Bosnia and Herzegovina:
How friends became
enemies
A case study research on the influence of the ICTY on the
process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Jody Bos
Faculty of Social Science
University of Amsterdam
Section of International Relations
Cover illustration
Drawing made during the ICTY Outreach workshop at the 10
thannual Sarajevo
Kids Festival held in June 2013
Bosnia and Herzegovina:
How friends became
enemies
A case study research on the influence of the ICTY on the
process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Jody Bos (10912169)
Amsterdam, January 2016
Master Thesis
Master International Relations
University of Amsterdam
Preface and Acknowledgements
This research forms the magnum opus of my Master’s degree in International Relations at the University of Amsterdam. This thesis allowed me to bring many of the acquired insights, interests, skills and fascinations together in one piece of work. This research hence became a reflection of my interest in the social relations in the Balkans. Due to personal experience, the fact that the open and hospitable people living in this region were able to be at war with each other - with their friends and their neighbours - only because of a difference in their ethnical background, has always fascinated me. To explore this subject matter in greater depth has therefore been an interesting process, which I have undergone with great pleasure.
This thesis would not have come about without the support of many others. First and foremost, I would like to thank my interviewees. Firstly Mr. Finci for giving me insights on how to combine the work of the ICTY with the process of reconciliation in the specific region of the Balkans. Secondly I would like to thank Mr. Veljacic, Mrs. Mrkela, Mr. Basić, Mr. Harbas and Mr. Durakovic for sharing their life stories with me and for their warm welcome. Without their stories and views on the war I would not have been able to write this thesis. I would also like to show my appreciation to the supervision of Dr. Marcel Hanegraaff, who supported me where needed in the process of writing this thesis.
Abstract
This thesis explores the influence of the ICTY on the process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As research shows, justice is indispensable for reconciliation (Orentlicher, 2010; Brouneus, 2007; Bar-Tal, 2000). By looking at 4 cases or events influenced by the ICTY, this assumption will be measured. The process of reconciliation is measured by the means of the reconciliation pyramid by Auerbach (2009), which is presented as a tool for exploring reconciliation processes, as it is a benchmark by which can be measured how far the different sides in a conflict are removed from each other. This paper draws upon both in-depth interviews as well as an extensive literature review. The analysis shows that, 20 years after war, the ICTY did not ignite the engine of reconciliation; attempts to start this process have been made but were not influential as of yet. A general division dominates the tension, strengthened by the current political situation which is a reflection of the ethnical division. Up until today, it can be concluded there is no reconciliation between the different ethnical groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it is to be noted that - like the Nuremberg trial - two generations from now this could be changed for the better.
Table of contents
Preface and Acknowledgements………...5
Abstract………...6
Table of contents………...7
Figures and Tables………9
Chapter 1: Introduction………...………10
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework………...15
2.1: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina………..15
2.2: The concept of reconciliation………..18
2.3. National- and meta –narratives………..…….19
2.4: The role of national narratives in identity conflicts………...20
2.5: The reconciliation pyramid………...23
2.6: The seven stages of the reconciliation pyramid………..25
Chapter 3: Methodology………..29 3.1: Research design………...29 3.1.1. Method……….29 3.1.2. In-depth interviews………..29 3.2: Validity……….………...30 3.3: Conceptualization……….………...31
3.3.1: ‘Influence of the ICTY’……….………..31
3.3.2: ‘Change in the process of reconciliation’………32
3.4: Resources………...32
3.5: Justification of the measurement points………..33
Chapter 4: Empirical analysis……….35
4.1: The case of the ICTY against Tadić………...35
4.2: The cases about what happened in Central Bosnia……….37
4.3: The case of the ICTY against Slobodan Milošević ………40
4.4: The death of Slobodan Milošević before getting sentenced………...43
Chapter 5: Analysis of the reconciliation pyramid………45
5.1: Current nationalism and how it influences politics and reconciliation…..…..………45
5.2: The expression of empathy, responsibility and apology and the way this influences reconciliation………...48
5.3: The current degree of reconciliation and the role of the ICTY in this…………...51
Chapter 6: Conclusion and discussion………...53
5.1: Conclusion………...53
5.2: Discussion and implications for further research………...55
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: The 7 stages of the Reconciliation Pyramid. ……….24 Table 1: Actual influence of the ICTY on the process of reconciliation per case………53
Chapter 1: Introduction
The Yugoslav wars were a series of violent ethnic conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia that took place between 1991 and 2001. These wars accompanied the breakup of the country, when its constituent republics declared their independence. However, the issues of ethnic minorities in the new countries were still unresolved by the time the republics were recognized internationally. The wars are generally considered to be a series of separate but related military conflicts which occurred in, and affected, almost all the countries emerging from the former Yugoslav republic. The aftermath of the Yugoslav wars is still present after more than a decade, resulting in continued frequent news coverage (Kerr, 2004).
Most recently, the death of Dušan Dunjić has been reported, who was to testify in the case against Ratko Mladić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – henceforth referred to as the ICTY - in The Hague on the 22nd of October 2015. The case of both Mladić, a former general of the Serbian army who is being held responsible for the genocide in the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in 1995, and Karadžić, who is charged with orchestrating the entire war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and all the crimes that happened there, including genocide, are still in progress. At the same time, the Mothers of Srebrenica – an activist and lobbying group who represent the 6.000 relatives of victims of Srebrenica – are holding the Dutch state and the UN responsible for the massacre and the fall of the enclave and demand compensation (NRC, 2014). These ongoing cases make the Yugoslav wars a continued presence in the lives of people nowadays, with questions that as of yet remain to be answered. Most important is the question how it was possible that a country in which different ethnicities seemed to be living in peace together, saw that peace to turn into violent hostility overnight.
The complicated situation in former Yugoslavia, in which national consciousness has always played a role, is one of the reasons for the escalation. With the death of the Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, also came the end of the state’s preserved stability, giving nationalism the chance to emerge faster than ever. When the Republic of Yugoslavia started falling apart not much later, the same occurred for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that has often been referred to as ‘Yugoslavia in miniature’, due to its variety in ethnic backgrounds (Tromp, 2002). The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that followed is the research topic of this thesis.
As research generally shows, states that have once experienced armed conflict, particularly a civil war, are more apt to undergo such violence again (Long & Brecke, 2003; Hartzell, 1999; Licklider, 1995; Walter, 1997; Werner, 1999). The high recidivism rate among civil war nations means that efforts to promote reconciliation are at the forefront of international attempts at postwar peace-building (Hampson in Meernik, 2005). But how should the international world deal with the atrocities of the past in a country emerging from internal conflict? Should there be tribunals to punish perpetrators? After all, as Orentlicher (2010) puts it; ‘without the influence of a Tribunal, collective responsibility, a primitive and archaic concept will gain the upper hand. Entire groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing and the wanton destruction of cities and villages.’ The history of the Yugoslav region
clearly shows that clinging to feelings of collective responsibility easily degenerates into resentment, hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further violence and new crimes. There is a strong consensus that, as Bar-Tal puts it, ‘justice is indispensable for reconciliation’ (Bar-Tal in Brounéus, 2007). In addition, one often hears the refrain ‘no justice, no peace’ from advocates, academics and practitioners (ibid.). But how do we define reconciliation?
Reconciliation has been the subject of research several times now. The problem with earlier reconciliation studies was that scholars seemed to be torn between two schools of thought. One claimed reconciliation to be a difficult and delicate process that is not simply a matter of the head. In this school the emotional, warm, healing aspects are highlighted (e.g. Montville, 1993; Staub, 1998, 2000, 2006). The other argued that the exalted goal of reconciliation would be better served if stripped-down from its warm, sentimental wrapping and presented in a more political, realistic context (e.g. Arendt, 1958; Dwyer, 1999; Eisiskovits, 2004; Long & Brecke, 2003).
Interestingly, these different schools of thought sometimes manifest themselves within the same person. An example of this is Michael Ignatief, an astute observer of the international scene with a specific focus on interethnic conflicts. Ignatief is by no means a naïve idealist. In his book, Warrior’s Honor (1999) he expressed a deep conviction that ethnic groups torn apart by hatred and violence have to undergo mutual mourning and consolation processes. As he said:
‘Without an apology, without recognition of what happened, the past cannot return to its place as the past […] Reconciliation built on mutual apology […] has no change against vengeance, unless it can replace the respect entailed in vengeance with rituals in which communities once in war learn to mourn their dead together’ (Ignatieff in Auerbach, 2009).
Several years later, and possibly as a result of his work in preparing the report on the Balkan War with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ignatieff had become a much more sober realist. He listed all the obstacles encountered on the way to forgiveness and reconciliation and proposed a sharp distinction between on the one hand warm, sentimental processes such as reconciliation, shared historical truth and forgiveness, and on the other hand cold, realistic, rational routes such as coexistence based on accepting the world as it actually is. He firmly recommends avoiding the former and adhering to the latter (ibid.).
Ignatieff is not the only influential author on this topic. Several other scholars argue that apology and forgiveness, as well as remorse and empathy should be seen as part of the political process that leads to reconciliation (Amstutz, 2005). This research paper echoes this argument but also emphasizes that reconciliation will not be achieved without addressing the cognitive, that is relatively cold, components of intractable conflicts, such as ‘societal beliefs’ (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004) and especially national narratives (Kelman, 2001). It is argued that if one party does not have the slightest knowledge of the others’ narratives of sufferance and victimhood, it cannot acknowledge or accept these narrative as legitimate, let alone feel empathy, assume responsibility or offer restitution for it. Genuine apology towards the other is
deemed a difficult but essential condition for reaching full reconciliation. In order to find out the stage of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this thesis follows the steps described by the reconciliation pyramid by Auerbach (2009).
The article in which the reconciliation pyramid is presented uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to explain how this pyramid works. When applied to this conflict, the reconciliation pyramid expresses that even though there have been several attempts at creating peace and reconciliation form higher levels of office – for example the Camp David episode –the people are apparently not ready yet to reconcile on a personal level. As Govier (in Auerbach, 2009) states: ‘While some people may have overcome some psychological barriers, others are still buried in their identity-territory nexus dominated by the victimhood there. For them, giving up the victimhood narrative seems incompatible with survival itself.’ The reconciliation pyramid provides some interesting insights about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its pathway towards reconciliation. Apart from the use of the pyramid in this conflict, Darling (2014) uses the pyramid to measure the degree of reconciliation between communities in Northern Ireland.
This method of measuring the process of reconciliation has however never been used in the Balkans, let alone Bosnia and Herzegovina. To see whether or not Bosnia and Herzegovina follows a similar pathway towards reconciliation gives a lot of information about reconciliation processes in general and can therefore yield very interesting results. Another reason for using this particular model is the fact that most of the research on reconciliation seems somewhat removed from the actual lives of the citizens. The reconciliation pyramid really focuses on the people’s point of view and their actions towards one another, which brings helpful insights pertaining to unraveling the complicated situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina between its three different ethnical groups (Rime at all., 2011; Staub, 2013; Brouneus, 2007; Hesse & Post, 1999; Teitel, 1999; Meernik, 2005).
The Reconciliation Pyramid is a tool for studying the psycho-political processes involved in climbing the rungs of an imaginary reconciliation ladder. Seven stages are characterized. The first stage is to get acquainted with the clashing narratives, relating to the core issues of the conflict. Acquaintance leads to the following stage, namely full acknowledgement of what happened. The following stage includes expression of empathy towards the other, following which, due to the feeling of empathy, it is assumed that one feels responsible for the plight of the other. In the next stage, material restitution is given after which follows request of forgiveness. The process reaches its peak when the two sides consider replacing their old, ethno-centric narratives with new, integrated narratives. In the last stage, full reconciliation is reached (Auerbach, 2009).
This research paper examines the process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the means of applying the principles of the reconciliation pyramid to specific moments and events, influential enough to have probably played an important role in the process of reconciliation. Firstly, we examine the first case of the ICTY against Tadić, who was sentenced on July 14th, 1997 to 20 years imprisonment for crimes committed in the camps of Omarksa, Trnopolje and the town of Kozarac. Secondly, we apply the reconciliation pyramid to the major cases dealing with the events in central Bosnia. These are the cases against the Bosnian Croats (the HVO) and
the cases against the Bosnian Muslim army leaders, Delić and Halilović. Thirdly, the case against Slobodan Milošević, often referred to as case of the century. Lastly, the death of Slobodan Milošević. The fact that his case remains unresolved still plays a huge role in a lot of people’s lives (Finci, appendix 2).
This research paper analyzes the manner of justice provided by the ICTY in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One must wonder to what extent legal justice influences the process towards reconciliation. Will the process accelerate as those who were most responsible for the violence and crimes are judged and punished, or will it have an adverse effect, as individuals believe that their communities are being singled out for prosecution or that their former enemies are not being punished enough? Or, could the effects of legal justice provided by international institutions be negligible or irrelevant to peoples’ lives? (Meernik, 2005). Taking the above into consideration, this leads to the following research question:
To what extend does the creation of Justice by the ICTY contribute to the process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
In order to find out the actual stage of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina twenty years after the war’s end, in-depth interviews were held with Bosnian people, who were in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war. The different respondents together represent all the different ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, either being Bosnian Serbian, Bosnian Croatian or Bosnian Muslim. In addition, an extensive literature review complements the data gathered from the interviews.
This research paper will begin by outlining the Theoretical Framework, in chapter 2, which will provide a further description of the case, delineating the war in former Yugoslavia and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the terminological part of this chapter describes the concepts of identity conflicts, (national/meta) narratives and reconciliation. Lastly, the reconciliation pyramid by Auerbach (2009) will be presented and implicated. Chapter 3 describes the Methodological part of this thesis. The research’s design and validity, its conceptualization and resources and the justification of the selected data will be documented. Chapter 4 sees a shift from the theoretical part to the empirical part of this thesis. This chapter will test the aforementioned cases and events by the means of the reconciliation pyramid. Subsequently, having determined the influence of the ICTY on the appointed cases, chapter 5 will juxtapose this with the current level of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the means of the reconciliation pyramid. Finally the conclusion endeavours to answer the research question and discuss the results, followed by recommendations for further research on this subject manner. This paper aims to answer the question to what extend the pursuit of justice by the ICTY contributes to the process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is academically relevant as this paper provides an overview of the extensive literature on this subject matter. The social relevance lies in the fact that the current situation in our world is one containing ethnic conflicts in the Ukraine, religious fundamentalism in the Middle East and Africa, gross violations of human rights which can eventually all lead to a situation in
which countries could be torn apart. The question whether the pursuit of international criminal justice can prove to be a suitable answer to the spreading of ethnic conflicts, virulent nationalism and religious fundamentalism - which could lead to widespread and gross violations of human rights (Franke, 1998) – is one that is morally important to answer. If a sense of justice that satisfies all parties cannot be achieved in the Balkans, on account of the many difficulties, one might wonder if the international community could provide it at all. (Meernik, 2005).
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
This chapter will first provide a further description of the case, outlining the war in the former Yugoslavian republic and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently, paragraph two will examine the concept of reconciliation. In order to explain reconciliation as a deep process, the concepts of conflict of identity and that of national and metanarratives need to be explained. Following that, in order to see how these concepts relate to reality, the role of national narratives in identity conflict will be described in paragraph 3. Having put forward the terminological framework, paragraph 4 will put this information into practice by explaining the reconciliation pyramid by Auerbach (2009). Lastly, the different stages of this pyramid are to be discussed followed by the assumptions that are made in this chapter.
2.1 The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The former Yugoslavian republic has always known a turbulent history as far as the relations between different ethnicities in the region are concerned. In order to understand how it was possible for the cruelties of the Yugoslav wars to happen here, we would need to go back in time to the period immediately following the First World War, in 1918. After experiencing all kinds of violence people were capable of during this war, the Big Three - France, the United Kingdom and the United States – tried to create a new world order in Paris. Under the guise of self-determination for all people, they set new national borders as determined with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In the Balkans however, this proved to be more problematic than expected (Zwaan, 2001).
The new borders put in place by the end of the war had made it so that different ethnicities were now joined in one state, causing the rise of national consciousness. The concept of national consciousness has always caused trouble in the Balkans, leading to periods of unrest. The so-called South Slavic national question or Yugoslav national question describes the development of national consciousness in the region. This topic is of great importance for the history of the 20th century and for the creation of the Yugoslav state, since there had been two opposing concepts of state ever since its inception. The first concept is a product of nationalist ideologies and can be summed up as the pursuit of separate Serbian and Croatian nation-states within their historical and ethnic boundaries. The second concept stems from the South Slavic Unitarism, which called for the formation of a joint-state (Tromp, 2002).
Over time the former Yugoslavian republic has known a history of balancing between the aforementioned concepts of either being separated nation-states or being a joint state. However, in 1954, the region united itself in a joint-state, this time as a communist federation under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The official name of the state was initially the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, but that name changed in 1963 to the ‘Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, which would continue to exist for more than 45 years. For 35 years Tito was the face of Yugoslavia and the one responsible for putting Yugoslavia on the world map. More importantly, Tito preserved stability in former Yugoslavia, holding the state together with an iron hand (ibid.).
On the one hand a form of stability was maintained through ordinary repression, but on the other hand a certain degree of autonomy was given to its states, also
contributing to this era of stability. In other world regions, members of groups at times together scapegoat a smaller group in order to enhance their innate connections and effective feelings, to protect own identity, and to gain a new world view. They create ideological visions that give their own group hopes for the future and are destructive in such a way that they actively distinguish and identify enemies who stand in their way. Examples of such ideologies include nationalism (Staub, 2013). A clever strategy called brotherhood and unity ensured that this ideology would not gain the upper hand in former Yugoslavia. No ethnicity was left out or treated like a minority and expressions of nationalism were prohibited. As Tito said: ‘No one is better or more valuable than another, whether Serb, Croat, or Slovene this does not play a role. One should not rake up old troubles.’ As leader of the partisan army and in order to keep the harmony, Tito himself was the only one who was truly supranational and stood above all parties (ibid.). Seven years later, after the death of Tito in 1980, the country was still united and Tito’s heirs kept ethnic hatreds buried. Yugoslavia’s tragedy began when in the republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, the right hand man of the president of Yugoslavia Ivan Stambolić, turned against him. The war that followed lasted for over ten years. It violated human rights in large numbers, leaving behind a region torn apart by civil war. The period of unsettlement began in Kosovo, Serbia’s poorest province, bordering Albania. In 1987 president Stambolić sent Milošević to this region to calm an ethnic conflict that had been brewing. The local communists, mainly ethnic Albanians, faced a challenge from a group of nationalist Serbs. Instead of keeping the calm and unity, Milošević decided to take sides with the Serb nationalists and gave in to Serbian frustration. By abusing these sentiments, Milošević gained huge Serbian support in a short amount of time, leading towards a majority for him in the Yugoslav government. It was this embrace of nationalism by Milošević in Kosovo that was later seen as the instigator for all the wars in Yugoslavia (Percy & Lapping, 1995).
Following the upsurge of Serbian power in the Yugoslav government, national sentiments started to rise in the other federal states. In the early 1990’s, these states started to secede themselves from the Republic of Yugoslavia. Both Croatia and Slovenia succeeded in their attempts, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia who were less successful. Other states, such as Kosovo, prepared for similar initiatives and set up underground governments. Here it became apparent again that divisions within the Republic of Yugoslavia thwarted the creation of a strong and greater Serbia, leading towards more frustration among the ethnical Serbs all over Yugoslavia (ibid.).
When the Bosnian state government proclaimed its independence in 1992, a civil war began. While the Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić tried to break apart Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian army encircled the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. Over the next several years Bosnian Serb forces, with the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army, targeted both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat civilians, committing grievous crimes resulting in the deaths of about 100,000 people by 1995 – 80 percent of which were Bosnian Muslims. It had been the worst act of genocide since the Nazi regime’s destruction of 6 million European Jews during World War II (Bek, 2011.).
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, three ethnicities were represented, of which Muslims formed the largest single population group by 1971. However, more and more Serbs and Croats emigrated over the next two decades, and in a 1991 census Bosnia’s population of some 4 million registered as 44 percent Bosnian Muslims, 31 percent Serb, and 17
percent Croatian. This divide was also visible in Bosnian politics. Elections held in late 1990 resulted in a coalition government, split between parties representing the three ethnicities roughly in proportion with the populations, led by the Muslim Alija Izetbegović. As tensions built both inside and outside the country, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and his Serbian Democratic Party withdrew from government and set up their own Serbian National Assembly. On March the third, 1992 after a referendum vote, which was blocked by Karadžić’s party in several Serb-populated areas, President Izetbegović proclaimed Bosnia’s independence (Percy & Lapping, 1995).
Far from seeking independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs wanted to be part of a dominant Serbian state in the Balkans - the Greater Serbia that Serbian separatists had long pictured. As mentioned above, two days after the United States and the European Community, forerunner to the European Union, recognized Bosnia’s independence in early May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces with the backing of Milošević and the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army launched their offensive with a bombardment of Bosnia’s capital, Sarajevo. They attacked Zvornik, Foca, and Visegrad, Muslim-dominated towns in eastern Bosnia, forcibly expelling Bosniak civilians from the region in a brutal process that was later classified as ethnic cleansing. It differs from genocide in that its primary goal is the deportation of a group of people from a geographical area rather than the actual physical destruction of that group, even though the same methods–including murder, rape, torture and forcible displacement–can occur (Bek, 2011).
Though Bosnian government forces tried to defend the territory, either with or without the help of the Croatian army, Bosnian Serb forces were in control of nearly three-quarters of the country by the end of 1993, and Karadžić’s party had set up their own Republika Srpska in the east. Most of the Bosnian Croats had left the country, while a profound part of the Muslim population had resorted to relocating to smaller settlements and towns. Several peace proposals between a Croatian-Muslim federation and Bosnian Serbs failed as the Serbs refused to give up any territory. The United Nations (U.N.) chose not to intervene in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but a campaign spearheaded by its High Commissioner for Refugees did provide humanitarian aid to the many displaced and injured victims (ibid.).
The influence of the international world expanded rapidly in July 1995 when the Serbs attacked Srebrenica. Three towns in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde remained under control of the Bosnian government. The U.N. had declared these enclaves to be safe havens, which were disarmed and protected by international peacekeeping forces. However, on July the 11th, Bosnian Serb forces advanced on Srebrenica, overwhelming a battalion of Dutch peacekeeping forces stationed there. Serbian forces subsequently separated the Muslim civilians living there, putting the women and girls on buses and sending them to Bosnian-held territory. Some of the women were sexually assaulted or raped, while the men and boys, who were forced to remain behind, were killed immediately or transported by buss to mass killing sites. Estimates of the amount of Muslims killed by Serb forces at Srebrenica vary from around 7,000 to more than 8,000 (ibid.).
After Bosnian Serb forces captured Zepa within a month afterwards and set off a bomb in a crowded Sarajevo market, the international community began to respond more forcefully to the ongoing conflict and its growing civilian death toll. In August 1995, after
the refusal of the Serbs to comply with a U.N. ultimatum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined efforts with Bosnian and Croatian forces. Together they mounted a ground offensive, following three weeks of bombing Bosnian Serb positions. With Serbia’s economy stagnated by U.N. trade sanctions and its military forces under assault in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milošević agreed to enter negotiations that October, after three years of warfare. U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 - which included Izetbegović, Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman - resulted in the creation of a federalized Bosnia and Herzegovina divided between a Croat-Muslim federation and a Serb republic (Percy & Lapping, 1995).
Even though the Dayton Pact was signed in 1995, this did not result in peace in the region. While the war had officially ended, the hatred between the different ethnicities did not diminish. In order to establish peace, and for all parties to be able to share the same narrative in the end, the process of reconciliation needed to take place. As proposed in this article, despite the fact that providing reconciliation is not one of the objectives of the ICTY, as they primarily deal with legal accusations and establishing guilt or innocence, it can be assumed to be one of the side effects of their actions (appendix 2). Therefore, the establishment of the ICTY has played an important role in the process of reconciliation. On 25. May 1993, before the signing of the Dayton pact, the UN Security Council took the extraordinary and unprecedented step of deciding to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a mechanism for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security (Kerr, 2004). In order to determine the actual influence of the Yugoslavia tribunal on the process of reconciliation, the theoretical background needs to be explored. In order to do this, we need to start with the concept of reconciliation.
2.2. The concept of reconciliation
Reconciliation in itself is a complicated, highly contested term. Some people see it simply as coexistence, but others as respect or mutual forgiveness. Kriesberg (1998a), one of the leading authors on reconciliation, views the concept as a ‘relatively peaceful relationship, established after a rupture in relations involving one-sided or mutual inflection of extreme injury’. She outlines the steps taken by former rivals on their way to reconciliation. Firstly, people should acknowledge the reality of the terrible acts that were perpetrated. Secondly there should be acceptance of the occurrences, with compassion for those who committed injurious conduct, as well as acknowledging each other’s sufferings. Those involved should believe that their injustices are being addressed and anticipate mutual security and well-being (ibid.). This thesis follows Kriesberg’s conceptualization of reconciliation as a long and deep process, which aims at radical changes in the hearts and minds of the communities involved in an identity conflict. According to this approach reconciliation goes beyond the formal intergovernmental agreements that merely focus on the material aspects of a conflict and are arrived at through ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘conflict management’ (ibid.). In order to describe and understand this process, we need to start at the beginning, and identify the sort of conflict we are dealing with.
Conflicts in general, whether between individuals or collectives, break out when basic needs are unmet and when two or more sides to the conflict have good reasons –at
least in their own eyes – to believe that the opposing party or parties are responsible for this deprivation. Human needs include both basic needs like food and security, and more elevated needs such as belonging, recognition and individual as well as collective identity (Ross, 2007). Studying conflicts form this angle, there are two types of conflict to be distinguished: material conflict and identity conflict. In the case of material conflicts, the dispute is mainly about fundamental concerns, such as territory, defensive borders and natural resources. Efforts at settling such conflicts are usually negotiated between formal representatives of the warring sides, sometimes with the mediation of third parties, often governmental or international agents. The efforts are mainly aimed at satisfying the material aspects of the two sides, guaranteeing safe and recognized borders, assuring the supply of oil, gas and basic commodities. Little attention is given to identity issues, since they have not played a crucial role in the evolution and dynamics of the conflict in general (ibid.).
In the case of identity conflicts, it is the need for identity that lies at the centre of the conflict. This type of conflict breaks out when at least one party feels that another has infracted its identity and denied it its rights as a legitimate player in the international arena. The emphasis on the subjective aspect of the identity conflict does not mean that there is no objective factual base to the abstract concepts of negative feelings, emotions, or beliefs entertained by either side in relation to the other. Rather, it highlights those factors that explain the depth and intensity of the mutual hostility in an identity conflict. A collective identity is founded upon and nourished by national narratives which are about the past and present. About glories and about traumas, where the antagonist was either defeated - in case of glories - or victorious - in traumas. These are the building blocks of national/ethnic identity. Their centrality in identity conflicts suggest that they can be – and usually are – barriers to the process of reconciliation between the torn apart rivals (Ross, 2007). However, they can also trigger this process of reconciliation. This could mean that if one wishes to unearth the concealed positive potential of narratives, one should differentiate between the basic narratives held by each side, which results in metanarratives. Metanarratives are more deeply rooted in the national psyche and are therefore more resistant to change. National narratives, although rooted in the more abstract metanarratives, are based more on facts than on feelings and are therefore potentially more flexible (ibid.).
2.3. National- and meta -narratives
Reconciliation as defined by Kriesberg (1998), cannot be achieved without confronting identity issues and the narratives on which they are built. In the following section metanarratives and national narratives will be presented and their role in reconciliation will be discussed.
A narrative is ‘… a story, and stories tell about things that have happened or are happening to people, […]. It is a story that contains a sequence of events, which means that narratives take place within or over […] some kind of period’ (Berger, 1997). In order to be powerful and convincing, a narrative should be coherent and consistent. Narratives contain five interrelated components, described by the following W questions: Who are the heroes of the story? What happened? When, where and why did it happen? The relationship between these five components lends coherence and strength to the
narrative. The strength of the national narratives are important for this research since, in countries where civil war has taken place, the different ethnicities have different national narratives which tend to be very strong. In order to reach full reconciliation, these different – often strong - national narratives should eventually change into shared narratives (ibid.).
Narratives in general, and particularly national narratives in an identity conflict, are not merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real events in their aspect as developmental processes. They rather entail ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even political implications. The epistemic, ontological, and ideological meaning of such narratives is derived from metanarratives. The term Meta stands for ‘a nature of a higher order of a more fundamental kind’. Metanarratives are stories about stories. They present national stories within a wider, holistic scheme. Local and national metanarratives still heavily influence ethnic groups nowadays (Loyotard, 1988, 1992) and the point can be made that the impact of national metanarratives is even greater and more evident when ethnic groups are in the process of building or rebuilding their national identity after a conflict (Loyotard, 1988, 1992).
The crucial role of national metanarratives as sources of identity and national legitimacy makes them the basis of competing claims to territory, patrimony and resources. In this way they contribute to the progression of normal conflicts of interests into cultural wars (Smith in Auerbach, 2009). The conflicting claims in identity conflicts are not, or at least not solely, motivated by demands of territory, water or oil, which are naturally divisible and therefore relatively easy to reconcile. Instead deep beliefs regarding national identity and rights to a specific territory, which are rooted in ancient history and are consequently strongly held or even non-negotiable, can be the main reason for conflict. In addition, the focus on the consciousness of victimhood among those groups that feel threatened by the memories of past suffering is what makes the identity conflicts’ metanarratives resistant to change (Bartov, 2003). Ethnic groups, involved in sharp disputes over national identity and territory, have become more and more preoccupied with the issue of victim versus victimizer. Either party often believes that they are the one and only victim in the conflict and their opponents are the perpetrators (Barkan, 2005; Montville, 2002). The following paragraph will describe how such narratives arise, attain coherence and strengthen.
2.4 The role of national narratives in identity conflicts
National narratives in an identity conflict tend to be seen as a set of binary opposites. When there is no agreement on the narratives, there is not a singular form of reconciliation. All parts must be clearly delineated and contrasted with their narratives in a way that allows for no confusion between the perceived good and bad (Cobb, 2003). The W questions will be demonstrated in order to give an overview of how the perceptions of the good and the bad arise. In light of the five W questions mentioned above, national narratives can be characterized as follows:
Who? In a typical national narrative the number of protagonists will be limited. There is a clear division between the good – us - and the bad – them. The good group is illustrated as peace lovers, righteous, honest, irreproachable and above all, victims of the other side.
The bad is the embodiment of wickedness and evil. In an ideal national narrative there is no differentiation between the leaders and the people, or between different layers of society. The other is simply perceived as a whole, belonging to a collective identity. The inhumane actions of the other are exemplified to reveal the identity of the people in whose name they are committed (Ignatieff, 1999).
What (happened)? The answer to this apparently factual question seems simple and incontestable, however it is not. The what question in a national narrative cannot be stripped from its mythological and historical ties. It draws on the metanarrative and earlier mentioned national narratives. Therefore the story of what actually happened can be answered in multiple ways, since obviously, there are different views (ibid.).
Why? Protagonists in an identity conflict generally adopt an attribution causal model. According to this model, both sides will explain their behaviour in a way that strengthens their moral position in the conflict (Auerbach, 2009). Our friendly and reconciliatory actions are conceptions of our good and peace-loving nature. Aggressive actions are portrayed as necessary reactions to the other’s behaviour. On the side of the other, their benevolent actions are imposed by circumstances, for example international pressure. Their hateful behaviour stems from their inherent wickedness and aggression. This pattern of attributing good motives to ourselves and bad motives to the other strengthens the negative bias towards the other. Once identified, the continued appliance of such motives makes it easy to predict the other’s future actions and turn such predictions to self-fulfilling prophecies. The causal component of the narrative adds a logical and psychological dimension to the national narrative, which thus becomes stronger, more coherent and starkly resistant to change (Ross, 2007).
When? National narratives involve the reconstruction of temporal sequences in order to resituate current difficulties and enable future action (Silverstein & Makdishi, 2006). The collective memory of a group contains only those events that are of pedagogic character. The way in which memory distorts the facts reflects the need to show that each individual event has significance beyond itself; that it has a logical place in the complete history and that it complements the other events (Halbwachs in Auerbach, 2009). Both parties in a conflict are motivated for their national narratives to be embedded in the past since they wish to create a solid base for their opposing demands and future action. The past, as told by protagonists, has none of the fixed and stable identity of a document (Ignatieff, 1999). Furthermore, the ‘past is not the past, and time, … [is] simultaneous not linear (ibid.)
To describe the process in which the interpretations, fantasies and feelings about a shared trauma merge with those pertaining to a current situation the term time collapse was devised. The time collapse phenomenon is applicable to chosen traumas as well as to chosen glories. History is likely to repeat itself, and time is blurred. To the protagonist, present enemies become justifiable reincarnations of the people who have tried to exterminate others throughout history. This narrative is transmitted from generation to generation. In addition each generation contributes to the eternal story of suffering, victimhood and miraculous salvation (Auerbach, 2009).
Where? The national narrative draws a clear distinction between the fatherland and those who were outcast. The fatherland is the disputed territory each group claims as its own, often by virtue of a divine promise imbedded in the metanarrative. In the Middle East, national narratives will include stories of endless battles between the legitimate
owners of the Holy Land and those who have been unlawfully trying to appropriate it. The outcast can be found everywhere the chosen group is dispersed outside this land. The outcast people will generally try to maintain their culture and avoid assimilation into local culture. They will preserve memories of their country of origin, lament their uprooting and never stop dreaming about coming back to their beloved fatherland. These deeply embedded beliefs and feelings toward this land legitimize their non-negotiable claim for the right to return to the fatherland they were forced to leave (ibid.).
The above-given analysis of national narratives in an identity conflict suggests that they are closed, consistent and self-sustained systems. Both sides are afraid that any change in their narratives that would accept even a small part of the other’s narrative would destroy their identity. This representation of national narratives is very rudimentary, as even in sharp identify conflicts it is not that simple; there will be individuals and groups that will consider their own as well as the other’s narrative in a more nuanced manner. Furthermore, narratives do change during the conflict with or without connection to the behaviour of the other side. However, at times of crisis and expanding threats when the need for bolstering national identities becomes more acute, this type of ideal national narrative emerges. In order for the process of reconciliation to take place, national narratives stand in the way. Both sides need to be more open for the other’s story, for the other’s national narrative. As long as the antagonists, locked in their mutual sense of victimhood, put identity issues at the centre of their conflict, the national narratives will basically not yield. This seemingly vicious circle of national narratives, in which both sides perpetually negate each other’s arguments and widen the gap of mistrust and hatred, makes any chance of reconciliation seem impossible (ibid.).
This assumption echoes Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory. According to this theory the core causes of ethnic war, the aforementioned identity conflicts, are ethnic hostility and the myths and fears that promote it, the metanarratives (Kaufman, 2001). It is an erroneous tendency of theoreticians and diplomats to dismiss peace building, or reconciliation, as either naïve or ineffective. He calls upon peace builders to help the rival sides to ‘replace the myths about the other side with better information, to replace the hostility and fear with understanding and most of all to build a cooperative inter-ethnical relationship to replace stereotyped hostile ones. Ethno-nationalist myths should be recast into cooperative and tolerant ones, by promoting the writing and teaching of fair-minded history instead of the ethnocentric and scapegoating kind’ (ibid.).
To sum up this paragraph, the responses to the five W questions as mentioned above, are integrated into the victimhood metanarrative. They become major obstacles in the pathway of reconciliation based on narrative dissolution and integration, since there is less chance on reaching an agreement on this subject matter. The smaller the chance on reaching an agreement on these questions, the further the narratives of the different parties are removed from one another and consequently, the further away the conflict is from reconciliation. As mentioned above, as long as both sides continue to be afraid that a change in their narrative destroys their identity, they remain far from being able to respect each other’s story and therefore reconciliation stays unattainable. However, when both sides are more open for the other’s story, for the other’s national narrative, actual reconciliation becomes more likely.
Having put forward a terminological framework dealing with the role of metanarratives and national narratives in the process of reconciliation and having illustrated the problems as well as the potential of national narratives as avenues for reconciliation in identity conflict, it now needs to be put into practice. Since much of the research on reconciliation seems to a certain extent removed from the lives of the citizens of the former Yugoslavia (Rime at al., 2011; Staub, 2013; Brouneus, 2007; Hesse & Post, 1999; Teitel, 1999; Meernik, 2005), this thesis makes use of the Reconciliation Pyramid by Auerbach (2009). This method has been chosen for its focus on the view of the people and their actions towards one another. The reconciliation pyramid, presented below, assumes that partners in an identity conflict will not be able to reconcile unless they become acquainted with each other’s narratives, acknowledge their respective legitimacy and be ready to incorporate them into their own. Through the deconstruction of the narratives, the more factual and less contestable components of the stories can be isolated and utilized to move forward in the process of reconciliation (ibid.).
2.5 The reconciliation pyramid
The reconciliation pyramid is presented as a tool for exploring the reconciliation processes. It is a benchmark by which one can measure how far the opposing sides are removed from the top stage of the pyramid, being reconciliation, and what their positions along the pyramid’s rungs are. The reconciliation pyramid is a metaphor presenting the progressing stages enemies have to overcome in their way to reconciliation. The pyramid discerns seven stages. The starting point in the process of reconciliation is becoming acquainted with the clashing narratives relating to the core issues of the conflict. Acquaintance with the narratives leads to full acknowledgement of them and may prepare the ground for a warm move, like the expressions of empathy towards the other. Empathizing with the enemy/other can lead to the assumption of, at least partial, responsibility for the plight of the other. This may than be followed by material restitution, a formal judicial step, and the request for forgiveness. The process reaches its peak when the two sides seriously and sincerely consider replacing their old, ethno-centric narratives with new, integrated narratives. The new integrated narratives are then based on the mutual acknowledgement of past miseries and a joint vision of the future (Auerbach, 2009).
Figure 1: The 7 stages of the Reconciliation Pyramid.
The reconciliation pyramid is based on the following assumptions:
1. Reconciliation, meaning changing attitudes from denial and resentment toward acceptance and trust, is essential, particularly in identity conflict.
2. The reconciliation process in identity conflicts is a strenuous, prolonged, and gradated one. It can start before peace negotiations or run parallel to them, but will usually continue long after the two sides have agreed upon a formal peace agreement.
3. A narrow social stratum –e.g., authors, academics, or religious authorities -will usually initiate the process. Its success, however, requires the support of official decision makers as well as acceptance by wider layers of the respective societies. 4. The process incorporates both warm (empathy, apology, forgiveness) and cold
(narrative acquaintance and acknowledgment) elements. The clashing national narratives in an identity conflict are the keys to understanding its tenacity as well as its potential for change.
5. Reconciliation between two sides demands the dismantling and ultimately the incorporation of their conflicting national narratives into the public discourse of the two previously antagonistic societies (ibid.).
The underlying idea of the reconciliation pyramid is that identity conflicts, in which victimhood metanarratives play a central role, carry so much pain and humiliation that there is a need for reconciliation in order to heal the wounds that injured people. Although material arrangements achieved by political representatives are crucial components of conflict resolution and play an important role in easing the path toward reconciliation, in order for identity conflicts to transform into a long-lasting peace based on change of heart and mind, they require deeper and longer processes. Genuine
7. Narrative incorporation 6. Apology 5. Responsibility 4. Restitution 3. Empathy 2. Acknowledgement 1. Acquintance
reconciliation is a final state. In most cases of extended identity conflicts reconciliation might not be realizable (ibid.).
2.6. The seven stages of the reconciliation pyramid Stage 1: Acquaintance with Clashing Narratives.
Reconciliation literature highlights the importance of acknowledging the others’ narrative in ethno-political conflicts (Kriesberg, 1998b, 1998c, 2004). Not enough attention has been given, however, to the difference between acquaintance, knowing the facts about the other, and acknowledgment, which incorporates the recognition that the version of the other has some validity (ibid.).
The main problem in an identity conflict is that long-standing mutual hatred and fear are so strong that they cause each side to concentrate on their own plight. This eliminates any possibility of even becoming acquainted with the narrative of the other. Not only are the two – or more - sides ignorant to the national narratives of the other, they also are incapable of candidly scrutinizing their own national narratives. This is particularly true for those involved with central issues in the conflict, and admitting the possible inaccuracies in their vision of the truth (ibid.).
Stage 2: Acknowledging the other’s narratives, without necessarily accepting them as being true.
Acknowledging the national narratives of the other implies understanding and recognizing them as authentic and legitimate. The transition from acquaintance is therefore not easy. Becoming acquainted with the other’s version of central events in the conflict does not necessarily threaten one’s own identity, but acknowledging the other’s core narratives constitutes a significant step toward lending legitimacy to the their metanarratives. In a zero-sum identity conflict this may be equal to compromising one’s own legitimacy (Kelman, 2001; Auerbach, 2009).
Stage 3: Expressing empathy for the other’s plight.
Empathy, seen as the ability to understand another person’s feelings and to be able to identify with it, is a warm and very demanding move. It is not likely for two rivals in an identity conflict to express this type of warm feelings towards each other. Any empathetic exchange is much more likely to happen on a personal level. For example, between parents on both sides who have lost their children in the conflict. In some societies, identification with the enemy may be considered equal to treason. In view of these difficulties, the feeling of empathy is often excluded in research on the political aspect of reconciliation, or replaced by sympathy. However, if preceded by the acquaintance and acknowledgment of the other’s narratives, empathy towards the suffering of the other is likely to become more realistic (Auerbach, 2009).
Stage 4: Assuming - at least partial - responsibility for the other’s alleged plights.
Assuming responsibility may be seen as being equal to pleading guilty, which makes it very difficult for each side involved in an identity conflict. To go from stage three to stage four therefore is a very difficult and tough process (ibid.).
Stage 5: Expressing readiness for restitution or reparation for past wrongs.
The four previous stages are characterized by the ‘people-to-people’ moves and are usually initiated by small, elite groups hoping to transmit the reconciliation message throughout society, eventually reaching the political leadership. The fifth stage, expressing readiness for restitution and actually granting reparations to ‘victims of the state’ is a political act, solely within the jurisdiction of the formal decision makers. It is a cold, calculated move, rarely taken by war leaders. If and when such a decision is made, it may be beneficial to reconciliation between former enemies. Indeed, there are authors who claim restitutions and reparations to be crucial elements of restoring morality after hard times and bringing about a successful reconciliation process (Barkan, 2000, 2005). However, if restitution is not accompanied by full acknowledgement of past evils and sincere forgiveness, the changes for genuine reconciliation between victim and perpetrator are minimal (Auerbach, 2009).
Stage 6: Publicly apologizing and asking for forgiveness for past wrongdoings.
Forgiveness is a crucial phase on the way to reconciliation in identity conflicts (Auerbach, 2004, 2005a). From a warm-cold perspective, forgiveness can be seen as a complex phenomenon. Partly incorporating results from practical considerations, it is a purely political and therefor a cold process. However, for the request of forgiveness to convey the right message and at the same time contribute to reconciliation, it must be a genuine, warm expression of remorse, stemming from deep seated regret and with the assumption of full responsibility. It is obviously very difficult to distinguish between honest declarations of acknowledgment and insincere political acts (Amstutz, 2005), which is why the request must be sincere in order for it to obtain mutual benevolence. The reconciliation pyramid places forgiveness at the sixth stage, following both cold, cognitive as well as warm, emotional steps. In this stage, hopefully having overcome the contrition of realistic and psychological difficulties, there is a chance of forgiveness and consequently of full reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009).
Stage 7: Striving to incorporate opposing narratives into acceptable mutual accounts of the past.
It has been suggested that the reconciliation process will only be completed ‘[…] if the two groups communicate their stories and form a common history.’ Both sides need to consider each other’s positive and negative behaviors during the conflict and incorporate them into the common narrative of the conflict (Worthington, 2006). Indeed, if and when the two sides to an identity conflict have managed to go through the preceding stages of the reconciliation process, both sides should be ready for a full-fledged narrative incorporation, which will bring the reconciliation between them to its culmination. Nevertheless in view of the difficulties inherent to each of the stages of the reconciliation pyramid, the probability of reaching this last stage seems quite small. But if one adopts a less ambitious version of narrative incorporation, the seemingly unattainable goal becomes more realistic (Staub, 2006).
As suggested, the process of reconciliation should follow the seven stages of the pyramid, beginning with the relatively cold move of becoming acquainted with the other’s national narratives, breaking them down into their component parts, identifying the parts that are
less controversial, or less essential and eventually crafting full acknowledgement of the contrasting national narratives. Only then will the both sides be ready to express empathy, assume responsibility and suggest restitution for at least part of the others suffering. By this stage, the door will hopefully have opened to allow a meaningful and mutual proposal of forgiveness. The opposite metanarrative will not appear as threatening as it was before, at the foot of the pyramid. The two sides would then be ready to consider each other’s suggestions on how to continue together from that moment onwards. The different parties may display readiness to introduce different versions of their national narratives into the public discourse. Finally the other’s narratives can be integrated into a shared common narrative of the conflict (Auerbach, 2009).
Crucially, the seven stages are not equally important. Arguably, the first two stages are necessary to ignite the engine of reconciliation and are at the same time the two most difficult stages to overcome. Their significance is drawn from the crucial role collective narratives play in transmitting a nation’s consciousness and memory, and in sustaining the collective identity (ibid.). Once people acknowledge some sort of validity in the other’s version of the story, the process of reconciliation starts. This is quite a revolutionary step in conflict relations since the willingness to do so raises questions as to the validity of one’s own historical narratives. Acknowledging (Stage 2), and there for, understanding the others motives is hard to, but less so than accepting their validity, as the latter would threaten one’s own identity. This move, from stage 1 to stage 2, is therefore a time-consuming process. The succeeding stages are still hard to overcome but require less effort in the sense that they do not depend upon acknowledging the validity of the other’s narrative; these stages are less demanding and therefore easier to achieve. It is assumed that once the first two stages are overcome, the subsequent stages will be easier.
In order to explain this more thoroughly, examples of groups that were and those that were not able to proceed from stage 1 to stage 2 will be presented. Firstly, a good example of groups that failed to transition from stage one to stage two, but clearly show the importance of narrative acquaintance and acknowledgement as the starting initiative of the reconciliation process, is that of the parties in the long lasting Turkish-Armenian conflict. On April 10 2005, the Turkish prime minister addressed a public letter to the president of Armenia to mark ‘the 90th anniversary of the 1915 events’. In this letter, Prime Minister Erdogan proposed to establish a joint group consisting of historians and experts from both countries, who were to study the developments of the 1915 events and share their findings with the international public. Such an initiative would shed light on a disputed period of history and also constitute a step towards contribution to the normalization of relations between the two countries (Erdogan in Auerbach, 2009). The reaction of the Armenian government however was negative in nature:
‘[…] this kind of offer can be taken seriously only if there is some semblance of normalcy between our countries. Then discussion on all other aspects of our relations, including the border and genocide can and should be carried out. […] With recognition of crimes of the past, we can move on to a dialogue of reconciliation’ (Oskanian in Auerbach, 2009).
The negative reaction of the Armenian government clearly shows that they feel that there is no recognition of their suffering, a crucial factor in the process of reconciliation. Both
countries do not see the other’s story as valid, therefore acquaintance and full acknowledgement are not yet the case.
Secondly, the case of West Germany and Israel gives an example of two parties that were able to transition from stage 1 to stage 2. Back in 1954 West-Germany fully acknowledged the suffering of the Israeli people in the wake of the Holocaust. Even though the relationship between the two sides still bears the stamp of the past, both sides have attained acquaintance with and acknowledgment of the others narratives. There is a certain degree of willingness to raise some questions about the validity of one’s own historical narratives and both parties do, to a certain extent, see the validity in the other’s story. Even though full recognition, sharing the same history and narrative, might not be the case fully as of yet, the first two stages have been overcome by both sides (Auerbach, 2009).
Bringing it all together, the following assumptions are made. When legal justice is served by the ICTY the different parties, in time, adjust their own national narrative to comply with the other’s national narrative. In this case, both parties have climbed important metaphorical steps on the reconciliation pyramid, eventually leading towards full reconciliation. However, in cases where legal action by the ICTY had not been taken, opposing parties have not adjusted their own national narrative to fit the other’s national narrative. In that case, both parties regress as far as the reconciliation pyramid is concerned, so that reconciliation does not take place.
Chapter 3: Methodology
In this chapter, the methodological framework of this paper will be discussed. The first section will explain the research design, in which both the method and in-depth interviews will be considered, as well as the benefits and limitations of this approach. The subsequent paragraph will contemplate the validity of the research and give a general overview of the process of the interviews. Paragraph three elaborates on the concepts of ‘Influence by the ICTY’ and ‘Change in the process of reconciliation’. The next section will give an overview of the resources used for this thesis. The final paragraph of this chapter aims to justify the measurement moments used for the thesis, as the four cases or events that are influenced by the ICTY will be briefly examined.
3.1. Research design 3.1.1 Method
This research paper is written from a social constructivist point of view and driven by a profound normative agenda in which peoples’ thoughts are the main focal point. In the most extreme sense of constructivism, reality does not exist. Individuals can experience and cope with the world that they themselves have constructed, which is unique to each person. People construct their own reality. Qualitative research produces interpretations of interpretations (Smaling, 2010). The case of the Yugoslavia tribunal – consisting of different interpretations from different people with different ethnical backgrounds - suits this kind of research perfectly. Reconciliation is a process that takes place primarily through thoughts, on the truth, on justice, on social status and on security, which differs for everyone who has taken part in the process.
3.1.2 In-depth interviews
This research paper uses in-depth interviews, a qualitative research technique of conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents that explores their perspectives on a particular idea, program or situation. In-depth interviews are useful for finding out detailed information about a person’s thoughts and behavior, and for exploring certain issues in depth. Interviews are often used to provide a context to other data, presenting a more complete picture of what happened in a given situation and why. This kind of research is most often employed when dealing with sensitive matters in which respondents are likely to give evasive or even misleading answers when questioned directly (Boyce & Neale, 2006).
The primary advantage of an in-depth interview is that it provides much more detailed information than that which is available through other methods of data collection, such as surveys. Contrary to filling out a survey, in-depth interviews may also provide a more relaxed and personal atmosphere in which to collect information in which subjects may feel more comfortable having a conversation about their ideas and opinions about certain cases as opposed to filling out a survey (ibid.).
