driven - Develop, apply and implement new technologies Problem-solving - Identify means to solve a policy problem

Interactive - Increase understanding

Learning/Enlightenment - Gradually gain knowledge, possibly changing belief systems

Strategic-Political

Tactical-Symbolic - Appear responsive - Deflect criticism - Delay or avoid action

Substantiating - Justify predetermined policy-position

- Use as ammunition to neutralize opponents and gather support

Legitimizing - Enhance legitimacy

Note. Based on the work of Weiss (1979), Weible (2008), Boswell (2008, 2009), and

Schrefler (2010).

Several studies provide practical evidence for these theoretical models of knowledge utilization. In a study on immigration and asylum policy-making in the European Commission (EC), Boswell (2008) found that the Directorate-General of Justice, Liberty and Security (DG

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16 JLS) initially utilized knowledge to enhance its legitimacy as the policy area of immigration and asylum was considered politically sensitive with contesting knowledge. Though, later knowledge was utilized in an instrumental and substantiating manner due to a demand for epistemic guidance which could be supplied by member states, simultaneously increasing potential support of member states (Boswell, 2008: 18-19). Other studies on immigration and asylum policy in Germany and the UK showed that knowledge was politically used to substantiate policy preferences, promoting a more liberal agenda on labour migration. Though, the required research investments were justified by stressing that instrumental knowledge was needed (Boswell, 2009: 18-19). In contrary, Rimkuté and Haverland (2014: 445) found in their survey of scientists who served on EC expert groups that knowledge is predominantly used for instrumental purposes. Although, there were instances of knowledge being used to justify already taken decisions or to appear competent. Not surprisingly, it seems that the specific motives for knowledge utilization are highly context-depended, but the motives of the different models of knowledge utilization can indeed be found in practice, including strategic-political motives.

2.2.2 Strategic-political knowledge utilization of policy advisory bodies

The ‘policy advice’ literature also mentions strategic-political motives or political influence in policy-making with regards to policy advisory bodies which can be considered sources of knowledge. Halligan (1995: 141) discusses government influence on policy advisory bodies and proposes a model which explains how the degree of government influence depends on the location of an advisory body (i.e. public service, internal to government, external to government). According to the model, temporary advisory bodies are internal to government and experience a high degree of government influence or control. A comparative study on internal advisory bodies in France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK, indeed shows that governments, regardless of the different political-administration regimes, try to regulate internal advisory bodies. Ironically, governments also emphasize the independence and fact-based knowledge of internal advisory bodies to enhance the legitimacy of a policy (Schulz, Bressers, Van der Steen & Van Twist, 2015: 14). Halligan (1995) further states that governments have made more use of political appointments and external advisers as well as installed more advisory bodies, both temporary and permanent. Craft and Howlett (2012: 84-86; 2013: 181) confirm that policy-making has become more externalized to government where the government now sits at the centre of a horizontal structure of advisory bodies, consisting of think tanks, research institutes, consultants, among others, contrary to the traditional vertical

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17 structure where the government sits above internal advisory bodies of the administration, consisting of civil servants and bureaucrats. This in accordance with the ‘scientization’ or ‘scientification’ of government policy making as mentioned by Weingart (1999), Christensen and Holst (2017), and Christensen (2018), in the sense that governments increasingly rely on scientific expertise that may only be found external to government. Furthermore, the nature of policy advice given to the government has shifted from a neutral, technical or objective form of advice towards a form advice that is tailored to government wishes due to advisers being politically biased and governments wanting to generate support for predetermined policy positions (Craft & Howlett, 2012: 86; Craft & Howlett; 2013: 191). For example, in a study on New Zealand policy advisers it was found that they sometimes constrain civil servants in giving candid advice, seemingly acting as gate-keepers of advice to the government. Even though policy advisers rarely pressure civil servants actively to change the content of their work, they do appear to passively affect civil servants in such a way that the content of the policy advice is adjusted beforehand to meet the political or partisan criteria of the policy adviser (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008: 351-352). These partisan policy advisers apparently have grown in number and influence in the Westminster political system of Anglo-Saxon countries (Craft & Halligan, 2017: 53). Clearly, the ‘policy advice’ literature shows that governments aim to control the policy-making process via policy advisory bodies and utilize their knowledge for substantiating and legitimizing ends. The externalization and ‘administrative politicization’ of policy advisory bodies have augmented these types of utilization (Halligan, 1995; Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Craft and Howlett, 2012, 2013).

Looking specifically at advisory or inquiry commissions, the strategic-political motives as mentioned in Table 1 can all be identified. Relatively early work of Bulmer (1981) showed that British and American governmental commissions utilize commissions because the public sees commissions as independent and truthful; thus, legitimizing or substantiating produced policy. However, it was also found that social scientists sometimes voice politically biased recommendations and that civil servants constrain the impact of social scientists on commissions by generalizing and misinterpreting social research (Bulmer, 1981: 365-366). Moreover, the political context usually shifts the goal of commissions from independent truth-seeking to reaching consensus. In the end, the report produced by a commission is still at the mercy of the government as they can decide to ignore, delay, or denounce the report (Bulmer, 1981: 372-374). Through a study on governmental ad hoc advisory and inquiry commissions in Sweden, Premfors (1983) confirms the political-strategic use of commissions and states that commissions “... are best described as an integral part of an often highly politicized process of

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18 policy-making” (p. 641). Still, Swedish commissions have an important instrumental use in policy-making and are rarely used for general tactical-symbolic motives such as delaying action but rather for specific tactical-symbolic motives such as substantiating policy by using research knowledge as political ammunition to neutralize opposition or to reach a consensus (Premfors, 1983: 628). Petersson (2015: 12), in a more recent study on Swedish commissions, notes a trend which indicates that commissions are now used less for reaching consensus and more so for neutralizing opponents, and that governments exert tighter control over commissions, similar to the findings of the ‘policy advice’ literature. Numerous other studies find similar results, highlighting the instrumental and strategic-political use of commissions. On Royal Commissions of Inquiry in Australia, Gilligan (2002) states that commissions are used to diffuse an issue or to legitimize action as commissions “... act as a bridge between a current situation and whatever is the desirable context or development for the interests of governments ...” (p. 303). Rowe and McAllister (2006: 104) find comparable results for British Royal Commissions and add that commissions serve a substantiating function for predetermined policy as well as to appear responsive, and to delay or avoid action. Hunter and Boswell (2015: 22-23) observe the same legitimizing and substantiating function of British commissions on migrant integration policy. Other than most studies, Marier (2009: 1219-1220) recognizes the learning function of commissions in France, Sweden, and the UK, but still notes the strategic-political functions of commissions, particularly to avoid action. However, if governments overuse commissions, people might see the government as incapable, as is the case in France. Focussing specifically on blame avoidance, Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010: 631-633) concludes that governments are more likely to use commissions of inquiry when blame lies at a distance of the government and when an issue is highly salient in the media and among voters.

In conclusion, knowledge is clearly utilized both in instrumental, learning, as well as strategic-political manners, in line with the theoretic models of knowledge utilization and their corresponding motives, and policy advisory bodies, particular advisory or inquiry commissions, as providers of knowledge are no exception. Somewhat remarkably however, the utilization driven by instrumental and strategical political motives is not only the work of governments external to commissions but also, though less so, the work of staff internal to commissions. In other words, both governments and commissions themselves are aware of and moved by the instrumental and strategic-political value of knowledge produced by commissions. Thus, knowledge utilization is not a unilateral occurrence only practiced by those who desire knowledge (i.e. governments). Instead, it is at least a bilateral occurrence that is also practiced by those who hold knowledge (i.e. commissions).

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2.3 Partisan influence on policy area focus of commissions

The previous section discussed how and why knowledge is utilized, in particular the strategic-political motives for using commissions. This section discusses how the strategic-political colour of government affects the strategic-political use of commissions, specifically the relation between political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions. The study focusses the aspect of policy area focus of commissions as it is directly determined by the government itself, at least in the case of Norway. Furthermore, it can be logically reasoned that the policy area focus of a commission greatly determines the content of the report or reports produced by a commission. It gives governments the power to steer and limit the discussion and subsequent policy-making on a certain issue since commission reports in Norway generally enter the policy-making process before actual policies are proposed. Therefore, it is of political-strategic interest for governments to influence the policy area focus of commissions, as will be further explained.

Based on the previous section and the ‘policy agenda’ literature, it is explained how a government decides which policy area or policy issue needs to be addressed and when it is necessary to install a commission. Through insights from the ‘politics matter’ and ‘partisan theory’ it is explored how political power of government affects the use of commissions. Lastly, by analysing a significant body of literature on policy preferences of political parties it is shown how political parties differ in their preferences for policy areas and policy issues on the basis of their ideology. At the end of each subsection hypotheses are formulated.

2.3.1 Political parties and policy agendas

As discussed before, there are many different motives for governments to install a commission on a certain topic that fits within a certain policy area. Though, what determines the policy area focus of a commission? How does a government decide which policy area needs the attention of a commission? And when does this occur? These questions are a matter of agenda-setting. First of all, what is an agenda? Second, what determines the policy agenda? According to Kingdon (2014), an agenda “is the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time.” (p. 3); and as Kingdon (1995) further states, “... agendas are set by problems and politics, and alternatives are generated in the policy stream.” (p. 409). Within the three streams of problems, politics, and policy, participants are involved and “If any one set of participants in the policy process is important in the shaping of the agenda, it is elected officials and their appointees ...” (Kingdon, 1995: 408). So politicians are key to

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agenda-20 setting, but what is it in politics that puts one issue higher on the agenda than another issue?

This partially depends on the interests of the government and whether an issue enjoys support or lacks opposition of political parties. Furthermore, it depends on the political power of political parties as agenda-setting is a competition for attention (Kingdon, 1995: 407-408). It would be too simple however to assume that the most powerful political party, usually a government party, decides the agenda, especially in a multi-party system, and that they only address their preferred policy issues while ignoring those of other political parties. Government parties will no doubt emphasize the issues that won them the election, because ‘Why change a winning team?’. However, the new opposition parties did not necessarily lose the election because they had an opposite stance on the same issues; rather, they emphasized different issues that were apparently not as popular among voters. After all, “Parties compete by trying to draw attention to issues they find advantageous rather than by assuming diverging positions on predetermined issues.” (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010: 258). Moreover, opposition parties enjoy a relative freedom to criticize the government parties on any issue they perceive as advantageous, putting an issue on the agenda with relative ease, while the government parties have the responsibility to constantly address the issues already on the agenda rather than putting issues on the agenda themselves (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010: 261-263). The new opposition will therefore regularly put forward new issues with the goal to destabilize and hopefully unseat the incumbent government. However, these new issues will not have much of an impact on the political stability of the government right after an election. Yet, over time the ‘winning issues’ of the government parties lose salience, leaving the government parties more vulnerable to the potential impact of new issues brought forward by the opposition (Carmines, 1991: 75). As implied by Frey and Schneider (1989) and Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald (2010), government parties will normally focus on issues in accordance with their ideology, but when election time approaches government parties will focus on issues that might deviate from their ideology if it increases the chance of re-election. Furthermore, as Weaver (1986: 373) explains, voters are more sensitive to negativity than to positivity. In other words, voters will ‘punish’ a political party for acting wrong rather than ‘reward’ them for acting right. For this reason, political parties seek to minimize blame rather than maximize credit, especially when an issue is highly salient among voters and the media (Weaver, 1986: 379; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010: 631-633). After all, political parties aim to preserve support rather than maximize support, especially if part of a multi-party coalition (Budge, Ezrow & McDonald, 2010: 804). Logically, opposition parties then seek to maximize blame on the government parties. In their defence, government parties can use commissions as a political-strategic tool to deflect criticism, avoid

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21 or delay action, appear responsive, or for substantiating and legitimizing reasons, as previously discussed. In simpler terms, a government appoints a commission in reaction to an issue put on the agenda by the opposition in order to mitigate potential political damage and preserve support. Thus, it can be expected that government parties are more likely to install commissions for a policy area that is salient on the agenda of opposition parties rather than a policy area that is salient on their own agenda, especially when nearing election time because they want to ensure re-election. Though, which policy areas are of particular interest to governments based on their political colour?

2.3.2 Political colour and policy preferences

Political parties are ideologically motivated and therefore pursue policies that suit their ideology (Hibbs, 1992: 363; Budge, Ezrow & McDonald, 2010: 804). A significant body of empirical studies indeed shows that political parties differ in their policy preferences based on their political ideology, colour, or orientation on the left-right spectrum, preferring specific policy areas (Castles & Mair, 1984; Laver & Hunt, 1992; Klingemann et al., 1994; Hubert & Inglehart, 1995; Budge et al., 2001; Krause et al., 2019; Volkens et al., 2019). Though, how can political parties, different policy areas, and specific policy preferences be located on the left-right spectrum in an accurate manner? A valid question that requires an answer. As Budge (2000) explains, it is largely dependent on expert judgements and therefore the measure of the left-right spectrum has significant limitations. These limitations are outlined and discussed in a separate section (§5.2) of this study. For now, it is more relevant to explore where the different policy areas and specific policies preferences are placed on the left-right spectrum. Analysis of the literature on party ideology and policy preferences mainly shows a reoccurring ideological divide between parties on economic and social policies. Concerning macro-economics, left-wing parties opt for policies involving higher taxation and lowering the budget deficit while right-wing parties want lower taxation, causing higher budget deficits (Nice, 1985; Schmidt, 1996; Petrocik, 1996; Tavits & Letki, 2009). Higher taxation is a means for left-wing parties to fund their expansion of the welfare state as well as to invest in health and education. On the contrary, right-wing parties prefer a small welfare state, emphasizing the economic self-reliance of people and stimulating the economy through economic incentives, promoting free enterprise, and reducing inflation (Nice, 1985; Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; Petrocik, 1996; Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001; Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen, 2003; Krause & Méndez, 2005). These preferences correspond with the fondness of the left and the dislike of the right for big government (Schmidt, 1996; Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001; Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen, 2003;

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22 Potrafke, 2017). Expanding government is one of many ways for the left to tackle unemployment which is a core aspect in the party programs of most left-leaning parties. Another core aspect is promoting equality regarding civil rights and in matters such as race, ethnicity, sex, gender, religion, among others (Hibbs, 1992; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Schmidt, 1996; Petrocik, 1996; Imbeau, Pétry & Lamari, 2001; Petrocik, Benoit & Hansen, 2003). Policy issues regarding cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy seem to be more prominent on the right side of the spectrum (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; Schmidt, 1996; Petrocik, 1996). Considering that governments are expected to install commissions on policy areas that are not associated with their own political colour, as the first hypothesis states, the following sub-hypotheses can be formulated:

H1a: The more right-leaning a government is, the more commissions a government will install on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H1b: The more left-leaning a government is, the more commissions a government will install on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

Before continuing, hypotheses 1a and 1b require some more elaboration. As is stated, more right-leaning governments are expected to install more commissions on the national budget and social welfare, and more left-leaning governments on taxation, even though parties on both sides of the spectrum are associated with these policy areas or policy issues. However, it is reasoned that more right-leaning parties care mostly about lowering taxation and simply accept the higher budget deficit as a consequence. A more right-leaning opposition party will therefore demand lower taxes from the incumbent government. Similarly, a more left-leaning opposition party will likely stress expansion of the welfare state to the incumbent government. The incumbent government can then respond by installing a commission to appease the opposition or for other political-strategic motives, as mentioned before.

As mentioned in the previous section, it is expected that, especially when election time is near, governments install commissions for a policy area that is salient on the agenda of opposition parties rather than a policy area that is salient on their own agenda, because the government wants to ensure re-election. Applying this to the two formulated hypotheses, the positive relationship between either right-leaning governments or left-leaning governments and particular policy areas of commissions is therefore expected to be stronger when election time is imminent. The imminence of election time is thus expected to moderate the relationship

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23 between political colour of government and the chosen policy area focus of commissions. This gives the following moderation hypotheses:

H2a: The greater the imminence of election time, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H2b: The greater the imminence of election time, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

Interestingly, ideological differences in policy area and policy issues become less pronounced in times of economic recession while more pronounced in times of economic prosperity as government parties then have more time and resources to invest in their ideological pursuits (Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996; Lipsmeyer, 2011). Therefore, it is hypothesized that economic growth moderates the relationship of the political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions, giving the following moderation hypotheses:

H3a: The greater the economic growth during a government’s tenure, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H3b: The greater the economic growth during a government’s tenure, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

2.3.3 Government composition

According to the literatures of ‘politics matter’ and ‘partisan theory’, policy choices and outputs are influenced by government composition – that is the amount or percentage of cabinet seats held by each governing party in the cabinet – and therefore it is hypothesized that politics does matter, and so do parties (Hibbs, 1992; Schmidt, 1996). Logically speaking, a single-party government with full parliamentary support would be, ceteris paribus, free to choose and implement any policy they so desire. As Keeler (1993: 477-478) found, the greater the

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24 government’s mandate, meaning the parliamentary strength and perceived power of the government, the greater the potential to achieve policy change. Of course, in a democratic multi-party system, as in most European countries including Norway, political power is divided and governments often are coalitions of different political parties that must come to a compromise (Martin & Vanberg, 2014). Thus, it can be assumed that governments consisting of one or few parties with majority support in the parliament hold more political power to affect policy than, for example, a multi-party minority government. A strong government, so to speak, can then comfortably pursue its desired policy while being less likely to succumb to the pressure of the opposition. In contrast, a weak government will have more difficulty with resisting the opposition. For a weak government, installing a commission could then be a valuable tool to resist the opposition or ensure support of the opposition. For example, in Sweden in 1920s, ad hoc commissions became politically prominent under very weak minority governments (Premfors, 1983: 625). In coalition governments, commissions can be used as a control mechanism when consensus cannot be easily attained (Falcó-Gimeno, 2014: 341). In such a case, commissions serve a problem-solving, interactive, or substantiating function as the coalition parties intend to convince each other to opt for their policy approach. Based on the aforementioned, it can be expected that governments with relatively little parliamentary support and governments consisting of relatively many parties have less political power to resist the political pressure of the opposition or ensure support of the opposition. Therefore, it can also be expected that parliamentary support for governments and the number of government parties moderate the relationship between the political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions, giving the following moderation hypotheses:

H4a: The lower the parliamentary support for governments, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H4b: The lower the parliamentary support for governments, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

H5a: The greater the number of government parties, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on

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25 policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H5b: The greater the number of government parties, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

Table 2

Formulated hypotheses

Number Description

H1a The more right-leaning a government is, the more commissions a government will install on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H1b The more left-leaning a government is, the more commissions a government will install on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

H2a The greater the imminence of election time, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of

commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H2b The greater the imminence of election time, the stronger is the positive

relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

H3a The greater the economic growth during a government’s tenure, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education.

H3b The greater the economic growth during a government’s tenure, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy. H4a The lower the parliamentary support for governments, the stronger is the positive

relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of

H4b The lower the parliamentary support for governments, the stronger is the positive relationship between left-leaning governments and the instalment of commissions on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

H5a The greater the number of government parties, the stronger is the positive relationship between right-leaning governments and the instalment of

H5b The greater the number of government parties, the stronger is the positive

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26 on policy areas concerned with taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy.

2.4 Conceptual model

The main variables in this study are the political colour of government (independent variable) and policy area focus of commission (dependent variable). The following variables are included as moderator variables: election imminence, economic growth, parliamentary support, and

number of government parties. Table 3 shows the conceptual definition of each variable.

Table 3

Conceptual definitions per variable

Variable Conceptual definition

Political colour of government

The position of a government on the left-right spectrum based on the manifestos of the governing parties and their respective cabinet seat shares.

Policy area focus of commission

The policy area focus (sub)-category assigned to a commission as in the NPIC dataset.

Member composition of commission

The absolute number of members per background or affiliation in commission functions, including the chairman and secretary functions.

Election imminence The relative position of a commission, based on the date of appointment, between the governments first day in office of the legislative term and the date of the next election.

Economic growth The annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) change in percentages.

Parliamentary support The combined seat share of the government parties in parliament Number of

government parties

The number of parties in the government.

Note. See Table A2 in Appendix A for policy area focus (sub)-categories of the NPIC

dataset.

Figure 1 shows an abstract representation of how the various concepts relate to each other. It is expected that (1) the political colour of government affects the policy area focus of a commission. To elaborate, based on the literature it was hypothesized that a government will install more commissions on policy areas that are not associated with their own political colour (H1a, H1b), because commissions are primarily a strategic-political tool to deflect criticism, to avoid blame, to avoid action, and appease the opposition, or in other words, decrease the political pressure of the opposition. For this reason, more right-leaning governments will install more commissions on policy areas concerned with the national budget, employment, social welfare, equality, health, and education (H1a). More left-leaning governments will install more

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27 Figure 1. Conceptual model.

commissions on policy areas concerned taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy (H1b). More left-leaning governments will install more commissions on policy areas concerned taxation, inflation, economic incentives, free enterprise, cultural traditions, crime, defence, and foreign policy (H1b). The relationship between the political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions is expected to be moderated (2) by the imminence of elections (H2a, H2b), economic growth (H3a, H3b), parliamentary support (H4a, H4b), and the number of governing parties (H5a, H5b). More specifically, greater election imminence, economic growth, and number of government parties as well as lower parliamentary support are expected to amplify the positive relationship between the political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions. To elaborate, the imminence of election time will motivate governments to install commissions on policy areas addressed by the opposition to mitigate any damage to the government’s campaign for re-election. Economic growth could stimulate the use of commissions as governments then have more time and resources to pursue ideological goals, while economic downturn could restrain the government in its use of commissions. Parliamentary support and the number of parties in government could be grouped under political power. A decrease in political power, that is lower parliamentary support and a higher number of government parties, makes it more difficult for the government to resist pressure from the opposition or ensure support from the opposition, increasing the likelihood of commissions being installed to better resist the pressure of the opposition or to please the opposition, ensuring support.

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3. Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology is discussed. First, the research design is discussed as well as the case selection and the data collection methods. Next, in the operationalisation section it is explained how the variables were measured. Lastly, in the section on data processing the data design and methods of analysis are discussed.

3.1 Research design

To research the relationship between the political colour of government and the policy area focus of commissions, this study applied a quantitative approach with a time series cross-sectional (TSCS) design. A quantitative approach was chosen over a qualitative approach mainly due to the availability of data. Additional qualitative research to make for a hybrid approach could definitely improve the study as is discussed in the limitations section (§5.2) and recommendations section (§5.3), but due to constraints such as time, location, and language barriers the study was limited to a quantitative approach. The data used in the study was mostly derived from the Norwegian Public Inquiry Commission (NPIC) dataset (Hesstvedt, 2019) which includes observations of each commission report delivered between 1972 and 2018 in Norway. Therefore, the study limited itself to the case of Norway. Despite this limitation, Norway made a great case for this particular study as ad hoc advisory commissions are a central part of government and have been so for a relatively long time in its modern history. Furthermore, Norwegian governments vary in their political colour or ideology as well as the amount of parties participating in government, giving both single-party and multi-party governments. Such consistent use of commissions and variation in governments makes Norway an interesting and appropriate case to analyse.

The study itself looked at the period between 1972 and 2013 due to the data restrictions of other datasets. As can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix, this gave 18 completed government terms. Each commission report was categorized under the government term in which the commission was appointed. Missing data as well as data on commissions that produced multiple reports, including permanent commissions, was filtered out. The latter was necessary as multiple reports from the same commission are usually, though not always, concerned with the same policy area, resulting in the excessive inclusion of the same data which in turn causes bias in the statistical analysis. After filtering the data, all government terms combined gave 905 commission reports (observations), each representing a unique commission. The dataset was further supplemented by the Comparative Manifesto Project

Ad hoc advisory commissions in Norway: Objectively appointed or politically exploited?