“I now address a word of clarity to all Brazilians”
An analysis of Dilma Rousseff’s discourses in face the Brazilian political crisis
Tiê Franco Brotto - s2113074
Supervisor: Dr. L.D. (Lydie) Cabane
Second reader: Dr.mr. E.E.A. (Ernst) Dijxhoorn Faculty of Governance & Global Affairs
MSc Crisis and Security Management June 9th, 2019
Index
Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 4 Theoretical Framework ______________________________________________________ 7 Crisis framing ____________________________________________________________ 7 Crisis communication strategies ____________________________________________ 10 Methodology _____________________________________________________________ 17 Research design and limitations _____________________________________________ 17 Methods and operationalisation _____________________________________________ 18 Corpus ________________________________________________________________ 19 Analysis _________________________________________________________________ 22 Initial discourse from the protests ___________________________________________ 22 Initial discourse by Dilma Rousseff __________________________________________ 26 Later discourse from the protests ____________________________________________ 35 Later discourse by Dilma Rousseff __________________________________________ 39 Conclusions ______________________________________________________________ 46 Bibliography _____________________________________________________________ 48
Tables
Table 1. CET blame matrix __________________________________________________ 12 Table 2. SCCT crisis response strategies ________________________________________ 14 Table 3. SCCT crisis response strategy guidelines ________________________________ 15 Table 4. Addresses to the Nation by Dilma Rousseff between Jun 2013 and Dec 2015 ____ 20 Table 5. Speeches by Dilma Rousseff between Jun 2013 and Dec 2015 _______________ 21 Table 6. President public ratings at the beginning of term __________________________ 22 Figures
Figure 1. Evolution of public opinion towards President Dilma Rousseff ______________ 18 Figure 2. Public support to Dilma Rousseff by income: bad/terrible __________________ 38
Introduction
In 2016, a corruption scandal in Brazil known as Lava Jato fuelled a political crisis in the country that culminated in the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff. When Rousseff took office in 2011, five years prior, she had the best approval rates of a recently elected president in recent Brazilian history (Table 6). Her popular support had grown over time, peaking in 2012 with over 65% of approval, while opposition was kept at a mere 7% (Figure 1). Only two years later, in August 2015, her support massively shrank to an ordinary 8% while opposition skyrocketed to 71% (Figure 1). In those two years, a massive corruption scandal began to unravelled by the Lava Jato operation, carried by the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF), and Rousseff was seriously damaged by the crisis it had generated. By the time the impeachment case was formally opened by the President of the Lower House, deputy Eduardo Cunha, in the beginning of December of that year, Rousseff’s image was already at its lowest. Protocoled by jurists Hélio Bicudo, Miguel Reale Júnior, and lawyer Janaína Paschoal, the case accusing Rousseff of breaking Brazil's budget laws (Passarinho, 2015) was taken to the Congress and in August of 2016, she was officially removed from office after the Congress concluded that Rousseff was guilty of a responsibility crime (Garcia, Calgaro, Matoso, Lis, & Rodrigues, 2016).
The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff gained international attention and was subject for numerous debates. There are naturally many different causes and possible explanations for the crisis that led to the impeachment. Irrespective of the legality, legitimacy, or any potential causes, however, Rousseff’s decline of popular support remains a fact. While it is not
possible to fully account for the elements that influenced the shift in public opinion, including for example the economy, several studies have looked at how the media, through television, newspaper, and magazines, shaped their discourse around the case (Castanheira, 2018; Cauduro, 2018; Coimbra, 2018; Copello, 2018; de Jesus, 2017; Floriani, 2017; Lopes, 2019; Mendes, 2017; E. S. C. Silva, 2018). Such studies aim to understand whether and how the media might have contributed to Rousseff’s decline in popular support, and therefore facilitated her impeachment. As important as the media is in political crises, much of the literature analysing the discourse from the media during the corruption scandal that fuelled the political crisis which culminated in the impeachment of Rousseff, overlooks her agency. While the media is a powerful influence on the public, representatives of organised interests
still have agency, if at worse, offering the rhetorical elements which may be used in a news story (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997, p. 224).
Generally, crises can take a variety of forms: train wrecks, airplane crashes, hurricanes, tsunamis, bombings, shootings, and also corruption and political scandals. In essence, a crisis is a “risk manifested” (Heath, 2010, p. 3). More specifically, a crisis can be defined as “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organisation’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs 2007b: 2–3 apud Coombs, 2010). This definition suggests that crises are partially socially constructed. That is, to the extent that crises are dependent on perceptions, anything shifting such perceptions could potentially shift the nature of such particular crisis. In the same way, as much as events may erupt seemingly unexpectedly, perceptions can change and evolve, and therefore so can a crisis change and evolve. Crisis communication is, then, “the collection, processing, and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20).
This research proposes to understand Rousseff’s crisis communication strategies in respect to her popular support, responding the question: “To what extent did Dilma Rousseff’s
discourses contribute to her major decline in popular support?” Between the major protests in June 2013 and the opening of her impeachment case, in December 2015, Rousseff
addressed directly the public through public television and public radio 11 times and gave numerous speeches in ceremonies, inaugurations, and other events, 12 of which have been selected to composed the corpus of this research. Her discourse responded in one way or another part of the public opinion, expressed in the protests that continued throughout the whole impeachment process, in a more or less dialectic fashion. Rousseff, civil society organisations, general public, as well as other actors not focused on this research such as the media, projected different points of view about the crisis, and for this reason it is impossible to analyse the effects of Rousseff’s crisis communication strategies in respect to her popular support without an understanding of the popular discourses articulated by the people. Based on Rousseff discourses, which are available to the public and widely appropriated in the media, and bibliographic research of the popular discourse from her opposition at that time, this research assesses Rousseff’s own responsibility in her popularity decline.
The first chapter delineates the theoretical framework used in the analysis. This research employs situational crisis communication theory, which is one of the most well-established
theories of crisis communication. The theory has been developed by Timothy Coombs and his colleagues for more than two decades, and points to best communication strategies to minimise reputational damage, in different types of crises. Based on these recommendations, this research analyses whether Rousseff employed strategies that best fitted the different stages of the crisis. ‘The crisis’ is frequently referred to in somewhat vague terms precisely because of the different perspectives from Rousseff and her opposition. To account for this dialectic and the evolving aspect of the crisis, this analysis employs crisis exploitation theory. This is a less established theory that focuses on framing contests and the attribution of
responsibility, or blame.
The second chapter defines the methodology employed by this research. The chapter discusses the research design and its limitations, the methods and operationalisation, and presents the corpus of this research. As comparing political crisis in this order of magnitude would require more resources, this research is limited to a single case study. This
methodological design comes with the limitation of generalisation. Given this limitation, this chapter explores the best possible design to responding the research question with the
available resources, including time, and lays up the ground for the analysis. The third chapter is the analysis. Here the discourse by Rousseff is analysed and situated in the context which it speaks to. It is impossible to analyse the effect of any political discourse in public support without simultaneously understanding the public. As any communicative act, a discourse depends on both the side speaking and the side listening.
The conclusion reflects back on the research question, and suggests what we gain by offering a fresh look at Rousseff’s part in the crisis. Studying political crisis is a major challenge that crisis communication still has a long way to cover. Leaders adopt varying strategies and styles, to a variety of results. This research contributes to another look, another step in this long walk.
Theoretical Framework
The aim of this research is to analyse the extent which Rousseff’s crises communication strategies contribute to her major decline in popularity. Considering that a crisis is defined as the perception of an event (Coombs 2007b: 2–3 apud Coombs, 2010), rather than the event itself, the theoretical framework starts by delineating the framing elements of crisis
communication. This framing process is important to be understood because it lays ground for the constructivist understanding of speech acts, that is, any communication about a crisis contributes to shaping it. This is why ‘the crisis’ is somewhat vaguely defined in this
research, because of the different perspectives from Rousseff and her opposition—it is a political crisis, fuelled by corruption scandals, but the details and even how to properly present it are disputed, as we shall see. The political crisis eventually led to the impeachment of Rousseff, or better yet, her reputation was damaged to a point that the political forces mobilising the impeachment did not have to face much resistance, as history has shown. The second part of the theoretical framework focuses on the crisis communication strategies known by scholars and experts that yield better results in minimising reputational damage. Intermingled, this research employs both situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) and crisis exploitation theory (CET). The first, one of the most well-established theories of crisis communication, has been developed by Timothy Coombs and his colleagues for more than two decades. The theory suggests best communication strategies to minimise reputational damage, in different types of crises, but in a way lack the dialectical aspect of a crisis. Thus, this analysis employs the less established crisis exploitation theory to account for this dialectic and the evolving aspect of the crisis. Combined, these two theories are used in this research to analyse whether Rousseff employed the most appropriate strategies according to the different stages of the crisis.
Crisis framing
Considering the constructivist approach that a crisis is defined as the perception of an event, as suggested by Coombs (Coombs 2007b: 2–3 apud Coombs, 2010), rather than the event itself, a solid theoretical framework for crisis communication must include the concept of framing. The idea that reality is context dependent, and that context can be altered is the foundation of framing theory, laid out by Goffman in 1974 (Goffman, 1974). Goffman observed that, “the important thing about reality […] is our sense of its realness in contrast to
our feeling that some things lack this quality” (Goffman, 1974, p. 2). This observation implies that reality is a particular and subjective experience derived from a feeling.
Therefore, if a crisis is dependent on the perception of an event, and reality is an individual perception, then different people may observe and react to the same event and have different conclusions as to why it constitutes a crisis or not, and if it does, then what kind of crisis it is. Moreover, if we assume that the feeling of reality is context dependent, as proposed by Goffman, and that context can be controlled, then one’s reality can be at least partially fabricated by others, and a shared reality is the product of a shared construction. In essence, framing is a communication process in which an actor defines or constructs a particular reality, usually social or political (Nelson et al., 1997). According to Entman, framing is a communication process “in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one location-such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel-to that consciousness” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Consequently, crisis communication being a set of strategies aimed at addressing a crisis situation, it is also a framing mechanism. The disturbance of a particular set of social conditions “challenge actors inside and outside government to weave persuasive narratives about what is happening and what is at stake. […] Those whose narratives are considered persuasive stand to gain prestige and support; those who are found wanting can end up as scapegoats” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 22). In that sense, crises can be viewed as backgrounds for framing contests between the different actors seeking to contain or exploit this opportunity for “political posturing and policy change” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 23).
Labelling a particular set of social conditions a ‘crisis’ results in the allocation of time, attention, and resources to a particular issue (Coombs, 2010, p. 19) that otherwise would not be available in a ‘normal’ situation. For this reason, labelling a particular set of social
conditions a ‘crisis’ can be considered as a major communicative act (Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2009, p. 83). According to Hajer & Laws, framing is one of three “ordering devices” that policy actors employ to “deal with ambiguity and allocate particular
significance to specific social or physical events,” in order to “to gain a handle on practical questions” (Hajer & Laws, 2006, p. 252). Thus, framing “makes a crucial difference between obtaining and losing the ‘permissive consensus’ leaders need to effectuate their policies and bolster their reputation” (Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, et al., 2009, p. 70).
Those political discourses take place in public forums such as direct addresses, press
conferences, nowadays social media, and otherwise mediated by the traditional mass media. These politicians use institutions or their already existing legitimacy to present their political message, in the case of crisis communication, their interpretation of the events taking place. This is done in a way that politicians manage to persuade their audiences in to believing that their goals are the same, when in fact it may not be necessarily so (Reyes, 2011, p. 784). But not only can traditional policy actors participate in defining a crisis. According to Castells, social movements may have very real and yet unpredictable electoral consequences (Castells, 2015, p. 255). Political actors, mass media, and citizenry interact in a dispute that results in a “persuasive story line (a narrative) that explains what happened, why it had to be that way, what its repercussions are, how it can be resolved, who can be relied upon to do so, and who is to blame” (Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, et al., 2009, pp. 69–70).
In situations where the events to which stakeholders are reacting are more obvious, such as natural disasters, it makes more sense to think of crisis management in three clear stages: pre-crisis, pre-crisis, and post-pre-crisis, as proposed by Coombs (Coombs, 2007). However, in situations where the events are less obvious, such as political crises and corruption scandals, frames are “constantly being renegotiated” (Hajer & Laws, 2006, p. 262), and a crisis can evolve and take different shapes. Therefore, differently than Coombs’ three clear stages, this research proposes to look as crisis as a framing contest, as proposed in crisis exploitation theory (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009).
To some extent, situational crisis communication theory lacks three important elements from framing contests and crisis exploitation theory. The first element is the subjective aspect of the crisis. Despite basing his theory on attribution theory, and reinforcing the importance of the perceived responsibility, when Coombs suggests that crisis managers identify which crisis type they are dealing with, he assumes the possibility of an objective interpretation (Coombs, 2007). The second element is the political aspect. While it may be true that the stakeholders’ interpretation of the situation is the key component of reputational damage, and deny crisis response strategies have the potential to offer an alternative interpretation of the situation, situational crisis communication theory assumes a simple bilateral relation between the organisation or individual and stakeholders or public (Coombs, 2007). Finally, the third element is the temporal development. While Coombs reminds that crisis response strategies can be employed either during or after the crisis, situational crisis communication theory does
not seem to take too much into consideration the evolution of perceptions during the crisis (Coombs, 2007).
Crisis communication strategies
Situational crisis communication theory aims at “discovering the range of crisis response/communication strategies organisations use in a crisis and finding the crisis response strategy or strategies best suited for a particular crisis type” (Coombs & Holladay, 1996, p. 279). In that sense, situational crisis communication theory maps out potential crises and possible responses, and develop theoretical associations between the two to suggest which responses are more adequate to which type of crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). In that sense, situational crisis communication theory considers that there the nature of the crisis is determined and only subsequently responded to. Crisis exploitation theory posits that the type of response helps shape the development of the crisis. According to crisis exploitation theory, “crises create four successive questions for framing efforts, concerning 1) the nature and severity of a crisis, 2) its causes, 3) the responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and 4) its policy implications” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 23). To combine both, we can take a chronological approach to a theoretical crisis communication effort.
According to crisis exploitation theory, the first framing contest is related to the severity of the event, whether it calls for a non-customary response and should be therefore labelled as a crisis in the first place. The authors describe three main frames: type-1, or ‘business-as-usual’, tend to deny the critical nature of the events; type-2, or ‘crisis as threat’, consider the events as a crisis, but a threat to status quo; type-3, or ‘crisis as opportunity’, consider the events as a crisis, and an opportunity to challenge the status quo (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, pp. 24–25). In general, what the authors observe is that “proponents of type-1 frames argue to minimise event significance; proponents of type-2 frames are more likely to acknowledge event significance; and proponents of type-3 frames are most likely to maximise event significance” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 26).
More often than not, disturbances are not self-evidently urgent and severe but rather
ambiguous. In that sense, “crisis framing in cases other than major disasters, huge outbursts of violence and the like is therefore a political challenge of considerable magnitude” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 26). Situations lacking obvious consensus leave substantial space for type-1 denials or relatively complacent understandings of such disturbances. When enough
evidence makes this type of framing unsustainable, actors compete to establish one of the other two types. There is not, however, a precise moment of transition that can be predicted or even recognised in foresight. Rather, this transition is “a function of a constellation of variable situational, historical, cultural and political forces” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 27). Situational crisis communication theory recognises three factors that determine the nature of the crisis, and shape its reputational threat: “(1) initial crisis responsibility, (2) crisis history, and (3) prior relational reputation” (Coombs, 2007, p. 166). Combined, these factors reveal 12 different crisis types, which are organised in three clusters: victim, accidental, and preventable (Coombs, 2007, p. 168). When a crisis is perceived as a natural disaster, or is caused by an external agent, organisations are seen a victim of the crisis, and therefore only weak attributions of responsibility and a mild reputational threat exist. When a crisis is perceived as an accident, such as technical errors, or founded on intangible claims, organisations are only minimally seen as responsible for the crisis and there is only a
moderate reputational threat. Finally, when a crisis is perceived as a result from an intentional and premeditated action, organisations are deemed strongly responsible for the crisis and suffer a severe reputational threat (Coombs, 2007, p. 168). In determining the nature of the crisis, therefore, situational crisis communication theory establishes both causality and blame, which are accordingly the second and third framing contests in crisis exploitation theory. The focus on causality is the second framing contest of crisis exploitation theory. After a disturbance is labelled as a crisis, questions around its causes gain prominence. Different than situational crisis communication theory, however, crisis exploitation theory focuses on how the organisation and other stakeholders shape the perception of the initial crisis responsibility in terms of causality. Proponents of type-1 and type-2 frames emphasise forces of nature, ‘out-groups’, or other external causes, in an attempt to ‘exogenise’ accountability and maintain the status quo. These frames appeal to either unforeseeability or uncontrollability, such as the impact of an international economic crisis in an otherwise stable domestic economy. Conversely, proponents of these frames risk being accused of ‘blindness’,
‘passivity’, and ‘rigidity’. Proponents of type-3 frames refer to specific individuals or small group, in an attempt to ‘endogenise’ accountability. In contrast, these frames emphasise factors that are portrayed as foreseeable and controllable, therefore calling for a revision of the status quo. On the other hand, proponents of this kind of frame risk coming across as ‘alarmist’ or ‘opportunistic’. In type-3 frames, the political future of office-holders and their
opposition, as well as the existing policies, programs and organisations surrounding the crisis are at stake (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 28). On top of that, crisis exploitation theory also makes observations to the other two factors of situational crisis communication theory that determine the nature of the crisis: crisis history and prior relational reputation. Crisis exploitation theory also adds that in political crises, also time in office matters, as newly elected officials are more prone to apologising (Boin, ’t Hart, & McConnell, 2009, p. 99). Assessing the reputational threat is, in other words, determining who is to blame. The third framing contest of crisis exploitation theory is focused on blame. Here, proponents of type-3 frames such as opposition parties have to consider whether they are able to articulate a credible case against current incumbents, or against past incumbents in the case that the proponent is a newly positioned office-holder. In case they feel that they can convincingly assert blame, they will need to decide whether they want to focus their efforts on only
delegitimising or push further and call for sanctions. Conversely, office-holders accused may choose between accepting the blame entirely or partially, or rejecting, deflecting, or diffusing the responsibility for the crisis (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 29). Office-holders may choose to deflect blame to exogenous factors, that is, sustain a type-2 frame; or they might opt to diffuse blame between multiple individuals and complex dynamics, while still not avoiding endogenous factors. The authors classify the political results of this framing contest in three categories: “elite damage (e.g. focused blame), elite escape (e.g. diffused or displaced blame) and elite rejuvenation (e.g. praise and support instead of blame)” (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 29).
Table 1. CET blame matrix
“Critics absolve blame Critics focus blame
Incumbents accept responsibility
I. Blame minimisation: elite escape likely
II. Blame acceptance: elite damage likely
Incumbents deny responsibility
III. Blame avoidance: elite escape likely
IV. Blame showdown: elite damage, escape,
rejuvenation all possible”
Source: (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 29)
Table 1 presents a simple scheme of the possibilities described above, as they are presented by ‘t Hart & Tindall. Considering this table, ’t Hart and Tindall draw the most likely scenario
for the third framing contest. For the ones criticising the status-quo, the best scenario would be box II, given that is the one where incumbents are more likely to suffer damage. Logically, incumbents will try to avoid the scenario most hurtful to them at all costs, so critics have to consider the other options. Looking at the lower half of the table, critics may choose between absolving blame (box III) and focusing blame (box IV). Absolving blame would, at best, only damage the reputation of incumbents, but it would be nevertheless a ‘tactical victory’. The problem is that if incumbents decide to accept responsibility, they might get away with the least favourable scenario for critics, box I. Focusing blame then remains the preferred action for critics (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, p. 29)
At the other side of the table, incumbents also have two options: denying responsibility in an attempt to escape blame, or even gain credit, or accept responsibility for the crisis or its poor management. Scenarios where critics absolve blame (boxes I and III) are naturally in the interest of incumbents as they have the most chance of preserving their position. They might consider the possibility that the critics are aiming for a tactical victory and pre-emptively accept blame, walking off with the best possible scenario for them. The chances of this happening, as demonstrated above, are low. A more realistic assessment would be that the critics will focus blame, and so the incumbents are pressed to deny responsibility as otherwise they might end up in their least favourable scenario (box II) (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009, pp. 29–30). Given these two calculations, the most likely scenario that the third framing contest will happen is box IV. This is the most intensely politicised scenario, involving long investigations. Both sides could still lose, but they have at least avoided their least favourable scenario.
The issue with crisis exploitation theory is that is focuses overwhelmingly on blame, and seems to assume that incumbents will be avert to accepting blame because they expect a greater reputational damage from that. More recent research, however, suggests that pre-emptively accepting blame, even in cases where it is clear that the incumbents were responsible for the crisis, can generate an outcome to their reputation better than not
accepting or only belatedly doing so (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012; Spence, Lachlan, Omilion-Hodges, & Goddard, 2014). According to situational crisis communication theory, denying or accepting blame are only two of ten possible crisis response strategies. Also, similarly to the more recent research, situational crisis communication theory suggests accepting blame and apologising, especially in cases where responsibility attribution is strong. Situational crisis
communication theory ten crisis response strategies are divided into four categories: denial, diminishment, rebuilding, and bolstering. The first three are considered primary strategies, while the last one, bolstering, should only be used as an added support (Coombs, 2007, p. 170). Table 2 presents a summary of the ten strategies of situational crisis communication theory, as presented by Coombs.
Table 2. SCCT crisis response strategies
Crisis Response Strategies
Deny
“Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization.
Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis.
Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis.
Diminish
Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that
triggered the crisis.
Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
Rebuild
Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.
Bolstering
Reminder: Tell stakeholders about the past good works of the organization. Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization.
Victimage: Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too”
Source: (Coombs, 2007, p. 170)
Situational crisis communication theory started to be developed in 1995 by W. Timothy Coombs, grounded in attribution theory (Coombs, 2007, pp. 165–166). In sum, attribution theory posits “positive associations between perceived controllability-anger-neglect and
between perceived uncontrollability-pity-help,” that is an association between responsibility and sympathy (Weiner, 1985, p. 569). In other words, people are less likely to offer help when they understand that the situation could be avoided. Based on this idea, situational crisis communication theory associates public perception of responsibility for a crisis to
reputational damage, and predicates best strategies for dealing with different scenarios. According to Coombs, “situational crisis communication theory posits that by understanding the crisis situation, the crisis manager can determine which crisis response strategy or
strategies will maximize reputational protection” (Coombs, 2007, p. 166).
The most notorious contribution of situational crisis communication theory is the conceptual match between the type of crisis and the adequate response strategy. Crisis managers can then interpret the perceived level of responsibility that their organisation or themselves face in a particular situation, and employ one or more adequate responses (Coombs, 2007). On top of the perceived level of responsibility, crisis managers may take into consideration the
reputation and level of credibility that their organisation or themselves carry, as it can directly influence the perceptions of different stakeholders (Coombs, 2007). Table 3 summarises the guidelines, as they are presented by Coombs.
Table 3. SCCT crisis response strategy guidelines Crisis Response Strategy Guidelines
1.“Informing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.
2.Victimage can be used as part of the response for workplace violence, product tampering, natural disasters and rumors.
3.Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises) coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.
4.Diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), which have no history of similar crises, and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation.
5.Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), coupled with a history of similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation.
6.Rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with strong attributions of crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or prior relationship reputation.
7.The deny posture crisis response strategies should be used for rumour and challenge crises, when possible.
8.Maintain consistency in crisis response strategies. Mixing deny crisis response strategies with either the diminish or rebuild strategies will erode the effectiveness of the overall response.”
Source: (Coombs, 2007, p. 173)
On top of that, more recent research on situational crisis communication theory from other authors suggests that the politician’s reputation and the audience’s supportive behaviour will be more positive following an apology strategy than in compensation or any bolstering
strategies (Sheldon & Sallot, 2008). Not only that, the politician’s character traits and concern for others, and the audience’s account acceptance are likely to be more positive in the
apology scenario. Only the politician’s competency is likely more damaged in the case of an apology (Sheldon & Sallot, 2008). In other words, despite being costly to the public
perception of the politician’s competency, the apology strategy has a more positive impact to the reputation than compensation or bolstering strategies.
Other researchers suggested additional responses to be part of situational crisis
communication theory, such as ignoring, separation, transcendence, endorsement (Liu, 2010), enhancing, transferring (Kim & Liu, 2012), “providing an explanation, accepting
responsibility, offering help, and admitting to needing help” (Bartman, 2018, pp. 186–187), but they are far from being established as additional actions and are so far best considered as sub-categories, at most.
Methodology
Having laid out the theorical framework, this chapter discusses the research design and its limitations, the methods and operationalisation, and presents the corpus of this research. Research design and limitations
Major political crises are not specific to Brazil, neither is corruption or government change, one does not need to look further than Latin America to find other examples. Enrique Peña Nieto, serving as president of Mexico until very recently, was caught in a corruption scandal in 2014, and current president of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, was mentioned in the Panama Papers leak in 2016. Large protests also took place in large nations in the 2010’s, drawing hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of citizens to the streets of Ukraine, Thailand, and Turkey, only to mention a few, some of which also culminated in government change like Brazil. Some studies managed to compare two or more of these cases from a particular angle, such as the democratic legitimacy of such protests (R. F. Mendonça & Ercan, 2015). Although similar in some ways, the magnitude of the political crisis fuelled by the corruption scandals in Brazil makes it difficult to compare to other political crisis. Such endeavour is definitely valuable and feasible, in the context of a larger research. This dissertation,
however, given the time and resource constraints, is limited to a single case study. The main limitation of this methodological design is that a single case study is very hard to separate from the social context which it occurs (Cutler, 2004). The obvious implication is that any generalisation of its conclusions is not possible. Given all the complexity of this case, it is impossible to establish an exact correlation, and much less causation. To address this limitation, this research would have needed significantly more resources, including time, which are beyond a dissertation. What this single case study can offer by analysing Rousseff’s discourse is an insight for possibly future research. Political crises are still underrepresented in the field of crisis communication.
Another limitation of this research is the inevitable bias from the researcher. Especially in a qualitative research like this, where discourse is analysed, it is important to be aware that any person carries a set of values that can interfere in one way or another with the results. In this case, I was born in Brazil, and lived a great part of the political crisis studied here. On the one hand this allows me to understand the crisis from a perspective that an outsider would not be able to, understand the nuances of the language and the context. On the other hand, I might
not have the distance that an outsider would have. Taking this into consideration, the way to ensure validity on this research is by having a transparent methodology and analysis, where the interpretation of the discourse is clear and open for contestation.
Methods and operationalisation
The methodologies used to gather and analyse data are primarily discourse analysis, for the speeches of Dilma Rousseff, and secondarily bibliography and document analysis, for picturing the crisis scenario and the discourse from the opposition. As Figure 1 shows, between Rousseff’s first term and her official removal from office, in 2016, two major shifts in public opinion happened. These two major shifts happened immediately after large demonstrations that took millions of Brazilians to the streets. Reflecting these two major shifts, the analysis will be divided in two time periods. One starting in June 2013 and ending in June 2014, after the FIFA World Cup, and the other extending from July 2014 until December 2015. The main distinction between the two periods is in terms of attribution of responsibility to Rousseff, so to better accommodate the theory. Only during the second period, the impeachment of Rousseff became a strong demand from large protests.
Figure 1. Evolution of public opinion towards President Dilma Rousseff
Source: Datafolha
As discussed in the previous chapter, crisis communication is dialectic. The implication is that, as any communicative act, it depends on a speaker and a listener. Going back to the research question: “to what extent did Dilma Rousseff’s discourses contribute to her major
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decline in popular support?” It is impossible to analyse the effect of any political discourse in popular support without also understanding the public discourse and the general context where these discourses exist. Therefore, the two periods described about are then each subdivided into the discourse from the protests, and the discourse by Rousseff. This will allow for a more dynamic analysis that takes into consideration the dialectic and evolving character of the crisis, as discussed in the theoretical framework. Without this, the discourse by Rousseff cannot analysed in relation with the context which it speaks to. The reason why this research does not focus on the media, other politicians, or even other actors, is simply that this is beyond the research question, which focuses on Rousseff and the public, only. This way, the structure of the analysis is informed mostly by crisis exploitation theory. Therefore, the analysis is composed of four segments. The segments follow a chronological order, starting with the analysis of the discourse from the protests, as a way to situate the analysis of the discourse by Rousseff. The first segment covers the initial discourse from the protests, from June 2013 to June 2014, and is based on bibliographic and document analysis. The second segment covers the initial discourse by Rousseff in the same period, and is based on the analysis of her selected discourses (see Corpus, below). The third and fourth part follow the same structure, for the second period, from July 2014 to December 2015. The main findings are compared to the best practices elected in the theoretical framework (see tables 1-3), and then summarised at the end of each segment. This way, responding to the research question is done by mapping the situated findings from Rousseff’s discourse in the possible responses, and compared to the strategies suggested by the theory. The main theory used, as described in the theoretical framework, is the situational crisis communication theory, while crisis exploitation theory gives support to the analysis and also the structuring of the analysis in different segments.
Corpus
The period covered in this study is demarcated from June 2013, when massive popular protests happened throughout Brazil, to the beginning of December 2015, when the
impeachment process of Dilma Rousseff was opened by the President of the Lower House, Eduardo Cunha. This time span covers the two main public opinion shifts and the two main events of public protests: the demonstrations of June 2013 and the demonstrations of March 2015. During this period, Rousseff went 11 times to address the nation on public television and public radio, as demonstrated on Table 4.
Table 4. Addresses to the Nation by Dilma Rousseff between Jun 2013 and Dec 2015
# Date Topic Length
2 21 June 2013 Protests of June 2013 9'58
4 06 September 2013 Independence Day 10'15
6 21 October 2013 Auction for Oil Exploration 8'03
8 29 December 2013 End of year recap 11'50
9 08 March 2014 International Women’s Day 8'22
10 30 April 2014 Workers Day 12'01
11 10 June 2014 FIFA World Cup 10'28
15 01 January 2015 Fight against Corruption 10'22
16 08 March 2015 International Women’s Day 15'18
23 02 December 2015 Opening of the Impeachment Process 2'55
Aside from these 11 addresses, Rousseff gave a number of other planned speeches, including during ceremonies, inaugurations, and other events. The public archive of the President Office lists 433 speeches, including addresses to the nation and a wide range of events
(Discursos, 2019). For this research, an additional 12 speeches were selected (Table 5), based on the titles and brief descriptions of each, and their relevance to the topic of this study. In total, the corpus of this research is composed by 23 speeches of Dilma Rousseff, given between June 2013 and December 2015, and amount to more than seven hours of material all combined.
The speeches from Rousseff were retrieved online from the official sources of the
government, coded in Portuguese, and the relevant quotes translated to English by the author. The bibliography and document analysis of the discourse from the opposition relied on existing research, mainly Dias (Dias, 2017), Galinari (Galinari, 2017), and Pinto (Pinto,
2017). To support, also news articles from the main newspapers and magazines in the country were used, to give a general context of the corruption scandals and the Lava Jato operation uncovering it.
Table 5. Speeches by Dilma Rousseff between Jun 2013 and Dec 2015
# Date Topic Length
1 18 June 2013 Protests of June 2013 17'32
3 24 June 2013 Political Reform 19'08
5 24 September 2013 Protests of June 2013 (at the United Nations) 22'37
7 25 October 2013 Political Reform 30'49
12 20 November 2014 Fight against Corruption 36'00 13 18 December 2014 Fight against Corruption and Elections 16'17 14 01 January 2015 Presidential inauguration 44'27
17 16 March 2015 Protests of March 2015 25'26
18 18 March 2015 Fight against Corruption 27'39
19 30 April 2015 Meeting with Unions 18'28
20 07 September 2015 Independence Day 8'08
21 05 October 2015 Ceremony for new Ministers 22'30
Analysis
The analysis is divided in four segments. The first covers the initial discourse from the protests, from June 2013 up to and including June 2014. The second part covers the initial discourse by Rousseff in that same period. The third part covers the later discourse from the protests, from July 2014 up to and including December 2015. Finally, the fourth part covers the later discourse by Rousseff in that same period. At the end of each segment, the main findings are summarised, reflecting back to the theory and the research question.
Initial discourse from the protests
In October 2010, Dilma Rousseff was elected the first woman to the Brazilian presidency. Her election gave continuity to the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in the presidency, already 8 years in charge of the executive branch with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Rousseff enjoyed the best approval rates in two decades (Table 6), and her
popularity grew even more in 2012 reaching over 65% of support, and only 7% of opposition (Figure 1). These numbers remained roughly at the same levels until early June 2013, when 57% of the population considered Rousseff’s performance as good or great, 33% regular, and 9% bad or terrible (Figure 1). By the end of June, a major shift in public opinion happened, support fell to 30%, regular raised to 43%, and opposition nearly tripled to 25% (Figure 1). Rousseff’s ratings had minor corrections after the protests in June 2013, but did not return to previous levels.
Table 6. President public ratings at the beginning of term
COLLOR 1990 ITAMAR 1992 FHC (1st term) 1995 FHC (2nd term) 1999 LULA (1st term) 2003 LULA (2nd term) 2007 DILMA (1st term) 2011 DILMA (2nd term) 2015 BOLSONARO 2019 Great/good 36 34 39 21 43 48 47 13 32 Regular 43 45 40 39 40 37 34 27 33 Bad/terrible 19 11 16 36 10 14 7 60 30 Not sure 2 11 5 4 7 1 12 1 4 Source: Datafolha
During that month, hundreds of thousands of Brazilians took the streets of the main cities in the country to protest, initially against the rise in public transport fares, and later against wider topics, including corruption. According to Pinto, there were three main groups protesting in June 2013, the MPL, the Black Blocs, and what she calls a ‘fragmented majority’ (Pinto, 2017). The Free Pass Movement (Movimento Passe Livre, MPL), centred around free public transportation and historically associated with the Brazilian left, was the most prominent in calling the first protests (Pinto, 2017, p. 130). The movement called for protests after the raise in public transportation fares in Sao Paulo. A few thousands of
protesters attended the protest on June 13th, but were brutally repressed by the military police
(‘13 de junho, o dia que não terminou’, 2013; Brito & Breda, 2013). The media was also repressed by the police, according to one source more than 50 journalists suffered aggressions from the police and 6 were arrested during the month of June (Manzano, 2013; Masutti, 2013). The unjustified violence from the state fuelled the public unsatisfaction and in June 17th hundreds of thousands protesters, in different cities of the country (‘Brasil acorda com
protestos em todo o país’, 2013; Mello & Massali, 2013). The demand from MPL, to suspend the bus fare increase, was soon accepted by the mayor, Fernando Haddad, from the PT, and the Governor Geraldo Alckmin, from the PSDB (Pinto, 2017, p. 130; ‘Vitória das ruas: Haddad e Alckmin revogam o aumento das passagens’, 2013). According to one MPL representative, once their demand was met, however, other groups saw an opportunity to insert their own agendas to the protests already in motion. The phrase ‘it is not just about the 20 cents’ (in refence to the 20 cents increase in the bus fares) gained popularity, but for the MPL it had always been about the 20 cents (Cirenza 2013 apud Pinto, 2017, p. 131). Another clearly defined group, the Black Blocs, distinguished their discourse from other groups’ by violent performances, which were harshly repressed by the police and labelled as vandals by the media (Pinto, 2017, p. 133). On June 20th, a few individuals acted violently
and confronted the police in Brasilia and other capitals, leading to arrests and hundreds of people injured (Passarinho, 2013). At the same time that the media continued to report on police violence (Batista Jr. & Deodoro, 2013a; ‘Novo protesto tem reação violenta da PM’, 2013), the turbulence from the relatively few violent performances were overly emphasised by the main newspapers and magazines, neglecting the legitimacy of the protests and linking them with the political far-left (Batista Jr. & Deodoro, 2013b; ‘Chegou a hora do basta’, 2013; ‘Editorial: Retomar a Paulista’, 2013; Müzell, 2013). The mayor of Sao Paulo,
Fernando Haddad, from the PT, the governor Geraldo Alckmin, from the PSDB, the Vice-President Michel Temer condemned the violence from the protesters (Rocha, 2013). An increasing number of protesters did not belong to neither the MPL nor the Black Blocs, and, in lack of a clear leadership, formed the ‘fragmented majority’ (Pinto, 2017). According to data collected on the streets by one of the largest polling institute in the country, IBOPE, the five main reasons for the protests were, in order: the political environment (especially corruption), public transportation, health, FIFA World Cup expenses, and education (‘Veja pesquisa completa do Ibope sobre os manifestantes’, 2013). The simple and objective discourse from the MPL, mixed with already existing frustrations, ignited by the police truculence quickly gathered thousands of people, most of them young (43% between 14 and 24, 20% between 25 and 29 years old), educated (49% concluded secondary school, 43% graduated from university), and from different economic backgrounds in the major cities of the country, about half of them participating on a protest for the first time, and the vast majority used social media to mobilise, and two thirds were against depredation and plundering during the protests while about one third said it was acceptable under certain conditions (‘Veja pesquisa completa do Ibope sobre os manifestantes’, 2013). In Sao Paulo, an even higher number of unexperienced young, well educated, and mostly male population participated to the protests (Datafolha, 2013c).
Nearly two thirds of the protesters in Sao Paulo self-identify as liberals, while more than three quarters of the adult population in the city align with more conservative ideas; 36% of the protesters identify with the political left, 31% as centrists, and 21% as right leaning (13% did not self-identify with any), whereas in the general population in Sao Paulo 34% align with the political right, 24% centre, 24% with the left, and 16% did not define their political orientation (Datafolha, 2013d). These numbers would be indicative of a protest composed by different political identities, with a majority of leftists protesting in an environment composed majorly of right leaning people. Looking at the support to the protests, however, what we see is a class cut, more so than a political identity cut. While by the end of the month of June, public support for the manifestations in Sao Paulo was at 89%, four months later the richer population maintained an 80% support whereas the poorer fell to 54%. The richer population also reported to be more confident that the protests bring more positive than negative impacts to their lives (Datafolha, 2013b). In other words, however public support for the protests suffered a small decrease overall, poor people were disproportionally less interested or
invested in continuing the protests. These numbers and facts indicate that the protests were an agenda increasingly associated with the wealthier classes.
Political identity, in fact, was at a low. While 61% said that they were very interested in politics and 28% had a medium interest, 83% did not feel represented by political parties and 89% did not feel represented by any politician (IBOPE, 2013). Support to a number of politicians changed immediately after the protests. Within a few weeks, the popular support of President Dilma Rousseff fell 27 points, from 57% to 30%. The popular support of other politicians such as Governor Geraldo Alckmin and Mayor Fernando Haddad also fell, 14 and 16 points, to 38% and 18% respectively (Datafolha, 2013a; ‘Manifestações derrubam
aprovação de governantes em três semanas’, 2013). Distrust in the political parties fuelled small groups that would from 2014 onwards take the highlights. ‘Revoltados On-line’ (Rebels On-line, ROL) and ‘NasRuas’ (OnTheStreets) by then small groups already active for a couple of years, participated on the June 2013 protests demanding for the impeachment of Rousseff and military intervention, a massively controversial topic for a country only a few decades out of a military dictatorship (‘Grupos que defendem a volta do militarismo convocam atos e pedem o impeachment de Dilma’, 2013). A few months after the protests, ‘Movimento Brasil Livre’ (Free Brazil Movement, MBL), perhaps the most influential popular group in the impeachment of Rousseff, was founded (Gobbi, 2016, p. 67).
In sum, at this point the protests were characterised by a relatively unorganised population, mostly young and well educated, and initially com a variety of economic backgrounds. They had vague demands around the political environment (especially corruption), public
transportation, health, FIFA World Cup expenses, and education. They had different political identities, but had extremely low trust in the political parties and politicians. With time, the agenda started to be articulated mostly by the wealthier population. The protests made clear that the severity of the situation called for a non-customary response, so we can say that they framed the situation as a crisis, or a non-type-1 framing. There were minimal attributions of blame or crisis responsibility to Rousseff, but it is important to keep in mind that the party she governed from, the PT, had been through a corruption scandal in the past, known as ‘Mensalão’ (Zobel, 2005). Considering those, situational crisis communication theory suggests a few possible strategies. If Rousseff managed to dissociate herself with the past of the PT, only informing and adjusting information would be necessary. If she for some reason got associated with the negative prior reputation of the PT, employing diminish crisis
response strategies, such as excuses and justifications. She was also to refrain from mixing deny crisis response strategies, as they would erode the effectiveness of the overall response (see ‘Crisis communication strategies’).
Initial discourse by Dilma Rousseff
In the aftermath of the protests of June 2013, Dilma Rousseff gave three speeches relevant to the insipient crisis. On June 18th 2013, during the ceremony for the launching of new mining
regulations, Dilma Rousseff publicly acknowledged the on-going protests for the first time. At the end of her discourse, after presenting the new regulations, she changes to subject to the protests while keeping the same positive and optimist tone she used to present the new
regulations: “Brazil has risen a stronger country today. The greatness of yesterday’s
demonstrations bear proof to the power of our democracy, to the strength of the voices from our streets and to the civility of our population” (Rousseff, 2013a). She goes on to say that “these voices from our streets must be heard” (Rousseff, 2013a). This is a clear indication that since the beginning of the protests, Rousseff did not try to push for a type-1, ‘business-as-usual frame’ (’t Hart & Tindall, 2009), she did not deny or downplay the protests. On the contrary, a few days later, during her public address on June 21st, Rousseff frames the
protests as an impulse to improve the country:
“[The demonstrations taking place in the country] show the strength of our democracy and the desire of our youth to move Brazil forward. If we make good use of the momentum brought by this new political energy, we can, in better and faster ways, achieve a lot of what Brazil has so far been unable to conquer because of political and economic constraints” (Rousseff, 2013b).
During a meeting with all governors and mayors of the capitals, Rousseff says that “the energy that comes from the streets is greater than any obstacle. Together with the people, we can solve big problems. There is no reason to stand inert, complacent or divided” (Rousseff, 2013c). All these statements reveal that not only Rousseff avoided talking about the subject, but that she presented them as a positive opportunity and perhaps necessary to further improving the country.
At this point, the crisis is still very loosely defined. The first demand from the opposition, to revert the bus fare increase, was quickly met in different cities, including Sao Paulo, where the largest protests were taking place. The Black Blocs were pushing a vague and intangible
‘anti-capitalist’ agenda, leaving the ‘fragmented majority’ demands the main subject for the government to interact with, widespread political corruption, the health and education system, and the FIFA World Cup expenses, as seen above. On top of that, it important to keep in mind the demographics of those manifestations, most of them were unexperienced young, well educated. Finally, the element of violence, both from the police and protesters, cannot be left aside. Looking at how the government responded to these demands, it is possible to determine whether the government considered the situation critical enough to call for non-customary responses, responding to crisis exploitation theory’s first framing contest. During her speech on June 18th and address on the 21st of that month, Rousseff condemned
violence, but did not suggest ways of curbing the violence:
“unfortunately, however, it is true that there were isolated acts of violence against persons and public and private property, which we must condemn and deter vigorously. We, government and society, know that all forms of violence are destructive and regrettable, and only generate more violence. We can never accept to live with it” (Rousseff, 2013a).
Violence was presented as a danger to the legitimacy of the peaceful demonstrations, and Rousseff tried to distance herself and her government from these acts:
“if we allow violence to stray us from our path, not only will we be wasting a great historic opportunity, but we also run the risk of putting a lot to lose. […] This violence, promoted by a small minority, cannot tarnish a peaceful and democratic movement. We cannot live with such violence, which shames Brazil. All institutions and public safety bodies have the obligation to curb, within the limits of law, all forms of violence and vandalism” (Rousseff, 2013b).
The main concerns from the ‘fragmented majority’, widespread political corruption, the public health and education system, and the FIFA World Cup expenses, were also present in Rousseff’s discourse. She summarises what she understands to be the main concerns from the streets, recognising the need for a better public health and education system, public
transportation, more political participation from the population, the need to fight against corruption and misuse of public money, and she introduces ideas for addressing some of these issues:
“With regard to the World Cup, I want to clarify that the federal money spent on the stadiums is in the form of financing that will be duly repaid by the companies and governments that are exploiting these stadiums” (Rousseff, 2013b).
“This clear message from the streets is for more citizenship, better schools, better hospitals, better health centres and the right to participation. This clear message from the streets shows the demand for high-quality and affordable public transportation. This clear message from the streets is for the right to influence the decisions of all
governments, the legislature and the judiciary. This clear message from the streets is one of repudiation of corruption and the misuse of public money” (Rousseff, 2013a). “Over the coming days, I will speak with the heads of the other government branches to join efforts. I will invite the state governors and mayors of all major cities of the
country to come together on a great pact for the improvement of public services. The focus will be threefold: First, the preparation of a National Urban Mobility Plan, which will emphasize public transportation. Second, the allocation of 100 percent of the national oil proceeds for education. Third, immediately bringing thousands of doctors from overseas to expand the services provided under the Unified Healthcare System (Rousseff, 2013b).
Instead of using an excuse or justification, Rousseff supports and legitimises the demands from the streets. Instead, she seems to invest in compensation, offering solutions to their demands. On June 24th, she presented a more detailed plan to address what she believes are
the main concerns from the streets, and talks about “concrete proposals and the political will to build at least five pacts for Brazil” (Rousseff, 2013c). They focus on, following in the order which she presented them: fiscal responsibility, political reform, healthcare, public transport, and public education. She speaks about the first pact almost en passant, then moves to the second pact, where in a few words she brings up an idea for a plebiscite:
“I want, right now, to propose a debate about a popular plebiscite that authorises the functioning of a specific constituent process to do the political reform which this country deserves so much. […] We must also prioritize the fight against corruption in an even more impactful way than is already being done in all sectors. In this sense, a key initiative is a new law that classifies wilful corruption as equivalent to a heinous crime, with severe, much more severe, penalties” (Rousseff, 2013c).
The idea of a plebiscite can be understood as an attempt to offer a compensation. Rousseff then goes on to dedicate most of her speech to the last three pacts. The fight against
corruption is already present at this stage, despite gaining significantly less time in her speech than the agenda that the PT’s government is historically already focused on. Often when she talks about corruption, she still attempts to address the subject with reminding strategies, continuously reminding the public about past good works from her, or more broadly, the PT’s government. One example is how she associates “more effective ways to fight corruption”, such as the Access to Information Act, to an initiative from “my government” (Rousseff, 2013b). She does, as we see, the opposite of distancing herself from the history of the PT. Passed the heat from the protests, Rousseff addressed the people three other times in 2013, and gave two other speeches in that year which are relevant for this research. The first address focused on the celebrations of the Independence Day, the second address focused on the auctions for exploration of recently discovered oil fields in the Brazilian southern coast, and the third was a recap of the year of 2013. The first speech was given at the United
Nations, and is relevant to this study for being her first speech in a major international setting, following the protests. The second speech is a follow-up on the ‘great pact for the
improvement of public services’ which she mentioned in June 2013, given in Sao Paulo. In the beginning of her address for the occasion of the Independence Day, Rousseff delivers one of the most interesting quotes of the whole period studies in this research. She does empathise with the public, admits the need to change, and anticipates the need for
humbleness and self-criticism, which would mostly become urgent once the responsibility attribution of the crisis grows in the late 2014. This is the only moment in the whole period analysed where she uses the word self-critical, and only of the very few times she ever uses the word humble, which would suggest an apology strategy, still not called for at this time, according to the situational crisis communication theory.
“I know as much as you do that there still a lot to be done. The government must be humble and self-critical to admit that Brazil has urgent problems to win, and the population has every right to be outraged by what is wrong and demand changes. But there is, equally, a Brazil of great results, that we must not fail to see and recognise. We cannot accept that a layer of pessimism covers everything and overshadows the most important: that Brazil advanced like never before during the last few years” (Rousseff, 2013d).
One of her most clear traits is also included there, the constant reminding strategy. As much secondary they are, in this case, they continuously tie the President to previous negative experiences involving corruption as well. For now, Rousseff seems to be focusing on the social issues, like education, rather than the vague corruption claims. In this sense, it would make sense to associate herself to the image of the PT, as a government which has, as she constantly reminds the people, improved the lives of so many Brazilians in poverty. In doing so, she is also favouring one part of the electorate, namely the ones who most benefit from the poverty reduction programmes of the government, and other types of public services:
“Unfortunately, we are still a country with public services of low quality. We are developing the five pacts to accelerate the improvement of health, education, and transportation, perfecting our politics and economy. The Pact for the Education already guaranteed 75% of the royalties from oil and 50% of the Pre-Salt Social Fund to
education. This will be one of the major legacies from our government to the present and coming generations (Rousseff, 2013d).
When Rousseff moves to the topic of corruption, she also uses once again a word which she later completely abandons: plebiscite. Shortly after her speech on June 24th, the largest
opposition party and second largest in the Lower House said they would not back a plebiscite until the 2014 elections (Castro & Mattos, 2013). Despite this, Rousseff insists one more time: “The Pact for the Political Reform and Fight Against Corruption has just taken a good step with the proposal of a legislative decree for the plebiscite. We want more transparency, more ethics, honesty, and democracy” (Rousseff, 2013d). Here it seems like Rousseff is still trying to push for a compensation that includes the people, that addresses the frustration with the political parties, but gradually sees her options for realising these compensations
undermines by the opposition. The next time she will bring up the idea for a plebiscite is only in August 2016, nearly three years after this point, and only a few weeks before the final vote that condemns her for a responsibility crime.
By the end of that same September, Rousseff opens the debate of the 68th UN General
Assembly in New York. During her discourse, she covers a wide range of international topics but also talk about the protests of June 2013, in a similar fashion which she did to the
Brazilian population. She acknowledges the legitimacy of the protests, sides with the people, and adds reminding strategies:
“The protests of June, in my country, are an inseparable part of our democratisation process and social change. My government did not repress the protests, on the contrary, listened and comprehended the voices from the streets. We listen and comprehend because we come from the streets. We grew from the daily struggles in Brazil. The street is our ground, our base. […] It was in this decade that we had the major reduction of inequality of the last 50 years” (Rousseff, 2013e).
On October 21st Rousseff addresses the nation on the topic of the ‘Pre-Salt’, the billionaire
fields of oil off the Brazilian coastline. She speaks to possible concerns about foreign companies participating in the exploration of the Pre-Salt, linking the gains from this
enterprise to mainly financing public education, and also public health (Rousseff, 2013f). The order of this enterprise is enormous: “In the next 35 years Libra [one of the fields] will pay […] a fabulous sum of more than R$ 1 trillion. I repeat: more than R$ 1 trillion” (Rousseff, 2013f). This could lead, according to her, to a “small revolution, benefiting and transforming our country” (Rousseff, 2013f).
Two days later, Rousseff goes to Sao Paulo to talk about the development of urban mobility, when she updates the five pacts. When she speaks, it becomes clear that political reform is losing space by the day:
“I continue being a supporter and a fighter for political reform, because I think that this will be very important for the country, right. I know there are many projects up
transiting in the Lower House. […] But I want to focus more on the three pacts for the services [education, health, transportation]” (Rousseff, 2013g).
By the end of 2013, Dilma Rousseff presents an optimistic view of the future, appealing for ingratiation: “thanks for the effort of all Brazilians, Brazil is better at the end of this year than at the start. We have reasons as well to hope a 2014 even better than 2013” (Rousseff,
2013h). She is talking to the working class: “that’s what you get when you work hard every day” (Rousseff, 2013h). About corruption, Rousseff says that “we have not given up, in any moment, to fight against corruption in all level. For this reason, never before in Brazil these wrongdoings have been so thoroughly investigated and punished” (Rousseff, 2013h). She calls for unity, to then end with a few mentions about education and health, and how her government prioritises these topics (Rousseff, 2013h).
