A Path Dependency for Turkey's European Union Membership

A Path Dependency for Turkey’s European Union Membership

A thesis submitted for the degree (MA) International Relations: European Union Studies

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Eren Duzgun Second reader: Dr. Jan Rood

Word Count: 14,653 5th _{July 2019}

Abstract

Parallels have been drawn between a catholic marriage and the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Every time the relationship appears to be on the brink of divorce a closer step towards Turkey’s accession is made. In this sense, the EU-Turkey relationship is in historical institutionalist terms path dependent. The institutionalisation of this relationship has meant that divorce incurs a high cost and is, therefore, unlikely to happen. Theoretical explanations have been given for and against Turkey’s accession, but these are unable to explain the fluidity of this relationship. Concentrating on history and how arguments are historically and contextually conditioned, this thesis incorporates a historical institutionalist framework to explain the decision-making by the EU in deepening its path dependent relationship with Turkey in order to aid in understanding EU enlargement and in particular Turkey’s EU accession process. Two critical junctures of the periods from 1997-1999 and 2011-2016 will be analysed to reveal the central elements which explain the EU’s decision-making. This analysis will examine EU documents concerning Turkish accession such as presidency conclusions, statements of the EU Heads of State or Government and international agreements between Turkey and the EU. In addition, this research will also draw on the already existing academic literature and use statements from the media and from leading figures to reflect on Turkey’s accession. Through using a historical institutionalist approach this thesis makes an original contribution in arguing that Europe’s enlargement approach has become vulnerable to reverse conditionality, fostering a path dependent relationship. The EU sees Turkey as a strategic ally rather than as an equal partner. Enlargement in the case of Turkey was initially used to incentivise Turkey to cooperate and has, therefore, been the EU’s most powerful source of leverage. However, this use of enlargement has made the EU vulnerable to the implementation of reverse conditionality. As soon as accession loses its significance divorce could be immanent unless the couple can find a compromise to settle on a different kind of relationship.

Table of Contents

L

A

________________________________ 4

Introduction ________________________________________ 5

Literature Review __________________________________ 8

The Historical Background of EU-Turkey Relations ________ 8

Arguments for Turkish Accession _____________________ 11

Arguments Against Turkish Accession _________________ 13

Theorizing European Enlargement ___________________ 16

Rational Approaches______________________________ 17

Constructivist Approaches _________________________ 18

Historical Institutionalism _________________________ 19

Chapter 1 _____________________________________ 22

1997-199: The High Cost of Reversal from the Luxembourg

Summit to the Helsinki Summit ____________________ 22

A Change in Attitude ____________________________ 22

Keeping a Re-emerging Power in the European Fold ___ 25

A Historical Institutionalist Explanation to EU-Turkey

Relations from 1997-1999 ________________________ 29

Chapter 2 ___________________________________ 32

2011-2016: The Cost of No Cooperation and Lessons

Learned from 1997 ____________________________ 32

Reopening a Negotiation Chapter _________________ 32

Turkey as a Migratory Superpower________________ 35

A Historical Institutionalist Explanation to EU-Turkey

Relations from 2011-2016 ______________________ 37

Conclusion _________________________________ 40

Bibliography ______________________________ 44

List of Abbreviations

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ROC – Republic of Cyprus

UK – United Kingdom

PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers' Party AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party CEM – Coercive Engineerd Migration (Greenhill 2016)

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment GDP – Gross Domestic Product

Introduction

Today's relationship between Turkey and the EU is like a Catholic marriage: divorce is not an option for either side. The only question then is whether the couple will be happy or not and the only special partnership that is acceptable to Turkey and to the vast majority of EU members is one they have today - an open-ended accession process (Gerald Knaus 2011).

The Turkey- European Union (EU) accession process appears to have come to an end, but divorce papers have not been served. Many in Turkey have questioned the future of the EU and their role within it. Many do not wish to give up their sovereignty, and they regard Europe to be engulfed with Islamophobia and a hostility towards other aspects of their culture. In Europe, many maintain cultural and religious prejudices objecting to Turkey's membership, and they continue to criticise Turkey's lack of compliance with European norms. The relationship has not come to an end and it was not that long ago that the EU 're-energised' accession negotiations with Turkey (European Council 2016). Nevertheless, Turkey’s EU accession process has still come to a standstill and is likely to remain so, if power dynamics do not take a radical shift. Turkey’s longstanding EU accession process provides insight as a case study to the broader dynamics and purpose of European integration and enlargement. As the project of European integration continues, many have come to fear the demise of the nation state, their national sovereignty and identity. The process of

European enlargement, has, therefore, become a controversial topic of discussion amongst intellectuals but also amongst the general public, especially as the political landscape of the EU is changing, with the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

The policy capacity of European enlargement is a central aspect of the EU, yet different explanations for European enlargement have been prophesized (Bartkowski 2003; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2016; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier 2002). The overarching aim of analysing the case of Turkey in the broader framework of EU enlargement is to contribute to the already established research exposing the greater purpose and impetus behind European enlargement. Instead of taking a narrow focus on short periods and issues in isolation as to why Turkey is not a member, this research will investigate this topic from a different angle, placing a strong emphasis on the role of history. This research is valuable as it does not discredit already established arguments but builds on these and makes an original contribution by arguing that Turkey's ability to employ reverse conditionality is a

central element as to why European and Turkish relations are path dependent. These concepts will be clarified in the literature review and theoretical framework chapters of this thesis.

Accession conditions require potential member states to conform to the Copenhagen criteria. The EU appears to set the norm for political structure by imposing such criteria, arguably posturing as a normative power (Manners 2002). Turkey's slow, yet open-ended accession process, has been explained through arguments of both a rationalist and normative nature. Turkey's economic standing and its failure to comply with European democratic values and human rights have been the explanations which have gained a significant amount of academic attention. The unresolved divide in Cyprus also remains an issue (Öniş 2003, 14). Cultural and religious prejudices also still play a role along with issues concerning the implementation of enlargement such as Turkey's geographical location and population size (Akçapar 2007, 22-23; Benhabib and Isiksel 2006, 221). Whilst these arguments may have contributed to stalling Turkey's accession, these factors alone do not explain the stalemate. Explanations such as cultural and religious prejudices have influenced decision-making because these sentiments have been historically conditioned. A lot of the literature takes a very narrow focus, concentrating on either Turkey or EU interests (Barysch 2007; Flam 2004; Kramer 2006: Öniş 2003). Whilst this research will reflect on the decision-making by the EU; broader contextual factors undoubtedly influenced this decision-making. With such a broad range of arguments, there is a need for a more inclusive framing approach to explain the EU's decision-making on Turkey's accession. This thesis will, therefore, incorporate a historical institutionalist framework. Historical institutionalism infers that political

institutions play a prominent role in structuring political behaviour. Institutional norms and regulations and the responses to these, influence an actors decision-making. Historical institutionalists draw on the greater historical significance through the identification of critical junctures, which are events that influence the chances of reoccurrence (Skocpol and Pierson 2002,6). This thesis will draw on two critical junctures which will be discussed in chapters one and two. Chapter one will focus on the period from 1997-1999 and chapter two will focus on the period from 2011-2016. In both these cases the EU made an unexpected decision when it appeared as if divorce was imminent, offering a thought-provoking period of analysis to explain why the EU decided to move forward along the road of accession with Turkey. The period from 1997-1999 offers value as often the process leading up to accession negotiations is ignored (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 501). The more contemporary period from 2011-2016 aims to balance the previous period by looking at more recent affairs. This thesis will, therefore, reveal what factors contribute to making Turkey’s EU accession

process, path dependent; where at the point of opportunity to break off the relationship, the cost of reversal is too high (Levi 1997, 28). The following research question shall, therefore, be considered throughout this paper:

During the critical junctures of 1997-1999 and 2011-2016, what are the central elements which explain the decision-making by the EU in deepening its path dependent relationship with Turkey and how do these explain Turkey’s longstanding EU accession process? This thesis shall incorporate a multidisciplinary framework combining both history and politics. The structure of this thesis will be as follows; it will first offer a brief introduction to the history of EU-Turkey relations. It will then explore the different arguments for and against Turkey's potential accession. These arguments will reveal that both normative and rational explanations have been made in explaining Turkey's slow accession process, and how more of an inclusive framework which draws on historical contextual factors is imperative to conduct sophisticated research. After the historical institutionalist framework has been described and justified, the objective of this thesis is to identify the central elements of the two critical junctures, the time periods stated above. Spread over two analytical

chapters, these elements will reveal what has made Turkey’s EU accession process path dependent.

Literature Review

The Historical Background of EU-Turkey Relations

Turkey stands alone among the nations. For centuries it was the terror of Christianity; for generations it was the Sick Man of Europe; today it stands formidably on the edge of Asia surrounded in the universal mind, as always, by an aura of mingles respect, resentment and fear (Morris 1991, xi).

Turkey has a longstanding relationship with Europe that precedes European integration. After the decline of the Ottoman Empire and under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, Turkey

resisted division and concentrated on the modernisation of a Turkish state. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the first World War, western development has been central to official state policy (Öniş 2010, 16-17). This westernising process, which included reforms concerned with law and economics but also addressed larger existential concerns, occurred simultaneously with Europe's inclination for Europeanization

(Allessandri, Lesser and Tastan 2018, 6). Shortly after World War II, Turkey became part of the securitisation project of NATO in 1952. In 1959 Turkey applied for associate

membership of the European Economic Community. Whilst more tangible economic and political benefits may have triggered the movement towards a formal partnership, Turkey viewed this alliance as the legitimate recognition of its revolutionised state (Allessandri, Lesser and Tastan 2018, 6). The application for associate membership into the European Economic Community led to an Association Agreement which was aimed at forming a Customs Union. In 1987 Turkey requested full membership. However, the EU indicated that negotiations during this time would be unmanageable due to the transformations the EU was undergoing in conjunction with the fall of the Soviet Union (Flam 2004, 172). Turkey faced its greatest rejection during the Luxembourg summit in 1997, where its candidate status was refused despite successful integration into the customs union and other European states being offered candidacy during this summit (Eralp 2002, 71-75). Turkey received official EU candidate status at the Helsinki Summit meeting of the European Council in 1999. Turkey has since held the official title of an 'accession partner' with the EU aimed at developing a framework where critical areas of development are established and worked on (Flam 2004, 172).

The accession negotiations launched in 2005 are currently frozen. The EU-Turkey relationship was faltering in 2011 (Sipahioğlu 2017, 52), but it seemed to be saved when in

March 2016 the EU and Turkey formed a migration deal which provided Turkey with an opportunity to move forward with its membership. Turkey remains intertwined with the EU on areas concerning economics, security and migration. Nevertheless, Turkey appears to be too far down the de-Europeanization path with the deterioration of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (Sipahioğlu 2017, 52). For these reasons, the General Affairs Council decided in June 2018 to freeze accession negotiations with Turkey for the time being

(European Commission 2019).

EU-Turkey relations currently appear to be on the brink of divorce; however,

whenever the relationship is at a low, the EU deepens its path with Turkey. Harry Flam draws attention to the Nice summit in 2000 as the moment that demonstrated that the EU was no longer considering Turkish membership (Flam 2004, 172). Flam acknowledges that Turkey's status as a candidate for membership has gained little formal recognition considering it did not receive so much as a timetable, a customary procedure to set the progress for future integration (Flam 2004, 172). Whilst Flam draws on the Nice summit as a barrier to accession; little emphasis is placed on contextual explanations as to why the EU dismissed Turkish membership at this time and despite failing to provide Turkey with a timetable, still left accession on the table. Although scholars have revealed various arguments to be based on concerns for the institutional inferences of Turkey's accession or the cultural ramifications accession could have for the European project, few have addressed the root causes of these arguments by looking at the larger contextual and historical relevance. This paper will consider the 1997 Luxembourg summit as a critical juncture. This summit will be considered as it had a profound effect on Turkey, feeling rejected as the EU proceeded to acknowledge other applicants. In addition to the first critical juncture the second critical juncture will identify the central elements in the period from 2011-2016 that influenced the EU’s decision-making in moving towards Turkey’s accession. The contextual relevance of these periods will be considered to help determine why relations are path dependent, this theoretical notion will be expanded on in the theoretical framework section of this thesis.

Since the negotiations commenced in 2005, there has been widespread opposition to Turkey's potential EU membership. Member states have instead hinted at a privileged partnership (De Vreese et al. 2012, 218-219; Nugent 2007, 482). A privileged partnership infers something less than membership, which is based on no legal framework and has mostly been received as an insult by the Turkish government (Euractiv 2009). Despite there being a wide range of arguments as to why Turkey should not be a member, and suggestions made for a privileged partnership, membership remains on the table. This thesis will conduct this

research by looking into the larger process of European enlargement and particularly membership accession. Turkey is a unique case due to its longstanding bid for membership and can, therefore, also offer insight into the larger purpose of EU enlargement.

Emphasising the role of history in the decision-making of the EU is significant to the analysis on enlargement as since the 1990s Europe recreated itself and has since been defined as a 'new Europe' that concerns itself with human rights, democracy and identity formation (Öniş 2003, 10). On the other hand, Turkey's cultural identity and ideology has been referred to as 'Kemalism;' describing Turkey's commitment to westernisation and modernisation (Yükleyen 2009, 121). Turkey's secularisation period was initiated by the resistance of Mustafa Kemal during the first World War, establishing Turkish independence (Kili 1980, 381). To transform Turkey into a secular state, Kemal sought to overthrow, through a revolution, the imperial notions associated with the Ottoman rule and develop Turkey into a modern-day European state (Mansfield 2013, 194). With Turkey fully committed to western development by the 1960s, and with the power lying in the hands of the EU due to its economic and political power, it appeared Turkey was submitting to Europe and the discourse they evoke (Yükleyen 2009, 121). Both the EU and Turkey, have, over time, transformed their cultural identities. This thesis will, therefore, pay particular attention to what the case study of Turkey's accession has to say about Europe's values. Recognising that Turkey has become a revisionist actor, it will further reflect on how the EU can respond to this whilst adhering to its own cultural identity. Most of the literature indicates EU-Turkey relations to be asymmetrical, with the EU holding the upper-hand in accession negotiations (Flam 2004; Yükleyen 2009). An example of this one-sided power relationship which can be seen in the works of Flam (2004) where he represents the EU as taking the initiative which has prevented or enabled negotiation. This may be due to the euro centricity of some of the works, formulating a biased and somewhat simplistic interpretation only revealing one side of the story. It will, therefore, also be imperative to briefly consider Turkey's domestic situation to understand what has shaped the relationship and led to Turkey not being considered for membership.

Turkey is intertwined with the EU, and this affiliation is unlikely to change in the near future. Turkey's accession process has gained much scholarly attention as well as a

significant amount of attention from the general public. Academic analysis has covered most aspects of Turkey's membership bid ranging from papers which discuss Turkey's strategic location, cultural identity and economic positionality, to name just a few, which presents the EU with both challenges and opportunities. Nonetheless, why these challenges have not

materialised into divorce is often overlooked, and it will be the purpose of this thesis to uncover the roots of these challenges and reveal the logic behind this impasse.

Arguments for Turkish Accession

Turkey's ambition for EU integration was mainly driven by the benefits associated with membership, believing it would increase economic welfare and secure foreign policy relations (Barysch 2005, 5). When negotiations commenced in 2005, arguments against Turkish accession were made on economic grounds, however, as stated by the IMF, during this period Turkey experienced incredible economic growth rates and the IMF projected the Turkish economy to have future potential (Krueger 2005). Yet, the IMF’s positive predictions do not seem to have materialised. Currently Turkey is still recovering from the 2008

recession and economists are apprehensive about Turkey's medium-term growth prospects as Turkey suffers from high levels of inequality. Investors have also been wary of investing in Turkey due to its complicated tax system and high levels of corruption. Turkey’s accession would, therefore, mean less state intervention and encourage FDI and boost Turkey’s GDP (Barysch 2005, 5). Burak Akçapar (2007) infers that the EU could also greatly benefit

economically from Turkey. Turkey is a large economy, which is mostly service based and the EU's prosperity from recent years is partly owed to Turkey (Akçapar 2007, 20). In addition, with Turkey, part of the EU's single market, the bargaining power of the Union would become pronounced (Akçapar 2007, 20). George Friedman also highlights the importance of Turkey's economic power within the broader region as the only modern economy in the Muslim world and its close relationship with the United States makes it an essential strategic actor (Friedman 2009, 80-82). More recently, suggestions have been made to modernise the customs union with Turkey, increasing trade liberalisation between the two. This

modernisation, it has been argued, has the potential to facilitate economic and political reforms (Ülgen 2017).

Turkey's membership would refute the claim that the European project is not an inclusive Union and not just a Christian club. In terms of foreign policy, Turkey is a passage to providing stability in the greater region. Whilst Turkey has built foreign relations with countries such as Iraq, relations with other countries, for instance, Azerbaijan and Israel remain apprehensive. Cooperating with the EU is, therefore, advised based on a shared

ambition for regional stability. Turkey's geostrategic positioning may help to bring peace and security (Kramer 2006). As claimed by Emerson and Tocci, "Turkey has the role of a

geographical hub for regional cooperation" (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 9).

If Turkey were to meet the Copenhagen criteria, this could further legitimise the use of EU conditionality policies. Conditionality is a notion concerned with the relative power relations between two actors where one actor is in a stronger position and can influence the weaker actor (Papakostas 2012). EU conditionality policies have mostly been associated with European enlargement. The policy of conditionality used to be concerned with economic transformation but is now often directed at altering political norms and structures (Stokke 2017). Europe's credibility and particularly its policy of conditionality, which is applied to Turkey, will be reflected on in this thesis. Moreover, providing an original contribution to this work, it will be suggested that Turkey employs a strategy of reverse conditionality during the accession process. Reverse conditionality was coined by Jean-Pierre Cassarino (2007) who in discussing Europe's involvement in negotiating readmission agreements, found Europe could be put in an inferior position relative to its negotiating partner as it had to retract from its original position due to the relative costs (2007, 191-192). Whilst the notion of conditionality has often been associated with Europe's power convictions; membership has allowed candidate states such as Turkey to also engage in reverse conditionality.

According to Heinz Kramer (2006), EU member states disagree on Turkeys membership in the EU, however, they do recognise if Turkey were to undergo democratic reform and have an efficient market economy, this would be beneficial to the EU (Kramer 2006). This demonstrates that political integration is not a priority for most member states and, therefore, Turkey may offer benefits which it could provide without having full

accession into the EU. Whilst this thesis will not compare the views on Turkeys membership across the EU member states, it will be relevant to look at some of the statements from leading figures within the EU to understand the complexity of what the different interests and obstacles are from the perspective of the EU and why despite these challenges the Turkey-EU relationship remains inextricably entwined.

Arguments Against Turkish Accession

Potential member states must conform to the Copenhagen criteria established in 1993. The Copenhagen criteria impose socio-economic principles. These accession criteria include; European democratic values of liberalism and human rights along with the implementation of a market economy and the implementation of the acquis, which binds all member states (European Commission 2016). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the negotiation process came to a stalemate because of the EU's double standards when it comes to these criteria, "The Copenhagen criteria are a thin veneer coated over old religious and cultural prejudices" (Benhabib and Isiksel 2006, 221). For Europe, these prejudices are grounded in historical records, where the Ottoman Empire came close to capturing Vienna. These stereotypical perceptions have created "hostile collective images" and lead to a process of 'othering' (Benhabib and Isiksel 2006, 221).

Looking at the meanings of both 'Europe' and 'Islam' Ahmet Yükleyen maintains Europe serves its interests by essentialising both religious and cultural arguments on the accession of Turkey into the EU (Yükleyen 2009, 121). According to Yükleyen, essentialist definitions characterising both Islam and Europe have fostered tensions and obstructed Turkey's accession for EU membership. The works of Seyla Benhabib and Türküler Isiksel (2006) and Ahmet Yükleyen (2009) infer that cultural prejudices are, therefore, employed to mask other interests; however, the underlying strategy of the EU is not mentioned. It will be the purpose of this thesis to uncover these interests. Yükleyen (2009) posits that September 11 was a turning point in the EU's consideration of Turkey's membership accession as it became symbolic of the tensions that multilateral cooperation is currently facing and the struggle between Islam and the West (Yükleyen 2009, 123). Burak Akçapar (2007) also discusses the impact of two murder cases in the Netherlands of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn and how these cases impacted Turkey's membership. Akçapar (2007) emphasises how Turkey was “caught up in a bigger storm that concerns immigration, integration and xenophobia” (Akçapar 2007, 25). This thesis will not concentrate on individual isolated incidences but will instead address larger issue themes and the role of history to explain Turkey's stalled accession talks.

Turkey's geographical location and its significant population size have been arguments made against Turkey's accession. The former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has touched on these issues. "Turkey is a country that is close to Europe, an

is located outside of Europe. With Turkey joining, it would mean sharing a border with Syria, Iraq and Iran (Debating Europe 2019). This raises further questions on what enlargement is concerned with. Arguments against Turkish accession based on Turkey's geographical location infers European enlargement is concerned primarily with geographical expansion. However, arguments have also been made based on norms and values. Turkey's population size has also been presented as an issue. Turkey's accession, it has been claimed would increase job competition and dominate the EU markets. Accession could, therefore, lead to migration patterns destabilising the EU markets (Akçapar 2007, 22). Moreover, voting influence is dictated according to a country's population size, which would change the dynamics within the European Parliament (Akçapar 2007, 23).

The unresolved Cyprus dispute, which dates back to 1974 has also contributed to preventing Turkey's accession (Öniş 2003, 24). The island is divided between the Turkish Cypriots in the North, the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Greek Cypriots in the South, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which is an EU member state. The EU is faced with a dilemma concerning Turkey's accession as it would be accepting a candidate which rejects one of its members, the RoC (European Voice 2004). EU-Turkey relations were obstructed through the accession of the RoC in 2004 (Öniş 2003, 24). It was perceived by an anti-EU coalition in Turkey that the EU was incapable of

upholding a neutral approach regarding the Cyprus issue. The membership of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was granted without meeting conditions to resolve the dispute. This has further fostered tensions and made settlement even more unlikely as the RoC is faced with little incentive to form a workable compromise (Öniş 2003, 24). As it stands, the TRNC is economically and politically isolated, and Turkey refuses to recognise the RoC until these embargos are lifted. Moreover, Turkey refuses to apply to additional protocol, which is part of the customs union agreement where the ports of the TRNC must be accessible to the RoC (European Commission 2019; Gorgulu 2014). Under international isolation, Turkey has little incentive to comply with these compromises. This has brought a complex issue to the

negotiation table between Turkey and the EU.

It can, therefore, be inferred that the main obstacles for accession are: the historical and religious narrative of the Turkish people, the vast population of Turkey, the Cyprus problem, and concerns of political freedom and human rights. This thesis does not discredit these arguments but will aim to include broader historical contextual issues that influenced the decision-making of the two-time periods, to determine how past events have contributed

to the frozen accession negotiations. It will do so by analysing the central elements which contributed to Europe's decision-making on deepening its accession path with Turkey.

Theorizing European Enlargement

To be able to understand the underlying dynamics of why Turkey is not a member of the EU and consequently the broader notion of EU enlargement, an explanation must be given on a more general level to explain how EU enlargement transpires. Following a conceptual clarification of EU enlargement, three critical theories for the geographical expansion are given. The two most common approaches to EU enlargement will be considered to demonstrate their inability to comprehensively define the dynamics of the EU-Turkey enlargement process and justify the theoretical approach that this thesis wishes to suggest as an alternative.

According to Michelle Cini, and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (2016), European enlargement may be perceived as both a process and a policy (2016, 228). The interpretation of enlargement as a process illustrates enlargement as a continuous accession procedure where the candidate country is aiming to fulfil the membership criteria set by the EU. During the 1990s after the Cold War, EU enlargement became increasingly diversified with more countries wanting to join and more substantive issues such as democratisation playing a role. In response to the EU's expansion, the EU amended its institutional set-up to adapt to this increasing diversity. EU enlargement has since been seen as policy initiative where EU enlargement refers to the "principles, goals and instruments defined by the EU, with the aim of incorporating new member states" (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2016, 228). Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (2016) include aspects such as 'principles' into their definition referring to the process of Europeanization where states become integrated into the EU based on their norms and value systems (Katzenstein 1997, 262).

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2002) refer to the broader notion of enlargement as "the process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalisation of

organisational rules and norms" (2002, 52). According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002), who focus primarily on institutions, institutions can expand beyond their incumbent actors primarily through a social process (2002, 52). Maciej Bartkowski (2003) infers that the European enlargement period can be analysed in stages. 'Imaginary enlargement' is the process prior to the negotiations with the EU and ends after the formal conclusion of the membership negotiations. 'Authentic enlargement' on the other hand, is the period after the application is granted, and negotiation chapters have been closed (Bartkowski 2003, 3). Defining the broader concept of enlargement aids to help determine the relevance of the

considered theoretical approaches. With Turkey's reigning title as the longest standing EU-candidate, Turkey's 'imaginary enlargement' has long expired where it finds itself trapped in a position prior to the 'authentic enlargement' period. In this sense, enlargement categorically constitutes a development whereby it is both a process but also a promotion of policy in terms of norms and values. To accurately portray the multifaceted nature of enlargement, the definition by Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán (2016) shall be used.

Rational Approaches

Two broad schools of thought have been associated with EU enlargement. The first are rationalist theories which include broader models of neoliberal institutionalism and realism as well as liberal-intergovernmentalism. The rationalist hypothesis claims enlargement takes place following the orchestration of a cross-benefit analysis and specifically when the

benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs. This analysis may be steered through estimating the cost of transactions as bargaining power practicalities with increasing numbers becomes difficult. Another considered cost may include significant policy costs, for instance, the consequence of crowding costs or a diminution in political autonomy (Schimmefennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 511). Within the broader rationalist school, various schools of thought will conduct these cross-benefit analyses differently. Neo-liberal institutionalists, for example, exclusively concentrate on absolute gains. Realists, on the other hand, are concerned with relative power relations and security interests, enlargement is, therefore, encouraged if it tilts the balance of power in that member's favour (Waltz 1979, 117-27). Liberal

intergovernmentalism places particular emphasis on the bargaining process and the balance of power in relation to the EU, where the EU projects exclusivity (Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2016, 236).

Whilst the rationalist approach accounts for the larger geopolitical, economic and security-related undercurrents; this approach ignores the salience of the EU's normative power features which have played a central role in Turkey's membership bid. Rationalist approaches for Turkish accession, therefore, evaluate the costs and benefits of for instance the economic impact on Turkey's accession but also interests relating to Europe's increased energy security if Turkey joins (Kramer 2006). Despite contrary perceptions of arguments for and against Turkish accession, the rational choice theory would still not account for the slow

movement of accession negotiations as according to rational choice theory, Europe would stop negotiations as membership incurs a high cost or speed up negotiations given the

offsetting benefits. The theory fails to explain why the EU engages in expansive enlargement and is more specifically stuck in a period of stalemate between 'imaginary' and 'authentic' enlargement with Turkey (Bartkowski 2003, 3). Moreover, these rational approaches fail to reflect on the significance of the more normative aspects that have contributed to the prevention of Turkish accession, for instance, issues relating to religious and cultural diversity.

Constructivist Approaches

Social constructivist approaches contribute to explanations as to why the EU has further pursued membership despite incremental costs. It is based on the idea where social, economic and political transactions foster a 'community' which share similar values and beliefs

(Deutsch 1957, 5). The morals formed in these identity-based communities translate into how humans respond to certain situations and can, therefore, play an instrumental role in global governance, such as the implementation of foreign policy. Analysing EU enlargement through a constructivist lens comprises of examining cultural and normative factors as opposed to the material quality a country would gain through membership.

The constructivist approach explains the normative barriers that have prevented Turkish accession into the EU, such as the Copenhagen criteria and the broader strategy of conditionality. In addition, this approach allows for the examination of the continuity of these norms, which the EU lacks in its policy towards Turkey. Nevertheless, this approach would not be wholly sufficient on its own as it does not account for more rational arguments such as that relating to regional security interests. Moreover, constructivist arguments do not account for sudden value changes that can be witnessed over the long period of time between Turkey and European relations such as the sudden change in attitude in between the period of 1997 until 1999, which will be examined in chapter one. Constructivist arguments, however, cannot be solely separated from rational arguments either. Whilst constructivist explanations could usually not account for the material aspects involved in power relations, this case study, looking at the institutional factor of membership, examines these power relations which are also grounded in normative aspects. Constructivists argue policy is shaped by

ideology and values and denies objectivity, whilst this theory cannot explain specific material qualities concerning European enlargement it does aid in explaining underlying currents. For instance, Turkey, as shall be demonstrated in the following chapter, argued that the criteria for accession employed by the EU were not objective.

Historical Institutionalism

The EU accession process is strongly portrayed as a process grounded in normative principles. This can be seen in the application of the Copenhagen criteria or the implementation of conditionality to spur on a member's process of Europeanization.

Concentrating on the aspiration for the formation of a community is merely too simplistic as the EU, in the case of Turkey, has on occasion put its norms and values to one side to achieve larger geopolitical endeavours (Konings 2018).

Public policy through a constructivist lens infers "the mental image of the self" or indeed a national identity, but these national conceptions only account for part of the explanation. Public policy is also dictated by a state's position in the global order (Akçapar 2007, 57). Moreover, whilst Europeanization may often be interpreted as a one-way process where the EU projects its ideals onto the periphery, it may also be interpreted as a two-way process. "European integration shapes domestic policies, politics and polities but member states also project themselves by seeking to shape the trajectory of European integration in ways that suit national interests" (Bomberg and Peterson 2000, 7). This definition, according to Burak Akçapar (2007), is also applicable to a candidate member, such as Turkey (cited in Akçapar 2007, 62). This reveals the complex nature of European enlargement, which includes conceptions such as that of Europeanization. Europeanization touched on in the literature review, is an example which demonstrates the need for a more inclusive framing approach that can demonstrate both the constructivist identity-based reality but also the rationalist responses based on self-interest.

The enlargement process of the EU can, therefore, not be defined through either a rationalist or constructivist framework. Perhaps more accurately, in the case of Turkey, one can observe a constructivist enlargement effort which has at times been directed by

supplementary rationalist undertones. This thesis proposes the application of a historical institutionalist approach which accounts for both normative and rational considerations to aid

in an understanding of the broader dynamics at play concerning EU enlargement. This thesis will also employ discourse analysis when analysing the two periods. Discourse can be 'performative' (Fairclough 2001). Discourse provides agency and value to contextual and material surroundings (Broad and Daddow 2010, 208). This will reveal the relevance of historically contextualised factors. The two-time periods will be divided across two different chapters and the EU's approach during these periods shall first be described. The central elements shall then be considered individually before being explicitly integrated with the theoretical framework due to the plethora of factors that come into play and so not to lose the reader in the lexicon of historical institutionalism. The final section of the following chapters will, therefore, apply central notions and concepts from the theory, to help explain EU-Turkey relations, the decision-making process behind this and the complex nature of European enlargement.

Historical institutionalists regard institutions to be at the centre of their analysis, believing they have a great ability to shape specific outcomes. In this sense, institutions play a significant role in shaping public policy but also normative values. "Historical

institutionalists analyse organisational configurations where others look at particular settings in isolation; and they pay attention to critical junctures and long-term processes where others look only at slices of time or short-term manoeuvres" (Skocpol and Pierson 2002,1).

Historical institutionalism, therefore, exposes the relevant context of a series of events and the contingencies that characterise particular policy-making decisions (Skocpol and Pierson 2002,1). It looks at the larger historical context over a long time through the identification of critical junctures, which are instances that increase the chances of the same incident

reoccurring (Skocpol and Pierson 2002,6). Central to the theory of historical institutionalism is path dependency. Path dependency, according to Margaret Levi (1997), may be defined as "Once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice" (Levi 1997, 28). Path dependency, therefore, states that once decisions are institutionalised, reversing these decisions is often unlikely due to the incurred costs. This lens allows for a greater analysis into ephemeral events which pose significant influence as it is these events that trigger reoccurrence (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 6). Historical institutionalists, therefore, also pay attention to the relevant timing and

sequencing of events as they can have a noteworthy bearing on future developments. The identification of broader overarching interrelated themes, referred to as conjunctures is also central to historical institutionalism (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 8-9). The interaction of

broader themes can also lead to unintended consequences where the actors may be affected unexpectedly by the outcome of their choices; this is something which more functional arguments cannot adequately explain (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 14). Taking into

consideration the relative dynamics of power, this approach considers the institutional setting to be the result of power struggles. These concepts will be applied to the following analysis to uncover the greater significance of European enlargement and more specifically, Turkey's accession bid (Skocpol and Pierson 2002, 6).

According to Skocpol and Pierson (2002), historical institutionalism has three central qualities. Firstly, historical institutionalism addresses a broad topic which poses relevance for academics as well as the ordinary public. The larger question of European enlargement and particularly Turkey's accession has gained widespread attention. As documented in the literature review, numerous scholars have created various reasons based on diverse theories that justify why Turkey should or should not join the EU. Turkey's accession into the EU has also been the topic of discussion amongst the general public. For instance, arguments against Turkish accession have been concerned for a long time with the integration of immigrants as was reported in the International Herald Tribune "It was Turkeys misfortune that it is seeking to enter this exclusive, mainly Christian club, at a time when many Europeans believe they are witnessing the failure of multicultural society in Europe" (Bowley 2004). Secondly, Skocpol and Pierson (2002) refer to the importance of a longitudinal study. Both the EU and Turkey have undergone significant changes since Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community in 1959. Looking at explanations which stretch over a long period is, therefore, essential. Recognising that historical institutionalist approaches do of course vary, most will look at the collective effects on institutions as well as institutional norms and regulations instead of narrowly focusing on one institution. Given the complexity of the issue at hand, ranging from arguments based on power, geographic positioning, economic standing and identity, this theory is appropriate as it takes all of these arguments into account. Using a historical institutionalist approach to explain what the central elements are which explain the EU's decision in deepening its path dependent relationship with Turkey in the two periods, and how these explain the accession process, allows for a comprehensive historical analysis to be conducted.

Chapter 1

1997-1999: The High Cost of Reversal from the Luxembourg Summit

to the Helsinki Summit

The period stretching from the Luxembourg summit (1997) to the Helsinki summit (1999) may be defined as a critical juncture, as during this period, a moment of uncertainty was put to an end when Europe made a crucial decision which would have lasting consequences. Despite the EU's strong normative rhetoric when it comes to enlargement policy, the EU at the Helsinki summit dismissed its normative commitments and granted Turkey candidate status, deepening its accession path with Turkey. This decision appeared to be contrary to Europe's position during the Luxembourg summit. The EU's relations with Turkey had become so entrenched that the cost of reversal was too high. The following discussion will reveal the central elements that explain why Europe made this decision and perceived granting Turkey candidacy as the only viable option. Such analysis can aid in understanding the dynamics of EU-Turkey relations and the broader notion of European enlargement. This critical juncture will demonstrate the ambiguous attitude of the EU towards Turkey. In this chapter, the sequence of events of this critical juncture shall first be described. Drawing on historical and contextual factors, two central conjunctures which have deepened Europe's path dependent relationship with Turkey shall be revealed. After having independently looked at these factors, a historical institutionalist lens will be applied.

A Change in Attitude

For the EU, the framework of the Association Agreement referred to as the Ankara Agreement in 1963 set the stage for close economic cooperation which would eventually establish into a customs union. The customs union came into effect in January 1996, and if it was going to be prosperous in fostering the flow of trade between the nations and spurring economic growth, further relations would be required to endorse European regulations bringing Turkey closer to European membership (Dodd 2000, I86-191). The EU's

motivations up until the 1990s, for closer relations with Turkey, had previously always been incentivised by economic factors as political relations had created blatant controversy (Aybey

2004, 28). Access to Turkey's market is perceived as a great benefit for the EU due to its rapidly increasing population size. With membership, new closer cooperation may occur, removing existing protectionist barriers (Nugent 2007, 484). Whilst economic incentives are undoubtedly a strong determent in why Europe wished to form closer relations with Turkey, in the 1990's Europe was developing into becoming an organisation which wanted much more than stable economic relations. The 1990s has been referred to as the period which established a 'new Europe' where Europe came to prioritise human rights, democracy and identity formation (Öniş 2003, 10). This critical juncture is situated in this period, where the EU began to see Turkey through a 'new' perspective.

On the 29th of April 1997 during the Association Council meeting, the EU reassured Turkey of the Union's commitment to Turkey's accession requesting the Commission to prepare to strengthen relations (Aybey 2004, 28-29). Nevertheless, as Europe embarked on a significant procedure of greater enlargement, it produced a report discounting Turkey. The Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union (1997) stated in the section on 'Enlarging the Union:' "Enlargement to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus is a historic challenge for the Union" (European Commission 1997). The absence of any

reference to Turkish membership was made outstandingly clear. The EU's more clearly pronounced attitude was, however, expressed in December 1997, at the Luxembourg summit. The EU dismissed Turkey from the list of countries which were eligible for membership and instead backpedalled from its preparations for Turkish accession. The following presidency conclusion from the Luxembourg European Council on the 12th and 13th of December (1997) titled A European Strategy for Turkey depicts this:

The Council confirms Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field (European Council 1997).

The above statement depicts the capricious nature of the EU's opinion on Turkish accession. The European strategy for Turkey leads with an affirmative statement that Turkey is eligible for EU membership. Moreover, it touches on the construction of a more intimate relationship with Turkey. Despite this and without expanding on the specific conditions, the presidency conclusion clearly states it is both the political and economic conditions that are preventing Turkish accession. This pessimistic attitude is perfectly sandwiched between two more

favourable statements, demonstrating how the EU ultimately rejected Turkish membership but wanted to highlight the possibility of an exclusive future relationship with Turkey; maintaining relations without the cost of membership. This ambivalent posturing towards Turkey seemed to be the most viable solution for the EU. Whilst not entirely closing the door on Turkey, Europe suggested that a specialised strategy for Turkey should be drawn up. This way, the EU was free from formulating an accession strategy and, therefore, did not have to pledge any formal financial agreement (Eralp 2000). Europe ultimately did not see Turkey as a prospective member but rather as a strategic partner.

Nevertheless, the sudden importance of EU-Turkey relations seemed to be realised by Europe during the Helsinki summit when the EU appeared to put an end to their uncertain attitude towards Turkish accession (Eralp 2000). During the Helsinki summit, Turkey gained formal recognition as a European candidate state, being considered in the EU's greater enlargement project.

The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the

accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession

preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession (European Council 1999).

Contrary to the Luxembourg summit, this statement from the presidency conclusion of the Helsinki summit shows how Turkey is being evaluated on an equal footing with other candidate states. Unlike the Luxembourg summit, these words aim at casting a more

inclusionary sentiment. Moreover, the Luxembourg summit seems to reflect on the benefits of closer cooperation with the EU could have by joining the Union. The sentence claiming "it

is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the EU in every field" (European Council 1999), infers it is a privilege for Turkey they must prepare for. Nevertheless, during the Helsinki summit, assurance is offered as well as specific incentives to prepare Turkey for accession. These include various benefits that accompany a pre-accession strategy, such as instruments to facilitate dialogue and additional financial assistance. Whilst the EU's attitude undeniably changed towards Turkey from the Luxembourg summit to the Helsinki summit, their optics still portray a one-sided power relationship, where Turkey must conform to European norms to reap the benefits of joining the Union. The extracts above initially infer Europe's power as it can draw on its criteria of conditionality and control Turkey's accession. Despite Europe being adamant Turkey was not a prospective member in 1997, the tune quickly changed in 1999. The EU could have ended negotiations with Turkey during this period, but it was perceived to be too risky, the following section will demonstrate why.

Keeping a Re-emerging Power in the European Fold

The reasons for the sudden change by the EU towards Turkey had to do with greater geopolitical factors and Turkey's ability to evoke reverse conditionality which heightened Europe's perception of the necessity to form closer relations with Turkey (Konings 2018, 38-39). During this period, numerous contextual issues show the EU was not so much concerned with enlargement as an internal integration process but instead used this for broader strategic aspirations grounded in both normative and rational arguments.

The deep-seated ambiguous nature of the EU reflects Europe's unsettled nature and underlying fear of the former Ottoman Empire. Burak Akçapar (2007) infers a wariness of Turkey within Europe that Turkey may wish to return to its imperial stronghold; however, it was only in the 1990s that this fear of Turkey's past diminished (2007, 77-78). As the world was entering a new global order, academics discussed what this new order would entail. The work of the scholars such as Francis Fukuyama (1992) and Samuel Huntington (1993) are examples of this period where the significance of the nation-state was discussed, and a clash between western and eastern civilisations was still portrayed. Previous fears of the Ottoman Empire knocking on the gates of Europe were, therefore, positioned in greater regional fears where there were still perceptions on a clash between East and West. On the 17th of

December 1997, the BBC reported the opinions of the UK, France and the Netherlands in why Turkey should be part of the European sphere.

The UK, France and the Netherlands insist that Turkey must be kept within the European fold. They are concerned that if Turkey is snubbed at Luxembourg, its secularist government will be defeated by fundamentalist Muslims and Turkey will be drawn towards the Muslim world (BBC 1997).

Europe's ambiguous position in this period was, therefore, caused by its greater regional insecurity of fearing Turkey but, therefore, also longing for its cooperation. However, it was also during this period Europe evolved into realising what Ahmet Davutoğlu (2004) coined as Turkey's 'strategic depth,' realising Turkey's nonmilitary power; its historical and cultural ties in the region (cited in Akçapar 2007, 82). Arguments against Turkey's accession were often related to cultural disparities, but it was not until after the Helsinki summit that these cultural pronouncements became envisioned as a power tool. As intellectual thinking progressed, the arguments based on cultural grounds as to why Turkey should not be included in the

European enlargement process became used to explain why Turkey should be a member of the EU. Europe's realisation for Turkey's 'strategic depth' in fostering stability in the region, therefore, almost runs in parallel to its conclusions on Turkish accession (cited in Akçapar 2007, 82). The 1990s also witnessed academic works concerned with ideological and cultural differences; such as the work of Samuel Huntington (1993) who proclaimed: "The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of global conflict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993). Nevertheless, these perceptions on the source of conflict were towards the end of the 1990s gradually deteriorating with the EU recognising Turkey's greater soft power assets and its regional role. Oli Rehn, who was the European commissioner for enlargement from 2004-2010, reflects on this advocating: “Turkey is a crucial partner for Europe, and the collapse of the Iron Curtain has not in any way reduced its strategic

importance. Turkey plays a key role in dialogue between civilisations and the West's relations with the Islamic world” (Rehn 2007).

The EU's inconclusive response towards Turkish accession during this period can, therefore, be explained through its realisation that Turkey could play a pivotal role in delivering strategic depth. Akçapar (2007) posited this strategic depth was not appreciated because of ideological conceptions; it was perhaps Europe's sudden appreciation that explains Europe's capricious attitude between the Luxembourg and Helsinki summits (2007, 82). Even with the adoption of the customs union, maltreatment had always been felt in Turkey, but the

decision by the EU at the Luxembourg summit solidified this feeling. The customs union agreement with Turkey formed in 1995 made EU-Turkey relations more path dependent as it facilitated the conditionality principles and the reform process. For this reason, it has been proliferated that with trade being a key diplomatic driver, upgrading the customs union can enable economic and political reform and promote relations with Turkey that have

deteriorated in the contemporary period (Kirişç and Bülbü 2017; Ülgen 2017).

The EU, as demonstrated above, opened accession talks with six candidate states, whilst excluding its long-awaiting candidate Turkey (Alpay 2009 157-178). The Turkish government responded indignantly to the EU's decision. The Economist reported: “The reaction of wounded pride is widespread. The Turks do not enjoy watching ex-communist countries being given precedence over them in the EU-application queue, when they have been standing in that queue since 1963” (The Economist 1997). Turkey's pride was

undoubtedly affected but as the article in the Economist (1997) also reports it is this rejection that allowed them to build a strong position proving that the "Turks have got a grip on

themselves" (The Economist 1997). Turkey's response seeking to engage in more profound alternative sub-regional relations ultimately made Europe concede to rethinking its decision of the Luxembourg summit. As asserted by Atila Eralp (2000), what led to this dispute was the address of 'candidate' which eleven countries were referred to as and which Turkey was not (Eralp 2000). This perception on the EU's nepotism can further be inferred by Turkey's prime minister of the time Mesut Yilmaz who strongly pronounced:

We reject these preconditions. The aspect of the Luxembourg summit that disturbed us the most is that certain Central and Eastern European countries that are behind us economically and that only began taking steps toward democracy in the last five or six years were given a status ahead of ours. For those countries, including Cyprus, there is a very clear prospect of membership, and even a timetable. For Turkey there is none. We see this as very clear discrimination. If the EU persists in such

discrimination, we will have no place in such an organisation (cited in Kinzer 1997).

Turkey met more of the political and economic criteria than some of the considered candidate countries, and this decision was, therefore, perceived as 'discrimination' and an inability by the EU to apply the criteria objectively (Eralp 2000). Since 1974, a significant part of the island of Cyprus was under Turkish occupation, Mesut Yilmaz' reference to Cyprus further portrays how Turkey felt the EU was pandering to Greece in the Cyprus dispute. The Luxembourg decision by the EU hardened the sceptic feelings towards the EU in Turkey (Eralp 2000). Instead of confrontation, Turkey used an indirect tactic which was nevertheless

just as confrontational and far-reaching if not more so; Turkey cut political ties with Europe rejecting participation in the European Conference and threatening to withdraw its

application for membership (Eralp 2000). Mesut Yilmaz announced "Turkey will have no political dialogue with the European Union from now on'' (cited in Kinzer 1997). The period after the Luxembourg summit saw tensions rise as disappointment and anger mounted on the Turkish side; it was, however, also a defining moment as Turkey realised it was able to hold its own and invoke reverse conditionality.

After a bipolar and what seemed like a stable framework, Turkey was soon

confronted with the aftermath of the recent world orders demise (Akçapar 2007, 78). Other than its approach to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War period was directed towards western integration rather than regional affairs (Akçapar 2007, 78). In the 1990s, Turkey was faced with immediate challenges due to its geographic positioning, fighting PKK terrorism and being directly affected by the remunerations of the Gulf War. Turkey lost a key trading partner due to the destitution of Iraq, Turkey's critical source of income, the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, was closed further damaging its already fragile economy (Akçapar 2007, 79). During 1997, Turkey, could not offer any substantial benefits for the EU, as there was no need for Turkey, the drive for accession from the perspective of the EU was also absent (Martin 2015, 2). Turkey's commitment to pursuing Europeanization seemed to provide them with little tangible benefits (Akçapar 2007, 79). From this moment, Turkey endeavoured to concentrate on its regional commitments. It was following such statements by Mesut Yilmaz (cited in Kinzer 1997) that showed Europe Turkey's was willing to seek an alternative to the EU. Whether Turkey had the resources to seek a realistic

alternative is a matter of debate, but it was something Europe did not want to test too much. An example of Turkey's regional efforts can be seen in the signing of two defence

cooperation agreements with Israel in 1996 (Akçapar 2007, 83; Eisenstadt 1997). After the disappointment of the Luxembourg summit, Mesut Yilmaz was reported to have said. "We have very close relations with the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and very good relations with Balkan countries except Greece'' (cited in Kinzer 1997). Moreover, referring to Turkey's deep-seated intentions, the prime minister vowed: “Turkey will not be isolated. But nobody should believe that Turkey will be forced to accept some unacceptable formulas just to enter the European Union” (cited in Kinzer 1997). Turkey's eviction in labelling the EU as "such an organisation" and qualifying it as "just to enter the European Union" (cited in Kinzer 1997) sends the message to Europe membership was no longer a valuable and sought-after commitment.

In 1998 Europe was confronted more directly with the demise of the Cold War period and faced regional problems of its own, in which it could benefit from Turkey's regional role. During the 1990's Europe was contemplating on forming its own defence mechanism.

Moreover, after Europe's failed EU policy in Bosnia and with the United States distancing itself in terms of foreign policy from Europe, the EU felt it needed to develop both its hard and soft power capabilities, to become recognised as a legitimate international player (Shepherd 2009, 513). The EU felt morally inclined to put an end to the armed conflict in Kosovo. As Turkey has historic relations with Kosovo and is committed to its western allies, Turkey was perceived to be an integral peacekeeper (Turhan 2012, 134-135). In addition, the accession of the divided island of Cyprus was on the table, with Europe wanting to resolve this conflict, Turkey's participation and comprise, as guarantor and occupier were critical (Martin 2015, 58). Finally, the great power of the United States, which at the time was distancing itself from European security concerns also played an active role in putting pressure on Europe to alleviate relations with Turkey (Larrabee and Lesser 2003, 52).

A Historical Institutionalist Explanation of EU-Turkey Relations from 1997-1999

Analysing the central elements as to why Europe chose to re-establish Turkey's candidacy title, can be explained through a historical institutionalist lens to help understand the EU-Turkey stalemate, the decision-making process behind this and thus the complex nature of European enlargement. Central notions from a historical institutionalist approach will be applied to this analysis. These include; drawing on the overarching and related themes in this historically contextualised analysis, revealing a path dependent quality, the unequal power relations, the relevance of time and sequencing and the role of unintended consequences.

EU and Turkey relations were initially concerned with establishing economic progress, but the 1990s saw Europe prioritise regional affairs. During 1997, Turkey seemed of little interest for the EU and, therefore, there was no real incentive to move closer towards accession, but due to pre-existing trade relations and potential future dilemmas Europe decided to propose an individually tailored agreement rather than fully fledged membership. Nevertheless, Europe's attitude quickly changed, offering Turkey candidacy status during the Helsinki summit. This macro-level analysis conducted over the period from the Luxembourg summit to the Helsinki summit revealed a series of conjunctures. The Post-Cold War period was concerned with regionalisation and to a certain extent cooperation, but it was during this

period that both Turkey and the EU were defining the very essence of this. Turkey, due to its Ottoman heritage, feared isolation, and with its geographical location burdening its

development, it continued to seek to legitimise its western modernisation policy (Akçapar 2007, 78). Europe, on the other hand, was more indirectly affected by the Post-Cold War period and sought to redefine itself in terms of enlargement (Akçapar 2007, 79). For Europe, integration with Turkey was initially seen as a reasonable endeavour to exploit the benefits of the customs union agreement; however, with ideological and cultural arguments triggering doubt, it took a while for Europe to realise Turkey's 'strategic depth.' As Turkey, during this period, was committed not to face the fate of its former isolationist period it sought to engage in more regional affairs. Regionalism was, therefore, a greater overarching theme in terms of both timing and sequencing, becoming a central factor in shaping the process of European enlargement in the Turkey- EU case. Moreover, softer power assets such as cultural

affiliations which were before seen as barriers to inclusion became one of the main reasons for closer cooperation.

As the EU sets the standards and conditions and ultimately decides on membership, power is often deemed to lie with the EU. Nevertheless, whilst this may have been initially true, Europe's actions at the Luxembourg summit created unintended consequences,

ultimately leading to Turkey testing Europe. Europe's response to Turkey's membership dismissal gave Turkey reassurance. By suspending relations with Europe and threatening to withdraw its membership application bid, Turkey subjugated the EU. On a more normative level, Turkey's dismissal of European membership portrayed that membership was not a tremendous privilege. For Europe, a candidate country turning down a membership

opportunity would delegitimise Europe's enlargement efforts. Moreover, Turkey turning to alternatives and seeking its own regional cooperation challenged Europe's regional

aspirations to be the central actor in the region and to isolate Europe from this expanse. It can be observed that the power relations between Turkey and the EU were not as asymmetrical as have always been perceived. The EU realised it needed to get closer to Turkey if it was going to grow to be an influential actor. Turkey's employment of reverse conditionality seemed too costly for the EU and shutting the door was not an option due to more significant regional problems. Consequently, Europe decided to grant Turkey candidacy status further deepening the path dependent relationship.

Turkey and the EU's progress path can, therefore, be characterised as expedient; a movement driven by necessity rather than a willingness for integration. Enlargement with the central and eastern European members can also be observed to have been initiated by

necessity because of the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the critical

difference is that Europe's response to the central and eastern enlargement has been described as 'sluggish,' stretching over a long period and developed once the EU started to play more of an active social and economic role (Andreev 2003). Turkey and the EU had already

established economic relations in the form of a customs union. Turkey's prospective

accession has also been sluggish over the long term, but in the short-term Europe's response was immediate. For Europe, this momentous decision to continue along the path of accession was an unintended consequence of pronouncing it did not want Turkey as a member in the Luxembourg summit. This leaves open the question of whether Europe ever saw Turkey as a credible member in the first place. Moreover, enlargement or rather, the notion of

membership was used here as an enticement strategy for cooperation rather than for closer integration. Europe could have closed the membership door on Turkey during this period; however, its vulnerability to Turkey's employment of reverse conditionality combined with the EU's dependence on Turkey caused Europe to deepen the accession path which it seemed reluctant to truly want (Zandstra 2019). The EU dismissing Turkey as a member but being forced to concede as it needs Turkey has shaped this path dependent relationship.