Consociationalism with an External Actor in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(1)

Consociationalism with an

External Actor in Bosnia

and Herzegovina

Blueprint for success or instability?

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts at Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

(2)

(3)

1 Introduction

“The Peace Implementation Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary.”

- Bonn Conclusions (Peace Implementation Council 1997)

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the Bosnian war that lasted from 1992 until 1995. The DPA provided the belligerent parties (the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs) a Constitution under which they would share power on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), from then on consisting of two entities, i.e. the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Moreover, the DPA mandated a wide range of international organizations to monitor, implement and oversee components of the agreement. One of these organizations is the Office of the High Representative (OHR). This institution is responsible for overseeing implementation of the civilian aspects of the DPA. The High Representative, shortly High Rep, (HR) cooperates with the people and institutions of BiH and the international community in order to ensure the evolvement of BiH into a peaceful and viable democracy on course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions (OHR 2006).

(6)

idea that intervention of the international community is meant to preserve and guarantee the peace agreement reached at Dayton. At the same time, the institutional structures set up by that agreement favor those political parties less likely to implement it (Belloni and Deane 2005).

Bosnia finds itself in an impasse. Power-sharing, or consociational democracy, as the optimal remedy to conflict did not (yet) make Bosnia a stable country. The three parties in parliament maintain zero-sum games towards each other, often resulting in uttering threats of secession or simply blocking decisions from other parties using the right to veto (Kasapovid 2005). The role of the international community and its far-reaching powers to interfere in Bosnian politics, seem to influence the effectiveness of the consociational democracy in a negative fashion, since now not three, but four different parties have different interests of outcomes of policy making. The OHR, the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) all try to work together to agree on major Constitutional reforms (Ashton 2010). These Constitutional reforms are needed for making progress. Reforms are considered the key for depoliticizing ethnicity again, which in turn is deemed necessary for moving Bosnia forward, towards its supposed goal of European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. The reforms will be one step further in closing the OHR. The OHR, however, is accused by RS of creating crises to block Constitutional reform and hence to stay in power in BiH (Lippman 2007).

(7)

Herzegovina influence the working of its consociational democracy as constructed by the Dayton Peace Agreement?

The following chapter addresses the criteria of Consociational Democracy, after which the sub-questions will be explored in order to answer the main question.

The first sub-question is “How do DPA’s provisions relate to the participation of representatives of all significant groups?” The Dayton Peace Agreement has provided the Bosnian people with a new Constitution and a new parliamentary assembly. In order to be effective, one of the criteria for a consociational democracy is the participation of representatives of all significant groups. The idea of the participation of representatives of all significant groups, shortly a grand coalition, is that policy choices shall not only have majority support, based on a minimum winning coalition, but rather the support of a great majority. A strong position, which is a feature of a majoritarian democracy, is avoided (Binningsbø 2005). In chapter 3, the provisions of the DPA and the most important outcomes of policy in Bosnia will be explored and reviewed how these outcomes came into existence. Was there indeed an overwhelming majority adopting the most significant policies, or was one party stronger, resulting in outcomes of policy that do not represent the interests of all parties involved?

Chapter 4 covers the second sub-question: “What role and powers does the international community have in Bosnia’s political life and how does this influence the degree of community autonomy?” A second criterion of consociational democracy is a high degree of segmental autonomy. This chapter will firstly analyze the degree of autonomy of Bosnia’s entities and secondly examine the powers of the international community in Bosnia. It will be shown that especially the Bonn powers are not in accordance with the requisite of self-government, since the High Representative can influence autonomous taken decisions of Bosnia’s political leaders.

(8)

in order to see what the attitudes are of the various parties towards the presence and the role of the OHR.

The fourth sub-question is “How are the entities’ interests and those of the international community related to the use of minority veto rights to protect vital interests?” In order to guarantee the vital interests of minorities, the theory of consociational democracy requires a right of veto for the minority. Chapter 6 explores what the interests of the entities are and when, by whom and for what reason the right of veto has been used. Also, the denial (if so) by the OHR of the vetoes used will be examined, as well as the decision taken as a result by the OHR and the interest involved.

In the concluding chapter 7, the outcomes of the four sub-questions are summarized, criticized and interpreted. The constructivist approach will be leading in coming to a well-considered interpretation and judgment of the extent to which each of these outcomes effect the decision-making process and stability in Bosnia.

In these questions, the four criteria or requirements for a consociational democracy according to Lijphart are intertwined. This possibly explains why the democracy in Bosnia is relatively fragile, whether the international community plays a positive or negative role in this, and whether the DPA’s consociationalism has potential to make Bosnia a politically stable country. After having examined the situation in Bosnia it will be possible to make a recommendation of what would be best for the future of Bosnia; should the DPA-framework be customized and/or should the international community stay or be attributed another role?

(9)

2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This chapter contains a description of the theory used in this thesis: consociational democracy. The main criteria and favorable conditions of consociational democracy will briefly be discussed followed by an overview of the most important limitations of the theory found in academic literature. Another section will clarify the concepts that will be used in the thesis, which will avoid discussions of interpretation. The methodology section elaborates the sub-questions, the methods of data collection and the approach of interpretation of the analysis.

2.1 Theoretical orientation: Consociational democracy

The consociational approach to conflict management is a group-based institutional mechanism centered on cooperation between political elites. Defined as an association of communities, a consociation is the outcome of a bargain or pact between representative political leaders of ethnic or religious groups in deeply divided societies. Based on four criteria, consociationalism requires: (1) government by a grand coalition and the participation of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; (2) minority veto rights to protect each group’s vital interests; (3) the proportionality principle to serve as the basic standard of political representation; and (4) a high degree of community autonomy or self-government (Belloni and Deane 2005).

(10)

zero-sum condition. This condition implies that, when common advantages play a role, evidently the zero-sum condition does not apply, and neither does the size principle. The zero-sum condition limits the application of size principle to coalition-building in two kinds of societies, namely the homogeneous societies and in societies marked by extreme internal antagonisms and hostilities. The last one applies to the Bosnian case. The size principle in this case applies when the participants in the political process perceive politics either as a game or as all-out war. In intermediate situations, there is at least some pressure for enlarging the coalition and perhaps even creating a grand coalition. Since the political stakes are often high in plural societies, it is advisable not to conduct politics as if it were a game; a grand coalition is therefore more appropriate than the government-versus-opposition pattern (Lijphart 1977, 27).

The second requirement for consociational democracy is the minority veto rights to protect each group’s vital interests, or mutual veto. Participation in a grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments, but no absolute and foolproof protection. Decisions are made in coalitions and when these are reached by majority vote, though the minority’s presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may nevertheless be outvoted by the majority. When such decisions affect the vital interests of a minority segment, such defeat will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger intersegmental elite cooperation. Therefore, a minority veto must be added to the grand coalition principle. Only a veto can give each segment a complete guarantee of political protection (Lijphart 1977, 36). A possible danger can be that this will lead to minority tyranny, which may delay the decision-making process.

The third requirement is the principle of proportionality. This principle serves two important functions; first, it is a method of allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments. The second and more important function of proportionality relates to the decision-making process itself.

(11)

of segmental autonomy is federalism. This entails the granting of autonomy to constituent parts of the state and the overrepresentation of the smaller subdivisions in the ‘federal’ chamber. Each segment is territorially concentrated and separated from the other segments, or, to put it differently, a society in which the segmental cleavages coincide with the regional cleavages. This is the case in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where both Croats and Bosniaks rule (Lijphart 1977, 43).

Besides the four requirements for consociational democracy, Lijphart also considered some favorable conditions for it to remain stable. The role of leadership is crucial in consociational democracy. The leaders must feel at least some commitment to maintenance the unity of the country as well as a commitment to democratic practices. The emphasis on the role of the elite has the theoretical advantage of aiding in the explanation of political stability in systems where one would have expected instability. Therefore, the explanatory power for this type is considerable, but its predictive power is for the same reason rather limited. A consociational democracy that has been in operation for some time, an analysis of its institutional mechanisms and the elite’s operational code would yield some grounds for predicting its successful continuation. But to predict whether an unstable democracy, such as Bosnia, can or will become stable by adopting consociational practice is much more difficult, because this entails a deliberate change in elite behavior. The explanatory and predictive powers can be improved by identifying the conditions that are conducive to overarching elite cooperation and stable non-elite support (Lijphart 1977, 53). The following factors appear to be particularly important: a multiple balance of power, small size of the country involved, overarching loyalties, segmental isolation, prior traditions of elite accommodation, and the presence of crosscutting cleavages. Not only do these factors contribute to cooperation among segmental leaders and loyal support by the followers in the segments, they are conditions that are helpful in both establishing consociational democracy and in maintaining and strengthening it. Lijphart emphasizes that the conditions are factors that are helpful but neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977, 54).

(12)

(13)

outcomes and 4 conditions that hardly met. This led to the sum or score of 3, which means that it cannot be considered a success, but not a defeat either.

1

Figure 1 (Schneckener, Making Power-sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation 2002) Favorable conditions for power-sharing

Figure 2 lists both the favorable and unfavorable factors of consociationalism for Bosnia in 1995, right after the war. The favorable factor of three major segments and no majority segment applies to the first sub-question concerning the participation of representatives of all significant groups. However, the unfavorable factor of unequal segmental distribution of support to government by grand coalition spoils the efficiency of consociationalism in Bosnia. The second sub-question concerns the degree of community autonomy and self-government. This is supported by the factor of distinct lines of cleavage among religious and ethnic segments, but the powers of the international community can considered being external threats. The third sub-question involves the proportionality principle and the role of the international community. The proportionality principle is supported by the fact that there exist three major segments and no majority segment in the current Bosnian political system. This is a favorable factor for efficiency of consociationalism. Nevertheless, the role of the international community often conflict with the Bosnian politicians’ wishes, which can be attributed to the unfavorable fact that there still is a weak tradition of democratic consociationalism. The final sub-question concerning the interests of both the entities and the international community and the criterion of a veto-right, is backed up by the favorable fact that there is a relatively high internal political cohesion of segments, but hampered by the existence of radical nationalisms making decision-making less efficient. In this thesis, the

1

(14)

emphasis on the role of the international community will be demonstrated by referring to these factors during the analysis.

Figure 2 (Kasapović 2005) Favorable and unfavorable factors for power-sharing

2.2 Limitations/ Critics of the theory

Figure 1 shows that consociational democracy would not per se become a success in Bosnia. Especially the actor-oriented conditions were not met. Are these the only limitations or are there more? Some of the constraints of consociational democracy are now explored.

(15)

consequences and tend to be risk averse, cautionary and limited in scope (Belloni and Deane 2005).

Principles Practices Problems

Broad-based coalitions among

ethnic political parties Grand coalition governments

Elites may initiate conflict to bolster their power at the center

Minority or mutual veto on matters of importance to the group

Group rights defined in Constitutional terms for named ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural groups

Can reinforce the ethnic divisions in society rather than promoting cross-cultural understanding

Proportionality

Proportional representation electoral system and the proportional allocation of jobs, spending, representation, and participation by ethnic group leaders

May reflect well the divisions in society but does not provide incentives for building bridges across community lines

Group autonomy Federalism, territorial, or "corporate"

May contain disincentives for contending groups to live peacefully together

Figure 3 (Sisk 2003) Problems of consociational democracy

Figure 2 lists five conditions that foster, and five conditions that hamper consociational democracy in Bosnia. Both figures are clear in explaining various factors, but both figures lack to explore the role of an external, third party with power in a consociational democracy and so does the theory of consociational democracy in general. However, since the most recent cases of newly constructed consociational democracy involve at least some form of international or external negotiation or other involvement, it can be marked as an important missing link in explaining why consociationalism succeeds or not.

(16)

Lijphart acknowledges two kinds of disadvantages of consociational democracy. The first is that consociational democracy may be criticized for not being democratic enough and the second is for being insufficiently capable of achieving a stable and efficient government. The first criticism is dependent from what one considers to be democracy and thus differs from person to person. The second criticism is more fundamental. For instance, government by grand coalition means slow decision-making. The veto may immobilize decision-making and eventually lead to total stagnation and instability that consociational democracy is created to avoid. Moreover, proportionality as a standard of recruitment to the civil service entails a higher priority to membership in a certain segment that to individual merit. This may be at the expense of administrative efficiency. Another criticism is that segmental autonomy requires high costs, because of the multiplication of governmental and administrative units etc. Lijphart finally argues that a distinction must be drawn between short-term and long-term effectiveness and that short-term efficiency is likely to lead to a breakdown in the long run (Lijphart 1977, 47-52). Although the consociational democracy is considered a normative model, it was at the time only applied to European cases (Lijphart 1977, 54). Therefore, the theory may be outdated. The latest cases of consociationalism involve international players, which may also change the outcome of the theory as an empirical model.

2.3 Clarification of concepts and definitions of Consociational Democracy

(17)

although these issues are still being contested internally. Second, democracy here is used as Lijphart used it as a synonym of what Dahl calls “polyarchy”. This means not a system of government that fully embodies all democratic ideals, but one that approximates them to a reasonable degree (Lijphart 1977). Thirdly, (political) stability here is used as a multidimensional concept, namely system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness. The key concept of consociational democracy is roughly defined in terms of both the segmental cleavages typical of a plural society and the political cooperation of the segmental elites. The Constitutional framework as constructed under the Dayton Accords can clearly be called (an attempt to) consociational democracy. Lastly, the international community most of the times concerns the OHR, but this term can more generally also concern the other international bodies as determined in DPA2.

2.4 Research Paradigm: Constructivism

The approach that will be used in this thesis is the social constructivist approach. This approach is oriented toward empirical research. Social constructivism rejects a one-sided material focus and emphasizes the social aspect of international relations (IR). Moreover, social reality is not objective or external to the observer of international affairs. The study of international affairs must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them. The international system exists only as intersubjective awareness among people. Not only the international system, but all knowledge is subjective in the sense that it is filtered through human consciousness; thoughts and beliefs, ideas and concepts, languages and discourses, signs, signals and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human beings such as states or nations (Jackson and Sorensen 2006, 162). Hence, constructivism converges on an ontology that depicts the social world as intersubjectively and collectively meaningful structures and processes. Moreover, constructivism makes interpretation an intrinsic part of social science and it stresses contingent generalizations (Adler 2002, 101). It is with this conception that the used data will be interpreted. The social constructivist approach is also

(18)

used in judging what role the international community plays in reaching stability through a framework of consociational democracy, as constructed by the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Using the approach of social constructivism reduces the danger of having a lack of credibility or reliability in the data used. All data is ‘colored’ by languages used, norms or beliefs etc. provided by the individual or institution. Moreover, my own interpretation is evidently also subject to beliefs and norms. Trying to deconstruct facts is beyond this thesis’ scope. The data used in this thesis is hence considered to be reliable and credible, but the reader must take the intersubjectivity of all information into account.

According to Adler (2002), a coherent constructivist methodological approach means approaching research less as a predictive enterprise than as an effort to explain how past and present events, practices and interests became possible and why they occurred in time and space the way they did (Adler 2002). This is exactly what will be done in this thesis. The aim is to analyze whether international interference in Bosnia affects the political stability, based on past and present events (e.g. Dayton Peace Agreement, decisions taken by the OHR, attitudes of political elites, and interests of the parties).

The application of constructivism in this thesis means that its concepts and definitions are used as constructivist theorists did. The most important concepts and definitions are now discussed.

The useful aspect of constructivist methodology is the use of combined (conventional) theories, such as liberalism and realism, complemented by constructivism. This fills the gaps in the incomplete explanatory scope that is inevitable when only using the conventional theories.

Norms are a shared and social concept, unlike ideas. They concern behavior and are intersubjective. Norms can be defined as collectively held ideas about behavior. Evidence for the existence of norms can be found in two places: first, norms create patterns of behavior in accordance with their prescriptions; second, norms may be articulated in discourse. Because of their intersubjectivity and the fact that they are collectively held, norms are often subject of discussion among actors. Since it is usual that actors specifically articulate norms in justifying actions, or that they may upon norms to persuade others to act, the discourse surrounding such behavior will be examined in this thesis (Finnemore 1996, 24-25).

(19)

the agent-structure relationship is quite complex. To understand the relationship between the agents and the structures, first the agencies will be bracketed and the power of social structures. Then the brackets will be reversed and this will give an insight where the normative structures influencing states came from. This together explains state behavior (Finnemore 1996).

Wendt (1992) described the process of signaling, interpreting, and responding to a certain situation. This process completes a ‘social act’ and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings (Wendt 1992). In the Bosnian case, the international community wants the three actors, the Bosniaks, the Croats and the Serbs to understand and to implement the concept of democracy as constructed under DPA and to act according to the principles of the consociational democracy. Figure 4 demonstrates this process and provides an explanation for the actors’ behavior. The Dayton Peace Agreement constructed a Constitution on the basis of a consociational democracy. The concept of democracy, although an ambiguous term, is an accepted and inherent social construction for the (Western) international community monitoring the consociational democracy in Bosnia. It is, however, an intersubjective understanding. The Bosnian actors are expected to behave in a fashion in which they pursue a well-working consociational democracy. So, (1) the international community requires a democracy; (2) the Bosnian actors have their own definition and understanding of what a democracy is and hence (3) act in the way they think they should act. This is or is not according to the international community’s expectation and (4) the international community interprets the behavior and applies its own definition of the situation. The international community then (5) reacts to the behavior of the Bosnian actors; for example, the OHR uses its Bonn powers in order for the Bosnians to better apply conditions for consociational democracy. This reaction is grounded on the international community’s intersubjective understanding of democracy and its expectations of the Bosnian politicians to act the way they should according to the international community. This brings us back to (1) and the circle starts over again.

(20)

community at that time and other expectations (namely, withdrawal after the first parliamentary elections), possibly explains all party’s behavior.

Figure 4 The codetermination of institutions and process in Bosnia-Herzegovina

2.5 Research Design

This thesis assesses the research question “How does the interference of the international

community in Bosnia and Herzegovina influence the working of its consociational democracy as constructed by the Dayton Peace Agreement? ” To analyze this question, several

sub-questions need to be explored. These sub-questions will one by one be justified and the method of analysis will be explained.

 Sub-question 1: How do DPA’s provisions relate to the participation of representatives of all significant groups?

(21)

unequal segmental distribution of support to government by grand coalition. According to Kasapovid (2005), this unfavorable factor is the biggest obstacle in Bosnia for three reasons. The first is that there is no consensus on the state, the second is that there is no consensus on the political system and the third is the lack of a consistent strategy of international actors in establishing a democratic state (Kasapovid 2005). These factors will be explored by using the sources mentioned. Figure 3 demonstrates that a problem that can possibly encountered while coming to an answer to this sub-question is that elites may initiate conflict to bolster their power at the center (Sisk 2003). If this has been the case in the past, the OHR would probably have intervened. Therefore, the database with OHR’s decisions and press releases will be consulted.

Resulting from these variables, a basis is offered for the first hypothesis of this thesis: A Constitution that enforces power-sharing of former belligerent parties, constructed under auspices of an external actor is not effective.

 Sub-question 2: What role and powers does the international community have in Bosnia’s political life and how does this relate to the degree of community autonomy or self-government?

In practice, this means that there is some degree of federalism. A possible problem is that the autonomy of the entities in Bosnia can contain disincentives for contending groups to live peacefully together (Sisk 2003). Other factors that must be taken into account are the distinct lines of cleavage among religious and ethnic segments and the unfavorable factor that the powers of the international community can be considered being external threats. The entities possibly reacted to this ‘threat’. This will be analyzed using documentation about the interference of the High Representative, journal articles, as well as the annex in the DPA about autonomy of the entities.

The variables in this sub-question lead to the second hypothesis: Interference of an external party in a consociational democracy threatens the degree of autonomy of the internal parties.

(22)

The idea behind this proportionality principle is a proportional representation in the electoral system and the proportional allocation of jobs, spending, representation and participation by ethnic group leaders. A problem the Bosnians possibly face is that although this principle may reflect the divisions in society, it does not necessarily provide incentives for building bridges across community lines (Sisk 2003). To examine to what extent this principle is executed as it originally was meant, the current representation of all parties at multiple levels are explored.

The proportionality principle is supported by the fact that there exist three major segments and no majority segment in the current Bosnian political system. This is a favorable factor for efficiency of consociationalism. Nevertheless, the role of the international community often conflict with the Bosnian politicians’ wishes, which can be attributed to the unfavorable fact that there still is a weak tradition of democratic consociationalism.

The different papers in Bosnia are naturally politically and/or ethnically biased. These papers hence represent the common sentiments of the parties and will function as source of data for studying the attitudes of the politicians.

The variables that are found in this sub-question leads to the third hypothesis of this thesis, namely: Extensive powers of an external regulating actor in a country with a weak tradition of democratic consociationalism tend to outbalance the proportionality principle.

 Sub-question 4: How are the entities’ interests and those of the international community related to the use of minority veto rights to protect vital interests?”

This question reflects the requisite of consociational democracy of mutual veto. This mutual veto needed for guaranteeing the group rights as defined in the DPA for named ethnic, racial, religious or cultural groups. A major problem this right brings along is the risk to reinforce the ethnic divisions in society rather than promoting cross-cultural understanding. This, on its turn, hampers the effectiveness of decision-making. The appropriate factor that contributes to an effective consociational democracy is the relative high internal political cohesion of segments. This is, however, hindered by radical nationalisms.

(23)

reported. Moreover, secondary literature will give an overview of the interests of all parties involved, which can explain why there are division and why using a veto to protect vital interests was needed.

The variables included in this sub-question lead to the fourth hypothesis of this thesis: The interests and the powers of an external party in a yet divided internal political system render the decision-making process inefficient.

 Sub-question 5: How does this effect Bosnia’s decision-making process and stability? In this concluding chapter, the outcomes of the four sub-questions are summarized, criticized and interpreted. The constructivist approach will be leading in coming to a well-considered interpretation and judgment of the extent to which each of these outcomes effect the decision-making process and stability in Bosnia. With all gathered knowledge of the previous questions, two broader hypotheses will be presented towards the end of the thesis. These are the following: The role and powers of the international community forces the parties in a consociational democracy to cooperate and to overcome zero-sum games; the role of the international community negatively affects the political stability.

(24)

Figure 5 Actors in the Bosnian consociational democracy: the international community as an external party or as another actor?

Although it is discussed in the academic literature, consociational democracy in general is workable. However, the Bosnian political situation is far from stable; the three parties do not succeed in making decisions in an efficient way, there is always at least one party delaying the process. Moreover, the negotiations of the reform of the Constitution are in an impasse. There are even ‘threats’ of the Serbs to organize a referendum for secession. This is a tricky development, since a referendum on autonomy or secession was the direct occasion for the war in 1992. This instability in the country brings about the question why the consociational democracy doesn’t optimally work in Bosnia. A major difference compared to other power-sharing democracies, is the involvement of the international community. Especially the powers possessed by the OHR are what make a difference. Therefore, the right half of figure 4 seems to be applicable to this situation and this thesis.

(25)

3 Grand coalition versus DPA’s provisions

This chapter will give an answer to the question “How do DPA’s provisions relate to the participation of representatives of all significant groups?”

Section 2.1 discussed the requirement of a grand coalition and the participation of the political leaders of all significant segments of a plural society. The size principle clarified the nature of grand coalition and the need for all players to have perfect information for a minimum winning coalition to occur. The zero-sum condition stipulates that the different parties in Bosnia limit the size principle to coalition building. The size principle in this case applies when the participants in the political process perceive politics either as a game or as all-out war (Lijphart 1977, 27).

This chapter examines several factors that influenced the make-up of the coalitions. First of all, the most important contents of the Dayton- Constitution will be briefly discussed, after which the parliamentary situation in the period from 1995 up to now will be examined and the most significant policies that were adapted in this period. The outcome of the chosen policies will give an insight in a possible balance in the coalition, or an eventual minimum winning coalition. Moreover, the outcomes will possibly give insight whether the process from 1995 to 2010 brought together the parties in Bosnian politics.

3.1 The Constitution

(26)

members of each party are present. The House of Representatives comprises forty-two members. Two thirds elected from the territory of the Federation and one third elected from RS territory. A majority of all members elected to the HoP comprise a quorum (OHR 1995, Article 4 (1)(2)).

Decisions in both chambers are taken by the majority of those present and voting. The Constitution states that the delegates and members shall make their best efforts to see that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes of delegates from the territory of each entity. If this criterion is not reached, then the Chair and Deputy Chairs consisting of one person of all three parties and rotating in position, meet as a commission and attempt to obtain approval within three days of the vote. If those efforts fail, decisions are taken by a majority of those present and voting, provided that the dissenting votes do not include two-thirds or more of the Delegates or Members elected from either Entity (OHR 1995, Article 4(3)).

The presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three members, one of each party who are directly elected from their territories. A dissenting member of the presidency may, within three days after adoption, declare a decision of the presidency destructible if it is of vital national interest. The decision shall then not take effect. The Chair of the Council of Ministers (CoM) is nominated by the presidency, again selected upon proportional grounds. The CoM resigns if at any time there is a vote of no-confidence by the Parliamentary Assembly (OHR 1995, Article 5).

The Constitutional Court of Bosnia consists of nine members: four of the Federation, two of RS and the other three are selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights. These three judges cannot be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighboring state. A majority of all members of the Court constitute a quorum. The Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that arises under the Constitution between the entities of Bosnia, including whether an entity’s decision to establish a special parallel relationship with a neighboring state is consistent with the Constitution3.

Worth mentioning is the fact that Bosnia’s Constitution was originally written in English and translated into the native language (Dimitrová 2005). Deriving from the fact that every language has unique words with a unique meaning not translatable into another

(27)

language, this may give or have given rise to differences in understanding on some issues. A reform of the Constitution has been under negotiations for a few years already. However, the parties do not succeed in finding consensus on this topic, and as a result postpone the negotiations as soon as elections approach. Moreover, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia found the provisions in the Constitution of RS containing language referring ‘the Serb people’ to be unconstitutional. Likewise, the Court found the provisions of the Federation’s Constitution containing the language ‘Bosnia(k)s, Croats as constituent peoples unconstitutional (Mansfield 2003). Nevertheless, only Serbs are represented in RS institutions and Croats and Bosniaks only in Federation institutions.

3.2 Parliament from 1995-2010

The favorable factor as discussed in section 2.1 linked to this sub-question was that there are three major segments and no majority. The unfavorable factor was an unequal segmental distribution of support to government by grand coalition. According to Kasapovid (2005), this unfavorable factor is the biggest obstacle in Bosnia for three reasons. The first is that there is no consensus on the state, the second is that there is no consensus on the political system and the third is the lack of a consistent strategy of international actors in establishing a democratic state (Kasapovid 2005). These factors will be examined and tested to the results and situations prior and during Parliamentary elections from 1995 up till now, since democratic elections are the cornerstone of DPA.

3.2.1 Consensus on the State

The main cause of inefficiency in Bosnia is said to be the lack of consensus of the members of the three constitutive national groups of the state. The agreement on signing the DPA can be interpreted as the consent of the majorities of the belligerent parties to peace, but not as the consent to living in a single state (Kasapovid 2005). This reasoning derives from the complex history the ethnic parties share.

(28)

future structure. The Muslims and Croats were in favor of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs and Croats and other who live in it. The Croats believed that they would eventually be able to secure wide-ranging autonomy from the Bosnian government and therefore favored this prescription to counter the possibility of a Serbian drive to create a Greater Serbia. The Serbs boycotted the referendum. Serbian nationalists came into action when it became obvious that, as a result of the referendum, Bosnia would declare independence. The counteraction was a declaration of independence of a Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the direct cause of the war (Friedman 2004, 47-49).

After a number of failed peace proposals, the international community became engaged in the effort of democratizing and building peace through the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Accords. It is said that Bosnia may be looked at as a test case of efficacy of international intervention in the political, economic, social, legal and cultural realms of a conflict-torn country (Friedman 2004, 59). However, this is not to say that with DPA unity was reached.

Elections are considered to be a key test of democratic institutionalization. If they are carried out when legally scheduled, organized in an inclusive, fair and competitive way, with voters registered and free from coercion, the votes counted fairly, and the winners allowed to take office without their terms being arbitrarily terminated, then institutionalization of democracy is considered (Chandler 2000). In the Bosnian case, elections may be the key test of democratic institutionalization, however, elections do not necessarily solve ethnic division. Kissinger (1997) argued that elections are not about alterations in office but about dominance in determining life, death and religion. This reasoning lies behind his view that the OSCE strategy of using absentee voting in municipal elections to encourage multi-ethnic rule, in areas that are currently mono-ethnic, generates renewed conflict; either the current ethnic division consolidated or there is the risk of conflict as absentee voters regain the right to rule (Kissinger 1997).

(29)

The Muslims party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was the winner of the elections. The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ) came in second and third after the SDA. Although supervised by the OSCE, the elections were far from free and fair (Bojkov 2002). The newly elected Parliament did not function as elected after a Serbian walk-out, since both the Serbs and the Croats produced their own small states with small parliaments and small governments. The organs representing Bosnia as a whole only exist on paper and the three mini-states continued their independent life. Moreover, RS signed an ‘agreement’ with small Yugoslavia on special ties and the coming unification (Ágh 1998, 217).

The parliamentary elections of 1998 are more or less the same story: predominantly ethnic parties won the elections.

The elections of November 2000, however, differed slightly with foregoing years. While Serbs and Croats predominantly stood by their nationalist parties, the Bosniaks had dispersed their votes between nationalist, leftist and centrist parties. Since the 1998 elections, the three nationalist parties SDS, HDZ and SDA had formed the central government. After the 2000 elections, however, they had lost the majority. The multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP) won the most seats, namely nine, where the nationalist SDA won eight, SDS six and five for HDZ. Since the end of the war it was the first time that a moderate Bosniak was chosen as the new Speaker of the State Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008). This first non-nationalist dominated government failed to succeed. Not because of ethnic conflict, but because of the ungainly and unworkable coalition of eleven parties crowded into a small state structure, and the unfortunate timing of taking power in a two-year cycle instead of the ensuing four-year mandate (NDI 2009).

In 2002, the nationalist parties won most seats in parliament and replaced the non- nationalist dominated parliament, although also three multi-ethnic parties won some seats. This government was heavily controlled by the international community. Compromises had to find their ways, but this was met with strong recalcitrance by the nationalist parties. Making concessions under international pressure was yet the only way to have a nationalist government (NDI 2009).

(30)

that were (and still are) vested in each entity to the central government, in an effort to overcome ethnic divisions and simplify State structures. The House of Representatives decided to return to the question after the elections. However, an issue that continued to be part of the electoral campaigns was the debate over the status of the entities that compose Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosniak-led parties argued that Republika Srpska should be abolished, whereas Milorad Dodik, RS’s Prime Minister called for secession of RS from BiH (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008).

In the run towards the upcoming elections of 2010, the Constitution is once again subject of discussion. It reflects the attitude of the politicians on the current political system. The Bosnian Croat former Prime Minister Kresimir Zubak, pleaded for a third entity, namely a separate Bosnian Croat one. He argued that their Federal partners, the Bosniaks, are intentionally violating the laws and the Constitution in order to encourage the departure of non-Bosniaks and in this way to realize the goal set in Zenica in 1993, to achieve absolute domination in the central part of the country providing a link to the sea. Zubak further argues that a Croat entity would be perfectly legitimized, because the Croats are a sovereign people who can democratically vote for their own federation. The international community would stop this development, since this would stimulate the disintegration of Bosnia (Zubak 2010).

The leader of the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action, Tihic, believes that it is not good to talk about Constitutional reforms before the upcoming October elections. This indicates that his party is content with the current political system (Tihic 2010).

(31)

Nations sharply criticized RS’s violation of the DPA and the Bosnian Constitution (Ashton 2010).

The statements of the three Constitutional parties indicate that there is no consensus of the state and its Constitution between the members.

3.2.2 Consensus on the political system

A second, closely related to the previous reason for the inefficiency of the Bosnian consociational democracy is the lack of consensus of the elites of all constitutive peoples on the political system or a lack of a firm belief of the elites of all ethnic segments that the preservation of the existing Constitutional and political system is necessary and desirable. The lack of consensus on the existing political system leads to the failure of the elites to create overarching loyalties among the social groups (Kasapovid 2005).

The lack of consensus in Bosnia has always been present. This lack arises from the historic development that creating a state is not necessarily a sufficient condition for creating a nation. For this to understand, a short recapitulation of the emergence of the three peoples in Bosnia is useful. Bosnia was from the middle-ages to the end of the twentieth century never an independent state. Therefore, ‘the state’ as such could never fulfill the role as integrating factor as it apparently functions. However, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the monarchical Yugoslavia have put into motion the integration of Serbian and Croatian communities in the area. The presence of the Bosnian Muslims comes from the Ottoman conquest of the area. These developments contribute to the difficulties to create a single Bosnian nation; it is very difficult, if not impossible to delete the inherent feeling of belonging to a certain people, especially when this is tried by an external power to construct. This is best illustrated by the failed attempt to create a Yugoslav nation after the establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918 (Kasapovid 2005). The only reason Yugoslavia did not collapse under Tito, was his hard-handed regime which held the state together.

(32)

nationalistic in their basis; the Muslims argue that the Serbs are rewarded for their struggle by getting what they initially wanted; an ethnically ‘clean’ homogeneous Serbian part of Bosnia, factually independent. Republika Srpska is said not to be created by DPA, but only verified by it (Kasapovid 2005).

The consequences of including three constitutive parties with different backgrounds in the DPA now become more visible. Republika Srpska is quite homogeneous in population, but the Bosnian-Croatian Federation by far is equally populated. The Croats are outnumbered by the Bosniaks and the Federation is made up of two segments of very unequal size (Kasapovid 2005).

The 2006 elections once again emphasized the lack of consensus on the political system. Seven parties in Bosnian parliament agreed on a proposal for Constitutional amendments that would have given legislative authority to an expended 87-member lower house of parliament, leaving the upper house to deal only with issues of vital national interest. However, this proposal was strongly opposed by the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) and the newly nationalist Croatian party Croatians Together (HDZ 1990), which resulted in a postponement of Constitutional issues after the elections (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008). The upcoming 2010 elections have once again been scene of nationalist rhetoric, resulting once more in fear of Bosnian politicians to lose votes if they propose reforms of the Constitution. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that before the October elections of 2010 there will be any reforms. The Bosnian politicians appear to be incapable of taking responsibility for policy in their own country. They may not be happy with the current status as an international protectorate; the only way to change this is to take their future in their own hands, even if this results in a loss of votes. The international community will only withdraw when the political elites prove to see the interest of a united country, where ethnic interests are inferior to country interests.

3.2.3 Lack of a consistent strategy of the international actor on establishing democracy

(33)

for experiments with reforms of the Constitutional order that may lead to political crises in the Bosnia. These adjustments since the end of the war are explored in this paragraph, together with its consequences.

In terms of democratic regime building in Bosnia, the OHR and the OSCE are the most important international institutions. Annex 10 of the DPA tasked the OHR with monitoring and facilitating the implementation of the agreement by the local parties, and it was mandated to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in civilian aspects of the peace settlement (Oisín 2009, 155). Annex 10 initially provided the High Representative with a weak enforcement mechanism. However, when in 1997 the country did not progress as wished, the Peace Implementation Council wanted reinforcement of the OHR’s powers, granting greater authority to take action in case of violation of the DPA, or of resistance to the international agenda. At the Bonn conference in 1997, the High Representative was given substantial new powers (Oisín 2009, 156). These powers included the authority to make binding decisions and impose legislation on issues where there is a lack of consensus and the power to dismiss local officials who are obstructing the implementation of DPA (Peace Implementation Council 1997). Since the extension of its powers, the intervention of the OHR has increased substantially. The sanctions are imposed unilaterally by the HR and are not controlled by another actor. This gives rise to the question how legitimate these interventions are (Dimitrová, Democracy and International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2005). Knaus and Martin (2003) compared the international presence and decision-making with liberal imperialism, since in Bosnia the expatriates make the major decisions, key appointments must receive foreign approval and where key reforms are enacted at the decree of international organizations. Hence, the international community controls the commanding heights of what amounts to a system of ‘indirect rule’ (Knaus and Martin 2003).

(34)

times a month. Christian Schwarz-Shilling (2006-2007) 3.9 times a month and Miroslav Lajčàk (2007-2009) on average 2.7 times a month. The current HR Valentin Inzko’s ratio is around zero (Pescanik 2010). Inzko encourages the Bosnian people to use ‘their’ Bonn powers on the elections on October 3, 2010, and elect new people and new ideas (Morning Media Brief 2010). This pronunciation led to indignation among some Bosnian people, because of its paradoxical content. They argued that in the first place, without the international community there exist no Bonn powers. And in the second place, even when the Bosnian people have elected their executive branch of authority, if the OHR does not agree with the newly elected people it can decide to place these officials out of office (Pescanik 2010).4

A democratic deficit lies in the fact that the measures taken by the HR cannot be reviewed by the Bosnian Court (Dimitrová 2005). Hence, there exists a lack of accountability that can send a wrong message to the people whose democracy is still new and fragile. In an open letter to the former HR Ashdown, Cox and Knaus (2003) argued why the Bonn Powers have become counterproductive in the development of effective institutions and a healthy democratic process. First, as for the rule of law, the protectorate role of the HR reinforces the worst tendencies of the old Yugoslav political culture, namely ‘the strong hand’ that acts outside the political process. Neither the Bosnian court nor the people can control decisions taken by the HR, nor in practice does the monitoring Peace Implementation Council. Second, as for the democratic process, as long as the HR has the final word, the Bosnian politicians are not forced to build constituencies in favor of unpopular reforms. Hence, they don’t need to engage in the hard work of forging consensus among different groups and across different levels of government. They don’t need to take responsibility as long as the international community is there to take this away from the Bosnian politicians. Moreover, it is very difficult for the politicians to disagree with the OHR’s policies, on penalty of a decision of the OHR to (Cox and Knaus 2003).

The interests of the Bosnian parties often oppose those of the international community, which also should be in the interest of the country. This in the past has more than once led to inconveniences between the Bosnian parties and the HR. The HR can never satisfy all parties if the ethnically-based rhetoric does not disappear. Ashdown labeled

(35)

Dayton a bureaucratic monster, acknowledging that the ethnically-led bureaucracy is hardly workable; not for the HR, nor for the ethnic parties (Ashdown 2007).

Moreover, the strategy of the HR in the process of Constitutional reform differs with the country of origin of the HR, and the legal system and legal tradition of that country which was frequently taken as model for actual reform (Seizovic 2007).

Another factor contributing to the inconsistency is the ambiguity of the closure of the OHR. This closure has already been subject of debate since the end of the initial closure date. Neither the international community nor the Bosnian parties know what to expect. Moreover, every time a new HR came into office, it remained unclear what powers were granted (Woodard 2007). Some argue that it is imperative for the international community to realize that, although the process of state-building comes in very slow paces, premature exit can have the consequence of slipping out embryonic roots, abandoning moderate voices to illiberal powerbrokers (Perry 2008).

3.3 Policy outcomes

Figure 3 demonstrates that a problem that can possibly emerge while coming to an answer to this sub-question is that elites may initiate conflict to bolster their power at the center (Sisk 2003). This section explores the (policy) outcomes resulting from atypical power constellations in the Bosnian presidium from 1995 up till now. Furthermore, the role of the international community (OHR) in the outcomes will be discussed.

The Bosnian electoral system represents the three ethnic groups. Most voters still cast their votes primarily on the basis of which party is perceived as being the defender of the interest of their own ethnic group. As a result, electoral candidates of ethnic-based parties are concerned only with appealing to and attracting the votes of their own ethnic group. The consequence is that politics in Bosnia turns into a zero-sum game, as ethnic leaders strike postures designed to show their nationalist credentials, to the detriment of the responsible government (International Crisis Group 1998).

(36)

basis of the Federation itself. Steiner called upon the Bosnian Croats and Muslims to not use the international community as a scapegoat for their own inaction and that commitment could only be brought about from the inside, not from the outside (Steiner 1996).

The former HR Carl Bildt in reaction to the third meeting of the Joint Interim Commission in Sarajevo expressed his concern with the fact that neither the Federation nor RS representatives amended their respective Constitutions before the date agreed in DPA (Bildt 1996). Furthermore, in his third report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Bildt declared that the results of the first elections in September 1996 in fact repeated the experience of the 1990 elections, namely the dominant role of the nationalist parties and their pursuance of nationalist issues in politics (Bildt 1996).

The dissatisfaction of the international community about the policy outcomes of Bosnian politics was demonstrated by the increasingly interventionist role of the OHR. The Bonn Powers gave the HR the power to impose decisions when the Bosnian authorities proved incapable (International Crisis Group 1998).

The Bosnian parties in annex 10 of DPA agreed to create laws and to take decision about the law on citizenship. These laws entail the agreement on passport laws, freedom of movement, license plate and currency issues. All of these issues concerned non-discriminatory provisions, which for the ethnic parties proved to be a sensitive issue. Each of the parties tried to gain as much power in parliament in order to press their interests through in the new legislation. When by the end of 1997 still no decisions were taken, the HR intervened by imposing a decision on these laws (Westendorp 1997).

The 2000 general election democratically worked better. There were still near-monopolies of the Serbs’ ultranationalist SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) and the Croats’ ultranationalist HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in the respective ethnic areas. However, more than half of the Muslim votes went to a multiethnic challenger to the Bosnian SDA (Party of Democratic Action), which led to an Alliance for Change coalition that pledged carry out reforms (Pond 2006, 154).

(37)

appointment by local authorities of successor officials every much problematic as those removed (Caplan 2004, 59).

The Bosnian politicians condemn the decisions of the HR. Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, in her latest quarterly report to the UN concludes that RS refused to comply with any of the HR’s (future) decisions and RS announced to sue the current and the previous HR’s for misuse of the Bonn powers (Ashton 2010). Milorad Dodik, RS’s Prime Minister, pledged for a referendum to reject decisions of the HR to extend the mandates of the international community (Latal 2010).

3.4 Complementary or exclusive?

The interference of the international community in Bosnian politics has proven not to please the three Bosnian actors. The Dayton Peace Agreements that ended the war, proved to be a bureaucratic monster. It was good to make an end to the atrocities in BiH and to tight the hands of the belligerent parties, but politically in turned out not to be effective and not workable. The ineffectiveness of the Constitution may have as a cause that DPA was negotiated by actors of war, even war criminals. It cannot be surprising that the compromise made by them does not provide rules for a new and liberal democratic beginning (Schwarz-Schilling 2007, 165). An ineffective Constitution needs to be revised or reformed. Especially in a country like BiH, where the democratic ethos is not yet deeply rooted in political life, a reform proves to be a tough job. Through provocation and counteraction, the reform finds itself in an impasse.

(38)

Bosnian norms conflict with the HR’s norms and thus where interference is needed in the eyes of the HR. The different HRs, however, all used different strategies, resulting in a lack of consistent strategy of international actors in establishing a democratic state. The constituent parties also perceived this lack of consistency as such, which in turn triggered new reactions of the Bosnian actors. Especially the Serbs are not happy with the interference of the HR, witnessing their reactions. The results of the first elections after the formation of the Bonn-powers gave evidence that a heavy-handed approach by a third party worked counter-productive. Strong international backing for reformist candidates seemed to have contributed to their defeat, as some voters resented the intervention of the international community (Caplan 2004, 59).

(39)

4 Proportionality versus the role of the international community

The idea behind the proportionality principle is to have a proportional representation in the electoral system and a proportional allocation of jobs, spending, representation and participation by ethnic group leaders. To examine to what extent this principle is executed as it originally was meant, the current representation of all parties at multiple levels are explored. This chapter will discuss the sub-question ‘How does the proportionality principle cope with the attitudes of the entities’ politicians toward the role of the international community?’

4.1 The proportionality principle

The proportionality principle is supported by the fact that there exist three major segments and no majority segment in the current Bosnian political system. This is a favorable factor for efficiency of consociationalism. Although this is a favorable factor, it comes not without problems. The principle of proportionality serves two important functions; first, it is a method of allocating civil service appointments and scarce financial resources in the form of government subsidies among the different segments. The second and more important function of proportionality relates to the decision-making process itself.

4.1.1 The constituent peoples

(40)

Parliamentary Assembly solely on the ground of their ethnic origins (CNN 2009). This despite article 2 of the Constitution, which provides human rights and fundamental freedoms in Bosnia. It explicitly mentions the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms to be secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground (it goes even further by making it more explicit in listing these grounds such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status) (OHR 1995).

The structure of Dayton encourages the politicization of ethnicity. This is illustrated by the voting system. Citizens of Bosnia vote for the rotating three-member presidency, each member belonging to one of the ethnic groups, but not to ‘the others’. Only members of RS can vote for the Serb member and only members of the Federation respectively for the Croat and the Bosniak member. This reinforces the notion among voters to vote for their own kind (NDI 2009).

In December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the Bosnian Constitution violates human rights, since the fourteen other minorities in BiH are excluded to stand for election to the HoP or for the Presidency. The Court ruled that the Constitution violated multiple articles of the ECHR, concerning non-discrimination, right to free elections and general prohibition of discrimination. When the ruling of the ECHR will be implemented, it will not only allow people of other ethnicities than the three constitutive people to be represented in Bosnian politics, it will equally allow Serb minorities in the Federation and Croat and Bosniak minorities in RS to stand for office in the entity where they live (Claridge 2010).

Consociationalism with an External Actor in Bosnia and Herzegovina