Preventing Violent Conflict
Finding Early Warning Indicators
for scarcity induced violent conflict
through the case study of Syria
Final Version
December 18, 2015
An Interdisciplinary Study by:
Roos van der Maas (10504532)
Political Science
Jennie Spruit (10250425)
Ecology & Evolution
Burret Schurer (10427430)
Human Geography
Abstract
The continuing growth of the world population combined with increasing living standards are putting more pressure on the availability of natural resources, sometimes leading to scarcity. Homer-Dixon (1994) conceptualized how increased environmental scarcity can lead to violent conflict. This research seeks to derive early warning indicators for scarcity induced violent conflict for the case study of Syria to strengthen an apparent weakness in the field of early warning and conflict studies. By reviewing the body of early warning literature the current scientific focus is identified and subsequently a new focus and interdisciplinary interpretation is constructed. Thereafter, a case study on Syria is conducted with an interdisciplinary emphasis on the interaction between environmental scarcity, policies and people. The results from both studies combined yield the insight that interventions within the social-ecological system to either increase productivity or to restore a disturbed balance are misguided when state planning focuses on short-term (mostly economic) gains. The resulting government management thereby neglects and/or artificially upholds the carrying capacity of the system. This forms an early warning indicator for acute environmental scarcity and scarcity-induced conflict.
Table of contents
Abstract
1
Introduction
3
1. Research Design
5
Review of literature; Early Warning Indicators
Case study; identifying indicators
Study area; Introduction to Syria
2. Theoretical Framework; Early Warning Indicators
7
Ecology
Conflict Studies
Reconciliation by integrating insights
3. Study Area; Introduction to Syria
12
4. Case Study of Syria; environmental scarcity and human responses
13
1. Rangeland and vegetation degradation (1950s-2014)
2. Irrigation and Groundwater depletion (1950s-2014)
3. Effects of continuing depletion and degradation (2000-2015)
Exacerbated consequences of drought Migration and Displacement
5. Found insights; Combining Early Warning and Data
19
Nature of interaction; Coevolution creating a downwards vicious cycle
Environmental scarcity in Syria; leading to war, not cooperation
Early warning indicators for scarcity induced violent conflict
Conclusion
21
Reflection on interdisciplinarity
Recommendations
22
Literature List
23
Introduction
Despite its young age, the 21st century has seen multiple inter and intra state wars. Daily, the images of seemingly endless and devastating violent conflicts are presented to us through the media. This often gives us the impression that the causes of war are to be found in social inequality, oppression and ethnic friction. However, over the past decades another perspective on the root causes of conflict has emerged. Since the publication of ‘The Limits to Growth’, written by the Club of Rome (1972), that awareness rose that the earth’s natural resources are limited. The fact that the IPCC has won the Nobel peace prize in 2007 for its efforts to build up a greater understanding of the risks related to overexploitation and scarcity of natural resources, underscores their deemed importance for peace.
Homer-Dixon (1994) theorized that increased resource scarcity could lead to violent conflict. His model (fig. 1, Homer-Dixon, 1994), shows how supply-induced scarcity (resource degradation), demand-induced scarcity (population growth), and structural scarcity (unequal access) combine to increase environmental scarcity. This invokes a series of social effects as migration and decreased economic productivity. In turn, these social effects destabilize the social-ecological system and thereby increase the likelihood of violent conflict.
Figure 1: Homer-Dixon (2010) conceptual model showing causal relation between environmental scarcity and violent conflict.
This theoretical model serves as a useful analytical tool and is the underlying assumption of this research. However, it lacks practical applicability. After all, some degree of resource
degradation, population growth and unequal resource access can probably be found everywhere in the world; it is more of a rule than an exception. Therefore, observing one or more of these drivers for environmental scarcity in a social-ecological system does not provide direct reason for drastic action.
This report argues that the insight Homer-Dixon provides can only become of practical use when there are early warning indicators to foresee whether the situation has become dangerously prone to violent conflict or not. This lack of early warning indicators, which is a concept used in literature from both ecology (e.g. Scheffer et al., 2009) and conflict studies (e.g. Carnegie, 1997), constitutes an apparent weakness in the field of environmental security. And in order to
effectively prevent future scarcity induced violent conflict, these are urgently needed.
Taking Homer-Dixon’s conceptual model (fig. 1) under consideration, it could be argued that the three sources of environmental scarcity, as portrayed on the left side of the model (fig. 1), function as early warning signals, since these form the starting point from which the system flows towards a state of violent conflict. However, this seemingly obvious conclusion does not
correspond with other observations in the field. Several studies report cases in which resource scarcity led to cooperation rather than conflict. For example, Witsenburg (2002) displays a case of water scarcity among cattle-farmers in Kenya, which led to local cooperation, not to violent conflict. Similarly, Adano et al. (2012) state that scarcity might actually foster cooperation over resources instead of triggering conflict. This suggests that the social outcome of environmental scarcity can go both ways, depending on how peoples and governments deal with the
environmental scarcity they are facing. Therefore, early warning signals for scarcity-induced violent conflict are not simply the sources of environmental scarcity as Homer-Dixon describes them. They should instead be sought in the social system. Or more specifically in the nature of its response to environmental scarcity.
The aim of this study is to take the first step in redressing the weakness in the field of conflict studies by identifying early warning indicators for scarcity-induced conflict using an
interdisciplinary approach. This will be accomplished by reviewing the current body of early warning literature and constructing an interdisciplinary interpretation of the concept. The subsequent case study of Syria will have an interdisciplinary emphasis on human and ecosystem interaction. Syria is selected for this study, not only because it deserves attention due to its ongoing humanitarian crisis, but also because it shows the characteristics of a resource-induced conflict (De Châtel, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). This case study will then be used to deduce possible early warning Indicators. Therefore, the following central research question is constructed:
Which early warning signals for environmental scarcity induced violent conflict in complex social-ecological systems can be derived from an analysis of Syria’s recent history?
The authors hope that the results will encourage further interdisciplinary research into early warning indicators for scarcity induced violent conflict, as improvements in anticipation are critical for successful prevention of devastating wars (Barton et al. 2008).
1. Research design
This study aims to take the first step in identifying early warning signals for scarcity induced violent conflict. As illustrated in the introduction, interaction between people and natural resource scarcity may lead to violent conflict or to cooperation (a.o. Homer-Dixon, 2010; Witsenburg, 2002; Adano et al., 2012; Frerks et al. 2014). It is very important to differentiate between the two sorts of interaction to know when intervention is required or not. Therefore, this research is designed to find the generic indicators that are needed for this differentiation. The research design is divided into steps in the figure 2. These steps will be elaborated upon below.
Figure 2: Research design
Review of literature; Early warning indicators
The existing body of early warning literature in the fields of conflict studies and ecology is
reviewed. The review is conducted to identify the current focus points and weaknesses. In order to redress these weaknesses an appropriate focus and a new interpretation of early warning
indicators is established.
Early warning indicators from 30 early warning models from the field of conflict studies are summarized in a data management table (Table 1). The table gives a clear overview of where the focus in the current body of literature lies. It was assembled with data from the three most recent early warning literature reviews by Walton (2011), Saferworld (2014) and Barton et al. (2008). Each of these reviews consists of a list of early warning indicators that are deemed important by scientists and influential organizations in the field. The lists largely overlap in content and sources.
In order to get the most complete picture of the current body of literature, these lists are merged and overlapping indicators are eliminated. This yields a table with 904 indicators for violent
conflict and instability. To make this data more accessible and to display focus points, the indicators are placed under main categories and subcategories. The division in categories was based on the categories used by the original literature reviews. Added to this table are the number of indicators per main category and per sub-category, thus showing where emphasis in current literature lies. Additionally, an effort has been made to find literature with an interdisciplinary interpretation of early warning indicators. This literature is not necessarily cited often or utilized by influential organizations. However, this addition is valuable as this research seeks to find early warning indicators concerning the interaction between environmental scarcity, policy and people, which is an interdisciplinary field.
In order to accomplish this aim an interdisciplinary approach is established by integrating subsequently different interpretations of early warning indicators into an interdisciplinary interpretation. An interdisciplinary approach is vital to our research as it provides a more
comprehensive view on the nature of early warning indicators, making it better fit to for identifying indicators concerning the interaction between scarcity, policy and people in the case study.
Case study; identifying indicators
To be able to identify the indicators that are necessary to make Homer-Dixon’s analytical model operational, this research conducts a case study. The case is selected based on the criteria of recently erupted war and environmental scarcity playing a key role in this development. Violent conflict must already have started, because only then the interaction between environmental scarcity, policies and people has in fact caused war, as opposed to the alternative of leading to cooperation (Witsenburg, 2002). Preliminary research showed that Syria fits this profile (de Chatel, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). Concepts from Homer-Dixon's relational model can also easily be
recognized in its recent history. This chosen case study is a mix of the critical and exemplifying case studies, as explained by Bryman (2010). Due to the scope of this project, the intensive study of other possibly valuable cases is not possible.
After conducting a broad preliminary literature research on Syria, the less relevant information and developments have been filtered out. Therefore, this report covers the developments preceding the war in Syria limited to three themes. Namely; 1. Rangeland and Vegetation degradation (1950s-2014), 2. Irrigation and Groundwater depletion (1950s-(1950s-2014), 3. Effects of continuing depletion and degradation (2000-2015). These themes illustrate the interaction between scarcity and human responses in the form of policies, actions and reactions, leading to increased environmental scarcity and war. The findings are summarized in a data management table.
By analysing the nature of this interaction, early warning indicators for scarcity induced violent conflict are composed. After having identified these possible indicators, large-N research should be conducted to decontextualize our findings. This however, is also outside the scope of this report and would be a task for future research.
2. Early Warning Indicators; a Theoretical Framework
A literature study was conducted on the existing body of literature concerning early warning indicators in the field of conflict studies. This was done to give an overview of the current focus and extent of the scientific field, which is still in its infancy, and to seek existing indicators which could fulfill the purpose of foreseeing resource-induced conflict and thereby fill the knowledge gap as defined in the introduction of this report.A general definition on early warning can be found in Lenton (2011). This article states that: “[early warning] can take several forms, ranging from the knowledge that an event could occur, through qualitative assessment that it is becoming more likely, to a forecast of its timing.” The terms early warning signals and early warning indicators are sometimes interchanged. For coherence purposes, this report will use the term early warning indicators, defined as all factors, aspects and variables of both society and ecology that have as a common purpose to help predict conflict and instability (CSIS, 2008).
The literature study yielded that the concept is still generally used in a mono-disciplinary manner. Therefore, this chapter gives an overview of the literature found within those disciplines that are relevant to our research, namely ecology and conflict studies. Additionally, the few relevant interdisciplinary studies which were found are discussed.
Ecology
The term early warning signals originates from the field of ecology and within this discipline there is a relatively large body of literature on the subject (Scheffer et al., 2009; Dakos et al., 2008; Drake et al., 2010; Guttal et al., 2008; Dakos et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). Here, early warning signals are predominantly model-based and used to foresee critical transitions in ecosystems, as defined in resilience theory (Gunderson, 2000). Examples include but are not limited to: increased
autocorrelation, flickering and slower recovery from perturbations. However, these ecological indicators are not suitable for our research’s purpose. They are useful in predicting ecosystem shifts and with that potential increases in environmental scarcity, but they do not enable us to foresee how people and governments will respond to and interact with this increasing scarcity, and whether this will lead to conflict.
Conflict Studies
Most authors in the field of conflict studies interpret early warning as a useful instrument for conflict preventive strategies that should alert decision-makers of the potential outbreak,
escalation and resurgence of violent conflict (Clingendael,1996; Rupeshinge,1993; Rupeshinge & Kuroda, 1992; Nyheim, 2008). This of course, with the objective to prevent violent conflict from happening through early response (Doom, 1994). What this instrument could consist of is described by Nikander (2002): “An observation, signal, message, or some other form of
communication that is or can be seen as an expression, indication, proof, or sign of the existence of some future or incipient positive or negative issue”.
Practitioners and scholars in the field of conflict studies have developed a variety of early warning models. These monitor longer-term, society-wide, structural variables to help forecast the complex dynamics that can result in conflict or instability to provide policymakers with more time to take preventive actions before conflicts erupts. (Barton et al. 2008). Table 1 shows where emphasis in the current body of early warning literature lies.
Table 1. Data Management Table (source: assembled from Walton (2011), Saferworld (2014) and Barton et al. (2008))
This table includes 904 indicators for violent conflict and instability. Of these only 25 are concerned with the environment and natural resources. Considering the work of Kaplan (1994), Homer-Dixon and the IPCC this topic seems rather underemphasized.
Table 2 provides a summary of the early warning indicators found within the Environment &
Natural Resources category (for the complete table, incl. references, see appendix A). Here, resource Scarcity and Competition & Access correspond with the left-most variables in Homer-Dixon’s
framework, leading to increased Environmental Scarcity (Fig. 1). But, as established earlier, these are no adequate predictors since this could lead to cooperation as well. Only those two within the
Management sub-category (European commission, 2006; SIPRI, 2004) do concern the interaction
between scarcity, people and policy and may be qualified. However, these indicators are very broad and vague, rendering them unusable in practice.
Table 2. Early warning indicators for conflict, category Environment and Natural Resources. (summarized from table 1, appendix A)
Interdisciplinary literature
The search for literature concerning interdisciplinary resource-use related early warning signals yielded only three publications (Richter et al., 2015; Lade et al., 2013; Kareva et al., 2012). All three used a model-based approach to study regime shifts in a social-ecological system of resource use. The early warning indicators derived from them are listed in table 3. The articles were very poorly cited (table 3). In comparison, Scheffer et al. (2009) was cited 1184 times. Lade et al. state that the linkages between natural resources and human actors are not well studied, but deserve careful attention. Evidently, this area of research is still in its infancy. But these publications do underscore the importance of coupled social-ecological dynamics in resource-use systems (Richter et al., 2015). Furthermore, all three articles concerned simplified theoretical models in which sufficient data is available. This makes them of limited use for management of real-world complex systems, which are often characterized by a lack of data (Lade et al., 2013). Also, although they take human-resource interactions into account, they only focus on possible human-resource collapse, disregarding its potential consequences (conflict vs cooperation). Thus, these articles do not fill the knowledge gap we aim to fill.
Interesting is the observation of Richter et al. (2015) that “robust detection of critical transitions may be confounded by recovery attempts undertaken by resource users in the vicinity of an
upcoming collapse, which may be falsely interpreted as a stabilization of the social–ecological system”, as this is in accordance with the findings of our case study of Syria.
Article Times cited Early warning signal Richter et
al. (2015)
0 Fluctuations in profits of resource use Lade et al.
(2013) 21 ‘Standard early warning signals’ from the field of ecology, of which the only reliable predictors were found to be: Standard deviation of the fraction of cooperators. And ‘The
generalized modeling-based signal’ Kareva et
al. (2012)
3 Increase in resource (over)consumption
Table 3. Interdisciplinary early warning indicators
Insights concerning current early warning literature
Notable about the nature of the vast majority of the indicators for violent conflict in the field of conflict studies is their mono-disciplinary character. There is a general emphasis, with very few exceptions, on either social, governmental or economic institutions and conditions (from now on summarized as societal circumstances) to foresee violent conflict. At the same time, there is insufficient focus on the environment and resource scarcity. Especially the interaction between scarcity, policy and people is underemphasized. From the field of ecology there is a strong predominant focus on early warning indicators to foresee a regime shift in ecosystems and interdisciplinary indicators are insufficiently researched and underappreciated.
Figure 3a Figure 3b
Schematically the focus of the literature could be captured by figure 3a. This figure however, ignores the possibility of scarcity induced violent conflict, because environmental conditions does not stand in contact with war. A link is missing between environmental conditions and social conditions. After all, in practice these two factors mutually affect each other. Figure 3b is therefore a better representation of reality and shows the connection that the current body of early warning literature fails to emphasize.
From the literature review is concluded that the currently utilized early warning indicators are not suitable for predicting resource-induced conflict, partly due to their lack of interdisciplinarity. Thus, with regards to the case study, a different approach and focus are required, which will be outlined below.
Reconciliation by integrating interpretations of early warning
Considering the work by Homer-Dixon (2010), Witsenburg (2002), Adano et al. (2012) and Frerks et al. (2014), environmental scarcity may trigger violent conflict or may lead to cooperation depending on the societal response to environmental scarcity. Indicators for scarcity induced violent conflict should therefore be sought in interaction between environmental conditions, such as resource scarcity, and societal conditions. As the current, almost exclusively monodisciplinary, early warning indicators do not seem to sufficiently support the interdisciplinary nature of the
indicators this research aims to identify, an integrated interpretation is used in which the
interactions between environmental conditions and societal conditions are emphasized. This new framework, through which this research operates with an interdisciplinary focus (blue bar), is graphically captured in figure 4.
Figure 4. Framework
With this interdisciplinary approach to early warning indicators, a more comprehensive view is accomplished which includes the blindspot in current early warning literature. This makes it better fit for identifying indicators concerning the interaction between scarcity, policy and people which is analysed in the case study.
This research utilizes the term socio-ecological system in the context of Syria as a coherent, perpetually dynamic and complex system of social and biophysical factors that interact with continuous adaptation (Redman et al. 2004). The concept of socio-ecological systems is used to emphasize the integration of people in their ecological context and to stress the artificial and arbitrary character of the delineation of social systems and ecological systems (Berkes et al. 2001).
3. Study area; Introduction to Syria
Before advancing to the case study, some relevant contextual information about the study area will be provided in this section. This obviously does not do justice to the complex reality, but gives the reader the necessary foreknowledge about Syria.
Environmental context
Syria, officially the Syrian Arab Republic, is located in the Middle-East and has an arid to semi-arid climate. Just like other countries in the Middle East, Syria is considered to be water scarce (FAO, 2014). Years of drought are a common and natural occurrence in Syria’s ecosystems, and given healthy ecosystem conditions, the vegetation is able to cope with this (Hole, 2009). As most rain falls along the west coast, the north and northeast of the country, this Fertile Crescent is where most agriculture takes place (Figure 5A). The steppe areas are used as rangelands (Erian, 2011)(Figure 5B).
Figure 5A: Land utilization in Syria. (source: ICARDA, 2008); Figure 5B: Long-term average precipitation in Syria (source: ICARDA, 2008)
Social context
Since the 1971 Syria has been under the quasi dictatorship of the al-Assad family (Bröning, 2011). The current president Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. The rapidly growing
population was officially estimated to have reached 21.5 million Syrians in 2010 (UN W.U.P., 2014). Among the population, diverse ethnic and religious groups are present from which the largest are the Sunni Muslims, the presidential family is however coming from the Alawite minority (van Dam, 2014). The revolutionary wave of protests began in 2011, al-Assad’s regime however, refused to step down and the unrest has since then evolved into a brutal war.
4. Case Study of Syria; Environmental Scarcity and
Human Responses
In the next section qualitative and quantitative data will be presented on the interaction between environmental scarcity and human responses in the form of actions and policies, for the past sixty years, organized in three themes. First, the following table gives a summary of the most important aspects of the case study of Syria.
When What Consequence
1950s Agricultural mechanization Extension croplands into rangeland ->
Decreased grazing area -> changing feeding patterns 1958 Abolishment tribal law End of rotational agreements
Rangelands common resource 1958-1961 Drought Half of sheep population lost. After drought Introduction supplementary feeding
system Growth of sheep population far past carrying capacity Large-scale ecosystem degradation
1995 - present Ban on crop cultivation in Badia Ineffective measure.
Rangeland degradation continues
1960s Introduction diesel motor pumps More intensive farming possible.
1970s-1980s Steep increase no. of wells Exponential increase of groundwater usage; Groundwater level drops.
1970s-1980s Expansion irrigated area, for food
self-sufficiency Cotton cultivation increases Wheat production already exceeded demand. 1970s-1980s Cheap loans for wells More wells
1970s-1980s Diesel prices subsidized Relatively inexpensive water extraction 1970s-1980s Licensing and monitoring poorly
organized Thousands of new wells sunk without permit 1980s-1990s Continued increase in number of
wells and total irrigated area Very large drop in groundwater levels. Large-scale migration from depleted lands in 1990s. 2001-2005 Various government measures to
reduce pressure on freshwater resources
Ineffective, no. of wells keeps growing; Corruption and unequal resource access; Resentment towards government.
2007 Worst regional drought in 40 years Yield of basic crops decreased; Syria becomes net-importer of grain, instead of exporter.
2007-2008 Doubling food prices Farmers/herders have difficulty making a living. mid-2009 Increased migration from drought
affected areas Overcrowding of urban areas
2009-2010 Rainfall patterns recovers Damage to social-ecological system remains 2010 Migrants move to cities Increased pressure on cities resources
March-2011 Protest in Dara’a Start of war
Table 4. Summary of events explained in case study. Color coding: Rangeland and vegetation degradation;
Irrigation and Groundwater depletion; Effects of continuing depletion and degradation.
Rangeland and vegetation degradation (1950s-2014)
For an overview of rangeland and vegetation degradation and the following human responses, this research goes back to the 1950s.
The Bedouin tribe in Syria had a longstanding tradition of using rotational grazing systems to support their livestock whilst allowing revegetation of the Badia rangelands. This changed with the agricultural mechanization in the 1950s, when cropland was extended further into the Badia, decreasing grazing area and changing feeding patterns. After the Second World War the
rain-fed farming, despite the low rainfall in the Badia. In 1958, the government abolished the tribal law, thereby destroying rotational grazing agreements and making the rangelands a common resource (Louhaichi & Tastad, 2010).
Between 1958 and 1961 a drought occurred which led to the death of half the sheep population. In reaction to this the government introduced a supplementary feeding system, controlling and subsidizing barley and other sorts of grains. Subsequently the use of supplementary feed increased with 25%, 50% and 70% in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, respectively (Masri, 2001).
However, this did not merely result in the recovery of the sheep population but also facilitated its expansion. More sheep could be raised using the same area, and as the human population grew between 1950 and 2007 from 4 to over 19 million, and their demand for animal products increased, the sheep population expanded from 3 to 22 million in the same timeframe (MAAR, 2008). The sixfold increase in the human population between 1950 and 2010 was (partly) caused by pro-natal governmental policies, which for example forbade the trade and use of contraceptives in the 1970s (De Châtel, 2014).
Due to the steep increase in livestock population the pressure on the Badia increased as well and further degraded its rangelands. Negative pressures such as overgrazing, uprooting of shrubs for fuelwood, landscape fragmentation, elevated air temperatures and decreased precipitation, resulted in (among others) reduced feed production, decreased vegetation cover, shifts in plant species composition favoring non-palatable plants, higher erosion rates, and sometimes
desertification (Louhaichi & Tastad, 2010; Salkini et al., 2008). This suggests that the natural carrying capacity of the steppe ecosystem was well exceeded.
To protect it against further degradation, the government banned crop cultivation in the Badia in 1995 (Louhaichi & Tastad, 2010). Even so, vegetation cover still declined yearly between 1997 and 2003, and led to a decrease in production of 50% (Louhaichi & Tastad, 2010). This percentage is likely to be an understatement, as crop cultivation and desired species were being replaced by invader species, reducing production but obscuring negative trends in biomass (Shinjo et al., 2000). Considering the ever increasing degradation, factors besides crop cultivation were evidently still negatively influencing the area, such as grazing pressure (Findlay, 1996).
Along with the decrease in rangeland quality, the available area also became smaller due to the extension of croplands into former rangeland area, resulting in a decrease from 7.9 to 2.6 ha available per sheep between 1961 and 1993 (FAO, 2003).
In 2000, a study concluded that the grazing pressure definitely exceeded the carrying capacity of the rangelands (Shinjo et al., 2000). This was confirmed as later, during the 2001-8 period, drought had had a devastating impact on the vegetation (Kelley et al., 2015). Notable is significant difference observed in condition of vegetation between areas of controlled grazing (no degradation) and areas where intensive grazing is allowed (severe degradation). This indicates that it was the combination of drought with a carrying capacity exceeding grazing pressure that caused rangeland degradation and increased scarcity (Serra et al. 2009).
Overgrazing in combination with extensive overexploitation of groundwater had turned the area of Nebk, which used to be known for its fruitful agriculture, into desert while crops were being burned by sandstorms, brought on by desertification of rangelands in the steppe (Hole, 2009). Arable land has decreased from 6,2 million ha in 1962 to 4,6 million ha in 2013 (Figure 6, FAO, 2013).
Figure 6: Decline of arable land in Syria between 1962 and 2013. (source: Assembled with data from FAO, 2013)
Irrigation and Groundwater depletion (1950s-2014)
The developments in water scarcity and the human response to this in the form of actions and policies is illustrated here, by again returning to the 1950s.
Farmers who lived away from major rivers during this period relied on seasonal rainfall to water crops and for domestic use. They used shallow hand-dug wells to draw up groundwater manually. As extraction was low, the groundwater levels were naturally replenished during rainy periods (De Châtel, 2014) keeping the ecosystem at equilibrium within its carrying capacity.
In the 1960s diesel motor pumps were introduced on a large scale, enabling more intensive farming due to a higher freshwater availability for irrigation. At the same time however, it caused a rapid drop in groundwater levels, which would not be naturally replenished (De Châtel, 2014; Aw-Hassan, 2014).
During the 1970s and 1980s the areas irrigated by groundwater expanded rapidly as farmers drilled hundreds of new wells across the country (De Châtel, 2010). From here on out the withdrawal of groundwater becomes approximately five times higher with each decade.
The government encouraged the large-scale expansion of groundwater-irrigated agriculture and supported the drilling of new wells for cotton cultivation (Aw-Hassan, 2014; Al-Shamali, 2009). According to the official narrative, the strong drive to develop irrigated agriculture was linked to the demands of a growing population and the desire to achieve food self-sufficiency. Yet the
national wheat production target of 4–5 million tonnes per year well exceeded internal demand (De Châtel, 2014), while cotton, a non-food crop, accounts for the greatest share of total irrigation water after wheat (FAO, 2014). Farmers were granted easy access to advantageous loans to drill wells and install pumps. Because diesel prices were heavily subsidized, extracting water, even from great depths, became inexpensive (Table 5, Aw-Hassan, 2014). On top of this thousands of new wells were being sunk without government licences as the licensing and monitoring was poorly organized (De Châtel, 2010; Aw-Hassan, 2014).
During the late 1980s and 1990s the number of wells and the total irrigated area increased with on average 15% per year, resulting in a doubling of irrigated area between 1984 and 2000, to 1.2 million ha (Aw-Hassan, 2014). In Mhardeh in the Hama governorate and Khan Shaykhun in the Idleb governorate, the over-pumping led to a drop of up to 100 metres between the 1950s and 2000 (De Châtel, 2014). Similarly, a research institute near Aleppo recorded an average drop in groundwater table of 1.5 m/y, between 1984 and 2010 (Figure 7, Aw-Hassan, 2014). In the period between 1993 and 2000, groundwater levels in the Damascus Ghuta and its surroundings dropped by more than 6 metres per year (Hobler & Rajab, 2002). Aquifers in large parts of Hassakeh
governorate, which had been heavily settled and cultivated since the 1970s, became depleted, causing large-scale migration from the land since the 1990s (Hole, 2009).
Figure 7: Precipitation and groundwater table level, 1984-2010. Source: FAOSTAT, 2013.
During the late 1990s the government issued a decree demanding the licensing of all illegal wells by 2001 to control the over extraction of groundwater. This measure however, had little concrete effect. In 1999 the number of wells was estimated around 135,089, this number steeply increased afterwards (Figure 8, Aw-Hassan, 2014). In 2001 one of the largest karst springs in the world, the Ras al Ain Springs on the Syrian–Turkish border, had disappeared completely following extensive over-extraction in the spring catchment area over the last 50 years (Hole, 2009). During the early 2000s the depletion of groundwater is also clearly evident from remotely sensed data (Joodaki et al., 2014). By 2010 the number of wells was estimated over 229,881 with fifty-seven per cent of these wells unlicensed (Fig. 8).
Various measures to improve water resource protection, license wells, better regulate drilling procedures, and a commitment to the punishment of violators with fines and prison sentences were outlined in the 2005 Water Law (De Châtel, 2010). The government required well licenses to be renewed annually in order to monitor the groundwater levels. Unfortunately, this engendered widespread corruption and unequal resource access as security personnel or local officials forced farmers to pay bribes for new licenses. Instead of reducing the pressure on freshwater resources through regulation, this triggered the continued drilling of new illegal wells, the exclusion of farmers from freshwater resources who could not meet bribes set by local officials, and a strong resentment toward the government in rural areas (Marzouq, 2011).
Effects of continuing depletion and degradation (2000-2015)
The increased pressure that Syria’s government and its people have put on its agricultural land for increased production and its groundwater resources for extensive irrigation, has led to
overexploitation of both soil and water resources. International market pressures have only increased this further by creating an incentive to keep up with international competition. Since 2000, the north-east region has been rapidly sinking further into poverty as groundwater reserves were depleted and a series of overambitious agricultural development projects overstretched both land and water resources (De Châtel, 2014, p. 2-10).
Exacerbated consequences of drought
In 2007 the worst regional drought in 40 years took place. Although drought is a natural
phenomenon in Syria, its ecosystems can only withstand it when in a healthy state. This becomes especially clear when drought strikes as the balance and carrying capacity of ecosystems have been exceeded. This is why the already severe drought could extremely exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Syria. During the 2007-8 season, average rainfall across Syria dropped to 66 per cent of the long-term average, with some regions receiving no rain at all (Brown, 2008). As a result, average yield of basic crops dropped by 32 per cent in irrigated areas and as much as 79 per cent in rainfed areas (Lennert, 2009). After being a net-exporter of grains for 15 years, Syria became a net
importer by 2008. Not having been able to harvest for two consecutive years, and having lost over 80% of their livestock, many small- and medium-scale farmers and herders saw their production drop to nearly zero (IFRC, 2009). The agricultural share of Syria’s GDP dropped from 25% in 2003 to 17% in 2008 (USDA, 2014). Between 2007 and 2008, the prices of wheat, rice and feed more than doubled (Nehme, 2008; IRIN, 2009a).
During the 2008-9 season the pattern of poor rainfall continues in parts of the country, particularly in the northeastern governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Hassakeh and Raqqa. During the second and third year of the drought these affected peoples became increasingly vulnerable. The rainfall in other regions largely recovered. Precipitation levels in the governorate of Dara’a even exceeded average rainfall during 2009-10, initiating migration of people from the northeast to this region.
Production was further crippled for farmers producing soft wheat on irrigated land. They suffered widespread crop losses due to an outbreak of yellow wheat rust, a fungal disease, which spread rapidly due to the previous years of drought (UN-HCR, 2011). As a result, the 2009-10 wheat crop came in at 3.2 million tonnes, well short of the 4–5 million tonnes predicted by the government (IRIN, 2009a).
In the 2009-10 season rainfall levels recovered across the country, though the northeast was plagued by irregular rainfall patterns.
Migration and Displacement
Large migration of people from drought affected areas increased substantially in mid-2009 to 250,000 to 500,000 people (Solh, 2010). During the 2006-2010 drought internally displaced people were estimated at 1.5 million (IRIN, 2009b; Solh, 2010; Massoud, 2010). Schools showed an 80% drop in enrollments due to families migrating (De Schutter, 2010). Most migrated to the peripheries of Syria’s cities in search of work, already burdened by strong population growth (∼2.5% per year).
In July 2009 for instance, 200.000 to 300.000 persons had migrated from Al-Hassake to urban centres of Damascus, Dara’a, Hama and Aleppo (Solh, 2010).
By 2010, about 20% of the urban population consisted of internally displaced people and Iraqi refugees (who had entered the country Between 2003 and 2007) (US Census Bureau, 2014). These influxes caused the total urban population to grow from 8.9 million in 2002 to 13.8 million in 2010, a extremely high rate, even compared to Syria’s already high population growth (Figure 9; Kelley et al., 2015). The percentage of the syrian population living in urban areas is estimated at 57 per cent for 2014 (UN, 2014). Figure 10 shows the change in urban population between 1950 and 2010. This rapid and large population increase put further strain on its resources (Erian, 2011). The urban peripheries where migrants (often illegally) settled were overcrowded showed high rates of unemployment (over 50%, according to some estimates) and crime, were neglected by the government, and became the epicentre of the developing civil unrest (Massoud, 2010). The
government not only neglected migrants who arrived in Syria’s cities but also actively tried to send them back to where they came from. Food and cash handouts were promised to the people who agreed to return to their land on Syria’s countryside and Syrian security forces discouraged private Syrian initiatives to help the migrants (De Châtel, 2014).
Figure 9. Syrian Total midyear population. (Source: Kelley et al., 2015)
Figure 10. Percentage of Syrian population at mid-year residing in urban areas. (Source: Assembled with data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, 2014)
In March 2011 social unrest had burst into violent conflict during a demonstration in Dara’a against corruption of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, most notably in the domain of well licensing and groundwater use (Bank & Mohns 2013). In July 2013, the United Nations estimated that more than 100,000 people had died since March 2011, while millions of officially registered and
unregistered refugees are scattered from Egypt to Turkey and beyond, and an estimated 4.25 million people are internally displaced. War became a fact.
5. Synthesis; Combining insights from case study and
literature review
The case study confirms;
1. that environmental scarcity influences both policies and people, 2. that policies influences people,
3. and that people’s actions in response, influences both scarcity and policies.
This interaction, or feedback loop, lays the groundwork for either a virtuous or a vicious circle. In the case of Syria it regards a vicious cycle.
Nature of interaction; Creating a vicious cycle
Indigenous peoples did not tend to disturb the established balance between people and ecosystem, but when pressured by population growth, market forces and the wish for food self-sufficiency, which in the case of Syria were co-established through central government, people were triggered to try and overcome the natural limitations of the ecosystem. This behavior has provided benefits in the form of higher yields in the short run but has led to greater environmental scarcity in the long run.
Technical advances such as the mechanization of agriculture initially increased the quantity of available soil for agriculture, but simultaneously decreased the availability of rangelands and groundwater. When it became evident that the new rate of resource utilization exceeded the
ecosystem’s carrying capacity, the government did not relieve the pressure on its natural resources. Instead, it tried to artificially uphold the productivity of the socio-ecological system by combating the symptoms of environmental scarcity, namely; resource scarcity, decreased economic
productivity and migration. This was done through providing supplementary feed for a sheep population which was too large for the rangelands they grazed on; by subsidizing diesel so water for irrigation remained accessible and affordable regardless of growing more scarce; by further increasing pressure on farmers and their lands to increase production for food self-sufficiency and export; and by repelling and sending back migrants from the outskirts of the cities.
A vicious cycle was created as policies in reaction to both natural and increasing resource scarcity were misguided. The interventions were aimed to overcome the natural limitations of the ecosystem, fostered short term gains and ignored the fact that there were simply too many people exploiting a finite resource. The manner in which people reacted to these various policy
interventions resulted in a feedback that increased scarcity.
Insights from case study in relation to early warning literature
The case study shows how the societal response to environmental scarcity in Syria has led to increased scarcity and bad resource management. The unsustainable nature of the interaction between scarcity, policies and people’s actions in response to both form the core of the increased scarcity problem. This underlines the shortcomings in current early warning literature, as
indicators concerning this interaction are severely underrepresented. Even though proving to be a potentially important source for indicators, there is hardly a qualitative understanding of it in current early warning literature.
As the case study suggests, unsustainable interaction leads to increased scarcity, loss of livestock, decreased of crop yields, rise in commodity and food prices, inflation, migration and displacement. Notable is how these consequences of unsustainable interaction are widely referred to in early warning literature (see appendix A). Evidently, these indicators are indeed an omen for war. However, once agricultural production is dropping and mass migration and displacement have become fact, the situation has already escalated, making (early) response to prevent war all the more difficult. Seeing as unsustainable interaction between scarcity, policies and people precedes this, an earlier warning indicator could be found here. This emphasizes the importance of
Insights from case study in relation to interdisciplinary early warning literature
Even though the literature study showed that interdisciplinary early warning indicators were almost nonexistent in this scientific field, it did yield a few interesting insights. The studies by Kareva et al. (2012) and Richter et al. (2015), though hardly significant if one is to measure this by cited references, yielded results that are compatible with ours. Both were concerned with social-ecological resource competition models, and thereby with human-resource interactions.Kareva et al. (2012) found that “while changes in population size and the resource over time may
seem to give no cause for alarm, the mean value of the parameter of over-consumption may signal trouble: the system will be recalibrating towards maximizing the amount of resource consumed, and as soon as the buffer capacity of the resource (in this case it is proportional to natural resource restoration and decay rates) is exhausted, both the population and the resource collapse.”
Richter et al. (2015) also made an interesting observation, stating that “robust detection of
critical transitions may be confounded by recovery attempts undertaken by resource users in the vicinity of an upcoming collapse, which may be falsely interpreted as a stabilization of the social– ecological system”. This indeed very closely resembles the process that was observed in Syria, in
which the government tried to artificially uphold the carrying capacity of the natural resources through policies. The seemingly stable state which can, apparently, be maintained for decades is what makes the situation so dangerous. It gives people a false feeling of safety and impedes the implementation of necessary measures to combat the increasing scarcity.
Early warning indicators for environmental scarcity induced violent conflict
With the foregoing findings in mind, this study underscores the importance of interdisciplinary indicators to gain insight into the qualitative nature of the interaction between scarcity, policies and people in socio-ecological systems. Following the literature review and the case study, the following preliminary indicators are constructed to signal the approach of scarcity induced violent conflict and thus fill the knowledge gap in early warning literature and conflict studies:
1. Centrally organized, insufficiently informed planning, which surpasses local knowledge on how to manage natural resources sustainably.
2. government ideology leading to policies that stimulates people to maximize economic productivity and short term gains, with little regard to the natural carrying capacity of the system.
3. Increasing human involvement in the natural way ecosystems preserve an equilibrium, to either increase productivity or to restore a disturbed balance.
Relevance for conflict prevention and early response
Countries and regions for which these insights may serve to prevent increased resource scarcity and violent conflict are particularly regions which already consist of fragile ecosystems. When these countries are for example liberalizing trade under supervision of the IMF and World Bank, governments and entrepreneurs will aim to increase productivity to be competitive in the international market. In doing so, traditional resource management is likely to be replaced by management that allow productivity to surge, making increased pressure on natural resources likely. Considering the finding of this research, when this situation occurs, recent developments and changes in management, agriculture and natural resources should be carefully analyzed and the nature of interaction between scarcity, policies and people should be qualified. This will determine whether a vicious or virtuous cycle -conflict or cooperation-, is more likely. When the indicators as described above prevail, early response should be initiated to prevent scarcity induced violent conflict.
As this has been an explorative, pioneer study, recommendations for further research will be made in the final chapter.
Conclusions
The following question was central in this research;
Which early warning indicators for environmental scarcity induced violent conflict in complex socio-ecological systems can be derived from analysis of Syria’s recent history?
The results from both the literature review and the case study combined yield the insight that early warning indicators concerning the nature of the interaction between environmental scarcity, policies and people are valuable. The nature of this interaction determines whether or not scarcity induced violent conflict is likely to develop in the socio-ecological system. State planning focusing on short-term (mostly economic) gains, ignoring the fact that there are too many people exploiting a finite resource and consisting of increasingly frequent policy interventions that are aimed to either increase productivity or to restore a disturbed balance, form early warning indicators for acute environmental scarcity and scarcity-induced conflict.
Reflection on interdisciplinarity
What proved essential to this complex study subject is interdisciplinarity. This study could not have been done solely from the ecological, political or human geographical perspective, or it would have had a severely limited scope. In fact, although different aspects of the subject (e.g. migration movements, ecosystem degradation) could have been grasped by the separate disciplines involved, scarcity-induced conflict itself is in its very nature an interdisciplinary problem. Therefore, a multidisciplinary approach would not have sufficed, as combining the insights of the different disciplines would not have covered the problem in its entirety. It is in the interactions between the disciplinary fields that this problem emerges.
As a consequence of this, during the research process the boundaries between the disciplines soon faded, and dividing the report in three separate fields is no longer possible. This could be seen as a sign that the interdisciplinary approach has been was successful.
Moreover, our results made clear that interdisciplinarity is virtually absent in current early warning literature. More interdisciplinary research efforts should be stimulated, as many of the complex problems that these indicators aim to apprehend are connected to multiple disciplines and interacting agents.
Hopefully, the results from this report will encourage further interdisciplinary research into early warning indicators for scarcity-induced violent conflict as it has proved to be critical in identifying early warning indicators and thus the prevention of devastating wars.
Recommendations
The prior report discusses matters from abstract theoretical models, to small literature study facts about the number of sheep in a specific Syrian region. This broad study scope, combined with the set limitations of this Interdisciplinary Project, inevitably leads to some weaknesses. This part of the report discusses therefore some recommendations for research. It is divided into two parts; recommendations for improving this research, and recommendations for future extending research on interdisciplinary early warning indicators for scarcity induced conflict. To improve this study, a few aspects are considered. The research design included the
intensive study of the recent history of Syria. However, due to time and costs limits, this studying was done only by voluminous literature study. To improve mostly the qualitative part of the case study of Syria, other research methods could be used. On-site research, for example, would improve understanding the finesse of the social reality in Syria. Related to this, the literature study was conducted on scientific articles and reports of renowned international institutions. An Arabic reading researcher or Arabic translator would have been a valuable addition as Syrian literature, newspapers and local government reports would become accessible. Naturally, follow-up research is also necessary to further validate this study’s findings.
Future interdisciplinary research into early warning signals for scarcity induced violent conflict should contain the intensive study of other possibly valuable cases. To know for certain that comprehensive action is required when the identified indicators are present in a socio-ecological system (regardless of its further characteristics) a large-N research is recommended. This should be conducted to help decontextualize current findings. Additionally, as this study showed, increasing environmental scarcity and conflict are likely when the identified indicators emerge simultaneously. To know what the effects on the social-ecological system are when one, or a combination of, these indicators is observed, a comparative study should be conducted.
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Appendix A
Table of early warning indicators within the category of Environment and Resources, obtained through literature study.
Organization Main category Sub-category Indicator
SIPRI Environment &
resources Competition & Access Competition over (scarce) resources (eg water)
SIPRI The
Environment & Natural Resources
Competition
& Access Problematic resources (eg oil, diamonds, and gold)
World Bank Environment &
resources Competition & Access Access to natural resources (including land) World Bank Environment &
resources Competition & Access In-country and cross-border competition over natural resources
OECD Environment &
resources Competition & Access Competition over natural resources BMZ - (German)
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
Environment &
resources Competition & Access Resource competition
UK DFID Environment &
resources Competition & Access Increasing competition over shared resources Tokyo NIRA - National
Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Disasters Natural disasters
SIPRI The
Environment & Natural Resources
Disasters Environmental disaster and general scarcity of natural resources
FEWER The
Environment & Natural Resources
Disasters Environmental: Environmental disaster
European Commission The
Environment & Natural Resources
Management How sustainable is the state’s environmental policy? Fairness of management of natural resources (e.g. water), anticipation of possible internal or external conflicts over natural resources, risk of serious environmental degradation (f.i. desertification) forcing people into exile or threatening traditional ways of life
SIPRI Environment &
resources Management Resource management Tokyo NIRA - National
Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
FEWER - Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Pollution Environmental: Pollution
Tokyo NIRA - National Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Pollution Water pollution
Tokyo NIRA - National Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Pollution Air pollution
Tokyo NIRA - National Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Pollution Soil pollution
Canadian Gov't &
Carleton U Environment & resources Scarcity People per Square Kilometre of Arable Land World Bank Environment &
resources Scarcity Availability of natural resources
Swisspeace The
Environment & Natural Resources
Scarcity Dependency on irrigation
Tokyo NIRA - National Institute for Research Advancement
The
Environment & Natural Resources
Scarcity Erosion and loss of topsoil
BMZ - (German) Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development The Environment & Natural Resources
Scarcity Environmental conditions
Canadian Gov't &
Carleton U The Environment & Natural Resources
Scarcity Rate of Deforestation
Canadian Gov't &
Carleton U The Environment & Natural Resources
Scarcity Freshwater Resources
USAID and Tulane The
Environment & Natural Resources
