Language and Identity: Chinese Nation-Building, Localization and
Individualization
By
Yunjing Feng
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts and Culture
In
Graduate School of Humanities
Comparative Cultural Analysis
University of Amsterdam
Instructor: David Duindam
Table of Contents
Abstract ... 3
Introduction ... 4
Chapter One: Chinese Language Policy and Mono-Nation-Building ... 15
1.1 Language and Nation ... 15
1.2 Putonghua Promotion and Chinese Mono-Nation-Building ... 21
1.3 Relationship Between Putonghua and Regional Languages ... 30
Chapter Two: Hong Kong Identity and Chineseness ... 39
2.1 Introduction ... 39
2.2 The Formation of Hong Kong Identity... 41
2.3 Hong Kong Identity and Chinese Identity ... 50
Chapter Three: Chinese Individualization and the Rise of Regionalism ... 57
3.1 Introduction ... 57
3.2 The Rise of Chinese Individualization ... 61
3.3 Nostalgia and Regionalism ... 72
Conclusion ... 83
Work Cited ... 89
Abstract
In the context of globalization, Chinese nation-building, localization and individualization are
three prominent trends that supplement each other and introduce a new mechanism for
different groups to interact. This thesis will mainly focus on the interrelationship between
these three processes and examine how language facilitates the construction of cultural
identity of different groups. We will first discuss how Chinese nation-building promotes its
national language to achieve national unity. Later on, we will probe into the relationship
between Hong Kong identity and Chinese identity in order to reveal the correlation between
localization and nation-building. In the end, we will analyze the rise of Chinese
individualization through our analysis of its “Chineseness” and “newness”; what is more, we
will link the process of individualization with the rise of regionalism.
Introduction
Globalization, which introduces a new mechanism for global interaction, generates
three tendencies simultaneously: nation-building, localization and individualization. First of
all, global migration along with the increasing social mobility interrogate the fixed physical
boundary of territories and lead to a trend of deterritorization. Although “nation” is not a
novel and recent concept, the idea of nation (the ideology of nationalism) is a modern product.
In the epoch of globalization, frequent transnational migrations intensify the contacts between
different nations and give rise to national awareness, which enables people to imagine their
nation as an unique group. Nation-states engage in a process of nation-building in order to
reconstruct the boundary of national identity and reconnect its citizens based on an imaginary
social bond. While globalization breaks the monopoly of the state and accelerates the process
of decentralization, local groups develop into another rising force that both competes against
and negotiates with nation-states. Globalization allows for the rise of local groups on the one hand but meanwhile blurs the line between different regional groups. Consequently, people’s cultural identity becomes fragmented and hybridized. To repair a sense of anxiety, local
groups adopt a binary approach to construct an unique regional identity by highlighting its
difference from others. In that sense, localization can be seen as another struggle for
self-affirmation, not at a national scale but in a regional level. The third trend of
between individuals and the state. Modernization, which brings about the division of labor,
the privation of economy, the mobilization of the population and the ubiquity of social media,
liberates individuals from their previous social confinements and raises their awareness of “self” as a subject rather than an object in society. This new status of individuals marks the rise of individualization.
The social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai points out that with the advent of
globalization, nation-states face a “crisis” which renders their legitimacy insecure (20). According to Appadurai, nation is a system that “appears poorly equipped to deal with the interlinked diasporas of people and images that mark the here and now ”(19). He summarizes
two major factors that disturb the boundary of nation: one is transnational migration which
accelerates border-crossing activities, and the other is mass mediation that links producers
with audiences across national boundaries and produces several “diasporic public spheres”
(Appadurai 22). If the geographical border fails to distinguish one nation from another, then
imagination offers an alternative to redefine the notion of nation. Benedict Anderson, an
American scholar specializing in international studies and political science, proposes a theory of “imagined community” to address this crisis of nation. According to him, nation is “an imagined political community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 15). As he explains, the word “imagined” indicates that members within their community do not know most of their fellows (Anderson 15) while the term “community” means that the
nation is conceived as a kind of comradeship and fraternity (Anderson 16). Under his theory, nation is no longer a spatial concept, but rather an “idea” of nation facilitated by people’s “doubleness of reading” (Anderson 37). This collective reading process creates a shared experience among people from different regions and thereby strengthens their identification with “strangers”. Since the rise of national consciousness is closely related to the crisis of nation, it is reasonable to perceive the idea of nation as a product of globalization.
In the context of globalization, China addresses this “crisis of nation” through a
process of nation-building. Its nation-building mainly strives for two goals: one is to promote the state’s new image worldwide to differentiate from other nations; the other is to unite the nation by constructing an inclusive national identity. The emergence of the “Chineseness” discourse illustrates the strategy of Chinese nation-building to promote its self-defined
national image in the global stage and counteract the hegemony of the West. Rey Chow, a
cultural critic specializing in post-colonial theory, suggests that the previous notion of “Chinese” emerges as a cultural supplement to the western practices (4). “There remains in the West, against the current facade of welcoming the non-Western others into putatively
interdisciplinary and cross-cultural exchanges, a continual tendency to stigmatize and
ghettoize non-Western culture precisely by way of ethnic, national labels” (Chow 4). The notion of “Chinese”, according to Chow, is a label imposed and promoted by the West, which remains “untheorized and taken for granted” (7). However, the new concept of “Chineseness”
put forwarded by Chinese intellectuals, reflects the nation’s struggle for self-determination. Guohua Zeng points out in his Ph. D thesis that the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Games serves the purpose of Chinese nation-building to change its old image into a modern one (50). This national strategy to articulate a new “Chineseness”, as Zeng argues, promotes a subject with equal standing with the west, but meanwhile its “to-be-looked-at-ness” feature implies a powerful gaze of the west (51). His statement reveals the paradox of “Chineseness” as a national strategy: on the one hand, it aims at building a new national identity as “Greater China” that challenges its previous stereotypes and displays
its inclusiveness; on the other hand, it fails to cut off its connection with the west, just as it
can neither avoid the influence of global interaction nor become self-sufficient.
The chief objective of Chinese nation-building is to construct an unified nation.
Chinese linguistic professor Minglang Zhou points out that China adopts the model of
mono-nation-building to integrate different national elements into an inclusive Chinese national identity (“Linguistic Diversity” 6). In theory, this model allows for the coexistence of national identity and regional identity, but in practice it promotes the ideology of “one nation with one national identity” which renders regional identity subordinated to the national identity. One of the methods to construct “one national identity” is to unify the language within the whole nation. Chinese language policy plays a crucial role in facilitating the
national standard language, which as a result unifies the nation’s linguistic environment and stimulates intergroup exchanges.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we will mainly examine how Chinese
mono-nation-building achieves national unity through the implementation of its language
policy. The major issue centers on how Putonghua is used to unite the nation and build an
inclusive national identity. It is noteworthy that Chinese mono-nation-building is not an
assimilating process but promotes both diversity and uniformity. In this chapter, we will first
examine the notion of nation to reveal the discourse of Chinese nation-building in the global
context. Later on, we will focus on how Chinese language policy standardizes and
popularizes the use of Putonghua to fulfill national uniformity and integration. In the end, we
are going to analyze the relationship between Putonghua and regional languages in China to
reveal the results of Chinese mono-nation-building.
In addition to nation-building, globalization also leads to another trend of localization.
Appadurai situates locality in the context of globalization and views it as relational and
contextual rather than spatial (178). He proposes three dimensions of the construction of
locality: (1) the efforts of modern nation-state to define neighborhoods under the sign of its
forms of allegiance; (2) the disjunction between territory, subjectivity and social movement;
(3) the steady erosion of relation between spatial and virtual neighborhoods, due to the force
only a local matter, but also an important issue for nation-states to seek legitimacy from a
regional level. Judging from these three dimension, the effects of globalization—including
the disconnection of physical sites and population movements, the intertwining relation between “neighborhoods”— gives rise to localization which restores the uniqueness of local groups and reconnects people to an “imagined community”. As Appadurai puts it, locality is a product of globalization. In the discourse of localization, both the global-local and
nation-local relations are crucial issues. Most related literature perceives localization as a
resistance to the force of globalization and nation-building. As the human geography
professor Tim Oakes points out, many scholars perceive the local as a space for resistance to both “modernist abstraction of nation-state” and “placeless globalism of transnational capital” (670). However, he contends that this approach ignores the role of the state in regulating
transnational flows which the local should not reject but rather align with it (Oakes 671).
Most importantly, Oakes redefines the relationship between nation and the local not as a
contradiction but as a reciprocal interaction. He states that while local elites promote the national discourse “Chineseness” to connect localities to a broader network of power (Oakes 669), nation states, fragmented by social movement, also seek for a localized identity (Oakes
670). His idea hints on the compatibility between nation-building and localization, and hence
With this relational concept of locality in mind, we will focus on the formation of
Hong Kong identity in the second chapter to investigate the dynamic interactions between
nation-building and localization. Hong Kong is a site where three forces (global, national and
local) compete against and reconcile with each other. Due to its colonial history and the ambivalent relationship with mainland China, Hong Kong’s identity is characterized by its ambiguity since it is constituted by a complex mixture of post-colonial identity, Chinese
identity and its local identity. Chinese professor Anthony Fung, who works in the field of
Hong Kong identity, concludes that Hong Kong identity is “hybridized between the local and national identity” (“Postcolonial Hong Kong Identity” 399). While Hong Kong people distinguish themselves from both the British and the Chinese, they are confronted with an identity dilemma where their “in-between” status lacks authenticity and legitimacy. To address its identity anxiety, Hong Kong constructs an unique local identity and endows it
with distinct value by distinguishing itself from mainland Chinese. With regard to Hong Kong’s ambiguous identity, the second chapter will focus on the central issue of how local identity both diverges from and intersects with national identity. It is commonly believed that
the construction of Hong Kong identity is local resistance against encroachment of
globalization and nation-building. For instance, Fung points out in his another article that the
articulation of Hong Kong identity is a collective resistance to its assimilation into the national culture (“What Makes the Local” 592). He clarifies that this resistance is not merely
about building a defensive mechanism against the dominant institutions, but also a
re-definition of Hong Kong identity (Fung, “What Makes the Local” 594). In contrast, other
opinions contend that it is possible to achieve an integration between Hong Kong identity and
Chinese identity during the process of localization. Based on the Common In-group Identity Model, the paper “Out-Group Value Incongruence and Intergroup Attitude” indicates that the more Hong Kong Chinese subgroup identifies with the super-ordinate Chinese group, the
more it acknowledges its common identity (Chinese identity) with other subgroups (Mainland
Chinese) and the more likely it is to achieves positive intergroup attitude (Guan et al. 383). In
this logic, the integration between Hong Kong identity and Chinese identity is achievable as
long as subgroups develop a strong identification with the superordinate group.
The question of whether the formation of Hong Kong identity is local resistance or an
integration into Chinese identity has much to do with our understanding of the relationship
between two groups. The dominant discourse in mainland China regards it as a correlation
between the subgroup and the superordinate group, while people in Hong Kong prefer to
consider it as an intergroup relation where two categories situate in an equal position. To
reflect these arguments above, our second chapter will specifically focus on a Hong Kong
film Comrades: Almost a Love Story (1996) to disentangle the complex relationship between
Hong Kong identity and Chinese identity. This film depicts the stories between two
changing identities indicate how Hong Kong identity is constructed through its comparison
with others and how it is included within the category of Chinese identity. The film points out
both the contradiction and connection between national identity and local identity. To
illustrate this nation-local interaction, we will first inquire into the formation of an exclusive
Hong Kong identity that is developed through intergroup comparison. In the second part, we
will discuss the way localization reacts to nation-building by examining the extent to which
Hong Kong identity diverges from and overlaps with Chinese identity.
Globalization not only facilitates the development of localization, but also gives rise
to individualization, which represents another form of resistance and self-determination from
an individual level. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck shows that individualization is not an invention of the twentieth century but the “triple individualization”, as he suggests, evolves from a recent process of modernization (127). He proposes three aspects of this
modern individualization: (1) disembedding or removal from historically prescribed social
forms (the “liberating dimension”); (2) the loss of traditional security (the “disenchantment dimension”); (3) re-embedding as a new type of social commitment (the “reintegration dimension”) (128). His analysis largely focuses on the institutional changes in the individual-society relation, which release individuals from the traditional social bond and meanwhile reconnect them to institutions. Referring to Beck’s individualization theory, Yunxiang Yan, a Chinese socio-cultural anthropology professor, puts forward the concept of
“partial individualization” to demonstrate the specificity of Chinese individualization (509). Yan borrows the concept of “duality of self” from a noted Chinese scholar Qichao Liang to demonstrate that Chinese individualization is characterized by its combination of the
collectivist and individualist culture. According to him, individuals in China obtain two selves: a “small self” which emphasizes their personal desire and a “greater self” that prioritizes the common good and subjugates the smaller one (494). This division points out
the two-sided effect of Chinese individualization: on the one hand, individuals release
themselves from previous social ties and become the self-conscious and independent citizens;
on the other hand, they are assigned with new responsibility to participate in public affairs
and to pursue the collective dream of modernity. In view of these arguments above, the third
chapter will first elaborate on the characteristics of Chinese individualization by dealing with
the following questions: what define the “Chineseness” of this individualization? What kind
of “new” features does Chinese individualization embrace? My key argument is that the most
distinctive feature of Chinese individualization lies in its continuity between collectivism and
individualism. To further expand this argument, I will introduce the Protecting Cantonese
Movement in 2010 in Guangzhou as a general context and mainly deal with the rise of
Chinese individualization embodied in this movement. In the second part of this chapter, I
will discuss how this individual movement develop into a regional campaign. I will look into
Guangzhou. The video mainly reveals local people’s concern about the destruction in the old
city and the disappearance of Cantonese in local society. We will examine how Rap
Guangzhou uses a nostalgia theme to strengthen people’s local awareness and encourage
Chapter One: Chinese Language Policy and Mono-Nation-Building
1.1 Language and Nation
Language is not merely a tool for communication, but it also facilitates the process of
nation-building. In China, due to its complex linguistic situation, it is fundamentally significant to build an united nation that accommodates diverse language groups. China’s linguistic environment is characterized by its multiplicity and diversity. Among all the 56
ethnic groups in China, including the majority Han ethnic and other 55 minorities, only 3
ethnic groups (Han, Hui and Manchu) speak Chinese whereas the rest use their own
languages. According to the Oxford handbook Language Policy and Ideology: Greater
China, Chinese regional languages are divided into seven groups: Putonghua (Mandarin),
Yue (Cantonese), Min, Hakka, Wu, Xiang and Gan (Zhang 1). To consolidate its national unity, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopts a national common language to unify the linguistic environment and promote domestic exchange. As a result, Putonghua was officially
adopted as the common speech for the nation in 1956. Longsheng Guo, a Chinese linguistic
scholar from the Institute of Applied Linguistics of the PRC State Language Commission, offers a definition of Putonghua: “To have Beijing speech as its standard pronunciation, the northern Chinese dialect as its base dialect, and modern Chinese literary classic written in vernacular Chinese as its grammatical norm” (46). From this description, we learn that
Putonghua, based on the northern dialect, is not the mother tongue for many regional groups,
but is promoted as a common speech for all groups in order to unify the whole nation.
Recent studies of Chinese language policy show a growing interest in the connection
between Putonghua promotion and Chinese nation-building. Most of the literature focuses on
how the normalization and popularization of Putonghua enables the state to build an unified
nation. For example, the Oxford handbook points out that in order to build a stronger and
united nation, Chinese language reform was initiated in the early period when China was
defeated by foreign powers during the Opium War (1840-1842, 1856-1860) and the first
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) (Zhang 2). When it came to the first half of the twentieth
century, efforts to standardize the phonetic symbols and simplify Chinese characters mainly
served the purpose of unifying the language nationwide (Zhang 2). After the establishment of
the PRC in 1949, language reforms aimed at building an unified and modern Chinese state
(Zhang 3). As the handbook concludes, Putonghua functions as a “sociopolitical tool for
nation-building” (Zhang 4). Another publication also suggests that the language policy in Chinese history is a strategy for the state to “regulate the power from the center” (Zhou and Ross 2). It mentions that early in the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) the “bloody” language
planning took place, where the government adopted xiaozhuan as the official script whilst
abolished all the other written forms in order to unify the newly-established nation (Zhou and
states that language policy is not adopted for its own sake but for other purposes, for instance
the establishment of a modern nation (Safran and Liu 270).
All these studies focus on the political function of national language that serves the
interests of the state to consolidate its legitimacy and unify the country. However, I would
argue that language is not only a tool for state-building but also a strategy for nation-building,
since it facilitates the psychological process of developing a national identity. Walker Connor,
a professor of political science best known for his work on nationalism, points out a
distinction between nation and state, where he defines the former as a “self-differentiating ethnic group” whereas the latter as “one the major political divisions of the globe” (25). It remains arguable whether ethnicity can be a decisive factor to define a nation, but I agree
with Connor in his division. Since the boundary between nation and state is highly blurred in
the context of China, people often conflate nation-building with state-building. Under such
circumstance, it is necessary for us to draw a line between these two notions in order to
understand both the political and psychological function of language in constructing a
national identity.
Before we address the issue of nation-building, we need to first answer this question:
what is nation? Nation, in a traditional sense, is often defined by its territorial or political
borders. However, with the advent of globalization and modernization, transnational
of nation. Under such circumstance, the notion of nation requires further redefinition and clarification. Anderson’s idea of “imagined” nation goes beyond the confinement of kinship and spatial division while underscores the cognitive dimension of nation. Since his notion is
closely linked to people’s psychological awareness, it implies a connection between the
formation of nation and the construction of a national identity. Arjun Appadurai further
develops Anderson’s idea of print capitalism into electronic capitalism and takes the global
interaction into account. He highlights that electronic mass mediation and transnational
mobilization break the monopoly of nation-state over the projection of modernization (10)
and leads to the “crisis” of nation-state (19). In Appadurai’s description, nation-states are “units in a complex interactive system”, which are unlikely to be the “long-term arbiters of the relationship between globality and modernity” (19). Appadurai attributes the crisis of nation to its inability deal with the “interlinked diaspora of people and images that mark the here and now” (19). Based on these discussions, I conclude that the frequent transnational interactions and the increasing social mobility question the stable border of nation and hence
give rise to the discourse of “imagined nation”.
Concerned with the dilemma of nation, Connor proposes a concept of “ethnonationalism” which links ethnicity closely with nationalism. He regards nation as a larger ethnic group where national consciousness and popular sovereignty serve as two
Anderson and Appadurai. First of all, his term “ethnonationalism” indicates that the ethnic kinship, as the basis of nation, is not restricted to the actual bond between people, but more as an emotional attachment to an ethnic group where people share the “myth of common descent” (Connor 25). This echoes Anderson’s notion of nation as a subjective group identification. Secondly, Connor also takes into account Appadurai’s concept of “modernity at large”. He points out that although modernization fails to explain why the idea of nation evolves, it does provides evidence of when it was formed. Anthony Smith, a British
ethnographer considered as a founder of nationalism studies, further elaborates on Connor’s argument. He adds that modernization increases the “intensity” of ethnic group interactions to the point where their frequent contacts become a threat to group identity and propel people to
participate in national politics to address this situation (Smith 58). All these scholars owe the
rise of national awareness to the development of modernization and globalization. Appadurai
explains why the idea of nation arises in the global age but does not clarify what exactly it is. Connor’s definition seems to be more comprehensive but his perspective is still limited to ethnicity. Smith, in consideration of the limitation of current studies of nation, tries to fill in
the gap. He points out that the problem of Connor lies in his dependence on the psychological
aspects of nation without showing enough attention to the real kinship (63). Smith argues that the subjective components, such as people’s common memories and emotional attachment to homeland, do not suffice to define the complex notion of nation (63). He proposes two more
components to supplement Connor’s definition of nation: one is the symbolic elements, such as memories, codes and values, which are indispensable for the nation to maintain its
distinctiveness (Smith 64); the other is institutional elements, including education, customs and rituals, which act as “long-term vehicles for reproduction of the distinctive heritage” (Smith 65). I agree with Smith in that the combination of actual kinship and imaginary social
tie offers a more comprehensive understanding of the discourse of nation. In view of all the
definitions above, I would like to propose two perspectives to examine nation-building,
namely the institutional and psychological dimensions. In this chapter, we will first analyze
both dimensions by examining two central questions: how does Chinese language policy lend
institutional support to the promotion of Putonghua and fulfill the goal of building an united
nation? How does the spread of Putonghua contribute to the formation of an inclusive
national identity? I would elaborate on my key point that Chinese nation-building is not
limited to a process of state-building which aims at consolidating the state control and
constructing an unified nation, but it also involves a psychological process of promoting its
national identity worldwide. In the second part, we will discuss the relationship between
Putonghua and regional languages, as a way to reveal how Chinese mono-nation-building
controls the degree of regional diversity on the one hand and gives rise to localization on the
1.2 Putonghua Promotion and Chinese Mono-Nation-Building
It is commonly believed that Chinese nation-building aims at maintaining national unity and
pursuing modernization. However, this idea confuses the process of state-building, which
serves the interests of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the process of nation-building.
With regard to this misunderstanding, I suggest that the overriding goal for Chinese
nation-building is not simply to build a politically united and powerful state, but also to
reconstruct a national identity. This new identity is not restricted to the geographical
boundary of the nation, but instead it refers to a larger imagined community known as “Greater China”, which includes overseas groups outside the border of mainland China, such as diaspora Chinese and people in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. In other words, Chinese
nation-building is not limited to the construction of a nation per se, but also aims at
promoting a more inclusive national identity worldwide.
In the current context of China, the construction of its national identity can be seen as
a process of mono-nation-building. Minglang Zhou points out a shift in Chinese
nation-building model from multi-nation-building to mono-nation-building. According to
Zhou, the PRC adopted the Soviet Union’s “multinational state building” model in the 1950s
which offered regional autonomy to the 55 minority nationalities and guaranteed them the
freedom to use their oral and written languages (“Linguistic Diversity” 5). Though this policy
all the minority languages should be the “satellite” of Han language (Putonghua or Mandarin) (Zhou, “Linguistic Diversity” 5). In other words, minority groups are supposed to give top
priority to the construction of a unified nation and put their demand for regional development
to a secondary position. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the PRC gradually
replaced its former multi-state-building model with a new model of “one nation with diversity”. Another article of Zhou mentions that if the previous “accommodationism” policy tolerates the pluralism of minorities’ linguistics, then this mono-nation-building model tends to integrate forcefully the minorities into the majority and prohibit linguistic pluralism (“Language Policy” 9). Since embracing multilingualism would undermine the “monopoly of the ‘national’ language” (Safran and Liu 280), the mono-nation-building model promotes the ideology of monolingualism as a way to secure the primacy and hegemony of the national
speech. As Putonghua develops into the only legitimate national language, it maintains its
dominance over other languages in China. The monopoly of Putonghua is not only a product
of the mono-nation-building model, but in return it also provides necessary conditions for the
construction of a mono-nation.
To achieve national unity, the standardization of language is one of the methods to
build an unitary state. Chinese mono-nation-building adopts various institutional
measures—including the implementation of language laws, the establishment of linguistic
standardize the nation’s language. Scholars Minglang Zhou and Heidi Ross sum up three
major goals of Chinese language policy: (1) to spread Putonghua until it become the national
common speech; (2) to promote the standard Romanization for Chinese, known as Hanyu
Pinyin; (3) to simplify Chinese characters (19). These goals point out three aspects of
language standardization process, including the normalization of the spoken speech, phonetic
spellings and written forms. In the early language reforms, a preliminary plan to standardize
all these linguistic components began to take shape. For example, the system of Phonetic
Symbols was approved by the Ministry of Education in 1918 and was further revised in 1930.
Besides, the first roman-alphabet-based system was formed in 1928. After several years of
heated discussions, Beijing dialect was chosen to form the basis of the spoken national
language. The language policy after 1949 provided a more systematic institutional framework
of language standardization. To improve national literacy, a comprehensive list of 2236
simplified characters was published and meanwhile the Scheme for Phonetic Alphabet of
Chinese was also approved in 1964. As the linguistics professor John Rohsenow points out,
this systematic list now becomes the standard for all newspapers, periodicals and modern
language books throughout mainland China (Rohsenow 22). The written forms of the
national language also became systematized when the Second Scheme of Simplified Chinese
Character was promulgated in 1977. Furthermore, the execution of Law of the People’s
significant progress in language legislation, since it largely widened the scope of Putonghua
use, from TV broadcasting to education.
All these efforts to standardize the national language correspond to the ideology of “one nation with one national language”: they solely focus on the standardization of Putonghua, based on an assumption that Putonghua is the only sources for language norms
which every Chinese should conform to. By providing the same codes and linguistic
standards for all speakers, Chinese language policy largely increases the degree of similarity
between different groups. The sociocultural anthropology professor Andrew Kipnis uses the term “commonality” to describe the double effect of Putonghua promotion: “Sharing a language and opportunities for communication allows for argumentation as much as
agreement . . . even argument can be said to produce commonality” (733). Though the spread
of common language does not guarantee national harmony, it does facilitate domestic
exchange by promoting “commonality” among diverse groups. As Anderson suggests, print
languages form the basis of national consciousness since they create unified fields of
communication (46). The same logic applies to the standardization of Putonghua. The
unification of written and spoken languages allows for trans-regional interaction and gives
rise to the idea of nation. That is to say while more people conform to the common linguistic
norms, they are able to identify with “others” and imagine those “strangers” as part of their
Chinese mono-nation-building model not only produces the same standard for different speakers, but also unifies the nation’s linguistic environment, which further legitimizes Putonghua’s monopoly and increases the accessibility of Putonghua to a larger population. As mentioned before, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Standard
Spoken and Written Chinese Language sets a milestone for Chinese language planning, since
it greatly widens the range of Putonghua application. According to its Article 10, schools and
other educational organizations should use Putonghua and the standardized Chinese
characters as the basic language and scripts in education. In the field of mass media,
Putonghua shall be adopted as the standard language for radio and television broadcasting, as
Article 12 states. Moreover, Article 14 specifies the situations where the national language
and scripts should be used:
(1) spoken and written language for broadcasting, films and TV programs;
(2) written language for the facilities in public places;
(3) written language in signboards and advertisements;
(5) packaging and specifications of commodities marketed in the country.1
Here we can see that the use of Putonghua is not limited to education instruction, but
also applies to diverse domains of public life, including broadcasting, publication,
commercial advertising and public services. The extensive application of this standard
language in public sphere mainly leads to two results. First of all, the popularization of
Putonghua allow various speakers nationwide to communicate in the same language.
Secondly, the spread of the common language norms creates an unified language
environment which makes Putonghua more available and comprehensible to a large group.
As more people, whether literate or illiterate, gain access to the national language, their
language barrier is greatly reduced. While the unified linguistic environment gives rise to
intergroup exchange and hence national integration, the unification of the nation become
achievable. As the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu suggests, the process of state formation
creates conditions for the construction of a unified linguistic market which is dominated by
the official language (45). He points out that the standardized language is a “normative product” (Bourdieu 46) which is suitable for transmission and can be easily decoded by any receivers (Bourdieu 48). Here, Bourdieu regards the standardization of official language as a
product of state-building. I would like to add that the proliferation of Putonghua can also
1
See Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language in the PRC government’s website. np.11 Dec. 2007. np.Web. 14 Jun. 2015.
create an imagination of nation in return. The dominance of common language establishes an
imagined linguistic community where people realize their connection with others based on
the same code they use. In short, the unification of linguistic environment facilitates the construction of a national identity and gives rise to people’s national consciousness.
When Putonghua develops into the most widely-used language in society, it becomes
a necessity for people to master this common language for pragmatic reasons. The dominance
of Putonghua allows it to become the most popular tool for social interaction and hence
increases the social demands for its use. Putonghua not only derives political power from the
legal system, but also enjoys a high economic value in the labor market. The 2001 law puts
forward the Putonghua Proficiency Test for governmental employees and specifies its
examination criterion. As a result, teachers from primary, secondary schools and colleges,
radio and television broadcasters and hosts, along with professional actors are all required to
pass this language test in order to gain access to job opportunities (Zhang 4). By linking the
use of Putonghua with labor market, this law endows Putonghua with economic value.
However, it also reduces Putonghua to a certain competence that can be possessed by people.
The Canadian linguistic anthropologist Monica Heller points out that global economy results
in the commodification of language and identity, which renders language as a measurable
skill (474). I agree with this metaphor, for it points out how the official discourse assigns
any other languages. It is the mono-nation-building that adds external values to its national language and makes Putonghua more “prestigious” than other languages. Because of its “superior” status and practical values, Putonghua becomes an useful skill for people to pursue personal development. By regarding Putonghua competence as an access to career
opportunities, Chinese language policy further enhances the use value of Putonghua and
greatly amplifies the social demand for Putonghua learning. People’s voluntary learning
process supplements the implementation of language laws and enlarges the scope of
Putonghua use. In the long run, as Putonghua expands its dominance from the official
discourse to the private sphere, it becomes well integrated into people’s daily lives and
develops into an indispensable personal competence.
Mono-nation-building not only involves institutional measures, such as the
implementation of language laws, but also has a psychological impact on the construction of a national identity, which Anthony Smith refers to as “symbolic components” (Smith 64). It has been clear that Chinese mono-nation-building generates the ideology of “one nation with
one language”. As this ideology ensures the monopoly of its national language, Putonghua
develops into the only legitimate and the most authentic representation of Chinese identity.
Differently put, the mono-nation-building model with its monolingualism ideology
strengthens the association between Putonghua and the national identity. In that case,
it also connotes a Chinese identity which links to overseas Chinese communities. The
promotion of Putonghua in Singapore offers a telling example in terms of how the language ideology “one culture with one language” is applied to unite diaspora Chinese.
According to the Singapore’s census of population in 2010, among 5.2 million of Singapore citizens, 74% of them are Chinese while 30% are Malays and 9% are of Indian
ethnic origin. While English remains to be Singapore’s lingua franca, Mandarin (Putonghua)
is the second popular language in local society due to the dominance of Chinese group.
Sherman Tan, a Ph.D. graduate from the Australian National University, points out an
interesting phenomenon that similar to mainland China, Singapore also promotes Mandarin (Putonghua) officially whereas discourages the use of other Chinese “dialects”. What intrigues me most is not what lead to the unequal status between Putonghua and Chinese
dialects in Singapore, but the reasons why Putonghua instead of other languages is chosen to
unite Chinese group. According to Tan, the “Speak Mandarin Campaign” launched by Singapore policymakers in 1979 sought to “devalue the non-Mandarin Chinese language” whereas exclusively promote Mandarin (341). He points out that while the official discourse in Singapore depicts Mandarin as a language of “high economic advantage”, the citizens’ online discourse resists the governmental eradication of dialects and calls for more
recognition of their regional languages (S. Tan 341). Tan argues that both discourses correspond to the ideology of “one culture-one language” which perceives language as a
“possessable commodity” with specific use values (345) and view it as an indicator of speaker’s identity (348). The fact that Singapore government prioritizes Putonghua over other Chinese languages not only indicates Putonghua’s prestigious status and higher economic value, but also reveals the prevalence of the language ideology of “one nation with one national identity” in Singapore. While promoting Putonghua within its Chinese community, the Singapore government conforms to the idea that Putonghua is the only legitimate
common language for every Chinese and it better represents Chinese identity than regional
dialects do. The similarity between the language policy in China and that in Singapore points
out their common ideology of “one nation/culture, one language”, which stresses the primacy
of Putonghua and promotes it as a symbol of Chinese identity. By examining the promotion
of Putonghua outside the boundary of China, I intend to point out that Putonghua not only
serves the state’s purpose of building one united nation, but also facilitates the construction of
Chinese identity on a worldwide scale. The idea that Putonghua forms a national identity
reveals the psychological dimension of Chinese mono-nation-building, which is in line with Anderson’s theory of “imagined nation” and Smith’s notion of “symbolic components”.
1.3 Relationship Between Putonghua and Regional Languages
Chinese mono-nation-building cannot be simply defined as a process of homogenization or
While analyzing Chinese nation-building, Andrew Kipnis refers to it as a process of constructing “commonality”, which implies “neither uniformity nor the production of a political or social consensus” but further “diversification” (733). Based on a dialectic
perspective, Kipnis suggests that the normalization of Chinese education and the unification
of language lead to both homogenization and individualization, and allow for the coexistence
of argumentation and agreement (733). To buttress his argument, Kipnis uses the example of
riots in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in 2009 to emphasize that the expanding literacy and the use of Putonghua are sources of “resistance” rather than “integration” (733).To challenge the conventional perception that Chinese nation-building is a homogenizing process, Kipnis
highlights the mutual development of commonality and diversity under Chinese
nation-building model. However, I would argue that for Chinese nation-building, the goal to
maintain language uniformity is still more salient than its need to encourage diversity.
To disentangle the complexity of Chinese nation-building, I would like to focus on the
dynamic relationship between the national language and minority languages as a way to
reveal how the pendulum of Chinese language policy swings between linguistic pluralism and
monolingualism in different phases. Chinese nation-building and its language policy vary its
priorities based on the changing demands of society. In the article “The Politics of Bilingual Education in the People’s Republic of China Since 1949”, Minglang Zhou divides Chinese minorities policy into three stages: first pluralistic stage (1949-1957), the
Chinese-monopolistic stage (1958-1977) and the second pluralistic stage (1978-present)
(147). According to Zhou, the first stage took place after the failure of minorities policy in the
previous Republic era (1911-1949) and the success of the Soviet Union accommodationism
model (147). That period was characterized by its “accommodationist policy” which
recognized the equality of all ethnic groups as well as the autonomy for minorities (149).
When the battle between capitalism and communism became imminent, this “accommodationism” gave way to “integrationism”, which accelerated the assimilation of minorities into Han ethnic majority “as a short-cut to mutual integration” (150). After Chinese Communist Party changed its main task to economic development in 1978, the
pluralist approach in minorities policy became more prevalent (152). Consequently, plenty of
language legislation was issued to ensure the right of minorities to use their own language in
schools in their regions (152). Judging from the development of Chinese minorities policies,
we can see that major task of Chinese language planning lingers between diversity and
uniformity which take turns to assume a dominant role in different phases. Despite their
divergent goals, these language policies in three stages all recognize the primacy of Han
majority and Putonghua. It means that even though minorities enjoy different degrees of
rights and autonomy, they do not share the same status with Han majority. The same is true
mono-nation-building model but it lies in a secondary position, since the fulfillment of
national unity precedes the promotion of regional diversity.
The coexistence of diversity and uniformity is possible under Chinese
mono-nation-building model, precisely because the management of heterogeneity and
diversity is carefully controlled. Since the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language in 2001 plays a significant role in Chinese
language planning, I would adopt it as an example again. It is regarded as the first law to
specify the public situations where dialects can be applied (Zhang 4). However, I argue that
its emphasis on the use of regional languages is far from adequate, compared with the
overwhelming promotion of Putonghua. According to its Article 16, only four occasions for
the use of dialects are mentioned:
(1) When State functionaries really need to use them in the performance of
official duties;
(2) Where they are used in broadcasting with the approval of the broadcasting
and television administration under the State Council or of the broadcasting
and television department at the provincial level;
(3) Where they are needed in traditional operas, films and TV programs and
(4) Where their use is really required in the publishing, teaching and research.2
Although Article 16, as the only article (out of 28 Articles) that explicitly mentions the use of
dialects, has legalized the use of dialects, regional groups can only exercise their linguistic
rights in a few “necessary” situations. Since the term “necessary” is ambiguous, it renders the
actual practice problematic due to a lack of clearly-defined conditions for dialect use. Besides,
this word implies a prohibition on the use of dialects in other “unnecessary” occasions. These
restrictions and unclear conditions reveal the government’s insufficient recognition of
regional languages. In that sense, the limited practice of language diversity is neither a guarantee for the fulfillment of minorities’ rights, nor a complete realization of multilingualism. However, I would add that this restricted diversity is a necessary
compromise since it reconciles the contradiction between disintegration and integration. Also,
its incompleteness is a prerequisite for the maintenance of national unity. In other words,
Chinese mono-nation-building promotes diversity as another way to facilitate national
integration, but meanwhile it puts this practice of diversity under strict control in order to
avoid potential threats brought by the excessive amount of social heterogeneity. This partial
diversity not only allows for the coexistence of national uniformity and multiplicity, but also
points out that under Chinese mono-nation-building model, the goal for language unification
2 See the PRC government’s website for the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Standard Spoken and
surpasses that the maintenance of linguistic difference. While the mono-nation-building
model preserves the hegemony of Putonghua, the disparity between the national language and
other languages still remains salient.
Chinese mono-nation-building model leads to an asymmetrical power relationship
between Putonghua and other regional languages. As I would argue, it is not the promotion of
Putonghua but the ideology of “one nation with one national language” that leads to the
polarization of languages and threatens the status of the less dominant languages. Specifically
speaking, this language ideology, known as monolingualism that evolves from the
mono-nation-building model, refuses to accommodate the practice of multilingualism and
thus exacerbates language inequality. Minglang Zhou defines multilingualism as a language
order where the chosen language gains full access to various resources whereas other languages only have partial access (“Linguistic Diversity” 4). This idea is also applicable to Chinese monolingual environment where the national language receives much legitimate
power whilst others are less recognized. The prestige and superiority of Putonghua are not its
inherent qualities, but they are added later and legitimized by language policies. The book
Language Reform in China: Documents and Commentary points out that Peking dialect,
instead of other vernaculars, is selected to be the standard speech, because it used to be the
official language in Ming and Qing dynasty, the national language in Republic era (still used
this historical context, policymakers consider it easier and more convenient to adopt
Putonghua as the national language, since it has been the official language for a long time.
Although their criteria for selecting a national language is problematic, their language choice
reveals how Putonghua is endowed with legal force and social value through a series of
institutional practices. As Bourdieu suggests, official language, in contrast with dialects,
benefits from institutional conditions which are necessary for its imposition and the
reinforcement of its dominance (45). He also points out that the relation between school system and labor market is “decisive in devaluating dialects and establishing a new hierarchy” (Bourdieu 49). The implementation of monolingualism provides necessary institutional supports for the promotion of Putonghua, which in long term undermines the
status of dialects and retains the monopoly of Putonghua.
As the prevalence of monolingualism produces a new language hierarchy, it further
oppresses the use of regional languages and renders them in a more disadvantageous situation.
This can be exemplified by the undermined status of Cantonese. Despite its dominance in
Southeast China and overseas Cantonese communities, Cantonese lacks enough recognition and necessary institutional support. According to the article “The Status of Cantonese in the Education Policy of Hong Kong”, Cantonese shares the official status with Putonghua “only in name but not in spirit”, since “neither the promotion nor the funding approaches on Cantonese match its legal status” (Lee and Leung 1). Even though Cantonese is the mother
tongue for the locals in Guangdong Province, it is not taught as a subject in schools but only
used as a medium of instruction in a limited number of courses, such as Chinese Literacy.
Even in Hong Kong where schools enjoy more autonomy of choosing their teaching
languages, Cantonese is only involved in the aspects of listening and speaking, but not
applicable to the sections of reading and writing (Lee and Leung 8). In addition to language
education, the promotion of Cantonese in other fields of society remains at a low level. The
Standing Committee on Language Education and Research in Hong Kong organizes different
activities to encourage the use of Cantonese in TV, radio programs and schools, such as
setting up a Proper Cantonese Pronunciation Day Camp (Lee and Leung 8). However, its
promotion of Cantonese is only limited to the standardization of its pronunciation. Besides,
the absence of Cantonese writing system and the shortage of systematic linguistics and grammar training reveal a discrepancy between local people’s demand for the use of Cantonese in daily lives and the unrecognized status of Cantonese in formal occasions. In that
sense, the previously dominant status of Cantonese is severely disrupted, not only due to the
large-scaled promotion of Putonghua, but mainly because the prevailing ideology of
monolingualism tends to maintain the purity and monopoly of the national language whilst
discourages the use of other languages.
However, the withdrawal of regional languages from the official discourse does not
civic space where there is less direct governmental intervention. Sociolinguistics professor
Xuesong Gao indicates that the commercial and entertaining values of regional languages
promote their application, for instance the use of Cantonese in television broadcasting (11).
The flourish of Canto-pop in Hong Kong best illustrates the revival of local culture as well as
rise of regional languages. Professor Wai-chung Ho who specializes in sociology of music
points out that the localization of Hong Kong popular music reveals a struggle for the
building of local culture and the pursuit of a sense of authenticity (146). Since the 1970s,
Canto-pop started to thrive in diverse cultural domains, which can be demonstrated by its
prevalence in the local radio programs, the burgeoning of Canto-pop music awards and the
blossoming of Cantonese concert business in Hong Kong (Ho 147). In face of the rise of Mandarin culture, Hong Kong’s promotion of Cantonese culture is not only a resistance to the hegemony of this national culture, but also a strategy to reconstruct its local image on the
global stage. Tim Oakes suggests that efforts to build local culture reveal the goal of
regionalism to access a broader political and economic power (Ho 4). In that case,
localization does not contradict with the development of nation-building, but on the contrary
Chapter Two: Hong Kong Identity and Chineseness
2.1 Introduction
Hong Kong identity dilemma results from a combined process of colonization,
nationalization and globalization. The construction of a self-defined Hong Kong identity can
be seen as a process of localization that protects local identity from encroachment and
reaffirms the uniqueness of local culture. Ever since 1842, when the British government took over Hong Kong from China in the First Opium War, Hong Kong people’s identity anxiety had emerged. Sarah Y.T. Mak, a Ph.D. graduate from the Politics Department in University
of California, suggests that the British colonial government carried out a “laissez-faire and
non-interventionist policy” (Mak 22), which allowed Hong Kong people to break loose from
their colonial identity. However, without a national identity, Hong Kong identity still lacked
legitimacy. The year 1997, when Hong Kong was handed over from the British colonist to
the PRC government, marked a significant change in Hong Kong’s regime, which indicated
an uncertain future and exacerbated Hong Kong’s identity crisis. While Chinese
mono-nation-building reinforced its centralized regime to unify the nation, Hong Kong
people were worried that they would lose their previous freedom and rights under the control
of the authoritarian PRC government. The Tiananmen massacre in 1989 in Beijing led to a
violent suppression of the pro-democracy protests and intensified the conflict between the
Kong’s ambivalence towards mainland China and its fear for an uncertain future increased people’s identity anxiety. Besides, globalization, which accelerates social mobility and generates a trend of deterritorialization, calls the geographical identity into question. In the
context of global migration, the physical boundary of Hong Kong identity was constantly
interrogated and disrupted by a large influx of migrants. There were mainly two migration
waves in Hong Kong in the last century: one took place in the 1980s, after the Tiananmen
Square incident in 1989, which witnessed a large number of mainland people left for Hong Kong mainly to avoid political prosecution; the other one was before Hong Kong’s change of sovereignty in 1997, where many Hong Kong citizens migrated to other countries, such as
Canada, Australia and the United States. The frequent trans-bordered migration continued to
challenge the stability of Hong Kong identity. Facing this identity dilemma, Hong Kong
constructs its own local identity that differentiates itself from the national identities, namely
British identity and Chinese identity. The formation of Hong Kong identity can be regarded
as a regional struggle to fulfill self-affirmation and pursue local uniqueness.
In the previous chapter, we have discussed that the conflict between Putonghua and
Cantonese is not merely a language issue, but it also reveals a deeper tension between
nation-building and the development of localization. To further shed light on the nation-local
relationship, I will focus on a Hong Kong film Comrades: Almost a Love Story (1996) and
This chapter will address two essential questions as follows: what distinguish Hong Kong
identity from the mainland identity? What is the relation between the Hong Kong identity and
the national identity known as “Chinese”? Here, we will not discuss the language tension
between Putonghua and Cantonese per se, but instead consider it as a reflection of the
correlation between nation-building and localization.
2.2 The Formation of Hong Kong Identity
The construction of Hong Kong identity is key for our understanding of Hong Kong’s
relationship with mainland China. The Hong Kong film Comrades: Almost a Love Story
(1996), while depicting two mainlanders succeed in being Hong Kongers, reveals how Hong
Kong identity both converges with and diverges from mainland identity. This movie, directed
by Peter Chan, was produced and screened in Hong Kong cinema in 1996, one year before Hong Kong’s handover to the PRC in 1997. At that time, a considerate number of mainlanders migrated to Hong Kong to seek a better life. Meanwhile, many local people
chose to leave for other countries before the year 1997. Set in the context of Hong Kong’s
two migration waves in the 1980s and the 1990s, the film depicts the changing relationships
between two mainlanders as they first migrate to Hong Kong and then settle down in New
York. Confronted with the same identity dilemma and marginal lives, these two mainlanders,
from good friends to intimate partners. But before long, they break up with each other, due to their divergent goals: Xiaojun’s dream is to marry his fiancee Xiao Ting in Hong Kong, whereas Qiao wants to become a successful Hong Konger and earns money to build a new
house for her parents. Though they both realize their Hong Kong dreams in the end, their
sense of loss is not alleviated thereafter, but instead becomes more intensified. Xiaojun puts
an end to his marriage with Ting, since he feels guilty of lying to her about his romance with
Qiao. Meanwhile, Qiao becomes a successful real-estate shareholder with the help of her new
boyfriend Pao, a powerful mob boss in local society. But when Pao becomes a target of local
police, Qiao chooses to leave Hong Kong with him to avoid further trouble. As the second
migration wave sweeps through Hong Kong before 1997, Xiaojun migrates to New York to
seek better career development whilst Qiao also illegally moves there with Pao. Their rootless
lives in that foreign country exacerbate their identity anxiety and thus reconnect them
together. In the end, their favorite song, Sweetness [Tian Mi Mi] performed by a famous
Chinese singer Teresa Tang, offers them a sense of belonging and finally reunites them in the
street of New York when they stop by the same video shop watching the death news of Tang.
The film blurs the line between Hong Kongers and mainlanders by allowing two
protagonists to obtain two identities at the same time. This precisely points out the ambiguity
of Hong Kong identity and explains why Hong Kong needs to clarify its boundary by
the comparison with mainland Chinese, then what are these distinctions between Hong Kong
identity and mainland identity? It is noteworthy that Hong Kong identity is not a fixed term,
but rather fluid, discursive and multifaceted. Mak offers an comprehensive view of the
multiplicity and complexity of Hong Kong identity. She suggests four major variants of Hong
Kong identity: Chinese identity, regional identity, post-colonial identity and global identity
(Mak 24-41). Here, this Chinese identity variant underlines Hong Kong’s linkage with
mainland China whereas other three variants celebrate its cultural, economic and political
differences from mainland China. These unique features of Hong Kong identity result from
the multiple processes of modernization, de-colonization and globalization.
Hong Kong’s modernization procedure enlarges its gap with mainland China. Early in
the 1950s, Hong Kong already underwent a process of industrialization driven by the rise of
its textile exports and manufacturing industries. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform
and the establishment of Special Zone accelerated Hong Kong’s modernization process. In the film, Xiaojun experiences a “modern shock” in Hong Kong as he encounters all kinds of “new phenomenons” which are absent in his hometown, such as skyscrapers and cellphones. His surprise implies the economic disparity between the underdeveloped mainland and highly modernized Hong Kong at that time. Hong Kong’s modern features celebrate its economic prosperity and reinforce people’s pride of their local identity.
Besides, Hong Kong’s post-colonial identity also adds to the distinctiveness of Hong Kong identity. Unlike other colonial states in Asia, Hong Kong’s anti-colonial nationalist sentiment is “relatively muted” (Mak 34). As the comparative literature professor Ackbar Abbas points out, Hong Kong is “not in a dependent subaltern position but is in fact more advanced . . . than the colonizing state” (Abbas 5-6). On the one hand, Hong Kong takes advantage of the British colonial legacy to maintain its superiority when competing with mainland China. On the other hand, Hong Kong’s de-colonization process gives rise to its local awareness and allows for its independence from British colonial rule. Taking Xiaojun’s
aunt Rosie for example, she spends her whole life indulging in her good memories of William
Holden, a western actor who stars in the film Love Is a Many Splendid Thing in Hong Kong. Her love for William indicates Hong Kong’s remaining fantasy for their past colonial times. However, Rosie’s obsession is regarded as outdated and mentally insane in the eyes of her friends. This change reveals that the prestige of Hong Kong’s colonial identity is undermined
by the de-colonization process whereas its post-colonial identity is more celebrated.
Furthermore, Hong Kong’s global link also demonstrates its superiority. In the film,
the ability to speak English is considered as an unique feature that distinguishes Hong
Kongers from mainlanders. The western symbols in the movie, such as Mickey Mouse and
the Statue of Liberty, also highlight Hong Kong’s global perspective. All these variants of
