Phenomenology and self-disclosure
On the truth theory of Martin Heidegger
Tijmen Lansdaal
Written under the supervision of:
Christian Skirke
University of AmsterdamJulian Kiverstein
Amsterdam Medical Center (Second reader)Michael Wheeler
University of Stirling (Third reader)Contents
INTRODUCTION §1. A conception of truth as the wedge in phenomenology §2. Historical background §3. Methodological remarks §4. Thesis structure: a retrospective narrative I. CLEARING-CONCEALING Chapter 1: The premises of the Beiträge §5. Introduction to Heidegger's transitional thinking §6. The Leitfrage of metaphysics §7. The relevance of truth in the Grundfrage Chapter 2: The true and the veritable §8. The orthotic conception of truth §9. The nihilistic conception of self §10. Truth as a shelter Chapter 3: Qualified unconcealment §11. Summary of the foregoing §12. ἀλήθεια's 'privation' and its difference from the notion of 'unconcealment' II. DISCLOSEDNESS Chapter 4: Tugendhat's critique §13. Basic tenets of Tugendhat's critique §14. Existentialist elaborations §15. Reply to existential interpretations of Heidegger's conception of truth §16. Exegetical problems concerning the notion of disclosedness Chapter 5: The breach of inauthenticity §17. The they-self §18. The proper nihilistic situation: anxiety §19. Summary of the foregoing Chapter 6: Truth and untruth §20. Heidegger's truth-discussion §21. Sein und Zeit's connection to the Beiträge: concealment1 1 2 3 4 6 6 6 7 8 9 9 11 12 13 13 14 17 17 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 26 27 27 28
Chapter 7: Heidegger's critique of phenomenology §22. Being as an immanent standard for entities §23. On consciousness and intentionality §24. Categorial intuition Chapter 8: Husserl's account §25. Heidegger's misrepresentation of the phenomenological method §26. Reappraisal of Husserlian concepts from the Logische Untersuchungen §27. Husserl's definitions of truth in conjunction with Heidegger's interpretations §28. Evidence as categorial §29. Assessment of the debate CONCLUSION §30. An infinitely challenging normativity §31. Intentional acts, thinking and philosophical practice §32. Self-disclosure BIBLIOGRAPHY NOTES 30 30 31 32 34 34 35 37 38 39 41 41 42 44 47 50
Introduction
§1. A conception of truth as the wedge in phenomenology Unlike 'Late Heidegger', 'Early Heidegger' endorsed phenomenological methodology in a way that is considered not to be decisively different from that of other phenomenologists, and he is therefore usually grouped with them. The method is often understood as something that is relatively easy to get the gist of, with some formulations more ideal than others. I think this is a mistake. Martin Heidegger deemed it necessary to break his association with his teacher Edmund Husserl. Moreover, 'late' Heidegger even abandoned his explicit adoption of the phenomenological method in order to radicalize his own position. As I argue here, there is considerable difference between Husserl's and Heidegger's views on truth, which is crucial to their ideas on the purpose of a phenomenological practice. In my view, Heidegger misunderstands Husserl's conception of truth, leading him to adopt a number of problematic presuppositions about the practice of philosophy. In so far as Heidegger adopts phenomenology, he does so with aims much more obscure than one might recognize at first glance. Surely, the two agree that phenomenology must be self-examination [Selbstbesinnung]1, but toHeidegger there is a problem with the way one's self is construed by Husserlian philosophy. Heidegger is faced with a problem on the topic of selfhood that, had he grasped the proper potential of Husserl's writings on the topic of truth, could have been approached in a more fruitful way.
Heidegger's conception of truth has been controversial ever since interpreter Ernst Tugendhat criticized it in the 1960s. As he convincingly argued, it is not clear why the conception is a theory of truth at all, in the sense that it does not seem to explain a phenomenon of truth (but rather something else), and in the sense that it cannot explain the opposition of truth to untruth. William H. Smith rightly comments that in order to vindicate Heidegger's conception of truth and to dispute Tugendhat's critique, one would have to provide a new and exegetically more satisfying account of its normative dimension2. This I call Smith's normativity challenge. I think one can formulate a
sufficiently convincing repudiation of Tugendhat to meet the challenge. As a close reading with regard to this kind of normativity shows, Heidegger's conception of truth has no opposition of truth to untruth. This opposition is a traditional element of conceptions of truth, considered paramount, and Husserlian phenomenology has it. Heidegger wants to distinguish himself from this norm, because he thinks it in principle cannot comply with the norm of 'authenticity' [eigentlichkeit]. Authenticity demands that one does not just correctly communicate the nature of just any entity in order to attain truth, but that one presents oneself as one is, which is to say: that one lives a life truly "of one's own". To Heidegger there is no way to make oneself manifest, which consequently means that an authentic self-realization has to attest to this impossibility. However, Heidegger's misunderstanding of the Husserlian conception of truth has to do precisely with the way in which the self is disclosed: with Husserl's more traditional ideas on normativity one can express one's own being in right and wrong ways. Having shown that the normative issues in Heidegger's conception of truth misunderstand the way one's self is involved in cases of truth and untruth, and having argued that one should not abandon an opposition of truth and untruth on this point, I have in this sense reinvigorated Tugendhat's point of critique.
My thesis thus presents a critique of Heidegger in the usual, negative sense, and an unusual, positive sense. The positive sense can be understood along the lines of Heidegger's own ideas on criticism: I explain and analyze his philosophy by use of distinctions, so as to highlight a decisive particular in it3. This is, in the case of my thesis, his sense of normativity regarding the topic of truth. My suggestion on this point is that Heidegger holds (what I call) a nihilistic conception of self. This means that Heidegger unconditionally denies the possibility for any kind of presence of oneself to oneself, such that authenticity would have to be both true and untrue. In the negative sense I argue against his motivation to adopt such a theory of self and provide a Husserlian alternative to his conception of truth that would remedy pertinent problems. §2. Historical background
Although one may be able to find less articulate precursors, Aristotle was the first to define truth. His formulation was found to be so striking and intuitively plausible that up to this day philosophers still find it to be explaining truth in a very basic sense. The complex but insightful definition secured perhaps the most long-standing approval among philosophers in any topic of philosophy. A 'new' conception of truth in this regard usually only elucidates how this formula works. The definition is stated as follows: τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἢ μὴ ὂν εἶναι ψευδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὂν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές [To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; but to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true]4 The definition means to differentiate true sentences from false ones. Given there is no other option, it reflects the principle of Non-Contradiction: one cannot say something that is both true and untrue, considering this would amount to saying of something (which may or may not be) that it is and is not at the same time. Not yet at issue is what is responsible for the truth of a sentence, which is to say that something would have to be the case or not for a sentence to be true or not. Aristotle's formulation is merely suggestive: 'saying something of something' seems to imply a relation of what is said to reality. In the 13th century Thomas of Aquinas attempted to make this intuition more obvious by reformulating 'veritas' [truth] as an 'adequatio rei et intellectus' [correspondence of thing and intellect]. The idea is that what the intellect produces (be it some thought or expression) holds a relation of correspondence to a real thing in the world. For that reason, this version is called the 'classical correspondence theory of truth'5.
It was only in the 19th century that philosophers began to question Aquinas' correspondence theory of truth. For example, one issue is that if something is true, and a relation holds between thought and reality, then it follows that one would never be able to truly state that it is true, given that this relation is not itself real. Problems surrounding the definition of truth would culminate in numerous new conceptions of truth from 1900 and onwards, mostly predominant in the academia of the Anglo-Saxon world, among philosophers that would in that time find themselves at odds with philosophy as practiced on the continent. However, the two main figures of phenomenology, Husserl and Heidegger, had a similar reaction to the discussion of the 19th century. They found it necessary to disassociate themselves from the classical theory and hereby instate a conception of truth of their own accord. To Husserl, it would be important to distinguish his newfound outlook on scientific philosophy from his
teacher Franz Brentano, who was one of the most influential figures to critique the classical view. The topic must have been wildly attractive to Heidegger, an avid student of Husserl and a huge admirer of ancient Greek philosophy. Perhaps overly convinced that the Greeks had a more accomplished sense of truth via their 'primordial' employment of the notion of ἀλήθεια [truth] than conceptions of truth he was familiar with, he intended to contrive a conception of truth that would upend any traditional conception.
Although few have paid attention to the importance of the topic of truth within phenomenological philosophy, one commentator was particularly influential in showing the critical role it played: Ernst Tugendhat. As said before, he stirred up controversy through a compelling critique of Heidegger's conception of truth. Now, more than fifty years later, this critique still gains attention from Heideggerians repudiating the critique, and additionally from other philosophers unconvinced by these Heideggerians. As Smith's and Christian Skirke's commentaries on this debate make clear, a compelling defense of Heidegger's conception of truth has yet to be given. With this thesis, I thus intend to show that on the one hand Tugendhat's critique gives an inadequate (but influential) account of Heidegger's intentions, which allows me to defend Heidegger, and that on the other hand there is still a problem with Heidegger's conception that has a lot to do with the topic addressed by Tugendhat (normativity). In this sense, my critique of Heidegger's conception of truth elaborates on that of Tugendhat. §3. Methodological remarks As for the method of my thesis, it intends to interpret philosophical conceptions in the right way. Expounding the right method for interpretation as such is a philosophical debate on its own (hermeneutics), and there is no room in this thesis to adequately represent debates concerning such methods. However, the topic of truth is axiomatic for such debates, in the sense that they show how truth is attained in the business of interpretation specifically, and not what truth as such is. For current purposes, I simply suppose that my thesis engages in the hermeneutic conduct proper to attaining truth in this matter, and ignore potential issues with my method of interpretation. Engaging in such a method is seemingly contrary to Heidegger's views, because he thinks the concept of 'correctness' [Richtigkeit] is presupposed in it, which is an idea that he considers problematic. With regard to this issue I assume one can, and I therefore try to, explain Heidegger's philosophy in a sufficiently telling way, so as to determine his reasons for not endorsing a conception of truth that involves correctness. However, I also intend to show that these reasons are not compelling, and that therefore ultimately I should be justified in upholding the idea of an adequate depiction of Heidegger's conception of truth.
As I hold to be true, the concept of truth is not a topic ancillary to the primary question of Heidegger's philosophy, but crucial to understanding its importance. However one would want to formulate the 'fundamental-ontological' enigma, this question concerns 'Being'. For Heidegger this is a problem of unmatched proportion, which upsets the whole tradition of philosophy, and to which he is not able to provide an immediate solution. It is a grave symptom of hermeneutic misconduct that most Heideggerian academics forfeit the ambition to show what the necessity of addressing Being amounts to, or the ambition to relate the problem to their interests in Heidegger's philosophy in ways that allow for an incessant commitment to the problem as a principal difficulty. In interpreting Heidegger's conception of truth, my thesis at the very least describes the general conditions under which the problem of Being arises. It therefore addresses the problem in a distinctly 'phenomenological' way, namely by description. There is at least
one explanatory tool that helps clarify my understanding of this problem: the concept of a so-called 'ontological difference' between Being and being. This is a prominent and puzzling concept of great importance. Being designates the obscure primordial sense of Being, often termed 'the Being of being(s)', whereas being [das Seiende] designates the conception of Being as just any entity, i.e. anything that could be considered to be, regardless of possible ontological commitments6. This concept is used throughout my
thesis. §4. Thesis structure: a retrospective narrative As Heidegger interpreter John Sallis already said, the trajectory of Heidegger's thought is largely determined by the question of truth, given that in general the way in which the topic must be addressed determines the very project of philosophy. The topic then appears in works from the beginning of his career up until the end of his life, with 1927-1943 being Heidegger's most prolific period of discussions on truth7. In 1927 Heidegger
published his magnum opus Sein und Zeit, in which the discussion of truth makes up a pivotal section of the book (§44). This discussion has been central in the reception of Heidegger's conception of truth and therefore plays a crucial role in this thesis. In 1938/1939 he wrote the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), as a second attempt to take up the question of Being expounded in his magnum opus, is often considered as his 'second magnum opus' and is the most extensive and systematic discussion of his philosophy that Heidegger went on to give at a later stage in his philosophy. The topic of truth rears its head here constantly, and the book contains a series of sections dedicated to it specifically (§204-247), which some consider part of the most important chapter of the book. Sein und Zeit and the Beiträge are the two books that give a sufficiently thorough understanding of Heidegger's conception of truth to assess it. Notably, this means that I use works from two allegedly different phases of Heidegger's career. In the first phase Heidegger explicitly endorsed a phenomenological method. At a later stage he considered his former works to be problematic in some sense, and phenomenology seems to only be present as a certain style of philosophical practice. Considering Heidegger himself states that both works attempt to address the question of a 'truth of Being'8, there should be a sufficiently consistent basis on which to assess their
conception of truth.
To avoid complicating the discussion of the Beiträge that I engage in, I give a somewhat general account of it in order to give an introduction to Heidegger's theory of truth (Part 1). The content of the book is sufficiently neutral to the ongoing discussion that mostly centers on Sein und Zeit, so as to provide new perspectives on it. I first give a basic account of the premises for his discussion of truth as it appears here (Chapter 1). Then the interpretation of his particular account on truth here is interpreted in order to provide one with a basic understanding of his more general conception of truth, and to provide a key concept ('concealment') that plays a large role in the next part of this thesis (Chapter 2). The central idea of this chapter is that the self inheres in the manifestation of entities as concealed by this manifestation. This means he has a nihilistic conception of the self: the self exists, but cannot become manifest in the way an entity is, because it is fundamental to such manifestation. Therefore, Heidegger consistently denies the possibility of a presence of oneself to oneself. This conception of self motivates his ideas on how entities manifest themselves and how truth takes place. Using the account of Heidegger's conception of truth that this chapter provides, one can then clarify why he never retracted his views, although it is a widely held belief that he ultimately did do so (as explained in the subsequent chapter, Chapter 3). This claim follows from my claim of consistency, in the sense that I think the truth-issue in
Heidegger's view remained largely the same throughout the whole trajectory of his thinking, but is simply misunderstood.
Given that Sein und Zeit offers Tugendhat the main source for his critique, I aim to settle the preparatory repudiation of that critique (from a Heideggerian point of view) in my discussion of the book (Part 2). First, I explain the basic tenets of Tugendhat's critique, its reception, and problems that one could have with its understanding of the conception (Chapter 4). Problems arise in reconstructing in what way Heidegger envisions truth and untruth to relate, and what truth has to do with the self specifically. In the next chapter, it is explained how the Heideggerian norm of authenticity does not oppose truth and untruth (as is traditional) but employs them both in order to do right by the nihilistic premises for one's own existence (Chapter 5). In a chapter that concludes this part, I connect the foregoing topics to perhaps the most crucial passage that Heidegger has ever written on truth: §44 (Chapter 6). It shows that Heidegger indeed has a dialetheic account of truth in virtue of his need for authenticity. Then, these conclusions are compared to conclusions of the previous part in order to show consistency. Having sufficiently accounted for Heidegger's actual conception of truth, I move on to a study of sources that could provide a reinvigoration of criticism on this conception (Part 3). As said before, Heidegger mistakenly uses the more traditionally inclined theories of his teacher in phenomenology as inspiration for his own views. His misinterpretation of phenomenology and its theory of truth are typical of the problems inherent to the reasons to adopt the kind of theory of truth that he did. The first step in assessing his misinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenological conception of truth is a detailed look at Heidegger's discussion of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen as the preparatory work for his own debut and magnum opus, Sein und Zeit, which was to dissociate his views from that of his influential predecessor. In this Prolegomena zur Geschichte des
Zeitbegriffs Heidegger portrays Husserl as a Cartesian philosopher with a classical
correspondence theory of truth (Chapter 7). I claim this is wrong, and much of the Husserlian topics are therefore obscured by Heidegger's account (Chapter 8).
Such an itinerary results in a retrospective analysis of Heidegger's works, in which his conception of truth is related to its instigation. My critique then focuses on assumptions made by Heidegger, which I think are not made in Husserlian phenomenology. These assumptions concern Heidegger's nihilistic conception of self. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which Husserl's method does right by Heidegger's intentions, in so far as it allows for a radical rethinking of 'the self'. The assessment of Heidegger's conception of truth in its contrast with Husserl's then results in an assessment of the right phenomenological method to disclose the self.
I. Clearing-concealing
Chapter 1:The premises of the Beiträge
§5. Introduction to Heidegger's transitional thinking Famously, Heidegger's contribution to the tradition of philosophy consists in posing the question of Being. What becomes central in his meditation on this supposed contribution is a distinction between what one might call two strands of thought in the concept of thinking, which Heidegger terms 'the Ereignis [event] of Being'. The 'decisive' event of Being, having actually 'happened' historically in the inception of the tradition by the philosophers of Ancient Greece, has led to a tradition of thought that goes by the name of metaphysics and is to be supervened by Heidegger's conception of Being. The contrast between these two types of thinking consists in their different sense of 'Being'9that arises out of a singular event of thinking. Heidegger designates this contrast 'the first beginning of philosophy and its other'10. Thought, one could say, is the
philosophical practice par excellence, and Heidegger means to construe a concept of thought that includes the transition of one conception of Being to another. Thought becomes ambiguous the moment it unfolds, as a relation of what thinking is and has
been. In the words of Françoise Dastur, the concept of time and the sense of Being co-belong in the occurrence of the inception of philosophy (as the event of Being)11. In a
philosophical contemplation of 'Being', something has to actually happen, in the way that the one strand 'moves on' to its other. As Daniela Vallega-Neu puts this issue of 'happening' aptly: the activity of thinking "finds itself caught up and determined by Being's historicality"12. The ideal for this happening of a 'decisive' difference in
conceptions of Being is of course not just any event, but the ominous Ereignis, i.e. the event of Being, in which the different conceptions are made obvious through Being's essential occurrence [Wesen]13. So, although one differentiates between strands of
thought, one should be aware that their roots are deeply entangled in the singular event of Being14.
The first step to seeing how the two strands of thought philosophically relate to the Ereignis is by explaining two ways of 'questioning' Being. Upholding the central theme of his magnum opus Sein und Zeit, Heidegger tries to clarify the notion of a Seinsfrage by distinguishing the Leitfrage [guiding question], which is the metaphysical conception of Being, and the Grundfrage [grounding question], which is the transitional, onto-temporal conception of Being. In the same way that the other beginning supervenes the first beginning, the Grundfrage 'answers' the Leitfrage. Whereas the metaphysical strand finds its answer in the other, the other in turn remains 'worthy of questioning', which is to say: is more like an open question15. The traditional conception of Being is
thus in some way underpinned by the Heideggerian conception. It is necessary to explore these conceptions of Being further in order to give a clear account of Heidegger's view on truth.
§6. The Leitfrage of metaphysics
Heidegger views the burden of transitional thinking to be historically poignant: the Ereignis culminates into a stereotypical contemporary situation, which he depicts in the chapter The Resonating [Der Anklang]. The central feature of this concurrence of conceptions of Being is the abandonment of Being [Seinsverlassenheit]: Being has withdrawn from entities16. At play is the ontological distinction. The fundamental
feature of the present age is that Being parts from entities in the sense that it conceals itself in or among manifest entities17. Heidegger's conception of Being settles this history
of self-concealment as such, making the abandonment of Being central to thinking, whereas the traditional conception has left it to oblivion in favor of anything. The concept of 'entities' is thus endemic to metaphysics. The following focuses on the traditional conception of Being in preparation of Heidegger's conception. It is based primarily on the chapter The Interplay [Zuspiel], which takes note of the most prominent characteristics of the metaphysical conception of Being.
In Heidegger's account of it, the manifestation of the conception of 'mere entities' is the history of metaphysics (as a historical eventuation of the first attempt at thinking of Being in the Ereignis)18. Metaphysics is the philosophical practice determined by the
Leitfrage, which asks the question 'τί τὸ ὂν; [what is the being?]' as does the Aristotelian study of ὂν ᾗ ὄν [being qua being]19. More specifically, asking the Leitfrage consists in
searching for that which makes the ὄν be, i.e. for the being-ness [Seiendheit] of entities20; in other words: 'being-ness' is the primary way in which Being is thought of21.
The most startling feature of being-ness is its presence [Anwesenheit]22. However
'being-ness' may be present (as the ideal, as the cause, as the enabling condition, as the ground etc.), entities are there 'simply' as they are, with a clear precedence [Vorrang] over whatever their generalized essence may be23. Metaphysics supposes the presence
of entities to be a kind of φύσις [nature], which in Heidegger's mind means self-appearance24. The nature of entities is to be absolutely apparent (or 'given' in an
epistemic sense)25. Being-ness as φύσις is supposed as a 'universal property' of the ὄν,
but is in itself not questioned26. So paradoxically, a look at the metaphysical concept of
being-ness shows that on the one hand the proper conception of Being should not be so thin that it takes entities to have a self-evident nature, on the other hand it would be problematic for it to be so thick that it comprises more than entities.
The situation is exacerbated in (and exemplified by) later strands of idealism that construe this conception as (self-)knowledge. This view construes the self to inhere in the presence of entities and measures the truth of the 'identity' of entities by using the self as the horizon for their presence27. The self functions as a horizon in the sense that the precedence of entities have their origin in acts of representation by the ego, and such acts are given alongside any kind of knowledge of entities28. The point is to contrast two poles of its conception of Being: on the one hand 'Vor-stellung' [representation] is used to refer to the precedence of entities, a precedence that can only exist through some act of an ego on the other hand29. The existence of the latter is taken for granted,
consolidating the former idea.
These themes of the metaphysical conception of Being (being-ness, φύσις, precedence, ego, etc.) serve as an axis for the assessment of its supervention. They were considered by Heidegger in order to show that although the conception of Being is consistent and grounded in a notion of (man given as) a self30, it does make felt the 'refusal' of the
primordial sense of Being31, such that it is shown to 'conceal itself'32. Such notions are
still missing from the account, but are expounded in the next section. The point is that metaphysicians think of entities in virtue of its concepts, whereas the 'true philosopher' thinks of metaphysical notions in virtue of how they conceal Being. Thinking in terms of
a metaphysical conception, one should experience the 'essential decay [Ver-wesung]' of Being in the abandonment by it33. This experiential 'answer' to the Leitfrage, being-ness
devoid of Being, is essential to understanding the Grundfrage in its different act-character34. §7. The relevance of truth in the Grundfrage In contrast to the Leitfrage's emphasis on entities in the self-evidence of their being, in the Grundfrage one experiences the ground of entities as the essential occurrence of Being35. The grounding-concepts inherent to the traditional conception of Being adhere
to experiences suppressed by metaphysics, and an understanding of these experiences explains how they came to 'guide' everything as the foundation. In that sense, 'Being as entity' is the truth that this experience of a ground itself has to live up to36. In one's
understanding of the ground of entities as preliminary to metaphysics, one experiences something that went missing in all of metaphysics37. Such a ground-relation
[Grundbezug] is called the 'clearing'38. It is here that the concept of truth becomes
relevant: the Grundfrage poses the question of how (in the Ereignis) the proper conception of Being makes possible the tradition of philosophy and in that sense inquires into the truth of Being39. The proper notion of truth is elucidated in 'the
grounding of entities' and is explored by prioritizing on Being rather than entities40. In
other words, in trying to uphold the ideas of metaphysics, Heidegger envisages a context in which entities arise to prominence and in which simultaneously Being goes concealed. This means first of all that the Grundfrage is like intentional consciousness: the context in which entities come to precedence, i.e. (situated) thought. Secondly, the grounding context 'contains' the fundamental, concealed conception of Being and therefore explores the essential occurrence of Being without denying entities their prominence. In his later writings on truth, Heidegger terms truth a 'clearing-concealing'41 in order to designate these juxtaposed aspects.
It is crucial advancement of the chapter The Leap [Der Sprung] over the other chapters that it makes concealment a fundamental issue in the clearing42, when one could also
view concealment as a symptom of the modern age (the 'abandonment of Being') that can be disregarded in metaphysics. Heidegger intends to show what it means for the conception of Being to be an actual issue. The issue of concealment could remind one of non-presentism. Presentism is a view in the philosophy of time that holds that everything must in some way be (temporally) present, and non-presentism denies this, usually arguing for something that is not present in such a way43. The concealment of
Being could perhaps be said to liken such non-presence, although in Heidegger's case the non-present is fundamental to ('grounds') what is present.
To clarify the idea of a clearing and its inherent non-presentism: Being arises in nihilistic situations (that must be in some sense overcome44). That something could not be
thought if it would not be a (representational) entity just like everything else implies that, at first, the thought of a primordial conception of Being appears as a negation. Exploring Being's withdrawal from entities, i.e. abandonment, means that it is essentially similar to a privation from entities to nothingness45. The experience of the
truth of Being can in that sense be viewed as a radical departure from everything (that can metaphysically be considered to be), a departure that nonetheless has a positive act-character46. Being is granted its self-concealment: not only are entities experienced in
their being-ness, a refusal is too, which is not the same as experiencing entities without experiencing Being (the forgetting of Being)47. This added experience of concealment is
more like an excess of the experience of entities, with no extra experience48.
becomes as something nihil-ish [nichthaft]50. This intimation is not 'nothing' in the sense
of what-is-not (in contrast to what-is), but rather involves what is no entity at all.
A second characteristic of the clearing is ipseity. According to Heidegger, the event of Being takes place as the Being of man51. The primordial sense of Being takes place as the human existence, in so far as man is in the clearing, and not just man as the given human creature52. In the clearing the human creature senses [ahnt] Being, making this 'abiding in the clearing' [Inständigkeit] the human act par excellence: the active happening from Being to entities makes up the existence of mankind53. The concept of 'the self' is thus completely dependent on the Ereignis. To put it in Vallega-Neu's words, Ereignis is an "appropriating event" that "brings together thought and beings to their own (eigen) essential occurrence"54. Some contextualization of the notion of 'Ereignis' can clarify this
point. In a broader perspective on his work, Heidegger's newfound preference for the concept of 'Ereignis' over 'Dasein' is noticeable in this book. Heidegger has become worried that the association between Ereignis and Dasein has led to anthropological misinterpretations of his ideas, in which the meaning of entities is the result of an act of a human creature. Via the terminological shift he stresses that Dasein should only be interpreted in terms of Being: Dasein is merely the site for the event of Being as clearing-concealing. Dasein, generally speaking, can thus only be properly understood on the basis of the notion of 'the clearing'. To emphasize the Being of the clearing, Heidegger turns to a notion that he temporarily abandoned: in as early as 1919 he characterized 'Ereignis' as the most intense lived experience in close conjunction with the idea of meaning-bestowal55. Later on, Heidegger deems it a suitable notion to
designate specifically the way in which the self is constituted as the act of grounding in the clearing. The notion is often translated as 'appropriation' or 'en-owning', although it ordinarily means 'event'. The dependency of the existence of Man on the event of Being, and the inherence of a concept of self in it, allows for a play on words by emphasizing the semblance of 'eigen' [own] to 'Er-eignis'56. In the event Being 'en-owns' [er-eignet], i.e. 'comes to selfhood'. Because this peculiar understanding of ipseity is relevant to his conception of thinking, Heidegger uses 'Ereignis' for a singular event of human thinking rather than just any event. Chapter 2:
The true and the veritable
§8. The orthotic conception of truth Heidegger consistently contrasts his conception of truth with a traditional conception. Although in his early writings he often polemicizes with a notion of correspondence as the fundamental concept for truth, later he starts using the notion of correctness [Richtigkeit] more consistently. From here onwards, I call this traditional conception 'orthotic truth', after the concept of ancient Greek philosophy that Heidegger associates this view with (ὀρθότης [straightened/aligned]), in order to avoid discussion over the correct translation of 'Richtigkeit'57. It is unclear if anyone actually ever held or will holdthe 'orthotic' conception that Heidegger ascribes to them, which I think makes the strenuousness of adopting this word tolerable.
Orthotic truth is extrapolated from the metaphysical conception of Being. It is an insufficient understanding of truth because it consolidates the precedence [Vor-rang] of entities rather than questioning it. In the presence of entities, their nature of being is
self-evident, and therefore the representation [Vor-stellung] must be correct. An entity simply is, as present being-ness, and any perception of entities therefore justifies correctness of the representation58. Therefore, orthotic truth is an epistemic
achievement with regard to entities, which is especially apparent in the concept of certainty [Gewißheit] that is endemic to idealism59. Self-evidence here means a presence
given to a self. The self actively conditions the performance of thought. Therefore, something is true orthotically if it is 'aligned' with the activity of the self, if it 'aims' [richtet] at the self60. This definition of orthetic truth applies to entities. The alignment
to the self is characteristic of entities as such, i.e. being-ness. Being-ness, as the fundamental concept of metaphysics, is not questioned, because being-ness is taken for granted on the basis of its presence, but it is 'functional' as that which entities are in line with61. Being-ness is the 'purpose' [Bestimmung] of beings, and beings are therefore
veritable [wahrhaft]62. In other words, in the orthotic view of truth entities become
clear, but the presupposed act of bringing to clarity [Leuchten-bringen] itself does not63.
A somewhat odd variant of a correspondence theory of truth is compatible with this formulation of orthetic truth. Historically, the understanding of the notion of truth shifts from metaphysician to metaphysician. The difference between ὀρθότης and ὁμοίωσις [correspondence] is historically explained by the shift from truth-definitions in Plato to those in Aristotle respectively. The truth, ἀλήθεια, for Plato is the way in which one becomes bound to apparent entities through the clearing: one unavoidably constitutes a relation to entities (truth as a 'yoke' [ζυγόν]). The beings consequently are veritable because they are still aligned to a specific context, namely: the clearing. In Aristotle, ὁμοίωσις is used to designate the way in which entities adhere to this original context64.
This makes it more clearly a relation of two distinguishable things: the entities and the context in which they arise. Thus an original context of thinking corresponds to the things like in the medieval formulation of the correspondence theory. Still, both Plato and Aristotle presuppose the clearing as the ground for veritable entities, and in that sense both terms refer to the orthotic notion of truth.
For Heidegger, what seems to be missing is an account of the activity of the self that 'guides' the Leitfrage: because that is indeterminate, the capacity for representation of entities is equally unbound65. Simply everything can be veritable in the sense of absolute
certainty [Gewißheit]66. However, this pertains to entities exclusively, and not to the
active ground-relation in which they arise. The clearing is the site in which entities (the veritable) come to precedence. Laying bare this enabling condition therefore requires a different kind of thinking. Whereas the 'manifestness' of entities is ascertained, the manifestation as such is not67. The orthotic conception of truth obfuscates Heideggerian
truth as it pertains to the clearing, and most importantly its character of concealing.
As it stands, Heidegger's critique of orthotic truth here seems akin to the anti-realism of Michael Dummett, which is primarily a critique of predominant theories of truth that say that for any truthbearer there must be something in virtue of which it is true68. This
relation cannot explain the phenomenon of truth because one can think of cases of truth in which it not so clear to determine whether it has a truthmaker or not. Heidegger too believes such a relation is insufficient for a theory of truth. In his case such a relation comprises entities and their original context of manifestation. This relation requires the truth of 'Being' as its truthmaker. Heidegger's criticism, however, does not provide alternatives to the realist view: it makes of the truthmaker the truthbearer of a different kind of truth. The insufficiency of the view is, for Heidegger, a necessary one, in accordance with this other sense of truth.
§9. The nihilistic conception of self
In conformance with the Grundfrage, Heidegger's conception of truth pertains to the clearing as the event of experiential entities alongside the self-concealment of Being. This situation is mostly explained in the Beiträge's chapter on truth, The Grounding [Die
Gründung]. This chapter deals with how the domain for truth, Dasein's clearing,
'grounds' entities. Note that in a metaphysical view the clearing is deemed to be the successful instantiation of entities, rather than the site for self-concealment. The notion of a ground may be reminiscent of a transcendental question towards the enabling condition for the precedence and consequent truth of entities, but, as the notion of a Grundfrage dictates, this condition remains in question. In the following I show that Heidegger is committed to the notion of concealment in a maximally radical sense, as an explanation of the way in which the ground remains in question. Not only does 'unconcealment entail concealment'69, this concealment functions as ultimately
'unsettling' for the precedence of entities. This is a conclusion that concerns Dasein. In the section after this one I will argue what sense of a 'proper' truth adheres to such an account of the clearing.
From the first general characteristic of the clearing it followed that Dasein's own existence consists in the taking place of the event of Being. This is based primarily in the concealment inherent to the clearing70: Dasein 'withstands' the concealment pertaining
to its own being71. This means that Dasein is the abiding in the event of Being at the site
in which beings arise (i.e. the clearing), regardless of the impossibility of Being coming to precedence as a being or beings. The grounding-relation thus consists in withstanding self-concealment and unfolding as manifest entities. Self-concealment is a nihilistic experience that Dasein must undergo within its manifestation of entities. Dasein is abided in to the degree of its intimation of nothing as the extremity of its situation72, the
extremity that belongs in particular to itself. In that sense one can interpret the main conclusion of section a) of The Grounding: Dasein jumps from Being (that which is nihilated) to entity (that which is manifested), i.e. it is an active crossing of the ontological difference. Dasein itself is therefore a domain that stands 'in-between'73.
In section b) Heidegger enters some (philosophical-) anthropological considerations that follow from the idea of Dasein as an in-between: Dasein is a human entity only in so far as Dasein as the active crossing from Being to entities grounds it74. Because the
ground-relation unfolds out of nothing, it is logical for Heidegger to designate it as 'schaffend [creating]' in the way it upholds its own being. Dasein 'constructs' a self from concealment such that it comes back to its self75. Dasein's event lets the human entity
come to the nihil-ish occurrence that is constitutive of it, and in that sense the event resuscitates the human being rather than renews it. This constant resuscitation is Dasein: it is a constructive activity that averts its essence. Heidegger holds that Dasein is an event rather than an entity, let alone a human entity. However, it must be emphasized that the eventuation of Being does Dasein occur as a 'self'. The crossing of Being to entity, i.e. the manner in which Dasein intimates nothingness within the clearing, takes place in a way that is constructed by Being as its self-concealment. Ereignis, the event of Being, in that sense 'appropriates' Dasein: the self is constituted in such a way that its constitution always recurs.
If this is correct, then this has radical consequences for the notion of a ground. An account of the notion of grounding can be drawn from section d) on the space-time of Dasein, which tries to account for the unity of empty forms of space and time in terms of the clearing in the Ereignis76. If the self merely comes to itself, how could one call this
'grounding'? Heidegger's main claim on this issue is that the grounding, the domain of truth, is primordially understood as an 'abyssal ground' [Ab-grund]. The abyssal ground
is the 'hesitant self-withholding', which is to say it is a hampering of thinking that discovers the lack of an ultimate ground. With the usage of the word grounding, one expects something to constitute something else, but the point here is that this constitution is at base a withdrawal that lets the constituted to itself. That which withdraws one could designate the 'primordial ground [Ur-grund]': Being. It is its self-concealment, the felt lack of Being, that forces it unto entities77. For the ground to
'function', for the concealment to be a determinate emptiness, it needs to be abyssal. In other words, the constitution needs to be fully depleted, so that the constituted may arise as its culmination. Dasein is such a total depletion of the clearing: in crossing from Being to entities it is 'taken aback' so that 'merely' entities take place. Dasein is the unsettling aspect of the clearing: it constantly displaces entities in order to abide as their ground, without an actual discerption from them. Dasein hampers within the manifestation of entities.
These ideas on Dasein and selfhood result in a nihilistic conception of self. Heidegger consistently emphasizes that entities presuppose the self as something nihil-ish and indeterminate with respect to these determinate entities, in order to distinguish self from any entities that would be the result of its constitution. No self is pre-given, but a self is an active 'abyssal' constitution of manifest entities. In this a comparison to a 'no-self' conception of self (contrived by Thomas Metzinger) clarifies Heidegger's stance somewhat. Heidegger too denies that the self can be anything like a self-subsistent entity, i.e. like a substance (he defends 'ontological anti-realism')78. He also denies that
there can be a substantive form of self-knowledge (he defends 'epistemic anti-realism')79. Furthermore, he denies that linguistic expressions concerning the self refer
to a specific part of reality ('semantic anti-realism')80. However, unlike Metzinger who
believes we can also dispense with the notion of a self as fundamental to scientific methodology, Heidegger does believe a self is necessary for the manifestation of entities. He therefore cannot be a 'methodological anti-realist'81: the way in which entities
become manifest signifies the self-concealment of Being, i.e. the activity of nihil-ish selfhood. In a sense, one's existence is restrained, crystallizing into the manifestation of entities. In this qualification of the way in which the non-self may nevertheless play a fundamental role for human life, Heidegger is much like Buddhist theories of self, which are also considered no-self conceptions. A Buddhist conception is signified by the concept of anātman (or alternatively, annatā) [non-self], which designates the deep-seated illusion in life that the self is an 'ontologically unique' entity that consciously apprehends the world82. To Heidegger ontology must also derive from the 'no-self' and can therefore not be an 'illusion'. §10. Truth as a shelter The concept of a concealment inherent to the clearing explains the distinction between Heidegger's truth-conception and the orthotic conception. Both have a sense of truth that is pertinent to the clearing, and so a distinction is needed. As section c) of The
Grounding makes clear, truth is only experienced primordially in self-concealment83.
Abiding in the clearing thus in some sense means to 'stay true to' the self-concealment. This is what Heidegger calls 'sheltering [Bergen]'. Sheltering is the notion that best explains the sense of truth that Heidegger ascribes to the clearing. At this point the notion of 'truth as the clearing-concealing' should be more obvious: it is the way in which the innermost self-concealment comes to pass in the clearing where entities come to arise. When ἀλήθεια is no longer used to designate the experience of self-concealment in the clearing, it loses its 'indeterminate depth'84 (although it is still true). This
indeterminate depth as the self that comes to pass in Dasein, which is to say: concealment, is what Heidegger deems true. Concealment permeates the Ereignis, such
that truth is never just the clearing, but the clearing-concealing85. Concealment is thus
central to sheltering.
Sheltering predetermines what it means to be correct, by bearing the mark of the self-concealment in its necessary, abyssal eventuation. It is a self-event that cannot be measured by correctness86, because the self performs its own concealment without
coming to precedence like entities do in the clearing. Nor does Heidegger explicate in what way one should assess that concealment is in place. Rather, Dasein is always appropriated by it. An important feature of sheltering, i.e. 'the intimation of nothing', is precisely that it remains completely indeterminate, but in so doing 'becoming' the truth as the Ereignis87. Truth cannot be wrong, but is only fully 'functional' in virtue of the
event of self-concealment. Regardless of its indeterminacy, one can still say truth clings to the primordial experience of the clearing as the grounding; it is the occurrence of 'knowledge' in so far as the self holds itself in the abyssal ground88.
Primordial truth thus has a distinct normative feature, the norm being the event of Being. It presents Dasein with an ever-recurring task of 'finding its true self' by insisting in the clearing. For this, it needs to acknowledge that it is no entity, but that the manifestation of entities involves an experience of Dasein's own obfuscation. The lack of its Being takes place as an appropriation of the manifestation of entities, which keeps them at distance in order to be nothing to it (a nothingness nonetheless proper to the manifestation). Insisting on the truth is a critical self-examination for the purpose of (mere) Being, although it must remain concealed qua Being. This abidance participates in the nothingness of self-concealment and in that sense could be viewed as expressive of its eventuation. As section e) of The Grounding (on sheltering) states, sheltering makes visible the way from entities to the truth: in clearing-concealing self-concealment moves 'out in the open'89. Dasein attunes itself to the withdrawal inherent to the
clearing, projecting itself onto the maximally nihil-ish aspect of eventuation, rather than attuning itself to that which derives from it (the veritable). Signification of one's self-concealment, i.e. of Being, by Dasein is a never-ending quest that it must undergo. Chapter 3:
Qualified unconcealment
§11. Summary of the foregoing The aim of the foregoing part of my thesis was to get some introduction to Heidegger's conception of truth. Heidegger distinguishes between the true and the veritable. This distinction is unavoidable to him, because the former is overtaken by the latter. The relevance of both types of truth pertains to situated thought ('the clearing'), in which entities naturally manifest. Simultaneously the manifestation as such, which is to say: the manner in which this manifestation of situated thought itself takes place, is obfuscated by the entities. The thought of entities as such deprive the original context to which they owe their own, proper standing. I have termed this lack of proper Being a 'nihilistic conception of self'. This idea is fundamental to Heidegger's conception of truth, in the sense that one's own Being can be considered anything like a manifest entity.
Truth is consequently a kind of persistence in the way manifestation takes place: one 'shelters' Being when one takes it upon oneself to abide in the constant dislodging of
one's own Being by any kind of entities. Truth expresses the extremity of having to Be oneself in contradistinction to anything else, by signifying that the supposed appearance of any entity is a contingent manner of taking part in the fundamental non-presence of one's self-eventuation. The concept that is central to this sense of truth is 'concealment', which is Heidegger's way to designate one's self-realization in the clearing.
Entities can be veritable in so far as their manifest nature originates in the clearing. Veritability is pertinent in so far as one is obfuscated by determinate manifestations, or in other words: in so far as manifest entities show that the impossibility of a similar presence of oneself to oneself presents a definite task in one's relation to oneself. This precedence of entities is therefore central to his conception, but only as a clue to a more important sense of truth. This insight is crucial to the reception of Heidegger's conception of truth. Usually, commentators on this topic base themselves primarily on 'early' Heidegger to conclude that 'unconcealment', a literal translation of ἀλήθεια, is a word that sufficiently captures Heidegger's sense of truth. This is a misunderstanding: it does not give one any footing on Heidegger's conception of self or its sense of truth, although it does designate the precedence of entities. The following section addresses the relevant interpretations and serves to further illustrate Heidegger's views. §12. ἀλήθεια's 'privation' and its difference from the notion of 'unconcealment' So, the general problem is that interpreters ascribe to Heidegger the view that truth is unconcealment, without further qualifications. This leads to two anomalies that will be discussed in the following subsections. The first concerns the so-called privative understanding of ἀλήθεια, the second concerns statements that Heidegger made in 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' on the usage of the term 'unconcealment'. In the first place (subsection A) Heidegger's frequent references to the privation inherent to the supposed primordial understanding of the word ἀλήθεια (ἀ- being the privative prefix to λήθη [forgetfulness/oblivion/concealment]) is badly explained in most secondary literature. Secondly (subsection B), on the basis of the understanding of truth as at bottom unconcealment, the statement in the aforementioned essay that 'ἀλήθεια and truth may not be equated'90 leads to
interpretations of the statement as a retraction. In the following I will show how to account for both problems. A. Typical of the first anomaly are Mark Wrathall's writings on Heidegger's notion of truth in his monograph Heidegger and Unconcealment. The basic premise of this book is accounting for unconcealment as "the methodological principle throughout Heidegger's work"91. In the foregoing we have seen that unconcealment is an important aspect of the
clearing in so far as it is the context in which entities come to precedence, but an emphasis on entities could be misleading in so far as it does not distinguish Heidegger's thinking from metaphysics adequately. In the introduction of Wrathall's book, the first acknowledgement concerning 'unconcealment' states that it is a literal translation of ἀλήθεια, which is the original understanding of truth that Heidegger works out the implications of92. He adds:
Unconcealment is a privative notion – it consists in removing concealment. Consequently, concealment is in some sense to be given priority in understanding entities and worlds. [...] According to Heidegger, for an entity to be is for it to stand in a context of constitutive relations. The lack of any possible context is thus an
ontological concealment – the absence of the conditions under which the entity in question could manifest itself in being.93 Wrathall thus understands unconcealment as a context of constitutive relations in which entities stand. Concealment is related to unconcealment as its opposite, in the sense that it does not allow for the manifestation of entities. Although unconcealment is rightfully described in terms of a context in which entities become manifest, similar to the clearing as the ground for entities, the contrast with concealment is inaccurate. Self-concealment is the primary feature of the eventuation of the clearing and is central to understanding Heidegger's account of both the orthotic truth-conception and his own. It becomes obvious that Wrathall misses this point in the first chapter (Unconcealment), where he tries to explain concealment further as a 'positive' term: unconcealment, as a privative notion, can only be understood on the basis of what it is not94. He describes
unconcealment as the (non-propositional) context in which the 'discoveredness' of entities is made available for comportment [Verhalten]. In his view Heidegger thus emphasizes a practical mastery of things95, and concealment is a non-operative
experience of things in the world96. Our understanding of entities is grounded in a
particular understanding of their essence, such that other ways of experiencing the world become concealed97. The downside of our comportment is thus that some things
go concealed. The 'positivity' of concealment consists in it being the reverse of the way our worldly engagement manifests itself. Obviously then, Wrathall overlooks that such obscurity is 'essential' to what Dasein itself is. Dasein can only manifest entities in virtue of its self-concealment, and truth shelters this self-concealment. Interestingly, here it becomes more apparent that Heidegger's conception of truth has some consequences for the idea of untruth, which I explain in the next part of my thesis. For now it should be clear that Wrathall's interpretations are misleading because they are far removed from the right conception of Being, as Heidegger predicted any understanding of ἀλήθεια 'from the side of entities' would98.
In contrast, the Beiträge has several sections that provide valuable commentary on how to understand the privative aspect supposed to the notion of ἀλήθεια. What it designates according to Heidegger is that concealment as such unavoidably gets cleared away99.
The ancient word already disregards Dasein's relation as a ground by thinking of the self-concealment as something that must be set aside in the manifestation of entities. Heidegger instead thinks of truth as a clearing-concealing, which shelters the concealment of an abyssal ground proper to Dasein100.
B.
In relation to Heidegger's essay 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' there are two supposed retractions ascribed to Heidegger, by Cristina Lafont in her work Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure.
The second retraction relates to Heidegger's acknowledgement that ἀλήθεια was never understood in any other way than the orthotic way, not even by the Greeks101. This is
clearly a response to criticisms by Heidegger's student, Paul Friedländer, who convincingly argued that ἀλήθεια should not be translated as unconcealment, on the basis of studies of the usage of the word in Ancient Greece102. It is not clear why this
would be a retraction of his conception of truth, if the primordial sense of truth does not reside in unconcealment. The second retraction is fundamental for Lafont's own account of truth, in the sense that she does not want to be negligent towards questions surrounding the orthotic notion of truth, even in connection to unconcealment. Any of
Heidegger's downplaying of this conception of truth "through the use of dubious theses about the history of metaphysics" would "lack any fundamentum in re [foundation in the thing]", according to her103. In Heidegger's view, the idea is not to dissociate his
conception of Being from this conception of truth, but to shelter the self-concealment that is inherent to it. By experiencing an abyssal ground Dasein is to understand the need for a withdrawal of Being so as to ground all manifestation in the clearing. This theme of Dasein as a ground-relation simply holds priority for Heidegger, which is not to say that other questions might not also hold in a less promising sense.
The first retraction concerns the unequatability of truth and unconcealment and reflects the general problem yet again. If one does not take Heidegger's statements in 'Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens' as retractions but rather as a failed attempt at clarification of the difference, then it is obvious that the mistake Lafont makes in the second retraction are consistent with the first. Nevertheless, with regard to the first retraction Heidegger's views are, as Lafont claims, indeed oriented solely toward questions considering (something like) unconcealment, and this does leave the way open to questions concerning the orthotic notion of truth104. However, this
orientation comprises of concealment and similar notions also. The first hint at what truth can possibly be in Heidegger's sense can be found in his warning that only unconcealment thought as the clearing provides this sense105. This warning goes
ignored, because in general people conflate the clearing with unconcealment. Consider the following passage that is successive to the ones quoted as retractions and goes equally ignored:
What is experienced and thought is only what ἀλήθεια as clearing makes true [gewährt], not what it is as such. This remains concealed. Does this happen by chance? Does it happen only as a consequence of the carelessness of human thinking? Or does it happen because self-concealment, concealment, λήθη belongs to ἀ-λήθεια, not just as an addition, not like shadow belongs to light, but rather as the heart of ἀλήθεια? And does not even a sheltering and safekeeping [Verwahren] prevail in this self-concealment of the clearing of presence from which unconcealment can be granted to begin with, and thus what is present can appear in its presence? If this were so, then the opening would not be the mere clearing of presence, but the clearing of presence concealing itself, the clearing of a self-concealing sheltering.106
This passage iterates the importance of the notion of concealment to Heidegger's conception of truth. It also iterates the complaint that thinking of the clearing as merely unconcealment only makes apparent the veritable, which is to say: manifest entities. The allusions to notions like self-concealment, the clearing and sheltering thus show this essay not to retract anything regarding his conception of truth. Rather, the essay explains common misunderstandings surrounding it.
II. Disclosedness
Chapter 4:Tugendhat's critique
§13. Basic tenets of Tugendhat's critique As the two excellent papers of Christian Skirke and William H. Smith on the topic make clear, there are two central problems Ernst Tugendhat ascribes to Heidegger's account of truth in Sein und Zeit107. Claim A: it is unclear what the sense of truth is in Heidegger'sconception. The phenomenon that is designated by it is more or less understood, but that this should be called 'truth' lacks argumentative support. Claim B: it is not clear how this phenomenon can be critical or normative. In the following I give an account of Tugendhat's interpretation that warrants this criticism. In Sein und Zeit's §44 Heidegger discusses truth by grounding a traditional conception of truth in his own, 'primordial' conception of truth. The primordial sense of truth is often called 'disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]', and accordingly Heidegger's truth-conception is then called 'truth as disclosedness'. I however think this usage of the term is misleading, and therefore avoid it. In its usage in the literature it merely concerns a truth-context as it opens up, like the notion of the clearing did in the previous part. Dasein is 'in the world', in such a way that it is the domain for the manifestation of entities108. The
traditional, roughly Aristotelian view that Heidegger polemicizes with (in subsection a) is a correspondence theory of truth. That theory views truth as a correspondence between an immanent representation and its transcendent object, which in Tugendhat's account of Heidegger is a faulty theory because any opinion could have such an intentional relation. According to Tugendhat, Heidegger instead argues that a true expression [Aussage] presents the entity, rather than merely corresponding to it109. The
correspondence view is grounded as follows: entities as they are given in the primordial context are the τέλος [aim/end] that can be attained in their expression with reference to hermeneutic self-understanding. Only on the basis of a familiarity with the significance of a situation can one make true (in the Heideggerian sense) statements that express entities. Statements are true or false expressions based on how entities reveal themselves in their significance in worldly engagement110. What Tugendhat explains
here is also often explained as a difference between propositional content (what is true or not) and non-propositional content (the hermeneutical situation), with the former being derivative of the latter (in a non-exhaustive way)111.
This basic framework is problematic, according to Tugendhat, because Heidegger is using the notion of discovering [entdecken] ambiguously for several different moments in his framework. There are three things that he could mean by discovering112: 1. The presentation of entities (in statements) as they are, which is to say: in 'selfsameness [Selbigkeit]'. 2. This expressive act as such, which can present or misrepresent, but always reveals [zeigt auf] something.
