Philosophy at the edge of time, difference and transcendental time: diverging Deleuze and Derrida

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Philosophy at the edge of time

Difference and transcendental time: diverging Deleuze and Derrida

Kasper Bockweg MA Philosophy University of Amsterdam Under the supervision of: Dr. Aukje van Rooden, Dr. Johan de Jong and Dr. Sjoerd van Tuinen 12-10-2015

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2 ‘And yet, and yet . . . Denying temporal succession, denying the self, denying the astronomical universe, are apparent desperations and secret consolations. Our destiny is not frightful by being unreal; it is frightful because it is irreversible and iron-clad. Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire.’

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Introduction

‘I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate, based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes, that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain gibberish (…) Why these truisms should suddenly become “a theory” or “philosophy” others will have to explain; Hume would have laughed.’ (Chomsky 1995) Speaking is Noam Chomsky in reference to two of the philosophers central to this thesis: Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). A large part of this thesis deals with what might be called a ‘classical’ philosophical subject: the philosophy of time. At the same time however, it centers on two philosophers whom, as we can see from the quote above, are disputed in the very way they conduct philosophy. Both Derrida and Deleuze are deemed to be intentionally obscure, scientifically inaccurate and, perhaps above all, un-philosophical (cf. Sokal and Bricmont 1999). In part, this criticism is caused by misunderstandings, prejudices against continental philosophy in general, or simply a penchant for polemic. The other part however, stems from Deleuze and Derrida themselves, and by this I refer in particular to the way in which they distance themselves from philosophy as it is conventionally conceived.

As most of their French contemporaries, Deleuze and Derrida share an antagonism towards philosophies dealing with truth, essence or transcendence – including that of Chomsky. They resist the kind of philosophy that departs from a subject and reflects on (the possibility of) knowing or reaching an object, opposing what they call a metaphysics based on identity (Deleuze) or presence (Derrida) and attempting to widen the ‘scope’ of philosophical inquiry by reflecting on the very conditions of truth, presence, identity or transcendence. As is well known, this leads to an emphasis on the historicity or structural embeddedness of the subject, added to which is a conception of the structural process by which a subject, that was conventionally understood as universal, is constituted in a specific manner, at a specific time and place. Indeed, if postwar French philosophy may be defined in terms of a generation – including not only Deleuze and Derrida but also Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan, Althusser and others – reaching intellectual maturity during the May 1968 uprisings, it can be done precisely on the basis of this ‘poststructuralist’ agreement on the embeddedness of the subject. In terms of historico-philosophical context, the influence of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud was decisive in the development of both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s philosophical concerns. In the thought of all three philosophers, the subject loses not only its claim to universality, but also its privileged position: it is constituted at a periphery of either relations and forces of production, a chaos of forces or

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6 Both Deleuze and Derrida utilize these philosophers in order to question and criticize the manner in which philosophy is conducted since. Both tend to put emphasis on the need to ‘think’ differently, on the flaws of conventional philosophies and the ways in which these flaws continue to play a role in the philosophies of their time. Both then, conceive of a philosophy that is fundamentally critical, to the point whence Derrida questions the whole possibility of doing philosophy as such – preferring to refer to himself as having more in common with an ‘historian’s attitude’ (Derrida 1989). However, in repeatedly distancing themselves from conventional philosophy, the reception of their work has perhaps become a bit too disconnected from philosophy. Particularly in Anglophonic context, whence their work is read, commented and interpreted mostly by scholars of literary- or cultural analysis departments. This relative disconnection of Deleuze and Derrida from the main spring of philosophical discourse (and institutions) – in favor of an almost exclusive focus on the esthetic dimensions of their work1 – is regrettable from more than one perspective. For one, it encourages criticism in the likes of Chomsky, stemming from the frustration caused by leaving the philosophical roots of many of their critical gestures largely in the obscure. Furthermore, it stands in the way of not only a proper appreciation of their critique leveled against conventional philosophy, but also leads to an underestimation of the contribution Deleuze and Derrida (and other, related philosophers) made to (the history of) philosophy. Indeed, if we seek to comprehend their legacy we cannot avoid locating them within, and relating them to the history of philosophy in not only a critical manner, but also in a manner that reveals the problems, ambivalences and lines of thought from which their thought springs forth.

This will be the broader, general aim of this thesis. More concrete, this aim covers my attempt to show how both Deleuze and Derrida can be said to respond to issues pertaining to the nature of Kant’s transcendentalism, and in particular his account of time. Time, of course is a broad term, concealing more than it reveals. But the importance of a philosophy of time in both Deleuze and Derrida lies at the very basis of their thought: if the subject is always embedded in – and constituted by – a structure liable to change over time, then its conditions have to be defined spatiotemporally – they have to be conceived in terms of a time that is not simply a container of events. It will be shown that the outlines of such an account of time are found in Kant’s understanding of time as a synthesis: the transcendental form in which we share a priori. For Deleuze and Derrida, this understanding will serve as a point of departure to explain in what way the subject is not only synthetically presented to itself but also how its experience (partly) stems from such a temporal synthesis. Both then, can be characterized as being fundamentally transcendentalist – though not in the universal, subject-centered sense of Kant – for both seek to reflect on the conditions of (temporal) experience. In light of recent

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For Derrida, this is witnessed in the success of deconstruction as a tool of literary analysis, undermining an appreciation of the philosophical – phenomenological – nature of his thought (see below chapter 2). As for Deleuze, it is revealed in the fact that most attention is given to his work with Felix Guattari, particularly the two books of Capitalism and schizophrenia, which are in fact the application and result of his ‘philosophical’ work in Difference and repetition and Logic of Sense.

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7 challenges to transcendental philosophy – and the Copernican turn as such2 – this inquiry into the nature, and, as we will see, the limits of (a transformed) transcendentalism seems all the more important.

Though it is true that both Deleuze and Derrida can be said to respond to Kant, and though both are influenced by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud and critical of Hegel, their responses are anything but the same. It is true that the similarities between the two are striking: for example, both hold that philosophy should avoid positing essences. Rather than appealing to a purported identity over time beyond the sensible appearance of a being, Derrida and Deleuze seek to deal with beings qua their appearance in time. Following Nietzsche, whom demanded that we should not seek to subject the ‘semblance’ of the sensible world to the purported truth lying behind it, Deleuze and Derrida seek to affirm the world as it given. In response, both develop a conception in which experience arises from the differences between beings, so that beings are constituted from the relations they have with different beings instead of being constituted by themselves – this theme will be treated extensively below. However, this ‘epistemic’ or paradigmatic common ground – as we might call it, using the term of Foucault or Kuhn – gives way to a fundamental difference. For Deleuze, difference is the occasion on which he develops a metaphysics revolving around pure difference, for Derrida however, this demand means one should avoid metaphysics proper, instead remaining within the confines of experience as it is given. These differences in orientation reflect a diverse intellectual heritage, Derrida’s thought (more in line with the ‘generation’ of soixante-huitards) commences from a reading of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas whereas Deleuze’s metaphysics is primarily influenced by Spinoza, Bergson, Hume and Kant. These differences in intellectual heritage are reflected by a difference in style: both Deleuze and Derrida write in a highly specialized idiosyncratic discourse, but whereas the latter has a more meditative, cautious style of writing, the former is (in his own words) ‘more naïve’ and explicit in his writing.

It is easy to state Derrida and Deleuze are put on divergent paths by their diverse readings in the history of philosophy.3 But this does little to enrich our understanding not only of the two philosophers in question and their relation, but also of what might called the relational paradigm for philosophy-proper – and the implications of this paradigm. The most eye catching difference between Deleuze and Derrida is that the former begins with a pure outside with regard to the subject,

subsequently showing how each (local) ‘inside’ is the product thereof, whereas the latter begins with the inside to reveal an outside to be always interior to it. But is this a mere difference in orientation or perspective? Does writing off transcendence in essence means writing off metaphysics as such or not? It is this difference that will be central to my thesis, and this difference that leads us to the subject of time once more. Time, conceived of as a transcendental phenomenon by Kant, Deleuze and Derrida

2_{I refer here to the so called speculative realists, whom seek to develop a philosophy beyond the correlation of}

thought and being perpetuated in Kant (cf. Meillassoux 2010).

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8 alike, will serve a double purpose in this thesis: on the one hand, it is, as said, the means by which Deleuze and Derrida can be ‘emancipated’ from their separation from the philosophical tradition proper, on the other, a focus on time is what enables us to stage an encounter between the two.

Time is able to fulfill this function because it serves as the structure upon and within which both the thought of Deleuze and Derrida is deployed. Departing from the fact that Deleuze and Derrida work within the tradition of transcendental philosophy, yet develop two fundamentally different conceptions of how, precisely, we are to comprehend the nature and implications of this ‘transcendentalism’, our inquiry will put emphasis on the ground structure of their respective transcendentalisms. This ground structure is defined in terms of temporality, as both Deleuze and Derrida follow Kant in holding that time is not only the form that structures our experience, but also that in which thought shares. Their thinking of time then, intermingles with their thinking of

philosophy: in transcendental fashion, it delineates what thought can- and cannot do – and to a lesser degree, what it should- and should not do. A focus on time then, seems like a good way of not only discussing and interpreting the thought of Deleuze and Derrida in its own right, but also a means by which a common ground may be established upon which not only the contours of their different manners of philosophizing may be revealed, but also the very point at which the two diverge. This search for an incommensurable difference – i.e. a difference which separates one from the other – will be the main topic of this thesis, a search that commences from the ostensibly simple question as to what it is that induces the two to think differently. In the wake of this question, we may reflect on the broader implications of the relational episteme, but most fundamentally on the establishment of a transcendental limit. If it is true both Deleuze and Derrida are transcendentalists, the incommensurable difference beyond mere perspective, beyond the arbitrary choice of either/or, ought to be found precisely at the limit of time (and thought), which comes to define the legitimacy of their respective approaches. The encounter of the two then, will be staged precisely at this limit, and ideally results in a conclusion to the benefit of either Deleuze or Derrida.

This thesis will be structured as follows: I will commence with a discussion of Kant and his understanding of time as a synthesis. This will not only offer us a proper grasp of the ‘level’ at which Deleuze and Derrida conduct their philosophies, it will also supply us with a point of departure in my subsequent treatment of both. It is in response to difficulties faced by Kant’s account of time that the necessity – or at least the relevance – of many of the seemingly unwarranted moves made by Derrida and Deleuze is revealed. It also allows me to discuss in what ways the two continue and transform transcendental philosophy, particularly with regard to time. Kant’s transcendental philosophy then, will serve as the background of many of the discussions treated in this thesis. Second, I will offer my discussion and interpretation of Derrida. In both this chapter, and the subsequent one dealing with Deleuze, I will utilize footnotes in order to refer to- and criticize scholarly treatments, interpretations and discussions of certain aspects of the philosophies involved – besides sometimes using them to expand on what is discussed in the main text. In the chapter on Derrida it will be my attempt to show

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9 how he was influenced primarily by phenomenology and how his conception of philosophy can be taken as a continuation – notwithstanding the changes made – of phenomenology. Amidst discussion, I will interpret some of Derrida’s key concepts individually – particularly the trace and différance. Moreover, I will reflect on the ambivalent status of the ‘outside’ in Derrida, offering an explanation for its (merely) apparent non-existence. The following chapter deals with the difference-based philosophy of Deleuze. Due to the complexity and cohesion of the themes involved, this chapter will take up the most space. Deleuze’s thought is defined by being radically interconnected, so that one has to discuss nearly all of its aspects one at the time before being able to comprehend it properly. My discussion of Deleuze will center on Difference and repetition, and shows how his concept of

difference is the basis on which he develops a non-apodictic metaphysics based on process. It

subsequently shows how Deleuze combines this metaphysics with a transcendentalism, culminating in an account of time as syntheses of repetition within a differential chaos.

The final chapter is devoted to the encounter of Deleuze and Derrida. First, I will discuss various scholarly takes on the difference between the two, after which I will develop my own reading of this difference. As will be revealed, in my view, this difference most fundamentally covers a collision of Derrida with Deleuze on the subject of pure difference – to the disadvantage of the latter. Let’s not, however, get ahead of ourselves too much and commence with the roots of this difference, found in Kant’s transcendental philosophy of time.

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1. Towards a synthetic time

Before commencing our discussion of Deleuze and Derrida, we should briefly look into the history of the philosophy of time. Not, of course, in its entirety, which would constitute a thesis by itself, but in so far as it relevant for the philosophical encounter central to this thesis. My aim in this chapter will be to uncover the philosophical roots of the problems dealt with by Deleuze and Derrida. In my view, these issues originate in the philosophy of Kant. With the Copernican Turn, Kant reinterpreted time as a transcendental synthesis, an understanding to which Deleuze and Derrida are not only indebted but also one that they seek to extend in different ways. It is especially the ambivalences in the work of Kant – ‘margins’ in the words of Derrida – that play a pivotal role in the development of both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s account of temporality. For Deleuze as for Derrida, thought commences in ‘problems’, and their own transcendental account of time is better appreciated in light of the problems surrounding the work of Kant. In fact, one of the problems found in Kant – that of sensible

temporality – which is to be outlined below, will help us set a common field within which both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s account of time can be said to respond. Although I cannot fully preserve myself from the risk of over-addressing one issue in favor of other, perhaps more important ones, I hope it will be revealed en passant that this approach rests on well-founded considerations that remain sensitive to the aims of both Deleuze and Derrida. Prior to our discussion of Kant however, we will discuss some basic themes of pre-Kantian accounts of time.

1.1. Time in pre-Kantian philosophy

In analytical philosophy, there is a distinction made between the so-called A-theory and B-theory of time.4 The first theory emphasizes the flow of time experienced by the senses: it holds that reality, being essentially temporal, is a continuous succession of presents and that past- and future tense are essentially real. The B-theory on the other hand, holds that the flow of time is an illusion, and reality is essentially static or eternal. This division may serve as a guideline through pre-Kantian accounts of time, whereas, as we shall see, Kant is situated somewhere in between. Deleuze and Derrida, on the other hand, seeking to remain within the flow of time, find fault with both the A and B theory, mainly because the first equates time’s passage to succession, and the latter it subjects time to eternity or timelessness.

B-theorists hold that the passage of time is but an accidental function of our senses. We can find this conception in St. Augustine, whom argues that the sole reason we experience time as passing, is because we are finite creatures with a limited consciousness. He subsequently opposes the human successive experience of time to God’s eternity, arguing that the latter is literally outside time,

4_{Made by McTaggart in 1908, this distinction is still widespread in contemporary, analytical discussions on the}

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11 that He transcends all temporality and (thus) perceives everything as a unified simultaneity (cf.

Augustine 1943, 54-56). What occurs here, as in all B-theories, is that the strict existence of time-flow is denied: time is an illusion which God – and perhaps contemplative reason – transcends. For

Derrida, this is typical of present-based metaphysics: ‘metaphysics holds time to be the nothingness or accident foreign to essence or truth’ (MG, 47). The problem is that time, in so far as it is granted existence, is reduced to a mere reference point for movement, being itself outside of time/movement. Things move in time, but time itself is eternally at rest or, as in the Platonic geocentric-model, a ‘[cyclically] moving image of eternity’. Thus, rather than confronting time’s passage, B-theorists lift this passage on the purportedly eternal sphere of our static conception of time.

In seeking to affirm the passage of time the A-theory of time is perhaps a better candidate. It does not argue against the reality of time’s passage, but holds time’s passage, being the succession of presents, is an objective property of reality. Briefly leaving aside the ontological status of time’s passage, Deleuze and Derrida find fault in contemplating the ‘structure of time’ as fundamentally successive (cf. OG 67). Succession, as the discrete and homological passage of presents, is, for reasons that will be revealed, insufficient for dealing with the passing of time. Both Deleuze and Derrida hold that time is more erratic, that it is ‘haunted by’ heterogeneous delays and deferrals (Derrida) or but a local ‘contraction’ in a chaotic, ever-changing field (Deleuze). They argue against the common sense, linear take on time by conceiving of events, ‘cuts’ and originary movements that interfere, interrupt or even ‘destroy’ the successive passage of time. But it is only when we think of time as being synthetic, that these different kinds of temporality gain meaning. Let us therefore commence our discussion of Kant.

1.2. Kantian time: the transcendental syntheses of temporality

With Kant, the difference of A- and B-theories becomes less important. In contrast to the classical conceptions of time discussed above, Kant conceived of time not as what is eternal, but precisely as the form of what is not eternal: a form of sensibility. Time, together with space, is the transcendental intuition of our faculty of sensibility, which serves as ‘a formal condition of all phenomena in general’ (MG, 77). Together with space, time is one of the pillars of the Copernican turn realized by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. It is no longer the question whether or not the flow of time is real (A or B), for each and every experience is a priori temporal. This means it is not possible to conceive of an experience that is outside of time, for our inherently synthetic perception of the world means that each and every experience is always one in-time. Time is no longer a ‘timeless’ reference point in relation to movement, nor an object of metaphysical inquiry. It is not an object of knowledge nor even one of experience. Instead, time is the form by which we perceive the world: temporally structuring our sensible experiences along different temporal modes, being itself pure and transcendental – i.e. in no way derived from empirical experience.

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12 Having defined time as a synthetic form of sensibility, Kant distinguishes three different modes of time, by which we (temporally) structure empirical intuitions: succession, simultaneity and permanence (CPR A254). These modes of time respectively correspond to syntheses of difference over time (succession), sameness over time (simultaneity), and things of all times (permanence). One remarkable consequence of this account is that it becomes erroneous to define time by its permanence, as permanence itself is a mode of time - there is no permanence of time, only permanence in time. The same goes of simultaneity and succession, for Kant, time hold no contents whatsoever, it is an empty form by which we synthetically perceive the world. Kant adds that these three syntheses are not applied by reason (in understanding). Rather, the spatiotemporally-structured field of possible experience constituted by the syntheses, precedes and is the condition for any act understanding. This is anteriority is to be taken in a formal- and not in the chronological sense: there is no temporality outside that constituted by the pure and empty form of time. After all, temporality is the product of synthesis, so the synthesis itself cannot be defined by it. Rather, Kant repeatedly states that the temporal syntheses of intuition are immediate: they occur a priori and instantly in each act of understanding.5

The appearance of past, present and future is also derivative of the synthetic forms of time, these temporal dimensions are constituted through our synthetic dealings with that which we intuit (KCP, vii-ix). These three dimensions come into existence analogous to, and alongside the three temporal modes, arising from our synthetic dealings with the world. Kant distinguishes three

syntheses: (1) apprehension in intuition (giving rise to the present and succession), (2) reproduction in imagination (constituting the past and simultaneity), and (3) recognition in apperception (allowing for endurance and the future). In the first synthesis, a manifold of intuitions is immediately apprehended and synthesized by imagination. Parts of these intuitions are intuitively related into a successive relation on the basis of difference. We ‘distinguish the time in the sequence of one impression upon another’ and this difference allows intuition synthesize a former and latter moment (CPR, A99).6 The moment they are related in succession, the present appears. This present is not equivalent to the common sense ‘now’ we might take it to be, because it is ever variable: one difference succeeds another and so on.

The second synthesis synthesizes these successive differences by retaining them and then reproducing them next to a current impression. The past is constituted in the retention and subsequent reproduction of an impression: it appears in the contrast of a reproduced earlier apprehension (past)

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To avoid anachronistic misunderstandings: the Kantian intuitive synthesis is - despite its immediacy and passiveness – realized by the subject. The concept of a pre-subjective, passive immediate synthesis of intuition is developed only later by Husserl.

6_{As will be shown below, the time involved in distinguishing one sequence here from another is contradictory}

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13 besides a current one (present).7 The temporal relation of simultaneity appears in the same synthesis. Once two or more impressions are apprehended and reproduced in successive order, imagination is able to synthesize other occurrences as simultaneous. If an impression is retained at the same moment different impressions are succeeding one another, it is contracted as simultaneous. It is crucial to remember the fact that for Kant, the first and second syntheses are immediate, that is, lack the temporal structure they constitute. This raises the question in what sense the mode of succession is prior to simultaneity. There are some ambiguities involved in their immediate constitution which, especially for Derrida, provoke a critical reading – but we should not get ahead of ourselves too much. For Kant, the reason succession precedes simultaneity is that simultaneity may only relate once impressions are in successive order. Impressions are differentiated in the first synthesis, before this, they are mere undifferentiated sensibilia – that is, before synthesis, they do not occur in a moment. The differentiation of the first synthesis is what allows for simultaneous occurrences, for the temporal differentiation in before and after allows imagination to distinguish yet other impressions to occur at the same moment as the impressions succeeding one another. In short then, it is because Kant equates the broader condition of differentiation to the synthesis that relates in succession, that the latter comes to serve as a condition for simultaneity.8

After the second synthesis ‘experience’9 still consists of a manifold of fragmentary

impressions, it lacks the unity which, according to Kant, only the mind can bestow on it. This happens in the third synthesis, which accounts not only for the identity of objects in experience and the unity of experience as such, but also for the appearance of the future. The third synthesis bridges the fragmentation of the second synthesis by an act of recognition. Recognition marks the intersection of the faculty of sensibility and understanding, that is, the transition of merely sensing a manifold of intuitions to the conscious perception of a specific object. This synthesis then, bridges the poles of thought (concept) and sensation (intuition) - respectively ‘empty’ and ‘blind’ in themselves (CPR A107). For Kant this transition ought to be seamless: if what is sensed is not completely comprehend in concepts, apodictic knowledge is a priori impossible. Thought would be tragically hindered in its attempt to comprehend sensation and forced to remain systematically separated from it. So as to prevent this separation and safeguard apodictic knowledge, Kant introduces a mediator between sensation and thought: the schemata.

Schemata are introduced by Kant to explain how the categories of understanding are able to have impact on our sensible perception despite the fact that they are ‘pure’, that is, despite them being innate forms of the mind, constitutive of but not derived from empirical experience. The schemata

7_{There is no remembrance or memory participating in this synthesis, Kant comprehends retention as a function}

of intuition and imagination. As we will see, Deleuze largely agrees with Kant here, but takes retention to be a bodily function, similar to the light-retaining of cells (see also Watkins 2001).

8_{As will be shown, Deleuze conceives of a temporal differentiation that is more fundamental than succession,}

rendering Kant’s identification of the two largely precipitous (cf. DR).

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14 force imagination to function by procedure, operating as a legislative limitation of its synthesizing. We have seen imagination is the synthetic force in the apprehension of impressions, but now it seems its ‘image-making’ (Vorstellungs-kraft) is not of its own accord: imagination schematizes. The schemata legislate over imagination by delineating the images it forms, in such a way that they are necessarily in accordance with the categories (and empirical concepts) of understanding – thence bridging sensation and understanding. The schemata then, ensure that synthesis, being the temporal determination of sensibility, always corresponds to the categories of understanding (cf. KCP, 16). However, as Kant acknowledges, in order to effectively function as a mediator, the schemata must share in both the faculty of sensibility and that of understanding: ‘this mediating representation must be pure, that is, void of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, while it must in one respect be intellectual, it must in another be sensible.’ (CPR, A181) This common denominator of sense and understanding is nothing other than time, as the form of both sensation and comprehension. Kant then, understands the form time as a pure schema: both categories and sensible experience share in the form of time, which makes time the purity under which the categories can schematically constrain

imagination’s apprehension of sensibilia.

If we briefly return to the first synthesis, we can easily see the way in which the schemata dictate the workings of imagination: once impressions are intuited, imagination contracts these in successive order; which is to say: imagination schematically forms images in accordance with the category of causality.10 The third synthesis is similar but more extensive. In it, imagination forms images corresponding to the schemata of the categories of quantity, quality and modality. The apprehended and reproduced impressions are respectively unified, qualified and determined with respect to their existence, so that the initial impression is comprehended through the form of all the categories. At this point, intuitions have gained the general form of an undetermined specific object, being provided with the reference necessary for subsuming them under the heading of a concept. This occurs in recognition, in which the apt concept is applied in an act of apperception. Apperception is judgment according to a rule, which is contained in the concept (CPR A159). Kant states that in recognition the specific concept is linked to the as yet undetermined perception on the basis of earlier perceptions. In recognition, the mind judges, that is, it relates properties of the perception under the fitting concept, whereby it is the concept itself that determines what properties are brought together exactly. In short, in apperception the mind subsumes perceptions according to the rules prescribed by the concept apt to the perceptions.11 This synthesis takes place under the temporal mode of duration (or permanence), in which the mind comprehends the object as an enduring entity, rendered possible by a concept safeguarding the identity (sameness over time) of the object. Finally, the third synthesis

10

Kant’s temporal syntheses cover the entire schema of the category of relations; see: CPR A143/B183. An integral discussion is not necessary here, the first and third synthesis may be considered as illustrative of the schematic structure as a whole.

11_{There is a parallel with the schematic relation of categories to phenomena: judgment follows out procedure in}

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15 allows for a representation of the future, as the reflection on recognized perceptions opens the

possibility to anticipate.12

1.3. The limits of Kant’s synthetic time

The Kantian understanding of time thus reveals us time as a (triple) synthesis of the form of

sensibility. In many ways, Deleuze and Derrida agree on this. They too, hold that temporal-experience is fundamentally synthetic, though for them the synthesis is no longer based in the universality of the subject. Indeed, both distance themselves from Kant in overstretching the subject, resulting in false ‘closure’ or ‘interiorization’ of the outside (cf. SP 102, DR 18-20).13 As their critique – quite direct in the case of Deleuze and indirect in that of Derrida – strongly serves the purpose of their respective philosophical concerns, my aim here will be to conduct a more general critique, sensitive to both philosophies. Of course, it remains indebted to Deleuze and Derrida – developed within the

conceptual space their combined work offers – but more in spirit instead of literally. This will allow us to construct a general, problematic point of departure, in response to which both Deleuze and Derrida’s accounts of time will be treated in the next chapters.

As said, Kant’s Copernican turn reframes the experience of successive presents. No longer is the succession of time due to a temporality proper to the world-in-itself, but due to the way the subject apprehends this world. At each moment events are synthesized along the temporal modes of

perception. However, by emphasizing the synthetic modes of temporality (succession, simultaneity and duration), Kant conceals the repetition of synthesis itself. Nonetheless, we might ponder on the nature of this incessant movement of temporal synthesizing. At each instant synthesis is ‘provoked’ – not caused, as causality is post-synthetic – by intuited impressions (sensibilia). Sensibilia however, remain largely ambiguous, an ambiguity that is veiled by Kant’s introduction of the schemata. Indeed, by schematically subjecting the initial apprehension of sensibilia a priori to the form of the categories, Kant likens the original impression on the senses to the final shape they take in the syntheses. Far from being coincidental, this constraint of imagination by the schemas of understanding,14 preserves the possibility of universal knowledge, but at what price?

12

After discussing the third synthesis, Kant infers the transcendental unity of apperception, of which an integral discussion is not necessary in this context. Suffice it to note that the transcendental unity of apperception, which accounts for the unity of experience as whole, is due to a subordination of all appearances to a transcendental unity on the basis of a unified consciousness.

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Though both authors work in a different context and develop their critique in relation to different authors, inscribing them in this context will allows us to reveal some deeper presuppositions defining Kant’s account of time. This inscription reflects their own textual strategies; witness for example Derrida inserting Freud in his reading of Husserl, or Heidegger, Nietzsche and Levinas in discussing différance (SP 63, MG) In much the same way, Deleuze inserts Nietzsche in criticizing Hegel and Bergson in reinterpreting Spinoza (cf. NP 24 and Deleuze 1988, 13).

14_{This is discussed by Deleuze in a broader context: that of the harmonious accord of the faculties, of which the}

legislation of understanding over imagination is but an example (cf. DR, Ch. 4). However, Deleuze disregards the schemata as Kant’s specific attempt to safeguard this harmony, and prefers to portray the harmonious accord

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16 Due to the schemata, immediate intuitions are apprehended (indirectly, through mediation) by the mind, revealing the subject’s involvement in a sphere that purportedly precedes it – that of

sensibility. Because of this extension a retroactive structure is facilitated, in which the result of the synthesis is already implied – through the schemata - at the outset thereof. The schemata then, become the locks on a closed subject: due to the subject’s all-encompassing involvement, every impression is assimilated a priori to the categories, which implicates each impression is somehow known in advance in the conditions – otherwise, they would necessarily go unnoticed (cf. KCP, 16). There is a

circularity involved here which makes the synthesis synthesize its own reflection: once intuited, the impression is formed in the image of the categories, but in the first instance, it is only intuited due to being in the image of the categories. In this light, the schemata can be understood as the result of a motive that lies at the basis of the Critique: defining the conditions for possible experience. By defining the conditions for the possibility of experience and subsequently framing them via the schemata as what is constitutive of any experience, Kant understands the totality of what occurs (reaching us in sensible experience) as a subset of the superset covering the space within our

representative capacities – i.e. the space delineated by the conditions of possibility. This means every sensible experience must necessarily fall within the field of the possible and conceivable.

Despite these difficulties, Kant needs the schemata, for without them synthesis could not effectively attribute sensibilia with the temporal structure necessary for recognition, hence omitting a sensuous surplus beyond the reach of conception – which would frustrate the possibility of apodictic knowledge. Even without the schemata however, Kant’s account of time faces problems. Namely, that sensibilia, or the pre-synthetic ‘manifold’ of intuition has no time (or space) in which it may appear. Time, being the form structuring our experience, is suspended in what lies outside it and in (the process of synthesis) itself – there is no time passing beyond or through the synthesis. Even if ‘intuition without relation to an object is mere sensation’, the question remains at and in what

‘moment’ (if any) the sensation may be sensed (CPR, A188). Kant avoids granting sensibilia temporal status, instead wavering between covering them over – by retroactively reducing sensibilia to

readymade proto-objects – or reducing them to an object of idle speculation beyond the scope of reason. Nonetheless, sensing cannot take place outside of time – if we seek to avoid regressing in a B-theory of the sort described above – nor can we allow ‘intuition without an object’ to take place in an time structured along the lines of succession or other modes of time – if we seek to avoid regressing in another A-theory – which would collapse into circularity. The issue at stake here is thus whether time can be at once synthetic whilst leaving room for some sort of temporal field in which sensing may take place. This touches the basis of the transcendental account of time and the Copernican Turn: how to conceive of a time that lies outside of categorically delineated and temporally structured possible experience? For Kant, this question cannot be meaningfully posed: it would remove the raison d’être

of Kant’s faculties to rest upon an implicit assumption - common sense (cf. KCP, 18) - as opposed to an explicit consideration.

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17 of his transcendentalism introduced for the aim of securing apodictic knowledge – that is apodictic only if the field of possible experience fully concurs with the field of sense. It is this perfect

concurrence that remains to be given, for the retroactive logic of schematism, rather than supplying an answer, comes short of finding a solution.15

A related, perhaps even more fundamental difficulty faced by the transcendental take on time is how to relate the process of synthesis to this purported ‘other’ time of sensibility. This touches both on the (im)possibility of a pre-synthetic time, in which sensing may occur, and an intra-synthetic time, or time in which the process of synthesis occurs. Both however, confront us with difficulties.

Synthetic time cannot be simply embedded in a pre-synthetic counterpart, for the latter can in no way be defined by modes of time or even by being present – a dimension proper to synthetic time – and the same applies to a conception of intra-synthetic time. How then, to relate synthetic- and this ‘other’ time without undermining the former?16 This is the issue at the basis of both Deleuze’s and Derrida’s account of time. Both seek to conceive of a synthetic or transcendental time without giving it a foundation in either subjectivity or objectivity. As will be revealed, it is Derrida who remains closest to Kant in this, with him, this other temporality figures within an a priori transcendental field, whence it paradoxically presents and ‘haunts’ experience as a ‘trace’ of the impossibility of presence. Deleuze on the other hand, takes a pre-synthetic temporality as a point of departure, whence it becomes the foundation of a systematic process-philosophy in which transcendental time – defined by its being synthetic in repetition – is immanently embedded. Our discussion will start with Derrida’s take on time, because of its kinship to Kant’s account.

15_{Another contradiction is revealed in the initial apprehension of sensibilia, in which ‘the mind distinguishes the}

time between sequence and another’. The problem being of course, what time is Kant speaking of here?

16_{I deliberately avoid characterizing pre-synthetic time as an ‘outside’, so as to remain sensitive to Derrida’s}

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2. Derrida: an ultra-transcendental différance

If an attempt was made to map all of Jacques Derrida’s philosophical influences, the result would likely be a cluttered agglomerate of completely divergent traditions: phenomenology, structuralism, Marxism, the Enlightenment, psychoanalysis and so forth. Kant would surely be included, but not in the central position. Indeed, Derrida has few direct references to Kant, but as he himself emphasizes, his philosophical project remains loyal to many of the aims of the transcendentalist tradition. Thus, he willingly portrays himself as a ‘responsible guardian of the heritage of transcendental idealism.’ (Derrida 1988, 93) Though there are many ways in which Derrida borders on Kant’s transcendental project,17 my focus here will be his understanding of experience and the temporal aspects thereof. I will attempt to show that Derrida’s account of spatio-temporal experience can be read as an unexpected response to Kant’s transcendental project – a response largely neglected thus far.18 Moreover, it will also be argued that Derrida is primarily – in the most basic aspects of his thought – influenced by Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology, most importantly in his understanding of a conjoined space and time. In its turn, the Derridean account of time seems to address the issues faced by the Kantian account of time discussed above. As we will see, Derrida not only redefines the transcendental syntheses (following phenomenology) but also develops a conception of intra-synthetic time sensitive to the limits of synthetic time, whilst remaining in complex ways within the limits set by the Copernican Turn.

Derrida’s account of temporality is first developed in a deconstructive reading of Husserl. In Speech and phenomena, a close reading of Husserl and a work whose importance has been re-appreciated in the past few decades, Derrida discloses a ‘privilege of presence’ at the heart of

Husserl’s project.19 Much of Derrida’s early work is devoted to reveal the impossibility of our attempt to reach at an unmediated, immediate presence – i.e. to achieve full closure. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Derrida reveals that along the history of Western metaphysics there is a recurrent effort to touch on this perfect presence. For Husserl, who in ‘his rejection of system and speculative closure’ sought to prevent thought from jumping to such precipitous conclusions, it is important that his own thought does not rest on the pretense he himself criticized (WD 194). However, at odds with

phenomenology’s aims as a ‘rigorous science’, Derrida reveals precisely such a metaphysical pretense

17_{For example, there has been much scholarly attention to the late Derrida’s deconstruction of ethical practices}

in comparison to the Kantian Idea - cf. Patton 2003, 30-46 and 183-195.

18

As a key aspect of his philosophy, it is remarkable Derrida’s work on ‘temporalizing’ (and ‘spacing’) has been little considered in relation to Kant. Rather, we see the discussions on this topic center on authors close to Derrida’s own readings: Freud, Heidegger, Levinas and Husserl. In my view, this restriction poorly reflects Derrida’s textual strategies, in which context becomes but heuristic center of a writing that is iterable. (see e.g., Hodge 2007,12-28 or May 1997, 85-88)

19_{Cf. May 1997, 78-79. Perhaps because of their polemical tone, Of grammatology and Writing and difference}

(both, as Speech and phenomena, published in 1967) acquired most scholarly attention. This has led to an undervaluation of the more technically oriented Speech and phenomena in which many of Derrida’s key ‘concepts’, including differance, are developed.

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19 at a key junction in Husserl’s thought: his account of time. The consequences thereof, as will be shown, are quite disastrous to many of the early aims of phenomenology, though not to a certain spirit of phenomenology – which Derrida can be said to carry on. I will commence this chapter with a discussion of Derrida’s reading of Husserl, after which it will be shown how the Derridean account of time is developed on the basis of this reading, and how it can be characterized as phenomenological. Finally, I will confront his account of time with Kant’s, addressing the problems set out above and offering a horizon for our encounter with Deleuze.

2.1. Derrida’s reading of Husserl: the present, delay and the trace

As is typical of a deconstructive reading – a textual procedure he formulated and generalized only after Speech and phenomena - Derrida sets out to disclose the inner contradictions working in Husserl’s Logical investigations and Cartesian meditations. These contradictions are not a result of Derrida’s reading, but are latent into the very fabric of Husserl’s text, that aims to close itself by referring to a presence lying outside the text. In the case of Husserl this presence lies in the ‘pure expression’ (Ausdruck) which he introduces as the explicit intention underlying every ‘indication’, or everyday speech (Anzeigen).

According to Husserl, the expression can be revealed fully in the self-presence of the subject to its own intention, an intimacy reached by way of a (eidetic- and/or transcendental) reduction of our natural attitude – everyday intentionality fraught with preconceptions about the world. This renders the distinction of expression-indication not equal but hierarchical: first comes the expression, a sign immediately meaningful due to the presence of a fully explicit intention or vouloir-dire. After comes indication, in which the expression is set forth (‘exiled’), a displacement in which the purity of the expression is lost. This ‘voluntarist’ understanding of meaning finds its ground in reflective

subjectivity, as the pure intention is only and fully ‘at home’ in the immediate presence of a subject to itself. Derrida proceeds to show that the distinction expression-indication is secretly founded on an implicit desire for presence. What is put aside as indicative encompasses every form of speech (and writing) in which the animating intention is present through mediation – in e.g. writing or the outside world being dependent on sensibility – which is understood as an accidental exile of an otherwise immediate (unmediated) intention. Husserl then opposes mediated signification (or indication), to the subject that ‘hears itself speak’ (auto-affection) in the moment of which the expression ‘is

immediately present to the self in the life of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world, space or nature.’ (SP, 42)

Putting pressure on the opposition, Derrida points out that the expression, as the concept of a thought immediately present to the subject that intends it, can be justified only if a strictly immediate relation of the subject to its own intention is possible. To be sure, Derrida’s question is of a temporal nature: auto-affection can only be given in a fully present actual now, allowing for a thought to present itself immediately. If it turns out that this present cannot be given, so that any immediacy rests

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20 on nothing but pretension, auto-affection must be considered speculative in the metaphysical sense. This would mean that Husserl’s distinction of expression-indication, his voluntarist account of language, his musings on reduction, indeed, a large part of Husserlian phenomenology as a whole, according to its own anti-metaphysical standards, must be considered flawed (cf. SP 32-36). The question concerns the constitution of this punctual now, a stable present serving as the space in which we may engage into immediate relations. Derrida finds the answer in Husserl’s own philosophical commitments. He argues that Husserl fails to appreciate the consequences of his own account of time, which as it turns out, denies him the possibility for immediate presence. Before showing why

immediate presence is unattainable for Husserl then, we need to discuss his conception of time – and Derrida’s reading thereof.

Husserl’s understanding of temporality responds to Kant, whom he criticized for limiting his analysis solely to the formal conditions of the possibility of experience. In contrast, Husserl aims to grasp the phenomenal in so far as it is lived experience.20 In order to do so, Husserl analyzes the present as the product of pre-subjective passive syntheses of retention and protention, out of which a living present is repeatedly presented to consciousness.21 In the synthesis of retention we retain parts of our experience and re-present them in the now we are currently experiencing. This (re-)presentation of that which is no longer before us, in what is currently before us, is the first step of passive

synthesis. The second step is described in protention, signifying that the living present is always an anticipation of a ‘to-come’ or a ‘coming-now’: each lived present necessarily bears this future-horizon. Together, retention and protention constitute a present of which past (as a present flowing) and future (as a present due) are indispensable parts. Husserl demonstrates that the present is never sheer present in discrete succession with other presents, rather conceiving of the present as an ever-moving compounded synthesis conjoining different points of a duration (cf. Husserl 1964, 50-56).

The present then, for Husserl, is a point along a synthetic duration, constituted by, but in relative autonomy of retention and protention. Derrida, by contrast, holds that retention and protention remove the possibility for a strict present to be presented at all. They ‘violate’ not only the possibility thereof, but also the ‘the homogeneity’ and ‘fundamental successivity’ of time (OG 67). According to Derrida, retention and protention reveal that every present is delayed and defined by what is not-(yet)-present, thus never adding up to immediate presence (of the present). Retention implies that the present is never a simple, immediate intuition, because it is always presented to consciousness as a re-presented ‘present’ no longer here. Derrida argues that Husserl fails to grasp the full scope of this movement of ‘bending-back’ (the apt term is Derrida’s: repliant; SP 64-65) or repetition of time.

20_{Cf. Husserl’s lecture on Kant: Husserl 1974.} 21

Though it may appear to relate to the discussion bearing on pre-synthetic temporality in the former chapter, this is not the case. Husserl’s pre-subjective syntheses, though in all respects an addition to Kant, nonetheless fails to come to terms with the temporal status of sensibility. The reasons for this are exactly the same as those which provoke Derrida´s reading: pre-synthetic time passes even through pre-subjective synthesis, so that we still have to account for the timelapse in which synthesis occurs – as Derrida sets out to do.

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21 What is called present-consciousness by Husserl, strictly speaking consists of a consciousness of what has just been (and what is to come) instead of being the immediate consciousness of what is. Derrida reaches this counterintuitive insight by revealing a time lapse in the process by which the conscious-present is conscious-presented – inspired by Freud.22 His argument rests on the insight that, during the process of presenting the present, time passes as well: this means there is an interval, a span of time – however small – during which a ‘trace’ is re-presented into the posterior present. Hence, the present is

structurally delayed: it is never immediately presented, for there is a necessary temporal discrepancy between each initial occurrence and what is (‘presently’) perceived as a result afterwards. In between, causing the delay, lies the repetition by which the present is given to us, thence revealing the

fundamentally retrospective nature of conscious experience. This alone is enough to rule out Husserl’s conception of immediate auto-affection: the subject is never immediately present to his own intention, for, in order to become conscious of it, a prior synthesis has already rendered it retrospective. The subject is separated from itself by the tiniest interval between the reflecting self and the reflected-upon self, in the delay preceding the appearance of even its innermost intention. But there are more issues involved here, and what’s more, this structural violation of presence in delay induces Derrida to posit some of his own concepts, forming the basis for his understanding of temporality.

Amidst his discussion, Derrida introduces his ‘quasi-concept’ (I will expand on this

determination below) of trace (SP 85). The trace is a ‘mark’ left by the temporally discrepant structure constituting the present: it is not to be understood as the presence of what precedes the present – which can never be quite present – but ‘rather [as] the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces and refers beyond itself.’ (MG/D, 156) It might be said the trace refers to a temporal surplus of everything that cannot be summed up in the simplicity of the present, but nevertheless inhabits it.23 But, in my view, this misses the broader implications of this quasi-concept. The trace can be viewed as a substantiation of a nonlinear understanding of the process of synthesis/retention. It stems from there being never a simple outcome of synthesis – the present is never fully given – solely a structural delay within which the present is ‘always already’ formed. This means that the present itself is necessarily ‘embedded’ in its own displacement, of which traces are marks. A linear

understanding of synthesis then, falls short, for the ‘result’ is never quite given, we are always within a quasi-circular movement of a repeating past, in its turn immersed in a time-span causing the present’s structural delay.24 In a sense then, the present is fundamentally ‘tracial’: being within a repetition that is structurally delayed, the trace denotes the structurally displaced ‘instant’ the present

22_{Amidst his discussion, Derrida makes a crucial en passant reference to delay in the work of Freud (SP 63 and}

OG 67-68). Freud introduces ‘afterwardsness’ (Nachträglichkeit) in the process of becoming conscious of an unconscious content. It seems that this is the temporal structure Derrida utilizes to radicalize Husserl’s retention, which fails to admit a time of ‘becoming conscious’ in which the synthesis occurs.

23_{See, for a similar definition: Bergo 2005.}

24_{As we will see in Chapter 3, Deleuze’s understanding of intra-synthetic time differs in precisely its lack of}

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22 always is. In its traciality, the present bears within it what is beyond it – indeed, its ‘being’ is defined by what is not present.

In a famous characterization, Derrida contemplates the trace as a kind of ‘archi-language’ (OG 60-61). This rests not in it being literally ‘linguistic’ but on the fact that the displacement marked by the trace is akin to that which is defined in the ‘iterability’ of language. Language operates on it being iterable, that is, repeatable regardless of the present-context it is used in. This allows for signification outside of an original context, or even beyond the original intention (or the author’s death). An expression can be inscribed in new contexts for it is embedded in the very temporal displacement described above: meaning, never being a simple presence, bears a trace in itself of what it is not – a surplus in which it is always already embedded. Meaning is ‘tracial’ then, or vice versa, the trace is a kind of language: the temporal displacement marked by the trace renders it repeatable. This repeatability rests on the more profound repeatability we have disclosed in the interval of retention: any presence (present) is ‘always already’ repeated and ‘is’ only within this repetition (frustrating its full presence). Getting a bit ahead of ourselves, this deeper kinship reveals that Derrida’s conception of language is based on his understanding of ‘displaced’ temporality – which, in its turn, might be called ‘archi-language’.25

2.2. Derrida’s reading of Husserl: spacing, différance and deferral

We have discussed the separation of Husserl’s subject from itself in delay and the absence of the trace. Now, Derrida adds that the non-coincidence of the subject in auto-affection, is not only temporal but spatial as well: in not being at the same time, the self is distanced from itself. This is because of the seemingly simple fact that not being at the same time, means that they are not exactly the same thing: a difference arises in between. This difference follows from the incapability of an object or presence to account for its presence by itself. As we have seen, each presence is

fundamentally displaced – for in order to be present it bears the temporal surplus of what it is not within it – so that there is no foundation by which it may present itself in space. As there is no clear cut temporal presence – let alone an extra-temporal essence – upon which such a presentation may rest, the reasons for the spatial presence of an object can no longer lie within the object itself. Though I will expand on this below in comparison to Kant, Derrida compensates for the lack of temporal presence – i.e. the absence of a ‘foundation of objectivity’ (WD, 199) – by appealing to structuralism.

This leads him to insert an account in which spatial presence is explained by the relation of a presence towards everything it is not – as with temporal presence, it is what it is not. Spatial presence is thus deemed possible due to the ‘spacing’ or ‘referring’26 (distancing itself from, or spacing itself

25

Experience thus acts ‘as if it were’ a text; which is hinted at in Derrida’s statement ‘il n’y a pas d’hors-texte’. Meaning ‘there is no outside-text’, due to there being no experience outside repeatability (characteristic of a ‘textual’ structure).

26_{Referral applies to the much discussed linguistic context of Derrida’s analysis, in particular his reading of De}

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23 with regard to) of a presence to other presences themselves referring and so forth: x is x because it is not y or z. As regards Husserl’s to auto-affection: the reflecting-self is the reflecting-self because it is not the reflected-upon self and vice versa. This distance, implying a difference, becomes the condition for the possibility of presence: without distancing or referral there is no arranged present-experience at all (cf. May 1997, 86-87). Spacing (espacement) then, explains the appearance of objects in the absence of an objective foundation without positing another foundation. It is by virtue of the distance – everything the object in question is not – that the object differentiates itself and is articulated in its spatial presence (cf. OG 46-47). However, for exactly the same reason, its strict presence is denied as well: the object is never fully present as its presence is always defined by and immersed in what is not present – i.e. the traces of other objects.

Together, both spacing and timing cover the movement by which experience is presented. The delay and distance by which the perception (or perceiver) is structurally differed from what is perceived can accordingly be understood as a process of spacing and timing, or more precise as ‘time becoming spatial’ and ‘space becoming temporal’ (SP 143). This process stresses the merging of spatiotemporality: the distancing of space ‘becomes temporal’ in the preclusion of a strict present as the delay of time ‘becomes spatial’ in ruling out a strict presence. Distance and delay complement one another: the traciality of time leaves room for the differentiation of space and the differentiation of space responds to the lack of a strict present in time. The two are conjoined in a structural movement that Derrida coins différance.27 This movement is Janus-faced, for on the one hand it presents the present, whilst at the other it denies strict coincidence of the present with itself, in both spatial- (spacing denies identity) and temporal (temporalizing denies immediacy) sense.

Thus far, I have remained silent on the workings of protention, but the movement of

différance operates on this slope as well. Protention, or the future that is installed in the present as its horizon, means the present is necessarily given as a to-come (a-venir). So, the present is not only denied being self-coincidental because of being a delayed past, it is also given other than itself

because it is permanently deferred as a present to-arrive (cf. MG/SP, 136). Here as well, the trace (left by différance) marks a displacement of the present. The present bears within it what is beyond it, though in this case the trace marks not a structural delay, but hollows out a strict present by denoting a future yet to come, that is, it marks that the present is (immersed in) a displaced instant which points beyond itself towards a future that is radically open. This tracial displacement on the slope of the

necessarily due to it being most fundamental but mostly due to a historical contingency, viz. the Anglo-Saxon reception of Derrida being channeled primarily through literary departments. Added to this, Derrida’s work appeared in the heyday of analytical philosophy and its exclusive focus on language, little surprise then the discussion surrounding his work centered on this theme, I will expand on this theme in what follows.

27

As is well known, différance is a performative signifier of a movement that remains invisible (non-present) because it accounts for the visible (present). Derrida’s emphasis lies in substituting the e for the a, which remains mute (invisible) in French speech, though it is visible in (logocentrist underprivileged) writing. Thus, in a double gesture, Derrida emancipates writing with regard to speech (a presence-privileged opposition) and illustrates the invisible (mute) workings of différance as I have discussed with regard to espacement.

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24 future, adds to that of the past. Derrida then, gives us a ‘present’ that never ‘is’, first because its strict presence is always deferred due to its structural/tracial openness, and second, because it is always too late to be a strict present. These two dimensions are structurally embedded in an instant Derrida refers to as present, even though the latter is nothing but the tension between both which ‘imply one another in a strange fashion.’ (OG 66).28 The present is thus presented in a structure of an always-unfinished process, a quasi-circular temporality specific to différance. This is also why Derrida refers to this ‘structure’ as structurality: it lies in the nature of the temporal structure of presenting to be provisional and indefinite – or that ‘the opening of the structure is structural’ (WD 194).

His deconstructive reading of Husserl allows Derrida to offer a picture of unfounded temporality. Derrida – as does Deleuze – refers to this temporality with Hamlet’s phrase of a ‘time out of joint’: denoting that there is no present that is perfectly ‘on time’(SM 19-20). It is a structural characteristic of the present to be always ‘too late’ (as a retained present already past) and ‘too soon’ (due to a horizon by which the present is always still to come). There is thus a perpetual ‘dialectic’ or ‘tension’ in the structure presenting the present, which renders the present present whilst precluding proper presence by displacing it in the trace – as well as in the spatial arrangement by endless referral. In transcendental terms: the present’s conditions for possibility are its conditions for impossibility and vice versa in a tension that never resolves.

2.3. The contours of an ultra-transcendentalism

It is important to note that both the trace and différance must ‘exist’ on a transcendental level, for they are not ‘at home’ in the actual (they displace it) nor are they transcendent to the actual (they fix the impossibility of any foundation). Derrida’s transcendental ‘structure’ – différance – is one that is always displaced and other-than-itself, so that it can be paradoxically characterized as ‘a sameness which is not identical’ (MG/D 129). It operates on some ‘pre-propositional level’ whence it

encompasses the conditions for the conditions of possibility, and shows the condition of possibility is always one of impossibility as well (cf. Gasché 1994).29 This ambivalence is, in my view, also why Derrida is hesitant in characterizing himself as a transcendentalist, in his own words: ‘I am not a transcendentalist, I am an ultra-transcendentalist or a quasi-transcendentalist.’ (Derrida 2001, 107) We see the same reserve when it comes to defining his ‘concepts’ themselves, on more than one occasion Derrida characterizes the trace and différance as ‘no longer simply a concept’. Rather he states they are ‘the possibility of conceptuality, of the conceptual system and process in general.’ (MG/SP 140) The ambivalence in defining these concepts reflects the workings of différance itself: the operation of

28_{Note Derrida’s anti-Hegelianism, his structure of temporality denies the Hegelian Aufhebung or end of history}

that lifts deferral in a future-present (or Spirit) coinciding with itself. The process of presenting is not a means to an end, but is the end itself: there is no present without deferral of ‘the present’. Derrida is influenced by Koyre’s reading of Hegel here (MG/SP, 144 and Wood 2009).

29_{I am indebted to Gasché’s interpretation here, who was one of the first to interpret deconstruction as a}

Philosophy at the edge of time, difference and transcendental time: diverging Deleuze and Derrida