Catching pirates in a network approach
Master thesis
Date: 11 January 2017
Author: Michiel Middelplaats
Student ID: 0743291
m.j.m.middelplaats@umail.leidenuniv.nl
Supervisor: Dr. M. de Haas
Second reader: Prof. Dr. E. Bakker
Master of Science
Public Administration
Foreword
Piracy off the coast of Somalia was frequently in the news in 2008, when the number of hijackings and attacks was at a peak. The extensive media coverage caught my attention and I became interested in this phenomenon. Moreover, the fact that my grandfather, although not fighting pirates, was a gunner on a merchant ship during World War II and also had to face threats of attack, made the topic even more interesting to me. This resulted in my thesis: ‘Catching pirates in a network approach’.
Table of Contents List of Abbreviations: ... 1 1. Introduction ... 3 1.2. Research question: ... 5 1.3. Sub-questions: ... 5 Academic relevance ... 6 Societal Relevance ... 6 Reading Guide ... 8
2. Body of knowledge and knowledge gap ... 9
3. Research Design ... 12
Methodology ... 12
Theoretical Framework ... 14
Operationalization ... 17
4. The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia ... 24
5. Favourable conditions for piracy ... 32
A fragile state ... 33
6. Responsibilities of national governments ... 37
Conclusion ... 43 7. Shipping companies ... 45 Conclusion ... 46 8. National stakeholders... 47 8.1 The Netherlands ... 47 Group transits ... 50
Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD) ... 51
Conclusion ... 54 8.2 United Kingdom ... 54 Retrospective... 58 Conclusion ... 58 8.3 United States ... 59 Private Security... 65 Conclusion ... 66 9. International stakeholders ... 68 9.1 United Nations ... 68 Retrospective... 73
Conclusion ... 74
9.2 The European Union (EU) ... 74
Retrospective... 78
Conclusion ... 79
9.3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization ... 80
Retrospective... 82
Conclusion ... 83
10. The anti-piracy network and possibilities for improvement ... 88
General anti-piracy network ... 88
Possible improvements ... 90
11. General Conclusion... 94
Research question ... 100
12. Discussion ... 101
13. Reflection... 102
Sources and Bibliography ... 103
List of tables and figures Table 1: Network concepts definitions and indicators..………...22
Figure 1: The anti-piracy network.………...…………23
Table 2: Timeline Piracy off the coast of Somalia………....………...25
Table 3: Ships currently held by pirates………...……….………...25
Table 4: Costs of Piracy.………...………...26
Table 5: Ways of combat by national governments………...…....67
Table 6: Ways of combat by international organizations……….84
Table 7: Overview of national-and international stakeholders……….……...….86
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List of Abbreviations:
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
ATALANTAOperatie Atalanta valt onder EU NAVFOR BIMCO Baltic International Maritime Council
BMP Best Management Practices
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGPCS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia CPSG Counter-Piracy Steering Group
CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy CTF Combined Task Force
CMF Combined Maritime Forces DCoC Djibouti Code of Conduct
EEAS External European Action Service EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ESS European Security Strategy
EUCAP NESTOR European Union’s capacity building effort in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean
EUNAVFOR European Union Naval Force EUSR European Union Special Representative EUTM European Union Training Mission Somalia EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FGS Federal Government of Somalia HSP Hostage Support Programme ICU Islamic Court Union
IMB International Maritime Bureau IMO International Maritime Organization
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature KNVR Koninklijke Nederlandse Verenig van Reders MASE Regional Maritime Security
MLC Maritime Labor Convention MOU Memory of Understanding
2 MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OBP Oceans Beyond Piracy
PSC Private Security Companies SOFA Status of Force Agreement
SUA CONVENTION Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
TFG Transitional Federal Government TEU Treaty on the European Union
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea U.K. United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia VPD Vessel Protection Detachment
WB World Bank
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1. Introduction
Although the days of the historic pirates like the (in)famous Edward Teach, better known as ‘Blackbeard’ (1680-1718), lie in the past, piracy is yet again a topic of concern for the international community (Dua & Menkhaus, 2012; Gardner, 2012).
Piracy can be defined as: “the act of boarding a ship or the attempt to board a ship with the
intention to commit theft or another criminal act, together with the intention or capability to use violence when committing this act”(Korteweg, 2006, pp. 11-12). It affects maritime
trade, interferes with the international legal order and endangers the freedom of the high seas (Middleton, 2008, pp. 8-10). Various factors contribute to the conditions favourable to the existence of piracy. Weak political and governmental structures are, among other factors, linked to the presence of piracy (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2010, p. 7).
While pirate attacks are known to take place in several geographical areas, the Gulf of Aden near Somalia is of specific interest. This interest can be explained by the number of pirate attacks that have taken place in this area and the ‘aggressive’ manner in which these attacks were carried out (Elliot, 2007). These two factors distinct Somali piracy from other acts of piracy. This thesis looks into Somali piracy and the factors and implications connected to it.
After the fall of the Barre regime in 1991 Somalia fell into disarray turning the country into a so-called ‘failed state’ (Menkhaus, 2003, p. 407). A ‘failed state’ can be defined as a state in which the governmental and political structures are lacking or are inefficient (Van Ginkel, 2014, p. 331). In Somalia a combination of factors, supported by overall lawlessness, poverty and an abundance of weaponry, led to a rise in crime. Without proper governmental structures in place a momentum for criminal activities to take place was present. Additionally,
criminality shifted from the land to the maritime area of Somalia (Eklöf, 2009, pp. 19-25).
From 1990 to 2006 the number of pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia remained limited in scope (Bruyneel, 2009, p. 48). The attacks mainly focused on foreign trawlers, private yachts and cargo vessels sailing through the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. However, from 2006 onwards, the pirates changed their scope and way of conduct. Heavily armed pirates
specifically began targeting large cargo ships and started to venture further out onto sea, expanding their area of operation (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2010, p. 16).
4 Piracy can be described as a complex problem. This becomes clear when considering the various public and private stakeholders that are affected by the piracy problem.
For a long time the international community was limited in their legal scope of action. As an illustration, in 2008, a coalition of the British, French and United States (US) urged the United Nations (UN) to take a stance and impose a mandate to “tackle piracy by organizing
patrol, reacting to acts of piracy, to take as many preventative measures as possible” (Weir,
2010, p. 215). This resulted in the ‘United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1816. This resolution is considered unique; as for the first time in history foreign armed forces were allowed, with consent of the Somali government, to intervene in the territorial waters of Somalia (Guilfolye, 2010).
In 2008, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) both intensified their anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. The EU was already active in Somalia since 1994, but only from 2008 their operations became focused on piracy. NATO’s involvement began at the request of the ‘World Food Programme’ (WFP), since humanitarian ships had become the target of pirates too (Gullestrup & Stumbaum, 2010, p. 108). During the course of time, NATO changed its role from ‘protection provider’ to carrying out patrols to deter possible pirate attacks (NATO, 2016). Although both organizations have different mandates and power, in general anti-piracy operations can be divided into efforts ashore and efforts offshore (Homan & Kamerling, 2010). The difference in anti-piracy operations is of importance as the international community acknowledges the fact that a long-term solution to piracy is to be found on land, not at sea (Tanaka, 2012, p. 387).
The increased actions of the international community did not directly affect the number of pirate attacks. On the contrary the number of pirate attacks increased substantially in the years 2009 and 2010 (EUNAVFOR, 2016). After 2011, the number of attacks dropped significantly even resulting in zero reported attacks in 2015 (EUNAVFOR, 2016).
The question arises if Somali piracy is on the brink of extinction or if it only temporarily occurs less. Is it possible for Somali pirates to make a comeback when the international attention diminishes? What has to be kept in mind is the fact that piracy cannot be seen as an isolated phenomenon that only occurs at sea. Factors such as economic equality, corruption and extremism are connected with the problem (Van Ginkel, Hemmer, Kamerling & Van der
5 Putten, 2009). In search for a substantial solution these factors will have to be addressed too in order to find a more permanent solution, even though it might be complicated to deal with these factors. Fortunately, the international community is aware of this, as is reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 1851 and the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (United Nations Security Council, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2012).
It is therefore of vital importance to investigate and reflect, in an academic manner, on the different anti-piracy operations and initiatives that have previously taken place. An
examination of these efforts and an understanding of how a decrease in the number of pirate attacks came about, contributes to the development of a coherent approach to piracy. This approach will be useful in the analysis of future acts of piracy, both off- shore and ashore. This thesis will look into this approach. In order to understand the recent developments of piracy in a broad manner, sub-questions, written down in paragraph 1.3. will guide the following research question of this thesis.
1.2. Research question:
How did the international community (both public and privates stakeholders) combat Somali piracy offshore- and ashore between the years 2008 to 2016, and how can future counter-piracy be improved?
1.3. Sub-questions:
What characterizes piracy in Somalia?
What conditions contribute to the existence of piracy in Somalia?
What are the responsibilities of public stakeholders such as national governments towards the protection of their citizens in case of piracy?
What legal bases do national governments have to combat piracy?
What measures can private stakeholders such as shipping companies take in order to protect their ships and crew?
What measures can national governments take to combat piracy? What measures can international organizations take to combat piracy?
6 Academic relevance
The research presented in this thesis demonstrates that Somali piracy is a complicated problem that requires a multi-faceted approach. Somali piracy has nothing to do with the classic image piracy holds and differs considerably: “The early days of what press reports
and academic works describe as subsistence pirates, who go to sea because they have had their livelihood taken away from them, are long gone” (House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee, 2011, p. 13). Piracy does not only threaten the freedom and safety of the high seas, it undermines the stability of Somalia and “seriously threatens regional and
international peace and stability” (Sterio, 2010, p. 1454).
As such, the problem cannot be seen as a geographically isolated issue in which pirates attack ships for their own benefits, it stretches much further. Individual motives of stakeholders to partake in the combat against piracy differ. It spans from defending lives and protecting economic interests, to combating terrorism or participating in a geopolitical battle for (naval) supremacy (Van Ginkel et al., 2009). The link of this thesis with Crisis and Security
management is the focus on international security management executed by public- and private stakeholders, directed at Somali piracy and its associated risks. This thesis explores and analyzes the different motives and actions of the international community (public and private stakeholders) in the combat against Somali piracy from 2008 to 2016. It contributes to the academic knowledge concerning the complexity of the problem of Somali piracy and eventually answers the research question. In the ‘Operationalization’ paragraph the selected stakeholders are defined and discussed.
Societal Relevance
The security risks that are related with maritime navigation around the Horn of Africa (the Peninsula in North East Africa which Somalia is part of) are of significant importance to nations whose ships are under threat. But Somali piracy also touches upon several other important societal issues connected to the problems that are not always recognizable for policy-makers and the broad public.
The topic ‘piracy’ has attracted considerable media coverage from 2008 onwards. After all, in 2008 the number of piracy attacks and hijackings off the coast of Somalia grew significantly (United Nations Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2010, pp. 35- 36). However,
7 the media generally only informs the public on Somali pirate attacks and hijackings (Collins, 2012). It often ignores the consequences for, for instance, economic wealth and the judicial prosecution of Somali pirates. These other aspects should be asserted too in order to really comprehend the phenomenon.
When speaking of economic factors you can conclude that Somali piracy has led to an increase in costs for the shipping industry (Gullestrup & Stumbaum, 2010). It furthermore altered the level of economic competiveness between nations, partly due to the differences in legislation on the deployment of Private Security Companies (PSC) onboard merchant ships (Baltic and International Maritime Council, 2009; Van Ginkel, Molenaar & Van der Putten, 2013, p. 34). Currently, the implementation of PSC’s is a topic of debate in the Netherlands. Another problem is the prosecution of captured pirates. For captured Somali pirates there is no universal obligation for nation states to prosecute and sentence them (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 15 and 100). As a result, depending on the nation state that intervenes, it can occur that captured pirates are released without being sentenced (Van Ginkel et al., 2013, pp. 98-101).
The aim of this thesis is to raise awareness among public and private stakeholders on the complexity and implications of Somali piracy. The research can provide new insights for policymakers and can be of added value in view of possible future developments concerning Somali piracy.
8 Reading Guide
Chapter 2 discusses the gap in literature regarding a coherent approach towards the problem of Somali piracy. Chapter 3 includes the research design used for this thesis; it describes the methodology and presents contextual information on network theory as basis for the research. Hereafter in the paragraph on Operationalization, indicators and concepts as well as the area of research are discussed. In Chapter 4 information is given on the number of hijackings, costs involved and the way in which pirates operate. Chapter 5 looks at aspects and factors in Somalia that have been beneficial to the rise and continuation of piracy. Chapter 6 explores the necessity for national governments to act against piracy in the context of the available legal framework. Attention is paid to the definition of piracy according to different
international conventions. In Chapter 7, measures for the shipping industry to implement in order to protect their ships and crew are discussed. Chapter 8 looks at the efforts and actions of the different national governments in their fight against piracy. Hereafter, in Chapter 9, the efforts and actions of the different international organizations in their fight against piracy is explored. Chapter 10 looks at the anti-piracy network as a whole and proposes suggestions for possible future improvements. Chapter 11 presents the conclusion to the sub-questions and the general research question. In Chapter 12 a number of recommendations is presented and is followed by a reflection of the research listed in Chapter 13.
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2. Body of knowledge and knowledge gap
There is much literature and research available on the topic of piracy. Research has shown that piracy is an age-old phenomenon that dates back to ancient Greece, when the profession was widespread and was seen as an honorable way to make a living (Puchala, 2005). During the course of history piracy remained a prevalent profession. Piracy thrived throughout the Middle Ages and especially in the late 16th and 17th century (Bradford, 2007; Heebøll-Holm, 2013). The potential profits of hijacking and plundering a ship did not go unnoticed and with the rise of the state as a political form of organization, piracy also became a political tool (Thomson, 1994, pp. 21-26).
This political tool, called ‘privateering’, is a form of naval warfare in which private persons were authorized by a state to capture enemy ships and goods (‘t Hart, 1997, p. 2).
The distinction between a privateer and a pirate is that: “a privateer acts under the authority
of a state that accepts or is charged with responsibility for his, while the latter acts in his own interests and on his own authority acts” (Thomson, 1994, p. 22). However, it was difficult to
make a distinction between the two forms of undertaking. For instance, not all privateers kept to the rules of war and their right to act. And when privateers could not benefit a state
anymore, they would often be denounced as pirates (Van Ginkel & Van der Putten, 2010). As a result numerous privateers turned to piracy.
In the 17th century the maritime trade sector expanded and particularly foreign maritime trade became of value to states (‘t Hart, 1997). The profit margins of maritime trade altered the view on privateering. Privateering became an obstruction to maritime trade and lost the status of an honorable profession (‘t Hart, 1997). European trading states now sought to safeguard their ships and cargo by establishing legal rules on the protection of maritime trade routes; these legal rules were detrimental to privateers and pirates (Thomson, 1994, pp. 70-75).
Literature on modern day Somali piracy is similarly extensive and shares resemblances with the age-old phenomenon of piracy. Once again safe and secure maritime navigation is no longer a guarantee. The freedom of the high sea is endangered due to piracy and pirate activities interfering with the international legal order (Middleton, 2008). Moreover, Somali pirates have chosen an important international maritime shipping route for their area of operation, namely the Gulf of Aden which is part of the Arabian Sea situated between
10 Somalia and Yemen, is targeted (Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, 2010). But Somali pirates are also known to venture further out and target ships in the Indian Ocean (United Nations Security Council, 2010, p. 36).
Many authors have tried to explain the phenomenon of Somali piracy. Ong-Webb (2007, pp. 45-46) analyses the rationale for piracy on basis of four characteristics: economic prosperity, social tradition, political will and geographic location. Other authors such as Nincic (2008) and Murphy (2009, as cited in Eklöf, 2009, p. 25) find that the phenomenon of Somali piracy has to do with the destruction of a state. In a ‘failed state’ governmental and political
structures are lacking or inefficient (Van Ginkel, 2014, p. 331).
There are scholars who do not try to explain the phenomenon of piracy, but instead focus on the effects of Somali piracy. Middleton (2008) finds that piracy creates chaos among the Somali people, while at the same time the result is that local economies benefit from a successful hijacking (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, p. 44). Eklöf (2009, p. 33) on the other hand, finds that Somali piracy has accelerated the dynamics in the waters around the Horn of Africa. This is an area in which several foreign powers, including the US, China and Russia, already aim to increase their involvement (Van Ginkel et. al, 2009; Homan & Kamerling, 2010; Holmes, 2010).
Research that looks at a possible solution to Somali piracy does exist, but this research is limited and shows a knowledge gap. As illustrated above, most of the literature is on either the phenomenon of piracy in general or on the effects of piracy. But only a few authors offer a coherent approach towards the solution of the problem. For instance, Sterio (2010) finds that practical solutions to eradicate piracy should include: an increase in commitment, regional cooperation, a rise of law enforcement- and diplomatic efforts and the building of capacity in Somalia. Liss (2009) is more specific and emphasizes the possibilities of deploying Private Security Companies (PSC) on board merchant ships. As a solution Naber (2009) also points to possible measures for shipping companies to take (in specific the crew) to fend off a pirate attack, such as water cannons, barbed wire or other management practices that prevent pirates from coming near the ship. Although the solutions from both Liss and Naber are more
specific than Sterio’s and could prove to be effective, they only offer a solution which can be deployed at sea. Both researchers neglect the effects piracy has on land, and how interwoven
11 piracy is with (local) politics and institutional structures. So far, the solutions (on seas and on land) are rarely brought together, creating a gap in the available literature.
Ultimately, bringing a halt to Somali piracy is a major challenge for the international community (Gullestrup & Stumbaum, 2010). Both public- and private stakeholders are affected (see paragraph: Operationalization). The challenge offers an opportunity to intensify international cooperation in the quest for a coherent approach (Van Ginkel et. al, 2009). In order to establish this coherent approach, the complexity of the phenomenon and the multitude of factors relevant in the combat of piracy have to be kept in mind. The international community has to take notice of the geopolitical, judicial, regional and operational aspects of the problem (Van Ginkel et al., 2009).
This thesis therefore aims to fill the knowledge gap and present a coherent approach to the solution of the problem of Somali piracy. The multiple aspects that are relevant in order to find a solution are brought together. This research looks at the situation in Somalia itself and the way in which public and private stakeholders act to face the problem.
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3. Research Design
This chapter discusses the methodology that has been used for this research. The methodology forms the basis for the collection and assessment of data. Parts of the network theory that I use help in analyzing my assumption that working together in combating piracy is important. I assume, based on the network theory, that by cooperation the international community is able to combat Somali piracy. In the ‘Operationalization’ paragraph indicators and concepts as well as the area of research are discussed.
Methodology
Answering the research question is difficult as Somali piracy is an intricate phenomenon that entails a multitude of factors and implications; this makes it difficult to view Somali piracy as an isolated problem (Middleton, 2008; Eklöf, 2009). Additionally, the phenomenon is defined by a particular historical context (Ong-Webb, 2007; Nincic, 2008). In the selection of a model for analysis, I have kept in mind the multitude of factors that play a role in the matter (Van Ginkel et al., 2009; Sterio, 2010). As a result, a case study design is chosen for the analysis of the problem. This is closest to a single-case (embedded) design. The chosen stakeholders form separate units of analysis in the larger context of combating Somali piracy. A case study makes it possible to conduct an in-depth exploration of stakeholders in the combat of Somali piracy. Hence, it can be said that a single-case (embedded) design is the most compatible method of research for this thesis. It does however mean that it will be difficult to generalize the findings of this research, as it is limited to Somali piracy.
As was mentioned in the chapter ‘Body of knowledge’, no particular theory or ‘one fits all’ approach is available to answer the research question. As a result, this thesis is both of an explorative nature as well as of an analytical nature.
Explorative: this research is done by reviewing different sources in literature with the aim to find new insights that can contribute to a comprehensive approach towards the combat of Somali piracy. It is often the case in public administration, being an interdisciplinary and applied field of study, that: “no theory alone is capable of accounting for the complexity of the
13 Analytical: to increase the feasibility of my research I use the network theory of Chad Whelan (2012) to make a qualitative content analysis. Certain concepts from Whelan’s theory help in analyzing the role of public and private stakeholders that are affected by- and involved in the combat of Somali piracy. By making use of certain concepts of Whelan’s theory my research is of an analytical nature. The reasons for selecting these concepts from this specific theory are described below in the paragraph ‘Network theory’.
This research is done by reviewing different sources of literature, making use of qualitative content analysis. The question arises: why use qualitative content analysis? In qualitative content analysis, focus is placed on the analysis of policy documents, resolutions, relevant literature and laws. By means of content analysis, data can be organized into general themes. Additionally, it can help in comparing and analyzing statements from two or more sources (United States General Accounting Office, 1989, p.9). Generally, it can be said that analyzing and comparing diverse sources can positively influence the validity of the research (Calmorin & Calmorin, 2007, p.51). However, it has to be kept in mind that content analysis can
disregard the contextual meaning of a document. This can imply a possible discrepancy between the actual written text and the intentions of the producer who wrote it (Hardy, Harley and Philips, 2004, p. 20). It is therefore of importance, in order to make valid inferences from text, to apply a consistent procedure of classification in coding (Weber, 1990, p. 12). This aspect has been taken into account for this research.
Assumption
The problem of piracy entails a multitude of factors that have to be taken into consideration when looking for a possible solution (Van Ginkel et al., 2009). As has been established in the previous chapter ‘Body of knowledge and knowledge gap’, only a few authors offer a
structural approach to the problem of Somali piracy. Moreover, all these approaches are isolated and are presented as independent from each other. Subsequently, although many solutions are offered in the literature, a general solution is lacking.
In order to answer the research question, the following assumption is made, based on
Whelan’s network theory: To combat piracy it is important that the international community
14 Theoretical Framework
The network theory of Chad Whelan (2012) is used as a method to analyze the way in which the stakeholders operate.
The reason for selecting this particular theory is the fact that Whelan offers a framework for analyzing organizational networks in (the sector of) public security. Somali piracy is a problem that restricts public security as it interferes with the freedom of the high seas and the international legal order (Middleton, 2008). Additionally, with Whelan’s theory as a basis, I was able to look at the assumption of ‘working together’ by a number of stakeholders within a demarcated network and limit my field of research to a feasible level. The concepts from Whelan’s theory that are used are defined in the paragraph ‘Operationalization’. Before demarcating the stakeholders and the area of research, network theory in the field of public administration is presented. This is done in order to understand the role of networks in the combat of piracy and gives a basis to the assumption of the important role of working together. So what does network theory entail?
Network Theory
In the following sub-paragraph the basic elements of network theory and the elements necessary for the analysis of combating piracy are described.
Networks
The term ‘network’ is commonly used in social- and political sciences. In the field of organization theory it is stated that ‘networks’ offer an efficient way for organizations to achieve tasks, such as: “acquiring resources and managing risks” (Ebers, 1997, as cited in Whelan, 2012, p. 3).
According to Whelan (2012), a network can refer to the relationships between actors within a group but also to the general organization of a network as a whole.
A network can be considered as a system of actors and the connections between them (so called ties) can be numerous (Whelan, 2012). This means that the actors in a network can consist of: organizations, people, and groups. Ties can occur between the actors in one network, between networks or between clusters of actors in a network.
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Motives to form a network
Network theory states that actors depend on each other to reach their goals (Klijn, 1996; De Bruijn, 2008). Different motives play a role in the need to create or join a network. O’Toole finds that certain problems can only be solved by working together; these problems are called ‘wicked problems’ (1997, as cited in Whelan, 2012, p. 54). Wicked problems are difficult to define clearly. The nature and extent of the problem depends on the perspective of each of the individual stakeholders. Thus, the nature of the problem is viewed as subjective. The term ‘wicked’ is not used in the sense of ‘evil’, but rather its ‘resistance to resolution’ (Keene, 2012, p. 11; West & Hindle, 2012, p. 23).
Motives to work together in a network are numerous. Firstly, working together can
substantially increase the impact of the actors, in contrast to the situation of working alone. Secondly, by cooperation costs can be lowered and actions can be taken more efficiently (Provan & Kenis, 2008).
Network performance and Network governance
O’Toole and Meir (2004) find that network performance relates to the way in which a network works. As network goals can differ and as it often takes a while to fulfill them, a network has to maintain its attractiveness for the actors. Without the attractiveness, actors will lose interest in the process and no longer participate (Whelan, 2012). Thus, it is important that attention is paid to the differences in network perspectives, the way in which a shared goal can be achieved and what kinds of strategies are followed. It can be said that the institutional setting in which a network operates also plays a role in the way a network performs (Whelan, 2012). The behavior of actors is influenced by their social- and political surrounding.
Provan and Kenis (2008) find that when dealing with network performance issues, attention has to be paid to the governance of a network. Network governance constitutes the way power is divided among network actors. It is the way in which actors function together (Provan and Kenis, 2008). A network can make use of various instruments to govern the network and share power among its actors. The following instruments can be identified according to De Bruijn (2008): judicial means (agreements), economic means (finances) and communicative means (advocacy).
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Whelan’s Network Theory
So far, it has been established that networks offer an efficient way for stakeholders to achieve goals. Motives to form a network differ but a certain dependency or need to work together lies at the basis of a network. Moreover, certain problems can only be resolved by working
together. The way in which a network functions, depends on its performance, governance and the institutional settings in which the network operates.
In order to investigate and analyze how these aspects play a role in the cooperation of actors within a network, Whelan (2012) defines three concepts: governance, mandate and policy. These concepts define the way in which (public and private) actors operate and work together. The first concept is ‘Governance’ and gives insight into how power and capabilities are
divided among the actors (Whelan, 2012, pp. 49-53).
The second concept is ‘Mandate’ and gives insight into the way a stakeholder holds authoritative and executive power (Whelan, 2012, p. 51).
The third concept is ‘Policy’ and gives insight into the way an actor uses its instruments (Whelan, 2012, pp. 82-83).
To summarize: a network can be described as a composition of actors that strive to reach a common network goal. On the basis of their own motives and goals, the actors deploy various strategies in which agreements, certain means and actions are used to effectuate the
realization of the network goal. In this way they try to realize their own goals. How this relates to the phenomenon of Somali piracy is explained below.
Network theory applied to Somali piracy
How can network theory be relevant in relation to piracy? Somali piracy can be regarded as a ‘wicked problem’ (Bueger, Stockbruegger & Werthes, 2011). A multitude of factors are linked to the problem, while at the same a coherent solution is lacking. As is implied in the assumption, it is important to work together. This is supported by Keene: “Solutions to wicked
problems must involve coordinated action by a range of stakeholders, including government departments, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, non‐profit organizations, private businesses and individuals” (2012, p. 11).
The need to work together involves relevant motives to work together. Motives to work together can consist of: increasing the impact of the measures taken, lowering costs, and
17 acting in a more efficient way (Provan & Kenis, 2008). These motives all apply to the
stakeholders in involved in piracy.
In combating piracy, it is also clear that stakeholders (except the pirates) have a common goal: to prevent acts of piracy. By using various instruments, such as agreements and
economic means, they try to reach this common goal. In this respect, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816 and 1851 (both established in 2008) are of importance. In both agreements Somalia is included and on this basis it became possible for ships of other countries to act in Somali territorial waters or deploy land-based operations against piracy (Guilfolye, 2010; United Nations Security Council, 2008). This will be further described in Chapter 6.
As specified before, institutional settings influence the network performance (Whelan, 2012). This is also the case when looking at Somali piracy. Of importance is the ‘fragile’ or ‘failed state’ of Somalia, as is described in the ‘Body of knowledge’ and further explained in Chapter 5. The unstable situation in Somalia has a negative impact on the network performance. Although all actors share the same goal (ending piracy), Somalia’s instability hinders their performance. It is important that this aspect, as well as the other aspects described in network theory, is given attention when seeking a solution to stop piracy. It shows that there are various aspects that are important.
Operationalization
Using elements from Whelan’s network theory, it is possible to demarcate the area of research and select a number of stakeholders involved in the combat of Somali piracy. Not only does it offer a way to approach the multitude of factors connected to Somali piracy, it also increases the feasibility of this research. It helps in answering the research question and in analyzing how a number of stakeholders dealt with Somali piracy during a set number of years within a delineated geographical area. By investigating and analyzing the actions of the selected stakeholders it is possible to judge their actions and cooperation in the combat of piracy. Subsequently, on the basis of this analysis it will be possible to propose, improvements for future counter-piracy actions.
Before relating concepts of Whelan’s network theory to the research question, a demarcation of the concepts is made and a further clarification of the concepts is given.
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Demarcation
The following concepts, relating to the research question, are demarcated: actors, ways of combat, region, timeframe, improvements, governance, mandate and policy.
● (A.1) Actors: the national government of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (US). Secondly, international organizations consisting of: the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). Finally, merchant shipping companies respectively their ships and crew.
(A.2) Somali pirates.
● (B) Ways of combat: anti-piracy strategies.
● (C) Region: Somali territories both offshore- and ashore. ● (D) Timeframe: the years 2008 to 2016.
● (E) Improvements: enhancement of cooperation between members of the international community
● (F) Governance: security strategies ● (G) Mandate: adherence to rule of law ● (H) Policy: stakeholder instruments
Clarification of the concepts
(A) It is the international community, consisting of a world-wide network of both public-and private actors, which combats piracy. Public actors include national governments and
international organizations (Homan & Kamerling, 2010). Private actors include the ships and crew of merchant shipping companies. They are all directly affected by piracy and are the first in line to encounter pirates or being the subject of an attack (Adviesraad Internationale
19 Reasons for selecting the U.K. and the Netherlands are: the importance of international
shipping to their economies and subsequently the financial damage piracy has caused both nations (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011; Maritieme Monitor, 2015). Both nations are economically affected by Somali piracy. Although these reasons apply to other nations as well, the U.K. and The Netherlands have been chosen due to the accessibility of the reports. Reports on legislation and laws are either in Dutch or English, thus translation is minimally affected by possible discrepancies between the actual text and the intentions of the writer.
The US has been selected for its dominant position within world politics and the size of its military power (Buzan, 2004; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2015).
The UN has been selected for being the embodiment of an intergovernmental organization, promoting international cooperation of peace and security (United Nations, 1945).
The EU has been selected for its ambition to fulfill a role as conflict manager; as stated by the European Commission: “to prevent, respond to, address and help recover from conflicts,
crises and other security threats outside its borders” (2013, p. 3).
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been selected for its role as a crisis- and peacekeeping manager in safeguarding the freedom and security of its members, through political and military means (NATO, n.d.).
(A.2) Somali pirates: Somali nationals that have committed acts of: “boarding a ship or the
attempt to board a ship with the intention to commit theft or another criminal act, together with the intention or capability to use violence when committing this act” (Korteweg, 2006,
pp. 11-12).
(B) Ways of combat: strategies to fight Somali piracy. There are several strategies that are used they can be differentiated along the following lines: deterrence and repression, capacity building measures.
The first line is prevention of pirate attacks by deterrence and repression. It also encompasses arresting and prosecuting people suspected of piracy (Homan & Kamerling, 2010; NATO, 2015). The second line addresses the context in which piracy could become lucrative and encompasses measures in Somalia itself. These measures are called ‘capacity building
20 measures’ (Van Ginkel, 2014). Capacity building measures can be defined as: “[it] measures
that encompass a country’s human, scientific, technological, organizational, and institutional and resource capabilities. A fundamental goal of capacity building is to enhance the ability to evaluate and address the crucial questions related to policy choices and modes of
implementation among development options, based on an understanding of environment potentials and limits and of needs perceived by the people of the country concerned”
(UNCED, 1992, p. 329).
(C) Region: Somali territories both offshore- and ashore. ‘Offshore’ includes the territorial waters of Somali, the Gulf of Aden, a part of the Arabian Sea situated between Somalia and Yemen and parts of the Indian Ocean. ‘Ashore’ entails the national territorial grounds of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
(D) The timeframe: the period from 2008 to 2016 has been chosen for the reason that in 2008 the number of Somali pirate attacks grew substantially in comparison to previous years. This is in contrast to 2016, when only one attack was recorded (EUNAVFOR, 2016). Another reason is that since 2008 the international community has been able, with consent of the Somali authorities, to intervene in Somalia waters and deploy land based operations by means of UN resolution 1816 and 1851 (United Nations Security Council, 2008; Guilfolye, 2010). (E) Improvements: actions and efforts focused on the enhancement of cooperation between members of the international community. Ultimately, members of the international
community should work together in a way by which they complement each other’s actions and efforts.
(F) The concept of Governance gives insight in the way power and capabilities are divided or structured among the selected actors (Whelan, 2012, pp. 49-53). They describe the
possibilities for a stakeholder to act. This can be analyzed by looking at a nation’s security strategy.
(G) Mandate includes the rules and regulations that grant a stakeholder authoritative and executive power and forms the basis to act for countries and organizations (Whelan, 2012, p. 51). This concept can be analyzed by looking at the actor’s national rule of law and adherence to international treaties and resolutions concerning piracy.
21 (H) The third concept Policy covers the way in which a stakeholder aims to achieve its goals by making use of different instruments at his disposal (Whelan, 2012, pp. 82-83). These can consist of: judicial means such as the arrest and prosecution of suspected pirates, economic means such as funding for state-building in Somalia or military means such as patrolling the waters in order to prevent pirate attacks by deterrence and repression.
The anti-piracy network
The public and private actors (as listed above), have a common goal to stop Somali piracy. Ideally, shipping companies, governments and international organizations should work together to achieve this goal. This network, in which the selected public and private actors work, is framed as an ‘anti-piracy network’. This network is visualized in figure 1. Important to note is that the actor’s actions against piracy can be done individually or mutually within the anti-piracy network.
Making use of the three concepts (Governance, Mandate and Policy) from Whelan’s network theory the actors’ strategies, instruments and conditions under which they operate in the ‘anti-piracy’ network are analyzed.
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Table 1: Network concepts definitions and indicators
Network theory Whelan
Concepts Definition Indicators
Governance The way in which power and capabilities are divided or structured among the selected actors. They
describe the possibilities for stakeholders to act.
Security Strategies Executive orders
Mandate The rules and regulations that grant a stakeholder authoritative and executive power and form the basis to act for countries and
organizations.
Treaties Rule of law resolutions
Policy The way in which a
stakeholder aims to achieve its goals by making use of the different instruments at his disposal.
Prevention of attacks by deterrence and repression The arrest and
prosecution of suspected pirates Capacity building measures Private Security Companies
Visualized below in figure 1 is the network in which anti-piracy efforts, of the selected public and private stakeholders, take place. It can be described as several groups of entities that are focused on a (geographical) ‘arena’; this consists of the territorial grounds and waters of Somalia.
23
Figure 1: The anti-piracy network
EU NATO UN Netherlands United Kingdom United States Somalia Merchant ships pirates
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4. The problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia
In this chapter an overview is given of the number of hijackings, the general costs that are involved in piracy and the way in which pirates operate. By looking at these aspects the severity of the problem can be shown.
The following sub-question will be answered: what characterizes piracy in Somalia?
Extent of piracy
Piracy in the traditional sense has drastically changed (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, pp. 14-15). In previous times pirates would hijack a ship with the intention to steal it or steal its cargo. Nowadays, a ship will be held until ransom is paid for the crew, while stealing of cargo and/or vessel does not take place anymore, as is stated by European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Commander Howes: “It is hostage and ransom’, not
piracy in the classic sense” (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, pp.
14-15).
Since 2013 the number of attacks and hijackings off the coast of Somalia has diminished, as visualized in the table 2. However, the problem was much more severe in previous years (EUNAVFOR, 2016). In 2010, the number of hijackings was substantial as 47 ships were hijacked and 1,016 crew members were taken hostage (International Maritime Bureau, 2011). From December 2008 till December 2011, a total of 2317 merchant seamen have been held hostage for an average of nearly 5 months. It is estimated that at least 60 merchant seaman died as a result of their captivity in the hand of pirates (Merchant ship crews held hostage in Somalia EUNAVFOR, 2011).
That same year, 92 % of all seizures of ships took place off the coast of Somalia (Middelburg, 2011, p. 1).
Suspicious movements, as visualized in table 2, are still taking place; they signify a potential presence of possible pirates. In addition, as shown in table 3, there are currently 26 people being held hostage as a result of a hijacking. What also has to be acknowledged is the fact that not all attacks or ‘attempts of an attack’ are reported, so the numbers may be higher; this can be due to shipping companies that want to avoid an increase of insurance costs when reporting attacks.
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Table 2: Timeline Piracy off the coast of Somalia
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Suspicious events 8 59 99 166 74 20 5 1 Total attacks 24 163 174 176 35 7 2 0 Of which pirated* 1 14 46 47 25 4 0 0 0 Disruptions*2 0 14 65 28 16 10 1 0
Source: EU NAVFOR, 27/05/2016, http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures
1) Total attacks: is the combined number of all attacks mounted by suspect pirates; those repelled/aborted and those leading to ships being in pirate hands and crews taken hostage
2) An action that renders a pirate group incapable of further pirate operation
Table 3: Ships currently held by pirates
Vessels held*3 Hostages held*4
0 26
Source: EU NAVFOR, 27/05/2016, http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures 3) Plus an unknown number of unreported/unconfirmed dhows and smaller vessels 4) Estimated
Not surprisingly, piracy has financial consequences for shipping companies that operate ships in the Indian Ocean. They spend money on prevention and- in case of a hijack- they have to pay ransom money. To conclude: shipping companies are directly- and indirectly financially affected (United Nations, 2009, p. 1).
It has been estimated that in 2012, the amount of money that was spent by the global shipping sector on anti-piracy measures amounted to $3, 5 billion. The total cost of piracy that same year was estimated to be between $7 and $ 12 billion (Ginkel, Honoré & Bakker, 2012, p. 127). What has to be kept in mind is that these costs are accounted for by many different aspects, as visualized in table 4.
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Table 4: Costs of Piracy
Costs Value (in US$)
Ransoms (excluded premiums) 176 million
Insurance premiums 460 million to 3,2 billion Deviations shipping routes 2,3 to 3 million
Security equipment for merchant ships 363 million to 2,5 billion
Naval deployment 2 billion
Jurisdictional prosecution pirates 31 million Anti-piracy organizations 19,5 million
Costs regional economy 19,5 million
Total estimate costs 7 to 12 billion annually
Source: B. van Ginkel, H. L’Honoré Naber en E. Bakker, ‘Niet-Statelijke Actoren en Individuen’, Strategische Monitor Clingendael 2012 (Den Haag 2012) p. 127.
How do pirates operate?
Piracy is an attractive business for young Somali men. Beside the financial gain a certain lifestyle appeals to these young men. With the potential easy money, drugs are more easily bought and successful Somalis have bigger chances of finding a wife (UNODC, 2013). Usually, more experienced men will be recruited as there are few places on the boats.
Experience and skills are leading factors when selecting these men. This does not mean only Somali men partake in piracy. Women are also recruited, though in smaller numbers. These women mainly find work as cook, care takers or sex worker. Though they do not partake in an actual attack or hijack, their supporting role still makes them part of a pirate group.
The number of Somali’s active in the field piracy in Somalia was estimated to be 1,500 to 3,000 people in 2011 (U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, p. 43). Often these men have a military background or a background in fishing (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC, 2013, p. 44). In the province of Puntland, in Northern Somalia, the majority of the pirates consist of former fishermen. Pirates active at the southern coastal strip of Somalia are usually former inland nomads. Though many pirates share a military
background, the majority comes from rural Somali communities and is uneducated or unskilled (UNODC, 2013). They often migrate to pirate camps using personal connections. It has to be mentioned that Somali pirates do not form one group as a whole. Research papers often take the pirates as a ‘whole’ unit of analysis; in practice this does not hold. It is difficult to research and analyze every single pirate group, especially since new groups are frequently formed and frequently disbanded. A general distinction can be made by separating the more
27 permanent groups and the more ad hoc groups. Although the type of group can differ, they both share a mutual goal: financial gain.
While the ad hoc groups would suggest there is no form of organization present, this is not true (UNODC, 2013). This form can be viewed as groups which consist of ‘freelance’ pirates who attack or hijack vessels on their own behalf. This means that an attack can be launched without extensive financial backing.
However, after a successful attack the group or ‘free-lancers’ will need to retain hostages and negotiate a ransom with involved parties. It is practical in these cases to be backed by an organization or community that can facilitate things. This is especially the case in Somalia, where community structures are important. With the backing of a community the negotiation process can be better facilitated.
The second and more common form of piracy takes place via a network form of organization (UNODC, 2013). There are several piracy networks active in Somalia. According to the UN Monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea, the most ‘stable’ network organizations can be found in isolated fishing villages in the South of Puntland and in the province of Galguduud. For example, the UN Monitoring Group gives information about the ‘Puntland Piracy
Network’, operating in the Northern part of Puntland, while in the south a group that is known as the ‘Hoboyo-Xarardheere’ network can be found.
These organized groups of pirates can consist of a range of actors: financers, seamen, community sponsors, suppliers, shore based security providers and negotiators. Before an attack is planned the different parties will commit themselves to their tasks by signing an agreement. This agreement covers the allocation of finances and possible rewards. The people who provide the financial backing or investments can come from within Somalia but also from abroad. They could be profiled as businessmen or ‘simple’ opportunists. In respect to organizing and conducting an attack or hijack, the investments play an important role and can be vital. Beside the hardware that is needed, money has to be invested in the community on land. Hardware includes: boats (including skiffs and a larger ‘mother’ vessel, a so-called dohw), weapons, ammunition, fuel, provisions and communication devices (World Bank, 2013 in UNODC, 2013, p. 43). The money invested in the community is needed for retaining and guarding the hostages. Research shows that a failure to invest in ‘proper’ guards can lead to the escape of hostages in certain cases. Moreover, it is not unlikely that rival organizations have an interest in the hostages as well. Therefore, pirate organizations need to maintain
28 adequate land-based security to ensure that they are being taken seriously by the local power structures. If they are unable to maintain control, this could lead to a considerate loss of finances and the possibility that the ransom will not be paid.
How is a hijack carried out?
It remains unclear how a hijacking operation commences or is initiated. An assumption is that the decision to launch an attack is often taken after investors and pirates have come to an agreement. Although it has been shown that certain pirate groups have a degree of continuity (such as the ‘Puntland Piracy Network’), attacks also take place on project basis by so called ‘freelancers’ or by opportunists. This is shown by stories and accounts of former hostages and naval observers.
Former hostages made it clear that pirates can be very professional in the sense that they are familiar with the ship they aim to board. This suggests a certain degree of selectiveness of the pirates: they focus on a particular ship they want to hijack. In other cases, observers witnessed that pirate vessels were simply waiting in international shipping lanes for a boat to pass. This indicates a form of opportunism.
In this context an attack carried out in March 2008 was opportunistic: at that time a group of pirates tried to attack a U.S. navy frigate in the Indian Ocean. This attack was fended off and the pirates were taken prisoner (Suspected pirates nabbed after skirmish with U.S. Naval Ship, 2010).
While pirates were able to reach and attack boats close to shore in the 1990’s, nowadays they have to sail further in order to reach a ship they want to attack or hijack. Therefore, they need to have a ‘mother vessel’ or a ‘dhow’ beside the smaller attack boats, the so called skiffs. They use the ‘dhow’ to tow the skiffs behind the ‘mother vessel’ to travel a larger distance or to travel when conditions at sea are rough. The mother vessels are usually formerly hijacked merchant vessels; it is also known that these vessels are traded between pirate groups
(UNODC, 2013, p. 41).
Similar to the process of acquiring a ‘mother vessel’, skiffs can also be bought, rented or taken from fishermen. The skiffs are small open crafts with a length of seven to ten meters that can operate swiftly. These boats are often powered by heavy outboard Yamaha motors. Usually, the pirates will attack with two to three skiffs with four to seven crew members each.
29 Making use of multiple boats the pirates can attack from different angles or enclose a fleeing ship.
Beside the extra fuel tanks and communication devices, the pirates carry homemade ladders and grappling hooks in order to board a targeted vessel. (United Nations Security Council, 2011, para. 94). Making use of assault rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers; pirates try to overpower their target. Pirate skiff vessels have also been seen with mounted heavy machine guns. It is not difficult for the pirates to get their hands on this kind of weapons in Somalia. Many weapons have been looted after the fall of the ‘Barre’ regime (Schroeder and King, 2012, p. 337).
Though in theory anyone can commandeer a skiff, the pirates lack the skills to operate a modern vessel. They rely on the hostages to sail the hijacked ship closer to shore or into Somali waters. Once in Somali waters or close to shore, hostages can be transported to land or can be retained on the ship, waiting for the ransom to be paid (US Congressional Research Service, 2011, p. 11).
Once a hijacking project is completed, the structures can be dissolved or maintained.
Financial aspects
It is not uncommon for investors to buy ‘shares’ for a planned hijacking. These shares are usually sold in US dollars; one share can be worth US $10,000. This amount of money is far too much for ‘normal’ Somalis and the shares are often bought by former successful pirates, foreign investors or small groups who can ‘pool resources’ (World Bank, 2013 in UNODC, 2013, p. 43). It has been estimated that the basic amount needed to start a hijacking operation is around US $50,000 (World Bank, 2013 in UNODC, 2013, p. 43). In return, the investors expect to be paid an ‘x’ fold when a hijacking has successfully taken place. For example, in case of a ransom of three million US dollar, almost one million dollars will go to the
investors.
When the pirates are able to successfully close a ransom deal, the money is often dropped at a designated area. Although it are ships owner(s) or insurance firms that pay the ransom, an airdrop is often carried out by negotiators or ‘crisis management’ consultancy firms (UNODC, 2013, p. 43).
30 The pirates who take part in the actual hijack are paid a relatively low amount of money compared to the investors. The pirates are ‘foot soldiers who are at the bottom of the
investment chain’ (House of Commons British Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, pp. 13-14). Nonetheless, the amount paid to the pirates can be between US$ 30,000 to US$ 60,000
(World Bank, 2013 in UNODC, 2013, p. 43). Leaders of the group will often be paid a double amount. Guards appointed to retain the hostages are often paid a fixed wage and not a
percentage of the ransom.
The persons who negotiate with the ships owners or consultancy firms have often been found to be well-educated former pirates. These negotiators can receive as much as 5% of the total ransom (UNODC, 2013, p. 44). Certain negotiators have been known to be involved in multiple hijackings.
Pirates use an additional rewarding system. For instance, pirates who are the first to board a ship receive an extra sum of money and they can also be rewarded for bringing in personal items such as firearms or other tools. On the other hand, the amount of money (per share or as wage) can also decrease as negotiations can take months; in that case the expenses made for provisions and shelter are subtracted from a pirate’s income. After all, it is the money of the investors that keeps the operation going.
When the pirates have successfully completed an operation and have enough money, they often start a lavish lifestyle. Beside investing money in new equipment, it is not uncommon that they buy ‘khat’ from Somali dealers, living abroad. By spending ‘ransom’ money abroad, often in Kenya, the pirates have a way to ‘launder’ the illegally obtained money. There have also been accounts of pirates using the ransom money as a tool to start a legitimate business; technically this can also be regarded as a form of ‘money laundering’ (UNODC, 2013, p. 43).
Beside the foreign investors and Somali pirates, many others in the local communities benefit from a successful hijacking. It is not uncommon that prices of sale or rent increase or decrease over time depending on whether a hijacking was a success or not. When pirates return
successfully, new cash directly affects the traffic of moving goods and products to the coastal areas, from which the suppliers benefit. Suppliers and other service providers thus make profits by the money earned by the pirates. It can also lead to an influx of sex workers, who have migrated voluntarily or are victim of human trafficking (UNODC, 2013, p. 44). This shows that a lot of people are affected by piracy.
31 When considering the aspects of recruitment, other necessary logistics and the overall goal of financial benefit, it is safe to say that piracy in Somalia can be regarded as a real business. One could say that certain pirate groups are criminal networks, since most attacks/ hijacks take place in a coordinated way. Are there other consequences of piracy; can piracy be linked to terrorism?
It has been argued that there are links between Somali pirate groups and the militant Somali Islamist group ‘Harakat Al-Shabaab’, a terrorist organization. (Anderson, de Wijk, Haines and J. Stevenson, 2009, p. 29)Although it is stated that there is a probable reason to believe so, there has been no real evidence of the existence of this link (Archibugi and Chiarugi, 2009). Interviews with Somali pirates confirm that the potential profit from a hijacking is the most important element in their motivation to take part. It can be concluded that pirates launch attacks for financial gain and not in order to make ‘political statements’, contrary to many terrorist organizations (Hansen, 2009). There is no evidence that this situation has changed since 2009.
Supporting the financial aspect of piracy, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia showed that only a mere 6, 5% of piracy attacks were targeted at fishing vessels: the majority of attacks were directed at larger merchant vessels carrying goods which could potentially be more valuable (Somali Pirates’ rich returns, 2011 in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011, p. 13).
What characterizes piracy in Somalia?
The way in which hijackings take place is very violent. Fortunately, since 2013 the number of hijackings and attacks has drastically dropped. It is known that pirates often operate in
organized structures. While there are several long lasting organized pirate groups, the ad-hoc form of piracy also has a certain level of organization. Financial benefits are the basis for pirate groups to carry out attacks. Most important is obtaining ransom money; the cargo of the ship is of less interest to the pirates. A certain degree of organization is important for a
successful attack and the follow up when securing the ransom. Not only pirates and their immediate surroundings benefit from successful hijackings; it has also become lucrative for foreign ‘investors’ to invest money in piracy. Taking these aspects into account, you can conclude that piracy is an organized form of crime. Until now no direct links have been found between piracy and terrorism.
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5. Favourable conditions for piracy
This chapter looks at aspects and factors in Somalia that have been beneficial to the rise in and continuation of piracy, as this problem cannot be viewed without looking at the broader context. The following question will be answered:
What conditions contribute to the existence of piracy in Somalia?
Somalia is a country located in the horn of Africa, in the far east of the continent Africa. It is a Federal Parliamentary Republic. The population of Somalia is estimated to be around 10 million, from which 85% are ethnic Somalis; the other 15% is formed by ethnic minorities (CIA World Factbook, 2016). Geographically, the country is surrounded by the Indian Ocean to the East and the Gulf of Aden to the North. Interestingly, the country has the longest coastline of the continent Africa. In the late nineteenth century colonies of Britain and Italy were situated here. Unfortunately, Somalia is nowadays mainly known for its instability, extremist Islamic groups and piracy. A turning point in the history of Somalia was in 1991 when the ‘Barre’ regime fell and the country fell into disarray (Sörenson, 2008, p. 11). In 1969, the ‘Barre’ regime took control of Somalia by a coup d’état, led by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre. Drastic changes followed in which the country’s businesses and industries were nationalized. This let to civil unrest and in 1991 a coalition of armed opposition groups overpowered the ‘Barre’ regime. Although united in overpowering the ‘Barre’ regime, the opposition was too divided and was not able to lead the country. As a result, with an abundance of weapons looted from the former regimes, the country fell into a civil war which is still ongoing today. At the time the regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug all claimed autonomy. Somalia became a ‘free for all’, in which different heavily armed groups ruled and controlled various parts of the country. In the year 2000, a
Transitional National Government was formed, followed by a Transitional Federal
Government in 2004. The Transitional Federal Government was able to resurrect national institutions such as the military. And with the help of Ethiopia certain conflict zones in the south could be regained from the Islamic Court Union (ICU), which had ruled there before. The defeat of the ICU left its members separated, resulting in the establishment of various ‘factions’, most notably radical Islamic groups such as Al-Shabaab. Although a national
33 federal government is in place, the country remains in a civil war and various armed factions roam the country.
A fragile state
Somaliland, a region in Somalia, declared itself an independent state in 1991. This self-proclaimed independence has been opposed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and most international countries and organizations. Today, Somaliland is recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia and maintains informal ties with the FGS. Puntland was declared autonomous by its leaders in 1998. Although this region does not seek secession from Somalia, the region functions relatively autonomous.
The self-proclaimed independence of Somaliland and the autonomous functioning of the region as well as the region of Puntland are a challenge for the FGS that aims to effectively govern and control the country. Moreover, being unrecognized by the international
community as autonomous, the region of Puntland experiences difficulties with official foreign ‘aid’ relations (Van Ginkel, 2014, p. 332). It is this region that is considered to be the ‘epicenter of piracy, harboring most pirates and offering a port to ships during ransom
negotiations (Lang, 2011, pp. 19-23).
In trying to control the situation, the government depended heavily on military support of troops, deployed by the ‘African Union Mission in Somalia’ (AMISOM). Even with the support of the deployed AMISOM troops the FGS did not succeed in controlling and governing all of Somalia’s regions and the government had to keep fighting the insurgent groups for a long time (Parsons, 2010, p. 164). Even today these insurgent groups have a stronghold in the country (Enagi, 2015; Lotze & Williams, 2016).
The political chaos and difficulties in controlling violence and lawlessness in the country allow pirates to operate without being afraid of legal consequences (Parson, 2010, p. 164). In addition, corruption is a widespread issue of concern for the country as it affects
governmental action (Transparency International, 2015, p. 17). For many years now, Somalia has - together with North Korea- the lowest position on the ‘Corruption Perception Index’, which means that it has a very high level of corruption in the public sector in comparison to other countries worldwide (Transparency International, 2015, p. 7).
