The alliance of small island states and the struggle against the tide of the times: The success of leadership strategies in a warming world

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1 Comparing climate impacts at 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C and 4°C | Climate Nexus, 2018)

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The Alliance of Small Island States and the Struggle Against

the Tide of the Times: the Success of Leadership Strategies in

a warming world

Wanja Akkerhuis

1361775

Supervisor

Dr. Wouter Veenendaal

Second reader

Prof. Dr. Ingrid van Biezen

Bachelor project number

1 Word count

8396

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2 Table 1: List of Abbreviations and Definitions

Name Abbreviation Definition

Adaptation

In human systems, the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, the process of adjustment to actual climate and its effects; human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects. (IPCC, 2018, p. 542)

Annex I countries

All OECD countries as of 1992 plus economies in transition (EITs) signed up for individual reduction targets compared with their emission levels of 1990 and to provide financial resources to support developing countries in the development of green

technology and adaptation strategies. Non-Annex I parties are developing countries that are recognized by the Convention as being especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and that do not have any mitigation responsibilities” (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, pp. 355–356).

Anthropogenic climate

change Human induced climate change (IPCC, 2018b, p. 543)

Copenhagen Agreement CA

The agreement that the COP produced in 2009 at the end of COP15. The agreement did not enter into force. COP15 was important because a new phase in the climate negotiations began that was intended to replace the Kyoto Protocol that was due to expire in 2012.

Conference of the

Parties COP

The supreme body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is comprised of parties with a right to vote that have ratified or acceded to the convention (IPCC, 2018, p. 546).

Consult table two for the chronography of COPs.

Enhanced Transparency Framework

ETF

In full: Transparency of support under the Paris Agreement. The enhanced transparency framework on action and support is central to the Paris Agreement, adding mandatory components of review. The transparency framework helps track countries’ progress toward the implementation of their mitigation contributions, which is essential for implementation and accountability. It significantly enhances information on adaptation and finance (Winkler et al., 2017, pp. 853–854).

Greenhouse gas GHG

Greenhouse gases are those gaseous constituents of the

atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere itself and by clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. Water vapor (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3) are the primary GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely human-made GHGs in the atmosphere, such as the halocarbons and other chlorine- and bromine-containing substances, dealt with

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3 under the Montreal Protocol. Beside CO2, N2O and CH4, the Kyoto Protocol deals with the GHGs Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). See also Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O) and Ozone (O3). (IPCC, 2018, pp. 550–551)

Global Stocktake GST

In 2023, just before the third round of NDCs are due to be submitted, the UN has agreed there will be a “global stocktake”. This is also a review designed to assess collective progress towards achieving the ultimate aims and long-term goals of the agreement. And as with the facilitative dialogue in 2018, countries must use its outcomes to inform their next NDC (Yeo, 2016).

Intergovernmental Panel

on Climate Change IPCC

In 1988 the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Program UNEP establish the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC assessments are the scientific underpinning of international negotiations while also providing unique insights into, for example, managing the risk of extreme events and disasters (UNFCCC, n.d.-b).

Kyoto Protocol KP

The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international treaty adopted in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, at the Third Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2015). It contains legally binding commitments, in addition to those included in the UNFCCC. Countries included in Annex B of the Protocol (mostly OECD countries and countries with

economies in transition) agreed to reduce their anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),

perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)) by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008– 2012). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and as of May 2018 had 192 Parties (191 States and the European Union). A second commitment period was agreed in December 2012 at COP18, known as the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, in which a new set of Parties committed to reduce GHG emissions by at least 18% below 1990 levels in the period from 2013 to 2020. However, as of May 2018, the Doha Amendment had not received sufficient ratifications to enter into force. (IPCC, 2018, p. 553)

Katowice Rulebook KR

The agreement that was reached at the end of COP24, which includes the practical implementation of the goals from the Paris Agreement.

Loss and Damage

Research has taken Loss and Damage (capitalized letters) to refer to political debate under the UNFCCC following the

establishment of the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage in 2013, which is to ‘address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.’ Lowercase letters (losses and damages) have been taken to refer broadly to harm from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks (see Mechler et al., in press) Harms from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks associated with future climate change. (IPCC, 2018, p. 533)

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Mitigation

A human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases. In climate policy, mitigation measures are technologies, processes or practices that contribute to mitigation, for example, renewable energy technologies, waste minimization processes and public transport commuting practices (IPCC, 2018, p. 554).

Nationally determined

contribution NDC

A term used under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) whereby a country that has joined the Paris Agreement outlines its plans for reducing its emissions. Some countries’ NDCs also address how they will adapt to climate change impacts, and what support they need from, or will provide to, other countries to adopt low-carbon pathways and to build climate resilience. According to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Paris Agreement, each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to achieve. In the lead up to 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015, countries submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). As countries join the Paris Agreement, unless they decide otherwise, this INDC becomes their first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). (IPCC, 2018, p. 554)

Paris Agreement PA

The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted on December 2015 in Paris, France, at the 21st session of the

Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC. The agreement, adopted by 196 Parties to the UNFCCC, entered into force on 4 November 2016 and as of May 2018 had 195 Signatories and was ratified by 177 Parties. One of the goals of the Paris Agreement is ‘Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. Additionally, the Agreement aims to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. The Paris Agreement is intended to become fully effective in 2020. (IPCC, 2018, p. 555)

Particles per million PPM This term is used to refer to the count of particles in the atmosphere per million

Parties (capital P)

Parties refer to states that have signed the UNFCCC. They are signatories to the convention. The reason the yearly conferences are called Conference of the Parties, is because the Parties convene.

Small Island Developing

States SIDS

Small island developing states (SIDS), as recognized by the United Nations OHRLLS (Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States), are a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities (UN-OHRLLS, 2011). They were recognized as a special case both for their environment and development at the Rio Earth Summit in Brazil in 1992. Fifty-eight countries and territories are presently classified as SIDS by the UN OHRLLS, with 38 being UN member states and 20 being Non-UN Members or Associate Members of the Regional Commissions (UN-OHRLLS, 2018). (IPCC, 2018, p. 558)

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5 Special Report on

Global Warming of 1.5°C

SR15

The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C analyses the “impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related GHG emission effects” (IPCC, 2018).

Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

SBSTA

The SBSTA is one of two permanent subsidiary bodies to the Convention established by the COP/CMP. It supports the work of the COP, the CMP and the CMA through the provision of timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, n.d.-a)

Talanoa Dialogue TD

Talanoa is a Fijian word that refers to a process of “inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue”. Fiji organized a year-long program of meetings around the globe between high ranking officials. Countries shared progress and challenges in dealing with climate change. It resulted in common understanding that shared higher ambitions were required to reduce global warming. (UNFCCC, 2018).

United Nations Framework on Climate

Change Convention

UNFCCC

The UNFCCC was adopted in May 1992 and opened for signature at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. It entered into force in March 1994 and as of May 2018 had 197 Parties (196 States and the European Union). The Convention’s ultimate objective is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ The provisions of the Convention are pursued and implemented by two treaties: the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. (IPCC, 2018, p. 560)

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6 Table 2: Chronology of COP locations, corresponding milestones and accords

Year COP City Outcome

1995 COP1 Berlin

1996 COP2 Geneva

1997 COP3 Kyoto Kyoto Protocol signed by all Parties

1998 COP4 Buenos Aires

1999 COP5 Bonn

2000 COP6 The Hague &

Bonn

2001 COP7 Marrakech

2002 COP8, New Delhi

2003 COP9 Milan

2004 COP10 Buenos Aires

2005 COP11 Montreal

2006 COP12/CMP 2 Nairobi

2007 COP13/CMP3 Bali

2008 COP14/CMP 4 Poznań

2009 COP15/CMP 5 Copenhagen Copenhagen Accord 2010 COP16/CMP 6 Cancún

2011 COP17/CMP 7 Durban

2012 COP18/CMP 8 Doha Doha Amendment to Kyoto Protocol, not ratified by all Parties

2013 COP 19/CMP 9 Warsaw 2014 COP 20/CMP 10 Lima

2015 COP 21/CMP 11 Paris Paris Accord 2016 COP 22/CMP 12/CMA

1-1 Marrakech

2017 COP 23/CMP 13/CMA

1-2 Bonn

2018 COP 24/CMP 14/CMA

1-3, Katowice Katowice Rulebook

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Introduction

Life on earth has seen 5 mass extinction events. The best-known mass extinction followed the meteorite impact in the Gulf of Mexico, which killed most dinosaurs. Other waves of extinction were likely caused by fluctuations in the earth’s climate (Mayhew, et al., 2008). The sixth mass extinction event, caused by human environmental pollution and greenhouse gas emission, has begun (IPBES, 2019). Global warming is one of the greatest threats to human life. Once released, a greenhouse gas (GHG) molecule warms the

atmosphere for decades, altering the climate permanently (Forster et al., 2018). The

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that global warming will reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and 20521_{(2018c, p. 8) and that by 2100, global average temperatures} will have risen between 3 and 4 degrees (Wallace-Wells, 2017, p. 5). Climate change is not slowing down, rather the levels of atmospheric carbon levels have reached a new record at 415 particles per million (PPM) (McGee, 2019).

Countries that have contributed the least to climate change are affected most, a phenomenon called climate injustice (Holden, 2018, p. 118). In the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR15), the IPCC predicts that small islands will suffer multiple

interrelated risks. Further warming exponentially increases the severity of the risks. Island states will see an increase of coastal flooding, with significant impacts on the inhabitants, infrastructures, and assets 2 (IPCC, 2018, p. 181). Small islands are disproportionately affected by global warming, they face an existential threat only containable by international cooperation.

To this end, a climate treaty called the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992. The main body of this treaty is the Conference of the Parties (COP), which assembles every year. The goal of UNFCCC is “to stabilize the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 355). The first tangible result of the COP was the Kyoto Protocol (KP) which was adopted in 1997

1_{Compared to pre-industrial levels}

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9 (IPCC, 2018a, p. 553) and set binding emission reduction targets for ANNEX I states 3. The protocol ended in 2012. COP15 in 2009 was intended to create new rules, but no agreement was reached and it was widely viewed as a failure (Betzold, 2010; de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012). The tide may be turning. In 2015, at COP21 all Parties agreed that temperature rise must be limited to 2°C by the year 2100 (but that 1.5°C is preferred) (Benjamin & Thomas, 2016). Where COP15 was a failure and COP21 showcased global ambition, COP24 was used to establish the rules to meet the ambitions.

Since the conception of the UNFCCC, the small islands developing states (SIDS) have formed a 44-member alliance called the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 4. Most members are shallow paradisiacal atoll islands scattered along the equator in the Pacific-, Atlantic-, Indian Ocean and the Caribbean (Park & Allaby, 2017). AOSIS members’ combined emissions are less than 1% of total global GHG emissions, global land mass and GDP (Betzold et al., 2012). Despite its shared characteristics of economic vulnerability (Sutton, 2011), small size and corresponding lack of power, AOSIS has consistently sought and found attention for their mortal fate. Small states influencing international politics are known as norm entrepreneurs. They do not use their physical power, but rather establish norms. The role and success of small state alliances as norm entrepreneurs in international climate negotiations is still sparsely researched. Only two articles extensively investigate AOSIS’ success, focusing on the failed COP15. This thesis, by making a comparison with the earlier research, analyses to what extent and through which mechanisms small states alliances are successful in slowing down the 6th wave of mass extinction

3_{OECD and EU Members}

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Theoretical Framework

The realist view on small states and power

In international relations, size is generally correlated with material power, which translates to greater influence (Browning, 2007, p. 669; Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 11). Size often correlates with the possession of more material resources and economic wealth (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 284). Small states are defined as having few material resources making them economically vulnerable and lower in material power. Therefore, according to realists, small states are largely incapable of influencing world affairs (Bartmann, 2002; Sutton, 2011; Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 136). Furthermore, as a result of this, smaller states should accept infringements on their sovereignty by larger powers (Tillikainen, 1998, p. 141). In sum, realists assume that small states have few foreign policy options and are essentially handicapped in an anarchic world (Browning, 2007, pp. 671 & 691; Ingebritsen, 2006, pp. 26–29; Jackson & Sørensen, 2013, p. 100; Jervis, 1999, pp. 43–45).

Despite these difficulties, realism prescribes two possibilities for small states to engage in world politics. The first is neutrality, which entails not taking a position in foreign policy. For example, Finland opted for neutrality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union to earn its trust and friendship (Browning, 2007, p. 676). The second available option is bandwagoning, which entails aligning with more powerful states by complying with their demands “to promote and protect views” (Browning, 2007, p. 671; Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 2).

The liberal view on small states and protection from power

The liberal view holds that there are grounds for mutually beneficial cooperation between states. Small states tend to be strong supporters of international organizations

because they can constrain the behavior of bigger states (Browning, 2007, p. 672; Hey, 2003, p. 187; Thorhallsson, 2012, pp. 142–159). Their interests are protected by the norms, laws, and treaties that make up international organizations. This contrasts with the realist view that small states are largely defenseless in an anarchic world (Jervis, 1999, p. 45).

Critique on the realist and liberalist views on small state power

Hey and Browning are critical of the realist small states foreign policy options, which they view as sometimes self-contradicting (Browning, 2007, p. 671; Hey, 2003, p. 6). Hey

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11 states that there is little evidence of small states advancing positions of neutrality (Hey, 2003, p. 194). Another criticism is that the realist perspective has trouble explaining how small states have been successful in influencing international politics in particular areas. For

example, Switzerland is very influential in the world of finance (Browning, 2006, p.672). The notion that small states can influence politics has promoted research into how this happens. Ingebritsen (2002) documented how Scandinavian states have pursued social power by promoting “a particular view of the good society”, persuading states to adopt new norms as norm entrepreneurs (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 143).

Constructivism and normative power

Rather than the realist focus on the material power of states or the liberal focus on the protection offered by international organizations, constructivism emphasizes the social dimension of power in international relations (Fierke in Dunne et al., 2013, p. 189;

McGlinchey et al., 2017, p. 36). Constructivists pay attention to the role of language, ideas, and norms in international relations. To gain influence in politics, otherwise powerless actors can use the strategy of norm entrepreneurship (Björkdahl, 2008, p. 138). If an actor persuades other actors to adopt and conform to new norms that actor is a norm entrepreneur (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895; Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 143).

Norm internalization

Norms are “established practices, codes of conduct, and standards of acceptable behavior” (Ingebritsen, 2002, p.12). For a norm to be established, three phases have to be concluded. These phases are norm emergence, norm acceptance and norm internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). For a norm to emerge (phase one), agents, such as states or alliances have to act as norm entrepreneurs by mustering support for specific standards of appropriateness and then persuading other states to adopt the new norms. Norm acceptance (phase two) is evidenced by a socialization effect; in absence of domestic pressure, states start conforming to the norm. Norm internalization (phase three) is achieved when conforming to the norm becomes automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896–901; Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 12).

Successful norm entrepreneurship

Not all attempts at norm entrepreneurship are successful. Success depends amongst others on perceived legitimacy, credibility moral persuasiveness, administrative capacities,

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12 diplomatic skill, collaboration and active participation (Corbett, Xu, & Weller, 2019, p. 22; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 364; Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 155). As small states often lack big bureaucracies, they have to focus attention on one topic of particular importance (Grøn & Wivel, 2011, p. 534). Successful examples include the establishment of norms on sustainable development at the behest of Scandinavian countries, as is evidenced by the internalization of these norms by the UN and the EU (Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 20). Furthermore, in a recent paper Corbett et al. argue that SIDS have successfully established norms (making them norm entrepreneurs) “surrounding the right to development, sovereign equality and the

disproportionate impact developed states have on climate change” (2019, p. 22). In sum, from a constructivist viewpoint, small states (alliances) can achieve social power by norm

entrepreneurship.

The success of small state alliances as norm entrepreneurs

Existing studies leave some questions unanswered. For example, little research has been done into the use of norm entrepreneurship by small state alliances. Most research was focused on non-state organizations (Björkdahl, 2008, p. 137). Therefore, it remains the question whether small island alliances can be successful in establishing norms. Where Ingebritsen argues that norm entrepreneurship can be a successful strategy for small states to establish new norms (Ingebritsen, 2002), Corbett and Connell are more critical. Small states lack the administrative capacity to effectively exert influence (2015, p. 449). This is amongst others, caused by the lack of educated personnel owing to brain drain and the lack of

diplomatic posts in countries where international organizations are based. Another limiting factor for small state alliances is that success in negotiating depends on group cohesion. Not all AOSIS members suffer the effects of global warming equally. Corbett et al. argue that this increases the difficulty of forming common targets and decreases group cohesion. Potentially, this can lead to reduced success in negotiations. For example, following AOSIS’ success at COP3 when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, its membership grew significantly5 (Corbett & Connell, 2015, p. 449; Corbett et al., 2018, p. 103) leading to less successful negotiations. In sum, the success of norm entrepreneurship is dependent on more than the total benefits of a norm.

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Earlier research into the success of small state alliances

Earlier research looked at how norm entrepreneurship functions (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1998), it looked at what entities could become norm entrepreneurs (Björkdahl, 2008; Ingebritsen, 2002) and whether small state alliances can be norm entrepreneurs (Corbett et al., 2019). Little research has been done in the practical effects of norm entrepreneurship. This thesis adds to the academic field of norm entrepreneurship research by analyzing the practical influence of norm entrepreneurs on international negotiations. Specifically, this research analyses how successful a small state coalition can be in international negotiations on an issue that is extreme importance to them.

Leadership strategies and success at COP15

Because the intention of this thesis is to first asses and then compare AOSIS’ success through the use of leadership strategies at COP15 with COP24, a firm understanding of the strategies available to small states for influencing international negotiations must be attained. Therefore, the theoretical framework is supplemented with an analysis of the only two articles into the use of leadership strategies by small state alliances in international negotiations. The intention is to assess to what extent leadership strategies are successful. Two articles will be discussed in order to be able to make that comparison. De Águeda Corneloup & Mol and Deitelhoff & Wallbott all analyzed the effects of AOSIS’ leadership strategies for COP15 in three of AOSIS’ targets. These targets are; (1) limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 °C in 2100, (2) additional funding for adaptation in vulnerable countries and (3) a legally binding accord. The authors conclude that none of AOSIS’ targets made it to the Copenhagen Agreement (CA) in full. In the following discussion of AOSIS’ first target, the leadership strategies are introduced.

Limiting temperature rise to 1.5 °C

Regarding AOSIS’ first target of limiting temperature rise to 1.5 °C, AOSIS relied “heavily on all three leadership strategies” according to de Águeda Corneloup & Mol (2014, p. 286). Despite their efforts, 1.5 °C was not included in the Copenhagen Accord. The first leadership strategy they find is entrepreneurial leadership, which is intended to influence how problems are presented by framing the negotiation agenda through diplomatic and

organizational means (2014, p. 286). (Deitelhoff & Wallbott call this reaching out and networking (2012, p. 353)). The authors name the 1.5 (℃) to stay alive campaign that AOSIS organized together at the start of the conference with two influential climate NGO’s; Avaaz &

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14 350.org. AOSIS also presented their targets as scientific findings, to avoid them being seen as merely political preferences. This strategy is called intellectual leadership, (Deitelhoff & Wallbott call this expertise and moral framing (2012, p. 358)). De Águeda Corneloup & Mol write that AOSIS sought to change the framing of the debate, by presenting 1.5 °C as a newer and more accurate scientific conclusion, while framing 2 °C as an old target that does not ensure the survival of all humans (2014, p. 286). The third leadership strategy that AOSIS used for the 1.5 °C target was environmental leadership (Deitelhoff & Wallbott call this task leadership (2012, p. 359)). This strategy involves pioneering domestic policies to prove ambition and credibility by drafting proposals during the conference. For example, by presenting member states’ own domestic mitigation initiatives, such as The Maldives which announced its plans to become carbon neutral by 2020 before COP15 (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 286). In the end, the 1.5°C target was not part of the CA; a UNFCCC secretariat member mentioned that China rejected any mentioning of the 1.5 °C target (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 287). On a positive note, Article 2 of the accord states that the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report 6_{(IPCC, 2007) must form the basis of future policy}

actions (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 360; UNFCCC, 2009).

Funding for adaptation

All strategies were found by the authors, however, to be of no avail. In intellectual leadership, AOSIS mostly referred to their vulnerability to climate change to argue in favor of funding for adaptation, de Águeda Corneloup & Mol write (2014, p. 288). AOSIS’

entrepreneurial leadership was operationalized by proposing the creation of an adaptation fund (2014, p. 288). Environmental leadership was lacking. Only a few AOSIS members had submitted their National Adaptation Programs 7, which is attributed to “financial, knowledge and capacity limitations” (2014, p. 288). Besides the strategies, a cause for the unsuccessful negotiations lies in the character of the issue. The COP15 negotiations belong to the issue of economics and environment, making it redistributive in character (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 363). The more (re)distributive the implications of negotiations are, the more negotiators are tempted to turn to bargaining 8(2012, p. 363). “Negotiations that involve bargaining”, Deitelhoff and Wallbott state, diminish small state alliances’ influence and lead to the most powerful states prevailing (2012, p. 364). In this case, the funding for adaptation proved their hypothesis. Despite the lack of success at COP15, COP16 in Cancún resulted in

6_{The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report details the effects of global warming}

7_{National Adaptation Plans have since become known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)} 8_{Bargaining is a type of structural leadership strategy (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 290)}

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15 the formal establishment of AOSIS’ funding for adaptation targets (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 289). In sum, the COP15 was unsuccessful for AOSIS. However, their

strategies might have resulted in achievements being made toward their target of a fund for adaptation.

A legally binding accord

AOSIS wanted COP15 to result in a legally binding accord that established

“mechanisms and consequences for noncompliance” (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 289). The main leadership strategy used was entrepreneurial leadership (2014, p. 289). For example, AOSIS was creative by making use of procedural initiatives (2014, p. 289).

Nonetheless, AOSIS’ interventions were swept aside by more powerful countries bargaining. Such as, the United States (US) and Brazil, South-Africa, India & China (BASIC) (Dasgupta, 2009), who had earlier sealed a deal ensuring that no legally binding accord be agreed to (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 290; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 360; Rapp et al., 2010). De Águeda Corneloup & Mol state that bargaining prevailed. Furthermore, the UN voting system (one state, one vote) lead to consensus-based procedures that favor bargaining (2012, p. 364).

Discursive Hegemony

In environmental politics actors aim to establish a discursive hegemony by seeking support for their discourse (interests and ideas), they do so by building a coalition around the discourse (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 285; Hajer, 1995, p. 59). AOSIS did not attain discursive hegemony in COP15. Discursive hegemony is a concept that denotes the influence of a norm. It is therefore related to norm entrepreneurship. Some of AOSIS’ demands partly made it into the final text, possibly as the result of AOSIS’ use of leadership strategies (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 294). Article 2 of the CA mentions that the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) must form the basis of future policy actions (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 360; UNFCCC, 2009). In sum, AOSIS' campaign was largely unsuccessful in attaining its targets, however, in a context of a “structural

disadvantage”, this must be seen as a considerable achievement (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 294). In addition, AOSIS furthered their discourse around norms. AOSIS’ strategies did affect the negotiations and a new discourse was established, but it was not a “hegemonic discourse” (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 291; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 360).

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Moral leadership

Furthermore, the findings indicated that AOSIS established a new strategy, more effective than the other three strategies. De Águeda Corneloup & Mol call this strategy moral leadership (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 292; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 358). Moral leadership involves portraying the actions of others as immoral and is reliant on the moral persuasiveness of the actor. Morality is used to delegitimize and shame other states (ibid). An example of moral leadership is recalling the polluter pays principle. Both

Deitelhoff & Wallbott and de Águeda Corneloup & Mol conclude that in order to be effective, small state coalitions should rely strongly on strategies in which their discursive power can prevail, especially in redistributive negotiation settings that favor bargaining (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 293; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 364).

Research Questions and Objectives

AOSIS at COP24

A lot has changed since COP15 in 2009. Every summer since, new temperature records have been broken. In 2015, the Paris agreement has been signed by 198 countries, which commits all signatories to a maximum of 2 °C of global warming in 2100. In 2018, the new IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C of Global Warming was published. In 2019, the UN published a report that details how one million species are facing extinction (IPBES, 2019). Despite the changes in both climate and global climate policy, AOSIS’ power has not structurally increased. AOSIS’ success at COP24 has not been analyzed as it has been at COP15. Arguably, the ever more tangible effects of global warming might have increased interest in AOSIS' targets. In environmental politics, de Águeda Corneloup & Mol note, “actors seek to secure support for their definition of reality, their interests, and ideas, or their discourse” (2014, p. 285). By building an alliance around a discourse, “actors look for and aim to establish a discursive hegemony” (ibid.). If this is true, the increasing effects of global warming may have grounded the discourse around emission reduction measures and climate change closer to that which AOSIS established at COP15. Furthermore, as both articles agreed that the moral leadership strategy is the strongest, AOSIS might have started using it more. The remainder of this thesis will analyze whether AOSIS’ negotiation strategies have changed and in what ways this has impacted the AOSIS’ success. Using a model that

combines the leadership strategies defined by de Águeda Corneloup & Mol and Deitelhoff & Wallbott. In doing so, an assessment can be made as to how effective the current approach

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17 was in achieving its targets and whether AOSIS achieved discursive hegemony. This thesis will contribute to the growing literature on the success of small state coalitions as norm entrepreneurs, by classifying and evaluating their preferred leadership strategies when

negotiating a topic of extremely high urgency. The research questions that this thesis seeks to answer is the following: Which leadership strategies were used by AOSIS at COP24 and how successful was AOSIS compared to COP15 in achieving its targets?

Conceptualization & Operationalization

This thesis aims to evaluate the leadership strategies used by AOSIS at COP24 and assess how these impacted AOSIS’ success in these negotiations compared with COP15. The concepts that need to be operationalized are the leadership strategies and success in the negotiations. Earlier research into leadership strategies used two similar models, differing in name, but not in operationalization. These leadership strategies have been combined in Table 3. Both articles’ leadership strategies are listed vertically, the strategies that are the same are listed horizontally.

Furthermore, the authors (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012) suggested that moral leadership may have been the most effective strategy. Therefore, the fourth leadership strategy moral leadership is created. Alongside the combined leadership strategies, keywords that signify a leadership strategy are listed. Some of the keywords have been used in the earlier research (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014), other’s because they appear frequently and are indicative of the strategy.

Table 3: The combined leadership strategies model

Deitelhoff and Wallbott’s (2012) Small state strategies

De Águeda Corneloupe and Mol's (2014) leadership strategies

Expertise and moral framing Reaching out and networking Task leadership

Intellectual leadership Entrepreneurial leadership Environmental leadership

Akkerhuis’ Combined leadership strategies Model

Leadership strategies Keywords

Intellectual leadership Science, Findings, Objectivity, IPCC Entrepreneurial leadership Organization

Environmental Leadership NDC

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18 (Own design, Akkerhuis, 2019) It follows that four leadership strategies are analyzed in this thesis. The first is

intellectual leadership, this involves the generation of knowledge and emphasizes the objectivity of scientific findings in arguments to justify a position. Keywords that will be looked for in this leadership strategy are “science”, “objectivity”, “findings” and “IPCC”. These keywords are chosen because they are indicative of the strategy used. Earlier research looked for similar keywords in identifying the leadership strategies (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012).

Entrepreneurial leadership involves the crafting of alliances with civil society and other states in order to create alliances around mutually acceptable deals bringing willing parties together consequently creating the possibility of influencing the way problems are presented. Indicative of this leadership strategy is the keyword “organization”.

Environmental leadership involves the proactive drafting of policies and introducing new policies domestically to prove ambition and credibility. Indicative of this strategy is “NDC”. Moral leadership is conceptualized as the strategic use of norm-based arguments to provide moral leadership, such as stating that it is immoral to not assist the victims and most

vulnerable. Indicative of this strategy is “climate injustice”. AOSIS’ targets are found in the press release that was presented prior to COP24 9_. AOSIS’ targets can be grouped into three categories. Namely, the IPCC report and the Talanoa Dialogue, Administrative and Institutional arrangements and thirdly Finance,

Funding, and Markets. Total success is all targets. If all targets are attained, AOSIS’ discourse was hegemonic (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 285).

Expectations

On the basis of the literature, a number of expectations can be formulated which this thesis will investigate. Through either confirming or disconfirming the expectations, the research question will be answered. The expectations are designed to discuss all factors that might explain a change in the outcomes compared to COP15. By correcting for similarities and changes in both the internal and external environment compared with the previous case.

Internal similarities

The administrative constraints that AOSIS faced earlier will persist, which hinders capabilities for dealing with complexities in negotiations, such as using technical arguments

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19 (Corbett & Connell, 2015, p. 454; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 347). Bargaining remains impossible because AOSIS has not attained material power. The strength of a coalition is related to its internal cohesion, it is known that not all AOSIS members are equally developed and not all suffer from global warming equally, which can hinder negotiating as a block (Barnett & Campbell, 2010, p. 101; Betzold et al., 2012; Corbett et al., 2019). It is therefore expected that AOSIS cannot resort to intimidation because of the lack of material power and will struggle to deal with complexities and make legal arguments as a result of lack of administrative capabilities and low internal cohesion.

Internal changes

Effectivity in negotiating is influenced by the perception of an actor’s legitimacy and credibility (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012). For actors that do not have structural power, legitimacy is the most important factor in determining the chances of success in negotiating. Legitimacy is determined by to what extent a leader is perceived to be promoting the common good (Karlsson, et al., 2012, p. 53). Additionally, the success of a norm entrepreneur is linked to the salience of an issue (Weiler, 2012, p. 565). Small state alliances’ use of leadership strategies can improve negotiation success if the issue is salient enough and if the leadership strategies are used by an actor that is deemed legitimate (Karlsson et al., 2012, p. 53). According to Corbett et al., small islands are norm

entrepreneurs in the field of the environment (2019, p. 22). Additionally, AOSIS has proven to be capable of entrepreneurial leadership, because Fiji organized both COP23 and the Talanoa Dialogue. This potentially strengthens AOSIS credibility and the effectiveness of the entrepreneurial leadership strategy. Therefore, it is expected that because AOSIS is seen as a legitimate and credible norm entrepreneur, the issue of climate has become more salient, intellectual leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, environmental leadership, and moral leadership will all used be to more effect compared with COP15.

External similarities

Negotiations on a global public good, such as climate, or funding for adaptation, constitute a Prisoner’s Dilemma, they are plagued by a free-rider problem, which means that not cooperating is more beneficial than cooperating. The outcome of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that parties can be less cooperative, resulting in outcomes low in obligation and precision. (Hall & Persson, 2018, p. 541; Weiler, 2012, p. 524). Furthermore, Deitelhoff and Wallbott hypothesize that the measure of success a small state coalition can attain in international negotiations is determined by the issue area (2012, p. 350). The authors state that an alliance’s

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20 success is more likely in negotiations of regulative character that are easily moralized,

whereas success is less likely on redistributive issues (economic and environmental issues). Therefore, it is expected that because both the COP24 negotiations on funding have a redistributive nature and the institutional rules constitute a contested global public good, AOSIS’ finance and institutional targets will not fully appear in the Katowice Rulebook.

External changes

Structural leadership is the most powerful leadership strategy (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, p. 284; Weiler, 2012, p. 565). Oftentimes, success in international negotiations is determined by the material power, which can be used for structural leadership allowing an actor “to deploy power-resources” creating new incentives and changing the costs and benefits associated with certain targets, and therefore structural leadership allows for more success in bargaining (Karlsson, et al., 2012, p. 47). The external environment has changed since COP15. The USA has retreated from the Paris Agreement in 2017 (Tollefson, 2017). However, China and the EU have grown more committed to climate leadership (Hilton & Kerr, 2016, p. 48; Parker, et al, 2017, p. 239), both promising to uphold the promises of the Paris Agreement (Boffey & Neslen, 2017). In addition, alliances with structural powers increase the chance of success of leadership strategies (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014, pp. 284–294). Therefore, it is expected that AOSIS increased cooperation with China and the EU, will result in AOSIS’ leadership strategies to be more effective which will lead to more of its targets represented in the Katowice Rulebook compared to COP15.

Methodology

Research design

This research takes the form of a qualitative single case study, wherein AOSIS as one actor will be studied intensively. AOSIS at COP24 is a critical case (Levy, 2008, p. 3), of which the goal is to test existing theories (Bryman, 2012, p. 70; Hague & Harrop, 2010, p. 364) about norm entrepreneurship, corresponding small state leadership strategies and discourse hegemony. By comparing AOSIS’ success at COP15 with success at COP24.

Because of difficulties that arise in synchronizing the preferences of all 44 AOSIS members, and the knowledge that small states have trouble dealing with complexities (Corbett & Connell, 2015, p. 454; Corbett et al., 2018, p. 103), it is expected that AOSIS will

encounter difficulties in negotiating. In addition, the norm entrepreneurship theory holds that once a norm is established it starts influencing actors automatically (Finnemore & Sikkink,

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21 1998, pp. 896–901). This would mean that if norms around sustainable development and pollution have really been established by AOSIS (Corbett et al., 2019), the Katowice Rulebook should contain more of the norms that AOSIS is advocating for. Therefore, the effect that AOSIS’ leadership strategies have on the outcome of the negotiations should increase. Lastly, by operationalizing the concept of hegemonic discourse as reflected by AOSIS’ overall success at COP24, this is a least likely case (de Águeda Corneloup & Mol, 2014; Hajer, 1995). The intention of this research is to add to research into small state alliances’ in negotiations as norm entrepreneurs through the use of leadership strategies by comparing success at COP24 with COP15.

Research methods

Data collection is done by assembling qualitative primary and secondary sources. Primary sources consist of expert interviews with AOSIS delegates, the Katowice Agreement (KA), reports from various the UN, NGOs, states, and interviews given to various media by AOSIS leaders during and after COP24. Secondary sources consist of analyses and articles by scholars and NGOs.

To answer the research question, a content analysis (Neuendorf, 2001) was performed, this is the appropriate method for three reasons. First, because the leadership strategies are found in the observed behavior of AOSIS are discursive. The content analysis is linked to the aforementioned strategies by linking key-words of those strategies to the object of the

analysis. This is done by looking for the key-words in data collected through the conducted expert interviews and, news- and scientific articles. Second, because the object of this research is to assess how successful AOSIS was, the content of the Katowice Rulebook is compared with the targets that AOSIS set in their press release. Third, content analysis allows an amount of longitudinal analysis (Bryman, 2012, p. 304). This is useful because my analysis compares the success and use of leadership strategies of a preceding case. The last part is answered by comparing the success of the preceding case with the current case. By combining these findings, an assessment is made as to which leadership strategies were used, how

successful they were and how these results compare to the preceding case.

To improve the validity of my findings, triangulation is used (Maxwell, 2009, p. 245). A reduction of the validity of the findings stemming from the delegates personal opinions and biases which could lead to an overly positive portrayal of COP24 are corrected for by

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cross-22 checking with the Katowice Rulebook and a third party analysis from Carbon Brief (Thies, 2002, p. 357).

Data Analysis

The IPCC and the Talanoa Dialogue

IPCC’s Special Report on 1.5 °C (SR15), intellectual leadership and moral leadership

In COP15, AOSIS’ intellectual leadership resulted in the scientific findings from IPCC’s fourth assessment report to be referred to in the CA’s article 2 as “the basis of future policy actions” (Deitelhoff & Wallbott, 2012, p. 360). A big win for AOSIS. AOSIS intended to achieve the same result at COP24. All three interviews confirm the importance of SR15. SR15 analyses the “impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related GHG emission effects” (IPCC, 2018a). The most important target for COP24 was “including the IPCC Special Report on 1.5“, “the vulnerability of SIDS to the effects of global warming is high” stated a senior Belizean AOSIS delegate (Carlos Fuller, personal

communication, May 31, 2019). To this end, AOSIS “relied heavily on the 1.5 °C report in bilateral meetings and in media” writes AOSIS’ communications manager (M. Crocker, personal communication, May 8, 2019). Similarly, Mr. Abdulla the Maldivian minister of Climate stated “according to the latest IPCC report small islands will suffer the worst consequences of global warming. That’s why AOSIS wanted it to inform all negotiations” (personal communication, May 23, 2019). Here, the keyword “IPCC” is indicative of intellectual leadership.

The report became a major source of tension (Evans & Timberley, 2018). Voting on SR15 was hampered by a blocking coalition of Saudi-Arabia, USA, Russia, and Kuwait, all oil-producing countries. The result infuriated “climate-vulnerable countries” according to Carbon brief, which lead to a postponing of the vote until 2019 (Evans & Timberley, 2018). The blockade also created a rift in the negotiations causing “the EU, a bloc of the 47 least developed countries, as well as African and Latin and South American nations” to speak in favor of the IPCC report (Watts & Doherty, 2018). This allowed AOSIS to morally argument that a blocking coalition of oil profiteers causes vulnerable countries to suffer the

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23 “welcomes the timely completion of the IPCC Report” (UNFCCC, 2018d, p. 6). Both

intellectual and moral leadership were used. The COPs refusal to welcome SR15 has not only been to AOSIS disadvantage, however, it was not exactly in accordance with AOSIS’ target.

The Talanoa Dialogue and entrepreneurial leadership

Talanoa is a Fijian word that refers to a process of “inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue” (UNFCCC, 2018a). The dialogue organized by Fiji was successful, it resulted in a mandate that displays a common understanding that increasing ambitions are warranted to reduce global warming. Organizing conferences is indicative of entrepreneurial leadership. AOSIS wanted the TD’s mandate to inform “the preparation of nationally

determined contributions by Parties”. Second, the KR had to include a COP decision on the TD. Third, the KR had to contain “a synthesis of Talanoa discussions and political statements from the COP presidencies” (AOSIS, 2018). None of the targets were reached in full,

Instead of informing the preparation of NDCs, the KR “invites Parties to consider the outcome …of the Talanoa Dialogue in preparing their NDCs” (UNFCCC, 2018d, p. 6). The Guardian links TD’s outcomes to a decision made by the High Ambition Coalition + China 10 all agreeing to “scale up their emissions-cutting efforts in line with a 1.5°C temperature rise limit” (High Ambition Coalition, 2018; Harvey et al., 2018). In sum, none of the demands made it exactly into the KR. However, entrepreneurial leadership may have helped the High-Ambition coalition and China to increase ambitions.

Administrative and Institutional agreements

The following paragraphs detail the agreements on the administrative and institutional aspects of the KR. The discussions centered around the regulations for implementation and emissions of countries’ national climate plans (NDCs) (Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate, 2019), the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), the Global Stocktake (GST) and the Compliance Committee. The following section contains a significant amount of technical arguments and demands, which means that this thesis’ first expectation, that AOSIS will have trouble using technical arguments is disconfirmed. If the rules made on accounting and reporting are globally effective, the full scope of countries’ negative influence on global warming will arise, which might lead to faster emission reductions.

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24

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and environmental leadership

NDCs are documents prepared by governments, they are updated every 5 years, specify the amount of emissions to be reduced toward the goals agreed in the PA, and how emissions are recorded (UNFCCC, 2018c; Yeo, 2015). This means that they are an important aspect of the global emission reduction regime. The content analysis indicates that the

UNFCCC was aware that The Marshall Islands were the first state to present its second NDC (Low, Bea, & Lu, 2019, p. 2). This is indicative of environmental leadership. It is plausible that environmental leadership might have further established AOSIS’ perception as a credible actor, which norm entrepreneurship requires (Thorhallsson, 2012, p. 155).

AOSIS wants the KR to provide guidelines on transparency and accounting in NDCs (2018). AOSIS’ targets were almost met in full. the KR requires that states will update the NDC every 5 years and that it contains “quantifiable information on methodologies, assumptions, approaches, time frames, scope and coverage” (UNFCCC, 2018). There was disagreement regarding rules for flexibility for developing countries. Mr. Abdulla stated that some countries count negative emissions three- or even four times, which means their effective emissions are much higher than reported (personal communication, May 23, 2019). The KR mandates that NDCs are quantifiable, but the rules may be applied selectively, as such AOSIS targets were not fully met.

Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF)

ETF’s goal is to create a publicly accessible system for registering all emissions and reductions. MPGs detail how emissions and mitigations are reported by states (Winkler et al., 2017, p. 861). The ETF allows states to track the progress of other states towards their NDCs

by centrally collecting all mitigation data. This allows all states to see the progress towards

the long-term goal of reducing global warming. After taking stock of all progress, the states reconsider gaps in their ambitions and fill gaps if necessary. The ETF eventually forms the

Global Stocktake (GST), which “is crucial for enhancing the collective ambition of action and

support towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement” (Evans & Timberley, 2018). The GST is the beating heart of the UNFCCC, stated a Japanese delegate in an interview with Carbon Brief (ibid.). The GST will be formed in 2023, and every five years thereafter (UNFCCC, 2018b). In sum, NDCs, the ETF and the GST ensure that all countries record their emissions, which is necessary for reaching the temperature goals that are included in the Paris Agreement.

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25 AOSIS wants the subsidiary body to provide guidance on the implementation of the ETF, and to prevent double counting it has to contain a “common set of transparent guidelines applicable to all states” 11. Double counting does not reduce global warming (Climate Focus, 2016, p. 2). Second, AOSIS wants the new accounting rules (MPGs) to enter effect as soon as possible. Third, explicit reference has to be made to loss and damage (AOSIS, 2018, p. 2). Loss and Damage matters to AOSIS because its members are increasingly unable to pay the cost of repairing damage to their assets.

AOSIS was quite successful regarding the ETF. First, it proved that assistance will be given by the SBSTA 12 (Low et al., 2019, p. 2). Second, common rules were agreed upon to track progress towards NDCs (UNFCCC, 2018e), allowing the emissions data to be quantified and aggregated. Third, a common start date is mandated, namely “no later than 31 December 2022” (UNFCCC, 2018d, p. 7). Lastly, AOSIS demanded that the ETF contained an explicit reference to loss and damage 13_{in the accounting rules. The KR does not mention loss and} damage in reference to the ETF. In sum, three of the four targets were met. The level of technicality contained in AOSIS targets disconfirms the expectation that AOSIS would struggle to formulate technical arguments.

The Compliance Committee

The Compliance Committee was established to facilitate the implementation of the Paris agreement and to ensure compliance with its provisions, such as the reporting of emissions (Evans & Timberley, 2018). AOSIS wants a strong committee for enforcing implementation and compliance. AOSIS fears that non-enforcement will result in more emissions. An analysis by Carbon Brief states that the committee has been made “facilitative in nature” in its institutional design. It “will not impose penalties or sanctions” (2018). If states continue to misreport their emissions statistics, the committee – with the consent of the state in question – is permitted to “engage in a facilitative consideration of issues” (Low et al., 2019, p. 4). Taking this all into consideration, it is concluded that AOSIS’ targets for the committee were not attained.

11_{For more info on double-counting consult: https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/20160105 -v.2.0 Double}

Counting and Paris Agreement FIN.pdf.

12_{For an explanation of SBSTA consult Table 1}

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26

Finance, Funding and Markets

Finance

Low et al. write that the finance negotiations “were expected to be contentious” (2019, p. 3), this is partly caused by the agreement reached in Paris that every year, the developed countries will provide a minimum of $100 billion of loans for adaptation and mitigation projects before 2025 (Thwaites & Amerasinghe, 2018; UNFCCC, 2018e). AOSIS states that only 2% of bilateral finance goes to its members and that the target was missed every year. AOSIS wants the rules for reporting the amount of finance provided to be completed (AOSIS, 2018).

The finance target was not met, countries are “allowed to report the full value of loans as climate finance, rather than the grant-equivalent portion of the total” 14_{(Evans &}

Timberley, 2018). This is problematic because it permits states to count both commercial loans and equity toward the global climate finance target of $100 billion. This will impede the flow of structural aid for adaptation that small islands need. On a positive note, high pollution projects such as coal plants are not allowed anymore (Thwaites & Amerasinghe, 2018). In sum, most finance items established that were established in Paris were finalized, but some types of funding that are not fully in accordance with AOSIS’ targets are still allowed.

Loss and damage

The concept of loss and damage 15 is important for vulnerable islands because they cannot protect themselves completely from the effects of global warming (Evans & Timberley, 2018). Some impacts are so disruptive, that they have permanently damaging effects (Mogelgaard & McGray, 2015). Therefore, AOSIS wants “clarity on rules for financing losses incurred due to loss and damage” (Crocker, 2018). To deal with loss and damage, an institute was created purposed on devising “risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change” (Dagnet, Cogswell, et al, 2019, p. 27). AOSIS was successful, rules were made that allow loss and damage to be recorded in the reporting to the UNFCCC (Dagnet et al., 2019, p. 42; Evans & Timberley, 2018).

14_{For a discussion regarding finance please consult}_{https://www.carbonbrief.org/interactive-how-}

climate-finance-flows-around-the-world

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27

Carbon Markets

Agreeing on rules for Carbon markets was expected to be difficult (Dufrasne, 2018; Evans & Timberley, 2018; Low et al., 2019; Müller & Michaelowa, 2019, p. 1). Carbon markets allow states to trade their emissions in order to reach overall emission reductions (UNFCCC, 2015). For example, if state X overshoots its emission reduction target, it is allowed to sell or trade the leftover GHGs to state Y. Importantly, overall emission reductions are effectuated by a mechanism that effectuates that with every trade of X amount carbon, Y amount of global emission reduction is realized. For example, if 100 carbon allowances are traded from Brazil to China, only 95 negative GHGs will be accounted for in China’s NDC. The 5% is deducted from the global emission allowance. This theoretically means that every trade will result in a global emission reduction.

AOSIS wanted a regime that allows for GHG trading leading to a net global reduction of atmospheric carbon. AOSIS was not successful. Some authors attribute these differing perceptions of environmental integrity (Müller & Michaelowa, 2019, p. 7). Low et al. state that this will hinder countries who planned to use the carbon market mechanisms toward meeting their NDCs (Low et al., 2019, p. 3). Carbon trading that generates a net benefit for the climate was made optional, as opposed to obligatory (ibid). The third expectation is confirmed by the outcome of the negotiations on double counting 16_{and markets. The nature} of the issue, being redistributive explains the difficulty that was encountered. Negotiations on a public good such as the climate or rules for carbon markets can result in a Prisoner’s

Dilemma that can lead to the free-rider problem, wherein not cooperating is more beneficial than cooperating. Brazil chose what amounts to the uncooperative strategy from the

Prisoner’s Dilemma (Evans & Timberley, 2018; Weiler, 2012). Negotiations on this topic have been pushed to 2019 (Evans & Timberley, 2018). AOSIS targets for markets were not met.

16_{Double counting: emissions reductions by the buyer and seller of [GHG] offsets are doubled (Evans &}

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28

Conclusion and Discussion

The objective of this thesis was to unravel which leadership strategies were used by AOSIS at COP24 and how successful AOSIS was compared to COP15. The findings from the content analysis of the Katowice Rulebook and the expert interviews, which were cross-checked with multiple external sources indicate that the leadership strategies AOSIS used at COP15, were used again at COP24.

The first expectation was that AOSIS cannot resort to intimidation because of the lack of material power and will struggle to deal with complexities and make legal arguments as a result of lack of administrative capabilities and low internal cohesion. is partly confirmed, there was indeed no evidence of bargaining strategies such as intimidation. However, despite its small size and corresponding administrative strength, a considerable amount of technical arguments were found in the opening statement (AOSIS, 2018).

Leadership strategies

The second expectation holds that because AOSIS is seen as a legitimate and credible norm entrepreneur, the issue of climate has become more salient, intellectual leadership, entrepreneurial leadership, environmental leadership and moral leadership will all be used to more effect compared with COP15 is confirmed. The content analysis indicates that all

leadership strategies found at COP15, have been found in the period leading up to and during the COP24. For example, Fiji’s organization of the Talanoa Dialogue and COP23 have proven AOSIS’ entrepreneurial leadership. Furthermore, both intellectual leadership and moral

leadership were indicated by the frequent references to the scientific findings in the SR15 in the discussions surrounding the report. For example, the blocking coalition allowed AOSIS to invoke climate injustice strengthening AOSIS’ moral discourse. Possibly resulting in the High-Ambition Coalition rising to voice support for higher ambitions. The fact that The Marshall Islands were the first state to present an NDC provides evidence for environmental

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29 leadership. However, no conclusive evidence was found for the articles in the preceding case predictions that moral leadership is the strongest strategy

Comparing the success of COP15 with COP24

The third expectation holds that because both the COP24 negotiations on carbon markets have a redistributive nature and the climate constitutes a contested global public good, AOSIS’ finance and institutional targets will not fully appear in the Katowice Rulebook Is confirmed. The negotiations for rules for carbon markets were postponed to COP25, and flexibility in the specifications for the types of finance that qualify as finance for the fund for adaptation remain.

The fourth expectation holds that AOSIS increased cooperation with China and the EU, will result in AOSIS’ leadership strategies to be more effective, which will lead to more of its targets represented in the Katowice Rulebook compared with COP15 is confirmed. Both researched into COP15 found its outcome unsuccessful for AOSIS, notably because it was only taken note of by the COP. At COP24, AOSIS could count on the support of the High Ambition Coalition and China, which arguably increased AOSIS success at COP24 for AOSIS. At COP15, no agreement could be reached, whereas the Katowice Rulebook was adopted by the COP.

In sum, three of the four expectations are confirmed, therefore the answer to the research question is, all leadership strategies have been found at COP24, and COP24 was more successful than COP15 because more of AOSIS’ targets were met. The comparison with COP15 was useful because it indicates that the global norms surrounding climate and the environment have inched closer toward that of AOSIS. Interestingly, all expert interviews indicated that COP24 was a success, although the content analysis indicated that few targets were met in full. Mr. Crocker stated that “considering the structural disadvantages and within the scope of what was politically realistic, AOSIS got almost everything it asked for. In terms of actually cutting emissions, that remains elusive and, in my opinion, largely divorced from the UNFCCC process” (Personal Communication, May 8, 2019).

Little evidence is found for the realist small state foreign policy options, if anything, AOSIS was not bandwagoning or neutral. Liberalism’s prescription about small states preference for international organizations holds true. All negotiations took place within the framework of the UN. Constructivist theories about norm entrepreneurship were found to be partly true, Corbett et al (2019) stated that small islands can be norm entrepreneurs on

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30 environmental issues. The theories about norm entrepreneurship state that the last phase, norm establishment, makes use of the norms automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). AOSIS success at COP24 was a least likely case, it was not expected that the AOSIS would have discursive hegemony. However, this research indicates that despite not attaining all targets AOSIS was quite successful.

Some questions remain, this research was not able to uncover which leadership strategy was most effective. Global emissions are still rising and a million species are facing extinction (Ngo et al., 2019, p. 3). These facts should provide academia with plenty of arguments for the continued interest in the use of leadership strategies and norm

entrepreneurship by small state alliances. More studies into the effectiveness of small state leadership strategies might benefit the whole of humanity.

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