Faculty of social and behavioral sciences
Policy Change in Air Traffic Regulation as a Result of the Volcanic Ash
Crisis:
The case for network governance
Maxime Schreurs 10266968
m.schreurs92@gmail.com
Politicologie – Bestuur en Beleid Julien Jeandesboz & Rosa Sanchez Salgado
June 26th 2015
Political Science- International Organization in a Networked World: governing environment, trade, and security
Abstract
This paper analyzes the changes in air traffic regulation policy in the European Union as a result of the 2010 volcanic ash crisis. We will examine how the response went from being determines formal
organizational structures to achieving negotiation based policy changes. Transboundary risks often do not have policy that is adequately formulated to deal with risks turning in crises but are more likely to occur in our modernized society. Through the use of a theoretical based of instrumental
organizational theory, advocacy coalition theory and network governance theory, this paper will try to explain policy changes and argue that in order to formulate effective policy the vertical
coordination between national and supranational bodies but also the horizontal coordination between organizations and agencies needs to be strengthened.
1. Introduction
In the early spring of 2010 the Icelandic Volcano Eyjafjallajökill erupted, sending a cloud of ash into the sky. Consequently all European air traffic was brought to a halt for about two weeks. Initially the cessation of all air traffic was deemed a sound decision based on the technical information that was released about the dangers flying through the ash cloud could have as a result. However, not long after the initial response protocol was put in place and executed, a lively debate came about. Not only was the technical information about the dangers of the ash contested, the debate spread also to include a contestation of the decisive authority of air traffic control authorities. As the monetary damage for commercial airlines started to grow, causing an increase in dissatisfaction with the course of action, the pressure for an alternative plan of action started to grow. Soon the European Union Commission succumbed to this pressure and agreed to meet with several
stakeholder to discuss the differentiation of air traffic control in the European Union. The crisis was only short lived since the volcano quieted down after only two weeks and normal air traffic was to be resumed as normal. Despite the brevity that characterized the volcanic ash crisis, the trans-boundary nature of the crisis and its substantial political and economic costs for the stakeholders involved, make this case important to be analyzed. So, exactly why is it relevant to study a crisis with transboundary nature and what does transboundary mean exactly? Ulrich Beck gave the concept of ‘risk society’ prominence and popularity several decades ago. According to Beck (1992: 21) a risk society is a society increasingly preoccupied with finding systematic ways to deal with the hazards and insecurities that modernization has brought along. With modernization came risks that became harder to contain. The volcanic ash crisis is an ideal example of a crisis that is not contained by any physical territorial boundaries, like land borders, since air moves around freely. Crisis response consequently became the responsibility of a multitude of governmental and non-governmental organizations from not only many countries simultaneously but also from many administrative levels and sectors, which is what makes the crisis ‘transboundary’. As society becomes more preoccupied with containing risk, and the likelihood of transboundary risk becoming crisis increasing, it hence becomes imperative to study those crises that have had transboundary features. Moreover, it is then essential to provide a framework with which it can be determined how the most effective policy to contain risk can be formulated and incrementally changed over time to accommodate the ever changing society.
In order to help come to such a framework, this paper will try to answer the following question: ‘How did policy change in air traffic regulation come about as a result of the 2010 volcanic ash crisis?’ To answer this question, multiple theories will be applied to understand the actions taken during the different stages of the volcanic ash crises. Many research focusses on using only one theory to explain policy changes and policy formulation. By combining several theories to analyze the consequences of only one crisis, one allows the ambiguity and multifaceted nature of crisis to show in the research of crisis as well. The unpredictability and fast changing nature of crisis means that those in charge of crisis management can no longer rely on recognized crisis problems,
establish logics and corresponding strategies (Stark, 2011: 1148). It thus becomes very well possible that different theories are most suitable to understand actions taken by actors during different stages of the crisis. Using multiple theories, namely instrumental organizational theory, advocacy coalition theory and network governance theory, will allow a fuller understanding of the policy changes that occurred as a result of the crisis. In this paper it will be argued that initial crisis response was dictated by the formal structure of the air traffic regulation system but that through the formation of advocacy coalitions, actors were able to accomplish policy changes that facilitate a more networked approach in the newly formulated risk policy. Finally it will be argued that not only the vertical coordination between national and supranational bodies should be strengthened but also the horizontal coordination between organizations and agencies to come to the most effective risk policy.
To come to this main argument each theory will be used to explain a set of sub questions: a) How was the crisis defined by different actors? What did this mean for the way the crisis
was handled? Why did air traffic regulation policy become an issue that was discussed on a central EU level?
b) How were actors involved in the discussion on air traffic regulation policy? How did they try to influence air traffic regulation policy? What means did they use to do so? What changes were made in the air traffic regulation policy?
c) What can be said about the characteristics of the new air traffic regulation policy? Can the changes be seen as a compromise between different interests?
The paper is structured as follows. First, the theoretical approach will be presented that includes the three theories that each will be used to describe events during one phase of the volcanic ash crisis. After that, it will be explained what data and method were used in this paper and what implication this has for the significance of its results. Then, an outline of the formal organization of
the European air traffic system will be given as to better understand which actors were involved and what the relationship between the actors is structured. Fourth, the initial sense making of the event and initial response will be analyzed through the use of instrumental theory. Fifth, the efforts to influence the decision making process will be analyzed with the use of the advocacy coalition framework. Lastly, with the use of network governance theory, the changes in air traffic regulation policy will be analyzed.
2. Theoretical framework 2.1 Instrumental-Structural perspective
To analyze the initial response to the volcanic ash crisis we will turn to the instrumental-structural perspective. The instrumental-structural perspective states that the formal structure of public organizations will influence how actors make sense of events and their accompanied decision-making behavior (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013:72). The structural design of
organizations and the behavior of actors in it, presents both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand it means organizations can work efficiently to fulfill public goals but on the other hand it means the organization can become inflexible when sense making and decision making processes are all in accordance with rational calculations to achieve goals set by the organization
(Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 73). When actors are aware of the formal structure of the organization this means that they will believe that acts will be more regularized and that interaction will be patterned accordingly to the structure (Zucker, 1977:728) The formal structure of organizations will thus dictate which actors can be involved in the decision making process, which will naturally predetermine actual involvement (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 73). In the case of the volcanic ash crisis this means that the formal structure that existed between air traffic regulatory bodies would dictate exactly which governmental, non-governmental, national, intra-national and supra national bodies would be involved and also to what extent they could be involved. The decision making structure is often a system of strict hierarchies where power concentrates around leaders (March & Olsen, 1983: 292) These leaders can however decide to decentralize or delegate authority to other, lower levels of power (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 73). Leaders in the decision making process can affect the decisions to be made according to their unambiguous interpretation of the situation which involves defining the
problems and their appropriate solutions. Nonetheless, other actors in the decision making system can oppose to the decisions being made by hierarchical leaders through forming alliances with other actors in the system that are also opposed to the hierarchical decisions. Later this will lead us into the theory of advocacy coalitions that will be used to explain the changes in the decision making process as the volcanic ash crisis unfolded. But first it must be explained what implication the instrumental-structural perspective will have for this thesis. This perspective dictates that, to make sense of the initial response to the volcanic ash crisis, it is crucial to figure out how the formal organization of the air traffic system was structured. This means that it must be determined which
bodies were involved, the degree of decentralization of the system, the strictness of formal procedures and how the systems was supposed to function in a time of crisis.
Instrumental-structural perspective leads us to believe that initial sense making and decision making process was in the hands of the most centralized and hierarchical body in the air traffic regulation policy field.
2.2 Advocacy coalition framework
As stated above, actors in the decision making system can oppose to the decisions being made by hierarchical leaders through forming alliances with other actors in the system. Although some literature has integrated this process into the instrumental-organizational perspective, for the purposes of this thesis this process will be explained and analyzed through the use of advocacy coalition framework. In part the purpose of this paper is to provide a multi theoretical analyses of the decision making process regarding air traffic regulation policy, so although the instrumental-organizational perspective might allow for analyses of alliances, using ACF will allow the analysis to be much more thorough since it provides more precise tools. Moreover, using ACF as an analytical tool for policy change in times of crisis can help solidify the ACF’s place in crisis management research.
The main premise of ACF is that policymaking is conducted within policy subsystems that have both territorial and functional scopes and are composed of a set of policy participants whom are actively involved in formulating public policies (Rozbicka, 2013: 839). In the case of the volcanic ash crisis the territorial scope is Europe and the air traffic regulation policy is the functional scope. Within policy subsystems actors often have a wide array of beliefs about the nature, severity, and solution to policy problems (Nohrtstedt, 2013: 996). Actors with the same beliefs regarding policy problems converge into an advocacy coalition, thus creating several competing advocacy coalitions. Within these advocacy coalition actors will harmonize attempts to influence public policy (Nohrstedt, 2013: 996). According to the literature on ACF there are four main assumption about how actors in competing advocacy coalition perceive public policy and how they might attempt to change it in times of crisis. First there is the role of scientific information. According to ACF, any actor that wants to gain influence in the decision-making process needs a thorough understanding of the problems, their causes and possible solutions to those problems within the policy field (Nohrstedt, 2013: 996). As a consequence, information becomes a crucial resource to actors in the policy subsystem. Actors attempt to strategically employ information in a manner that allows them to win political battles against opponents (Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 203). This means that researchers and policy experts become important allies in the policy system since they are most adequately able at
interpreting and framing problems that are technically complex (Rozbicka, 2013: 840). The second assumption is closely related to the interpretation and framing of problems. ACF states that
coalitions use competing crisis narratives to defend and push their policy agenda. Advocacy
coalitions form around a set of normative beliefs that determine how underlying causes, the overall seriousness of problems and basic strategies for achieving core values are perceived (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 133). This in turn means that actors from different coalitions are prone to understand the same information in different ways (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). Coalitions will thus pursue different crisis narratives in order to present technical validation for their position and to gain support form a wider audience outside the subsystem (Norhstedt, 2013: 996). The third assumption about how coalitions achieve their policy goals is that coalitions will mobilize political
resources and policy venues. In order to gain influence in the decision making process, coalitions will
constantly seek influence by exploiting venues and by mobilizing political resources, including, public opinion, formal legal authority, mobilizable supporters, and leadership (Nohrstedt, 2013: 996). Closely related to this is the assumption that coalitions are opportunistic. When advocacy coalition see any opportunity to realize their policy goals, they will exploit the situation. Crises in this sense are especially convenient since they signify the failure of the current order and thus present the perfect opportunity to redistributing resources and open new venues for minority coalitions to gain influence.
After the initial reaction to the volcanic ash crisis will be illustrated by using the instrumental-structural perspective, the consequent events will be analyzed in accordance with the four
assumptions that were just presented. To do so, it will first be established what advocacy coalitions can be detected in the air traffic regulatory policy field. After that, analyses will show how the coalitions used the four assumptions to achieve their policy goals.
2.3 Network governance
The last part of the analyses of this paper consist of establishing whether the changes in air traffic regulation policy were in the end the result of effective network governance. To do so, first it has to be explained what the characteristics of network governance are and then it is possible to
determine whether they are applicable to the actors in the air traffic regulation policy field.
According to the literature on network governance, there are a few features that define this form of governing public policy. As defined by Sorensen and Torfing (2005:197) network governance includes a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors who interact through negotiations that involve bargaining, deliberation and intense power
struggles which take place within a relatively institutionalized framework of contingently
articulated rules, norms, knowledge and social imaginations that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and which contribute to the production of public purpose in the broad sense of visions, ideas, plans and regulations.
As a concept, network governance tries to argue that it can accomplish increased efficiency and reduced agency problems for organizations existing in highly turbulent environments. The argument for the increased efficiency is two-fold: on the one hand, the efficiency is enhanced through distributed knowledge acquisition and decentralized problem solving; on the other, the effectiveness is improved through the emergence of collective solutions to global problems in different self-regulated sectors of activity (Dedeurwaedere, 2007: 210).
Network governance constitutes a "distinct form of coordinating economic activity" which contrasts and competes with markets and hierarchies (Jones et al, 1997: 941). There are three ways in which governance networks differs from the hierarchical control and competitive
regulation. First of all the relationship between the actors in governance network can be described as a "pluricentric governance system" as opposed to the "unicentric system of state rule and the multicentric system of market competition" (Kersbergen, 2004: 148). Which means that many different actors with many different resources are involved but they have all agreed on the same interactions rooted in trust and regulated by rules that are negotiated and agreed by network participants (Rhodes, 2000:61). Secondly, the decision making process is different because network governance involves a large number of interdependent organization and actors who have to
interact in order to produce a public purpose, which stands in contrast with the hierarchical rule (Rhodes, 2000:61). Since the organization in the network are interdependent and structured less hierarchically, actors have to rely on negotiation rationality when making decisions (Scharpf, 1997: 46). Lastly, compliance is ensured not through the exertion of power but through trust and political obligations. Over time self-constituted rules and norms within the network will solidify that trust and the political obligation between the actors in the network (Pedersen, 1988: 98).
To determine whether air traffic regulation policy changes in the end were indeed the result of network governance it is necessary to establish to what degree the network is indeed pluricentric, to what degree their decision are based on negotiation and to what degree compliance result from mutual trust and political obligations.
3. Data and Method
For this research several sources were used to get a general overview of decisions made during the crisis and the consequent regulatory changes. News articles mainly from the British press were gathered, for language reasons, using several news article search engines. The articles used all centered on the same two week time period, April 14th to April 28th, which was when the crisis was
ongoing but also include in depth articles from after the crisis. This makes it possible to not only analyze the sense making of the events while it happened but also the response this fostered afterwards. Besides news articles, many formal policy documents, reports and press releases from the most relevant actors in the air traffic network, were analyzed. These sources were found through the online webpages of the organizations. The methodology used for this research is a qualitative case study. As said before in the introduction, the case was chosen for its transboundary nature. There have been several crises in the European union over the last couple decades that had some features of being transboundary, like the BSE crisis or the FMD epidemic, but none of them showcased these features to the degree the volcanic ash crisis did. Which makes the volcanic ash crisis a more interesting and innovative case to study since it exhibits some features that many other, often studied crises don’t have. An objective when choosing this case was to provide an example to study similar cases with the same type of theoretical framework. Although this
methodology might provide some thorough insight into this specific case, and some aspects might be transferable to other cases, since it is a qualitative study, the prospect for generalizations are not as great as one would like them to be. Moreover, this case falls within the political framework of the European Union. It could be argued that results might be useful for other cases found within the EU but that this research loses some of its strength when trying to apply it to other political systems because the features of those political systems differ too much from the one studied in this case.
4. Structure of European air traffic control
An outline of the actors involved in the crisis and their relationship will now be given to get a clear understanding of the many levels of governance involved in the policy field of air traffic regulation in the Europe Union. Since air space and air traffic is not bound by physical or national boarders, much of European but also national air traffic legislation is bound by global agreements. These global agreements include policy regulations about the appropriate response to volcanic activity. For the purposes of this paper, it is essential to look not only at the actors that are involved at the global level of air traffic regulations in case of volcanic activity but also at the influence these actors and their resources have for policy response on the European level. By outlining how European air traffic regulations came about and what actors historically were involved, we can establish not only the relevant institutions and organizations but also the structures in which these institutions and organizations move.
International cooperation within the field of air traffic regulation is not a novel idea. Air traffic regulations on an international level first came about in 1947 with the establishment of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The ICAO is an agency of the United Nations and is responsible for constructing standards and practices related to civil aviation (Norhstedt, 2013: 968). Today it holds approximately 190 member countries (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 74). Within the European Union air traffic regulation policy is based on a collaboration between the European Commission (directorate General for Mobility and Transport), the European Safety Agency (EASA), the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), EU member state civil aviation authorities, aircraft manufacturers, and the airlines (Norhstedt, 2013: 968). Besides the ICAO, these before mentioned actors also engage in a continuous dialogue with the International Air Transport Association (IATA), and international trade body and lobby organization representing about 230 airline companies. Two other main lobbying organizations connected to the airline industry are the Association of European airlines (AEA) and the Airports Council International (ACI). The main aim of these organizations is to serve the interest of their members through both informal cooperation based on exchange of knowledge, expertize, and best practices but also formal cooperation in the form of joint resistance against regulatory reform (Nohrstedt, 2013: 968). In the specific case of the volcanic ash crisis, the European and national institution relied fairly heavily on a detailed contingency plan provided by the ICAO since they have
a fairly strong regulatory role in preparing guidelines and legislation for dealing with volcanic ash at the international level (ICAO, 2009). Another organization that played a crucial advisory role during the volcanic ash crisis was the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (VAAC). As an organization specialized in the analysis of volcanic ash, it played a significant role in providing the EU with updated significant meteorological data and notifications to airmen about no-fly-zones around the erupting Volcano (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 74). The VAAC, however, is an organization set up by the ICAO and as a result the ICAO has a hefty influence on the VAAC since it is the primary giver of legislation and guidelines for dealing with erupting volcanoes (Christensen, 2013:74). The organization within the EU that is responsible for specifying and translating legislation provided by the ICAO is the EASA. EASE has the formal right to issue certifications and standards regarding air traffic safety (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid 2013: 74). Moreover, the EASA evaluates whether the implementation of the specified legislation is up to par by
arranging inspections of national level aviation authorities. On a day to day basis the organization most involved in air traffic regulation is Eurocontrol. Eurocontrol’s daily task is to coordinate air traffic management (ATM) and has specified its core purpose as ‘the development of a seamless European ATM system’ (Eurocontrol, 2011). The main project to create this seamless pan-European ATM system is better known as the Single pan-European Sky (SES). The incentive behind the SES initiative was the high amount of delays during the late 1980’s and the 1990’s. Considering that the amount of air traffic would only grow, affecting delay figures even more negatively, the push for the initiative was even higher (Christensen, Johanessen and Laegreid, 2013:75). Although the European commission has stated that the reorganization of the airspace was considered a technical matter, the issues it caused for national sovereignty made the implementation of the initiative a strenuous task. Considering the air traffic regulation system in Europe encompasses such a large amount of organizations and institutions, there are formal channels through which participation in policy discussion is facilitated such as the Social Dialogue and the Industry Consultation body (ICB). Both these forums give actors a chance to voice their opinions and to have those opinions heard when new legislation is drafted, effectively giving them the opportunity to influence the decision-making process (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 92). The organization mentioned here are mainly either European or international umbrella organizations that include national actors.
To sum up the abundance of information just given, various actors within air traffic regulation policy field interact closely with one another and their areas of expertise and interest have a certain amount of overlap. One important thing to note before moving on to the section of the paper where
the existing policy comes into play is that a significant amount of the legislation implemented in the European region stem from policy regulation composed by the ICAO. Although the policy can be seen as a necessary feature of European air traffic regulation it is not sufficient, meaning that member state have the prerogative to make their own national air traffic regulations more restrictive. The reason most of the legislation proposed by the ICAO is indeed adopted on a European level can be sought in the cross-border nature of the issue of aviation. The higher the degree of harmonization of rules, standards and regulation on a regional and international level, the more effective cooperation can be (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 75).
5. Instrumental-structural perspective: initial response.
Now that it is clear which actors are involved in air traffic regulation policy, it is time use this information for the analysis. Before the analysis starts, it is important to know which question are sought out to be answered in this section. The following questions were set forth in the
introduction: How was the crisis defined? What did this mean for the way the crisis was handled? Why did air traffic regulation policy become an issue that was discussed on a central EU level? The main aim of this part of the research is to understand why eventually the level of discontent with the current air traffic regulation policy was high enough for actors to pursue policy change. As stated before, the ICAO has a strong regulatory role when it comes to air traffic regulation. The member states of the EU have agreed on a risk assessment model concerning opening or closing national airspace that is based on ICAO guidelines but nonetheless the actual decision to shut down or open airspace is entirely national. The decision to open or close airspace can be made by national authorities but since Eurocontrol is the organization that is in control of approving flight plans, it can still be the case that though countries want to open their airspace, no planes can leave the ground (European Commission, 2010). When the volcano erupted on April 14th, although national Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) had the authority to keep the airspace open, most of them started submitting requests to the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) to shut down part of their airspace based on the contingency plan that was brought forward by the ICAO. The decision to do so was based mainly on the scientific information the VAAC started putting out directly after the eruption about the spread of volcanic ash throughout Europe and its possible dangers. The reports and significant meteorological data and the models for predicting the spread of volcanic ash were all in line with legislation previously set up by the ICAO. ICAO guidelines are based on strict precautionary doctrine. Their recommended procedure in case of volcanic ash includes the following statement: ‘the recommended procedure in case of volcanic ash is exactly the same as with low-level wind shear, regardless of ash concentration: AVOID AVOID AVOID (Nohrstedt, 2013: 970). The first countries to close down parts of their airspace were Scotland, northern England and Norway (Eurocontrol, 2011). The amount of airspace that was being shut down kept rising for the next couple of days until practically the entire continent was on lockdown. According to
Eurocontrol a normal day in April would see approximately 24.000 flights go air born, by April 18th
So how was the crisis defined and dealt with in the early stages? In the early stages of the crisis the actors most involved in framing the issue at hand were the European commission, Eurocontrol, ICAO and VAAC. They viewed the decision that was being made as a routine operation that was based on technical evaluation and dealt with by following current legislation and guidelines for dealing with erupting volcanoes (ICAO, 2009). The European commission and Eurocontrol emphasized that any actions related to the airspace shut-down should be based on scientific evidence and expert analyses (Christensen, Johanessen and Laegreid, 2013:75). Volcanic eruption simulations had previously been run on Iceland and staff on the national and European level had been taught how to cope with a crisis like this, making the reaction more resembling of a routine operation than spontaneous crisis response. Eurocontrol also dealt with the issue in a fashion that seemed nothing out of their ordinary routine. Eurocontrol dealt with this situation the same way it had dealt with any other disruption to air traffic: by following relevant legislation and guidelines. In the theoretical framework it was stated that to determine to what degree initial response was indeed characterized by the instrumental-structural perspective, we would have to establish to what degree the response was decentralized, how strict the formal procedures were and how the systems were supposed to operate in a time of crisis. After this very brief overview of the initial response to the crisis, it can be said that the response was in line with the instrumental-structural perspective. The decision to close airspace was decentralized and came from the major regulatory bodies in the air traffic regulatory system. Formal procedure were followed strictly and correctly. Also, the response was in line with crisis management protocol that had been practiced before. After it became clear that most air traffic in Northern Europe had come to a standstill and that the situation was going to have more serious implication than initially expected, some major airlines and their associations became the most predominant critics of the air traffic regulation
(Chirstensen, 2013: 77). IATA’s Director-General and CEO, Giovanni Bisignani, vocalized discontent with the analytical methods that were used by the VAAC to test the presence of ash in the European airspace and stated that: ‘We must move away from this blanket closure and find ways to flexibly open airspace, step by step’ (The Telegraph, 2010). The European Union at this time was still using a system that was based on a theoretical model instead of taking a decision based on fact and risk assessment (Hough et al, 2010). The alternative method that IATA suggested to test airspace was to ‘use data from test flights and pilot/maintenance repost and improve the predictive products’ (IATA, 2010), making heard their claim for a more differentiated system for dealing with volcanic eruptions. The AEA and ACI argued, as opposed to the European Commission, that the volcanic eruption was not an unprecedented event and that the European response was disproportionate in
comparison with similar events in other parts of the world (AEA/ACI, 2010). As opposed to the motive of the regulatory air traffic bodies, the motive of the actors in the industry air traffic bodies was more commercial. The crisis quite evidently had a huge negative effect on their businesses, a continuing closing of the airspace would have huge repercussions for their profit and customer satisfaction (EU Business, 2010). Their main interest was in opening the air space again as fast as possible. Regardless of these protest to the initial response to the crisis, the main argument remained that one could not compromise on the safety of passengers (EU Business, 2010). But these were not the only actors to voice their opinion on the response to the crisis. One of the groups that took a stand in the discussion were the pilots and their associations. Although they work for important industry actors in the network, their personal interest was somewhat different. Pilots feared that their discretionary professional judgement would become part of the decision whether or not to fly and didn’t want to be burdened with such a big decision regarding people’s safety (The Guardian, 2010). They therefore framed their position as being concerned about the safety issues and supported the broad restrictions that had been placed on air traffic (The Guardian, 2010). Airplane engine manufactures took the same stance as they also tried to balance the
technical and safety issues on the one side while keeping in mind the commercial interest of their companies (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013: 76). Another group that tried to somehow shape how the crisis was viewed was a diverse group of technical experts. Multiple experts voiced the opinion that the methodology for measuring ash particles were insufficient while other still did support the harsh air traffic restrictions (The Guardian, 2010).
In conclusion, the main goal of this section was to establish how initial crisis response came about and how this led to an environment of policy dissatisfaction. The initial framing of the crisis and crisis response can be characterized by the instrumental-structural perspective meaning that standard procedures were the driving force behind the decisions that were made. Initially, this response was deemed appropriate by the affected organizations but when the effects of the crisis became too severe, some industry organization stepped up to voice discontent and to call for a different approach to the problem. Actors in the network had distinctly different incentives to be either content or not with the course of action. While regulatory bodies were mostly involved with safety issues, industry bodies were more concerned with their commercial needs. The contrast between the two is what led air traffic regulation policy to become an issue that was discussed on a central EU level.
6. Advocacy Coalitions: Policy Venues and Policy changes
Now that is has been determined why and how air traffic policy became disputed, the next step is to analyze how actors tried to influence the policy. To illustrate this, an advocacy coalition framework will be used that is set out to answer the following questions: How were actors involved in the discussion on air traffic regulation policy? How did they try to influence air traffic regulation policy? What means did they use to do so? What changes were made in the air traffic regulation policy? As described in the theoretical framework, these question will be answered by analyzing to what extent advocacy coalitions did the following things: made use of scientific information, made use of crisis narratives, made use of political resources and venues and opportunism.
First, it has to be determined which advocacy coalition exist in the air traffic regulation policy field. It is possible to establish a difference between the organizations that are part of an ‘airline industry coalition’ and the organizations that are part of the ‘aviation regulatory coalition’. The airline industry coalition includes the IATA, AEA and the ACI while the aviation regulatory coalition includes the European commission, EASA, Eurocontrol, ICAO and VAAC.
The first way in which the airline industry coalition tried to influence the discussion on air traffic regulation policy is by opposing the crisis narrative giving by the aviation regulatory coalition. During the initial crisis response the regulatory organizations, mainly Eurocontrol and VAAC, managed to frame the crisis as purely technical and in need of a strict protocol that would protect the safety of flight personnel and passengers. Had the crisis only lasted a week, this response maybe would have been deemed appropriate and not gotten much resistance from the competing airline industry coalition. This is however not what happened. With major airlines losing a great deal of business, coalition were now divided. Major airlines and their associations, whom are part of the airline industry network, started calling for regulatory reform as they challenged the technical definitions of safety and the models used to test this safety. Airlines such as KLM and Lufthansa started doing test flights to prove that it was safe to fly hence trying to disprove the crisis narrative of the aviation regulatory coalition (The Guardian, 2010).
Secondly, they tried to put out different scientific information or contest the scientific information already brought forth by the aviation regulatory coalition. The major point of discussion during the volcanic ash crisis was related to the production and interpretation of scientific models and the data they produced (Nohrstedt, 2013: 971). Both coalitions used scientific information they
received, albeit from different sources, in an instrumental way. Meaning they used expert-based information to solve policy problems and directly impact public policy making (Nohrstedt, 2013: 971). The VAAC did this when their risk assessment was used as the primary source of information for the decision to close most of the European airspace (Norhstedt, 2013: 970). Organizations like IATA, AEA, and ACI did so by using data generated by test flights to counter the information previously provided. Although the actors in the competing advocacy coalitions did not see eye to eye on the implications the scientific information should have, they did agree on the use of a scientific method as the base of public policy decision making.
After trying to use scientific data to change the course of actions, the Civil Aviation Authority, the national regulator of the United Kingdom, turned to its political resources and searched for policy venues. Based on new scientific data provided by some major airlines, the CAA presented a solution to move away from the zero tolerance policy (Lawless, 2011: 242). On April 19th 2010 this initiative
was eventually approved when Eurocontrol hosted a phone call between the Commission, several European states, ANSP’s and technical experts (European Commission, 2010). At the end of the phone call it was concluded that ‘the initial reaction by the States was prudent and reduced risk to an absolute minimum but now it’s time to move towards a harmonized European approach (…) that permits flights but only where safety is not compromised’ (Eurocontrol, 2010). What this meant was that the no-fly zone would become smaller and that aircraft operator would be permitted fly outside of this limited no fly zone with their decision whether to fly being supported by data from the scientific community (Eurocontrol, 2010). This shows that the CAA used the political power it had to facilitate a debate and made it possible for themselves to have a say in the manner.
A special council meeting of ministers of transport was held after the outcome of the earlier conference became known. After the special council meeting, all the transport ministers agreed to ‘reinforce a coordinated European response in respect to the crisis, through the European
Commission and Eurocontrol that fully guarantees the safety that permits the different Member States to open their air space’ (European Council, 2010). The airspace was consequently split up into three different flight zone based on the degree of volcanic ash contamination (European council, 2010). This decision making process was and ad hoc affaire of consultation between experts whom combined limited datasets rather than systematically and gradually gathering scientific knowledge (Christensen, Johannessen and Laegreid, 2013:77). The council’s decision to split the air space up into three zones was then further specified by the EASA as a part of the regulatory change and the new public policy. The new policy was put out, outlining three operating zones: areas of low contamination (enhanced procedures), areas of medium contamination (limited
time of operation), and areas of high contamination (shut down entirely) (EASA, 2010). A couple more institutional changes were established in the wake of the crisis. Which is where we can see some use of opportunism by the advocacy coalitions. One of the changes was the formation of a working group of experts with representatives from major organizations such as Eurocontrol, EASE, Member States and other in the industry (European Commission, 2010). Second of all, the implementation of the SES, which was stalled by the EU member states prior to the crisis, was to be sped up (European Commission, 2010:10). The implementation of the SES had been troublesome in the past but now aviation regulatory coalition had the volcanic ash crisis to validate their call for a faster implementation of the SES (Nohrstedt, 2011: 11). The volcanic ash crisis was the window of opportunity the European Commission needed to move the SES project along. Thirdly, a structure to permanently coordinate the response to future crisis was erected, the European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC). During the crisis several European organizations had convened on an ad hoc basis. EU transport ministers concluded that there should be a structure that would facilitate these kind of meetings on a more formal basis and hence the EACCC was born (European
Commission, 2010). Lastly both actors on the aviation regulatory coalition and the airline industry coalition professed a need for a reform of the European and international systems for risk
assessment. Therefore, the European Commission started and inquiry into the current research and technology projects on risk assessment to be able to identify those resources that could potentially be used to develop pre-existing risk assessment methodologies (European Commission, 2010). The main goal of this section was to determine what advocacy coalitions could be found in the air traffic regulation policy field and to analyze how they used several methods to influence policy change. It can be seen that all four assumptions about advocacy coalition were true. Both coalitions used scientific information and their competing crisis narratives to influence the course of actions. Also the political resources were used to facilitate meetings, both in person and over the phone, to come to a new policy. The European Commission was quite successful in using this crisis as an opportunity to push their SES project.
7. Analysis of policy changes: towards network governance?
The last set of questions that remains unanswered is: What can be said about the characteristics of the new air traffic regulation policy? Can the changes be seen as a compromise between different interests? Did a network emerge? In this section of the paper, the changes to air traffic regulation policy will be discussed in terms of how much de policy now resembles network governance. This will be determined by analyzing to what degree the network is indeed pluricentric, to what degree their decision are based on negotiation and to what degree compliance results from mutual trust and political obligations. Unfortunately the answers to these question will not be as clear cut as some previous answers have been since it’s more of a scale type question. Nonetheless, it will give some insight into the future behavior of actors in the air traffic regulation policy field.
There is an argument to be made that the air traffic regulatory policy field is pluricentric. In this paper, a wide array of actors have been discussed and many of them have had some sort of influence in either the sense making or the decision making process during the volcanic ash crisis. The policy field contains governmental organizations, non-governmental organization, national organizations, international organization, supranational organization, but also companies,
associations, technical experts, and even individuals such as pilots. In the debate on crisis response and policy adaption, all these different actors weighed in on the issue by participation in the debate. The phone call that was held between the Commission, several European states, ANSP’s and
technical experts would suggest that there is some degree of negotiation. This is true in the sense that this phone call was a platform for ideas and demands to be voiced but not true in the sense that many organizations were not included in this phone meeting. Moreover, the eventually proposed and implemented changes were formulation in a council meeting with only the ministers of transport. So while the phone call to come to a conclusion on the next course of action to be taken can be seen as a form of negotiation, the next course of action, namely formulation policy changes by the ministers of transport, was not negotiation based. However, some changes might imply that in the future, crisis response will be more negotiation based since a working group of experts was created and the EACCC was erected to coordinate future crisis response. Both of these policy changes, show some of negotiation based policy since more actors will structurally get a chance to participate in crisis management debate.
The last question is most difficult to answer. It is quite difficult from this analyses to determine whether actors exhibit mutual trust and political obligation. One point can however be made about the policy changes resulting from political obligations and mutual trust as the phone call that was hosted by Eurocontrol was initiated by the CAA. Eurocontrol did not have any formal obligation to do anything about the initiative of the CAA but nonetheless decided to host a debate to discuss it. This would imply that to some extent, actors are willing to listen to each other’s expertize and opinion on the manner.
Overall, there is too little evidence supporting the claim that the air traffic regulation policy field acts in accordance with network governance but nonetheless the actors showcase some features that are subscribed to network governance. Also, the policy changes suggest that in the case of a future crisis, conversation between actors and decision making will be better coordinated and more decentralized.
8. Conclusion
The volcanic ash crisis shows that policy is not always sufficiently formulated to appease all the members of the policy field. One the one hand the structures and procedures in the network made it possible for the initial crisis response to be quite quick and universal; most of European air space was effectively shut down. However, as the crisis unfolded and caused more severe consequences, the lack of negotiation at the start of the crisis, meant that the initial reaction was now insufficient to satisfy all actors involved in the crisis. Through the formulation of advocacy coalition, actors were capable to gain some of the influence, they would have rather had from the start. What this shows is that risk policy should strive to be decentralized, non-fragmented, and collaborative. When different actors are including in the sense-making stage and decision making stage of the crisis, responsibility will be divided among different actors in the policy field. One organization or agency will then not be able to determine the course of action based on only its own specialized skills. By strengthening not only the vertical coordination between national and supranational bodies but also the horizontal coordination between organizations and agencies, risk policy will be better integrated, facilitating a more effective crisis response.
There are of course limitations to this study, some of which have been discussed earlier on and these limitations have implications for future research. Although using multiple theories to
understand the events of a single crisis might give a better broad understanding of the issue, it also means that some of the nuances can get lost. This type of research did not allow for single actors to be studies in depth or for single actor influence to be fully explored. Also, often times theories are better equipped to deal with issues which can be observed over a longer period of time and not the brief, tumultuous frame that crises provide. However, doing so might mean that future research can focus on how theories can be adapted in such a manner that they’re also applicable to pressured situations. Also, to see if these findings can be generalized or whether these theories can be used more often to research policy change in times of crisis, a transboundary crisis should be studied that occurred outside of the political system that is the European Union. A theory holding up or being useful in one specific case is not enough to make a broad argument for its use for all crisis induced policy change research so more research in different settings is needed.
The example of the volcanic ash crisis does however provide a decent argument for policy to facilitate cooperative networks that can negotiate controversial scientific information in times of uncertainty. To ensure the swift mobilization that is needed in times of crisis, policy should also
help to shape internal norms among members of the policy field that fosters agreement on ambiguous issues like crises.
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