Russian counter-hegemony in the information age:
Russia Today (RT) and the war of position
Master thesis Political Science Specialisation: International Relations
Author: Hugo Gilden
Supervisor: Annette Freyberg-Inan Second reader: Benno Netelenbos
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Master thesis Political Science University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Social Sciences Specialisation: International Relations
Research project: Globalization and its critics Author: Hugo Gilden
Student: 10181504
Thesis supervisor: Annette Freyberg-Inan Second reader: Benno Netelenbos
Wordcount: 17.423 Date: 27-01-20117
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Table of contents
Introduction ... 3
Methodology ... 5
1. Russia and the post-Cold War global order ... 6
The post-Cold War global order ... 6
Russia’s (desired) post-Cold War identity ... 9
Russia and the crisis in Ukraine: worsening relationships, and making friends... 11
Russia and the multipolar world order ... 13
2. Russia and the instrumentalization of ideology... 16
Soft power and its critics ... 16
Russia’s approach to soft power ... 17
Russia’s public diplomacy ... 19
Russia Today (RT): introduction ... 20
3. Russia Today (RT) and the war of position ... 22
RT and the war of position: RT versus the establishment ... 23
RT and the war of position: get Russianalized ... 26
Russia’s fluid ideology: a discourse analysis ... 28
RT and the war of position: limitations and challenges ... 36
The combined contributions of Russia’s war of position and the war of movement .... 40
Conclusions ... 42
Bibliography ... 45
Appendix ... 51
Survey questionnaire ... 51
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, we have entered a stage in world history that is characterised by a rapid form of globalisation. One of the core facets of this globalisation is seen to exist within developments made in the field of communications which have made the volume and velocity by which information crosses national borders greater and faster than ever before (Nye 2014: 19). This development has led scholars to argue that we have entered an information age (2008: 107), in which information has reached the status of serving as a key power resource for states and other actors alike (Nye 2014: 20). One of the expressions of the importance of information in the globalised post-Cold War can be made visible by looking at the role fulfilled by international news agencies.
While news agencies like BBC World operate under the guise of committing to the distribution of news from a global perspective to a global audience, Lisa Dencik has explained that such global news operates very much from within, and without challenging, a set of geopolitical and economic pressures and concerns (Dencik 2013: 132). However, the information age that we have entered under the spectre of globalisation has also given impetus to the rise in visibility of international news agencies that operate from different parts of the world. The one-sidedness of global news agencies as described above, is hereby challenged by the existence of international news agencies that operate from within a different set of geopolitical and economic pressures and concerns (Ranwsley 2015; 275). An example of this is Russia’s leading international broadcasting agency Russia Today (RT).
In this thesis, I study Russia Today (RT) by placing it within the broader framework of Russia’s Cold War foreign policy. In my discussion of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy, emphasis is placed on expressions of this foreign policy that can be read as forms of resistance against what Russia perceives of as the hegemonic nature of the trajectory of post-Cold War globalisation. Here, I will draw on literature that allows me to place Russia’s resistance to the trajectory of globalisation in a framework of counter-hegemony. By relating this form of resistance to the increased importance and influence of information and international broadcasting agencies that I have described above, the following research question can be successfully answered: How and what does Russia Today (RT) contribute to Russia’s (desired) post-Cold War identity? Here, the word ‘desired’ is placed between brackets. Throughout my thesis, I
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explain that there exists a significant and meaningful difference between Russia’s desired identity, and between Russia’s identity in the eyes of outside observers. At its core, my thesis will be structured along the lines of the distinction that Robert Cox has made between the material and ideational factors that are constitutive of (counter-) hegemony (Cox 1981: 139). More specifically, my thesis is divided between a focus on Russia’s war of movement, in which it attempts to gain ‘control over re-sources and institutions’ (Lipsitz 19988: 147) and Russia’s war of position, through which counter-hegemonic initiatives are to ‘make their triumphs appear legitimate’ (Lipsitz 1988: 147). In chapter 1, I focus on the material elements of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy that constitute such a war of movement. First, I discuss several key developments in, and scholarly interpretations of, the post-Cold War order. These developments and interpretations will serve to underlie the descriptions of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy and (desired) post-Cold War identity that follows. Finally, I focus on two specific expressions of Russia’s approach to the war of movement by analysing the material base of Putin’s interactions with several groups and political parties throughout Europe, and by analysing Russia’s approach to regional integration. In chapter 2, the ideological element of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy is introduced and underlined by analysing theories that serve to illustrate Russia’s post-Cold War approach to ideology. Chapters 1 and 2 both can both be seen as providing the necessary background information for chapter 3, in which my research question will be answered by conducting a rigid study of Russia Today (RT). Here, I focus on the methods of Russia Today (RT) that can be seen as elements of a war of position. Finally, I elaborate on RT’s contribution to Russia’s broader counter-hegemony by offering insights into the ways in which the material and ideational factors of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy and identity are interrelated.
In writing this thesis, I anticipate a number of limitations and challenges to meet me on my path. For example, in my thesis I explain that Russia Today (RT) is widely criticised for being propaganda, and while the goal of my thesis is not to gain insight into how and to what extent this is true, the scent of propaganda that surrounds the website is one that might lead to difficulties in constructing arguments about the intended nature of the content that I will be analysing in chapter 3. Also, where a number of arguments that I will be drawing on are published in academic journals like the Journal of Democracy, it could be anticipated that the arguments made in these articles about the
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nature of Russia Today (RT) are founded on a certain degree of bias. Finally, while drawing on literature that gains insight into Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy and literature that offers sufficient insight into the possible counter-hegemonic designs of this foreign policy, many of the processes that I analyse are recent developments and this, in some cases, leads to open endings in my analysis.
Despite these difficulties and limitations, I intend to contribute to the academic field in both significant and more modest ways. My analysis of the role of Russia Today (RT) in Russia’s foreign policy can be seen as contributing to the study of Russia’s foreign policy in general and, more specifically, to an understanding of the increasingly significant role of international broadcasting agencies in the information age. Also, my perspective on incorporating Russia Today (RT) into the designs of a possible Russian counter-hegemonic initiatives has, to my knowledge, not been done before. Finally, by drawing on the work of Stefano Braghiroli & Andrey Makarychev (2015) and Peter Pomerantsev (2015) on Russia’s instrumental approach to ideology, the definition of the war of position is broadened to include such an instrumental and encompassing approach to ideology.
Methodology
In order to provide an adequate and insightful answer to my research question, I will apply the following methodology. My thesis is a mixed-method styled research in which I combine a literature study with a discourse, and a survey analysis. The theoretical framework that the literature provides serves to introduce and underline the topics that I focus on in chapter 3 of my thesis, where the discourse and survey analysis are conducted. In my discourse analysis, I will be drawing on theories of media discourse analysis by signalling the interpretive packages that underlie and structure Russia Today (RT)’s news items. Interpretive packages are defined as the frames and symbolic devices such as ‘metaphors, catchphrases […] and moral appeals’ that provide structure to a news items and that ‘give meaning to an issue’ (Gamson & Modigliani 1989: 2). The goal of this discourse analysis is to understand the reasoning behind, and the designs of Russia Today (RT)’s news items. To answer my research question, it is crucial to offer a deep understanding of Russia Today (RT)’s approach to the ways in which it presents its news to its audience. Finally, I present an analysis of a survey that I have conducted with the goal of gaining insight into the implications and motivations behind using Russia
6 Today (RT) as a news source, and to create insight into what my respondents ‘gain’ from it. In total, 115 respondents have filled in the questionnaire. As for demographics, the average age of my respondents is 26,3 (see Appendix, figure 1). 53,5% of my respondents is of the female gender, and 46,5% is male (see Appendix, figure 2). Out of my 115 respondents, 82 live in the Netherlands (see Appendix, figure 3). Finally, 87,6% of my respondents is in possession of a bachelor’s degree or a higher title (see Appendix, figure 4).
Chapter 1. Russia and the post-Cold War global order
As I have explained in my introduction, the goal of this chapter is to gain insight into the material factors of Russia’s counter-hegemony, which will be seen as constitutive of Russia’s war of movement. First, I will elaborate on developments in the post-Cold War global order. These developments will, secondly, prove to be illustrative of several elements of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy orientation and discourse. Third, I analyse some of the effects that the Ukraine crisis had for Russia’s relations with the Western world and how the Kremlin reacted to this. Fourth, I elaborate on the implications and motivations behind Russia’s increased focus on regional integration projects. Finally, at the end of this chapter I offer a re-cap of the topics discussed throughout and place them within the framework of the war of movement.
The post-Cold War global order
Underlying the scholarly views on the post-Cold War global order is the fact that the post-Cold war period has been characterised by the globalisation of neoliberalism and free market capitalism (Worth 2013: 10). This premise led Francis Fukuyama to argue that we entered the so-called end of history, in which the struggle over ideology had reached its end phase (Worth 2013: 9). In a reflection on his theory that Fukuyama provided in an interview with New Perspectives Quarterly, Fukuyama re-affirmed his statement by adding to it that while neoliberalism is flawed and has been met with opposition, these challengers have not succeeded in undermining the core premise of his argument (Fukuyama 2013:31). Another influential, but very much different, view on the post-Cold War global order has been offered by Samuel Huntington. For Huntington, the post-Cold War global order is one in which civilizational divides will be
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exacerbated and will lead to a situation in which ‘The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural lines separating these civilizations from another’ (Huntington 1993: 25). The work of Fukuyama and Huntington, in several ways, underlies the arguments made throughout this thesis. In the paragraphs that follow, Russia’s post-Cold War relation to the outside world and its resistance to neoliberal globalisation will be analysed. Here, it will become clear that civilizational rhetoric is an integral element of Russia’s resistance to what it perceives of as the hegemony of neoliberal globalisation.
At the initial stages of the process of neoliberal globalisation that has characterised the post-Cold War era, the U.S was the only remaining superpower and had a loyal supporter in Europe (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2014: 67). This situation led Charles Krauthammer to coin the notion of the unipolar moment, which would in his opinion continue to exist for a long time to come (Baylis, Smith & Owens 2014: 67). In a reflection on his theory, Krauthammer emphasised that this unipolar world order is one in which, by serving its own interests, the US fundamentally contributes to global ends. By serving its own interests, for Krauthammer, the US is ‘extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort’ (Krauthammer 2002: 14- 15). Increasingly, however, the flaws of the trajectory of neoliberal globalisation have become apparent, and challengers to its dominance have emerged (Worth 2013: 9-10), leading to the notion of a multipolar world order becoming more widespread.
For Owen Worth, the financial crisis of 2008 was a defining moment in the (nature of) resistance to neoliberal globalisation. Worth explains that the criticisms of neoliberal globalisation that existed before the crisis – in which neoliberalism was, for example, depicted as functioning in an undemocratic way or working as a tool to serve American imperialism - reached a critical point during and after the financial crisis of 2008. The crisis fundamentally exposed the flaws of neoliberal globalisation and thereby significantly weakened the legitimacy of the dominant powers within that system (Worth 2013: 29). In his work, Worth discusses forms of resistance to neoliberal globalisation like religious fundamentalism, national populism and progressive internationalism, but reaches the conclusion that the most significant threat and potential challenge to neoliberal globalisation exists within the increased prominence of projects of regional integration (Worth 2013: 139-140).
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The increased visibility of neoliberalism’s flaws and the regionalism that has gained shape as a form of resistance against neoliberal globalisation has led some scholars to argue that we are entering, or are in fact already living in, a multipolar world order. Similar to the arguments made by Worth, Christopher Layne explains that the rise of great powers like China, and the fact that the financial crisis of 2008 has led to a situation in which, on the one hand, governments have resorted to nationalist economic measures to bounce back after the crisis. And, on the other hand, the very much visible economic vulnerability of the Western world has led to a situation in which both neoliberalism and the legitimacy of the dominance of the Western world’s leading role are increasingly being doubted (Layne 2011: 159). What we are entering, for Layne, is ‘an era of de-globalization, rising nationalism and neo-mercantilism, geopolitical instability, and great power competition’ (Layne 2011: 160). However, scholars like Chantal Mouffe possess a more positive view of a multipolar world order.
For Chantal Mouffe, a pluralisation of hegemonies built around several regional powers in which differences in political and cultural values are recognised and legitimated would lead to less friction and confrontation than a world in which ‘ a single economic and political model is presented as the only legitimate one and is imposed on all parties in the name of its supposedly superior rationality and morality’ (Mouffe 2000: 533). Here, Mouffe introduces another important facet of the post-Cold War global order and Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy discourse. The neoliberal globalisation that characterises the post-Cold War era has been accompanied by strong normative and political beliefs and interpretations, and this greatly influences those – like Russia - that aspire to obtain power within the global order (Hurrell 2006: 4).
Here, the post-Cold War global order is one that, both in IR-theory and practice.
has given rise to a norms and values based international political system and a situation in which in IR-theory neorealism has (at least temporarily) lost in prominence to neoliberalism and constructivism (Gallarotti 2011: 37). This development, more concretely, has a double-edged meaning for states that attempt to challenge the neoliberal global order. On the one hand, this international society functions in such a way that it is capable of imposing sanctions and other disciplinary measures (Hurrell 2006: 3) on states and it has led to a situation in which, increasingly, great power status is to be obtained through being recognised as legitimate (or a legitimate authority) by others. Status with such ambitions will have to ‘respect’ international society and live by
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its norms, since ‘membership of the club of great power is a social category that depends on recognition by others’ (Hurrell 2006: 3-4). In other words, ‘The world stage has become less amenable to Hobbesian brutes, and more amenable to actors that are sensitized to the soft opportunities and constraints imposed by this new global environment’ (Gallarotti 2011: 26). The term ‘soft’, here, refers to soft power, which is an important concept in this thesis. In chapter 2, the concept and, importantly, Russia’s interpretation of soft power will be analysed. Before doing so, I wil offer an historical overview of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Here, several of the notions described above will prove to greatly influence and underlie Russia’s foreign policy discourse and orientations.
Russia (desired) post-Cold War identity
Russia’s present socio-economic structure is defined by Ksenia Kirkham as a federal bureaucracy and monopoly capitalism in which there exists a ‘highly concentrated ownership and control over the modes of production’ (Kirkham 2016: 115). While this configuration clearly deviates from neoliberal doctrines, Russia in the early years of its post-Cold War development pursued a much more Westernist approach.
In the early years of the post-Cold war era, Russia's economy was hit by an economic crisis that was caused by a series of high-speed reforms. These reforms had the goal of opening up the country to global markets and creating a (competitive) market economy (Worth 2013: 16-17). The reforms were made under the guise of the Westernist vision that was led by president Boris Yeltsin, in which the Yeltsin administration committed itself to deep forms cooperation with the West and an incorporation into Western economic and security institutions (Tsygankov 2012: 9-10). This Westernist vision, however, was soon met with resistance by those in Russia’s state and military apparatus that felt that Russia’s commitment to being incorporated into such Western structures was not met sufficient acknowledgement by the dominant Western powers (Tsygankov 2012: 9-10). This sentiment paved the way for an increasingly defensive foreign policy. This defensive foreign policy was one that stressed that Russia did not seek confrontation, but emphasised the intent to return to Russia the great power status that many in the Russian state apparatus perceived was Russia’s rightful position (Tsygankov 2012: 10).
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received for its commitment to cooperation in the US-led war on terror (Tsygankov 2012: 10). Moreover, Russia saw in the US’ invasion of Iraq of lack of respect for international law and an increased willingness to resort to a unilateral foreign policy (Sakwa 2008: 249). Also, the colour revolutions that took place in Ukraine and Georgia in the mid-2000s instilled disillusionment in the Kremlin and discouraged Russia in its attempts to cooperate and improve ties with the United States (Wilson 2015: 291). Importantly, in the mid-2000s Russia experienced an economic upswing and this enabled the Kremlin to construct pipelines, take closer control over networks of transportation in the former Soviet Union and take other measures that were designed to ‘strengthen its energy position in world markets’ (Tsygankov 2012: 10). The important role in Russia’s foreign policy of these energy supplies (Tsygankov 2012: 10) will be further illustrated in the next sub-chapter.
What developed in the late 2000s into the 2010s is a relationship between Russia and the Western world that was on the one hand built on important trade and investment relations, but on the other hand was characterised by the EU’s criticisms of Russia’s socio- economic structure and its domestic and regional human rights records (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 349). Here, a Russian attitude developed that for Richard Sakwa seemed to be balanced between ‘trying both to join and remain autonomous’ (Sakwa 2008: 266). This attitude, for Sakwa, shaped a Russian attitude towards the outside world that he defines as neo-revisionist.
In this neo-revisionist attitude Russia ‘wishes not to destroy the existing constitution of international society but to modify it in a way that would give Russia what is perceived to be its due weight and to ensure that the hegemonic powers apply their normative declarations to themselves as well as others’ (Sakwa 2011a: 199). Russia, as this citation indicates, perceives international society to function as imposing so-called universal values on Russia – and other nations – while it is in some cases not respecting them itself. In this light, for Sakwa, Russia attempts to position itself as a norm enforcer (Sakwa 2011a: 199-201) in which it resists the tenets of globalisation by committing to traditional political values based on a return to territorial sovereignty and the incorporation of ‘civilizational diversity and cultural difference’ into a ‘genuinely universal’ global order (Sakwa 2011a: 205). In chapters 2 and 3, I explain in more detail how and why Russia commits to this attitude and what Russia’s international broadcasting Russia Today (RT) contributes to this desired norm enforcing image.
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Sakwa has labelled Russia’s neo-revisionism as a delicate balancing strategy ‘between deployment into the hegemonic order, on the one hand, and veering towards outright revisionism, on the other’ (Sakwa 2011b: 968), The delicacy of this practice is one that at some points in time reaches forms of positive engagement while at other times it presents itself in the form antagonistic competition (Sakwa 2011a: 202). Andrey Tsygankov explained in 2012 that Russian assertiveness was likely to remain at a low point (Tsygankov 2012:11), partly because of the economic relations between Russia and the West that have been described throughout this sub-chapter. However, the crisis in Ukraine marks a point in time of Russia’s relations with the Western world in which Russia’s balancing strategy reached its most delicate stage of the post-Cold War era.
Russia and the crisis in Ukraine: worsening relationships, and making friends
The protracted crisis in Ukraine is, in several ways and from different perspectives, illustrative of Russia’s position in the post-Cold War global order and this global order itself. For Richard Sakwa, ‘The Ukraine crisis exposed the flaws in Europe’s post-Cold War development’ (Sakwa 2015: 574). Sakwa, more concretely, states that the trajectory of post-Cold War EU integration led to a situation in which the distribution between the states that formed the core of the EU power structure and those in the periphery became unsustainable (Sakwa 2015: 563). From such a perspective, the EU’s interest in a further integration of Ukraine was by Russia perceived as another example of the (perceived) lack of acknowledgement of Russia’s commitment to cooperation and its position in the global order (Tsygankov 2015: 297-298) that has been described in the previous section of this thesis. In this vein, Putin ‘acted as if thwarting the American ambitions to influence Kiev was his last stand against global American hegemony’ (Tsygankov 2015: 292). However, relating back to the previous sub-chapter of this thesis where Russia’s (desired) post-Cold War identity was described as being neo-revisionist, for scholars like Francois Heisbourg the Ukraine crisis is very much illustrative of a revisionist Russian attitude.
For Heisbourg, the annexation of Crimea distinctly opposed several institutional agreements that were defining features of the post-Cold War global order, whereby Russia was signalling ‘an across-the-board enmity for Western institutions in Europe and Western values in the world’ (Heisbourg 2015: 32-34). Such beliefs are fairly widespread. The prevalence of these interpretations has led to a situation in which
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Russia was left ‘in a state of semi-isolation, not leading any powerful coalitions or alliances’ (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 351) and severely jeopardized the already ambivalent nature of possible friendly relations between Russia and the Western world (Smith 2016: 181). However, where normative integration of Russia into the EU’s institutional framework reached a low because of the Ukraine crisis (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2015: 217) Russia’s actions in Ukraine seem to have triggered increased interactions between Russia and the European radical left and far right, which are said to be attracted to the Russian discourse on the penetrative nature of EU integration which it uses as a motivation for its actions in Ukraine (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2015: 214).
The relationship between Russia and the European radical left and far right is, however, more than one sided. At the core of the relationship lie material factors that can, in several ways, be seen as beneficial to Putin’s foreign policy and Russia’s national interests. Therefore, Putin has purposefully approached several European radical left and far right parties by providing them with financial support (Pomerantsev 2015: 44) and besides political parties, importantly, Putin has also sought to increase its contacts with and influence on business lobbies throughout Europe (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 26). The intended functions of these contacts have much to do with Russia’s energy supplies.
Peter Pomerantsev & Michael Weiss explain that Russia’s relationship with the radical left, far right and business lobbies serves to support the Kremlin’s tactic of using the ‘openness of global markets as an opportunity to employ money, commerce and energy as foreign policy weapons’ (Pomerantsev 2014: 6). It should be added here that the economic sanctions that were imposed on Russia after its (illegal) annexation of Crimea and the support that Russia offered to pro-Russian separatist in the East of Ukraine severely limited Russia’s energy potential (Braghiroli & Makarychev 2015: 217), since Ukraine was traditionally an important (transport) hub of Russia’s energy supplies and production (Tsygankov 2015: 288). To fully grasp the material element of these relationships, Braghiroli & Makarychev explain that ‘Russia is deeply interested in support from the EU politicians to energy projects developed by Gazprom ‘(Braghiroli & Makarychev 2015: 218). Here, we have seen how Russia’s material interests have been damaged by the crisis in Ukraine and how it uses contacts with businesses and parties throughout Europe to re-store some of its lost material interests. Another way in which
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the Kremlin has been attempting to strengthen its material bases is by engaging in projects of regional integration, on which I will elaborate further in the paragraphs that follow.
Russia and the multipolar world order
At the beginning of this chapter I explained that for Owen Worth, regionalism poses a significant challenge to neoliberal globalisation. Indeed, Russia’s focus on regional integration can very well be seen as a form of resistance against neoliberal globalisation. Richard Sakwa explains that globalisation ‘in Russia is seen as the ideology of the international hegemony of the dominant power system’ (Sakwa 2011b: 970). Because of this, Russia is an outspoken proponent of a multipolar world order. Within Sakwa’s definition of Russia’s neo-revisionism, Russia’s view on the multipolar world order is one that sees this multipolar world order as a system in which it is not accepted ‘that one or more dominant state(s) should be able to impose rules on the rest of the world’ (Sergunin & Karabeshin 2015: 351). In this multipolar world order, Russia sees itself as a centre and, more specifically, a centre with equal rights and status as other major power centres like the U.S, China, and the EU (Trenin 2011: 10). And, importantly, Russia expresses the demand or desire to have the ‘right to cast a vote during discussions of humanity’s most important problems’ (Trenin 2011: 10-11). Where I have explained that one of the tenets of the post-Cold War global order has been related to the increased weight of international society, Russia’s vision a multipolar world order is designed in such a way that it is able to resist these tenets.
The earlier described ambivalent nature of Russia’s foreign policy in which Russia on the one hand adapts to the international system while, on the other hand, it wants to remain autonomous is interestingly incorporated into Russia’s foreign policy discourse on the multipolar world order. Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov stated in 2013 that Russia’s vision of a multipolar world order and regional integration is based on the premise that the present international political system is one in which ‘a plurality of development models is becoming evident’ (Lavrov 2013: 9). On the other hand, Lavrov emphasises that Russia’s pursuing of regional integration is a focus that should not be interpreted as reminiscent of the Soviet Union, but is an orientation that very much follows the example set by present day standards, because it ‘reflects objective trends of this globalization era, including the role of regional alliances’ (Lavrov 2013: 10). A
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concrete example of Russia’s approach to regional integration and how it might resist neoliberal globalisation can be offered by studying the Eurasian Economic Union. The idea of the Eurasian Economic Union was introduced by Putin in 2011, and it promised its potential members (importantly, Ukraine included) ‘an increase in trade, common modernization projects, and improved standards of living’ (Tsygankov 2015: 284). Russian discourse on the Eurasian Economic Union states that the core goal of the Union is to give ‘additional substance to the members’ economic bases’ (Kirkham 2016: 117) and, importantly, consistently emphasises the open nature of the project, upholding the intent to include Ukraine (and, of course, other states) (Lavrov 2013: 11). An important way in which the Eurasian Economic Union is illustrative of earlier made arguments about Russia’s relation to the Western world can be seen in the fact that, Ksenia Kirkham explains, the relevance attributed to the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union has been triggered by what Russia perceived of as its ‘de facto exclusion from political, economic and military developments in Europe’ (Kirkham 2016: 121). Behind this seemingly reactive motivation, however, lie interpretations and understandings of the Eurasian Economic Union that paint a picture of the Eurasian Economic Union as a Russian attempt to (re-) construct regional hegemony.
In her analysis of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kirkham offers a detailed description of how and to what extent the Eurasian Economic Union is effective in the creation or consolidation of a Russian regional hegemony. My analysis will not go in this much depth, but it is important for the scope of this thesis to, similar to Kirkham, draw on the work of Robert Cox and his arguments about the functions of institutionalisation. For Robert Cox, institutions play an important role in the process of ‘stabilising and perpetuating a particular order’ (Cox 1981: 137-137). In a Coxian understanding, an institution like the Eurasian Economic Union can serve to imprint upon its members the ‘rules which support the dominant mode of production’ (Cox 1983: 171-2), which is in this case based on Russian preferences and designs.
Despite the fact that, as Kirkham explains, the Eurasian Economic Union is greatly limited because of factors like ‘insufficient financial funds and severe economic asymmetry between its members’ (Kirkham 2016: 117), when we combine Russia’s interest in the creation and strengthening of regional institutions with the material aspects of Russia’s relations with the European radical left, far right, and business lobbies we can gain insight into the structure of a possible Russian counter-hegemonic
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war of movement. For George Lipsitz, a war of movement is concerned with the gaining of control over re-sources and institutions’ (Lipsitz 1988: 147). On the one hand, we have seen how Russia’s energy supplies play a central role in the interactions that the Kremlin purposefully pursues and upholds with political parties and businesses through Europe. On the other hand, we have seen how the post-Cold War era has been one in which Russia has on several moments in time experienced and expressed a certain discontent with the trajectory of European integration and what it perceives as its exclusion from this integration. By pursuing an institutionalisation strategy that allows it to realise its own interests more actively, we can see the signs of a Russian war of movement taking shape.
Kirkham, however, also emphasises that an important element in the potential success of the Eurasian Economic Union lies in Russia’s ability to exert cultural leadership over its member states, since the Union has to, partly, be based on Eurasianism as an ideology (Kirkham 2016: 123). Similarly, Tsygankov explains that underlying the Eurasian Economic Union is the fact that the Union symbolises political and cultural values that are very much opposed to the way in which, for Tsygankov, ‘the EU presented Ukrainian membership in the organization [the EU] as a “civilizational” choice’ (Tsygankov 2015: 292). The success of a the Eurasian Economic Union, which is at its core motivated by material motivations, lies to a significant degree in the Union’s ability to express and draw upon ideational factors.
However, the ideational factors that are meant to strengthen the Eurasian Economic Union might not strike well with some of the other groups that the Kremlin engages with, like the European radical left and far right. For this reason, Russia applies an instrumental approach to ideology, which ‘allows the Kremlin to treat many political concepts as empty signifiers open to reinterpretation and thus fill them with diverse meanings ‘(Braghiroli & Makarychev 2015: 228). What this means and how this functions will be explained in detail in chapters 2 and 3. In chapter 2, this practice is analysed by focusing on some of the theoretical explanations and motivations behind it. In chapter 3, I focus on Russia Today (RT)’s interpretation of, and contribution to this approach to ideology. At the end of chapter 3, I offer more insight into manifestations of the crucial interplay between the material and ideational elements of Russia’s counter-hegemonic initiative.
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Chapter 2. Russia and the instrumentalization of ideology
At the core of Russia’s interactions with the European radical left and far right lies the Kremlin’s instrumental approach to ideology, which fills the blank space that was left in Russia’s ideological configuration after the Soviet Union and its ideological doctrines dissipated (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 351). What developed, for Peter Pomerantsev, was a fluid ideology which allows the Kremlin to foster divisions within the West (Pomerantsev 2015: 43) and, more concretely, to garner support for its policies by creating ‘an echo chamber of Kremlin support’ (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 6). In this chapter, I provide the theoretical insights necessary to fully grasp the implications and motivations behind Russia’s instrumental approach to ideology. The first step to take in this process is to analyse Russia’s interpretation of the concept of soft power. Soft power, I will explain, is one of the practices that has increased in importance in the post-Cold War era as a result of neoliberal globalisation and is one the vehicles through which Russia’s resistance to neoliberal globalisation is meant to be realised. Soft power and its critics
Soft power is a concept that has been coined by Joseph Nye. Nye explains that, in the post-Cold War era, ‘proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behaviour of states’ (Nye 1990: 155). This ability, more concretely, lies in (the promotion of) an actors culture, political values, and foreign policy (Nye 2008: 96). Where up to this point I focused on the material forms of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy and (desired) identity, by focusing on soft power we can gain more insight into the ways in which Russia realises its ‘ability to attract others by attraction and persuasion rather than just coercion and payment’ (Nye 2014: 200). Soft power is a typical product of post-Cold War globalisation, since this globalisation is one in which interdependence has increased and many technological developments have taken place. This has led Nye to conclude that in the information age, soft power will be a crucial part of global power relations (Nye 2008: 107). However, it is important to note that, as stressed by Steven Lukes, Nye’s definitions of soft power are made with U.S foreign policy in mind, and to understand how the U.S can make more efficient use of its soft power (Lukes 2005: 487). This, in several ways, lies at the core of the criticisms on soft power and Russia’s approach to soft power that I will discuss in the paragraphs that
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follow.
For Todd Hall soft power has a distinct political utility and serves to ‘reaffirm the policies that political actors – Nye included – advance’ (Hall 2010: 196). Hall explains that the U.S displayed an increased interest in the practice of soft power after 9/11 and states that this interest is not to be interpreted as a mere promotion of the U.S’s positive soft power values, but was designed to re-capture some of the lost legitimacy and power that can be seen to have caused and followed the attacks (Hall 2010: 195-196).The fact that soft power is a concept that is very much designed with U.S foreign policy mind and is ‘a Western, indeed, largely an American construct’ (Wilson 2015: 296) means that the concept embodies definitions of the means by which attraction is to take (culture, political values, and foreign policy) that assume a Western interpretation of these values. What this implicates, more concretely, is that in order to exert what is perceived by the outside world as legitimate soft power, this has to be done within the framework of these Western interpretations (Kiseleva 2015: 320). This has definite implications for Russia’s soft power initiatives and potential. However, notwithstanding the limitations to Russia’s soft power potential that are imposed by the hegemonic qualities of the concept as described above, Russia’s approach to soft power also differs from traditional understandings of soft power in several ways.
Russia’s approach to soft power
Displaying awareness of the growing importance of the practice, soft power became an increasingly important concept in Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy discourse and practice (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 349). The prominence attributed to soft power was not only caused by a desire to improve its image abroad, but was underscored by Russia’s desire to present an ‘objective and truthful image of Russia in Western society […] against deep seated stereotypes’ (Kiseleva 2015: 322). In the paragraphs that follow, I present an historical overview of Russia’s soft power initiatives. In this overview, several implications behind the Kremlin’s interest in the practice of soft power will be highlighted.
While the concept was officially introduced in the 2013 foreign policy concept, expressions of an interest in improving Russia’s soft power potential date back to the start of Putin’s second presidency in 2004. The colour revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), triggered the initial Russian interest in the
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practice of soft power (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 349-350). At this time, Russia’s soft power initiatives were solely aimed at improving its image in the post-Soviet world. In this vein, an important Russian soft power tool was the notion of the Russian world, which was officially introduced through a (government induced) ‘NGO’ called the Russkiy Mir (Russian World Foundation). The core functions of this foundations are the promotion of Russian language, culture and education throughout the post-Soviet world (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 355). Increasingly, however, Russia’s soft power became a global project (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 352). The Georgian War of 2008 and the (protracted) crisis in Ukraine that started in 2013 were not only detrimental to Russia’s efforts to lose its regional image as an ‘aggressive neighbour’ (Just 2016: 93), but also jeopardized Russia’s global image and soft power potential (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 349) for reasons that I have described in chapter 1 of this thesis.
Russia’s approach to improving its soft power potential in the Western world expresses itself in several ways. In the broadest sense, Giulio Gallarotti explains, Russia’s soft power can be exerted by its participation in, and commitment to, for example ‘international law, norms and institutions’ (Gallarotti 2011: 32), because this signals Russia’s commitment to political values that are in line with those that are deemed legitimate by the dominant Western powers. Related to this, however, Russia is simultaneously able to engage in a form of resistance against what it perceives of as the hegemonic nature of soft power. I have described in chapter 1 that the European radical left and far right were attracted to Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis because it symbolised Russia’s attitude against the penetrative nature of the trajectory of EU integration. In this vein, Russia uses its soft power to obtain ‘the high ground in claiming to adhere to a soft power policy that does not intrude into the internal affairs of sovereign states’ (Wilson 2015: 290).
More concretely, Russia’s soft power efforts can be seen by looking at the ways in which it actively engages in educational and academic exchange programmes, international broadcasting, discussion forums, think tanks, regional forums, and the orthodox church (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 354). In my study of Russia’s international broadcasting agency Russia Today (RT) in chapter 3, more examples of Russia’s soft power that is designed to reach the Western world will be presented. Before reaching that point, however, it is important to take notice of the ways in which Russia’s interpretation of the concept differs from Nye’s original conceptualization of
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soft power. By doing this, more insight can at a later stage be gained into the instrumental nature of Russia’s approach to ideology and the counter-hegemonic potential that this embodies.
Russia’s interpretation of, and approach to soft power differs from Nye’s traditional definition of the concept in several ways. Crucially, for Joseph Nye an important role in the practice of soft power is attributed to civil society (Nye 2014: 21). In Russia, however, such civil society structures are oppressed and the practice of soft power is a task that is carried out with ‘a strict oversight of organisations meant to promote Russia’s image in either a domestic or a foreign policy context’ (Wilson 2015: 293). In other words, Russia’s soft power is very much a project of the state (Wilson 2015: 293). The implications behind this can be illustrated by the work of Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss (2014), who see in Russia’s approach to soft power a weaponization of ideas, culture and money (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014). For Pomerantsev & Weiss, the motivation behind Russia’s soft power initiatives ‘is less to further cultural understanding across borders, one of the pillars of liberal democracy, and more to use culture and ideas as tools to divide and rule, corrupt and co-opt’ (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 18). For Pomerantsev & Weiss, this weaponization can best be illustrated by studying Russia Today (RT) (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 14). Before analysing Russia Today (RT), I feel that it is of added value to briefly elaborate on Russia’s approach to public diplomacy, since this works to further illustrate some of the core motivations and implications behind the creation of the news agency.
Russia’s public diplomacy
Soft power and public diplomacy are two closely interrelated terms. Public diplomacy is related to soft power in the sense that it is a government’s attempt to reach a foreign public (Cull 2008: 31), and to communicate to this audience the means of attraction that soft power consists of; culture, political values, and foreign policy. One of the means by which this is to takes place is international broadcasting (Nye 2008: 95).
Before the Kremlin displayed an interest in the practices of soft power and public diplomacy, the domestic media had already played an important role in the coming to power of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin. The national media attributed greatly to his (later) success, by turning him from a ‘bland nobody with few political prospects’ into a ‘strong military leader’ (Pomerantsev 2015: 40). In later years, more or less paralleling
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Russia’s soft power initiatives, international broadcasting became an increasingly important point on the Kremlin’s agenda. Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives developed throughout the 2000s, and the Georgian War of 2008 led the Kremlin to further bolster its public diplomacy efforts. The Kremlin’s view on the war in Georgia was one in which Russia lost out in the ‘information game’, and it realised that it had to improve its public diplomacy potential (Yablokov 2015: 303, Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 12).
Besides wanting to reach foreign publics to communicate their soft power means, Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives are triggered by the conviction that Russia’s ‘poor image and reputation’ (Simons 2014: 444) is the result of a perpetual negative treatment of and bias towards Russia that exists in, and is (re-) produced by the (mainstream) Western media (Avgerinos 2009: 121). Gary Rawnsley explains that this ‘distorted flow of communications’ (Rawnsley 2015: 284) is interpreted, in Russian discourse, as a form of cultural imperialism, in which it is implied that ‘command over the direction of news, information and culture is a reflection of economic power that translates into strategic and political power’ (Rawnsley 2015: 284). Having briefly explained the motivations and reasoning behind Russia’s public diplomacy initiatives, I will now focus on one of Russia’s most important public diplomacy tools; Russia Today (RT).
Russia Today (RT): Introduction
Russia Today (RT) was founded in 2005 as an initiative of, and sponsored by the state-controlled news agency NIA Rovosti (Avgerinos 2009: 122). Russia Today (RT) is designed to function in a way that fulfils Russia’s soft power and public diplomacy aspiration by intending to reach an international audience to improve its image abroad, and at the same time to oppose the anti-Russian bias that the Kremlin beliefs to exist in (mainstream) Western media (Loffe 2010: 44). In several ways, Russia Today (RT)’s methods and layout are constructed with the goal of attracting international audiences. This approach also explains why the channel’s name was changed from Russia Today into RT (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2015: 15). RT now has several different country-specific websites, such as RT Deutsch, RT USA, and RT France (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 6), and is purposefully copying Western media-formats so as to make Western audiences more ‘comfortable with the news presented’, and to ‘counter propaganda accusations’ by
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looking more like a ‘legitimate news agency’ (Simons 2014: 446-447). As of 2015, RT is estimated to have a budget of approximately 300 million USD (Pomerantsev 2015: 44-45). Also as of 2015, RT’s own website claims to have ‘nearly 50 million unique users monthly’ and declares that its Youtube channel is ‘the #1 TV news network on the platform with more than 4 billion views across its channels and 4.5 million subscribers (RT n.d ‘About us’).
While RT also publishes articles about Russia. ‘its schedule focuses on what it calls “other” or “unreported” [news], which is the network’s special niche’ (Pomerantsev 2015: 45). Related to this is the fact that RT has garnered for itself the image as a ‘place where people can freely share their ideas’ (Yablokov 2015: 308-309). What the following paragraphs will show is that this approach to news allows RT to adapt and contribute to the instrumentalization of Russia’s fluid approach to ideology. RT invites and hosts shows of many guest speakers with, while of different political backgrounds and orientations, in many cases a distinct anti-Western and broader anti-elitist orientation (Pomerantsev 2015: 45). The role that these guest speakers fulfil is one that seems very much akin to the Gramscian notion of the organic intellectual.
For Antonio Gramsci, ‘every relationship of “hegemony” is necessarily an educational relationship’ (Gramsci 1971: 247-248). Intellectuals, in Gramsci’s work, are ‘the dominant group’s “deputies”, exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government’ (Gramsci 1971: 12, quoted in Worth 2013: 24, emphasis in original). Worth, furthermore, explains that the function of organic intellectuals is one that is connected to the hegemon because ‘they [organic intellectuals] can be seen as anyone that communicates and reiterates the dominant ideology’s overriding common sense’ (Worth 2013: 24 miss 25). This function of organic intellectuals, however, can also be translated to counter-hegemony.
Worth explains that ‘the role of organic intellectuals is important in forming the consciousness of a specific ideology, [and] this would have to be strongly evident if a counter-hegemonic project were to be successful’ (Worth 2013: 34). This interpretation of the role of organic intellectuals is one that is emphasised by Russian nationalist Alexander Dugin. For Dugin, what makes an intellectual organic is the very fact that ‘he or she consciously takes his/her stance on hegemony’ (Dugin 2016). For Dugin, the function of organic intellectuals is essential in the process of counter-hegemony. Dugin writes: ‘the counter-hegemonic bloc is built by intellectuals. Therefore, at its core should
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be a global revolutionary elite which rejects the “status quo” at its deepest level’ (Dugin 2016). Dugin’s notoriously nationalistic rhetoric, however, has made him a controversial figure. About Dugin’s influence on Putin, Andrey Tsygankov explains that Putin’s expressions of nationalist discourse which can be seen as resonating well with Dugin’s overall reasoning are in many cases designed with the goal of silencing critics of the state (Tsygankov 2015: 294-295). On the other hand, however, Marlene Laruelle has argued that ‘the influence of his personality and his work must not be underestimated’ (Laruelle 2006: 22). At any rate, Dugin’s understanding of the role of the organic intellectual allows for a deeper understanding of RT’s practices to be generated.
In the following chapter, RT’s contribution to the (effective) functioning of organic intellectuals in Russia’s counter-hegemony will be elaborated on in more detail. In this chapter, the core arguments of my thesis will be unravelled. First, I will elaborate on the theoretical implications that underlie my study of RT and the ways in which it engages in a war of position. Second, several forms of content will be studied by drawing on these theories. Third, I will conduct a discourse analysis of RT’s news items. Here, the counter-hegemonic elements of Russia’s soft power discourse are incorporated into my analysis of Russia Today (RT) and the war of position. Finally, I offer insights into the interplay between Russia’s war of movement that I have described in chapter 1, and the war of position that will be described in the chapter that follows.
Chapter 3. Russia Today (RT) and the (neo-)Gramscian war of position
In the introduction of this thesis I have explained that (successful) counter-hegemony is structured through a war of movement and a war of position. In the paragraphs that follow, I attempt to gain an understanding of the design, potential, and limitations that underlie and challenge Russia’s war of position. A war of position is to be waged through the ‘subtle forms of contestation that are strategically aimed at transforming common sense and consciousness’ (Worth & Kuhling 2004: 35). The media are a significant force within the war of position (Cammaerts 2015: 526). For Gramsci, the press is one of the ‘forms of cultural organisation which keep the ideological world in movement within a given country’ (Gramsci 1971: 254). In other words, the media function to ‘create in people certain modes of behaviour consistent with the hegemonic social order’ (Cox 1983: 164). When we translate these (neo-)Gramscian understandings to the role of the contemporary mainstream media, we learn that the mainstream media ‘maintains the
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invisibility of capitalist interests’ (Cammaerts 2015: 534). Where capitalist interests are not visible, I believe, they belong to the realm of common sense and consciousness.
In what follows, I analyse RT’s war of position by focusing, first, on RT’s attempts to delegitimise both the media establishment and the political establishment. Second, I look at the ways in which an alternative hegemony is constructed through forms of cultural exchange and RT’s contribution to Russia’s instrumental approach to ideology. RT and the war of position: RT versus the establishment
For Greg Simons, RT and other international broadcasting agencies compete with each other over the core public diplomacy goal of reaching foreign publics (Simons 2014: 446-447). In order to beat one’s opponent in this competition, which Joseph Nye defines as one of competitive credibility, players strive to ‘enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponent’ (Nye 2008: 100). RT’s credibility is challenged, and limited, in several ways.
A common form of critique is that RT’s functions and goals do not reach very far beyond propaganda. Julia Loffe, for example, argues that while the motivation behind the initial inception of Russia Today might have been to increase Russia’s soft power potential, the channel increasingly became an ordinary propaganda tool, being ‘provocative for the sake of being provocative’ (Loffe 2010: 44). For Christopher Walker, applying the label soft power to RT is a misconception, since RT does not focus on improving its own image, but is preoccupied with containing ‘the spread of democracy and to reshape norms of international order’ (Walker 2015: 61). In public diplomacy terms, similarly, RT does not score very well. For Katherine Avgerinos, Russia’s public diplomacy potential is limited by the ‘centuries-old hegemonic mentality and rhetoric’ and the tradition of ‘uniting people around a common enemy’ that exist at the core of Russian discourse (Avgerinos 2009: 127). These narratives make it difficult to communicate a ‘brand Russia’ that is communicated ‘clearly and consistently’, and can be designed in such a way that it could be received well in the Western world (Avgerinos 2009: 131).
An awareness of being a competitor in this credibility contest is very much visible on RT. In what, by those authors that question RT’s credibility and general approach to international broadcasting, will most likely be perceived as an ironic designation of blame, RT offers its readers ‘The ultimate guide to mainstream media” (RT n.d: ‘Ultimate
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guide’). In this ‘guide’, RT shows its audience what the ‘final destination’ is that several of the main actors in the mainstream media have up their sleeves. It does so by listing information about their ownership, revenue, political orientations, authors and journalists and, crucially, scandals and controversies that the channels have been connected to. Similarly, touching on the recent controversies surrounding fake news, a show hosted by (organic intellectual) Ed Schultz is introduced with the following statement:
‘There’s no doubt in anyone’s mind. Republication or Democrat: there’s been a proliferation of fake news as of late. But this new era of news and information isn’t a story Americans know in full. Mike Papantonio, host of “America’s Lawyer”, joins “News With Ed”, saying: “Most Americans don’t know that two nights before Christmas, Obama […] created truly the closest thing to a ministry of propaganda. Now, he felt like he could do it it because of all those fake news stories’ (RT 2017a).
In this excerpt, not only is the credibility of the American media delegitimised, it is written within a conspiratorial narrative. RT has gained a certain notoriety for its publications on conspiracy theories about 9/11 (Pomerantsev 2015), and conspiratorial narratives pervasively circulate on RT (Yablokov 2015). Ilya Yablokov has made a distinction between two types of conspiratorial narratives that underlie much of RT’s publications. On the one hand, Yablokov explains, conspiracies against Russia are depicted in which Russia is positioned as the leader of the ‘majority’, targeted by and challenging the New World Order (Yablokov 2015: 305). On the other hand, anti-establishment conspiratorial narratives underlie many statements made by RT or its guest speakers and experts. Here, a narrative is constructed that portrays a situation in which ‘certain privileged individuals have constructed agreements against the will of the people’ (Worth 2013: 73) and, crucially, ‘which aim[s] at uniting the imagined global community of “the people” against the dangerous “other”, represented by the US establishment’ (Yablokov 2015: 312).
While the two shows that are discussed most closely in Yablokov’s piece, Truthseeker and Breaking the Set, are not aired anymore (Truthseeker was sanctioned for having violated impartiality rules for broadcasting a ‘series of misleading or biased programmes’ on the conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria) (Jackson 2015), RT’s approach to the distribution of ‘other or unreported news’ in which it challenges an elitist aspect of American politics through populist ideas vocalised by experts’ (Yablokov 2015: 304)
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very much persists. What Yablokov has described here is the function of RT’s organic intellectuals. The excerpt presented below is extracted from Chris Hedges’ show ‘On contact’, which seems to focus specifically on anti-establishment ideas and, importantly, the need to resist:
‘The artifice of corporate totalitarianism has been exposed. The citizens, disgusted by the lies and manipulation, have turned on the political establishment […]. As the pretence of democracy is unmasked, the naked fist of state repression takes its place. This moment in American history is what Antonio Gramsci called the ‘interregnum’, the period when a discredited regime is collapsing but a new one has yet to take its place. There is no guarantee that what comes next will be better. But this space, which will close soon, offers citizens the final chance to embrace a new vision, and a new direction. This vision will only be obtained through a radical break with corporate capitalism, indeed its overthrow, and sustained mass acts of civil mobilization and civil disobedience across the country’ (RT 2016a).
This excerpt illustrates well RT’s approach to its anti-establishment orientation, and the crucial counter-hegemonic orientation in which the need to strive for an alternative is stressed. Interesting to pin-point is the mention of Gramsci’s work, further underlining the intentions of this show as related to a (counter-)hegemonic orientation. With this quotation, I intend to underline the function of RT as described in the previous paragraphs. Importantly, where a distinction seems to have been made between RT’s war of position against the media establishment and the political establishment, it is the interrelated character of these two forms of establishment that defines both the strength of this ‘establishment’ and that underlies the nature of RT’s resistance.
When we place the preceding paragraphs in the broader framework of counter-hegemony, such practices are intended to delegitimise the hegemonic order by attempting to ‘tear apart the very fabric of the common sense that neoliberalism has produced’ (Worth 2013: 50). However, as I have explained in the introduction of this thesis, another defining moment of a war of position lies in a counter-hegemonic project’s ability to construct an alternative. In what follows, I attempt to demonstrate RT’s approach to the construction of such an alternative. To facilitate this, I elaborate first on sections of RT that focus on the construction of common sense and consciousness by the promotion of Russian language and history. Following this, I conduct a media discourse analysis by which more insight is created into the potential contributions that RT makes to Russia’s instrumental approach to ideology, which is an
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essential facet of Russia’s counter-hegemonic soft power discourse RT and the war of position: Get Russianalized
Besides news items, RT offers its audience free language classes and information about Russian history and, crucially, what Russian history means for contemporary Russia and Russians. On a page titled ‘victory day, 70 years since victory over Nazi Germany ‘ (RT n.d.: ‘Victory day’) for example, RT’s audience is presented with a Russian interpretation of the Second World War or, I should say, the Great Patriotic War. The introductory text to the web-page is concluded with the following sentence:
‘the Great Patriotic War, which started for the Soviets in 1941, united the entire nation and remains a centrepiece of Russia’s consciousness’.
The emphasis placed in this phrase on the importance that this part of Russian history has for the consciousness of the Russian people is what has led me to incorporate this form of RT’s content into my thesis. A similar form of content can further illustrate the implications behind such a focus on consciousness. Russiapedia (RT n.d ‘Russiapedia’) promotes a broader range of information about the country, like basic facts, (other) historical periods and figures, famous authors, actors, politicians, athletes, etc. This type of content can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a form of soft power, since it informs foreign audiences about the facets that Russian culture has consisted of and has produced. On the other hand, I claim that it can be seen within the light of a war of position. I will explain. While I was writing this paragraph and browsing Russiapedia, I noticed a difference between the phrases Russiapedia: Get to know Russia better, as displayed as the title of the website, and Get Russianalized: Russiapedia, which appeared when I scrolled over the browser tab. Entering Russiapedia as a search word on Google, similarly, resulted in a link to a page titled Russiapedia: Get Russianalized. What explains this difference might be a technical reason which my limited knowledge of computer technology (ignorantly) fails to comprehend. However, the difference itself is not important, but the fact that there is a difference is.
Drawing on the work of Benedict Anderson can help to understand this point better. For Benedict Anderson, one of the functions of history is that it creates a narrative based on a sense of continuity between history and the present. A narrative is created in which ‘the frame is historical and their [the narrative’s] setting sociological’
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(Anderson 2006: 205). What this implies is that contemporary societal common sense and consciousness are very much constructed on the existence of a collective memory and historical narrative. Also, where language, for Antonio Gramsci, ‘also means culture and philosophy (if only at the level of common sense)’ and allows for ‘a greater or lesser number of individuals who understand each other’s mode of expression in different degrees’ (Gramsci 1971: 247), a shared language contributes to the possibility of a shared common sense and allows for collectives to experience culture in the same way. When we remember that language and culture are important soft power tools used to construct the notion of the so-called Russian world (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015: 355), this promotion of language functions to strengthen and broaden the scope of Russia’s soft power. In the following excerpt, an argument is made for the relevance of the soft power of Russian culture in relation to the Western world:
While UK-Russia bilateral relations are not at their highest, at least, this does not prevent intense artistic exchange between the two countries as people feel connection on the cultural level regardless of political tension, Fiennes said. (RT 2016b)
Here, we see how RT is attempting to attract the Western world on the level of culture, which is an important soft power tool. Not only is the importance of the soft power of culture - which through a knowledge of the Russian language can be experienced more effectively – stressed, the already existing (soft) power of the Russian culture is underscored by using the words of an English actor and by signalling that this form of Russia’s soft power is sufficiently powerful to persist despite political tensions. Getting Russianized, then, might be similar to Anderson’s depiction of the practice of naturalization as a way of being ‘invited into the imagined community’ (Anderson 2006: 145). By promoting soft power tools like culture and language we are, in a sense, invited into the Russian world. Perhaps translating this to RT’s promotion of history is not exhaustive, because Anderson’s work is focused on nationalism, but I see a similar potential effect or goal behind this practice. Promoting an understanding of (the relevance of) Russia’s history to a foreign audience, I argue here, can be read as an attempt to make Russia’s contemporary narratives more relatable to the foreign audiences of RT and, in a broader sense, contributes to Russia’s war of position. I have explained in chapter 1 of this thesis that a part of Russia’s (desired) post-Cold War identity and image is related to historical narratives emphasising Russia’s significant historical role. This image and identity could be made less conflicting with the common
