Muslim community in the city of Amsterdam : their role in countering radicalization

1 Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Amsterdam

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations

Muslim Community in the City of

Amsterdam

2 Supervised by: mw. Prof. dr. M. de Goede

Second reader: mw. Dr. Anja van Heelsum Research project: European Security Politics Name: Skander Alexander Ghehioueche Student number: 11125144

Date: August 7, 2016

Abstract

This thesis takes on the topic of identifying the role of the Muslim community in relation to counter radicalization efforts. The role is presented from two perspectives: the perspective of the local government of the city of Amsterdam and the perspective of the Muslim community itself. The topic is researched by having recourse to several sets of interviews with various actors that are directly engaged with counter radicalization initiatives from both sides of the spectrum in addition to analysis of sets of governmental grey documents as well as counter radicalization programs. The research resulted in identifying three roles that has been ascribed by the government which are the following: resilience to radicalization, cooperation with the government and finally alliance and actively engaging the radicalization threat. From the point of view of the Muslim community only two roles have been identified: passive participation or active participation or in other terms resilience to radicalization and engagement with countering radicalization. The roles that have been identified are relatively similar with the exception of certain minor differences but in general terms they seem to be aligned in terms of how to handle the threats of radicalism and terrorism.

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Index

Conception of risk: Muslim community being at risk and risky ... 17

3. Methods ... 22

4. Background ... 28

Islam in the Netherlands ... 28

Muslims/Islam in Amsterdam ... 28

Muslim Organizations in Amsterdam ... 30

Relations with the government ... 30

Identifying the Muslim Community ... 31

5. Analysis ... 34

5.1 The role attributed to the Muslim Community by the City Council of Amsterdam ... 34

5.1.1 At National Level ... 35

5.1.2 At the local level (Amsterdam) ... 41

5.1.2 Police force ... 47

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5.2 The role the Muslim community ascribe to themselves ... 54

5.2.1 The feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism... 56

5.2.2 The relationship with the authorities ... 58

5.2.3 The communities counter terrorism efforts ... 62

5.3 Synthesis of the findings ... 65

Conclusion ... 68

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1. Introduction

The start of the Arab spring in 2011 was at first met with optimism as the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were toppled and an era of freedom and democracy was expected to take root in the region. However, with the exception of Tunisia that has somewhat managed a democratic transition all of the other revolutions seem to have failed as the authoritarian regimes seem to have been either replaced by states of chaos or failed states and a dramatic rise in Islamic Fundamentalism or violent Salafism.

The ongoing crisis in the MENA region is not only disrupting the affected regions and their bordering countries but also Europe and the West as the sectarian wars on populations and faiths, in addition to the rise of the Islamic State, is raging through the region causing destruction, massive refugee flows in addition to political and religious motivated radicalism/terrorism.

The latter has been gaining renewed public, media and political attention in the west as the consequences of the abovementioned events, in the form of terror threats and attacks for instance both Paris attacks of 2015, have increased the level of threat that is described as substantial in several European countries including The Netherlands (NCTV, 2015) in addition to creating tensions within western societies. It is worth mentioning that the terror threat is not only seen as an external threat but also as an internal one with the apparition of the so called foreign fighters as well as home grown terrorists. These Foreign fighters and the home grown terrorists represent nowadays a bigger threat due to the external situation in the MENA region and more commonly the civil war in Syria that provides them with sanctuary, training and financing that would be

6 used to perpetuate attacks on their country of birth or other in the Schengen space, due to the open borders and freedom of movement.

Based on the current analysis of the terrorist threat, European governments present radical Islam as a risk to society and what is being described as the western way of life. In order to face the threat, several soft as well as hard measures have been used as methods to counter the radicalization of European youth, which are considered as the most vulnerable population within the community.

The Netherlands is no exception, even though it has not experienced a terrorist attack on the same scale as other European countries such as the UK, Spain or Norway, it still had to deal with several radicalization and terrorism incidents (Eijkman et al, 2012). The most notable terrorism incident in recent years was the murder of the controversial film maker Theo van Gogh by the Dutch Moroccan dual national Mohamed Bouyeri in 2012 (BBC News, 2002).

Even though the Netherlands have not suffered any major Islamist terror attacks the risk is still considered to be substantial as the threat posed by individuals travelling to Syria to fight in the civil war is considered to be real. The Dutch authorities fear that the traumatic experiences of the foreign fighters and their further indoctrination may result in further radicalization and thus potentially increase the eventuality of them returning to commit attacks domestically as it was the case in the Paris latest attacks (ICSR, 2013).

In order to minimize the risk of Islamic terrorism the Dutch government has taken steps in order to prevent the radicalization of Dutch citizens with Muslim background in addition to disengaging those who already possess radical views to stay clear of turning to violence.

7 It is worth mentioning that radicalism is perceived by many scholars and security professionals to be the precursor to acts of violent radicalism or in other words terrorism.

In an effort to counter radicalization, the Dutch government has opted for a combination of both hard and soft measures. The hard measures include punitive actions whereas soft measures are in the form of programs that aim in most cases at prevention. The hard punitive measures serve the purpose of punishing those who do not respect the rule of law and at the same time serve as a deterrent. When it comes to soft measures, several institutions, both governmental as well as nongovernmental have been set up in order to counteract the radicalization of disillusioned youth, with little to no proof of effective results. These measures have been targeting the Muslim community as tool of governance with the aim of imposing control and prevent further radicalism. However in the case of the Netherlands the government’s approach has been more focused on soft measures. On these terms and in an effort to effectively apply counter radicalization programs the government attempts to include the affected community, which is the Muslim community, which it considers as being the breeding ground for terrorism; as it is a strict interpretation of the Islamic faith on which the terrorists base their ideology. The government seeks therefore to include the Muslim community in its counter radicalization efforts in order to reach better effectiveness as they are considered the concerned party. Based on this duality one could wonder about the role the government has attributed the Muslim community since in some respect they are considered as both the pest and the cure. In addition, the perspective of the community is often overlooked when it comes to their role in counter radicalization.

8 What is the role the Muslim community, in the Amsterdam, has assigned itself in countering radicalization? And what is the role that has been assigned to it by governmental agencies?

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2. Theory

In this chapter the theoretical starting points will be discussed which will lay the foundations for building a thesis and answering the research question mentioned above. For this purpose three main theories have been selected: The concept of radicalization, suspect communities and concept of risk.

Since the thesis deals with the controversial topic of counter radicalization it is in its place to start by analyzing the much discussed and controversial concept of radicalization. The suspect community theory aims at exploring the status that has been attributed to the Muslim community. Finally, the conception of being risky and at risk serves the purpose of highlighting the duality of roles attributed to the community.

Concept of Radicalization

The radicalization discourse emerged as a consequence of lack of understanding as well as difficulties in applying the various conventional linear wisdoms to the emanation of Islamic terrorism (Rapoport, 2002) which generated the problematique of how to govern the emerging problem of home grown terrorism. The home grown terrorism issue gained prominence in 2005 as a result of the 7th of July London bomb attacks where four British radicals committed a series of coordinated suicide attacks in central London that targeted civilians using public transportation during the morning rush. The 7/7 bombings confronted the British public with a threat that was perceived to be external with the reality of a threat that came comes from within

10 and that in this case did not align itself with the conventional radicalization/terrorism discourse (Sedgwick, 2010). The City of Amsterdam experienced a similar incident but at a smaller scale with the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004 by a home grown terrorist. In other practical terms, the radicalization discourse implies that the term radicalization is a tool of power that is exercised by the policy makers, state apparatuses, media and scholarly communities to control Muslim communities (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).

Since radicalization has become a hot topic governments have had trouble to define and administrate the threat emanating from radicalism. Therefore, in order to govern be able to govern radicalization a radicalization discourse was created by the government. For instance, the Dutch Security Service the AIVD (2005) defines radicalization as "Growing readiness to pursue

and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order." Such a working definition permits the

state apparatuses to take action against an indefinable concept.

The manner by which the radicalization discourse is created happen by generating a linear narrative that explains the production of terrorism through the process of radicalization without taking into account the multitude of ways that may lead to terrorism and the validity of such a narrative when radicalism is tested against real transitions to violence. The creation of a radicalization process that leads to terrorism enables the problem to be governable and thus enters the concepts of risk that in turn classifies the Muslim communities (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).

The conventional wisdom of Islamic radicalization asserts that issues linked to identity, integration, lack of secularism, Saudi Arabian and Middle Eastern influences (such as the

11 financing and supporting of Salafist groups) and other related factors might trigger a switch in individuals within the Muslim community which leads them to violent extremism. This extremism is externalized by means of either contextualizing the violence or by actively supporting it (Philips, 2006) in other words by either committing violent acts or supporting them. Radicalization is hard to define as the term is used differently in various fields and there seems not to be a consensus on the usability of the term however there seems to be an agreement on the idea that, as Mark Sedgwick (2010, 479) simply put it, radicalization represents a rough signifier for “what happens before the bomb goes off”.

There is therefore talk about a plurality in understanding of the radicalization concept as there are a multitude of various publications around the subject that could be classified in two main categories: those who advocate for the existence of a radicalization process and those who argue against the existence of such a process by highlighting the complexity of the radicalization process.

First, in the understanding of radicalization as a singular process there are a myriad of theories, approaches and understandings that attempt to shed light on the process such as the effects of group dynamics and transformative learning. In their report on understanding of the process of online radicalization Stevens & Neuman (2009, 10) explain radicalization in these terms “Most

of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalization as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims.”

The following are some of these academic definitions presented from different perspectives: One of these perspectives is the effects of group dynamics in the process of radicalization in

12 which the concept is described as an "Increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in

directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in group." (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 416). The process of radicalization has also been

viewed from the perspective of sociological and psychological concepts. Based on their review of the psychological and the sociological concepts in radicalization, Crossett and Spitaletta (2010: 10) presented radicalization as "The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)." In a different approach, Wilner & Dubouloz discussed how home grown terrorism and extremism is influenced by the process of transformative learning. In their publication, Wilner & Dubouloz (2010: 38 page) define radicalization as “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour." Based on these definitions it is possible to observe that all of them, while taking into consideration the variety of the sources, subscribe that radicalization ultimately leads to violence and terrorism.

However, even though the conventional wisdom of radicalization might have a degree of truth it does also oversimplify the complex realities of the radicalism triggers, process and outcome (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Further research and analysis reject the idea of the existence of a single theory or a process that could be applicable to all radicalization cases (Borum, 2004). Efforts have been made in order to uncover a possible sequence of stages, trigger events or sets of issues that could generate a universal process that begins with radicalization to end with committing violent acts of terrorism but failed. The same is applicable to terrorism theories as the search for

13 a general theory is misguided since there are several types of terrorism in existence and their character is in constant motion as its character changes over time and space (Laqueur, 2003). Heath-Kelly (2013) takes the criticism of the conventional wisdom even further by comparing it to the theory of dark matter that exists to fill holes in existing theoretical physics. The latter supports the assumptions that most of the conventional views concerning radicalization particularly what has been written about it leading to violent terrorism are more conceptual rather than empirical (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010) since it is clear that radicalization pathways are based on the individual and mechanisms function in different ways for different individuals (Borum, 2011). On this basis, it may seem that at an operational level a non linear understanding of radicalization could be more beneficial in search for understanding the question of ‘how do individuals adopt radical doctrines and translate them or not into committing violent terrorism?’ and thus be able to better develop practices that could prevent the spread of violent extremism. For this thesis, an understanding of the complexity of radicalization process is imperative as it will help better understand the stance of the Muslim community when it comes to the radicalization issues in addition to explaining the role(s) it perceives it has in countering radicalization. From the local government side such an understanding of radicalization will explain the various programs and approaches it has to countering radicalization which in turn would explain the role it has attributed the Muslim community in countering radicalization.

Suspect Community

A number of scholars subscribe to the idea that when it comes to governmental counter terrorism efforts Muslims have been unintentionally categorized as being part of what has been labeled as a suspect community (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011). The analyses that lead to the conclusion that the Muslims are indeed part of a suspect community can be observed in the various counter

14 radicalization / counter terrorism policies and initiatives that have been gradually implemented in order to face the threat of homegrown terrorists. These measures will be discussed later on.

A suspect community is a sub group of a certain population that is being singled out by the government for being problematic in nature and is therefore targeted by the state for being part of the group. A suspect community is singled out based on one or several attributes that delineate the group such as gender, language, ethnicity, race, religion, political ideology etc (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). In other terms, the state apparatuses would draw extra attention, on the group in question for being problematic, through intelligence and police authorities by means of control and surveillance. However, the security apparatuses are not only governmental entities that are increasing their focus on the community. Other state apparatuses at all levels such as ministries, local governments and city councils does draw added attention to the problematic community but in contrary to the security services with more focus on the preventive rather than surveillance. The measures deployed against the suspect community, which is in this case is the Muslim community, can be categorized into hard and soft measures. It is worth mentioning that this thesis will mainly draw its focus upon the preventative counter radicalization measures as it is more relevant to the topic at hand.

The notion of suspect community will reveal how the Muslim community in Amsterdam is in fact treated as a suspect community. It will facilitate the comprehension of how the Muslim Community is being singled out and based on the manner in which the local Police and the local government of Amsterdam perceive the role of the Muslim community.

In Pantazis and Pemberton’s (2011) view the suspicion that is subjected to the suspect community has different levels and is represented in a form of a pyramid where the bottom is

15 composed of the Muslim Community as a whole that is targeted by the media and political discourses, in the middle informal suspects that are targeted by stop and search measures, and topping the pyramid is a minority of formal suspects that are targeted by the security apparatus using means of control and surveillance.

In their understanding of the notion of community, Pantazis and Pemberton (2011) had recourse to Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) perspective of community that is characterized by common ways of life, concentrated social ties and tradition. Using that logic, Pantazis and Pemberton (2011) argue that the suspect community is defined by a common subjective experience which in the case of the Muslim community is based on ummatic attachments which can be explained in their understanding of a community that is based on a common feeling of solidarity and experience.

Although the Muslim Community or the “Ummah” is often regarded as a community like any other it does have its differences from other communities. The American-Palestianian philosopher, Isma'il Raji Al-Faruqi (1998) has defined the Ummah as “a universal society whose membership includes the widest possible variety of ethnicities or communities, but whose commitment to Islam binds them to a specific social order”. Moreover, geographic boundaries are not recognized in the Islamic society as it was asserted by Al-Faruqi the ummah is “not determined at all by geographic considerations. Its territory is not only the whole earth, but all of creation.” (Al-Faruqi, 1998).

Although the theory of suspect category can be understood and applied, just as Ragazzi (2016) argued it is rather incomplete, as the situation is more complex and those within the community can be further divided and subdivided into three categories or roles: Trusted, victims and risky. Ragazzi justifies his approach by explaining how the state classifies sub groups within the community depending on their level of threat or usability. In other words according to Ragazzi

16 (2016) the roles of the Muslim community is divided into passive by standers (potential victims) or allies “trusted”. In this sense the trusted Muslims are those being pulled closer to the government in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. The techniques the government use of the ‘trusted ones’ are those of empowerment, partnership and community policing.

This relationship is beneficial for both parties as the state apparatuses profit from the reach of the trusted Muslim that could, due to their status within the community, attain hard to reach individuals and/or provide insider information by having recourse to their social, cultural and linguistic understanding that permits them greater reach than ‘outsiders’. In return the trusted ones gain monetary and social benefits in form of employment, funding and social capital which in return would help increase the individual’s status and increased reach. The increased social capital comes in form of training, leadership programs, participation in radicalization awareness programs etc (Ragazzi, 2016).

In the case of the Netherlands, these programs are offered to a selection of individuals based on their status within the community. The selection criterion is yet to be available. Those who are not among the trusted community and who not align either willingly or not with the requirements of the state agencies fall into the category of being at risk and potentially risky and are thus subject to the same pressures as the rest that include most of the Muslim community. As for those deemed risky, they are subject to harsh forms of preventative measures such as constant surveillance, assets freezing, passport retraction and provisory detention or harsh punitive measures such as retrieval of citizenship, blacklisting and deportation among other.

17 Based on the latter, an image of how the government classifies the Muslims and their roles can be extracted through Ragazzi’s understanding of the roles, which have been confirmed through the interviews. In addition, Ragazzi (2016) argues that there are no clear boundaries between the trusted and those at risk / risky as the categories of suspicion are many and in constant movement. This means that the line between these categories is in constant negotiation and depending on minor elements could topple the balance one way or the other from trusted to suspect and vice versa. Ragazzi’s (2016) classification of the roles of individuals within the suspect community as well as the interchangeable categories of suspicion will permit to understand the workings of the roles assigned by the government on the Muslim community and how the suspect community is formed through counter radicalization measures.

Ragazzi’s suspect categories provided us with a clearer framework from which to approach the Muslim community in this thesis which will help extract the roles that have been ascribed to it. However, although Ragazzi’s notions do help in shedding light on the government’s perspective on the role of the suspect community, little light is shed on the how the community perceives its own role. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to shed light on the other side of the story and uncover if both visions do align.

Conception of risk: Muslim community being at risk and risky

The concept of suspect community can also be engaged from the point of view of risk, risk society and risk management (Beck, 1999) that leads to the creation of risk knowledge that has been used in terrorism studies to make terrorism preemptively governable. The creation of risk knowledge and making risk actionable results eventually in the production of what it is supposed

18 to target, in other words it renders risk to become performative (Heath-Kelly, 2013). The fact that risk has become actionable, in light of the fight against terror, permits the governmental agencies to have recourse to preventive measures in the form of surveillance, asset freezing and preventive detention among other measures. Counter terrorism initiatives rely therefore on the invention of the radicalization discourse as well as the process that leads to terrorism in order to govern communities that are considered suspicious which in turn make terrorism identifiable and thus governable through the conceptions of risk.

The radicalization discourse serves the objectives of the state by generating a counterfactual to terrorism which renders the future (terrorism) knowable, hence governable (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Taking the latter into account, the invention of radicalization discourse as a tool for governance in post 9/11era and the creation of knowledge about transition to terrorism, had lead to the creation of a suspect Muslim community that is supposedly knowable and thus governable through the conception of risk (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Radicalization is once again presented to be a threat to the wider population as it is the precursor to terrorism that is bred within a Muslim community that is framed as both victim and a threat or as at risk and risky. Therefore, the government seeks to steer the conduct of the Muslim communities by classifying the individuals in terms of risk in order to govern those who are considered to be risky in addition to those who are at risk by having recourse to the acquired knowledge to perform counter terrorism (Heath-Kelly, 2013).

The conception of a risky and at risk community comes from the assertions that radical ideology becomes salient to the individual through social networks and the influence of peers (Horgan, 2008) as those who tend to become violent radicals share specific networks that could be either virtual (online), real or both. Following the same logic, violent radical ideas are compared to a

19 virus by drawing a parallel to the contagiousness of radical ideology; those who come in contact with the source become contaminated with the radical doctrine. Thus, the community is being at risk and at the same risky as it is within semi clandestine / underground networks that radical ideology develop and flourish (Crenshaw, 1995).

From the point of view of the governmental agencies, what accentuates the riskiness of the community is the surface normality of the radicals or home grown terrorists as often those individuals are described as regular law abiding citizens by their community and that their actions came as surprise to everyone. Moreover, in many cases these violent radicals are highly educated well integrated individuals which make them escape detection of the state apparatuses as well as the civil society.

The contagiousness of the radical ideologies paired with the apparent normality of terrorists are used to justify the framing of the Muslim community through the discourse of managing the unknown, since it is this opacity that generates the need for knowledge and its production, while emphasizing the intrusive needs for security practices that could better identify the dangerous Muslims within the community (Heath-Kelly, 2013).

At risk populations can also be produced as risky through actions of security management by turning the at risk population’s vulnerability into potential dangerousness which means that they are already considered as being a threat to society (Heath Kelly, 2013). Although the Muslim community is framed as both a potential victim and a suspect it is also considered to be a vital ally within the fight against terrorism since the community itself is not only considered to be the problem but also part of the solution (Hickman et al, 2011). The Muslim community is usually the best placed to prevent the young from becoming radicalized by either challenging the

20 extremist narratives or by detecting signs of radicalism and potential dangers and informing the local authorities about potential risks (Briggs, 2010); Networks of radical islamists exist within the Muslim community and in certain cases are known to many. The local government uses therefore their partnership with the police, the mosque and the local community in order to identify and reach out to those who are considered to be at risk of contagion and support them.

Based on the abovementioned concepts of being risky and at risk, one can observe contradictions of the radicalization discourse in its governance purpose since it generates the risk it is intended to manage or in other words, produces risk which in turn enables intervention. Therefore, the radicalization discourse provides more knowledge concerning approaches to terrorism and future governance rather than motivations, reasons and causes for transitions to radicalism (Heath Kelly, 2013).

The approaches, concepts and theories, that were discussed in this section, provide valuable insights into the concept of radicalization, risk and riskiness as well as the suspect community they present these issues from the point of view of the policy makers and governmental institutions and their perceptions in the governance of the terrorism threat by having recourse to the most accessible tool available the governance of radicalization.

Although much is being written concerning these issues from the policy makers stand points and their view of the Muslim community, very little has been written about how they perceive the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalization and even less concerning how the community view their role in countering radicalization. In the coming sections views from both sides of the spectrum will be presented, in the case of the city of Amsterdam, by adapting them

21 to the abovementioned theories and at a later stage comparing and contrasting them in order to uncover a possible alignment in or conflict in point in their respective visions.

In this section, the theoretical framework has been defined for the thesis, concepts of radicalization, suspect communities and risky/at risk have been explained and put into the context. In the coming section the methodologies and the operationalization of will be presented and developed.

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3. Methods

For the thesis a qualitative approach will be taken in order to answer the research question by determining the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalization from the point of view of the local government and the Muslim community itself and looking for signs of discrepancies. The analysis part will be divided into two parts. The first part will cover the government view of the role by having recourse to grey documents and interviews and a second part will cover the view of the Muslim community’s view of the role through a combination of three interviews.

The timeframe that will be used has its starting point the killing of Theo van Gogh, since it is the event that marked the start of the Dutch counter radicalization policies, until today.

The analysis will comprise government publications will be used to determine the manner in which the local government of the city of Amsterdam defines the role of the Muslim community in light of the relations between the policy and the goals (Geva-May & Pal, 1999). The analysis will be of existing policies in an attempt to explain the government’s approach in tackling counter radicalization through which roles that have been implicitly assigned to the Muslim community could be revealed. This part is commonly analytical and descriptive.

The documents that will be used will be a compilation of grey documents in from the central government as well as the local city government since each city has the possibility to apply policies in their own way in addition to reports of the AIVD and the NCTV that constitute the basis of all policy decisions. The documents in question are Annual reports of the AIVD,

23 Amsterdam City Council, We Amsterdam initiative, The NCTV yearly security and risk analysis DNT and finally The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism- a collaboration of the Ministry of Security and Justice, the National Coordinator for Security and Counter-Terrorism and the Ministry of Social Affairs. These documents have been chosen for the particular reason that it is believed that through the governmental policies and reports it is possible to determine the role it has attributed to the Muslim community.

A lack of documentation when it comes to the role Muslim community has assigned itself in relation to counter radicalization efforts has made it hard to make a comparative analysis of the Governmental and the Community stance. The latter lead to the decision of holding interviews with representatives of the community “the mosque” and policy advisors of the local city government in order to get a clearer picture and be able to compare and contrast both sides.

Concerning the interviews, they have been held with individuals from both sides of the spectrum and thus governmental officers that are directly involved with Islamic communities when it comes to counter-radicalization initiatives in addition to imams or local figure heads in the Islamic community as to interrogate them about their concerns and perceptions of the counter radicalization programs that aim in part in securitizing these communities by labeling them as being at risk and risky while at the same time presenting them with the responsibility of dealing with the problems internally.

The interview would provide the research with insight into the Islamic community concerning the above mentioned dilemma, as well as the internal mechanisms and the main thoughts that are roaming the corridors of the authorities, of the city of Amsterdam, concerning the Islamic community as well as the role it plays.

24 Before moving on it is important to mention that in this research the Muslim community will be represented by the religious authority of the mosque and Islamic centers as those can be perceived as unofficial community leaders since in the Muslim world imams are highly respected within the community and are often consulted in religious as well as social matters. I will also be specifically looking into the Sunni Muslim community as it is the largest Muslim denomination (PewResearchCenter, 2009) and that is also followed by extremist terror groups such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State.

The choice of interview type that was considered to be the most appropriate for the thesis would be semi structured interviews. The choice for conducting semi structured interviews lies within the fact that in contrast to the rigidity of structured interview it offers a flexibility that allows to bring new ideas and questions during the interview, asking following up and probing questions, improvising off the answers of the interviewee (Berg, 2007). There is of course initial questions and an initial framework that has to be respected within the theme that is to be explored (Berg, 2007). The interview questions were at first standardized to all participants then at a second stage they were slightly adapted to each interviewee. The standardized questions can be found in the Annex I. The reason for adapting the questions lies in need to formulate the questions in the vocabulary of the participants for instance a police officer does not use the same vocabulary as an Imam. It is therefore important to approach the world from the subject’s perspective ( Berg, 2007).

Both interviews could be compared and contrasted to each other as well as to the policy documents in order to locate any discrepancies or inconstancies in the discourses as well as assessing to what extent the policies mirror what is happening on the field.

25 For my thesis I have conducted interviews with on the one hand, a spokesperson of Amsterdam Badr mosque Abdelhafidh El Mouddin, the chairman of the Contactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid (CMO) Euboubaker Ozture and an Imam Al Omrani who is a leader of an Islamic youth association named ‘Al-Huda’, to represent the Muslim community. On the other hand, interviews have been conducted with Anas Chrifou Project Manager within the city council who deals with counter radicalization in addition to a police inspector Youssef Gharbi who is stationed within a district with a Muslims Majority.

The reason for which the decision to speak to the imam of the Moroccan mosque Badr is that it is the biggest Sunni Moroccan/Arab mosque in Amsterdam with the capacity of approximately 1000 adherents. Concerning Al-Huda youth center it was selected because of its numerous social activities within the local community. In addition, the reason behind approaching the Contactorgaan Moslem en Overheid (CMO), an organization that is led by Turks, is that the organization represents 80% of all Turkish and Moroccan mosques and organizations in the Netherlands. Moreover, the CMO has been recognized by the Dutch government as a dialogue partner in order to reach out to the community and in order to deal with issues related to the Islamic community. The CMO is the organization with most adherents with over 500, 000 and it represents mainly the Sunni branch of Islam.

The choice for selecting a Turkish led organization (CMO) as well as a Moroccan mosque was motivated by the fact that they represent the two main Sunni Islamic congregations that represent the two biggest minorities in Amsterdam. In addition, the importance of the mosque, in most cases, resides in its size and number of adherents as it is the biggest mosques that attract the most faithful, that have the most financial power due to support and donations etc.

26 The reason for choosing to address both Moroccan and Turkish Islamic organizations is motivated by the fact that they represent the largest Muslim communities in Amsterdam.

Attempts have been made to contact Al-Tawheed mosque, a known Salafist mosque with a controversial history and that is publicly known to have drawn the attention of the AIVD in the past. Al-Tawheed mosque has categorically refused all requests for interviews. It could be interesting to mention that the board of Al-Tawheed mosque is composed of Egyptian nationals.

From the government’s side the reason for interviewing the counter radicalization professional is simply his position as the focal point of all radicalization related issues and is responsible of all counter radicalization projects in his designated district which sets him in prime position to have substantial knowledge about the topic of counter radicalization and how the city council perceive the roles of the Muslim community. The thesis would have been missing valuable information if one did not look at the various governmental efforts at a micro level. For that reason it deemed important to conduct an interview with a police inspector whose jurisdiction falls within a suspect Muslim community. The combination of these two interviews from the different state apparatuses permit to view the governmental workings on both the preventive as well as the punitive side.

It must be stated that all interviewees accepted to speak under their real names. A cover of anonymity was offered however it was gracefully rejected by all as they do not oppose to stand for what they are saying.

The manner in which I contacted the various individuals was by calling them directly after conducting research on their establishment. I perceived the telephone call as a more direct and persuasive technique in order to convince the interviewees to accept the interview request. In

27 addition, in order to gain their trust and have a more open interview I addressed the interviewees with North African origins for instance the Imam, the spokesperson and the police officer in their native Arabic.

The choice of selecting the city of Amsterdam fell naturally as a consequence of wanting to focus on one city in order to acquire as much information as possible about once city and a more accurate examination between the Muslim Community and the local government. Moreover having fragmented findings, spread over different cities, would weaken the quality of the findings. Finally, the choice of Amsterdam was also made due to the fact it has the biggest Muslim population in the Netherlands in addition to it being an example of diversity.

In the coming section will begin by uncovering the historical as well as societal context of Islam in the Netherlands and more specifically in the city of Amsterdam in order to have a clear grasp of the various implications and notions that the thesis will draw upon.

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4. Background

In order to be able to gain a good understanding of the full picture it is important to start with setting the background and the context of the topic which is in this case the Muslim community in the Netherland and Amsterdam and how it is structured and organized

Islam in the Netherlands

Historically Muslims have settled in the Netherlands for almost 5 centuries now as various counts state that they settled in the Netherlands at the wake of the 16th century when Ottoman traders settled in the major port cities (Van Gelder, 2015). It must be taken into account that the Muslim presence was considered insignificant until the start of the labor migration waves of the 60’s and 70’s that brought nowadays largest minorities in the Netherlands, namely Moroccan, Turks and Surinamese.

In the Netherlands, Islam has the second biggest congregation, after the various branches of Christianity, and it is estimated to be practiced by 5% of the Population (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2015). The vast majority of the Muslims residing in the Netherlands are affiliated with Sunni Islam whereas a minority is affiliated with Shia Islam and a lesser number to various other sects (PewResearchCenter, 2009). The majority of Muslims in the Netherlands reside in the country’s biggest cities namely Utrecht, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

Muslims/Islam in Amsterdam

As the capital city of the Netherlands, it does not come as a surprise that the majority of the Muslim population is residing in Amsterdam. The Islamic population as a whole, including all

29 branches of the faith, represents approximately 14% of the entire Amsterdam population (Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2012). Seven of the fifteen Amsterdam districts have a significant number of Muslims. The districs are the following: De Baarsjes, Oud-West, Slotermeer, Oost-Watergraafsmeer, Slotervaart, Osdrop and Bos en Lommer (Open Society Institute, 2007).

The city of Amsterdam’s total population is about, as of December 2015, 821.702 (iamsterdam, 2015) with approximately 73,210 inhabitants are of Moroccan descent, 42,358 of Turkish descent and 25,988 of Indonesian decent (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015). The latter three communities are not only the largest Muslim communities in Amsterdam but also among the top four populations by country of origin (ibid). Others are from Egyptian, Pakistani and Surinamese decent.

The Muslim population in Amsterdam is considered to be relatively young which is mirrored at the peak of immigration of the 80’s-90. Over 50 per cent of the Muslims in Amsterdam are first generation immigrants whereas those belonging to the second generation represent slightly less than 50 per cent (Open Society Foundations, 2010); the first-second generation ratio is rather balanced.

As of 2016, there are approximately 44 mosques in the city of Amsterdam. Most mosques are can be attended by most but their boards are divided by ethnicity, most of them cover the four biggest foreign populations in Amsterdam, Moroccan, Turks, Surinamese, Indonesian and of course a smaller number of mosques for other religious or ethnic minorities (Wildeman, 2016). It is worth mentioning that most of the city mosques are linked to the Sunni branch of Islam. In addition to mosques the city offers several other Muslim foundations and centers that represent the cultural, ethnic, and spiritual diversity of the Muslim scene in Amsterdam.

30 Muslim Organizations in Amsterdam

In addition to mosques there are many Muslim organizations in Amsterdam that represent Islamic youth, women, in addition to several other umbrella and cultural organizations, most of which are affiliated with either the Turkish or Moroccan Diaspora.

There are approximately 20 Turkish religious organizations in Amsterdam most of which are either affiliated with the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation that is linked to the Turkish Diyanat, Ministry of Religious Affairs, or The Millî Görüş Movement.

On the Moroccan front there are approximately 30 Muslim organizations in the capital city most of which belong to either Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands (UMMON) or the Urban Moroccan Council and a union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and Surroundings (UMMAO) (Schriemer, 2004).

Relations with the government

Ever since the severance of the ties between the State and the Church/Religious institutions in the 80’s the Netherlands has been a secular state that is based on secular constitutional principles. In such an environment Muslims enjoyed their freedom of religion with the likes of other faith practitioners in the country.

The situation started changing ever since the terror attacks of 9/11 and then rapidly escalated in 2004 after the Madrid bombings and most importantly for the Dutch context the assassination of the Filmmaker Theo van Gogh by the Dutch-Moroccan Muslim Fundamentalist Mohamed

31 Bouyeri. The murder of the film maker rendered the Islamist threat real to the Dutch public as well as Amsterdam policy makers that were pushed to take action.

The latter lead to the securitization of the Muslim community in Amsterdam which in its turn led to targeting them with counter/de-radicalization programs. As a consequence the local government felt the urge to reach out to the community and agreed on opening a dialogue with two Islamic organizations that have been recognized by the national government namely Contactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid (CMO) and Contact Groep Islam (CGI). In this thesis the focus will be on the CMO as it is the contact group that has the most adherents, over 500,000, represents the main Turkish as well as Moroccan mosques and organizations, and represents a majority of the Sunni branch. Since the topic is related to Islamic terrorism and it is the fo llowers of a subcategory of the Sunni branch that are mainly involved in terror organizations the likes of ISIS and Al Qaida.

The CGI on the other hand is a contact group that also represents non Sunni minorities such as the Shia, Alewites, Soufies etc, it has approximately 115,000 members. Therefore, due to its sectarian diversity and lack in numbers of adherents the CGI will be discarded from the analysis.

Identifying the Muslim Community

If it were to be simplified, the Muslim community of the city of Amsterdam would be those who adhere to Islam as a faith. However, the simplification leads to a lack of accuracy as there are several branches within Islam namely Ahmadiyya, Sunni, Shia and Khawarij. As it has been mentioned previously in this paper the main focus will of this paper will be on the Sunni branch of Islam as it is the branch to which the most active terror organizations adhere to. It is very

32 limiting to believe that the Sunni are one united bloc as they can be divided into several Schools or jurisprudence Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’I (Gregory, 2012).

These schools of jurisprudence have different ways of interpreting the sources of Islam and determining whether certain acts are Halal (Permissible) or Haram (Impermissible) although there is a general agreement on most theological issues (Ibid). Each of these schools is usually practiced in specific parts of the world however due to globalization and facility of movement and political support to certain schools such as the Saudi Hanbali support for Wahabism and Salafism. Wahabism and Salafism have been classified by the European Parliament as the roots of global terrorism (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013).

Based on the latter, even though it might be possible to generalize by marking them as the same we can conclude that the Muslims are not a fixed determined group that has defined boundaries, ethnicity nor national identities, Muslims are a diverse set of individuals with different backgrounds, practices and cultures. A common mistake would be also to link a certain group due to their national identity or ethnicity to Islam even though they may be practicing another faith or even none, for instance not all Moroccans are Muslims but are assumed to be by others or governments.

Therefore, the estimation of the numbers of Muslims in the city of Amsterdam is done using methods that are usually based on ethnic backgrounds as it is impossible to accurately determine an individual’s faith based upon appearance or other tangible methods. It is clear though that within certain communities a majority ascribes to Islam for instance 90 per cent of the people of Moroccan descent and 70 per cent of the people of Turkish descent state their affiliation to the Islamic faith (Open Society Foundations, 2010).

33 After looking into the theoretical framework, setting up the operationalization of the thesis and introducing the Islamic community, in the coming section will be discussed the role the local government of the city of Amsterdam or more precisely the City Council of Amsterdam has attributed the Muslim community in countering radicalization. In order to understand how the city council view this role, policy documents need to be examined from both the various counter terrorism agencies in addition to those of the central government. Even though it might seem odd to look into documents of the likes of the NCTV, AIVD or the central government for a thesis with a thematic that focuses on the city of Amsterdam, there is a logical thought behind the approach which starts by understanding how city councils implement policies in the Netherlands. In addition to the role attributed to the Muslim community by the local Amsterdam government the role it has been attributed by the local Police force will also be looked into. One must not forget that violent radicalism is a penal matter and thus the role of the police is therefore primordial in understanding the full picture. Interviews with professionals within both organs have been conducted and will be used throughout this analysis.

The analysis part will commence by explaining the political decision making in the Netherlands and how it affects the local government.

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5. Analysis

This chapter will include the analysis of the various documents, programs and interviews that will help identify the roles attributed to the Muslim community. In the first part of this chapter we will look into the roles that have been attributed by the local government while in the second part we will look into the roles that have been ascribed by the Muslim community to itself.

5.1 The role attributed to the Muslim Community by the City Council of Amsterdam

It is rather complex to uncover what role is attributed to the Muslim community in counter radicalism since no central governments nor do local governments go out publicly with their views on the subject since it is a sensitive one. Therefore, as it was mentioned earlier in the methodological section of the thesis, to uncover how the city council of Amsterdam views the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalism an analysis of grey documents, the various counter radicalization programs as well as an interview with a radicalization project officer that is linked to the Amsterdam City Counsel. However, in order to be better equipped to understand the role that has been ascribed to the Muslim community it is important to have an understanding of the counter terrorism programs and initiatives that are proposed at a national level since these programs already implicitly accord a role to the Muslim community.

In the Netherlands, when it comes to policy making in matters of counter terrorism or any other political issue it is the central government that is based in Den Haag that makes the decisions that it disseminates through to the various states or provinces. However, the Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state which means that the different states, provinces or even municipalities possess a degree of autonomy. This autonomy enables the cities councils to create and

35 implement self drafted policies that concern city life and well being such as infrastructure, working environment, safety and security etc. In addition, policies are based on the guidelines of the central government and are negotiated at the three government levels. The idea behind such a system lies in the thought that the municipalities are closer to the populations and thus have the possibility to listen and then react upon what is required within the society (Association of Netherlands Municipalities, 2008).

This structure is also used in matters of counter radicalization as the central government makes its decisions based on the suggestions made by the competent authorities, for instance the AIVD and the NCTV, when it comes to risk assessment of the terrorist threat and the likelihood of an attack by home grown terrorists. The local government applies then the policies proposed by the central government in a way it sees best fit its situation and its needs. For instance even though the central government has a unified counter terrorism and counter radicalization policy cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam or Den Haag have different approaches to how they are applying these policies depending on their needs.

As a result it is possible to have recourse to documents that are produced by the central government and / or the security services in the analysis part of the thesis. Therefore, an overview over the efforts that have been made to promote Islamic integration and countering terrorism as well as radicalization should be presented and roles extracted.

5.1.1 At National Level

The first substantial Dutch counter terrorism and counter radicalization action plans were first created prior to the Theo van Gogh assassination which hugely impacted the Dutch society

36 generally and the city of Amsterdam specifically. The assassination of the public figure was motivated for religious reasons. This resulted in the Muslim community being pressured by the general public, the media and the political elite to distance themselves from the murder and at the same time show their loyalty to the values of democracy and integration (Penninx, 2006). Moreover, critical voices rose to condemn what they called lenient and naïve migrant policies on behalf of the central government (Hajer & Uitermark, 2008).

Since the terror attacks of 9/11, a decline has been observed in the political multicultural discourse as it has gradually fallen out of favor among politicians in Europe (Joppke, 2004). Politicians such as the British David Cameron (Dailymail, 2013) and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel voiced their dissatisfaction of Multiculturalism by labeling it as a failure.

The tone in the Netherlands was not different as the Dutch government explicitly expressed distancing itself from multiculturalism as it is shown through the covering letter of an integration bill that was presented by the former minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations Piet Hein Donner in which it is stated that "The government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society." (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2011).

The justification for distancing from multiculturalism comes under the form security and counter terrorism arguments in addition to an alleged link between multiculturalism and homegrown terrorism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). The abandonment of the Multiculturalism project, of permitting different foreign cultures to exist and flourish within national framework, for the

37 abovementioned security reasons, is one of several reasons that lead to the employment of counter terrorism / counter radicalization measures against a targeted Muslim community.

Therefore, as a result of the hefty criticisms the government increased drastically its counter terrorism spending and in the following years 28 million Euros were spent in order to tackle violent radicalism and its causes (Vermulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). The Dutch approach on tackling radicalization and violent extremism had a strong focus on social issues especially economic discrimination and deprivation of the Muslim community. The Dutch government’s stance is that dire economic and social situation may create a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. In order to tackle these issues the government decided to focus on having recourse to soft preventative measures that would improve the situation for the Muslim population and thus by implementing social projects and promoting integration (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012).

It can be said that the Netherlands has a century old history of cultural tolerance that has seen waves of immigrants settling in the country for reasons of escaping prosecution, labor migration or to seek better life opportunities. In more recent history, in the 1970’s, the Dutch government adopted a multiculturalist policy in an effort to promote and compel social integration (Archick et al, 2011).

The integration policy has been aimed at integrating both newcomers as well as later generations born within the Netherlands. Already in 1990’s, the Ministry of Interior launched a policy aimed at integrating disadvantaged minorities by improving their social economic positions. The policy stressed the importance of cooperation between the minorities and the government. The government’s responsibility lied in facilitating integration by providing the necessary tools and

38 help while the minorities’ responsibility was to use these tools to assimilate with the Dutch society (Raymunt, 2011).

In addition the Dutch government created several programs with the intention to thwart discrimination. For instance, a law was passed in 2009 under which the local governments have the obligation to make available non discrimination services and offices that will permit the locals to complain about any acts of discrimination at a municipal level (Raymunt, 2011).

Moreover, the authorities have implemented various programs with the objective of counteracting extremism such as increasing knowledge about Islam in order to produce a counter narrative for radical Islamic doctrines in addition to providing the possibility for Muslims to integrate their religion in the local society (Vermulen & Bovenkerk, 2012).

However, the Dutch government did not only have recourse to soft measures, hard measures were taken in order to target and isolate the extremist threat by ways of disciplinary and legal means. Anti-terror laws were created and amended several times over the years that made it easier to prosecute suspects that are part of or planning to join terror groups or committing terrorism or even providing support. The Dutch security services such as the intelligence services, the AIVD, have been expanded and the police force have been improved to be able to deal with the new and constantly changing threat of terrorism (Rabasa et al, 2010). These measures included increased surveillance of certain individuals organizations or mosques, deportation of radical preachers, revocation of travel documents of suspected terrorists and stop and search warrants subjected to a specific geographic area, among other measures (Ministry of Security and Justice; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism; Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014). These hard measures tend to target mostly Muslims which as a

39 consequence provoke feelings of vulnerability, dissatisfaction and anger within the Muslim community, in other words generate a sense of suspect community and exclusion (Ragazzi, 2016).

What is interesting in the Dutch government’s approach to counter radicalization / counter terrorism is that Religion is hardly mentioned as a link to violent extremism. This has not always been the case. By comparing the ‘Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland’ (DTN) or the Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands over the past years one can observe a difference in the terms employed. In the first DNT publication, DNT1, the emphasis was put on the ‘Islamic terrorist threat’ (DNT1, 2005). However, ten years later in DNT40 the term has evolved to ‘Jihadist threat’ (DNT40, 2015). The change of the terminology can be considered deliberate since it can

also be observed on other types of documents that are produced by the NCTV or the AIVD. In the AIVD annual report for 2015, only the term Jihadism has been used in order to describe the threat of Islamic extremism. However, in the AIVD annual report from 2005a thorough analysis of the Islamic extremism threat was conducted. Under the Radicalization section of the 2005 annual report, various ethnic groups were specifically mentioned and their level of threat assessed based on their Islamic affiliations with a special emphasis on the Moroccan community (AIVD, 2005). Such classification would evidently lead entire communities to feel under pressure, isolated and segregated, which in turn would increase polarization, particularly the Islamic Moroccan community.

It is believed that the aim of choosing a different tone in more recent documents such as the 2015 AIVD Annual report is to attempt to separate religion, Islam, from terrorism in order to be less

40 divisive and discriminatory even though the Muslim community as a whole is still subject to counter radicalization measures.

As a result, the Dutch government portrays violent extremism as a phenomenon that is linked to isolated youths in search for an identity, opportunity and a place in society. This is why the Dutch authorities counter radicalization initiatives aim at enhancing social cohesion and integrating alienated groups into mainstream society (Rabasa et al, 2010). It is worth mentioning that the Dutch authorities based on the reports by the AIVD were not only concerned about violent radicals but also non violent radicals as they feared the creation of a parallel society with the Dutch society were anti-democratic ideologies would prosper (Vidino, 2009). Therefore, the thought is that by improving the integration of Muslims the number of potential radicals would decrease.

Although there are several differences between the two annual reports separated by a decade both organizations consider Salafism a threat since the doctrine provide a breeding ground to violent radicalism in addition to holding divisive anti western rhetoric and undemocratic views (AIVD, 2005; AIVD, 2015). This was also expressed during the interviews with the police officer as well as the counter radicalization project manager. Both governmental interviewees were hesitating in confirming the perceived threat of the salafists. Moreover, in order to further demonstrate to what extent Salafism is perceived as a threat, the AIVD and the NCTV have jointly published a 16 page report entitled ‘Salafism in the Netherlands: Diversity and Dynamics’ that sheds light on the development of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands and explains its dynamics (AIVD & NCTV, 2015). This reveals the existence of an official stance aimed at the general public and a practical one for professional purposes. The professional purposes would be

41 to be able to monitor and isolate the Salafist threat whereas the official stance would be to avoid singling out any particular group in order not to generate divisions and polarisation. In addition, the inclusion of Salafism as a constant threat for over a period exceeding a decade highlights the existence of different shades of perceived Islamic threats by the authorities.

In spite of the fact Salafism is being singled out as a potential precursor to a terrorist threat the rest of the Islamic community is still subject to counter terrorism/ counter radicalization measures for the simple reason that Sunni non Salafist Muslims are ‘at risk’ of becoming radicalized by the Salafi doctrine as the following quotes show:

“[…] certain elements of Salafist ideology can breed radicalisation leading to jihadism.”

(AIVD, 2015. P33).

“The AIVD has also witnessed cases of Salafists attempting to impose their ideology upon those around them. Moderate Muslim communities, in particular, are coming under pressure from these fundamentalist ideologues.” (AIVD, 2015. P33).

5.1.2 At the local level (Amsterdam)

As it was previously mentioned, the policies of the Dutch capital city, Amsterdam, is obligated to follow the great lines of the central government’s counter terror / radicalization policies even though the application of these policies may slightly vary. However, in this case the local policies are quite aligned with the national policies and that for two main reasons. The first reason is that the local government reached the same conclusions as the nation government, of the importance of focusing on social issues and prevention, and secondly, because most of the project financing are provided for by the state (Vermeulen & Kooiman, 2009).