Convergence à la carte: European policy adoption in Ukraine and
Moldova in water management
Emily Gale, 10897143
Master thesis: ‘Convergence à la carte: European policy adoption in Ukraine and Moldova in water management’.
Master Political Science International Relations
Research project: The EU and its immediate neighbours Supervisor: dhr. A. Demidov
University of Amsterdam 19.012 words
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‘Water is not a commercial product like any other but,
rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended
and treated as such’
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Table of contents
Introduction 7
Chapter one: Water knowledge in the European Union and beyond 10
1.1. From water knowledge to water policy 10
1.2. External governance on water management 13
Chapter two: Explanatory models of incentives for change towards European policy 16 adoption
2.1. The external incentive model 16
2.2. Socialisation & the policy learning model 18
2.3. Preliminary conclusion of the theory 19
Chapter three: Explanatory models of implementation of European policy in ENP 20 countries
3.1. The domestic governance theory 20
3.2. Preliminary conclusion of the theory 22
Chapter four: Methodology 22
4.1. Case selection 22
4.2. Data collection 22
4.3. Methodology of the research analysis 23
4.4. Hypotheses 25
Chapter five: The case of Ukraine 26
5.1. Incentives for change towards European policy adoption 26 5.2. Preliminary conclusion of the first research question 28
5.3. Implementation of EU policy in Ukraine 28
5.3.1. Policy convergence of Ukrainian law to EU policy 28
5.3.1.1. Convergence in water knowledge 28
5.3.1.2. Convergence in national legislation 31
5.3.2. Role of institutions 33
5.3.3. Role of non-state actors 34
5.3.4. Role of civil society 35
5.4. Main findings case study Ukraine 36
Chapter six: The case of Moldova 37
6.1. Incentives for change towards European policy adoption 37 6.2. Preliminary conclusion of the first research question 39
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6.3.1. Policy convergence of Moldovan law to EU policy 40
6.3.1.1. Convergence in water knowledge 40
6.3.1.2. Convergence in national legislation 41
6.3.2. Role of institutions 43
6.3.3. Role of non-state actors 45
6.3.4. Role of civil society 46
6.4. Main findings case study Moldova 47
Chapter seven: Conclusion - Comparing the two case studies on European policy 48 adoption and implementation
Chapter eight: Discussion 53
References 55
6 ABSTRACT
The European Union’s external governance in pre-accession countries has been very effective in prompting the alignment in water policy reforms. But as the future EU membership prospect does not hold for ENP countries, the fact that water policies in Ukraine and Moldova are aligning EU policies is remarkable. This thesis argues how association agreements and the belief in a future EU membership prospect are still powerful incentives to reform in a way that aligns with EU laws. Although the EU is not considering to enlarge in the upcoming five years, data on actual implementation of European policy adoption in Ukraine and Moldova suggest that the belief in EU membership can fight domestic resistance. Empirical findings therefore challenge several explanatory models such as the external incentive model and the socialisation and policy learning model and suggest that a belief in future EU membership might be the most explanatory when researching incentives and implementation of policy reforms in the field of water management.
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Introduction
Demands on water are increasing and evolving. Over-utilized and stressed water resources are becoming a threat to health as water quality problems are increasing (Bruch & Troell 2011; European Parliament and Council 2000). The European Union’s (EU) neighbouring countries, specifically the former Soviet states, deal with an increasing number of floods and the percentage of people who have no access to safe drinking water is approaching Africa proportions. In order to sustain agriculture, food security and other livelihoods in this area, water policy in these countries is reforming rapidly. And although Europe might be seen as a well-developed continent, many of the former Soviet states that have not and will not join the European Union (EU) are still in the developmental phase in effective water management.
Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has provided a framework that enables the EU to intensify its relations and engage with its neighbouring countries that are not an EU member (European Commission 2015). According to the ENP and in line with the Treaty on the European Union ‘the Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation’ (ibid., p. 2). Environmental policy seems to be one of the most far-reaching areas of EU legislation (Buzogány 2013). This is exemplified in the rapid changes in the water policies of several ENP countries.
An important component of this process is the transfer of EU law into the ENP countries and implementation of EU’s water policy in new societies. This is also known as Europeanisation (Gorton et al. 2010; Olsen 2002). The remarkable issue at stake is the fact that these ENP countries reform their water policies aligning EU rules (Knill & Tosun 2009; Nanni 2012). This is happening while EU President Juncker has stated that ‘no further enlargement of the EU will take place over the next five years’ (European Commission 2015, p. 3). This raises a question why and to what extent neighbouring countries - who cannot apply for EU membership - reform their water policies in accordance with EU standards. What is the underlying rationale?
The voluminous literature on Europeanisation and European policy adoption can help to answer this question. Scholars on Europeanisation and external governance have researched under what circumstances countries are willing to adopt EU policies. The external incentives model states that a state is most likely to adopt EU policy if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Hereby,
8 the ultimate reward is EU membership. Casier (2011) argues that neighbouring countries count on ‘a process in which accession becomes the inevitable option’ if they implement EU policy thoroughly (ibid., p. 49). But since there is no EU enlargement happening in the next five years, incentives to change would be based on a belief in future membership on the long term, which is still quite questionable. The socialisation and policy learning model argues that a non-member state adopts EU policy to fix domestic problems. Therefore, the most general proposition of socialisation and the policy learning model is that a state is most likely to adopt EU policy if it is convinced of the appropriateness of EU rules (ibid.).
What seems to be virtually missing from the literature on EU’s external governance are the incentives to reform in countries where the reward does not entail future EU membership. In addition, dynamics that explain European policy adoption work differently within the field of water management. For instance, Lavenex (2014) argues how access to the European market can be a major incentive to reform trade policies. However, when talking about the water sector, rewards are more regarded in light of practical solutions to water management problems such as the decrease in floods or enhancing water quality. When neighbouring countries do adopt EU policy, questions can also be asked to what extent new legislation is correctly implemented into society. Compliance thus implicates an analysis to what extent EU policy is actually implemented (Langbein & Börzel 2013). This will be analysed in the second part of this thesis using Börzel’s (2011) theory, who argues that external governance empowers reform actors within the government, rather than within a society. This means that EU’s external governance is more focused on enhancing the effectiveness of state institutions, rather than domestic actors as civil society or non-state actors. This lack of political autonomy expels the influence of domestic non-state actors and civil society.
Ukraine and Moldova are chosen as case studies, since they are both within the European Neighbourhood Policy and do not hold short-term, or even medium term, EU membership prospects (Börzel 2011; Buzogány 2013). Yet policy reforms on water management in these countries are taking place rapidly. Based on the data collected through interviews and policy documents, this master thesis makes two contributions. First, it conceptualises the underlying rationale of European policy adoption by neighbouring countries. By doing this it answers the first research question: why are water policies of Ukraine and Moldova reforming to align with the EU’s water management policy? The second research question focuses more on actual implementation of these reforms: to what extent is the reformed water policy of Ukraine/Moldova implemented into
9 Ukrainian/Moldovan society? The second research question is explained through an analysis of how the principles of IWRM, on which the water policy of the EU is based, are implemented into today’s societies of Ukraine and Moldova. Since this can be easily checked via implementation reports, a comparison of legislation would be repetitive work. Rather, based on the IWRM, implementation of the other actors mentioned in the IWRM principle are analysed via policy documents and interviews with local water experts and diplomats.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter will outline main lines of water policy development within the EU and its power to influence states outside EU borders. The following chapter will handle the external incentive model and the socialisation and policy learning model to seek an explanation of European policy adoption. The penultimate section describes the research that has taken place on patterns of policy change within water management in Ukraine and Moldova, in which answers are sought to the two research questions. The last section summarises the empirical findings and highlights some of the conceptual problems in convergence processes concerning water policy.
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Chapter one: Water knowledge in the European Union and beyond
In order to understand the dynamics of international water management, this chapter contends the ideology of the EU concerning sustainable water management and its power to influence states outside its borders. Integrated Water Resource Management will be introduced in line with its corresponding piece of legislation: the Water Framework Directive. It will proceed by explaining which features make external governance of water management possible via the European Neighbourhood Policy and principles of the Water Framework Directive. A brief historical context is given to introduce Ukraine and Moldova as case studies to analyse why and to what extent European policy adoption is taking place in these countries.
1.1. From water knowledge to water policy
In Europe water is used intensively for industry and agriculture. Since water is needed for food crops, too little water could enhance the risk of food scarcity. Too much water could flood agricultural fields. Water of the wrong quality can become a threat to health and to established ecosystems. Having said this, quantity and quality of water are inseparable (Louka 2009). This insight led world leaders to the holistic approach of integrated water resource management (IWRM) (ibid.). The IWRM upholds the principle that a policymaker cannot make decisions about the quantity of water without being concerned about the effects it will have on water quality (Bruch & Troell 2011; Louka 2009).
The IWRM is the dominant discourse when talking about international water management (Bruch & Troell 2011; Louka 2009). It became part of the actual debate at the International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland in 1992. The Dublin Conference was not an intergovernmental conference but a conference including 500 government-designated experts in water managements and representatives of international and intergovernmental organisations (UN 1992a). The main objective of the conference was the development, management and utilisation of water resources, taking sustainable and environmental conservation into account (ibid.). With this objective, the conference was the world’s first major meeting to focus on the holistic management of water, including all sectors and seeking a balance between human need and environmental capacity. Four main principles emerged to integrate the IWRM, consisting of (1) the holistic approach to a sustainable water policy is based on the development of human societies and economies, (2) institutions should have a participatory role in the arrangements and management of water resources, (3) implementing and evaluating the IWRM is based on the participatory role of the public and
11 4) raising awareness of the importance of water among policy- makers and the general public (ibid.).
In 1992, another unilateral action on IWRM took place. The ‘United Nations Conference on Environment and Development’ in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), also known as the Earth Summit, produced a policy document called ‘Agenda 21’, containing various cross-cutting issues of environment and development. According to Agenda 21, IWRM must pursue four objectives including the aforementioned principles of the Dublin Conference, adding that the implementation of this approach should be done at the level of catchment basin or sub-basin (Bruch & Troell 2011; UN 1992b) and formally applying the ‘polluter pays’ principle - where the polluter is responsible to meet the costs to which it gives rise (Correljé et al. 2007). Agenda 21 also made the case for the precautionary principle, emphasising that environmental damage should preferably be prevented at the source, skewing environmental policy more towards issues like emission standards, rather than using ‘end-of-the-pipe technology’ like quality standards (Correljé et al. 2007; Kundzewicz 2001).
The aforementioned principles of water knowledge emphasised since 1992 have found their way into today’s national legislation of EU member states. IWRM entered the EU agenda through the adoption of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) in 2000 (Correljé et al. 2007). The WFD provides a common framework for the co-operation, planning and management of water resources based on integrating environmental arrangements within river basin districts (Correljé et al. 2007; Mylopoulos & Kolokytha 2008). The directive endorses three concepts that could be considered the organising pillars of IWRM in the EU, including (1) the river basin district as the organising/planning unit for water management, (2) river basin management plans as planning tool for the river basin districts and (3) enforcing the consultation with and participation of the public (European Parliament and Council 2000).
Throughout the EU it is increasingly acknowledged that the level at which water resource management can be dealt with in order to influence climate change should be within a river basin context (Bruch & Troell 2011; UNECE & OSCE 2007). Since river basins cross national borders, water legislation plays a critical role in supporting adaptive water management. Although it has not always been conceived as a tool to support international water management, there has been a trend towards acknowledging the need to provide some kind of underlying mandate for monitoring and periodically revising implementation of the basis of water management (UNECE & OSCE 2007). According to the WFD, this revising should be assigned to the public. Article 14 states that ‘river basin management plans have to include ‘a summary of the public information and consultation measures taken, their results
12 and the changes to the plan made as a consequence’ (European Parliament and Council 2000, Preamble). The Directive ensures open access to specified documents related to river basin management plans (ibid.).
The aims of the WFD are to improve water quality and ensure sustainability of water resources across the EU (ibid., p. 3). It aims at a good status for surface water, implying a certain standard concerning chemical as well as biological quality (Duca et al. 2014). To achieve these environmental objectives, the WFD emphasises the importance of an integrated approach to sustainable management (ibid.). By ensuring objectives such as protecting, preserving and improving the quality of the environment via the precautionary principle, the WFD gives a legitimate reason for preventive action. Environmental damage should be rectified at the source where the polluter pays (European Parliament and Council 2000). This requires member states to achieve a good status of water by 2015. But since the WFD is more consultative and prescribes that member states need to review the status and particularities of its own water resources, this leaves the way of implementation open to domestic insight (Mylopoulos & Kolokytha 2008).
In order to ensure implementation of the WFD, institutional coordination is often the way ahead. In this way, states can mitigate the collective action problem since river basins cross national borders, making responsibility fuzzy (Gerlak 2004). In order to encourage cooperation, states must be given incentives to participate and bargain in environmental agreements and to ‘surrender some degree of sovereignty’ (ibid.). The shift in balance from national to regional and global economies, such as the EU, makes identifying such limits in today’s world more complex. The role of the state in this is often the way of legislation. However, the degree and speed of implementation depends on the relationship between the government, the governed and neighbouring states (McGlade 2002).
The WFD establishes three routes for its implementation which in practice have become closely intertwined. The first route is via legislation, adopting the European directives (Sabel & Zeitlin 2008). Another is the executive route, where the power of the European Commission is used to issue decisions and guidelines subject to the double committee principle (or comitology procedure) of member states. Thirdly, through the autonomous action of national authorities, member states implement the WFD through their own national legislation, creating more space for possible opt-outs (ibid.). However, these ways of implementation only apply to member states within the EU. Other ENP countries outside the EU do not have to adopt European directives, give in to the power of the European Commission or create an opt-out as they are not obliged to follow EU directives. This raises
13 the question of how the EU can influence ENP countries on water management. The next paragraph addresses this issue.
1.2. External governance on water management
Member states are legally required to adopt policies and programmes defined by the supranational law of the EU. This form of governance is known as hierarchical governance (Knill & Tosun 2009). The specific and ultimate outcome of hierarchical governance is harmonisation, referring to a state where supranational policies are implemented in order to answer to an international obligation. However, water management by the IWRM approach is based on hydrographic boundaries that organise water management within the river basin districts, disregarding the national and political borders it may cross (Louka 2009). Since the IWRM is focused on a river basin district approach, non EU member states are also actors of potential cooperation. But although non EU member states are not obliged to follow or implement the EU’s WFD upon domestic water policy, this doesn’t mean that the EU cannot influence water policy outside its borders. Since there is evidence of rapid WFD implementation in countries not holding EU membership, harmonisation seems to find its way outside member states. It is this extension of internal EU policy rules that the notion of external governance seeks to capture (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning 2009). In order to understand the dynamics that can clarify why this pattern is occurring, the next paragraphs will analyse what accounts for the external effects of EU influence beyond its borders.
One of the most prominent examples of external governance is the EU’s enlargement policy (ibid.). In order to become a member, states need to adopt the EU acquis and therefore implement intense reforms. However, potential candidate countries for EU membership face more and stricter requirements in order to meet the conditions for accession than the admitted countries in the last enlargement period between 2004 and 2007 (ibid.). Today’s candidate countries have had slower transitions to liberal democracies and more difficulty in building the capacity of their judicial and administrative institutions, which are essential for effective EU governance (ibid.).
Over the past 10 years, the EU has developed and expanded the instruments of the ENP. The European Commission stated that ‘one of the goals regarding the participating countries is introducing sectoral reforms (...) in order to improve management and encourage the authorities to account for their decisions to those they administer’ (European Commission 2006). Stating this, the relationship between the EU and its neighbouring countries has
14 significantly intensified through the ENP as commitments were spelled out by both sides in the ENP action plans (European Commission 2015).
The relations between the EU and the neighbouring countries are currently structured in the legal framework provided by association agreements (ibid.). The Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 and made deep comprehensive trade agreements, as well as a loosened visa regime possible for countries in eastern Europe (European Commission 2015). Association agreements offer each Eastern Partnership country the opportunity to choose the level of integration and reform it will undertake (European Commission 2011). The implementation report of the European Commission (2011) states that association agreements can be used for regulatory and institutional convergence to align EU norms, laws and standards, leading progressively to economic integration in the internal market. In addition, civil society forums have been established, enhancing the views of civil society in the workings of the Eastern Partnership (ibid.).
The ENP is often seen as a replica of the existing accession policy, since the aforementioned reforms imply a one-way direction of European policy adoption by ENP countries. By adjusting the careful wording of policy adoption, the ENP is deviating more and more from accession policy. An example is the use of the term ‘legal approximation’, which was used to address the need for implementation of the EU acquis into domestic legislation of the ENP countries (Buzogány 2013). After some time, references of ‘approximation’ were replaced by the term ‘convergence’, which is understood as a less intensive and more gradual form of alignment (European Commission 2003). This illustrates how the ENP started to deviate as replica of the existing accession policy. Also, with President Juncker stating in the ENP of 2015 that ‘no further enlargement will take place over the next five years’ (European Commission 2015, p. 3), EU-membership prospects cannot account for the swift policy reforms in the ENP countries.
Since the literature falls short on providing an answer, this raises two questions; why are neighbouring countries aligning European policies and to what extent are the reforms in the ENP countries aligning EU’s water policy? Compliance to EU policy implies an analysis to what extent ENP countries act in accordance with the actual EU policy. In order to understand why countries with no EU - membership prospect actually implement the WFD, an analysis is conducted on explanatory theories of European policy adoption. However, since the scope of this master thesis does not enable inclusion of all ENP countries, Ukraine and Moldova have been selected to conduct a comparative case study. With the enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007, the EU needed to revise their relationship with their new eastern
15 neighbours. This was at the heart of the initial documents of the ENP. Ukraine and Moldova provide a good insight into the ENP process, due to the many reforms in water management in these countries since the ratification of the WFD in EU member states. In both countries, mass attitudes have generally been favourable towards the EU, which might explain a part of the incentive to reform (Sasse 2008). In both countries, the ENP is seen as a first step towards membership, even though this has been explicitly debunked by the EU (ibid.).
In the case of Ukraine, the EU and Ukraine signed the Association Agreement in 2014. This was the ultimate step to finalise the Free Trade Agreement, significantly expanding the Ukrainian market. The Association Agreement ‘notices the importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity; taking into account the strong public support in Ukraine for the country's European choice and confirming that the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine’ (European Union & Government of Ukraine 2014, p. 2). In line with the idea of the ENP, it failed however to give a specific indication if Ukraine could be eligible to join the EU (Sasse 2008). Article 363 specifically points out the ‘gradual approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law and policy on environment’ (European Union & Government of Ukraine 2014, p. 144). Upon entry into force of the Association Agreement in 2014, within two years the ‘adoption of national legislation and designation of competent authorities’ and ‘the establishment of a procedure for consultation with environmental authorities and a public consultation procedure’ (ibid., p. 1947) should be implemented. This means that by 2016, implementation of IWRM principles should be noticeable within legislation and in different layers of society such as institutions, non-state actors and civil society. But without an EU membership prospect, reforms in water management met some domestic resistance (Sasse 2008). This raises the question why Ukraine reforms at all, despite this resistance, high adaptation costs and without a future EU membership prospect. It also raises the question of how the reforms have been implemented, despite the resistance.
Similar to the water legislation of Ukraine, Moldova has its own ‘Environmental Strategy for the years 2014-2023’ (hereafter referred to as the Strategy). With the ratification of the Strategy, a long-term strategic reform planning in line with a sustainable way of water management according to the IWRM was introduced into Moldovan society for the 2014-2023 period. The commitments agreed in the Association Agreement, also signed in 2014, are fully included in this Strategy (Government of Moldova 2014). The Strategy states that ‘the level of the implementation of the Association Agreement and the Strategy strongly depends on whether the Republic of Moldova will join the European Union’ (Government of Moldova 2014, p. 61). This refers to a firm belief in Moldova joining the EU in the middle to
long-16 term, despite the fact that the ENP is not in favour of expanding the EU in the upcoming years (European Commission 2015). This raises the question to what extent Moldova is more outspoken to become a member of the EU compared to Ukraine and if this shows in Moldovan implementation of EU water management in national legislation.
The aforementioned paragraphs explained the dominant ideology of the EU concerning water management and its power to influence ENP-countries outside the EU via association agreements. It emphasised principles such as the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle, as well as the role of institutions, river basin management plans and involvement of the public. The principles of the IWRM and the WFD redefine the borders of European influence. Reforms in water management of Ukraine and Moldova are aligning EU water policy because of these principles, the ENP and association agreements. In order to understand the incentives for change of these two countries, the next chapter will address explanatory models.
Chapter two: Explanatory models of incentives for change towards European policy adoption
The previous section has shown the current status of EU water management and how external governance is issued via association agreements. In order to understand how the EU is able to influence countries beyond its border without providing a membership prospect, the external incentive theory and the socialisation and policy learning theory are analysed to seek an explanation.
2.1. The external incentive model
The external incentive model is a ‘rationalist bargaining model’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p. 663). This entails rational actors that are interested in the ‘maximisation of their own power and welfare’ (ibid.). This is pursued via a costs versus benefit calculation, where the benefits of reforming will have to outweigh the costs. Compliance costs will be lower when there is a high degree of preferential fit between national legislation and the EU acquis (Gorton et al. 2010; Knill & Tosun 2009). This means that changing the national law to EU law doesn’t entail much reform.
According to this model, the EU follows a strategy of conditionality where the EU sets its rules as conditions. The neighbouring countries will have to fulfil these in order to receive EU rewards, such as co-operation via association agreements (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Since the neighbouring countries such as Ukraine and Moldova have no future EU
17 membership prospect, the EU can influence national policy by inflicting extra costs (‘reinforcement by punishment’) or offering extra benefits (‘reinforcement by support’) (ibid.). A concrete example of reinforcement by punishment within water management is the polluter pays principle. Here the EU holds non EU members responsible for the costs of water pollution if the source of the pollution is actually located within the non-member state. However, if neighbouring countries would adopt EU policy in the field of water quality for example, the benefits of access to more clean water would balance or even outweigh the costs of pollution. The most general proposition of the external incentive model is therefore that a state is most likely to adopt EU policy if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs (ibid.).
Rule adoption becomes more likely when the reward of extra benefits will be due in the near future. A vivid example of this was the reforms in the pre-accession countries, where countries were willing to adopt and implement EU policies rapidly due to the near accession to the EU. However, since the reward for neighbouring countries does not entail future EU membership in the short term, this gives rise to the question why the water sector in Ukraine and Moldova is changing quickly. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that the longer the temporal distance of the payment of rewards is, the lower the incentive to comply (swiftly)’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p. 665). But due to the aforementioned arguments, this does not explain the reforms in water management in Ukraine and Moldova.
Casier (2011) argues how the perceived prospect of accession could explain the incentives to reform. He argues that the attempt of neighbouring countries to show proper implementation of EU policy is based on the hope of increasing their chances of becoming an EU member in the mid or longer term (Casier 2011). This might explain why Ukraine and Moldova have implemented the costly reforms. Both countries have appointed a Deputy Prime minister for European Integration, in order to ensure approximation of national law with EU rules (ibid.). This also contributes to their reputation of trustworthy and legitimate partners. Casier (2011) argues that Ukraine and Moldova count on ‘a process in which accession becomes the inevitable option’ (ibid., p. 49).
The explanatory potential of the external incentive model entails a thorough understanding of states as rational actors, basing their action on cost-benefit calculations in order to maximise their gains. However, the model falls short on explaining why states comply when rewards are shoved on the long term. A possible incentive to reform could be the potential of becoming a future EU member state, as Casier (2011) stated. This might explain why costly reforms are implemented by non EU member states.
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2.2. Socialisation & the policy learning model
In contrast to the rationalist model of external incentives, the socialisation model assumes a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March & Olsen 1989, p. 160). According to this logic, the actors involved are motivated by their choice of action. Among alternative options, they choose the most appropriate or legitimate one. The perception of the EU as a legitimate rule-setting institution contributes to the likelihood of neighbouring countries adopting EU legislation (Jano 2016; Lavenex 2014; Manners 2002). The legitimacy of the EU increases if EU norms and values are perceived as appropriate and are accepted as new governmental standards (Lavenex 2014; Manners 2002). Correspondingly, socialisation and policy learning is characterised by arguing about legitimacy, rather than bargaining about rewards (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004).
In order to achieve this, the EU uses more horizontal forms of governance, known as network governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). By socialisation of political and administrative elites, the EU promotes mutual learning and voluntary information exchange in EU-sponsored networks. By setting up an institutionalised infrastructure for the exchange of information, policy learning via network governance might explain the way in which external governance can exercise its influence beyond EU borders (Knill & Tosun 2009). The more a country exchanges information with the EU, the more likely it will adopt European environmental policies in the end. Therefore, the most general proposition of socialisation and the policy learning model is that a state is most likely to adopt EU policy if it is convinced of the appropriateness of EU rules (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Specific examples of the EU working in these networks within water management are the Danube Commission and the International Commission on the Protection of the Danube.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue how the policy learning model also captures a ‘dissatisfaction with the status quo’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p. 667), meaning that a non-member state adopts EU policy without incentives or persuasion of socialisation, but generally seeks a solution to a domestic problem. Transferability of EU rules is part of researching the likelihood of European policy adoption. The general proposition for this theory is that a state is most likely to adopt EU policy if it expects these rules to solve domestic problems effectively (ibid.).
The strength of the explanatory potential of this model lies in its capacity to conceptualise the EU as a legitimate rule setter. Furthermore, the argument raised by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) remains interesting as they argue that incentives to reforms could also be based on the resolving effectiveness of EU policy for domestic issues
19 concerning water management. This might explain reforms in Ukraine and Moldova, despite the fact that they do not hold an EU membership prospect.
Source: Gorton et al., 2010, p. 581.
2.3. Preliminary conclusion of the theory
The aforementioned paragraphs analysed the literature that explains why European policy adoption happens in two countries despite having no EU membership prospect. This was structured along two theories. First, the external incentive model explained how the costs of compliance depend on the benefits reforms would give. The belief of future membership described by Casier (2011) might hold the highest potential to explain successful policy adoption in Ukraine and Moldova. Second, the socialisation and policy learning model argued how political elites are socialised via network governance. After they accepted the EU as a legitimate rule-setting institution, ENP countries can work via an institutional basis towards EU compliance. However, dissatisfaction with the status quo was mentioned as a powerful incentive to reform policy. This raises the question in what way policy reforms are actually implemented in order to change the status quo. Theory on implementation of European policy adoption will be addressed in the next chapter.
Table 1: Explanatory models for European policy adoption by Gorton et al. (2010)
External incentive model Socialisation & policy learning
Conceptualisation Rationalist bargaining: government adopts EU rules if it benefits outweigh expected costs
Government adopts EU rules based on the opinion of appropriateness of EU rules
Unit of analysis Legal harmonisation Rule adoption
Factors affecting compliance
Balance of costs versus benefits Degree to which EU rules are seen as superior, legitimate and achievable
Assumptions Rule adjustment is costly. Willingness to learn prompted by domestic quest for solution of local problems
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Chapter three: Explanatory models for the implementation of EU policy in ENP countries
Scholars on Europeanisation agree that the domestic impact of European policy adoption is differential (Börzel 2011; Buzogany 2013). The high degree of incompatibility between EU policy and national law complicates implementation (Langbein & Börzel 2013). Due to the weak regulatory capacities of institutions, the likelihood of successful implementation of new legislation is challenged even more (ibid.). The pressure for adaptation is however high, meeting resistance from below (ibid.). This implies an analysis to what extent policy adoption is actually implemented into its new society. In order to understand how implementation of European policy adoption works, domestic actors are analysed to see how the reforms affect them. This will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
3.1. The domestic governance theory
Börzel (2011) argues that external governance empowers reform actors within the government, rather than within a society. When it comes to the practical implementation of action plans, the EU has focused on enhancing the effectiveness of state institutions, rather than domestic actors as civil society or non-state actors. By enhancing the capacity of state institutions, this means a fight against corruption, raising adaptation costs. Due to these high costs, reform resistance can occur in grassroots actors. However, the influence of civil society and non-state actors is generally weak because of the authoritarian legacy of the Soviet Union’s socialist regime. A brief summary of the positions of these actors is provided below.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that external incentives are more likely to cause domestic resistance, accompanied by poor implementation as it is more focused on formal rule adoption and lacks continued monitoring to control implementation (ibid.). Non-state actors often lack sufficient expertise, information and money to act as watchdogs of practical application and enforcement. This lack of political autonomy expels the influence of domestic non-state actors. Buzogány (2013) argues that these domestic actors can be actively involved in supporting or opposing alignment of external rules, as they might provide them with economic benefits. Strengthening the influence of NGOs as well as the business sector was used by the European Commission to enforce EU rule adoption in accession states (Buzogány 2013). Sachs (1995) argues that by decreasing the role of the state via the enhancement of appointing property rights, economic targets can be used as instruments of environmental control. By privatising enterprises, companies become responsible for their
21 environmental discharge and this might enhance their rational use of water. By not being supported by the central bank, firms become more responsive to market incentives, as well as implementing an absolute decline in heavy industry (ibid.).
Table 2: Explanatory models for European policy adoption by Gorton et al. (2010)
Domestic governance
Conceptualisation States experience difficulty in ability to ratify changes
Unit of analysis Practical implementation on the ground, enforced by the government
Factors affecting compliance Depends on the nature of civic culture; traditions.
Assumptions Failure to effectively implement European legislation is rooted in domestic institutional failure and political culture
Source: Gorton et al., 2010, p. 581.
Wetzel (2011) argues that public participation is a regular component of EU-financed, water-related projects. By stating public participation within the decision-making process as a project goal, the EU ensures that part of the process of convergence also covers the implementation of certain norms via concrete action. This is especially worthy in situations where top-down leverage (for example EU membership) or bottom-up linkage strategies (for example access to the EU’s market) reach their limits (Lavenex 2014; Wetzel 2011). With its focus on the transfer of functional solutions for policy problems, this governance approach emphasizes the role of institutions and the role of public participation (Lavenex 2014).
The explanatory potential of domestic governance dynamics lies in its capacity to explain how a top-down structure conflicts with the influence of grassroots actors. By only focusing on the state-owned institutional layer to implement reforms, a major proportion of the domestic actors is neglected, causing poor implementation of EU policy.
22
3.2. Preliminary conclusion of the theory
Compliance implies an analysis as to what extent ENP countries actually act in accordance with EU policies (Langbein & Börzel 2013). According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) the external incentive model is more likely to cause domestic resistance as it is more focused on formal rule adoption. The high degree of incompatibility between EU policy and national law complicates implementation even more (Langbein & Börzel 2013). The pressure for adaptation is however high, meeting resistance from below (ibid.). But since EU’s external governance empowers reform actors within the government, society is left behind (Börzel 2011). Non-state actors often lack sufficient expertise and resources to be involved with the implementation process. According to the theory, this causes deficits between European policy adoption and actual implementation within society. This claim is being researched in the next chapters of this master thesis.
Chapter four: Methodology
4.1. Case selection
This research is conducted as a case-based research. This means that the focus is on a relatively small number of cases (N=2), analysed with attention to each case as an interpretable whole, seeking to understand the complex unity rather than establish relationships between variables (Della Porta 2008). Ukraine and Moldova are chosen as case studies, since they are both within the European Neighbourhood Policy but do not qualify as EU candidate states as they do not have a future EU membership prospect. Yet policy adoption on water management in these countries is taking place rapidly. Both countries have signed association agreements, taking up an impressive number of commitments to reform (Casier 2011). Situated between two power blocs, namely the EU and Russia, Ukraine is a viable case to test the success of the ENP and the influence of the EU. As a downstream country of the Danube river, Moldova has a strong interest in cooperating with the EU on water management. In both countries, the EU is one of the most important financiers of environmental cooperation in the region (Freyburg et al. 2011).
4.2. Data collection
Both case studies consist of primary and secondary data. Primary data consists in both cases of qualitative content analysis of policy documents from the European Union and textual data from the Ukrainian and Moldovan European integration offices. Translated textual data of EU
23 policy documents shows how the governments of both countries mainly describe the intention rather than the actual implementation steps, influencing the actual policy reforms. By using more than one method and source, triangulation of data resources made it possible to cross-check findings within the literature and policy documents, centering the contextual understanding in both cases (Bryman 2012). By analysing these policy documents, an understanding was created on what processes management of water is more dependent on. This is in line with what Della Porta (2008) names as ‘Weberian logics in comparative politics’, that would aim at concrete knowledge about processes. Via progress reports, both perspectives of the two ENP countries and the EU have been compared.
This way of content analysis does not answer the ‘why-question’. This is why additional data-collection in the form of semi-structured interviews has been conducted in order to be able to understand why water policies of the two countries have been reformed and to what extent European policy adoption has been implemented in today’s Ukrainian and Moldovan society. Sampling of the respondents has been done by quota, since the data has focused on experts in the field of water policy in the two countries. Interviews were conducted with legislative diplomats, as well as professionals in the business sector and water institutions. In total 56 professionals were approached via email; 20 in the case of Ukraine, 22 in the case of Moldova and 14 professionals working on water management in both countries via the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Of the 56 professionals approached, 16 professionals replied and 40 did not. Eventually 4 interviews were held: 2 with Ukrainian experts and 2 with Moldovan experts. Five respondents were not comfortable speaking English over Skype for an interview and replied to an emailed questionnaire and sent some policy documents as annexes to the questionnaire.
Secondary data in this master thesis is used as background information on the topic of water management and consists of published journal articles and books. Here, content analysis also justifies replication as content analysis by coding schemes enhances external reliability. By using triangulation of textual data and interviews, the internal validity was higher as there was a good match between textual concepts and discussed topics and understandings in the interview.
4.3. Methodology of the research analysis
By interviewing the respondents in a semi-structured way, the opportunity arose to enable respondents to express themselves in their own words, what they find important and how they
24 see these water policy reforms. This added valuable information to the aim of this research for a better understanding of water management and the influence of the EU on water policy. Doing the interviews gave valuable insights that went beyond the official documents.
The main aim of the interviews was to understand why the water sector in both countries has been reformed in the way it was and to see if adoption of the EU rules shows in implementation on the ground. Scholars on Europeanisation provide a rich pool of explanatory variables accounting for policy change (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). Since this master thesis is about testing how the EU influenced the water policies of Ukraine and Moldova, the interviews were structured along the four main principles on which EU water policy is based: Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). The three main principles entail (1) water knowledge in line with sustainable development via IWRM, (2) the participatory role of institutions, (3) the participatory role of non-state actors and (4) the participatory role of civil society (4) (UN 1992). Examples of the questions in the interviews were (1) Why, do you think, are water sectors in the eastern region reforming their policies/ what is deficit in their own policies?, (2) Do you see water policies reformed to align with EU policy? And (3) In your line of work, do you see water policy changing in a way that enhances the role of institutions/ non-state actor / civil society?.
By analysing policy documents, bilateral agreements between the two countries and the EU and national legislation, an understanding of the dominant water ideology can be detected. This would create an understanding if water ideology parallels with the first IWRM principle. The second principle is a research in the role of institutions. Institutions are understood as the central authorities in environmental protection and water management other than the Ministry of Environment or other government bodies. This could include research institutes, universities and water authorities. The third principle covers the role of non-state actors, including the business sector and non-governmental organisations. The fourth principle encounters the role of civil society. Here, public awareness and open access to information and data of water statistics is tested.
After the interviews, transcribing and coding were applied to analyse the understanding of these professionals and to see if they included matching and overarching themes and understandings. Used labels to classify quotes in the interviews were ‘Biography of the expert’, ‘The problem’, ‘Implementation’, ‘Legislation’, ‘Institutions’, ‘Non-state actor’, ‘Public salience’ and ‘Water knowledge’. The label ‘The problem’ was eventually arrayed under the research paragraph ‘Incentives for change’. Data under the ‘Implementation’- label was divided between ‘Water knowledge’ and ‘Legislation’.
25 Secondary data was analysed via content analysis. By bringing together primary data such as policy documents and interviews, and secondary data, such as research by reputable research institutes, a balance was found to explore the dynamics between the written intentions of policy documents and the actual implementation on the ground.
4.4. Hypotheses
This master thesis is testing several theories using the two case studies. Regarding the literature in the previous chapters, the next hypotheses have been formulated to structure the aims of this master thesis. The first research question states why Ukraine and Moldova align their water policies with EU’s water management. The external incentives theory and the socialisation and policy learning theory have been discussed to answer this question. This raises two hypotheses that can answer the first research question:
1. EU policy adoption by Ukraine and Moldova depends on external incentives such as a belief in future membership (External incentive model).
2. EU policy adoption by Ukraine and Moldova depends on socialisation of political elites whereby the EU is seen as a legitimate rule setter to solve the dissatisfaction with the status quo (Socialisation and policy learning model).
The second research question states to what extent Ukraine and Moldova align their water policies with EU’s water management based on IWRM. The domestic governance theory argued how different layers of society should be involved with the implementation process. This raises the next hypothesis:
3. The implementation of EU’s water policy depends on the involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society (Domestic governance model).
26
Chapter five: The case of Ukraine
Although EU President Juncker stated that ‘no further enlargement of the EU will take place over the next five years’ (European Commission 2015, p. 3), Ukraine has been reforming its water policy in a way that it aligns with EU rules. This raised the research question: why are water policies of Ukraine (and Moldova) reforming to align with the EU’s water management policy?.
According to the voluminous literature, two theories would be able to explain incentives to change. The external incentives model explained how the costs of compliance depends on the benefits reforms would give. Here, the highest benefit to change was a belief in future membership. The second theory described how socialisation and policy learning trigger incentives to change the status quo. The next paragraphs will provide an answer to the first research question.
5.1. Incentives for change towards European policy adoption
As mentioned before, the Association Agreement ‘notices the importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity; taking into account the strong public support in Ukraine for the country's European choice and confirming that the European Union acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine’ (European Union & Government of Ukraine 2014, p. 2). The ‘European aspirations of Ukraine’ could be seen as a desire to become a future EU member. Two interviews have been conducted with Ukrainian professionals in the field of water management to see what their view is on the reforms. The first interview was conducted with a Ukrainian OSCE officer specialised in cross border water management between Ukraine and Moldova. The second interview was with the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Hydrometeorology Research Institute (hereafter referred to as the Deputy Head). This independent research institute conducts studies about climate change scenarios in all eight river basins of Ukraine and provides technical support for hydromatic activities in the country.
When asking the Depute Head about incentives to reform the current water policies of Ukraine, one of the main concerns of the Deputy Head is the water quality. He states that the drinking water in the area of the city of Kiev after water purification is ‘not good’1
. Water contains high levels of nitrates and phosphates, which are not healthy for human consumption. Stated in the national Environmental law of Ukraine, in terms of water resources management
27 and water quality, Ukraine ranks 95th among the total of 122 countries, according to UNESCO data (Government of Ukraine 2010). A second problem, according to the Deputy Head, are the outdated pipelines to transport the water. During summer time when the air temperature is on the rise, bacteria of the old pipelines contaminate the water, giving it a ‘bad smell’2
. But in order to renovate or build new pipelines, the development of new protocols is also needed. New rules and regulations on how to correctly operate it, is paving the will and the need to reform. In light of the socialisation and policy learning model, the arguments of the Deputy Head clearly indicate a dissatisfaction with the status quo. Domestic problems such as the poor water quality and the outdated pipelines are in need of an effective solution. This implies that the socialisation and policy learning model can explain incentives for change because of a dissatisfaction with the status quo and a belief that EU policy would be the legitimate solution to these domestic problems.
The domestic reasons why any reform is needed are clear. But why did Ukraine reform specifically in line with EU policies? When asking the respondents in an interview if the reforms in water policies are due to a certain influence by the EU, the Deputy Head’s first reply is: ‘No, because the floods don’t depend on the EU’3
. Climate change and the expected higher and heavier floods are the main reasons for pursuing change, he argues. However, when asked specifically what the role of the Association Agreement is, the Deputy Head as well as the Ukrainian OSCE officer reply that the many obligations set out in the Association Agreement clearly indicate what should be done to reform to align with the WFD. This means that the influence of the EU is specifically mentioned regarding policy adoption through the Association Agreement. In light of the theory of socialisation, the EU is apparently seen as a legitimate rule setter via the Association Agreement.
The data from the interviews contradict the statement made in the Association Agreement. Both respondents did not acknowledge European aspiration for Ukraine or a future belief in EU membership, nor even a desire to become a future member. When asking the Ukrainian OSCE officer if she thinks Ukrainian membership to the EU is a viable option she explains that the Association Agreement is ‘above all based on a sectoral approach, willing to give technical assistance in factors we need to change’4
. A clear indication that the reward for reforms would eventually be future EU membership on the long term was not
2 Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4 Interview with the water expert at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine,
28 found. This disconfirms the explanation provided by the external incentive model in the case of reforms in Ukraine in water management.
5.2. Preliminary conclusion of the first research question
In order to understand why Ukraine reformed the way it did, the answer seems to be twofold. The first answer is mainly based on a dissatisfaction with the status quo. Reforms of the EU documented in the Association Agreements are believed as appropriate solution to domestic problems. The second answer is pointing to the importance of the Association Agreement, in which technical assistance is provided by the EU. A belief in future membership was absent in both interviews with the respondents, even though it is specifically mentioned in the Association Agreement as such. This indicates a deviation between statements made in the Association Agreements and the actual implementation of reforms on the ground. This triggers the next and second research question: to what extent is the reformed water policy of Ukraine actually implemented into Ukrainian society? This is being analysed in the next paragraphs.
5.3. Implementation of EU policy in Ukraine
The next paragraphs addresses the second research question. In order to understand what the reforms exactly entail, some research has been done on the actual alignment of national law with EU policy. Section 5.3.1.1. will cover the change Ukrainian water knowledge has made, followed by a section that will elaborate on how this change has effected national law. This will be evaluated in light of the first principle of IWRM. Then, according to the remaining three principles of IWRM, an analysis will be done in what way the new policy adoption actually has been implemented on the ground.
5.3.1. Policy convergence of Ukrainian law to EU policy 5.3.1.1. Convergence in water knowledge
Going back to the first chapter this thesis, EU’s water knowledge is based on the four principles of the IWRM consisting of (1) the holistic approach to a sustainable water policy based on the development of human societies and economies, (2) institutions should have a participatory role in the arrangements and management of water resources, (3) implementing and evaluating the IWRM based on the participatory role of the public and (4) raising awareness of the importance of water among policy-makers and the general public (UN 1992, p. 13-14). The IWRM has been implemented in the EU via the WFD, emphasising the three concepts that could be considered the organizing pillars of IWRM in the EU, including (1)
29 river basin districts as the organising/planning unit for water management, (2) river basin management plans as planning tool for the river basin districts and (3) enforcing the consultation with and participation of the public (European Parliament and Council 2000).
In this research, the first principle of the IWRM is seen as the dominant assumption of water knowledge in the EU. Concerning the reforms in Ukrainian water policies, changes have been made to involve basin management, which is one of the pillars of the WFD, within water management. This has been incorporated into the Ukrainian Water Plan of 2002 (GWP 2012). These changes in the methodology of water planning show that Ukrainian law is approaching EU water knowledge. This is also specifically stated in the ‘Concept of the National Targeted Program for Water Management Development up to 2020’ (hereafter referred to as the Concept), which was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2009 (ibid.). According to the Concept, the integrated water management policy should be endorsed through the basin principle and it implements the key direction of national policy towards the WFD (GWP 2012b; UNEP et al. 2007). The IWRM ideology emphasises rational use of water with respect for next generations to come. By implementing the IWRM ideology, the old Soviet approach was replaced. Main points on which these two ideologies differ is the fact that the Soviet approach, in contrast to the IWRM, emphasised water resource quantity to meet the needs of the people and domestic industry, rather than water quantity being used in a more sustainable and thrifty manner (GWP 2012b). In an e-mail received from the First Secretary of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU, she states that ‘one of the most important strategic directions of the state water policy is the reform to integrate the IWRM via the river basin principle’5
. She expressed the view that the existing state system in this sphere is ‘simply outdated and inefficient’6
.
That the change of water knowledge is skewing towards the IWRM can also be seen in water assessment methodology. Up until 2007, water quality and climate studies in Ukraine were conducted on a national scale, based on either geology or on the basis of other zoning (for example landscape of provincial zoning). Since 2007, river basins are the base on which these studies are being carried out (GWP 2012b; UNEP et al. 2007). This new way of zoning also implied a different way of assessing water quality. The aforementioned Soviet approach is based on the so-called ‘zero-risk approach’ to assess the impact of chemical and bacteriological continuation of water on human health (GWP 2012b). Risk was calculated at 0% when measured below a maximum permitted level and calculated as 100% risk when
5 E-mail contact with the First Secretary of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU, Ukraine, 10/5/2016
30 pollution exceeded this limit (ibid.). When interviewing the Deputy Head, he confirms that concerning the assessment of Ukrainian water bodies, the way of assessment stems from the Soviet era, analysing the maximum permissible concentration of pollutants. However, since the law is now aligning the WFD, the way to assess water quality is reforming, focussing on other biological parameters. Considering this new way of water quality assessment, water pollutants in Ukraine tend to be higher. The old assessment style took the natural conditions of ground water into account, while the WFD assesses water solely on other biological parameters and on stricter concentration of pollutants, ignoring the origin of the water.
When analysing capital investment streams, a change in the statistics in graph 1 can be observed. Although the new EU regulations require higher standards when it comes to water quality, investments in the purification of waste water appears to be decreasing while other non-water related topics seem to gain in investment values. This is remarkable because as EU water purification standards are higher than Ukrainian standards, Ukraine would be expected to invest more in water purification in order to align with EU rules. However, the statistics show that the investments in purification of waste water is decreasing. This shows that Ukraine is not embracing the precautionary principle, which states that pollution should be prevented at the source.
Source: State Statistic Service of Ukraine, 2015, p. 498
To summarise this section, change in water knowledge is noticeable in two ways. First, water management is now reduced to the level of basin management by law. Second, implementation of new water assessment strategies deviate from the dominant Soviet approach. This contributes to endorsement of water knowledge through the IWRM ideology
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 1996 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Graph 1: Structure of capital investment in environmental protection, by purpose
Other, non water related environmental topics Protection of surface and subsurface water Purification of waste water
31 of the EU. In order to understand in what way this change is legally supported, research has been done on the changes in national legislation of Ukraine.
5.3.1.2. Convergence in national legislation
As stated in the aforementioned paragraphs, water knowledge of Ukraine is changing towards supporting IWRM. Since this master thesis is about European policy adoption, this section will briefly outline the major changes in national legislation. This will be the basis from which the implementation of other principles of IWRM can be tested.
The parliament of Ukraine approved the ‘Fundamental Principles of Strategy of Ukraine's State Environmental Policy for the Period until 2020’ (further referred to as the Strategy) in 2010 (Government of Ukraine 2010). The Strategy, together with the corresponding Environmental Action Plan (adopted in 2011), legislatively reformed state water management in line with the WFD and legally implemented the IWRM based on the river basin approach by stating that:
‘Reforms of the public administration system in the field of water protection and efficiency shall be done by adopting integrated water resource management in accordance with the basin principle’ (ibid., p. 11).
When asking the respondents about actual implementation of this legislative reform, both respondents active in the Ukrainian water sector pointed out that on the 22nd of April 2016 a vote was held in the Ukrainian parliament in order to change the Water Code, which had to align with the WFD and is key in implementing the WFD on a legislative level. The actual content changing of the law was already done. However, both respondents admit that the actual ratification of the new Water Code is not yet completed. Noting that the Strategy has been ratified since 2010, the actual change of legislation apparently has to wait. When asked why this legislative reform process is taking so long, the Deputy Head replied laughing: ‘These guys have issues!’7
, referring to the troubled and long lasting process of ratification the ministers encounter. In addition to this statement, the OSCE officer points out that in order to ratify any treaty or agreement, the approval of all ministries and central authorities in Ukraine is needed. If one minister is replaced, the signature of the other ministries have to be sought all over. This never-ending continuum, together with the fact that the government of Ukraine sees ministers come and go with increasing regularity, makes ratifying any agreement a
