The Transcendence of Finitude. An investigation into the possibility of absolute knowledge

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The Transcendence of Finitude

An investigation into the possibility of absolute knowledge

Research Master’s Thesis in Philosophy A.L.D. van Steen

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University of Amsterdam a.l.d.vansteen@gmail.com

Supervisor: Prof. dr. P.G. Cobben Second reader: Dr. S. Niklas 10-02-2018

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Introduction

Already in the first year of my studies, the philosophical project of G.W.F. Hegel sparked my interest. In the mean time, it has taken a firm hold of me. This fascination has mainly been instigated thanks to a reading group in which Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit1

(1807/2015) has been studied meticulously and with great dedication. This particular way of reading has brought me to experience that studying a philosophical work that has been written over 200 years ago can still take place in the form of a lively and critical dialogue, bringing questions to light that have in no way become redundant in our age and time. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a prime example of this: in this work, Hegel strives to put all philosophical positions within Western philosophy under the closest scrutiny, and attempts to lay bare their presuppositions. He thus engages into a lively discussion with the philosophical tradition and methodically turns against all forms of dogmatic conviction, in order to answer that one question: “how can we know what is true?”. It is this quintessential philosophical question that will be put at the heart of this thesis.

In the Introduction of the PhoS, Hegel immediately confronts us with the object of his philosophical project. He writes: “das Absolute [ist] allein war, oder das Wahre allein Absolut” (p. 54). It is clear that Hegel, in reply to Immanuel Kant, wants to reinvestigate the possibility of absolute knowledge, of knowledge of “die Sache selbst (p. 53), i.e. the thing

in itself. The attainment of absolute knowledge has been deemed impossible by many, and

Hegel has been strongly criticized and even ridiculed by succeeding generations for trying to obtain it. Heidegger (1969) for instance blames Hegel for presenting an “onto-theology”2_{(p. 47), Levinas (1969) believes that Hegelian philosophy leads to a position in}

which all transcendence is lost within an “impersonal reason”3_{(p. 87), and Adorno (1973)}

wants to rid philosophy of Hegel’s absolute concept when he introduces a form of “negative dialectics…that extinguishes the autarky of the concept” (p. 12), to name but a few post-modern philosophers.

Despite the fact that these philosophers, each in their own right, deserve a much more detailed analysis and comparison to Hegelian thought4_{, the central point of critique pointed}

1 From now on to be referred to as PhoS. I will refer to the German “Akademieausgabe” published by Meiner

Verlag (2015). I have chosen not to use any English translations, because I believe the preciseness of the

argumentation requires it to refer to Hegel’s original wordings, and not to an interpretation of those wordings.

2 M. Heidegger criticizes Hegel on several occasions. For instance, he devotes a lecture to the theme of

“onto-theological metaphysics”, published in the book Identity and Difference (1969). Here, he compares his own thought with Hegel’s: “For Hegel, the matter of thinking is the idea as the absolute concept. For us, formulated in a primary fashion, the matter of thinking is the difference as difference” (p. 47). As we will see, it is precisely this “difference as difference” that will play a crucial role in Hegel’s project, and is thus in no way neglected as Heidegger seems to suggest.

3 E. Levinas writes in Totality and Infinitude (1969): “This seems to us to be the justification of freedom aspired

after by the philosophy that, from Spinoza to Hegel, identifies will and reason, that, contrary to Descartes, removes from truth its character of being a free work so as to situate it where the opposition between the I and the non-I disappears, in an impersonal reason. Freedom is not maintained but reduced to being the reflection of a universal order which maintains itself and justifies itself all by itself like the God of the ontological argument” (p. 87). My investigation aims to show that transcendence still takes a central place in the PhoS, albeit in a very specific way.

4_{Unfortunately, I will not be able to compare views within the scope of this thesis. I do hope however that my}

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at Hegel can be distilled from the quotes above: Hegel’s concept of the absolute in one way or the other neglects the fact that human beings are finite beings, and can thus only attain

finite knowledge. The attempt to identify the absolute is then characterized as a sign of hubris, of man undertaking an Icarean endeavor, believing to be God. Although I do not

deny that Hegel’s central subject of thought is to conceptualize the absolute, I do object to a reading of Hegel that reduces his philosophical project one-sidedly to the attainment of a position of infinitude, in other words, a position that defends the claim that all of difference or transcendence needs to be sublated; a conception of the absolute that aims to absorb everything into a closed system, thereby destroying all freedom and individuality, making way for ideology and dictatorship. Inspired by the interpretation of Cobben (1996/2009/2012, among others), I would like to offer a reading of Hegel that can be called

post-dialectical,5_{that is, a reading that does justice to human finitude without neglecting the}

central point of Hegelian thought, namely that the only true philosophical knowledge is absolute knowledge.

Of course, for now this is nothing but an introduction to the position I would like to defend, a mere claim that needs to be proven over the course of the investigation. I aim to do so by answering the following research question:

What are the logical conditions of possibility that allow finite beings to be able to attain absolute knowledge?

In this investigation, I will present an analysis of the last chapter of part A. Consciousness, namely the chapter Force and Understanding, and the first part of B. Self-consciousness, from

The Truth of Self-certainty to the Lord/Bondsman relation. I have chosen these parts of the

book because I believe they can be used as a key to unlock the core structure of the entire

Phos. The investigation will consist of a close-reading analysis of Hegel’s primary text,

through which I aim to present an argument that is developed step-by-step according to an immanent logic. Only when we are able to critically prove the necessity of Hegel’s exposition it will be possible to formulate an answer to the question above6_.

In order to further specify the object of research, it will be necessary to look at the nature of the problem at hand. Before the real textual analysis starts, I will therefore first devote a chapter to the central problem that Hegel addresses in the PhoS, and explain the main methodological features that Hegel hands us in order to be able to answer the question

5 Cf. Cobben, Postdialectische Zedelijkheid (1996).

6 My research thus aims to explicate the necessary logical structure of the text. Because of the density and

abstract nature of Hegel’s use of language, this step by step analysis has taken all my attention and time. I will therefore not explicitly engage in a discussion with the secondary literature, at least not in the main text. I will however comment on the leading interpreters within the field in footnotes. Next to this practical argument, I think there are also a more principal arguments in favor of the method I have chosen. First of all, many interpreters fail to present an analysis that concerns the logical necessity of the arguments, even though I believe that such an analysis is required in order to do justice to Hegel’s project. Secondly, since Hegel’s work has been commented on for over 200 years, it is quite easy to lose oneself in all that is written. The ability to compare interpretations with the primary text or with each other already presupposes a point of view that has appropriated and understood the primary text. To achieve such an appropriation and understanding is precisely the objective of this thesis. Therefore, I consider it most valuable to engage in a lively discussion with the primary text first, before turning to any of its interpretations. Once one is able to formulate specific questions, it can of course be very useful and even enlightening to turn to secondary literature.

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that lies at the core of his epistemological project. This first framework will offer us a set of hypotheses that can guide our search for the answer to the central question of this thesis.

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1. The Project and Methodology of the Phenomenology of Spirit

1.1. The Project

1.1.1. The Absolute: What is it?

Before we turn to to the problem at hand, it will be useful to determine the object of research, namely the absolute. Of course it is problematic to try to do this before the investigation has even started. Precisely because it is the absolute it is supposed to be allencompassing: the whole presupposes its parts and vice versa. What the absolute really is can only be developed over the course of the argument. If we would already have a full understanding of the concept, the investigation that lies ahead of us would become superfluous. Nonetheless, it will be needed to formally introduce the conceptual and methodological considerations that lie at the base of the PhoS, even if it remains impossible to justify their use until the whole project has been completed.

For a formal definition of the absolute, I want to refer to Spinoza, a philosopher held in great esteem by Hegel7_{because of his attempt to unify the Cartesian distinction between res} cogitans and res extensa8_{. In the Ethics (1677/2014) Spinoza writes: “By substance, I mean}

that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception”. Substance, another term for the absolute, is that which is not depending on something external to it to be what it is. It is what it is in itself, unconditionally and by necessity. For if it would depend on something else outside itself to be what it is, it would not encompass the entire substance; it would rather be tied to a presupposition in distinction to which it would be identified as substance. This would introduce a substance dualism, and in such a dualism, the absolute has lost its absoluteness, and has become relative to something outside of itself. Absolute knowledge thus cannot be conceptualized as a multitude: if the truth of a position principally depends on another position, we end up in an infinite regress of positions supporting each other without ever reaching true substance, that is, something which can be identified as it is in

itself, and not just for another. This leads to the first hypothesis of the investigation: in order to obtain absolute knowledge, it must be possible to identify something as it is in itself, namely as substance. Until this hypothesis is proven to be true, the true existence and meaning of the

absolute remains a question to be answered, and if it turns out that it cannot be proven, the Hegelian project has failed. However, before the task that lies ahead can commence, it will be necessary to identify the problem that lies before us more precisely.

1.1.2. The Problem

Since we now have a formal determination of the absolute, we can start to unravel the epistemological problem that lies at the base of the PhoS. A first step will be to explain why there exists a problem in the first place. This can be illustrated by looking at the basic

7 _{Hegel writes in his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (1833/1986): “Wenn man anfängt zu}

philosophieren, so muss man zuerst Spinozist sein. Die Seele muss sich baden in diesem Äther der einen Substanz, in der alles, was man für wahr gehalten hat, untergegangen ist. Es ist diese Negation alles Besonderen, zu der jeder Philosoph gekommen sein muss; es ist die Befreiung des Geistes und seine absolute Grundlage” (p. 164).

8 _{See Descartes, R. (1641/1996). Meditations on First Philosophy. (J. Cottingham, transl.) Cambridge:}

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nature of any philosophical investigation. Philosophy as a discipline, no matter what school, tradition or movement we take into consideration, presupposes at least one thing: the ability to ask questions. This ability confronts human beings immediately with the fact that they are finite beings. To put it in Kantian terms: being human means not to have an intellectual

intuition9. In other words, there exists a distinction between the subject that poses the

question and the object that the question is about. If we relate this to the question that lies before us, namely the question of absolute truth, it can be said that we cannot present an immediate insight into the nature of reality, producing the content of our knowledge. Quite the opposite is in fact true: we are related to what we are not because the content we try to grasp is an external content that is given to us by means of sensory perception.

It is not difficult to imagine the trouble we are facing now: on the one hand it has been stated that if we want to speak about truth, it needs to be absolute truth, i.e. the criterion for the attainment of knowledge has become the identification of something as it is in itself. On the other hand however, we have seen that the presupposition underlying the research is the fact that humans are finite beings, and as such not in an immediate unity with otherness, but always only related to it mediated by sensory perception. That means that finite beings are always related to what they are not, to difference. For if they would be able to identify otherness immediately, it would not be different, but identical, that is, equal to itself. The problem can thus be defined as follows: to be able to identify something as it is in itself, it cannot

be different. But as finite human beings, we are always related to difference; which means that we can only identify something as it appears for us, and not as it is in itself. This seems to lead to an

unsolvable contradiction. Nonetheless, it is Hegel’s attempt to find a solution to it; and the attempt of this investigation to explicate the logical conditions of possibility that allow Hegel to do so. We will therefore now take a closer look at the structure of the absolute in order to be able to construct a setting in which the problem as formulated above can be overcome.

1.1.3. The Dialectical Structure

The first step towards a solution of the problem lies in a correct understanding of the nature of the contradiction as it has been identified above. To be able to achieve such an understanding, it is instructive to look at a quote from the Wissenschaft der Logik (1832/2015) about the starting point of the PhoS: “In dieser Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes wird von dem empirischen, sinnlichen Bewusstseyn ausgegangen; und dieses ist das eigentliche unmittelbare Wissen; daselbst wird erörtert, was an diesem unmittelbaren Wissen ist” (p. 40). The PhoS thus begins with an immediate form of knowledge held by a finite subject (“sinnlichen Bewusstseyn”); this subject claims that its content can be known in the form of the absolute. However, for the readers of the PhoS it is clear that this claim at first is only a subjective claim that is not yet objectively true. Because the finite subject has an immediate form of knowledge, it has not yet been able to adequately explicate the relation between itself and the object of research. It is not until this

9 As Kant puts it in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787/2011): “Von einer “nichtsinnlichen”, “intellektuellen”

Anschauung, deren Gegenstände Noumena im positiven Sinne sind, haben wir keinen positiven Begriff, wir können sie nicht begreifen. Ein Verstand, der die Dinge “intuitiv in einer nichtsinnlichen Anschauung” (nicht “diskursiv, durch Kategorien) erkennt, ist für uns rein problematisch”

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contradiction between the subjective conviction and the objective reality has been overcome, that it is possible to conceptualize the reality of the absolute. Therefore, a structure that is able to unify these two perspectives is required. This structure is the dialectical structure. I will explain why.

The immediate knowledge of a finite subject can be described as a positive determination of the thing in itself, i.e. the absolute. The finite subject in fact subjectively poses the reality of the absolute, even though it has not been proven to be objectively true. In that sense, this positive determination can be understood as an abstract determination of substance, because the relation between subject and object has not been explicated as such. In other words, seen from the perspective of the finite subject, subject and object are immediately unified: both terms are said to be identical, i.e. equal to each other. We however can see that difference is in play as well. A finite being is never able to immediately grasp the unity of difference, for then it would be immediately identical to what it is different from and any question would be meaningless. Human knowledge of the absolute cannot be an immediate identity with itself, but is sublated difference; the knowledge we might have of the absolute cannot be immediately present, but needs to be appropriated. The difference must thus be conceptualized as a necessary moment of negativity that lies within the structure of the absolute. The identification of the finite subject therefore presupposes a mediated relation to difference. Identity and difference stand in relative opposition10_{to one another, in other}

words, they constitute a dialectical unity. In order to conceptualize this unity, the moment of the abstract thesis of the finite subject needs to be internally related to the negative

anti-thesis, as to realize a concrete synthesis of both. This dialectical structure is technically named

the structure of “Begriff”, the concept11_.

The dialectical structure tells us that the knowledge of a finite subject cannot be pure positivity, but contains a negation as well. The absolute therefore needs to be understood as the unity of positivity and negativity. This points back to the “unsolvable contradiction” that has been explicated earlier. The investigation necessarily starts off from an “Ungleichheit, die im Bewusstseyn zwischen dem Ich und der Substanz, die sein Gegenstand ist, statt findet”, as Hegel writes in the Preface (p. 29). This inequality seems to be highly problematic: the subject tries to determine substance as something equal to itself, but it cannot, because substance appears as an object that is different, or unequal to the subject. However, as has been shown, it is precisely this distinction between subject and substance that should not be made undone, but has to be explicated. It is precisely the

negativity of the relation between subject and substance that expresses the relation as such.

Would it be pure positivity, there would be no relation at all. It therefore becomes the task of the finite subject to explicate for itself what it is in itself; in other words, it needs to

explicate the inequality between itself and its object in order to be able to sublate the

10 _{A relative opposition is an opposition in which the opposing terms can only be determined in relation to}

each other. A well known example is the relation between parent and child; both terms have no meaning without the other.

11 _{In some translations, “Begriff” is translated as “the Notion”, in others as “the concept”. I will only use}

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difference between subject and substance, and to understand substance as subject12_{. It is}

precisely this movement of the subject becoming aware of itself as a relation that is explicated in the transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. Where Consciousness still believes that its object appears immediately and can be identified as such, Self-consciousness has experienced to be explicated negativity, that is, a relation of self-consciousness to itself; to be self-conscious means to have become for itself, that is, to have the structure of negativity

as such. Therefore it is possible to introduce a second hypothesis: substance needs to be conceptualized as a self-relation.

Being a self-relation means to have explicated the unity of identity and difference, and in that sense to be absolute and independent. Nonetheless, this pure conceptual structure of the being for itself of self-consciousness is not just pure negativity as such, but a determined negativity. Although self-consciousness has the structure of self-reflectivity, it is still tied to what it is not, i.e. to difference. So even though the objective reality of Consciousness is

declared to be mere appearance, it must be explicated why it cannot be mere appearance. The

subject still is a finite subject; as we will see, the pure self-relation at the beginning of the

Self-consciousness chapter presupposes the corporeality of the subject, a hidden

presupposition that requires to be unveiled in order to be able to identify something as substance. In chapter 3 and 4 it will be shown how Hegel explicates these hidden presuppositions.

The fact that the finitude of the subject plays a role right from the start comes to the fore when Hegel speaks about experience: “Das Bewusstseyn weiss und begreift nichts, als was in seiner Erfahrung ist” (p. 29). The subject can come to “Begriff”, the concept, when it has experienced every step of the development towards an understanding of itself as a self-relation. To be able to do that, the subject needs to experience a process “worin das Unmittelbare… sich entfremdet, und dann aus dieser Erfahrung zu sich zurückgeht” (p. 29). Only when the subject experiences to be outside of itself, it can come to the insight that

negativity lies within itself, and only then it can see for itself what it is in itself. To be a subject

thus means to contain negativity within oneself. As said, for a finite subject this cannot be an immediate insight, but has to be understood as a movement of becoming. This becoming means that the subject needs to alienate itself from itself before it is capable to reach an insight into itself; the absolute cannot be grasped as a fixed point but needs to be explicated in a movement of self-consciousness towards itself13_.

This alienation will culminate in the metaphor of the fear of death, an experience that can be understood as the logical core of the Lord/Bondsman relation. In this relation the answer

12 As Hegel writes in a famous sentence of the Preface: “Es kömmt nach meiner Einsicht, welche sich durch die

Darstellung des Systems selbst rechtfertigen muss, alles darauf an, das Wahre nicht als Substanz, sondern eben so sehr als Subject aufzufassen und auszudrücken” (p. 18).

13 _{A comment from A. Kok (2012) on this matter is very instructive: “Die Substanz ist die Bewegung des}

Werdens. Sie hat keinen äusseren Anstoss, sondern bewegt sich selbst. Das Werden des Seins ist deshalb kann

genetivus objektivus, sondern genitivus subjectivus. Wäre das Werden des Seins als Kausalität gedacht, so wäre das

Verhältnis von Sein und Nichts ein Übergang van Nichts zum Sein. Wie ein Nichts ein Sein verursachen kann, ist für uns unbegreiflich. Ebenso würde durch ein solches Werden sich das Wesen des Seins ändern. Das

kausale Werden betrifft also Veränderung, und nicht Begriff. Für einen Begriff des Seins ist wichtig, dass das

Werden nicht als eine Beziehung der Kausalität gedacht wird, sondern, dass das absolute Sein in der Bewegung sich gleich bleibt. Das Werden kann daher kein Übergang vom Nichts zum Sein sein, sondern es ist ein Übergang vom Sein zum Nichts: Das Sein ist unmittelbar im Dasein vorhanden, aber erst durch die explizite Negativität kann es für dieses Dasein selbst sein” (p. 146).

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to the research question comes to light, and I aim to show that the Lord/Bondsman relation can be conceptualized as a model in which the logical conditions of possibility needed in order to obtain absolute knowledge are presented. However, before we turn to the

Lord/Bondsman relation, I consider it important to first explicate a further specification of

the problem that will be addressed at the level of the Lord/Bondsman relation.

1.1.4. The Possibility to Identify the Absolute

In order to understand the full purport of the Lord/Bondsman relation, it is important to take another look at the problem that lies at the core of this investigation. In the paragraphs above, I have emphasised the importance of the dialectical structure, a structure that can be determined as the unity of identity and difference: both terms of the relation are determined by each other, because they are not externally connected, but rather internally related to each other. As we will see in the section on the methodology of the PhoS, this being internally related is key to be able to conceive of a form of knowledge that does not depend on an outside perspective in order to be determined as true knowledge. Nonetheless, this dialectical structure still presents us with a problem when we try to identify substance: when we want to be able to identify something as it is in itself, it cannot stand in a relation of relative opposition towards something else. That would still make the terms of the relation dependent on what they are not for their existence, and thus not absolute.

Therefore, a new problem arises: on the one hand, difference needs to be sublated, because if it would remain different, it would not be identifiable. As such, the truth of absolute knowledge is to sublate the difference it is confronted with. On the other hand however, it has to be concluded that difference cannot be negated in the negative sense of the term alone but needs to be preserved as well, because it is an essential moment of the absolute. It is precisely this last moment of the preservation of difference that has remained hidden in the transition from Consciousness towards Self-consciousness, and that needs to be brought to light again. In that sense, Self-consciousness is not only the presupposition of

Consciousness, but Consciousness is also the presupposition of Self-consciousness.

Difference thus needs to be negated and preserved at the same time. But how is it possible to do both? This can only be done when difference is identified as it is in itself, as difference. It is only in the identification of difference as it is in itself that the unity of identity and difference can be grasped. When difference is identified as it is in itself, it has become identical, but only in a very specific sense: because it is known as such, as difference, it reveals itself as an identity. Hegel refers to this structure himself at the end of the PhoS, in the chapter on Absolute Knowledge, when he writes: “[Das Bewusstseyn ist] in seinem Andersseyn als solchem bey sich” (p. 422). The subject is not in otherness returned back to itself; that would be a dialectical relation in which both terms refer to one another. It is in otherness as such, as it is in itself, returned back to itself, what means that the subject has sublated difference when it has identified difference as it is itself. Because the sublation takes place through an identification, difference is not ignored, but preserved, and in such a way that the subject can have an open and free relation to it; since it has returned to itself, it has become independent towards its object. Therefore, I consider it necessary to introduce a third hypothesis, namely: the identification of the absolute presupposes a structure of transcendental

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openness14_{. This openness is transcendental since it appears as a necessary condition of}

possibility that will be needed to adequately conceptualize the absolute.

As this is an analysis of Hegelian thought, this might sound surprising, or even shocking to some. Nonetheless, over the course of this investigation I aim to present enough arguments to convince the reader to take this seriously. Let us now look how the problem is specified and made more concrete within the context of the Lord/Bondsman relation and see in what way this relation can offer a solution.

1.1.5. The Lord/Bondsman relation

The fact that the subject is only able to obtain knowledge mediated by the receptivity of the senses already points to the fact that the subject is a living subject, i.e. it has a body. Since the objective of this investigation has been determined as the identification of substance, the body confronts us with a problem, namely with the fact that we are finite. In other words, the existence of the body is contingent, whilst the requirement of the absolute is to exist by necessity. That means that the body needs to be sublated by the subject. But again, this negation cannot be a termination of the body: that would stop a self-consciousness from being real altogether. A solution to this problem will be formulated in the course of this thesis, and this brings me to the last hypothesis of the investigation: the Lord/Bondsman

relation explicates the structure of transcendental openness as the unity of the pure self-consciousness and the body15_{. Although this hypothesis will not be proven until the end of the research, I}

will already present a short formal outline why I think this must be the case.

In order for life to be more than mere contingency, it must be expressed as something that is absolute, in other words, that has the structure to be for itself, that is, the structure of self-consciousness. The only life that can be absolute is thus self-conscious life. In order for life to be substance, it needs to know its life as life, i.e. it needs to be self-conscious, and in order for pure self-consciousness to be substance, it needs to be real, i.e. it needs to be alive. As we will see, the relation between pure self-consciousness and life will at first appear as a contradiction. Life will only become self-conscious life at the level of the Lord/Bondsman

relation. In this relation it will be explicated how both moments of substance, to be equal to

itself and to be unequal to itself, are to be thought in unity. This can be explained as follows. As we have seen, the absolute, or substance, can only be conceptualized (“begriffen”) as a movement of the subject towards itself; it is “das entfaltende Werden” (p. 20), a becoming in which substance is not constituted or created, but explicated, i.e. it unfolds itself. This unfolding consists of two moments: on the one hand the identity of the for itself with itself, i.e. the pure self-relation, and on the other that what is different in itself, i.e. the body that is only what it is in relation to a self-consciousness. The first moment is in immediate identity with itself, the second has experienced the reality of the difference between the pure

14 This term is first used by J. Hollak (1966), an influential Dutch interpreter and critic of Hegel.

15 This hypothesis is indebted to the interpretation of Cobben (2009): “Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is… a

systematic philosophical attempt to develop the unity between mind and body (preserving, as well, the own nature of the mind as the body). To conceptualize the immediate unity between mind and body, Hegel makes use of the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman relation: The lord represents the mind that also has a body; the bondsman represents the body that also has a mind” (pp. 1-2). I do however not use the english word “mind” because I think its connotation refers too much to the way (some) philosophers from the analytical tradition use the term. According to Hegel “Mind” is not an epiphenomenon of the body, but is “Geist”, i.e. only real in a relation of recognition.

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consciousness and the body. In the Lord/Bondsman relation, Hegel aims to show how the difference of the second moment can be understood as sublated difference, or self-conscious life. The body must be conceived as a unity with the pure self-consciousness. This will be done when the inequality between body and self-consciousness has been overcome. As we have already seen, this cannot happen by an abstract negation of the body, but can only come to the fore when the difference of the body is explicated as such, as difference. Finitude is thus by no means sublated, but identified as it is in itself; absolute knowledge is absolute because it expresses an infinite insight into the nature of finitude, not because it sublates contingency altogether.

In the previous paragraphs I have presented a general outline of the project of the PhoS. Next to that, I have formulated four hypotheses that need to be proven in order to be able to answer the research question. These hypotheses have been used to guide the investigation into the right direction. They are the following:

1. In order to obtain absolute knowledge, it must be possible to identify something as it is in itself,

namely as substance

2. Substance needs to be conceptualized as a self-relation

3. An identification of the absolute presupposes a structure of transcendental openness

4. The Lord/Bondsman relation explicates the structure of transcendental openness as the unity

of the pure self-consciousness and the body

To get a better overview of the investigation that is to follow, I will shortly explicate the relation between these hypotheses.

As said, absolute knowledge is knowledge of the thing in itself. In order to be able to identify something as it is in itself, i.e. in its own nature, the object of identification cannot stand in relative opposition to the subject that identifies it. In other words, it is required to have an open relation towards otherness. However, although this openness is transcendental, i.e. a condition of possibility of absolute knowledge, it cannot be understood as a tabula rasa, an empty and purely receptive consciousness that has no determination whatsoever. That would reduce the subject to the object, thereby ignoring the determinateness of the subject altogether, and as such the fact that the question that lies at the base of this investigation has initially come to the fore precisely because of the distinction between subject and object. Without this distinction, there would be no question at all. Rather, the fact that the distinction between subject and object is real needs to be explicated, but in such a way that both are not separated from each other either. In other words, the fact that our knowledge is neither full positivity, nor full negativity, but carries a negation within itself, needs to come to light. This is done when substance is understood as subject, that is, as a self-relation. The subject that is related to itself is related to an object, and thus determined by it, but because the object is the subject itself, its determinateness turns out to be a self-determination. A self-determination allows for the possibility of an open relation towards the object because it explicitly distinguishes itself from it; as self-relation it is related, i.e. it carries a determinate negation within itself, but because it negates itself it simultaneously sublates its determinateness; as such, it is an absolute negation. Nonetheless, the fact that the self-relation

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is an absolute negation does not present itself immediately. At first, the self-consciousness that is presented as a pure self-relation is considered to be an immediate identity; as such it has abstracted from the fact that it is alive as well. When this presupposition is unveiled, it has to be explicated how the life of self-consciousness can be thought in unity with its being a pure self-relation. This will be done in the Lord/Bondsman relation, more specifically in the experience of the fear of death, in which the finitude of the self-consciousness can be transcended by experiencing finitude as such.

By the exposition above I have attempted to shed some light on the goal of the project of the PhoS. In the next section I aim to present the methodological setting through which Hegel addresses the question of absolute truth, and by which he aims to guarantee the necessity of the development towards a conceptualization of the absolute.

1.2. Methodology

Although I aim to prove the hypothesis that it is the project of the PhoS to sublate dialectics

in the end, that does not at all mean that the dialectical method will be set aside completely.

It still plays a central and necessary role in the book, without which an absolute identification would be wholly impossible. Rather, the dialectical method is tied to a necessary presupposition, namely the structure of transcendental openness or freedom of the subject that identifies the absolute. The dialectical method is precisely designed to unveil this presupposition as a necessary one. We thus require an explanation of the way in which this dialectical method is used in order to get a conception of substance in which this structure unfolds itself.

1.2.1. The Structure of the Development towards Absolute Knowledge

At the beginning of this chapter, the apparent contradiction that lies at the base of the investigation has been explicated. It has been stated that if we take the identification of otherness to be dependent on our subjective cognitive powers, then the attainment of absolute knowledge becomes impossible before the investigation has even started.16

Therefore, Hegel turns the setting around and introduces a hypothesis that can only be proven at the end of the book, namely that it is indeed possible to identify something as it is in

itself because we are not separated from it, but immediately related to it in a positive way. If the

absolute can be known at all, our participation to it must be presupposed from the start. The existence of the absolute cannot be depending on our subjective construction, but, if the concept has any meaning, it must be real all the time.

Of course, this does not change the fact that we still cannot claim an immediate insight into otherness; an investigation into the nature of the absolute is still needed. However, it has come to light that the task of this investigation cannot be to construct a view on the absolute, but can only explicate what is already there through a process of reflection. The investigation thus does not start with a separation between identity and difference, but its

16_{Hegel blames Kant for doing this when he introduces the a-priori concepts of our understanding through}

which we unify the multitude given to us by the senses. Hegel writes in the Introduction: “Denn ist das Erkennen das Werkzeug, sich des absoluten Wesens zu ermächtigen, so fällt sogleich auf, dass die Anwendung eines Werkzeugs auf eine Sache, sie vielmehr nicht lasst, wie sie für sich ist, sondern eine Formirung und Veränderung mit ihr vornimmt” (p. 53).

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point of departure is essentially different: the presupposition that the absolute is in fact real is integrated in to the method of research, which starts off with a subjective claim to be immediately related to the absolute. The question then becomes if this subjective conviction to be in the possession of absolute knowledge can be proven to be true. In this way, the ability to pose questions does not only confront us with a problem, but becomes part of the solution as well: it expresses the fact that when an answer to the question of truth is given, the subject claims to be immediately identical to what is known, i.e. its object, since it is in fact the cognitive content of the subject. This immediate conviction is what is called the

subjective certitude of natural consciousness, two methodological terms that require further

explaining.

1.2.2. Natural Consciousness

When the immediate identity of the subject with its object of knowledge is presupposed, it seems as if the difference of the object has been overcome. The subject has the subjective

certitude, that is, an undoubtable conviction, that what it identifies is immediately true. This

subject is what Hegel calls natural consciousness (pp. 55-56). Natural consciousness represents a specific philosophical position from the tradition of philosophy that immediately claims to be true, i.e. it is dogmatically convinced of the fact that it can identify something in itself.17

That means that natural consciousness does not reflect on the presuppositions that adhere to its conviction18_{. But what does the introduction of natural consciousness actually solve?}

Surely it is clear to us that natural consciousness represents a specific philosophical position, that exists only in distinction to other philosophical positions. Although this cannot be “seen” from the perspective of natural consciousness itself, it is insightful for us that different positions cause a multitude of truth claims that are not compatible with each other. Natural consciousness therefore merely seems to be a subjective view on what is true, and brings us right back to the problem we started with. As emphasized before, it remains a problem how it is possible to develop an insight into the absolute when it is not given from the start. Distinct philosophical positions might criticize each other, but without a firm criterion to decide which one is right our investigation is doomed to fail. And even if we had a criterion it would be problematic, because it would be externally imposed, and thus introduce a third position that would have to be put to the test in the same way, leading to an infinite regress. Therefore, the process needs to be constructed as to overcome the problem of the external perspective.

Natural consciousness is in fact the beginning of the solution to this problem. Because it immediately claims to be in the possession of absolute knowledge, it brings its own criterion through which it believes to be able to identify the absolute.19_{The criterion is thus not}

17 _{Cf. Werner Marx (1971): “das natürliche Bewusstsein ‘ist’ wesenhaft in unmittelbarer Einheit mit seiner}

jeweils herrschenden, es bestimmenden Gesamtsituation, sie gehört zu ihr” (p. 23)

18 _{Natural consciousness is thus by no means a subject in the sense of a real individual that has “common}

sense” as Stekeler-Weithofer (2014, pp. 378/379) calls it, or “common consciousness” in the words of Hyppolite (1974, p. 6). The first three parts of the PhoS are designed to explicate what it means to speak about a real individual as a unity of identity and difference, i.e. mind and body. Therefore it is not before the Spirit chapter that real individuals belonging to a historical society are introduced.

19 _{“Das Bewusstseyn gibt seinen Massstab an ihm selbst, und die Untersuchung wird dadurch eine}

Vergleichung seiner mit sich selbst seyn; denn die Unterscheidung, welche so eben gemacht worden ist, fällt in es. Es ist in ihm eines für ein anderes, oder es hat überhaupt die Bestimmtheit des Moments des Wissens an

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externally imposed, but it is left to the philosophical position itself to test if it is possible to use this criterion to identify something as it is in itself. As said, natural consciousness has the subjective certitude, i.e. a criterion for itself, through which it has to prove that its knowledge is objectively true. It must be noted that this is a practical process: natural consciousness has a dogmatic conviction and does not reflect on the presuppositions that adhere to its position. So when it turns out that the subjective certitude cannot be used as a criterion to identify the absolute, it can only be clear to us, the readers, that the reason for this is a contradiction between the subjective certitude and the objective truth. The moment of reflection is thus separated from natural consciousness and attributed to the reader of the

PhoS, a position that will be technically called phenomenological consciousness. 1.2.3. Phenomenological Consciousness

A natural consciousness that practically tests its own subjective certitude has an immanent criterion that relieves us, the readers, or phenomenological consciousness, from the task of testing the philosophical position under scrutiny by use of our own criteria. That means that the problem of the external perspective that would be needed to verify or falsify the truth claim of natural consciousness has been resolved: phenomenological consciousness only has to see how natural consciousness tries to prove its subjective certitude, and can therefore be characterized as “das reine Zusehen”(p. 59)20_{. Phenomenological consciousness}

can however do something that natural consciousness itself cannot, namely identify the contradiction that comes to the fore when natural consciousness tries to prove the objective reality of its subjective certitude. It becomes visible for us that the subjective certitude of natural consciousness is indeed subjective, and not absolute. When natural consciousness tries to prove the truth of its subjective certitude, it will show for us that it is tied to a hidden presupposition that has not been accounted for within this specific position. Because this hidden presupposition is unveiled at the moment when natural consciousness puts its subjective certitude to the test, it shows for us that its subjective certitude contradicts objective truth. It therefore can be concluded that the specific subjective certitude of natural consciousness that was put to the test has to be discarded.

It seems as if it has not brought us any closer to the attainment of absolute knowledge, and thus only leads to a negative result. However, this is not the case. Since the position that has been discarded is a specific, positive, determinate position, the negation of it is a

determinate negation: the negation of a determinate philosophical position has made the

hidden presuppositions of this position explicit. This can indeed be understood as a positive result: although the identification of the absolute has failed, it has done so based on specific

grounds that positively express why the identification has failed. That allows for the

possibility to construct a new form of natural consciousness that takes up a new subjective certitude, in which the presuppositions of the previous position are positively brought to the fore because they are integrated into this new subjective certitude. It is this determinate ihm; zugleich ist ihm diss andere nicht nur für es, sondern auch ausser dieser Beziehung oder an sich; das Moment der Wahrheit” (Hegel, p. 59).

20 _{“Wir werden auch der Mühe der Vergleichung beider und der eigentlichen Prüffung überhoben, so dass,}

indem das Bewusstseyn sich selbst prüfft, uns auch von dieser Seite nur das reine Zusehen bleibt” (Hegel, p. 59).

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negation that has to guarantee the logical necessity of the project, because it allows us to do more than merely discard a position in favor of another; rather, it is the principle by which it is possible to unveil all hidden presuppositions that come to the fore in a systematic way. It is precisely the determinate negation that brings us the dialectical structure of the development towards absolute knowledge: first we have the immediate identity of natural consciousness with itself, because it claims to have absolute knowledge (thesis); but when it tries to prove this claim, it shows for us that its knowledge is not absolute, but rather subjective; it is different from itself (anti-thesis). This seemed to cause an unsolvable contradiction. But now we have introduced the determinate negation. This negation allows us to bring the hidden presupposition of the subjective certitude of natural consciousness to light, and as such it makes room for a new position in which the presupposition of the previous position is integrated. This leads to a synthesis of the subjective certitude of natural consciousness and its presupposition, which represents a new form of natural consciousness, and a new step in the development towards absolute knowledge. It is this structure that we have previously identified as the dialectical structure: it is the unity of identity and difference. When all presuppositions are explicated, i.e. when the absolute as it appears to us21

corresponds to the absolute as it is in itself, then the dialectic has reached its end point, and

natural consciousness and phenomenological consciousness have become philosophical consciousness22_.

1.2.4. Philosophical Consciousness

For phenomenological consciousness, the end point can only be the result of the development. That confronts us with a problem: although we are able to reflect on the position of natural consciousness as it is presented to us, we are incapable of doing more than that; we have not obtained absolute knowledge yet, and therefore we do not know where the process should lead to. Although the determinate negation secures the logical necessity of the development, it does not help us to understand (“begreiffen”) the developmental steps that lead towards the concept (“Begriff”) of the absolute. We therefore need a perspective that can guide us through the development of the different stages towards absolute knowledge. This is the perspective of the author, which can be called

philosophical consciousness. Because the author has already obtained absolute knowledge, he is

able to do so. It must be kept in mind however that this is only a hypothetical position at first: it is not until we have obtained absolute knowledge ourselves that we are able to internalize the perspective of philosophical consciousness. Nonetheless, for now we must assume that it is philosophical consciousness that is able to offer examples from the history of philosophy that allow phenomenological consciousness to obtain an experience of the logical forms of natural consciousness through which it is able to know the absolute. These

21 It is important to note that it is only phenomenological consciousness that is able to connect the different

subjective certitudes of natural consciousness into a substantial whole. Natural consciousness itself has no memory: “diese Notwendigkeit selbst, oder die Entstehung des neuen Gegenstandes, der dem Bewusstseyn, ohne zu wissen, wie ihm geschieht, sich darbietet, ist es, was für uns gleichsam hinter seinem Rücken vorgeht” (Hegel, p. 61), and: “Diese Betrachtung der Sache ist unsere Zutat, wodurch sich die Reihe der Erfahrungen des Bewusstseyns zum wissenschaftlichen Gange erhebt, und welche nicht für das Bewusstseyn ist, das wir betrachten” (p. 61)

22 _{This threefold structure is derived from J. Heinrichs as put forward in Die Logik der “Phänomenologie des}

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examples mediate our understanding of the logical development that unfolds itself before us; without such examples, absolute knowledge would be reduced to an abstract formula that would not be understandable for us as finite beings; absolute knowledge cannot be deduced by abstract thought alone, but need to be internalized because it has come in contact with a historical process in which an insight in the absolute has unfolded itself.23_{When this insight}

has been reached it is possible to look back at the development and understand the different philosophical positions that we have been confronted with as necessary moments of the self-realization of the absolute. Since these moments are then identifiable as necessary moments, we can say that the process in which absolute knowledge is attained is not a ladder that can be thrown away when we have reached the viewpoint of the absolute. Rather, we can see that the insight into the absolute is the positive result of a historical process that can be reconstructed as a systematic and logical development towards absolute knowledge, i.e. a

positive concept of human finitude as such.

The exposition above has aimed to offer the reader of this thesis some guidance into the goal and method of the investigation. I do realize that this will always be a somewhat flawed attempt; for if one explains everything in an introduction it would not be an introduction anymore, and if one does not it is at most only an incomplete display of the subject under consideration. Therefore, it is best to turn to the proper analysis of the argument. I will start with an analysis of the last chapter of A. Consciousness, Force and Understanding. As we will see, it is this chapter that prepares the themes that are developed more thoroughly in the chapter B. Self-consciousness, and as such it serves as a suitable starting point of the investigation.

23 Although every new form of natural consciousness must be the logical consequence of the preceding form, it

must be said that every concretization of natural consciousness by philosophical consciousness is in a way determined by historical and therefore contingent features. For example, in the chapter on Force and

Understanding, the concept of force that is introduced is derived from natural science. Someone coming from a

culture that has not developed a conception of modern science would thus not be able to understand what Hegel would mean by this concept. We therefore have to acknowledge the fact that the insight into the absolute has expressed itself within a specific historical tradition. This can however not lead us to conclude that it is determined by a contingent historical process; the objective is still to attain absolute knowledge. Especially the first chapters (Consciousness and Self-consciousness) consider abstract and theoretical positions that only express logical versions of philosophical positions. We certainly need examples to be able to relate to these positions, but that does not excuse us from the task to explicate the logical form that lies at the heart of the matter.

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2. Force and Understanding

2.1. Introduction

Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness starts with a determination of the new subjective certitude of natural consciousness. He determines it as follows: “eine Gewissheit, welche ihrer Wahrheit gleich ist, denn die Gewissheit ist sich selbst ihr Gegenstand, und das Bewusstseyn ist sich selbst das Wahre. Es ist darin zwar auch ein Anderssein; das Bewusstseyn unterscheidet nämlich, aber ein solches, das für es zugleich ein nicht unterschiedenes ist” (p. 103). To be able to clarify this position, we first need to look at the chapter that precedes B. Self-consciousness, namely the last chapter of A. Consciousness: Force

and Understanding. It is this chapter that prepares the transition to Self-consciousness, and as

such it forms an introduction into the determination of substance as a self-relation.

Force and Understanding is the last position of Consciousness, a technical term used by

Hegel to describe an immediate relation between concept and object. In general, the technical position of Consciousness can be defined as something that distinguishes something from

itself, but is related to it at the same time. Being an immediate relation, the relation has not been

explicated as such to natural consciousness, but is only insightful for us, phenomenological consciousness. The immediacy of Consciousness will show to be problematic, and it will be our task to unravel its presuppositions. As well as the former positions of Consciousness,

Force and Understanding is a form of empiricism: it claims to be able to identify an objective

being as substance. This objective being is external to consciousness, but has indeed got the structure of the concept24_{(“Begriff”). It is this conceptual structure that will serve as a} criterion for natural consciousness to prove that its subjective certitude is true. The subjective certitude of natural consciousness is that the objective reality that is given to the senses has the structure of the concept. As with all moments of the PhoS, the criterion of Force and Understanding will be concretized by philosophical consciousness. Only then

phenomenological consciousness can understand the subjective certitude of natural consciousness, and will it be able to see how natural consciousness puts it to the test, in order to see if it can formulate the truth as it is not only for itself, but also in itself. In Force

and Understanding, the criterion, being the concept, is made concrete by philosophical

consciousness through the idea of a force of nature.

2.2. Force

In what way then does the force of nature appear as an objective unity? Hegel describes a force as being both “die in sich zurückgedrängte Krafft” as “ihre Aeusserung” (p. 84), as the force that is pushed back into itself as a unity and its manifestation at different moments. As such, the force is presented as the unity of identity and difference25_{. But taken as a single}

24 The position of Force and Understanding is the result of a determinate negation of the subjective certitude of

Perception. As concept, it is the unity of unity and difference, or the unity of the general and the particular. In

Perception, unity and difference could not be united, but in Force and Understanding this is possible because at this level it is the unity that expresses itself in a multiplicity and as such returns to itself. Unity and multiplicity are not externally connected, but it is the internal self-expression of the unity in multiplicity on the one hand, and the multiplicity of the unity on the other.

25 _{This can be exemplified by use of the force of gravity, an example that Hegel uses too and will return}

throughout this chapter. Gravity can be described in terms of a reciprocal interplay of attraction between different point masses that manifest themselves at different positions in space and at different moments in

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force, it is impossible for both moments to appear simultaneously: when the force manifests itself at different moments in time and positions in space it only expresses its manifestation, its being different. The unity of the force does not appear. Since the criterion of natural consciousness is the appearance of the “unbedingt allgemeine” (p. 84), i.e. the concept, both moments of the force need to be related to each other internally to ensure the reality and existence of the force as it is in-and-for-itself26_.

To be able to construct the object of natural consciousness in such a manner that it appears as the objective reality of the concept, philosophical consciousness introduces the

interplay of forces. This interplay of forces is presented as a completely symmetrical relation

between two forces, both forces being pushed back into themselves, and thus a unity on the one hand, and the manifestation of this unity as the realization of a force in many appearances on the other. Constructed as such, it seems possible to understand the interplay of forces as the reality of the concept. This can be demonstrated by use of the example of the force of gravity: when an object falls towards the earth, the falling movement can be taken as the manifestation of the force of gravity. Formally a point mass (p1) exerts a pull on another point mass (p2), causing (p2) to move towards (p1). The mass (p2) is solicited by (p1) to express itself, whereas (p1) is pushed back into itself by (p2). But this movement can, depending on the perspective of the observer, be understood the other way around as well: (p2) can then be taken as the force pushed back into itself, soliciting (p1) to come to appearance as the manifestation of the unity of the force. In the symmetrical relation towards each other, the interplay of forces brings both moments of the force to appearance. Both moments are soliciting each other and solicited27_{by each other simultaneously. The}

force that is pushed back into itself is shown to be the manifold manifestation of that same force as well, and the opposing force that manifests itself is shown to be unity that is pushed back into itself at the same time.

This can only be so in the purely symmetrical and reciprocal relation of the forces. The singular force could not be brought to appearance as both the unity and the difference of the concept. The force in relation to another force can be taken as the unity of unity and difference, because both forces symmetrically realize themselves in the other force. When the unity of the force is solicited by another force to realize itself, this can be understood as the self-differentiation of the force. And when the manifold manifestation of a force is pushed back into itself by another force, it can be taken as the unity of the difference of the

force itself. We can therefore now say that the independence of the force exists only in

relation to another force.28

time. Nonetheless, this manifestation of the force cannot be understood as mere difference; rather, it is a self-differentiation of the force that separates itself from itself and immediately returns to itself as a unity. To put it differently, the variables in which gravity appears as a force can only be described as variables of the unity of the

force. As we will see, this unity can supposedly be described in a law, namely the law of gravity.

26 “Dass also die Kraft in ihrer Wahrheit sei, muss sie ganz vom Gedanken Frey gelassen und als die Substanz

dieser Unterschiede gesetzt werden, das heisst einmal, sie als diese ganze Krafft wesentlich an und für sich bleibend, und dann ihre Unterschiede als substantiell, oder als für sich bestehende Momente” (Hegel, p. 84)

27 _{“Es verwandelt sich hiermit ach dieser Unterschied, der zwischen beiden statt fand, dass das eine das}

solliciterende, das andere das sollicitirte seyn sollte, in dieselbe Austauschung der Bestimmtheiten gegeneinander” (Hegel, p. 86)

28_{In my opinion, it is however not yet possible to speak about a real dialectical relation at this level. A point}

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The question remains if natural consciousness is able to identify the dynamic interplay of forces as substance. This is not the case. When the interplay of forces is more closely examined, it has to be concluded that it cannot appear as a unity in-and-for-itself. As a dynamic and practical interplay of forces, the moments of unity and difference cannot be taken as a unity, but have continuously changed into each other. The unity of the force is but a moment of the force as force; and as moment of the force we have seen that it immediately changes into its opposite, namely the manifestation of the force. Therefore, the interplay of forces can only be understood as a unity of unity and difference when it is taken as the dynamic movement as such. As “Erscheinung” (p. 88), the unity of the interplay of forces cannot appear; it is “selbst nunmehr ein Verschwinden” (p. 88). The interplay of forces as such is nonetheless “ein Ganzes des Scheins” (p. 88), and as such it transcends all empirical determinations and becomes the expression of “das Innere der Dinge, als Inneres” (p. 88), or the inner essence of objective reality.29_{This transcendence introduces an eternal}

and supra-sensible world that represents the essence of the world of the senses.30 2.3. The Appearance of the Supra-sensible Essence

From our perspective, it is important to reflect a bit more on the systematic importance of “Erscheinung”, appearance, as it is used by Hegel in this section. He clearly states that the supra-sensible world that has been introduced as the essence of the phenomenal world cannot be understood as an empty “Jenseits” (p. 89).31_{When the inner essence is determined}

as being on the other side of consciousness, in an other-worldly realm that cannot be known, it becomes impossible for consciousness to identify the inner essence of appearance. In such a case, the final attempt to grasp the truth would mean that consciousness can only take appearance as it object, even though it knows that appearance cannot be taken as the true essence of reality. This will lead to a contradiction; appearance cannot be taken as the essential and the inessential at the same time.

Hegel thus presents a positive determination of appearance that does not start with a dichotomy between inner essence and appearance. When analyzed formally, this different starting point solves the problem of the distinction between the essential and the inessential: when inner essence and appearance are separated from the start and then externally conjoined, point of the transition from Consciousness to Self-consciousness. A necessary internal relation presupposes that the moments are expressed as moments. Such an expression presupposes the structure of the Self. A conception of the Self still has to be gained. Therefore, the true dialectical relation that is presupposed to the interplay of forces will come to the fore at the level of Self-consciousness, where it appears as the relation of

recognition.

29 Siep (2000) rightly remarks that it is already on this level that the distinction between concept and reality

reveals itself for us as a problematic one: “This ‘play’ constitutes the reality of the force. But in order to be able to distinguish the ‘essence’ of a force from its actual fases of movement, I must again have recourse to the concept of that force. Concept and reality thus reveal themselves to be just as indistinguishable as the intrinsic constitution or disposition of a force and its expression” (p. 82).

30 _{“In diesem innern Wahren, als dem absolut allgemeinen, welches vom Gegensatze des Allgemeinen und}

Einzelnen gereinigt und für den Verstand geworden ist, schliesst sich erst über der sinnlichen als der erscheinenden Welt, nunmehr eine übersinnliche als die wahre Welt auf, über dem verschwindenden Disseits das bleibende Jenseits” (Hegel, p. 89).

31_{The paragraph on page 89 can clearly be read as a critique of the Kantian concept of the “Ding an sich”:}

“Noch ist das Innere reines Jenseits für das Bewusstseyn, denn es findet sich selbst in ihm noch nicht; es ist leer, denn es ist nur das Nichts der Erscheinung und positiv das einfache Allgemeine. Diese Weise des Innern zu seyn, stimmt unmittelbar denjenigen bey, welche sagen, dass das Innre der Dinge nicht zu erkennen sei; aber der Grund würde anders gefasst werden müssen” (Hegel, p. 89).

The Transcendence of Finitude. An investigation into the possibility of absolute knowledge