The Directions of Karabakh’s status quo

(1)

The Directions of Karabakh’s status quo

The influences of foreign visitors on

the degree of independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

from the Republic of Armenia

MA Thesis in East European Studies Graduate School for Humanities University of Amsterdam

Rinke van Diermen Student ID: 5927870

Main Supervisor: dhr. dr. C.W.C. Reijnen Second Supervisor: dhr. prof. dr. M.J. Wintle Date: June 30th₂₀₁₇

(2)

(3)

3

Abstract

After the Karabakh War was halted by an OSCE brokered ceasefire in 1994, the territory of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and some surrounding districts in Azerbaijan stayed under control of the Karabakh Armenians. The non-recognized state of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic does since de facto rule over this area, with help of the strong support by the Republic of Armenia. Since the de facto borders of Nagorno Karabakh with Azerbaijan and Iran are closed, Armenia is the only accessible neighbour. Nagorno Karabakh is to a large extent dependent on the economic and military assistance from their lifeline Armenia. Although Karabakh has an insecure security states because of the ongoing state of war with Azerbaijan, the status qua can be called relatively stable, and daily life continues in the de facto independent status for over two decades now.

However isolated Nagorno Karabakh is, foreign visitors do frequent this region for various reasons. Foreigner visit as tourists, being attracted by the history, nature, cultural heritage or the curious unofficial status in which the de facto state finds itself. The Armenian diaspora is particularly interested in the area, and various charity initiatives have invested in the region’s educational, medical and

infrastructural systems that were heavily damaged during the Karabakh War. They also form a lobby that achieves relative successes in international recognition of the status quo, particularly in some American states that have recognized the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenian nationals can be perceived as foreigners to Nagorno Karabakh as well, as the republic considers itself an independent country. The Armenian nationals arriving to Karabakh have economic relations with the region, and form an important military support.

These visitors have various influences on the direction of development of the de facto state. Some of these developments help state-building processes and steer towards a higher degree of independency for Karabakh from the Republic of Armenia. Other developments lead to a relationship between Karabakh and Armenia that have an integrational character.

Visits that aid Karabakh to gain more independency and legitimacy are for instance the tourists, as they support the Karabakh internal economy and financial independence from Armenia and increase the notoriety of the de facto state abroad, which increases legitimacy for its existence. The Armenian diaspora lobby that advocates the recognition of the Nagorno Karabakh state has the same effects on legitimacy and independency.

Visits that generate a further integration of the two ethnic Armenian republics are most of the diaspora charity investments and the Armenian nationals that visit Karabakh. Some of the most influential charity investments have been directed to connecting the Karabakh and Armenian road system. Visitors from the Republic of Armenia aid Karabakh in being part of Armenia’s economic area and integrate it in that manner. Armenians that arrive in Karabakh for military purpose help to integrate the military structure and sense of common responsibility to defend a common border against a common enemy.

(5)

5

Introduction

A cease fire, signed in May 1994, made an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh War. A conflict between the Azerbaijani central Baku government and a mountainous region with local Armenian majorities seeking independence. In the course of the war, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes in the broader region. Azeri’s and Kurds were expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia proper. Armenians fled from Baku, Nakhchevan and the rest of Azerbaijan, mainly to the Republic of Armenia. Pogroms and ethnic violence made whole villages gather their belongings and flee. The military conflict was limited to the Karabakh region. The cease fire that was signed between the Azerbaijani and the ethnic Armenian forces in 1994 resulted in around 14% of internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan being in control of the self-declared de facto independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR) with Stepanakert as its capital.

With regular clashes at the line of contact the ‘frozen conflict’ sees sparks of increased violence from time to time. The most severe clash since the cease fire agreements being only recently, in April 2016, when some dozen of casualties fell on both sides in the course of a three days ‘April War’. But in general, looking at the more than two decades of de facto existence of the NKR, the situation on the ground can be called calm, and even an occasional tourist does visit Stepanakert. This work intends to investigate the effects of daily life going on in the region and slowly reshaping it among lines set by the current controllers. The work will focus on the effects foreign activities have on the directions the region develops in relation to its only accessible neighbour, its supporter and vital ally: the Republic of Armenia. The need for support from this indispensable neighbour makes the Nagorno Karabakh Republic float somewhere between annexed, a satellite state, an autonomous region and independence.

The NKR is ruled by its elected government, that allowed the NKR exist, evolve, organize and function for over twenty-five years now. It allowed the rulers to invite the investors and individuals to the area according to their choice and liking, but they are limited by closed borders and the non-official status of the state they created.

The core topic of this work, the foreign visitors effects on the regions developments, are aligned along two different possible developments. The one being the emergence of an ever stronger, viable, self-supporting and more independent NKR that gains a wider and international legitimacy for its own existence. The other being the ever further incorporation of the region within Armenia proper, proving the impossibility of this region to sustain an independence from Azerbaijan without being a de facto part of Armenia.

The work consists of three parts which will lead to an overall conclusion. The first part will give a background to the regions history, geo-political situation and ethnic and cultural shape, the second will investigate the different foreign activities in the NKR that can be distinguished, and the third will study

(6)

6

these activities among the two recognized possible directions of the NKR’s future and recent development.

The first part starts off with describing the historical context of the conflict, the events of the 1992-1994 Nagorno-Karabakh war itself, and the period after the cease fire agreements where the NKR makes efforts to establish itself like a functioning state. As an acting state, the NKR holds presidential and parliamentary elections, it has a military, all usual ministries, a national ombudsman, a state university, their own postal stamps, and if you wish to visit, you will get an official visa in your passport. And people do visit this region. As isolated as it is, without air-services, the only open border being the one with the itself isolated Republic of Armenia, the little visitors the NKR gets may only be of higher importance. You cannot be a decent country without foreign relations, without international trade, and without the foreign visitors that can prove your very existence to the outside world. This part will find its content in the various works scholars have written on the region. It will have a special focus on the Karabakh historic and contemporary ethnic composition, and on the degree of self-governance it had and currently has compared to the regional powers.

The second part of this work will shine light on several ways in which foreign individuals and organizations deploy activities in the NKR. This in range from a short visit as a passing tourist, to a well-organized multiannual investment by an international charity organization. This work distinguishes three different groups of foreign visitors. There are the individuals that visit the NKR in the score of

international tourism, members of the worldwide Armenian diaspora, and the frequenters form close neighbour Armenia that will be investigated respectively.

To construct this part, besides the information to be found in literature and internet media, the information collected during a field trip to the NKR and Armenia in March 2017. Various interviews, meetings and personal encounters that have taken place during this visit, will be used to illustrate the scope, nature and motivation of these visitors.

The third part of this work will focus on what these foreign visitors to the NKR effectuate in the republic’s practical functioning. It will analyse the direction the effects of foreign activities is leading the NKR to. Although heavily dependent on Armenia, the Republic presents itself like an independent country deserving international recognition. This part will look at developments since the de facto independence of the NKR as well as future possible directions. The text aims to shine light on the findings in part two, concerning the core issue of the NKR to become an ever stronger separate state, or an gradual integration into the bigger Armenian sphere of the lesser Caucasus.

(7)

7

Part I

(8)

8

Evening has fallen over the city. It is crowded in the park, where young and old enjoy the cooler summer evening hours. A fountain with colourful lights draws the attention of children, young parents are chatting with each other, older men sit on wooden benches. A group of musicians prepares for a live evening concert at Stepanakert’s central park, while Karabakh’s youth gallivants in circles around the fountain. The lush green grass is being watered, and the whole park is a ‘Free Wi-Fi Area’. The world couldn’t get much more peaceful than here and now. Right across the street stands the Presidential Palace of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

A picture on Google Maps names this park ‘Mübariz Ibrahimov Park’. Mübariz Ağakərim oğlu Ibrahimov, an Azeri, died in 2010 at the age of 22, while in Azerbaijani army service, at the cease fire line separating the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from the land under direct control of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This cease fire line (also called ‘Line of Contact’, or LoC) is a series of trenches where

Armenian and Azerbaijani military forces have been watching each other for the last 23 years. Every year soldiers from both sides lose their lives at this LoC due to cease fire violations, reported from both sides on an almost daily basis.

The relative peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and its current purely Armenian culture stands in stark contrast to the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural outlook the region had until recent history. It is of vital importance to understand the region’s history and the contrasts and conflicts that it has faced, and faces still, as everything that happens today, stands in light of that past. It is vital to have an idea of the full background of today’s activities in the region, and the political statements that are in every single movement that is made concerning the area. Therefore I have chosen to take the space and time in this work to give an overview of the events that have created the current situation on the ground, and the powers and peoples that have left their footsteps on what we regard as Karabakh.

(9)

9

I

An Introduction to Geographical Karabakh

Karabakh is a geographic region in the South-Eastern Lesser Caucasus. Its geographical borders are the Murovdag, or Mrav, mountain ridge in the north, from which it stretches south over mountainous lands until the Aras river, and eastwards over the lower plains towards the Kura river. Nagorno or

‘Mountainous’ Karabakh contains alpine landscapes in the northern mountain ridge and high summer grazing fields above the tree line, as well as alpine steppes along the western borders with Armenia. When descending from its higher parts we find coniferous and deciduous forests and fertile slopes, descending into the green undulating landscape fit for agriculture. Below that the more barren ‘lower’ Karabakh is stretching out into the eastern plains.

The name Karabakh is believed to be of combined Turkic-Persian origin, with ‘kara’ meaning ‘black’, referring to the dark green forests or the darker rich soils, and ‘bakh’ most often being translated into ‘garden’. The prefix ‘nagorno’ derives from a Russian adjective meaning ‘mountainous’. It is this ‘mountainous’ or ‘upper’ Karabakh where local Armenian majorities have been living for over centuries. They currently prefer to use the Armenian name ‘Artsakh’ for the region, after the ancient Armenian province Artsakh within the Armenian Empire dating back two thousand years.

In this work Nagorno-Karabakh and Karabakh will be used indistinctively, as the name Lower Karabakh is hardly used to point out the eastern plains of the region, and the work focusses on the hilly part of the region encompassing the territory currently in control of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (or NKR, in short). The name Artsakh will occasionally be used for Karabakh when in Armenian contexts. Whenever the territory is meant that was under local Armenian administration within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, it will be specified under the name ‘Former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’.

Concerning the names for regions, rivers, towns and cities, in this work the names used by the majority of the local population as during the bigger part of contemporary history will be used. Therefore, it will speak of Stepanakert, not Khankendi, Ağdam, not Akna, Shusha, not Shushi, and Kalbajar, not Karvachar.

By means of a referendum on February 20th_{2017, the population of the NKR has voted in favour} of changes to their constitution. These changes include a change of the official name the republic goes by. In fact the name has been changed from ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (Artsakh Republic)’, into ‘Artsakh Republic (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic)’.1_{This can be seen as a symbolic decision for the prevalence of} the Armenian name, above the more known but linguistically ‘foreign’ one, but has little to no

consequences as the state continues the legal use of both names. This work will use the name Nagorno-Karabakh Republic or NKR to refer to the Artsakh Republic (Nagorno-Nagorno-Karabakh Republic).

1_{The Armenian Weekly. “Artsakh Votes for New Constitution, Officially Renames the Republic.”, The Armenian} Weekly, February 21st, 2017

(10)

10

II

A Place between Three Empires

When Armenians refer to Karabakh as ‘Artsakh’, they refer back to the Artsakh province of the Armenian Kingdom that controlled the area in the antiquities. Inhabited by various Caucasian tribes, the area now known as Karabakh has over the course of centuries been part of numerous kingdoms and empires. It subordinated to the Persian Sassanid Empire as the Caucasian Albanian satrapy, later the Islamic Abbasid Caliphate, it was the easternmost province of the Bagratid Kingdom of Armenia, part of the Mongo Il-Khanate and switched several times between the Ottoman empire and the Persian Safavid empire from the late middle ages until the eighteenth century.

Whenever under Ottoman or Persian rule, and later under control of the southwards expanding Russian empire, the local administration in Karabakh was under the control of Armenian meliks, or princes (from the Arab word ‘malik’, meaning ‘king’). These meliks enjoyed various degrees of independency, playing out the different empires, maintaining their own juridical and tax systems as well as building fortifications like the strategically placed town of Shusha (Armenian, Shushi).2

These Armenian noble families ruled over multi-ethnic populations, where in the administrative, trade and cultural centres Armenian, Persian and Turkic cultures and languages thrived. It is songs, poems and artefacts created by ethnic Azeri in Karabakh during this period that makes Azerbaijan claim

Karabakh is ancient Azerbaijani homeland without which Azerbaijan is not a whole. An example of a poet and musician that shows the interwoven cultures of Transcaucasia of this era is Sayat-Nova, an Armenian born by the name of Harutyan Sayatyan in the early eighteenth century. While born in Tbilisi, now capital of Georgia but at that time a predominantly Armenian town, he wrote his poems and songs in Armenian, Georgian, Azeri Turkish and Persian.3_{An ethnic Armenian writing Azeri Turkish songs using Georgian} letters; a more Transcaucasian mixture of cultures is hard to find.

Though co-existing and inter-mixing on the one hand, mass expulsion and resettling of ethnic groups happened on the other. This when empires had various reasons to believe one group was to be trusted more or less than the other. Changes in control over land between the Persian, Russian and Ottoman empires resulted in different mass-migrations that changed the ethnic composition of Karabakh. These so called ‘migrational strategies’ by resettling or expelling populations was used by Persia long before the famous example of Cossack settlements used by the Russian Empire to control the northern Caucasian plains and slopes.4

The two main events concerning resettlement of ethnic groups in the Karabakh area that helped shaping the ethnic composition of the region in pre-Soviet times are the settlement of Kurds in the Kalbajar and Lachin districts and the settling of Armenians in the Zangezur and Stepanakert regions.

2_{Robert H. Hewsen and Christopher C. Salvatico, Armenia: a historical atlas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,} 2001), p. 155

3_{Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War – 10th-year anniversary edition, revised and} updated (New York: New York University Press 2013), p. 324

(11)

11

Persian Safavids are believed to have resettled Shi’i Kurds in the Kalbajar-Lachin strip of land to

strengthen their control over the frontier lands. Resettling of Armenians occurred after the Russo-Persian wars of the beginning of the nineteenth century, resulting in the irrevocable loss of all Persia’s Caucasian territories to the Russian empire. In the aftermath of these wars parts of the Muslim population of nowadays Armenia and Azerbaijan moved out to lands that remained under Persian control, while many Armenians migrated from Persian lands to areas in the Erivan Khanate, Zangezur and Karabakh. This helped increasing the Armenian local majority in the mountainous parts of Karabakh.5

During the course of the nineteenth century migration between the Russian empire and the Persian and Ottoman empires continued in various intensities. Muslim inhabitants left Russian

Transcaucasia, and Armenians escaped Muslim rule. Migration intensified during and in the aftermath of the Russian-Turkish wars of 1855-56 and 1877-78. During the forced deportation, expulsion and mass killings of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, by Enver Pasha’s Young Turks in 1915, some Armenian escape routes lead to lands under Russian control. Most of these Armenians settled in what is now Armenia proper, and these events had little effects on the ethnic composition of Karabakh.6_{The effect the iconic} traumatic year of 1915 does have, is that the current conflict over Karabakh mobilizes a determined group of Armenian Diaspora in mainly the US, that sees in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict a possibility, a duty even to defend the ‘Armenian motherland’ against ‘the Muslim threat’.

III

Karabakh under Soviet Rule

After the October Revolution of 1917, the Caucasus region became a playing field for various empyreal powers once again. This time with the factors of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism, communist loyalists and forces loyal to the White Russian empyreal armies increasing complexity.

Karabakh was claimed as part of the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic at its foundation in Tbilisi in May 1918, but continuously claimed by the Republic of Armenia (also Dashnak Armenia) at its declaration of independence two days later, also in Tbilisi. While both states could not fully control the region, local Armenians in Karabakh had de facto self-control over the territory, until British forces appointed an Azeri governor over the area. The Armenians of Karabakh, and particularly those of Shusha, who had come to see the town as an Armenian cultural centre, protested Azeri rulership over the multi-ethnic city. An attempt of Armenian forces to dismantle the Azeri military presence in Shusha in the late evening of March 22nd_{1920 failed. It was intended to take the Azeri by surprise, but poor planning} and coordination made the situation turn a 180 degrees. In the following days the Armenian part of

5_{Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia: A Legal Appraisal (The Hague: Kluwer Law} International, 2001), p. 2

(12)

12

Shusha was burned down, and an exodus of Armenians down the hill to Stepanakert emerged, making Shusha a predominantly Azeri town overnight.7

While the fragile state of Azerbaijan was concentrating its military around Karabakh, the soviet Red Army stood at its northern borders, ready to start a campaign on the Caucasus. Giving little resistance, Azerbaijan was reincorporated within Moscow’s realm, with Armenia following in the year after. This made the decisions on the future status of the Karabakh regions to the nationalities policies of the Soviet Union, with Josef Stalin appointed to the decisive position of drawing borders and setting regulations for autonomy as Commissar of Nationality Affairs.

Decision-making on the statuses of the Nakhchivan, Zangezur and Karabakh regions was extremely messy because of contradictory statements from various soviet officials. Stalin made the final call on Karabakh to be part of soviet Azerbaijan, but it would take two years before the final status would be confirmed. Borders were drafted carefully around the areas of Armenian majority, separating the highlands from the lowlands of historical Karabakh, and creating the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno Karabakh in 1923. An Autonomous Oblast had smaller degrees of autonomy than an Autonomous Republic, as the status Nakhchivan received within the soviet Republic of Azerbaijan.

Discontent on the loss of Karabakh for Armenia, and the mere relative autonomy Armenian inhabitants of Karabakh was given, resulted in different ways of protests through the years. In 1963, 2.500 Karabakh Armenians signed a petition to Khrushchev asking to be attached to either Armenia or Russia. The demand being ignored by Moscow, later that year demonstrations resulted in clashes in Stepanakert that left eighteen people dead.8_{In the Armenian SSR, Karabakh was not forgotten, and when the 50}th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was commemorated in Yerevan in April 1965, an unofficial demonstration with 100.000 people asked for Karabakhs inclusion in soviet Armenia.9_Armenian

nationalists in the NKAO claimed that important political-administrative positions were given to Azeri’s, at the cost of Armenians, and that Karabakh received fewer subsidies from the central government in Baku than other regions in the Republic. According to Armenian nationalists, unification with Armenia would prevent deterioration of the situation in the Karabakh region and preserve Armenian identity.10

Protests in the Soviet Union, and especially in Armenia, were becoming more regular in the late 1980’s, under Mikhail Gorbachev and his Glasnost and Perestroika. While first the more ‘non-political’ subjects as environmental issues were pulling people to the streets, the protests became more political in time. Armenian environmental issues like the air pollution over Yerevan caused by the heavy industry in its vicinity, dangerously placed nuclear power plants at geographical fault lines close to major population centres and the poisoned Sevan Lake due to catastrophic ecological planning were seen as threatening the

7_{Jonathan D. Smele, The ‘Russian’ Civil Wars, 1916-1926: Ten Years That Shook the World (London: Hurst & Company,} 2015), p. 143

8_{Tim Potier, Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, p. 5}

9_{Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,} 2002), p. 71

10_{Emil Souleimanov, Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered} (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2013), p. 54

(13)

13

soul of Armenian existence. This made the environmental movement becoming inseparable from the Armenian national movement.11_{A growing and openly expressed national movement and the sense of} possible open demonstrations put the demonstrators just one step away of addressing national issues that had remained an open vein throughout the soviet era; Karabakh.

IV

From Glasnost into Full War

Gorbachev’s doctrines of Glasnost and Perestroika created an atmosphere that would make open criticism and local restructuring initiatives more likely. Part of the Perestroika idea was it that local governments would take over responsibilities from the central government. This was meant to work as a method of liberalization in economic terms, but soon turned political in the Baltics, as well as in the Caucasus.12

The local government in Stepanakert used this opportunity to speak out their ambitions on 20 February 1988. The local Soviet asked for the NKAO to be transferred from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR. In fact they asked Moscow to change its country’s internal borders, and by that means the Karabakh Armenians were making politics from below for the first time since the 1920’s.13_{The political} aim to unite Armenia and Karabakh found many supporters, in Stepanakert, but even more in Yerevan, and rally’s in support for this idea were symbolized by the term ‘Miatsum!’, or ‘Unity!’.

In the previous week, on 13 February 1988, a small demonstration had taken place in the centre of Stepanakert to advocate the Armenians demand for unification with Armenia. This unsanctioned political rally had grown day by day, and warned the Azeri inhabitants of the NKAO. Azeri from Shusha, a town with a substantial Azeri majority and just uphill from Stepanakert, organized counter protests.14

The events followed with high speed. On 22 February, a crowd of angry Azerbaijani from the Azerbaijani town of Ağdam, 25 kilometres east of Stepanakert, set out to Stepanakert for a confrontation after hearing of two Azeri girls being raped in Stepanakert. At the Armenian village of Askeran they were met by local police and Armenian civilians, some of them armed. There was a clash, wounding around 25 people from both sides, and two Azerbaijani young men were killed. A detachment of the Soviet Army was called in to maintain order. 15

Signs of interethnic tension could now be seen in various places in Armenia and in Azerbaijan. In the mid-80’s around 350.000 Armenians lived in Azerbaijan outside the NKAO, and 200.000 Azeri’s lived

11_{Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian, Armenia: at the crossroads (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers,} 1999), p. 2

12_{Chris Miller, The struggle to save the Soviet economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill: The} University of North Carolina Press, 2016), p. 158

13_{Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York: New York University} Press 2003), p. 11

14_{Ibidem, p. 12}

15_{Ohannes Geukjian, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus}_{: Nagorno-Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet} Nationalities Policies (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), p. 144

(14)

14

in Armenia, mainly in the southern areas around Meghri and Kapan; the Zangezur.16_{Now a serious move} of the minorities to their titular nations had started.

But in February 1988 incident upon incident unfolded rapidly, with the Sumgait pogroms between 26 February and March 1st_{as a tragic nadir so far. Local Armenian minority in Sumgait was targeted by} groups of Azeri civilians, armed with knives, clubs and metal rods, determent to make casualties. Official numbers give over two dozen dead in the course of five days.17_{Pogroms in Kirovabad (nowadays Ganja)} and Baku lead to the expulsion of most Armenians from Azerbaijan in the course of 1988. In the

meantime Azeri villagers in rural Armenia were not safe. Azeri’s had been seen arriving in Baku forced to flee from their houses in the Zangezur region since late 1987. The year 1988 saw almost all Azeri’s and Muslim Kurds being expelled from the Armenian SSR. Armenian gangs raided Muslim settlements, forcing its inhabitants to flee on foot, leaving many villages deserted.18_{The arrival of homeless, petrified} Armenians in Yerevan, and deprived Azeri refugees in Baku created an atmosphere of growing animosity, and washed away the last believes in a possibility of a peaceful coexistence of the two ethnicities in Armenia and Azerbaijan, even in the regions historically multicultural metropoles.

On a political level, 1988 was the year of the ‘war of laws’. The Karabakh leadership was offered a compromise in May 1988 that would mean the NKAO would see an upgrade to an Autonomous Republic, with an own constitution, but the proposal was rejected. The Armenian Supreme Soviet supported this decision, and adopted a resolution in June that welcomed Karabakh to join the Armenian SSR. Two days later the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution reaffirming Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. A definitive verdict had to come from the USSR Supreme Soviet in July, that decided

Karabakh would remain within Azerbaijan, but be ruled by a ‘special representative’ from Moscow able to overrule Baku19

The ‘special representative’, Arkady Volsky, would stay for eighteen months, in which rule of law and central power declined. There were different authorities Armenian as well as Azeri, expressing power on the ground, and civilians were obtaining weapons. While the situation slowly deteriorated, Karabakh slowly slipped from the Moscow agenda. More serious problems emerged that were threatening to the very existence of the Soviet Union. The Baltic states called for independence, Boris Jeltsin as leader of the Russian SFSR undermined Gorbachev’s power, and in Azerbaijan, the movement Popular Front gained serious support among the population.

January 1990 is remembered as ‘Black January’ in Baku. Growing numbers of protesters supporting the National Front against Soviet rule, fuelled by recent developments in Karabakh, turned once more violent against Baku’s Armenian minority. The following pogroms left nearly ninety Armenians dead, and made the authorities to evacuate the last Armenians out of Baku. With the Armenians out of sight, protests continued, and were directed against Soviet rule directly. In fact the city of Baku was taken

16_{de Waal, Black Garden (2003), p. 18} 17_{Masih and Krikorian, Armenia, p. 8} 18_{de Waal, Black Garden (2003), p. 62} 19_{Ibidem, pp. 60-61}

(15)

15

in control of the National Front movement. The Ministry of Internal Affair’s MVD troops were not capable of controlling the city. The Soviet army had to come in action to regain control over its own territory as if it was under enemy occupation, leading to some hundred thirty deaths. Control was re-established, but the anti-Soviet independence movement Popular Front only saw its popular support increase.

As Soviet authority in Armenia and Azerbaijan declined, the conflicts in Karabakh seized to be a Soviet interior affair, and rushed to be a full military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In practice, MVD forces were moving out near the end of 1991, leaving their material to the OMON Azerbaijani interior special police forces and Armenian military units in exchange for cash or vodka.20

On the political front, the parliament of the newly created Republic of Azerbaijan takes decisions in November 1991 concerning the status of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan. It abolishes its special status, divides the region over different Azerbaijani provinces and substitutes the name of Stepanakert officially for the Azerbaijani name Khankendi. In Stepanakert, on 10 December, a referendum is held, boycotted by the Azeri inhabitants, resulting in the proclamation of the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic on 6 January 1992.

In the first half of 1992, Stepanakert suffered from heavy shelling by Azerbaijani forces based in Shusha and until late February, Khojaly, a village east of Stepanakert in the direction of Ağdam. When Armenian forces captured the Azeri village of Khojaly on 25 February, civilians were massacred on a large scale. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 161 fleeing Azeri had been killed when coming across an Armenian military post on their way to the Azeri controlled territory of Ağdam.21_{The massacre is} actively remembered in Azerbaijan since, and commemorated annually as the ‘Khojaly Genocide’ in Baku and other places. In 1992 the Khojaly massacre showed the Azerbaijani leaderships inability to use their military supernumerary to safeguard its own population. The young nation was weakened by political instability when the leadership of Ayaz Mutalibov was held responsible for more losses in the spring of 1992. The strategically town of Shusha was lost to Armenian forces, as well as the town of Lachin, which gave the Armenians of Karabakh a land corridor to Armenia proper.

A coup against Mutalibov’s regime by activists of the Azerbaijani Popular Front brought Abulfaz Elchibey in power in Baku. He reorganized the Azerbaijani forces to launch an attack on lost positions in the summer of 1992. The northern Karabakh region of Shahumyan was quickly conquered, and the Armenian population was forcefully expelled from the area. The offensive continued south in the Martakert region, ultimately controlling almost half of the former NKAO territory.

Due to the scarcity of resources, both for the isolated Karabakh as well as for the malfunctioning economy of Azerbaijan, the winter months were calm. When the conflict heated up in early 1993 the tides had turned for the Armenian forces. In a few months, Armenian commander Monte Melkonian proved very valuable, and Armenian forces recaptured the Martakert region. Melkonian was an American-born

20_{de Waal, Black Garden (2003), p. 167} 21_{Human Rights Watch World Report 1993}

(16)

16

Armenian, a diaspora-Armenian who had come to Karabakh to make the Armenian case benefit from his military experience. Disorganization of Azeri military units led to more strategic losses for the Azeri forces in the spring months of 1993. Melkonian managed to capture the Kalbajar and Lachin in the north, and other Armenian forces conquered the regions of Fizuli, Jabrail and Ağdam by August. These new conquered regions had not been inhabited by ethnic Armenians, and made the local Kurdish and Azeri population flee to safer grounds. Especially the loss of Ağdam resulted in a mass exodus. The town, once with a population of over 30.000 people, is a ghost town since.

Due to continuing military losses, Elchibey saw growing discontent among his military apparatus as well as the Azerbaijani population. He stepped down from office, leaving the position to the highly respected former leader of Soviet Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, who promised to restore social order. Aliyev, enjoying great authority among Azerbaijani elites and population, did not manage to regain much of the lost territory, but did restore social order in the rest of the country. He cooperated with representatives of Armenia, the NKR and Russia, on behalf of the OSCE Minsk group, to sign a preliminary ceasefire agreement, the Bishkek Protocol, on 5 May 1994.

V

Dealing with a de facto Nagorno Karabakh Republic

Since the Bishkek Protocol came into effect in 1994, it has effectively stopped mass military actions between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. The Protocol was meant only to serve as a preliminary ceasefire agreement and a step to further peace talks. In this regard it has to be mentioned that no progression has been made beyond the Bishkek Protocol. Nevertheless, the ceasefire line, or Line of Contact (LoC), has proven to be more or less static for the last two decades. Both sides have dug

themselves in at the ceasefire line creating a line of trenches, heavily armed and manned by tensely vigilant subscripts. Although the ceasefire held, except for some outbursts of violence as in 2008 and the April 2016 fighting, no agreement was made after 1994, and no internationally force was deployed to monitor the front line.

The ceasefire is officially overseen by representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States. The Minsk Group “…spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”22_{The mandate given to the Minsk Group in March} 1995 in Vienna says it was established to make efforts to strengthen the cease-fire, develop a basis for negotiations, compose and operate a multinational OSCE peace-keeping force and visit the region of conflict to maintain contacts with the parties.23_{A delegation of the Minsk Group, represented by one of}

22_{OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “OSCE Minsk Group”, accessed March 1st 2017,} http://www.osce.org/mg.

(17)

17

the co-chairholders, does regularly visit the LoC, but no serious steps have been accomplished in order to install a multinational peace-keeping mission.

It can be argued that no process is made because of the simple fact that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has never made it to be of top priority for any of the co-chairing nations that could put more pressure on both sides of the conflict to accept compromises. But over time, different proposals have been made by the Minsk Group, especially in the late 1990’s. However, when talks made it in a direction of a mutual agreed action plan, one of the conflicting parties would step back, frustrating any possible process the OSCE seeks to compose.24

The stances of the two parties are driving any negotiation into a deadlock. The Armenians use the occupied territories of Azerbaijan as a bargaining chip they don’t want to give away until agreements are made on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh. They demand the right of self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the surrounding territories remain under their control until. The Azerbaijani don’t want to make any concessions until the Armenian troops retract from the occupied territories and the internally displaced population can go back to their lands. They demand complete territorial integrity.25_{An additional problem to the Armenian negotiators is that Baku will not accept} representatives of the NKR to be part of the negotiations. They see Yerevan as the only factor in the conflict, and don’t distinguish between Stepanakert and Yerevan.26

The possibility of making any concessions has highly decreased because it would be a hard thing to sell at home. Over the last two decades, lack of communication and human links between the two ethnic groups of Armenians and Azeri have resulted in a growing mistrust and misunderstanding. Especially the younger generations have grown up surrounded with maximalist viewpoint. The impermeable cease-fire line has only entrenched ethnic hatred, negative stereotypes and war rhetoric toward ‘the other’.27_{Media outlets like Armenpress.am, News.am, News.az and the Azerbaijan state news} agency at Azertag.az, make daily notions of cease-fire violations of the opposite side. The Azeri elite commemorates the atrocities committed by the enemy using a victim discourse and negative stereotypes of Armenian.28_{In both countries the political leadership has committed themselves to a non-concessional} stance. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the political elite fears to lose face whenever agreeing with less than their own maximalist demands. These post-Soviet elites, that Ayunts calls ‘competitive

authoritarianism’ in case of Armenia, and ‘fully authoritarian’ in the case of Azerbaijan, know how fragile

24_{Fariz Ismailzade, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Current Trends and Future Scenarios”, Istituto Affari} Internationali, November 2011, p. 3

25_{Artak Ayunts, “Nagorny Karabakh conflict: prospects for conflict transformation”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 44,} No. 4, 2016, p. 545

26_{Ceylan Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict} (1991-2009)”, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, No. 7, August 2011, p. 1230

27_{Ayunts, “Nagorny Karabakh conflict”, p. 543}

28_{Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991-2009)”, p.} 1227

(18)

18

their legitimacy to power is, and fear losing face is losing power. Making themselves kidnapped by their own viewpoints.29

In the meantime, the Nagorno Karabakh Republic enjoys a de facto existence. It is even

recognized by some separate American States like California and Rhode Island with influential Armenian minorities, and by the separatist de facto states of Abkhazia and Transnistria. However, it does not get official recognition from any UN member state, not even Armenia. Despite negligible international recognition, the NKR tries to organize itself like an independent state. It holds parliamentary and presidential elections, established a usual score of ministries, has a national Ombudsman, conducts, according to good old Soviet use, a population census every decade, and prints its own postal stamps and travel visas.

Despite the independent and official outlook, the NKR is highly dependent on the Republic of Armenia for security, energy infrastructure. Economically it is not viable, the state depending on funding from Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora, as its population comes by with remittances from relatives working abroad. While Armenia suffers from its isolation and its limited natural resources, the economic outlook of Azerbaijan has changed drastically since 1994. The return of relative stability after the cease-fire agreements has brought investors to Baku that allowed it to use its oil reserves. The Azerbaijani GDP has risen 20-fold since.30_{This allows Azerbaijan to purchase Russian weapon on a large scale. Recently, the} annual investment in the military apparatus of Azerbaijan transcends Armenia’s total annual budget.31 Although Armenia can buy its military equipment from Russia at cut prices, the power balance shifts in Azerbaijan’s favour. This makes Armenia more dependent on its security deals with Russia. It sees itself forced to allow the presence of Russian military bases in the country in order to guarantee its national security.

VI

Views on Future Scenario’s

In the early days of April 2016, Karabakh appeared briefly in the international media, as fights emerged at three different places along the Line of Contact. These were the most intense clashes since the 1994 cease-fire agreement. The fights continued for four consecutive days from April 2nd_{until April 5}th_{, resulting in} minor territory gain for the Azerbaijan army, and an estimated total death toll of 350.32_{The decapitation} of a killed Armenian serviceman, and the mutilation and killing of civilians in the northern NKR town of Terter, show the intense hatred towards the enemy. They illustrate the very ethnic dimension of this conflict, where the ‘enemy ethnicity’ is targeted, instead of the ‘enemy army’.

29_{Ayunts, “Nagorny Karabakh conflict”, p. 548}

30_{Thomas de Waal, “Nagorny Karabakh: Closer to War than Peace”, Russia and Eurasia Summary, July 25th 2013, p. 2} 31_{Ismailzade, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, p. 8}

(19)

19

British academic Thomas de Waal, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sees these latest clashes as signs for the end of the period of relative calmness at the LoC, and thinks further military actions will be ever harder to contain.33_{Writing in 2013, he saw two possible future} scenarios. With a changed perception of Azerbaijan, that through economic growth can

self-confidently act like a regional power now, De Waal sees a danger in the government’s rhetoric on the Karabakh topic. By focusing so strongly on trauma and injustice done to the Azerbaijani nation by the Armenians, Karabakh could in economic or social insecure times, be the only way of uniting the nation.34 Gathering the nation behind its flag to claim back Karabakh could become the only option left to Azerbaijani leadership to legitimize its power. In order to explain the reasons behind the April 2016 violence, observers point out to falling oil prices that have seriously affected Azerbaijan’s financial room for manoeuvre. By putting Karabakh back on the agenda, attention of regular Azerbaijani’s could be distracted from the recent cuts in the government’s expenditure on the country’s social infrastructure.35

As a second point of risk for escalation De Waal points at a future incident at the LoC that could spiral out of control.36_{Fariz Ismailzade, currently connected to the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy} University in Baku, recognized this “Gradual, unwanted transition to war”37_{as a likely scenario for future} developments as well when writing in 2011.

VII Daily Life Directions in the Diplomatic Freeze

Since the cease-fire agreements have been signed, the NKR has rebuild the region, and deepened its links with Armenia.38_{Import and export can only go through Armenia. The NKR uses the Armenia’s national} currency, the Armenian Dram as legal coinage, and shares a customs union with its neighbour. In recent years, the infrastructure between Yerevan and Stepanakert has seen some serious investment and improvement. The airport of Stepanakert, near Khojaly, has been undergoing repair work, and could be put in use, was it not for Azerbaijan threatening to shoot down airplanes using Azerbaijani airspace illegally.3940_{Roadworks have improved the Yerevan-Vardenis-Stepanakert connection, with the help of}

33_{Thomas de Waal, “Prisoners of the Caucasus; Resolving the Karabakh Security Dilemma”, Carnagie Europe, June} 16th₂₀₁₆

34_de_{Waal, “Nagorno-Karabakh”, p. 5}

35_{Magdalena Grono, “What’s Behind the Flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh?”, International Crisis Group, April 3}rd₂₀₁₆ 36_de_{Waal, “Nagorno-Karabakh”, p. 5}

37_{Ismailzade, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, p. 8} 38_de_{Waal, “Nagorno-Karabakh”, p. 2}

39_{Giorgi Lomsadze, “Azerbaijan: Flights to Nagorno Karabakh Will Be Boarding at Gunpoint”, Eurasianet, March} 17th₂₀₁₁

40_{Kolter, Christian, “The reopening of the Stepanakert airport (Nagorno-Karabakh): In the crosshair of Azerbaijan”,} Eufoa, February 2014

(20)

20

Armenian diaspora investors.41_{This opens up a second road corridor besides the} Yerevan-Goris-Stepanakert connection that had been improved in the 1990’s thanks to likewise diaspora funding.42

As this chapter has shown, history can identify various phases in which multiple empires had some sort of control over the area. When zoomed in into the area of Karabakh, it where for a long time the local Armenians who executed de facto self-rule, in cooperation with the various local ethnicities. Although Armenia is the one lifeline in the current isolated situation, besides the support of the Republic of Armenia, the Armenian diaspora, by Monte Melkonian, have helped to create the de facto independent state of Nagorno-Karabakh. Still, Karabakh has a de facto self-rule, and does not fully belong to either Armenia nor Azerbaijan. Arguments can be found to motivate that Karabakh has in fact never been that much integrated into the rest of Caucasian Armenia.

While the NKR proclaims to be an independent state, as cars in the NKR carry Armenian license plates, border passing goes along with just a simple glance at one’s documents, in reality as well as in perception, the NKR can be easily perceived as just another province of Armenia. Svante E. Cornell, Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program in Stockholm, clearly states that Karabakh has been slowly but steadily integrated into Armenia. Cornell: “Armenia has repeatedly asserted that it can neither control nor vouch for Karabakh officials, but the image of free association between Yerevan and Stepanakert has mainly been a fig leaf put in place to ward off international sanctions for occupying another state’s territory.”43

41_{Hayastan All Armenian Fund, “Construction of Vardenis - Martakert Highway Project”, accessed May 1}st_2017, http://www.himnadram.org/index.php?id=24242.

42_{Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2011) p. 135} 43_{Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, p. 135}

(21)

21

Part II

(22)

22

As small and isolated as it is, the world is in close contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. The place attracts many, and it awaits its visitors with open arms. They can be interested strangers, whom can be shown what rich culture and nature the ‘black garden’ has, or can be fellow Armenians that want to feel and share their common backgrounds. These visits can diverge from a brief visit from a passing traveller to a multiannual commitment by foreign charity organizations.

In this part of this work the various activities of foreign nationals in Karabakh will be put under a magnifying glass. First the scope, characteristics and potential of the tourist business will be treated. Multiple interviews with individuals close to Karabakh tourism and various tourism aimed initiatives will give an idea of the nature of tourism and its effects and future prospects regarding the NKR.

The second chapter will shine light upon the extensive Armenian diaspora. Their activities in Karabakh will be examined by their nature, organizational structure, backgrounds and results. Among other sources, an interview with one of the main operating diaspora charity organizations will shine light on these matters.

The third chapter tries to grasp the nature of visits the inhabitants of the Republic of Armenia bring to their little brother Karabakh. Visits with the purpose of business and leisure will be treated as far as sources are available. The undeniably meaningful impact of the military commitment Armenian individuals have for the case of Karabakh will be brought to attention, as this might be seen as one of the most powerful elements in the terms of Karabakhi and Armenian interpersonal interactions in the times of the Karabakh war until today.

(23)

23

I

Conventional Tourism

Although it might not strike the average family to pick Nagorno-Karabakh for a summer holiday destination, what is unattractive to many, can be very attractive to some, and tourists do find their way into the Republic. Not for the usual city-trips, and there are obviously no beach resorts. But as the countries of the Caucasus, with Tbilisi in Georgia as the main tourist gateway to the region, get more known for their natural beauty, cultural richness and soft visa regulations, tourism is growing in both Georgia and Armenia, as well as in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Georgia benefits the most. With a tourist infrastructure that expands year by year the country is starting to become an ever more ‘regular destination’ and will soon lose its ‘off the beaten track’ status, to use the language of the Lonely Planet guidebooks. The increasingly western oriented Georgian tourism infrastructure attracts many to its mountains, churches, wine and old city centres. Visitors arrive from western countries, as well as from Eastern Asia. Armenia is less popular, but sees a steady increase as well, as people visit the wider region or particularly choose the country for their travel destination. Besides the usual nationalities, a large amount of these tourists come from its neighbour Iran. Comfortable coaches with Iranian tourists drive back and forth from Tehran and Tabriz, showing the passengers their curious little Christian neighbour country. During the Nowruz holidays in March 2017, Farsi could be heard at every street corner of Yerevan’s city centre. The third Trans-Caucasian country of Azerbaijan is the exception to the rule. This despite their recent efforts to attract international attention. The country hosted the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest and the 2015 European Games, and seized this chance for international publicity with both hands making it prestigious, costly events. It even sponsored the Spanish football team of Atlético Madrid. The team played with the slogan ‘Azerbaijan, Land of Fire’ on their shirts. But as the country comes in the picture, so do claimed human rights violations and suppression of free press. Not such good publicity for Azerbaijan’s tourist sector.

Nagorno-Karabakh gets a, although small in actual numbers, wide variety of tourists. Visa regulations are very soft. Visitors do not need a visa on forehand, but register at the Republic’s ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ in Stepanakert. They pay an equivalent of €6,- in Armenian Dram and can stay for up to 21 days on a tourist visa.44_{You will be asked whether you wish your visa in your passport or on a} separate paper, as a visa in your passport will block you from future visits to Azerbaijan. You are likely to be handed the personal phone number of the young man behind the counter, in case you have any further questions or inconveniences. This personal approach from a Karabakh official institution can be seen as an effluent from the rather limited amount of visitors who come to visit this office, but it is more than that. Visits to Karabakh are met with appreciation from local authorities and residents, as a visit means their ‘state’ is being noticed and worthy a visit from the outside world. In addition to this, it is of the authorities highest interest that tourists return home after visiting Karabakh with a positive story, that will make the NKR live through in the hearts and minds and therefore gain sympathy for its existence.

(24)

24

While bureaucratic hassle will not be an obstacle in tourists way, the practical trip could. As Azerbaijan does not allow the Khojaly Airport to be used, there are no direct flights into the NKR. Travelers are forced to undertake a seven hour drive from Yerevan over windy roads, that are for a considerable part in a deplorable state. Visiting the NKR means a detour in any way. Therefore you will not be likely to end up there accidentally. Tourists consciously pick this destination, and will at some level be informed about the uncertain status of the region. Ministries of Foreign affairs will warn their citizens for the ongoing insecure security situation, and will inform their people that their country cannot provide councillor services from Baku in this break-away region of what is officially regarded Azerbaijan. Although the accessibility and the political situation will stop the bigger flow of tourists, it attracts another, limited flow, that feels attracted to a country that in some way does not exist. Therefore a substantial part of the visitors to NKR will stay only briefly, and mainly out of curiosity for the experience and excitement of being in some place particular, some place tricky, some place unusual.

The NKR government has been taking tourism rather serious, and has a well-organized tourist information infrastructure for the small region it is and the general development status it has. Permanently opened tourist offices are located in Stepanakert and Shusha, and smaller dependences are to be found at a handful of their main tourist attractions during the summer period. They provide their guests with free maps and booklets on the republic’s main sights in various languages. With a limited number of tourists, upon visiting one of the tourist centres one can expect a very personal approach from the hostess. They have the time. Tourists are kindly informed in Armenian, Russian, and occasionally, English.

The tourist office proudly brings to attention what the region has to offer to the common tourist. There is the monasteries, with Gandzasar as the icon for Karabakh Armenian Orthodoxy, and Dadivank, a smaller monastery in the north. Several small museums are located throughout the region, like the one commemorating the important historical figure Nikol Duman in a little house-museum, the national archaeological treasures in the museum at the neatly renovated Tigranakert castle, or the state’s historical museum in Stepanakert itself among others.

In the case of the Gandzasar monastery, the government of Nagorno Karabakh has been trying to get the site recognised and listed in the directory of the UNESCO World Heritage Sites. This with the objective that it would give one of the main tourist sites of Karabakh international appeal, and might attract more visitors.45_{An authority on Armenian historical architecture, Samvel Karapetyan, has little} trust the attempt will succeed.46_{Armenian businessman Levon Hayrapetyan has funded a ‘renovation’ of} the church in the early 2000’s that basically meant that a layer of freshly cut tiles were cemented on the older stones. Clearly an unsophisticated way of treating cultural heritage according to international standards.47_{This ‘kitsch’ way of renovating shows what can happen in a place where private initiatives}

45_{Gandzasar Armenian Apostolic Church monastery, official website, “Pilgrimage and Tourism Nagorno} Karabakh”, available at http://www.gandzasar.com/pilgrimage-and-tourism-nagorno-karabakh.htm 46_{Aysor, “Karapetyan: UNESCO to refuse including Gandzasar in its list”, Aysor, July 13}th₂₀₁₁

47_{Yerkir Media, “SAMVEL KARAPETYAN GANDZASAR”, Yerkir Media, published on Youtube July} 13th₂₀₁₁

(25)

25

with a certain amount of funding can surpass well-structured rebuilding programs and knowledge of historical value.

All these sites are specifically presented as richness of Karabakh’s history, with a special notion on local Armenian autonomy that would date back a long period. The castle of Tigranakert is an excellent example in this matter, as it is named after an ancient Armenian king. Although they stand in the bigger history of Armenian presence in the wider region, the Karabakhness or Artsakhness of the sites are emphatically underlined. These are signs of a specific Karabakh identity, derived from local Armenian remnants of historic autonomy, that are strengthening a separate Karabakh identity as part of an Armenian identity Not connected to the state of Armenia, but to the Armenian ethnicity.

The NKR’s national beauty is brought under attention as well, with the main returning beauties being the Shusha Gorge and the dense green forests. These forests are a rarity in the Armenian realm, where most of the land exists of rocky slopes and barren alpine grazing lands. Since a few years the ‘Janapar’ (meaning ‘voyage’ in Armenian) project provides a signposted walking path touching upon many of the region’s highlights. This Janapar Trail has been set out by two Americans of Armenian descent, who organized a crowdfunding project to build and maintain the track. They intended to open up the area for the hiking nature loving adventurous tourist and created a website to inform future strollers on Karabakh’s paths. Maps and GPS-tracks can be downloaded from the website to prepare for a unique summer hike.48

The website shows images of spring flowers, lush mountains and waterfalls, providing a serene image that would fit to what one would expect from what a hike in the Swiss Alps would look like. With little background information, the serenity of these images and the presented stories of an utter hospitable local population presents the image of an uncomplicated peaceful place. Not to call this presentation intentionally deceiving, but a limited presentation does shape an image to the audience that is aiding to create the image of a stable, independent and legitimate country.

The efforts of the trail’s builders have not in the least been in vain. The trail is a notoriety in Karabakh’s tourism world, and many of the visiting tourists walk at least a small part of this trail during their visits.

The NKR tourism department actively campaigns for more notoriety as a tourist destination at international tourism fairs. Since nine years there are missions been sent to fairs in various western cities like Berlin, Milano and Paris.49_{It also shared a booth with Armenia at the World Travel Market exhibition} in London, one of the leading trade shows in the tourist industry. Although it shared a booth with the Armenian National Tourism Organization, Nagorno-Karabakh, was, with this name, represented by a separated part of the booth, campaigning exclusively for Karabakh.50_{This tells us something about the} way the NKR presents itself to the outside world. Maybe in cooperation with their Armenian

counterparts, but the image to the outside is clearly that Karabakh is a separate destination.

48_{For more information: http://www.janapar.org/wiki/Main_Page} 49_{Sergey Shahverdyan, interviewed in Stepanakert, March 17}th₂₀₁₇

(26)

26

These activities do not pass unnoticed by the Azerbaijani authorities. When Karabakh shared a pavilion with Armenia at the ITB Tourism fair in 2016 in Berlin, spokesperson of Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hikmat Hajiyev reacted to say Armenia is abusing tourism in order to annex occupied Azerbaijani territories. On a previous edition of the ITB, Azerbaijan had successfully blocked Karabakhs participation with an own booth. The ITB fair had in that time chosen to follow the standards of the United Nations World Tourism Organization and not to facilitate the promotion of tourism in occupied territories. According to the Azerbaijani official Hajiyev, Armenia and Karabakh had now been deceiving the organizing committee of the tourism fair.51_{Azerbaijan shows to have a close watch on these matters} by protesting at a similar case at the Madrid tourism fair early 2017.52_{The presentation of Karabakh as a} tourist destination clearly feels threatening to Azerbaijan, that fears a decreasing legitimacy for reclaiming Karabakh in the public eye.

Special attention of the Nagorno-Karabakh Tourism Organisation goes to the Russian market, where various tour operators and journalists enjoyed a presentation on tourist potential of the region. In Moscow, the Karabakh mission was aided by the Ministry of Economy of Armenia. Although the support of the organizational infrastructure Armenia enjoys seems to be of high importance to the presentation of Karabakh on these events abroad, the focus of the event in Moscow was explicitly on Karabakh. With the name of the presentation being ‘The Artsakhian days in Moscow’.53

The NKR government opened all possibilities for Armenian tour operators to include Karabakh in their tour packages. Hovhannes Kandilyan, product manager of Nueva Vista, one of the major tour operators in Armenia and Karabakh, says he meets no restrictions at all to deliver services in the NKR, without any arrangements with the local authorities. The tour organizer only has to present a list of passport details of the travellers, which can sent in advance, shortening waiting time in getting the visas arranged in Stepanakert. Kandilyan’s package tours that cover Karabakh all start and end in Yerevan, and the guides are not locals, but Armenians who accompany the group from start to end. Nueva Vista does not see the advantage in local guides, as it is easy to cover Armenia and Karabakh as one region.54_{As all} visitors to the NKR travel through Armenia, it is of high importance for the Karabakh tourism industry that there to be no hindrance for Armenian based tour operators to include Karabakh as a main or sub-destination in their package tours.

The number of foreign visitors to the Karabakh has in general been slowly increasing over the years. Figures presented by the NKR government show the amount of visitors increased by 15,5% in 201555_{, resulting in a 13% growth of the tourist industry. It was a welcome growth, as 2014 had shown a}

50_{News.am, “Karabakh presented at World Travel Market exhibition in London”, News.am, November 2}nd₂₀₁₂ 51_{Daily Karabakh, “Armenia abuses tourism in order to strengthen results of occupation”, Daily Karabakh, March} 10th_{, 2016}

52_{Azernews, “Armenia’s provocation at Madrid tourism fair prevented”, Azernews, January 24}th_{, 2017} 53_{Karabakh Travel, ‘Artsakh tourism potential has been presented to Russian market’, November 18}th₂₀₁₅ 54_{Hovhannes Kandilyan, interviewed in Yerevan, March 21}st₂₀₁₇

(27)

27

11% decrease compared to the previous year.56_{In actual numbers, international tourism has grown from} around 5.000 visitors in 2007, to 14.375 in 2014, and 16.366 in 2015.57_{As the NKR shares a customs} union with Armenia, Armenians are not obliged to obtain a visa upon arrival in Karabakh, and therefore are not included in these numbers. Diaspora Armenians with Republic of Armenia passports as well as citizens of Armenia are not counted as foreign visitors.58

There is a strong correlation between the success of the NKR’s tourism sector and the military situation at the front lines. The Four-day-war in April 2016 had a very negative influence on tourism. Susanna Petrosyan, living and working in Stepanakert, has been active in Karabakh’s tourist sector for the last 20 years, arranging lodging and tours. She saw a very steep decline of tourism after the April 2016 war. While she in general experiences a steady rise of tourism since she began her activities in 1997, last year she saw herself forced to downscale her office. She currently works alone, and has sufficient work only for a part-time occupation.59

Mister Sergey Shahverdyan, head of the Department of Tourism of the NKR, informed me, during an interview in his office in northern Stepanakert, that the tourist industry is currently responsible for a share of around 3 % of the republic’s GDP, and has been creating a considerable amount of jobs.60 With tourists spending over $6 million annually in Karabakh, it is a major source of income.61_{Although of} considerable economic importance to the NKR, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims these numbers are ‘ridiculous’, as “About $4 million a year is spent only for participation of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in international tourism exhibitions in Armenia's pavilion.”62_{According to the head of their press service} Hikmet Hajiyev.

The tourist information centre in Stepanakert informed me on the nationalities visiting their information centres, which gives an idea on what origins the visitors have. These figures, transmitted by Anusha Vanesyan, working for the NKR Tourism Organization, show that as much as 44% are from Russia, with visitors from the USA (11%) and Iran (5%) being second and third numerous. In the rest of the top-15 nationalities we see almost exclusively Western European countries, with Lebanon, China and Ukraine as exceptions.63_{With Ukraine and Lebanon being countries with considerable Armenian diaspora} concentrations. As a remark to these figures it is necessary to note that visitors from Armenia or the recently emigrated diaspora might not visit the centres as much as the tourist with lesser familiarity with the region would.

56_{Karabakh Travel, ‘Tourism is growing rapidly in Karabakh’}

57_{Asbarez Newspaper, “Tourism in Karabakh increases”, Asbarez Newspaper, December 28}th_{, 2015}

58_{Arka News Agency, “The number of tourists visiting Nagorno-Karabakh Republic growing annually”, Arka News} Agency, March 21st_{, 2016}

59_{Susanna Petrosyan, interviewed in Stepanakert, March 16}th₂₀₁₇ 60_{Sergey Shahverdyan, interviewed in Stepanakert, March 17}th₂₀₁₇

61_{PanArmenian, “Artsakh posts tourism income of $6.4 million in 2014”, PanArmenian, March 5}th₂₀₁₅

62_{Virtual Karabakh, “ ‘Tourism statistics’ in Armenia-occupied Azerbaijani territories ridiculous – ministry”, Virtual} Karabakh, March 10th_{, 2015}

The Directions of Karabakh’s status quo