The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal and the Field of International Relations:
A Case Study Testing the Theory
Student: Aafke Hoekstra Student Number: 11077549
First Supervisor: dhr. dr. S. Rezaeiejan Second Supervisor: dhr. drs. F. Boussaid
Master Thesis International Relations (Political Science) University of Amsterdam
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract iii
Map I. Iran’s Nuclear Sites iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms v
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1
CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework 4
2.1 Neorealism 4
2.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism 11
2.3 Constructivism 17
CHAPTER 3: Methods and Operationalization 25
3.1 Methods: Causal Process Tracing 25
3.2 Data and Operationalization 29
CHAPTER 4: Historical Overview 31
4.1 Nuclear Beginnings 31
4.2 The Bush Presidency 2001 – 2009 33
4.3 The View from Iran 34
4.4 Revelations about the Nuclear Program 35
4.5 Broken Promises and Continued European Efforts 37
4.6 A New Leader 40
4.7 2006: A Policy Shift 41
4.8 The Threat of War 42
4.9 End of the Bush Presidency: Failed Efforts and Cooperation Breakdown 43
4.10 The Obama Presidency: 2009 – present 44
4.11 The Geneva Talks and its Aftermath 46
4.12 In Search of Allies 47
4.13 The Brazilian-Turkish Cooperation 49
4.14 Sanctions: the UN and Beyond 49
4.15 No Further Progress 50
4.16 The Trend Continues 52
4.17 New Sanctions: Taking Risks 54
4.18 New Rounds of Talks 54
4.19 A Breakthrough: the Joint Plan of Action 57
4.20 Domestic Opposition 57
4.21 Optimism Prevails 58
4.22 A Procedural Shortcut 59
4.23 US Domestic Opposition Takes Hold 61
4.24 Approaching a Final Deal 62
4.25 What Came After 63
CHAPTER 5: Analysis 65
5.1 Defensive Neorealism: Waltz 65
5.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism: Solingen 67
5.3 Constructivism: Rublee 69
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 72
References 75
Abstract
Until recently Iran’s nuclear crisis has been a pressing issue on Western agendas for years. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 Western states mistrusted Iranian reassurances that their nuclear program was entirely peaceful. Yet after decades of suspicion a nuclear agreement was reached in 2015 that would ensure that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. This thesis will take on this case to study whether IR-inspired theories of non-proliferation can account for the Iranian nuclear deal. Drawing upon the endless debate within IR – that between realism, liberalism and constructivism – three theoretical approaches will be selected and tested by utilizing process tracing as a method. An analysis will show that neorealism preforms poorly at explaining the Iranian case, while neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism do a better job. The conclusion will therefore show that the latter theoretical approaches are the better choice at explaining nuclear (non-)proliferation – or at least that is what the Iranian case suggests.
MAP I. Iran’s Nuclear Sites
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran CIA Central Intelligence Agency
EEAS European External Action Service EU European Union
EU-3 United Kingdom, France, and Germany IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICG International Crisis Group
IR International Relations
ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Institute for Science and International Security JPOA Joint Plan of Action
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action NCRI National Council of Resistance of Iran NIAC National Iranian American Council
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons P5 Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council
P5+1 Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council plus Germany RCSS The Regional Center for Strategic Studies
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US United States of America VAT Value-added Tax
1. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes dubbed as ‘the ultimate weapon,’ nuclear weapons have long time drawn significant debate and speculation. Some argue that we have to thank nuclear weapons for the long lasting peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Jervis, 1988, 80). Yet many others believe that, while we have been lucky so far, global catastrophe is just around the corner. In other words, nuclear weapons are a threat to global peace and they should, preferably, be abolished altogether (Mueller, 1998, 55). Hence, when in 2015 a nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran was struck, that ensured that Iran’s nuclear weapons building capability would be severely constraint, many applauded the agreement. Indeed many, although not all, world leaders were positive of the agreement made with Iran; American president Barack Obama hailed the nuclear deal, envisioning a “new direction.” Moreover, Russian president Vladimir Putin referred to the agreement as a global “sigh of relief (Cheers and Jeers Greet Iran Nuclear Deal, 2015).”
The Iran nuclear deal was officially announced on July 14th in Vienna by Iran, the P5+11 and the European Union (EU). These states declared that they had agreed upon an
agreement that would limit Iran’s nuclear program for more than a decade. In return Iran would be freed from the sanctions that the United Nations (UN), the United States (US) and the EU had put into place during the past nine years (Borger, 2015a). Implementation of the officially titled the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) began on January 16th 2016 after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that confirmed that Iran had taken the necessary preparatory steps (Implementation Day for JCPOA, 2015).
Given these developments it is hard to imagine that relations between Iran and the West, particularly the US, had reached an all-time low just thirteen years before. Specifically, utterances in the State of the Union Address to Congress of American president George W. Bush in January 2002 caused a deterioration of already fragile Iran-US relations. In his speech president Bush had referred to Iran as being part of an ‘Axis of Evil,’ along with Iraq and North Korea. He stated that; “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an Axis of Evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction,
1 The P5+1 is a group of world powers consisting of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic Germany. The term ‘P5’ refers to the first five members who are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and also the five recognised nuclear-weapon-states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The term ‘+1’ refers to Germany. The P5+1 is also referred to as the E3+3 (or E3/EU+3 referring to the P5+1 plus the EU) in the texts of agreements with Iran (see Pichon, 2015).
these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.” President Bush also specifically mentioned the threat that Iran posed to the world; “Iran aggressively pursues these weapons [of mass destruction] and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom (Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, 2002).” Iranian political leaders met these accusations with anger. The Supreme leader, Ayatollah Khameini, described President Bush as “a man thirsty for blood,” and President Khatami called the speech “bellicose and insulting (Fathi, 2002).”
Obviously the question that immediately arises from this is ‘how can we explain the Iran nuclear deal given the strained relations between the US and Iran of just years before?’ This thesis will try to take up the question by utilizing international relations (IR) theories. More specifically, the endless debate between forms of realism, liberalism and constructivism will be repeated once again, as they are the most common theoretical approaches toward nuclear (non-)proliferation issues. This body of literature of most relevant to the puzzle sketched above as the goal of this research is thus to establish which approach best explains Iran’s decision to, at least seemingly, give up its nuclear weapons capability. To summarize, the research question is as follows;
How can IR theories explain the 2015 Iran nuclear deal given the strained US-Iran relations since 2002?
Answering this question might contribute to the enhancement our understanding of nuclear proliferation and to creating more theoretical consensus on the issue. As Singh and Way (2004, 860) point out there is a lack of reliable knowledge about nuclear proliferation determinants. Even more, few scholars agree on the validity or generalizability of theories on nuclear (non-)proliferation. But the theoretical implications can in turn also influence policy, even beyond the nuclear realm. As Rublee (2009, 9) argues policies toward any type of proliferation might profit from better understandings of nuclear proliferation. If, for instance, expectations from neorealism best explain proliferation, multilateralism is not the way to go for policy-makers. However, if constructivism does preform, then policy-makers possibly have tools to move non-proliferation policy forward (Rublee, 2009, 9). And if nuclear weapons are indeed deemed undesirable, this by extension then means moving to a more peaceful world.
So how will this contribution to theory and politics be achieved and, more importantly, how will the research question be answered? First the theoretical foundations of this thesis
will be discussed. To be specific; the three basic theoretical approaches toward nuclear proliferation issues – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism – will be reviewed. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches will be weight and the most promising works of different scholars will eventually be tested in the analysis. Before moving on the analysis however the methodology and operationalization will be laid out as well as a general historical background of Iranian nuclear efforts and Iran’s relation to the US and vice versa. Thereafter the analysis will follow in which the different theoretical takes on the subject will be tested separately. The goal is to use the theoretical ‘lenses’ in order to interpret the events that led up to the nuclear deal. This will for instance entail the use of theoretical approach specific concepts and ideas. Finally, the conclusion will discuss the general findings and their implications.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2.1 Neorealism
As mentioned in the introduction the most prominent theoretical approaches toward nuclear proliferation issues are neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. The theoretical framework will begin with discussing neorealism. First, an introduction in the theoretical foundations of this approach will be given. Afterwards this section will continue with discussing the differences regarding defensive and offensive neorealist takes on nuclear proliferation.
Predominant thinking on nuclear proliferation stems from realist thought, which leads to the assumption that it is inevitable for states to pursue nuclear weapons to secure their survival (Ogilvie-White, 1996). Neorealism (or structural realism) is based on the assertion that the nature of politics derives from the ordering principle of system. In order to understand international politics it is therefore vital to properly taken into account the structure of a given system (Waltz, 2014, 125). It is commonly thought that there are two ordering principles; hierarchy and anarchy. Neorealists argues that the international system anarchic, referring to a system in which a world government or universal arbiter is absent. In such a system states emerge as the primary actors because they are best equipped to deal with the consequences of anarchy (Collard-Wexler, 2006, 399). The structure of state, regimes, groups or individuals are thus deemed irrelevant in this view (Solingen, 2007, 11). Because of the state of anarchy states can rely only upon themselves to protect their interests, like in cases of aggression. Under anarchy states are thus dictated by the logic of survival and are pressured by competition and socializing forces. Survival becomes the primary goal of states and hence they will seek to maximize utilities in a unitary rational way. States are therefore always expected to act rationally in accordance with their national interests (Collard-Wexler, 2006, 399).
Due to the ever-present pressure to survive states will always seek to balance against their peers, boost their national assets or form alliances with other states (Mearsheimer, 2003 in Collard-Wexler, 2006, 400). Because of the fear that rising or dominant powers might become a menace in the future states are expected to prefer to balance power rather than bandwagon with them. This however does not implicate a form of coordinated cooperation among states. Rather balance of power is the result of uncoordinated state policies, that together result in the end goal of power balance. Neorealists believe cooperation to be extremely difficult for several reasons. First, cooperation under anarchy is thought to be similar to the prisoners dilemma in which defecting is the primary strategy. Hence, this makes
states worry about cheating. Second, neorealists argue that states are less concerned about absolute gains than relative gains. Meaning that states will block cooperation if they sense that other states will profit disproportionally. As Waltz (1979, 106) articulates; “A state worries about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself.” Third, states are careful that cooperation does not create too much interdependence. Namely, in the international self-help system interdependence tends to equal vulnerability. As Collard-Wexler (2006, 400) describes “autarky is a wiser policy than interdependence and vulnerability.”
For neorealists power becomes the most prominent currency for the international system since it guarantees a state’s survival. Power in neorealist theory refers to the combined capabilities of a state and the distribution of this among states helps shape international structures (Waltz, 1990, 36). These structures in turn are the second structuring principle of the international system (Waltz, 2014, 124). On contrast to classical realism neorealism regards power as a means in itself rather than an end goal. Yet there is also a significant divide between neorealists. Defensive realists hold that it is unwise for states to pursue maximum power. Doing so could result in punishment from the system as others will try to prevent them from gaining too much power. Waltz (1990, 36) states ‘neorealists […] see power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it.’ Offensive neorealists on the other hand do believe in the maximization of power, and when the circumstances are right, striving for hegemony would be wise for a state to do. In this way the survival of a state is best ensured according to offensive neorealists.
Both defensive and offensive neorealists regard nuclear weapons as the ultimate tool of deterrence and therefore desirable for all states. Neorealism therefore assumes that as soon as states possess the right technological and economical capabilities they would strive for nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, once a state acquires nuclear weapons other states can feel threatened, sparking the desire to launch their own nuclear programs. However, since only states with the right scientific, technological and economic resources will be capable of developing their own nuclear programs, weaker states will have to adopt other strategies for survival. For instance, they can form an alliance with a nuclear power in order to balance power in the international system. Often this option represents the only viable option for weak states even though they then still face the risk that their ally might not want to guarantee their security (Sagan, 1996, 57). Nevertheless, there are differences between defensive and offensive neorealists that make that there are different expectations regarding state behaviour
concerning nuclear weapons acquisition. These differences will be discussed in more detail below.
Kenneth Waltz: Defensive neorealism
Kenneth Waltz (1954, 232), the founding father of defensive neorealism, initially rejected the idea that nuclear weapons could deter states from waging war against each other. In Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis he argues that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. The anarchic international system is the root cause of this however Waltz (1954, 232) also contends “special reasons become the immediate, or efficient, causes of war.” In 1981 he changed his views and argued that nuclear weapons can enhance international security through mutual deterrence (Waltz, 1981). According to his theory, once more than one state has acquired nuclear weapons capability, nuclear war between nuclear weapons states becomes unlikely as mutual destruction is assured. This in turn creates incentives for other states to also acquire nuclear weapons to provide their security needs and feel more secure. What follows from this is that nuclear proliferation is inevitable, and the more they spread the better it is for keeping international peace (Ogilvie-White, 1996, 45).
Waltz originally developed nuclear deterrence theory during the Cold War to explain the why the world witnessed such as long peace between the two great powers. He came to the conclusion that this was the result of the bipolar structure of the international system (Ogilvie-White, 1996, 46). According to Waltz (1981, 3) bipolar structures tend to be more peaceful compared to a multipolar world. At the end of the Cold War he suggested that the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world might speed up nuclear proliferation processes. Waltz suggested that the weakening of the Soviet Union might make other states more insecure and to make up for the loss of the nuclear umbrella they might seek nuclear weapons themselves. He used the renewed tensions in South Asia to back up his claims, and argued that they could lead to a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation, something that did not really happen in the end (Waltz, 1995 in Ogilvie-White 1996, 47).
With regard to Iran Waltz (2012) has openly argued that the country should acquire nuclear weapons. Waltz (2012, 2) believes that this will restore regional stability rather than disrupt it. Backing up his claims he (2012, 162) has stated that nuclear weapons support peace and that “there is no reason to believe that things would be different if Iran acquired such arms.” Moreover, he argued that “Taking advantage of the protection that their atomic arsenals provide, nuclear armed states can feel freer to make minor incursions, deploy terrorism, and engage in generally annoying behaviour. But the question is how significant these disruptive behaviours are compared with the peace and stability that nuclear weapons
produce.” When in 2007 he was asked why he thought Iran would want to have nuclear weapons, he answered that there were two simple answers; the instability and rivalry in the region and the threat coming from the United States (Sagan et al., 2007, 137).
John J. Mearsheimer: Offensive neorealism
John J. Mearsheimer, the founder of offensive neorealism, like Waltz believes that nuclear weapons can promote peace. Specifically, Mearsheimer (1990) argues that nuclear weapons help establish peace in two ways. First, they are more useful as a defensive tool rather than a weapon for state aggression. Namely, if two nuclear weapon states can employ an attack neither state could gain a meaningful military advantage because of the mutually assured destruction. Second, the possession of nuclear weapons creates equality among states in terms of power relations (Mearsheimer, 1990, 4). Moreover, roughly in accordance with Waltz’s theory, Mearsheimer believes that multipolar systems are more prone to war than bipolar systems. Mearsheimer (1990, 1) therefore argued at the end of the Cold War that Europe would be facing more conflict and war because of the emergence of a multipolar system. He (1990, 1) states; “The next forty-five years in Europe are not likely to be so violent as the forty-five years before the Cold War, but they are likely to be substantially more violent than the past forty-five years, the era that we may someday look back upon not as the Cold War but as the Long Peace […].”
Mearsheimer (1990, 4) also believed bipolar and multipolar systems are both more likely to be peaceful when power is distributed equally among states. Inequality in power is an invite to war because it enhances an aggressors’ prospect of success when going to war. Put differently, small gaps in power prevent war whereas big gaps promote war. Nuclear weapons are therefore a powerful force of peace according the Mearsheimer (1990, 4) because they ensure that deterrence will hold. He (1990, 4) states; “Deterrence is most likely to hold when the costs and risks of going to war are unambiguously stark.” Unlike Waltz however Mearsheimer argued that multipolar system could be either balanced or unbalanced. In the balanced version multipolarity there is no hegemon and the distribution of power is more or less equal. States are therefore able to balance against each other. In an unbalanced system however power is distributed unevenly causing one greater power to profit. This greater power can therefore be a potential regional hegemon (Toft, 2003).
Mearsheimer (2006, 112) further criticizes Waltz’s theory for the idea that states can sometimes behave act irrational and that for those cases separate, non-realist, theories of foreign policy are needed to make sense of the outcomes. Mearsheimer therefore argues that
his theory both explains behaviour and outcomes whereas that of Waltz can only account for outcomes. As a result defensive realism is not good at explaining the behaviour of great powers according to Mearsheimer (2006, 111; 112). The origin of this problem lies in the assumptions that Waltz makes. Namely, the theory of Waltz rests on two assumptions; that the international system is anarchic and that states seek to survive. Waltz does explicitly mention that he assumes that states are not rational actors. Mearsheimer on the other hand does make this explicit. He (2006, 112) states; “My theory is based on five assumptions: (1) the system is anarchic, (2) all great powers have some offensive military capability, (3) states can never be certain about other states’ intentions, (4) states seek to survive, and (5) great powers are rational actors or strategic calculators.” The difference between the two theories according to Mearsheimer (2006, 112) therefore is that “Waltz has created an escape hatch in his theory that mine does not have.”
Considering the case of Iran, Mearsheimer (2012), like Waltz (2012), is of the opinion that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons would have positive effects. He argues; “I think there’s no question that a nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the region, because nuclear weapons are weapons of peace.” Yet he also acknowledges the detrimental effects of a nuclear attack. He argues it is only small possibility; “But that small possibility is enough to make me very wary of the idea of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.” In fact Mearsheimer (2006, 19) has stated; “On nuclear proliferation, I prefer to limit it as much as possible […].” Moreover, following the nuclear deal with Iran Mearsheimer released a public statement along with fellow scholars in which they argued; “The historic agreement will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and can prove that through creative diplomacy, the most complex conflicts can be resolved peacefully (NIAC, 2015).”
Criticism
The most profound criticism on neorealism is its failure to explain nuclear non-proliferation as it tends to overpredict proliferation (Ogilvie-White, 1996, 45). Mearsheimer himself for instance argued that Ukraine should keep the inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union stored on its territory. According to him this would ensure the peace between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, he did believe that Ukraine would never give up the weapons to the state it feared most; Russia. He (1993, 50; 51) stated; “Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee.” Obviously, the problem however is that Ukraine eventually did gave up its nuclear weapons to Russia. In return they got security
assurances from the United States after signing on the NPT in 1994 (Ogilvie-White, 1996, 47).
Over time neorealists have tried to make up for the lack of explanations for cases of non-proliferation. Namely, under the banner of self-help there are a number of options available for states to address security vulnerabilities; “straightforward acquisition and testing of nuclear weapons (Pakistan), hegemonic guarantees in lieu of indigenous nuclear weapons (Japan, South Korea), ambiguous nuclear stances outside the NPT (Israel), formal NPT membership cum flagrant violations of its principles (Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Iran), and renunciation of nuclear weapons to avoid arms races (post-1970s Egypt) (Solingen, 2007, 26).” Another theoretical response argues that acquiring nuclear weapons can in fact undermine a state’s security since having nuclear weapons could make a state a target for other states. Hence, some states would opt to forgo the nuclear option in order to secure their survival (Rublee, 2009, 7). Yet this argument would be hard to reconcile with realism’s core assumptions, namely anarchy and self-help (Rublee, 2009, 8). Therefore Solingen (2007, 26) argues that one of the problems of neorealism is multifinality, meaning that there are multiple possible outcomes based on the value of one variable. Hence, such formulations of realism ultimately become barely falsifiable as Legro and Moravcsik (1999, 26) argue.
Moreover, according to Ogilvie-White (1996, 45) if the logical of deterrence of Waltz is followed, a nuclear arms race would be indeed be futile. Therefore, vertical proliferation should be avoided to prevent the undermining of a state’s capabilities, most significantly its economic strength. However, as Ogilvie-White (1996, 45) points out this would mean that the United States and the Soviet Union were acting irrationally as they were keeping vertical proliferation in place. Neorealism is therefore at loss at explaining these vertical proliferation policies of the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, Ogilvie-White (1996, 45) argues that this undermines the rational actor approach, bringing further doubt to the approach.
Conclusion
As shown above defensive and offensive neorealism have different expectations regarding nuclear proliferation. However, since Mearsheimer (1990; 2006; 2012) is so adamant regarding the idea that states can sometimes act irrational – which in this case would be giving up nuclear weapons capability – the approach by Waltz (1954; 1981; 2012) seems more fruitful. Therefore only defensive neorealism will be tested in the analysis. Concretely, this means that in the analysis traces of focal points pivotal to neorealism will be weight in order to see if they match evidence from the data. The focal points pivotal to neorealism are –
as discussed – the idea that states are the primary actors, seeking for survival in the anarchic world system. This for instance leads to a focus on Iran’ security needs to see whether they can explain Iran’s nuclear decision-making.
2.2 Neoliberal institutionalism
This section will discuss the neoliberal institutionalist take on nuclear proliferation issues. The section will start off with a discussion on the general assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism. Afterwards, two specific neoliberal institutionalist approaches on nuclear proliferation will be highlighted. Yet only one of those approaches is well enough adapted to be tested in the analysis.
Neoliberal institutionalism (also referred to as neoliberalism or institutional liberalism) concentrates of the role of international institutions in mitigating conflict and maintaining peace (Navari, 2012). Much like realism neoliberal institutionalists however maintain that states remain the principle actors within the international system. As one of the founding fathers of neoliberal institutionalism, Robert O. Keohane (1989), articulates; “States are at the centre of our interpretation of world politics, as they are for realists; but formal and informal rules play a much larger role in the neoliberal than in the realist account.” Moreover, neoliberal institutionalists like neorealists believe that the international system is characterized by anarchy. Neoliberal institutionalists however disagree about the consequences that this has for states. Namely, well they maintain that states above all seek survival, neoliberal institutionalists believe that cooperation among states is more likely than neorealists assume (Powell, 1994, 320; 321).
Specifically, neoliberal institutionalism predicts that states engage in international institutions to manage their interests. Institutions help lowering transaction costs, overcome collective action problems, offer greater transparency, manage growing interdependence, and monitor compliance (Rublee, 2009, 10; North, 1981, Keohane, 1984, Lipson, 1984, Gourevitch, 1999 in Solingen, 2007, 26). States therefore join institutions because they would be worse off without them. Because of this compliance institutions can also alter states’ behaviour and change the way they perceive strategies and their outcomes (Solingen, 2007, 26). Nevertheless, institutions cannot change the state of anarchy. But they thus can change the character of the international environment by transforming the behaviour and interests of states. Institutions do this in a number of ways, for instance by offering favourable cooperation conditions or giving power disincentives like trade sanctions (Navari, 2012).
Thus according to liberals, states create institutions as they facilitate in managing and maximizing their interests. For realists institutions only serve as a way to realize and maintain domination. According to Mearsheimer (1994, 13), “The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it.” Realism also contends that the most powerful states dominate institutions;
latecomers or less powerful members will have less influence and can exercise less control over outcomes. Hence, these states benefit less from the creation of institutions, and eventually have less interest in maintaining institutions (Gruber, 2000 in Navari, 2012). Moreover, realism believes that institutions do not have an independent effect on state behaviour (Mearsheimer, 1994, 7). Neoliberals argue the contrary, “that the ‘shadow of the future’ – the possibility to attain gains in the future – provides a strong incentive for all states to cooperate and create institutions that benefit all parties (Navari, 2012).”
However, realism and neoliberalism still both share the assumption that the absence of a sovereign authority makes that states advance their interests unilaterally, generally making cooperation difficult (Jervis, 1999, 43). Keohane (1989) states; “Neoliberal institutionalists do not assert that international agreements are easy to make or to keep; indeed, we assume the contrary.” In addition Keohane and Martin (1995, 42) argue neoliberal institutionalism still operates under the same principles of power and interests as realism. They (1995, 42) state; “By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid.” But as Jervis (1999, 42) points out, neoliberal institutionalists regard conflict as something unnecessary and avoidable, in contrast to realists. Hence, for a neoliberal institutionalist there is much more room for potential cooperation than for a realist (Jervis, 1999, 47).
The risks that can accompany cooperation for neoliberal institutionalists is the danger that states might be cheated or that they receive a low payoff. Realists also fear cheating and moreover they fear decline in relative power if others benefit unequally from cooperation. The barriers for neoliberal institutionalists to cooperate are thus lower than for realists; while neoliberal institutionalism is concerned with the compliance of other states, realists also fear the relative gains of other states (Grieco, 1988, 503). It is therefore often thought that neoliberal institutionalists assume that states only care about their own absolute gains and are largely indifferent to the gains of others. Put differently, whether cooperation results in a relative gain or loss does not really matter for states as long as they gain in absolute terms. For neorealists however it is the relative gains that matter more because a state’s power utilities are measured against that of other states (Powell, 1991, 1303). However, according to Jervis (1999, 46) the distinction between realists and neoliberals on the issue of absolute and relative gains should not be exaggerated. He argues that realists never claimed that relative gains did not matter. More specifically he points at the months after the detonation of the first atomic bomb in which realists noted that once parties had acquired a sufficient number of
these weapons further increases would instil little fear for the other party; indicating that the greatest form of military power had become relative (Jervis, 1999, 46).
Regarding issues of nuclear proliferation neoliberal institutionalists often point at the power of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to them the non-proliferation regime offers states an escape to the prisoner’s dilemma in the sense that it reassures states that other states will not proliferate. Moreover, the NPT offers states another significant trade-off; while the first five acknowledged nuclear-weapons-states commit to disarmament non-nuclear states are allowed to develop nuclear energy programs for civilian purposes (Solingen, 2007, 28; 29). However, while intuitively plausible Potter and Mukhatzhanova (2008, 155) point out that this proposition has rarely been tested properly. Therefore two neoliberal institutionalist motivated takes on nuclear proliferation will now be discussed.
Glenn Chafetz: The Role of Democracy
Arguably in line with democratic peace theory – the believe that liberal states do not wage war against each other (Navari, 2012) – Glenn Chafetz (1993) argues that liberal democracies feel more secure and have less incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. According to Chafetz (1993) the world can be divided in ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ states. The domestic political systems in the core states tend to be dominated by liberal democratic regimes. This in turn makes that core states develop shared norms and values, making cooperation among core states more likely than arms racing. And since core states do not regard each other as military threats the likelihood that they will proliferate is dramatically reduced. However, states in the periphery often do not have much experience with liberal democracy and hence lack the shared norms that core states have. Such states therefore are more likely to regard others a military threats and more prone to develop nuclear weapons programs to increase their security (Chafetz, 1993).
Consequently, this leads to the theoretical assumption that the spread of democracy will reduce the likelihood of states wanting to acquire nuclear weapons (Singh & Way, 2004, 864). It indeed is true that some democracies have started nuclear weapons programs and abandoned it. Moreover, no non-nuclear weapons state has every tried to start a covert nuclear weapons program after joining the NPT (Sagan, 2011, 238). However, Singh and Way (2004) found that democracies are not less likely to proliferate than non-democratic states. In fact, they might be more likely to do so, Singh and Way (2004, 875) state; “Even controlling for level of income and economic development, countries that score high on the democracy scale
are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons.” Arguably, the theory of Chafetz (1993) is therefore less equipped to explain issues of nuclear proliferation.
Etel Solingen: The Role of the Global Economy
The theory of Solingen (1994; 2007) is more in line with basic principles of commercial liberalism – the believe that there is a positive link between trade and development, and by extension peace (see Press-Barnathan, 2006). In her work Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East she seeks to explain why there is significantly more nuclear ambition in the Middle East as compared to East Asia. According to Solingen (2007) a norm against nuclear proliferation has taken hold in East Asia with North Korea as an exception. In the Middle East however ‘nuclearization’ has become the norm with the notable exceptions of Egypt and Libya (Solingen, 2007, 4). Solingen argues this is due to differences in domestic political coalitions in both regions. She distinguishes between outward-looking and inward-looking coalitions. In South Asia outward-inward-looking domestic coalitions are dominant, meaning that these coalitions favour internationalization and integration in the international economy and therefore they are more likely to adhere to the international norm of non-proliferation (Solingen, 2007, 5). Inward-looking coalitions, that are dominating the Middle East, however adhere greater importance to staying in power and “have greater incentives to use nuclear weapons as tools of nationalist platforms of political competition (Solingen, 2007, 5).” Put differently, Solingen (2007) argues that different orientations toward the global political economy make up for differences in nuclear decision-making.
While thus continuing the neoliberal institutionalists tradition Solingen (2007) also inherently criticizes the paradigm. Namely, while accrediting some explaining power to the international non-proliferation regime she assesses that domestic considerations regarding norms, security and/or politics have played a more significant role in accounting for nuclear decisions (Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2008, 156). To back up this claim she stresses that the decisions not to go nuclear in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were made prior to ratifying the NPT. Making the ratification of the NPT a consequence of nuclear forbearance, and not the other way around. Moreover, she argues that the NPT did not prevent Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons capability (Solingen 2007; Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2008, 156; 157).
Solingen (2007, 185; 186) dismisses the idea that external security threats – as stemming from neorealism theory – could explain why Iran might move toward the development of nuclear weapons. According to her the main motivator of insecurity for Iran
would be Iraq, with the United States, Israel and Pakistan following with some distance. But Solingen (2007, 186) argues that many within Iran do not agree with the premise of these threats. Hence, she (2007, 186) argues that; “This open-endedness forces attention to other factors influencing Iran’s nuclear behaviour.”
In 2011, when she was asked about current developments concerning the Middle East, Solingen (2011) maintained that Iran was a though nut to crack because it was authoritarian, inward-looking, and not interested in global economic integration. She (2011) argued; “China wanted to open up to the world economy, and Nixon obliged. It was a perfect match. You don't have that at all in Iran.” Moreover, following the 2015 nuclear deal she restated her belief that Iran’s nuclear program depends on the balance between those who seek to deepen economic openness and on those who oppose it (Solingen & Malnight, 2016). She furthermore said that; “The P5+1/Iran 2015 nuclear agreement may well be designed to encourage a nascent shift in an internationalizing direction (Solingen & Malnight, 2016).”
Ogilvie-White (1996, 49) assess that the work of Solingen offers an important advancement to the study of nuclear proliferation as it acknowledges that “states have multiple goals, and that these link foreign and domestic policies inextricably.” Moreover, Potter and Mukhatzhanova (2008, 145) point out the work of Solingen (2007) has two important theoretical implications; first of all that nuclear policies might be relatively immune to changes in the external security situation. And second, nuclear policies may change significantly over time due to changes in the domestic economic and political conditions even when the external security landscape remains relatively constant (Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2008, 145).
Constructivist Maria R. Rublee (2009, 12) criticizes Solingen (2007) taking the normative orientation of domestic political coalitions for granted. Specially, she (2009, 12) argues that Solingen (2007) assumes that policy changes to integrate in the global economy are solely driven by economic interests. Rublee (2009, 12) argues; “What she [Solingen] does not consider, but to which her evidence also points, is that these newly democratizing regimes wanted something larger than just access to foreign capital and markets, something that can be described as membership in the Western “club.” Rublee (2009, 12) concludes that joining the NPT is just one of the things that countries who whished to join the Western club, had to commit to, in addition to for instance democratize or liberalize the economy.
Conclusion
As the discussion pointed out there are two main neoliberal institutionalist approaches specifically focused on nuclear proliferation issues – that of Chafetz (1993) and of Solingen (2007). While both approaches thus employ a neoliberal institutionalist perspective they also both differ a bit from the ‘general’ neoliberal institutionalist answer on non-proliferation. Overall, the theory of Solingen (2007) seems to most promising to explain the Iran nuclear deal and hence this approach will be tested. In practice, this means that focal points for the analysis of neoliberal institutionalism will be focused on domestic political coalitions and economic decision-making in relation to the nuclear deal.
2.3 Constructivism
This section will discuss the constructivist take on (non-)proliferation issues. After a general introduction on constructivism and its general stance regarding nuclear weapons matters three leading constructivist works will be discussed. It will be concluded that only two of these theories are well enough equipped to deal with the acquirement of nuclear weapons, and thus are suited to test. Finally, the criticisms of the constructivist approach toward norms research will be summarized.
The term constructivism refers to a broad theoretical approach that is an ontology rather than a grounded theory. According to constructivists our reality is socially constructed in such a way that things are not social facts but that they have certain social meanings. They argue that meaning is constructed through a “complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which scholars must understand if they are to explain state behaviour (Slaughter, 2011).” This focus on social context has led constructivist to focus on issues such as identity and beliefs (Slaughter, 2011). The basic shared assumption among constructivists regarding security issues is that security in itself is a social construction. This does not mean that there is no such a thing as ‘security’ and the concept misses any meaning. Rather constructivists tend to avoid advancing universal and abstract meanings of security and instead focus on how perspectives security and practices emerge (McDonald, 2008, 65).
Constructivism thus locates actors within social structures that both constitute those actors and also are constituted by the interactions of those actors. This stands much in contrast to the believe of realists and neoliberals who assume the world is inhabited by undifferentiated, rational actors whose relationships are based on the distribution of material factors (Farrell, 2002, 50). Nevertheless, Wendt (1995, 72) argues that he agrees with all five of Mearsheimer’s (2006) realist assumptions, as in fact both realists and constructivists are structuralists. They differ however, according to Wendt (1995) in opinion on what it is the structure consists of. Neorealists assume that structures are made up of a distribution of material capabilities, whereas constructivists also believe that structures are made of social relations. According to Wendt (1995, 72) constructivists believe that structures have three elements; shared knowledge, material resources and practices.
Put differently, constructivism problematizes the things that rationalist theories like neorealism and neoliberalism take for granted, such as interests and identities (Farrell 2002, 50). As Kowert (1998, 2) argues rationalist theories like neorealism and neoliberalism explain how actors should choose or bargain but “they say nothing about who the actors are or how their interests are constituted.” To illustrate, a constructivist reading of a security dilemma
would describe it as a particular “social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms (Wendt, 1995, 72).”
Constructivism is much concerned with the impact of norms on international security. Norms in the constructivist sense are “intersubjective beliefs about the social and cultural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of actions (Farrell, 2002, 49).” In contrast in the liberal, rationalist sense it is often assumed that norms are based upon underlying power distributions (Checkel, 1999, 84). According to liberals norms affect the actions of actors in a constraining way. Actors can be coerced by non-state actors to adopt a certain norm. And while some actors might adopt certain norms decision-makers do not internalize them, rather the norm represents a behavioural constraint and the adoption of the norm is therefore strictly instrumental. Constructivists by contrast thus argue that actors can internalize norms, meaning that they learn to accept new interests and value. Following this their behaviour is prompted by logic of appropriateness. Norms in the constructivist sense can therefore be described as constituting whereas norms in the liberal, rational sense can be described as constraining (Checkel, 1997, 477). According to Tannenwald (1999, 437) ideally both understandings are utilized, leading to the understanding that a single norm can have multiple effects; being constraining as well as constituting (Tannenwald, 1999, 437). After all, constructivists also accept the importance of material factors, yet it is required to study them in relation to the role of ideational factors (see McDonald, 2008, 67).
For constructivists norms thus regulate action by defining what is appropriate (Farrell, 2002, 50) and states are expected do what they ought to be most appropriate. This ‘logic of appropriateness’ is often contrasted with a ‘logic of consequentialism’, that is the rationalist view that actors are making rationalistic cost–benefit calculations about their choices (Hopf, 2010, 539). Yet according to constructivists states are guided by norms that define identities, formal rules and practices within international politics (Farrell, 2002, 52). Constructivists also believe that appropriate behaviour can become so powerful that it limits the possibilities for certain political action. In fact these expectations can become so sedimented that they can become hegemonic, and penalties those who display deviant behaviour (McDonald, 2008, 70). Wendt (1995, 75) argues that social structures can constrain action so much that transformation is largely impossible. This is a result of the fact that social structures are collective in nature, meaning that structural change depends upon ‘a chancing a system of expectations that may be mutually reinforcing (Wendt, 1995, 75).” Nevertheless, one consequence of the claim that structures are socially constructed is also the assumption that
structures can change overtime. But as Wendt (1995, 75) argues there is no guarantee that they will change.
Regarding nuclear proliferation some constructivists argue that nuclear weapons can be symbols of prestige, motivating states to acquire them so to display ‘their modernity’ through this ‘ultimate weapon’. In this sense prestige is a motivator in itself, and possible security benefits are benefits of secondary importance (Solingen, 2007, 30). Sagan (1996) has argued that the case of French proliferation can in fact be best explained by prestige incentives. He states (1996, 79); “For de Gaulle, the atomic bomb was a dramatic symbol of French independence and was thus needed for France to continue to be seen, by itself and others, as a great power.” Moreover, it has also been argued that prestige was the main motivator of British, Indian, Argentinian, Brazilian and Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons (Solingen, 2007, 30).
The case of nuclear forbearance is most often explained by constructivists with the argument that multilateral institutions can change the preferences of states in such a way that they no longer perceive nuclear weapons to be a necessary of acceptable part of their national defence (Rublee, 2009, 3). Among constructivists it is widely believed that the non-proliferation regime socialized nuclear and non-nuclear states, created new habits and expectations, and transformed states’ ideas about the morality of nuclear weapons. This in turn led to near-universal compliance to the non-proliferation regime. The non-proliferation regime itself is the outcome of the evolution of global anti-nuclear norms, and is embedded and sustained in the NPT (Solingen, 2007, 28). So just like neoliberal institutionalists constructivists adhere explanatory power to the NPT in explaining nuclear restraint. However, in the constructivist sense the NPT is not important in its ability to lower transaction costs but rather that is reflects international non-proliferation norms (Wan & Solingen, 2015, 5). Put differently, constructivists believe that international organizations are not empty vessels like neoliberal institutionalist assume. But according to constructivism international organization are purposive entities that in some cases are able to steer states in their behaviour and affect their power (Checkel, 1998, 331). This take on anti-nuclear norms will further be discussed on the basis of the work of Nina Tannenwald (2007) who has produced a seminal work on this topic.
Nina Tannenwald: Norms of Non-Use
A seminal, constructivist work on nuclear weapons comes from Nina Tannenwald (1999; 2007). In her work The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons Since 1945 (2007) she traces the rise of nuclear taboo and its influence, specifically regarding American leaders. She concludes that in 1945, when Hiroshima and Nagaski were bombed, no nuclear taboo existed but that since then it started to emerge. During the Korean War that started in 1950 an emerging taboo entered deliberations of United States leaders. Truman shied away from the use of nuclear weapons regarding it as morally repugnant while Eisenhower and his top advisors did not necessarily agree with this position. Nevertheless, they too were constraint in their freedom by the emerging taboo. By the 1960s the norm became implicitly institutionalized and during the Vietnam War the use of nuclear weapons was hardly considered, or so argues Tannenwald (2007, 363; 364).
However, while Tannenwald (1999) shows the emergence of an anti-nuclear norm – a norm that in turn contributed a presumed international non-proliferation regime – she only demonstrates the rise of a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, there is insufficient evidence from the work of Tannenwald (1999; 2007) to suggest that the norm developed along side a norm that goes against the acquisition of nuclear weapons as well (Solingen, 2007, 15). Therefore two other constructivist informed theories that deal with the acquiring of nuclear weapons will be discussed and their potential will be explored. Thereafter the criticisms of constructivism will be discussed.
Maria R. Rublee: The Social Psychology of Norms
In her work Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint Maria R. Rublee (2009) focuses on states that choose nuclear restraint and she seeks to explain their nuclear forbearance. According to fellow constructivist Tannenwald (2009, 527) the work of Rublee (2009) is the most constructivist take on the issue of nuclear proliferation to date while Rublee (2009) in fact combines constructivism with social psychology. Rublee (2009) argues that this particular approach looks at state elites and decision-makers rather than perceiving the state as a monolithic entity like neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism does.
Thus drawing upon social psychology Rublee (2009, 4) suggests a breakdown of possible behavioural outcomes in the international environment. This categorization results in three behavioural patterns in which the first one is called ‘persuasion’. This type of behaviour describes behaviour that results from genuine transformation of preferences. ‘Social conformity’ on the other hand represents behaviour that stems from the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimalize social costs, without a change of underlying preferences. Lastly, ‘identification’ refers to behaviour that results from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other (Rublee, 2009, 2). This last category falls between persuasion
(where preferences have changed) and social conformity (where preferences have not changed). In contrast to social conformity - which is based upon strategic acts - identification is based upon the desire to strengthen or maintain a relationship (Rublee, 2009, 18; 19).
Rublee (2009) furthermore pays much attention to the way norms are transmitted and processed by actors. Again drawing upon social psychology, she argues that actors can process norms using three mechanisms. The first is ‘linking’, this refers to the linking of a norm to a well-established value (Rublee, 2009, 44). Second, ‘activation’ refers to a norm that has been made focal and states often tend to abide norms that are currently focal, even if other, sometimes contrary norms might also be relevant (Rublee, 2009, 45). Finally, ‘consistency’ means that the need of states to be consistent in their behaviour. This is therefore a powerful motivator for states (Rublee, 2009, 46).
Rublee (2009) explores five case studies that include states that gave up their nuclear ambitions; Japan, Sweden, Germany, Egypt and Libya. She argues that in the three democratic states – Japan, Sweden and Germany – domestic resistance caused the political costs to go nuclear to rise and hence political leaders backed down. This was development strengthened by security guarantees but they were not the root cause for the nuclear forbearance (Rublee, 2009, 203). Overtime elites changed their preferences and Rublee (2009, 184) believes that least the case of Sweden represents persuasion. In the authoritarian states several obstacles led leaders to give up the option of nuclear weapons. Rublee (2009, 203) believes that social conformity and later on persuasion played a role in Egypt and Libya, although the road Libya took was much longer than that of Egypt.
Since Rublee (2009) only researched states that choose nuclear restraint at the time she did not look into the Iranian case with much depth. However, she (2009, 4) did state that; “Iran promises to be the most challenging case for the regime in the next decade, as Iranian leadership continues to pursue uranium enrichment (under the guise of civilian technology) and periodically threatens to withdraw from the NPT Additional Protocol or even the NPT itself.” She (2009, 10) argues furthermore that Iran fits the description of a state that reaps the benefits of the nonnuclear proliferation regime while it can also turn its back to secure nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Rublee (2015) was optimistic about the nuclear deal with Iran, claiming that it was a great way to contain Iran’s nuclear weapons making ability. Moreover, she (2015) added; “And I think we should all be happy about that.”
Solingen (2009) is critical of the case study on Egypt in which Rublee (2009) argues that Egypt was first primarily motivated by ‘social conformity’ incentives and later became ‘persuaded.’ According to Solingen (2009, 530) there is not enough evidence to suggest that
Egypt’s leaders actually thought “proliferation was bad.” Moreover, Solingen (2009, 528) notes that others might criticize the case study on Japan. Namely, Rublee (2009) argues that Japan internalized the international non-proliferation norm and hence, at least, partially accounts for Japan’s nuclear forbearance. Some however might argue that Japan’s ‘nuclear allergy’ is the result of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagaski, thus pre-dating the international non-proliferation regime (Solingen, 2009, 529).
Furthermore, Hofferberth and Weber (2015, 80) offer another critique on constructivist norm research in general. They argue that overtime norm researchers have developed a cultural-determinist framework that is rather ill equipped to explain change. This contrasts the basic constructivist claim that norms are created intersubjectively. More precisely, researchers have started to conceptualise norms as fixed standards in order to carry out empirical analyses, which inherently needs constant variables. Moreover, the treating of norms as independent variables that account for state behaviour led to the assumption of a mechanistic model in which states passively respond to their cultural environment (Hofferberth & Weber, 2015, 80). In other words, although action was previously understood as the concrete, meaning-oriented activity of an agent, it was reduced overtime to something that is similar to stimulus-response behaviour (Goddard & Nexon, 2005, 14).
Jacques E.C. Hymans: Threat Perception and Nationalism
Jacques E.C. Hymans has utilized a constructivist research agenda to explain why Australia has pursued a nuclear weapons program but later abandoned it. Unlike most constructivist works he neither emphasizes international non-proliferation norms, nor does he refer to constraints that stems from societal pressures (Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2008, 158). Instead, he argues that the threat perceptions of leaders, combined with a special type of nationalism, create incentives to go nuclear. These threat perceptions are however rarely justified and are more often misperceptions than real threats (Hymans, 2000, 2). Regarding the case of Australia, Hymans (2000) argues that political leaders initially moved towards nuclear proliferation because they faced a serious threat and were subject to a high level of nationalism. This changed in 1972 when the new government adopted a more ‘non-oppositional nationalism’ and the nuclear ambition was subsequently let go. As Hymans (2000, 18) states; “In the case of Australia, the great transformation policy was the result of a profound internal rethinking of the nation and its relationship wit hits neighbours.”
In 2012 Hymans (2012) criticized the idea that Iranian nuclear weapons are inevitable, unless other powers intervene to stop Iran from acquiring them. By contrast Hymans (2012,
45) argues that nuclear developments in Iran have in fact been slow. Moreover, the ability of governments to maneuver nuclear programs in secret is overestimated by American intelligence agencies according to Hymans (2012, 52). In fact, Hymans (2012, 44) argues that it is more likely that Iran will fail at acquiring nuclear weapons, or that it will at least take them considerable time, than that they will come into the possession of nuclear weapons in the next few years. The main cause of this are not the non-proliferation efforts by, mainly, the United States but dysfunctional management tendencies (Hymans, 2012, 45). Hymans argues that steps toward reining Iran are most likely to work counterproductive. Instead he (2012, 45) suggests a ‘simpler strategy’, namely “getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program’s worst enemies—Iran’s political leaders—to hinder the country’s nuclear progress all by themselves.” Regarding the nuclear deal Hymans (2015) argued that the two years of negotiations leading up to the deal had a positive impact on international security. Moreover, he (2015) stated that the Iranian nuclear issue remained “a marathon, not a sprint.”
Criticism on the work of Hymans (2000) comes inter alia from Lantis (2006) who questions some of the conceptual frameworks. He (2006, 651) asks himself; “To what degree are national identity conceptions shared by government leaders and society? How do national identity conceptions differ from cultural orientations?” Moreover, one key assumption Hymans (2000, 2) makes is that states do not seek nuclear weapons unless they face an extraordinary threat and Rublee (2009, 15) harshly criticizes this assumption. She points out that states have developed nuclear weapons in absence of a great threat. Arguably, she (2009, 15) is right when she points out the Hymans’ work “in essence offers a more sophisticated version of a neorealist argument; positing that threats are socially constructed and that identity helps filter how elites believe they should respond to those threats.” Hymans (2000) could possibly counter argue that the states that did go nuclear in fact did perceive a great threat whether it was justified or not. As Hymans (2000, 2) states; “Occasionally, albeit rarely, a states’ perception of existential threat is justified.” Nevertheless, the work of Hymans (2000) offers only one way to nuclear proliferation and rules out other avenues to nuclear ambition (see Rublee, 2009, 15).
Conclusion
The constructivist approach toward nuclear proliferation issue is thus primarily focused on the role of antinuclear norms in the international environment that steer the behaviour of states. A prime example of this is the work of Tannenwald (1999; 2007), however it only focuses on non-use norms, not on norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Another approach is
that of Hymans (2000) but since his work involves states that went from pro-nuclear weapons to anti-nuclear weapons this work is not considered appropriate to the Iranian case; namely, Iran has never openly had a nuclear weapons program. The other constructivist approach by Rublee (2009) is therefore better fitted even though this approach also incorporates social psychology. The analysis will therefore focus on the role of norms and the different ways they can have effect according to Rublee (2009). Moreover, other important focal points stemming from constructivism will be taken into account such as the role of identity, ideas and beliefs.
3. METHODS & OPERATIONALIZATION
This section will discuss the method used in this thesis, namely process tracing. To be more specific, the general ideas underlying this method will be discussed as well as the general requirements. After this the different tests that involve process tracing will be reviewed. Finally, the data that will be used for the analysis will be presented and discussed.
3.1 Methods: Causal Process Tracing
Case study research is good method to uncover the perceptions and motivations of important actors, and often is better suited to do this than large N studies (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 6). Case studies are also better at accommodating complex causal relations (Bennett, 2004, 38) and identifying new variables are hypotheses than other methods (Bennett, 2004, 19). Causal-process tracing, as one of the three approaches toward case study research, is most fit to deal with the case under scrutiny as it starts with an interest in a specific outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 24); the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in this case. Moreover, one of the research objectives of process tracing is the evaluation of prior explanatory hypotheses (Collier, 2011, 824) as is the objective of this research.
The goal during process tracing is to establish an interrupted chain of evidence that corresponds with expectations that stem from theory. In other words, it examines whether the hypothesized cause of an observed outcome moves in the same direction the theory has predicted (Bennett, 2004, 22). In this way process tracing can increase the internal validity of a causal claim and establish that ‘factor x’ at least mattered (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 29). The main objective for the researcher is thus to establish a temporal chain of events or processes within the case that can confirm or reject the predictions from theory. Process tracing requires continuity and completeness to explain a case. Ideally every step of the way is accounted for and once an intermediate step fails to align with the hypothesised cause, the whole hypothesis should be modified to explain the case. To illustrate, “If, for example, 98 of 100 dominoes standing in a straight line knock one another over but the 99th domino does not fall or strike the final domino, we need a separate explanation for why the 100th domino has fallen (Bennett, 2004, 23).”
However, the researcher can also start his investigation with the assumption that multiple factors might have contributed to the outcome (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 24), making process tracing a holistic approach. Process tracing can therefore also contribute to discovering other hypotheses. This is because researchers work their way backwards – from observed outcomes to potential causes – as well as forward – from hypothesized causes to
subsequent outcomes – which allows researchers to uncover variables that have not be considered previously (Bennett, 2010). Process tracing can also help establish sequence; did X cause Y, or did Y cause X? For example, it might establish “establish whether an arms race caused a war, or whether the anticipation of war caused an arms race (Bennett, 2010).” In order to establish claims about causal inference four, basic empirical tests can be utilized. These tests are categorized according to whether a test is necessary and/or sufficient for accepting causal inference (Collier, 2011, 825). These tests will be discussed below.
Straw in the Wind tests
Straw in the wind tests can provide useful information to the researchers as they can favour or call into question a certain hypothesis. But these tests are not decisive in themselves; passing merely means that the hypothesis might be relevant whereas failing does not eliminate a hypothesis, rather it just suggests that the hypothesis is not relevant. Straw in the wind tests are therefore neither necessary not sufficient to confirm or reject a hypothesis (Bennett, 2010). This test is therefore the weakest of all four tests; it places the least demands on the researchers knowledge and assumptions. Yet they can offer the researcher an initial benchmark for further inquiry (Collier, 2011, 826). A famous example of the straw in the wind test is that of a stolen racehorse; the dog that was supposed to guard the stables at night did not bark, suggesting the thief was someone known to the dog. However, this observation is not strong enough to fully confirm the hypothesis (Collier, 2011, 826).
Hoop tests
A hoop test proposes that a given piece of evidence much be present in the case to account for the validity of a hypothesis. If a hypothesis fails this test it means that the hypothesis can be rejected (Mahoney, 2012, 571). However, passing a hoop test does not confirm a hypothesis as it does not significantly raise the researcher’s confidence that the hypothesis is valid (Punton & Welle, 2015, 3). Passing a hoop test is therefore necessary but not sufficient for the validity of a certain hypothesis (Mahoney, 2012, 574). Nevertheless, if a hypothesis passes a hoop test it can contribute to some positive evidence in favour of the hypothesis (Mahoney, 2012, 575). Compared to straw in the wind tests the hoop test also has more impact on rival theories once a hypothesis passes. Namely, it somewhat weakens the plausibility of rival theories without necessarily dismissing the possibility that alternative hypotheses might also be relevant (Collier, 2011, 826).
