Political Science
Public Policy and governance: Contested knowledge and alternative facts. Reason and power in politics and governance
Civic integration policy in the Netherlands:
understanding the role of discourse in policy-making
Author:
Aldert van Dam
Supervisor: Dr. A.M.C. (Anne) Loeber
Contents
Introduction 4
Literature Review 6
Literature review part I: understanding policy-making . . . 6
Literature review part II: (civic) integration discourse in the Netherlands . . . 10
Theory 13 Methodology and outline of the analysis 15 Data . . . 16
Case 18 2013: responsibilisation of migrants for their own integration . . . 18
2015: The labour module . . . 19
2017: the participation agreement and support . . . 19
Analysis 21 1. 2013 Re-establishing responbilisation 21 1.1. What’s the problem represented to be in the policy in 2013 . . . 21
1.2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem? . . . 22
1.2. ... and on what kinds of knowledge are these based? . . . 24
1.3. How has this representation of the problem come about in this instance? . . . 25
1.4. How as the problem been thought about by VluchtelingenWerk Nederland? . . . 26
1.5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’ in discourse and with relation to participation, puzzling and powering as well? . . . 26
2015: The labour module and modernity 28 2.1 What’s the problem represented to be in the policy in 2015 . . . 28
2.2 What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem? . . . 28
2.2. ... and on what kinds of knowledge are these based? . . . 30
2.3 How has this representation of the problem come about in this instance? . . . 30
2.4. How as the problem been thought about by VluchtelingenWerk Nederland? . . . 30
2.5 What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’ in discourse and with relation to participation, puzzling and powering as well? . . . 31
2017: The participation agreement, culturalisation and establishing relations with migrants 32 3.1. What’s the problem represented to be in the policy in 2017? . . . 32
3.2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem . . . 33
3.2. ... and on what kinds of knowledge are these based? . . . 34
3.3. How has this representation of the problem come about in this instance? . . . 35
3.4. How as the problem been thought about by VluchtelingenWerk Nederland? . . . 35
3.5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’ in discourse and with relation to participation, puzzling and powering as well? . . . 35
Conclusions 37
Reflection 38
References 39
Introduction
Over the last 5 years the civic integration program in the Netherlands has been changed several times. A migrant that wants to integrate and receive Dutch citizenship has to successfully undergo seven elements of examination, whilst in 2014 five test elements were enough in order to naturalise. Moreover, the current Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the ministry responsible for integration, wants to overhaul the integration policy thoroughly. This has led to critical responses from NGO’s, pleading in favour of a more “evidence based” approach and a smaller role for political considerations in policy-making. Several academics have tackled the issue of Dutch (civic) integration policy. These range from historical overviews to comparative pedagogical studies, but also studies on knowledge in the form of boundary work have been done. Next to this a large body of work discusses changes in Dutch discourse about these issues. The latter of these studies will be discussed in further detail below, however for now it will suffice to say that they do not suggest political or knowledge primacy per se. It has been argued that political and public discourse may have moved towards a notion of culturalisation of citizenship, but how these changes are reflected in policy is not yet been well researched. A closer look into policy formulation in civic integration policies would help uncover the way that discourse, or knowledge (or indeed something entirely different) plays a role in the changes in civic integration policy. This is what I will attempt to do here.
The question I will attempt to answer here is: How was the problem represented in the subsequent changes in civic integration policy in the Netherlands between 2013 and 2017, and what are the causes and consequences of these representations?This questions departs from the notion that policy in itself is not a solution to a problem, but represents a problem as well. The way a ’wicked problem’ is represented determines the solutions that policies that might come up to ’solve’ the problem. Understanding the problem representation, and the way it came to be may help understanding what assumptions underlie the policy that solves the represented problem. This would allow me to discern how discourse influences the policy-making in the field of civic integration policy in the Netherlands.
Scholars of Dutch integration have argued that the discourse has shifted toward support of a more strict, focussed on culture and more obligated notion of integration. This shift has been noted in the context of media as well as politics. In order to understand how a ’discourse’ is translated to policy I draw my attention to the aspects of policy-making that may cause a discrepancy between policy on paper and discourse. In order to understand how discourse may ’find its way’ into policy, the way policy is made needs to be discussed. Through the ’Whats the problem represented to be’(or WPR approach) I will be able to show the underlying ’ordering’ discourse that is the foundation of the problem representation and policy.
In order to do so I will answer the following sub questions which are based on the aforementioned or WPR approach. This approach consists of 6 questions to ask as a researcher, of which I will take over 5. I will go into these questions in more depth in the theory and methodology section of this thesis, eventually the following sub questions will emerge:
1. What’s the problem represented to be in the policy (of said year)?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem, and on what kinds of knowledge are these based?
3. How has this representation of the problem come about in this instance? 4. How as the problem been thought about by VluchtelingenWerk Nederland?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’ in discourse and with relation to participa-tion, puzzling and powering as well?
This will hopefully allow me to answer the research question, and say something about policy formation and alterations in (civic) integration policy.
Firstly I will give an overview of the way in which scholars have understood policy making, which will bring me to the problem representation approach. Later I will discuss relevant insights into the discourse around Dutch citizenship and integration. This will enable me to derive a theoretical framework that might help me understand policy making and formulation. After discussing the case at hand in its (political) context I will turn to the changes
in policy of the period 2013-2017. With all this work out of the way, I will apply the ’whats the problem rep-resented to be’ approach, albeit slightly different from Bacchi’s original set of questions, to the three subsequent policy changes. Afterwards I will recap my findings, and reflect on the decisions made here, as well as the scientific and societal relevance of my findings.
Societal and scientific relevance
Above I have given some indications of why this endeavour is relevant. With regards to scientific relevance I hope to further the understanding on the relation between discourse and policy. As I will discuss in more depths below, studies on discourse often refer to policy that aligns with the way in which discourse would want the world to be (see for example van van Houdt, Suvarierol, and Schinkel (2011), or Tonkens and Duyvendak (2016)). They do so however without spending considerable attention to the way in which policy is made. Czaika and de Haas show rea-sons why there may be a considerable ’gap’ between discourse, policy on paper and policy effects (Czaika & Haas, 2017) but do so without fully operationalising the way this gap functions. My thesis will hopefully operationalise this gap further, and may provide a guide for further research in this direction. With regards to social relevance the idea shared by many NGO’s, but also politicians is that integration policy is rather ’fact-free’ (Website VNL a; NRC, 05-02-2018). Through an analysis of the assumptions that underlie policy and the backings in knowledge they may have, I hope to provide a more in depth view on this issue.
Literature Review
This thesis is concerned with improving the understanding of the development, formulation and changes in civic integration policy in the Netherlands. My endeavour is specifically focussed on uncovering the relationship between discourse(s) and policy making. First I will give an (selective) overview of the way in which scholars have thought about the way policy is formulated, specifically in complex, or ’wicked’ policy spheres. I will attempt to uncover how policy is made in these policy spheres, and how discourse(s) may be expressed in said policies. What these discourses are will be elaborated upon in the second part of my literature review where I will discuss Dutch (civic) integration policy. I will discuss the complexity of the policy terrain that this thesis is dealing with in this part of my literature review as well. While the first part of my literature review will help me formulate a theoretical framework and a methodologically fit for my endeavour, the latter part will help with contextualising the findings in the analysis and conclusion that will follow.
Literature review part I: understanding policy-making
Understanding policy making requires an understanding of what policy is. A possible definition, one used in Dutch high schools, defines policy as "[a]ll means and regulations the government uses to solve, reduce or prevent problems"(Website Digischool) This definition assumes a problem ’out there’: there is a problem in society and politicians, policy makers and aldermen come to know this problem, and search for solutions to this problem. This view however, has come under scrutiny. In The Argumentative Turn Fischer and Forrester (1993) and others show how the practice of policy-making is an argumentative one (Fisscher and Forrester, 1993: 5-7). They argue that these ’solutions, reductions or preventions’ of a problem have been influenced by the way this ’problem’ is formu-lated and constructed (idem: 5). If these formulations were different, the problem can be represented differently and different ways of ’dealing’ with the problem may arise. Whether or not a situation is perceived as a problem depends on if and how it is discussed (Hajer, 1993, 44). Following this position more classical notions of policy-making become problematic. Policy as presented by Parsons (1995, as cited in Hoppe, 2015: 47) for example, suggests that a problem ‘enters’ the policy making process, is then defined and options for solutions are discussed and evaluated. After this discussion a policy is suggested, implemented, and evaluated, and the cycle continues (ibid). This idea bears similarity to the ‘sacred model’ of policy making, in which citizens bring problems to government, and expect them to provide solutions, or at least respond to them. What follows is a rational process from problem to solution (ibid: 48-49). Easton presents a similar idea,but he does argue that for a certain solution to prevail support for chosen policy positions is necessary (Easton, 1957, 390-391). It also pays attention to the environment a political system is in, and to the politicisation of support as well (Easton, 1957, 399).
Both accounts have been scrutinized, in respect of the problem being ‘external’ of the policy process (Hoppe, 2015: 46), which suggest that problems do not arise, or are not relevant when they arise, in other ‘phases’ of policy-making. It’s assumptions on rationality are also problematized: even if the limitations of our rationality as humans are put aside, dominance of certain worldviews, methods or ideologies in policy circles influence its outcome. Hoppe therefore argues that the sacred model, rather than being a depiction of reality, is a story people tell to validate policy outcomes and the political system as a whole, because otherwise the “practice is alleged to fall apart”(Hoppe, 2015: 48). Policy-making is thus not only the fitting of a solution to a problem that has come up in society. The way a problem is talked about should also be taken into account when attempting to understand how a policy came to be.
Czaika and de Haas discuss the relation between discourse in relation to migration policy, and they uncover three ’gaps’ from what is said will be done to what is actually happening with respect to migration (Czaika & Haas, 2017, 495) (The model is included in the appendix: appendix 2). Most relevant to my goal here, the article proposes how the ’discursive gap’ may explain why there are differences between public policy discourse and actual policy on paper. This ’gap’ between stated objectives by politicians and the actual ’migration policies on paper’ is explained by the differences between general and specific policy objectives and the role of interest groups and other actors in
policy (idem: 493-494). This ’gap’ and understanding how it functions is closely aligned to the goal of this thesis. Between the discourse of politicians and the eventual policy interest groups struggle amongst each other for certain policy outcomes, and as has been argued above, certain problem representations. A more systematic approach of this struggle is presented by Hoppe in the Governance of Problems (2015) which I will discuss now:
According to Hoppe the problem definition, or in his words the “authoritative problem definition" is a temporary fixed outcome of the struggle amongst different competing problem representations, and is expressed in the formal policy design (Hoppe, 2015: 30-31). To Hoppe this dominant problem structure comes to be through argumentation and instigation. In argumentation and instigations, frames “in good currency” are utilized by proximate policy play-ers (idem.). Who these playplay-ers are depends on "critical junctures in powering" and "participation" (ibid.). The type, amount of, and interactions between, policy players that surround a policy, the policy network if you will, influences problem definitions. Actors may attempt to gain support for their own positions, seek out public confrontations, or attempt to alter the policy in small incremental steps. Those that participate may, when they have sufficient ’power’ attempt to do the above through the utilization and production of these ’problem frames in good currency’ (idem: 17). These in turn however, also depend on the so called ’critical junctures in puzzling’, in this area, questions on different dominant ways of thinking about the problem, how these ways of thinking are contested, and what bases these representations have are central (idem: 54). Through the concepts of powering, participation and puzzling, Hoppe provides clear points of departure for understanding at least one features ’discursive gap’ in more detail. However, Hoppe points us to frames in good currency and how these frames are dependent on both powering and participation, as well as previous rounds of problem structuring. This brings us to one of the core arguments of Hoppe: the way problems are represented and defined, influences the network of those that participate, have power, and the way those that participate represent the problem (idem: 17). Multiple mechanisms surround and influence the governance of problems, and the problem structuring that occurs. An important part of this is the design of policy. Policy designs are, when politically decided upon, important since they structure governmental actions and discourse (Hoppe, 2015: 51). Design dynamics relate to the structuring of problem definitions, and the politics that surround it.
The study of frames and framing is well established in the policy studies, and has been so for several decades (van Hulst & Yanow, 2014, 1). Rather often, Van Hulst and Yanow argue, frames may be interpreted as constant, or as "objects people possess in their heads and develop for explicitly strategic purposes" (idem: 2). In contrast they talk about framing, which is dynamic and done in relation to other actors or situations, not ’possessed’. They argue framing ’works’ in three ways: sense-making, naming and storytelling. Framing as sense-making are the ’theories of a situation’ actors create to ’make sense’ of the situation. Actors order they already established ways of understanding the world and it guides possible paths of action to take (idem: 7). In the policy sphere framing that occurs in this sense both defines a situation, as well as providing a course of action. Or indeed, it may represent a problem, and through ’sense making’ present a solution. Framing as naming and, the authors add, selecting and categorizing, relates to the way in which some aspects of a policy are highlighted, and others are obscured. Calling a policy or situation important or salient puts it apart from those that are not referred to in that way (Idem: 8-9). This in turn may have consequences for resources, attention and the effort put into solving said issue. Finally framing as story telling refers to the way in which features of a situation may be ’bound together’ into a ’pattern’. It features both forms of framing discussed, put together in a coherent story that attempts to persuade others and in that it helps in guiding action (idem 9-10). One last remark on framing relates to the ’entities’ that are framed: the substance of policy issues; the policy-relevant actors’ identities and relationships, and the policy process (Idem: 11-12). To me, this relates closely to the issues put forward by Hoppe as well. Framing what the issue is, who is (or is ought to be) involved, and whether the policy process is perceived as a budget cut, or as co-creation with actors in the field, are important when attempting to understand policy. Subsequently they can be linked to Hoppe’s concepts of puzzling, powering and participation. Through framing of the relevant actors’ identities and relationship (and framing them as relevant in the first place), participation of actors and their power in the policy process may be altered. The framing as naming, story telling and sense-making can be interpreted as the critical junctures in puzzling, and through this
puzzling, an authoritative, and persuasive ’frame’ or problem representation comes to be. The above insights show an interesting way of engaging with the subject of policy, and I will soon turn to the ways in which the above insights can be operationalised into a method of study. The question does emerge whether these framing dynamics, the complex interactions and relations of participating actors, there frames and the way a problem is represented are always prevalent in policy issues. Van Hulst and Yanow argue that, to an increasing extent these issues have arisen and that more technical ’straightforward’ ways of policy-making are no longer feasible. These reasons are the emergence of network governance and the awareness of the limits of this technical decision making (idem: 13). In their 1973 piece, Rittel and Webber Rittel and Webber (1973) discuss these ’limits’. They argue that states that have accomplished basic infrastructure, education and medical facilities, have reached the limits of professional public service and planning. These professionals are coming to realize that social processes are linked with one another, and that consequently these professionals are “now sensitized to the waves of repercussions generated by a problem solving action to any one node in the network”(Idem: 159). They continue “we are all beginning to realize that one of the most intractable problems is that of defining problems (. . . ) and of locating problems” and just as difficult is the act of “identifying the actions that might effectively narrow the gap between is and what-ought-to-be” (ibid). They conclude that “planning problems are inherently wicked” (idem: 160). These wicked problems (in contrast to ‘tame’ problems) are defined as having no definitive formulation of the problem. Moreover it is unclear when the problem is solved since the the solutions are ambiguous (i.e. not false or true) and there are no ‘tests’ of these solutions. Additionally there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error (it is a ‘one shot operation’), making it impossible for the policy-maker to be ’wrong’. Because of this, there is no way to determine if all potential solutions are ‘on the table’. And since wicked problems are unique from other wicked problems, and they can be considered as symptoms another wicked problem; the choice of ‘explanation’ determines the nature of the problems resolutions (Idem: 161-166). This also underlies Hoppe’s problem typology of structured, semi-structured and unsemi-structured problems. Unsemi-structured problems to Hoppe are cases in which policy makers observe a critique on the status quo “(. . . ) yet still perceive persistent high uncertainty about relevant knowledge claims” and a lack of consensus over the values that are at stake (Hoppe, 2010, 73) .
Solving these problems is not easy. Others dealing with this issues such as Putnam and Wondolleck (Putnam & Wondolleck, 2003) call these problems intractable. They point toward the long duration of these kind of problems in which they have not been resolved. These problems are also likely to be “intense, divisive, pervasive, and complex”(Idem: 58). They argue ideology (ill defined in the piece, and cited in a vague relation to ontology as well) may influence “ways that people think and solve problems” (Idem: 43). When tackling these wicked problems, these framing dynamics are thus relevant, however when speaking about ’tame’ problems (however one might determine that a problem is ’tame’) it might turn out to be less relevant.
The other issue van Hulst and Yanow mentioned was ’network governance’, this is closely related to the wicked-ness of the issue at hand as well. For example Putnam and Wondolleck argue that ambiguous contexts for the social systems in which these problems are located may trigger these ’intractable’ problems more easily: if there is no existent authoritative actor, and no clear rules on what to do, intractable conflicts may emerge (Idem: 48). This relation between authority and social context and the problems that emerge is discussed by Hajer (Hajer, 2009) in more detail. Hajer argues that three ‘deficits’ cause the authority problems with classic ‘modernist’ government similar to those discussed above. He discusses an implementation deficit, a learning deficit, by which he means that the distinctions between the executive, administrative and political branches of government are not there in practicality, and rather interaction between these branches is required; and a legitimacy deficit: related to the fact that more and more decisions do not lie directly under the jurisdiction of the elected officials. A strategy to deal with this is network governance (Idem: 29-30). In this form of governance the state is no longer the one to ‘impose’ a way of doing or a solution to a problem. Rather these issues are dealt with in a network of other actors, both state and non governmental. Interdependence of the actors of this network is an important aspect of network governance (Idem: 31). This new way of governance, aptly put as “next to or across established orders” (Idem: 33) is dubbed as an ‘institutional void’ where “there are no clear and generally accepted rules and norms according to which
politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon”(Idem: 34). This does not mean that state government is powerless, however, more contact with other actors (local government or non-governmental and private) is made, and the legitimacy of said government becomes an issue (Idem: 34). These governance networks are related to the following empirical phenomena: complex decision-making processes; inter-organizational net-works for service delivery; and partnerships and new forms of alliances between public and private actors (Klijn, 2008, 516-517). Hoppe also discusses the type of configurations of actors that emerge around certain problems. However as mentioned, Hoppe presents the governance of problems as a more cyclical relation to certain problems. Not only do policies bring about problems; problem representations bring about the configuration of policy actors that may decide upon them as well. Not only is this network governance a kind of governance that problematises more traditional ways of decision making through the amount of actors involved, and the problems this diversity of actors causes, it is also closely related to the kind of problems that policy-makers are dealing with. In this sense, the causality Putnam and Wondolleck assume in respect to the idea that lack of authority causes these more intractable problems works, as discussed, also the other way around.
I do want to pause at another feature of these wicked problems, if ’tame’ problems are solvable through ’tech-nical’ solutions, how are these wicked problems solved? Yes, framing and problem representations may explain why certain decisions are made, but are knowledge and science obsolete in these problems? Rein and Schon do point to the idea that intractable policy controversies are “immune to resolutions by appeal to the facts” (Schön & Rein, 1994, 4). Others argue that while these intractable controversies, wicked, or unstructured problems are not solvable by what is called ‘normal science’, there are still ways that knowledge can play an important role. Because indeed "the complexity of policy problems corresponds to the complexity of the relevant knowledge" (Ravetz, 1999, 653), this complexity can be ’embraced’, therefore Ravetz argues in favour of post-normal science, or at least a minimal awareness of post-normal science: a form of knowledge production in which ’textbook’ knowledge is accompanied with "other ways of knowing"(Ravetz, 1999, 647). (Classical) expertise, he argues, can only suffice in a situation with relative certainties and decisions that have low stakes. Consequently, the higher the stakes and the larger the uncertainties, the more ’post normal’ science is important. This is also why Fischer argues we go ‘beyond empiricism’ "Rather than providing technical answers designed to bring political discussions to an end, the task of the analyst-as-facilitator is to assist citizens in their efforts to examine their own interests and to make their own decisions"(Fischer, 2003, 225) This can occur through, for example "[b]ringing together the analytical perspectives of social science and the competing normative arguments of the relevant participant in the policymak-ing process"(ibid). And indeed, more and more, Hoppe argues, policy makers believe in a more interpretive mode of knowledge, that of ‘making sense together’, meaning using tacit practitioner knowledge, scientific knowledge, professional knowledge and knowledge provided by others in policy-making (Hoppe, 2015: 55). How can I, in this sphere in which multiple knowledges are, and perhaps ought to be, used in order to make sense of the situation understand the usage of knowledge in policy?
Knowledge in policy has partly stemmed from policy analysis, which has helped create many useful tools such as, cost-benefit analysis, operations research and so on (Lasswell, 1971: XIII). In this, the policy studies and policy analyses have played a significant role in the scientification of policy. The scientification of policy has a rather dialectical relationship to the politicization of science: at the same time scientific advice to government has increased, the idea of what science is and how it relates to policy and politics has shifted also (Weingardt, 1999: 152). This scientification of policy has been played down, or at least been nuanced by scholars studying the usage of the knowledges acquired through policy studies and the liking. Weiss shows that while, research ’as data’ is quite central in economic decision making in the American context, the results of these continues streams of collected data are used to proclaim contrasting positions (ibid: 310-311). Frequent usage of knowledge relates more to notions of knowledge creep, or as knowledge as ’ideas’, in this sense knowledge has a more indirect, and unintended effect on policy. But also in more intended use of knowledge, the idea of ’scientificated’ politics is problematic. Research is selectively used in order to improve an already established political position for political goals. As a consequence "(...) not only are some of the data lost, as with research as ideas, but data are selectively
lost. Those findings that favour ’the other hand’, or weaken the power of the argument, are sheared away in order to make the argument more persuasive"(Weiss, 1991: 314). Knowledge is thus used in framing to make a story more persuasive. But as Hoppe pointed out above, more and more diverse kinds of knowledge are used. This notion is expanded upon by Adams who points out that knowledge does not only come from research per se, but a multitude of ’knowledge domains’ provide information on which decisions can be made, or argumentation can be based on. These domains are: Public, political, opinion leaders, interest groups, media, experts, and local knowledge. Each of these domains may have different ways of expressing their knowledge, and different sites where it is produced. These types of information, when drawn on, are put into into managerial, expertise based styles of expression, when perhaps, due to the basis of this knowledge, this way of producing information requires us as analysts to be more sensitive to less clear cut, factual statements (Adams, 2004: 34-37). One last remark on knowledge in policy. As was argued above, "the complexity of policy problems corresponds to the complexity of the relevant knowledge" (Ravetz, 1999, 653), and within the more wicked problems, solutions are influenced by the way the problem is defined and a definition of a problem. This happens through framing as categorization and naming which sheds light on one issue while having blind spots for aspects of the situation. This is closely related to scholar of science Knorr Cetina. When considering knowledge, she argues we have to understand the learning and excitement that underlies research (Knorr Cetina, 2001: 155). In order to do this she focuses on ‘objects of knowledge’, which she characterizes in terms of “a lack in completeness of being (. . . ) [They] have the capacity to unfold indefinitely.” This means that the object can never be “fully attained”, rather they are “always in the process of being materially defined, they continually acquire new properties and change the ones they have”(Ibid: 181). The properties of these objects do not only vary over time, but can have various forms at the same time as well. These further point of inquiry do not always replace one another, and can be “[split] into different strands” (ibid: 183-186). Note that the relationship between the practice surrounding the object of knowledge, also called epistemic practice, and the object of knowledge itself is thus a relation that can reproduce a certain point of inquiry, and reiterate it.
With these insights on knowledge, I hope to offer the reader and myself a better understanding of how to un-derstand the role of knowledge (through framing and problem representations) in policy-making. Knowledge is an important feature of this because it is, in itself an expression of the same dynamics that cause certain problem repre-sentations to become the dominant ones. Policy, and policy-making can be understood as the interplay of different frames on what the problem is, what the solutions are, and the respective (knowledge) backings for these frame’s. This interplay, specifically in network governance, is done by different actors that participate in the governance of the problem. These frames eventually, through struggle in where the ’power’ of those that participate plays a role, are solidified in the authoritative policy text, which leads to a policy design for the governance of said problem. This design in turn influences which frames are authoritative, where power lies in this constellation and who participates also. Below in the theoretical section of my thesis I will operationalise this notion of policy in a more structured sense through the help of Hoogewerf (1990) and Bacchi (2009; 2012). First, however, I will discuss Dutch (civic) integration discourse and what types of framing are dominant. When a short overview of the discourse is given, I will be able to discuss the ways in which this discourse may or may not have influenced the problem representations and the assumptions that underlie them in civic integration policy between 2013 and 2017 and answer my research question as has been set out in the introduction.
Literature review part II: (civic) integration discourse in the Netherlands
Here I will discuss some of the important works in respect to (civic) integration literature with a specific focus on the discourse that has developed in the Netherlands. This will hopefully enable me, after the analysis, to draw conclusions with respect to the question on the origins of different rounds of policy-making in the Netherlands and the role that discourse plays in policy-making. Before discussing this very discourse I will discuss ideas on what integration and citizenship are in the Dutch context.
might prove even harder, as Peeters puts it “there is a fundamental dissensus in the both the public as the political debate in respect to the question of what integration is, and how can it be realised.”To Peeters, this question has by definition “no objective of neutral answer, because it touches on ideas on how society in the Netherlands functions, and how it should be” (Peeters, 2013: 27). Integration policy has no ‘natural place’ and is highly politicised. Both scientists as well as professionals are thus, Peeters argues, constantly searching for ‘meaning’ and “a certain common ground where a conversation is possible”(Peeters, 2013: 27). This search for meaning is not only done by politicians or spokespersons, rather it occurs on a daily basis. How this occurs on a daily basis is shown in Crafting Citizenship. The book shows how, in the daily practice of ’being a citizen’ in the Netherlands, people shape what is meant by citizenship and the very being of a citizen (Hurenkamp, Tonkens, & Duyvendak, 2012). The authors show how citizens do assist one another, and, on average, are not per se as individualistic as it may seem, but that these active participating citizens are "always the same people"(Hurenkamp et al., 2012, 4), causing newcomers to feel unwelcome at these initiatives (idem.). The second claim the authors make is that, since citizenship concerns sharing the status and rights that come with being a citizen, the sharing of those rights and status is divisive. Part of the craft of citizenship is conflict about what citizenship is, this can be ’resolved’ by actors through stating that one way of citizenship is the best one, thereby making the issue of citizenship antagonistic (Hurenkamp et al., 2012, 141-145), but indeed, the actors that state what citizenship is may be these ’same people’. Politicians and policy makers are themselves also part of this guild of citizenship craftpersons, and thereby partake in these daily practices as well as in the public and political debate.
When perceiving citizenship as a craft, being a Dutch citizen entails more than owning a Dutch a passport. This becomes clear in The Culturalization of Citizenship (Tonkens & Duyvendak, 2016). This book shows that even after the period of integration, which includes civic integration exams (which have been extended upon since the time this book came out as will be discussed here) "symbolic acces to belonging" is still denied for groups of Dutch people with a migration background (or with on or more parents with a migration background) (idem: 2). At the core of this notion is the static perception of (Dutch) culture, which is consequently fundamental to citizenship itself. And, as a central part of this culture: secularism that is intertwined with sexuality (idem: 10-11). This is understood as a restorative notion of culture, which suggests that culture is given and known. Subsequently, that which is not ’known’ should be rediscovered "by referring to a historical cannon" (ibid: 8). In the Netherlands, this is often the ’Judeo Christian’ canon(Schinkel, 2013, 1154). How did this cultural notion of citizenship develop? Before the turn of the century, Dutch-ness was discussed in public debates in papers and other media outlets, the Dutch were viewed as "democratic, remarkabley open, excedingly tolerant, stubbornly egalitarian and (...) anti-nationalistic" (Tonkens & Duyvendak, 2016, 33). This notion of Dutch culture was used, in the same decade (the 1990’s), to contrast the ’western modernity’ with "’non-western’ backwardness" by VVD politician Bolkestein(Ibid). Not much later, on the democratic left, Scheffer and de Beus argued in 1994 in favour of strengthening the national identity, which was referred to as "tolerance, egalitarianism and pragmatism"(ibid.). One of these authors, Schef-fer, has often been portrayed as the kick starting the debate on national identity in the 21st century with his piece ’the multicultural drama’ in 2000. In which he stated that multiculturalism has failed, and the Netherlands ought to focus more on the integration of migrants and their children. Dutch culture and history (including the ’black pages’) need to revitalised (Scheffer, 2000). Others such as political leader Pim Fortuyn continued contrasting the ’modern western culture’ with ’non-western’ (Islamic) backwardness (Tonkens & Duyvendak, 2016, 36). In 2003 this discourse enters the Dutch cabinet with Rita Verdonk who wants to add cultural elements to civic integration programs and does so (idem: 37). Here it was argued that correct citizenship was the enactment of these social norms ’without guidance’, bringing van Reekum to the conclusion that "Her legacy was not so much one of cultural nationalism, but a further responsibilisation of citizenship through obliquely culturalist means"(ibid). Culturalism in the Netherlands was not so much a conservative idea of family values and other associated values, but it did aim to ’conserve and enforce cultural norms’ (Uitermark, 2012: 118). To a much larger extent, it was related to this aforementioned idea of modernity, therefore cultural relativism and the idea that cultures were equal was attacked: "inequality of cultures should be acknowledged (...) to protect the equality of men and women, homosexuals and
heterosexuals" (Ibid). Here also the secularism intertwined with sexuality is central. As argued in part one of the literature review, these discourses are linked to knowledge(s) as well. For example Schinkel discusses how forms of operationalization and ‘scientific observation’ envision a society to integrate into, and this through an “a priori valuation of certain values as unique and paramount characteristics of society”(Idem: 1147). Through literal and figurative visualisation of, in the most literal sense graphs of statistics, Dutch with a migration background, or the children of those with a migration background (this goes even further, to what Schinkel calls the "Nth generation (Idem: 1149)) are compared to native Dutch, which shows how the former ’lag in integration’ to the ’modern’ latter (idem, 1147-1148). An example of this are the research questions by the year report on integration by CBS and SCP on acceptance of homosexuality (Idem: 1152). This idea of responsibility that was argued to be Verdonks legacy is dealt with in depth by Van Houdt et al. (2011). Who show how citizenship is something that is to be earned in the Netherlands by ’closing the cultural gap’. Failure to participate in the economy is namely explained by culture. High potential migrants face less restrictive integration and entry regulations for these very reasons (Idem: 422). The tendency to perceive citizenship as something to be earned is accompanied by notions of ’sacralization’ and ’contractualization’ of citizenship: in this sense (temporarily) individualizing the migrant, while deindividualizing the nation. This combination they dub ’neoliberal communitarian citizenship’ (Idem: 424).
Dutch discourse on citizenship, integration and Dutch culture as seen around the turn of the century and into the 21st has been interpreted to be ’culturalist’, this Dutch culture can be known, and is known since it features (at the very least) values of modernity in particularly sexually. This discourse is accompanied with the notion of responsibility for the migrant of her own integration, also referred to as responsibilisation. While some of the authors refer instances of policy and argue that they are expressions of said discourse, (such as the case with Verdonk her ’legacy’) little is written on the exact way this discourse is translated into policy. As I have shown above, policy-making is not a simple one-on-one relation to the discourse of political officials. I will turn to the way in which I will tackle this issue of discourse and policy in the following two sections: theory and methods.
Theory
Above I have described that I will perceive policy as the end result of a struggle around different kinds of ’framing’ of the problem, that present solutions as well. Consequently I have also described how different kinds of knowledge are related to this, and how the issue of knowledge is especially interesting when analysing wicked problems, since the insight that knowledge can ’unfold’ seemingly indefinitely which is closely aligned with un-certainties about problem representations. I have also discussed that (civic) integration is a contested issue in the Netherlands, and that the discourse has developed into a more obligatory, culturalist one. My theoretical framework attempts to grasp the issues discussed above in a coherent theory, which will be operationalised in the methodology section below.
It seems, however, that I am in luck, since Bacchi already presented a theory that departs from the notion that "what one proposes to do about something reveals what one thinks is problematic" (Bacchi, 2012: 21). Indeed, policies do not solve problems per se, policies produce ’problems’. This approach, the ’what’s the problem repre-sented to be’ approach (or WPR approach for short) sees problem representations as framing processes, which in turn, "contain [and] reduce complexity" (Bacchi, 2009: XII). It deals with looking closely at the "Participation in and management of the problems" (Deleuze, 1994; as cited in Bacchi, 2009: XVII) than with solving them. Not in the least because it does not assume that there is a problem per se when a problem is represented. The insights gained from the first part of the literature review about the different types of framings would suggest that ’simply’ looking into the problem representation would not suffice, because many other different kinds of framing occur. Moreover, my discussion on knowledge also suggests that there is more happening in policy-making that what one can discern from the problem representation. Bacchi fills this gap by arguing that the WPR approach attempts to search for ’deep conceptual premises’, to her "The point, in other words, is not to identify some ’promises’ as empty, but to draw attention to the assumptions and presuppositions that made it possible to make those ’promises’ and to develop those policies."(idem: XIX). Through this, the analyst attempts to provide insights in the policy that the policy maker herself might not have. This is done in an, at face value, rather clear cut way, namely by attempting to answer the following questions:
1. What’s the ‘problem’ (...) represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal? 2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’? 3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?
6. How and-or where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?(Bacchi, 2012: 21).
In my literature review I also discussed the problem only emerges when discussing the complexity of governance at the present and does not find its origin ’outside’ of this governance of the problem. Moreover, we should not assume all problem representation occurs within the state, it may very well also be outside, or indeed, alongside the state. The media, of course plays a large role, however I will not take that role into account here because of the space available to me here. Below I will further tackle to what extent I will take over these questions, and which issues I will not deal with. For now however I do want to elaborate on the second question: 2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?
This notion bears similarity to the idea of a ’policy theory’, this is a ‘coherent’ collection of perceived (causal) hypothesis(Hoogerwerf, 1990, 288). In using this approach the researcher would gather all ‘goal-means’ relations presented by the policy, as well as ‘cause-effect’ and normative relations. After gathering these I would have to construct them into a coherent whole in order to construct the ‘policy’ theory itself (ibid.). Through this reconstruc-tion of the policy theory the analyst would be able to discern what ’lies at the root’ of a policy (idem: 285). Policy theory is also engaged in ’evaluating’ a policy in relation to, for example, societal goals (idem: 288-289).
Because my intention is to uncover what the causes and effects of certain problem representations are, and specif-ically how discourse is represented in policy, I will not partake in this part of policy theory analysis, and will mainly use it as a way to structure the assumptions that underlie a problem representation. Within these causal assumptions and pressuppositions, Bacchi asks us to focus on the knowledge that is ‘taken-for-granted’, what categories are assumed to be in social reality, what rationalities are used, in order words, what knowledge, what way of thinking has allowed this problem representation to be (Bacchi, 2009: 5-8). I will combine the above two theoretical strands, by examining the (explicit) sources that underlie the hypothesis that underlie policy theory. My data however will force me to look mainly into ‘explicit’ hypothesis. I will discuss the explicit knowledges (multiple, see Adams in literature review) that underlie the hypothesis.
The third question relates to the origin of certain problem representations. As argued above, Hoppe may help develop the notion of problem representations, and the way they come about specifically. To Hoppe a dominant problem structure comes to be through argumentation and instigation. Within this frames “in good currency” are utilized by proximate policy players (Hoppe, 2015: 17 and 54). Who these players are depend on "critical junctures in powering" and participation. The type, amount of, and interactions between, policy players that surround a policy, the policy network if you will, influences problem definitions. Actors may attempt to gain support for their own positions, seek out public confrontations, or attempt to alter the policy in small incremental steps (Idem: 17). The positions and the framings that accompany them are depend on the so called ’critical junctures in puzzling’, in this area, questions on different dominant ways of thinking about the problem, how these ways of thinking are contested, and what bases these representations have (Idem: 54). Knowledge plays an interesting role here. As discussed, knowledge may be used as data, ideas, or it may ’enlighten’ the policy makers. On the other hand the (well established) producers of this knowledge may have certain ways of ’doing knowledge’ which in turn structures the design of the policy and its participants (Idem: 56). These feedback effects may structure future problem representations. Using the ideas of Hoppe, concretely as concepts or possible ways of looking into the matter may help further understand the ’coming about’ of these problem representations. Moreover, these feedback effects show that in understanding the problem representation in one ’round’ of problem governance, one might want to look at previous instances of problem representation and governance.
This is why the fifth question Bacchi formulates is highly relevant when using this theoretical lens to understand consecutive round of problem representation. To Bacchi these effects refer to discursive, subjectification and ’lived effects’. The first being limitation and/or production of possible ways of speaking about the subject. Subjectification effects consider the way in which subjects are ’constituted’, and the latter considers the effect on daily lived lives (Carson & Edwards, 2011, 76). These effects need to be considered in relation to one another. For example, how do certain categorizations of individuals constrain their ability to receive welfare or food wares (Bacchi, 2009: 18). But, since the way a problem is represented also relates to the way a problem is governed, which will influence future problem governance, I will also look into puzzling, powering and participation.
The formulated question with respect to the ’silences’ of the policy allows me to discuss (albeit shortly, which I will go into below) how these problem representations only produce one of the many unfolding features a situation may have. Discussing this enables me to understand the influence of problem representations even better as it allows for a discussion about alternative ways of problem governance. This is also what the last question is meant for, it follows Foucault in attempting to uncover the means through which a discourse reaches an audience and gains legitimacy, in particular the role of the media can be assessed here (Bacchi, 2009: 19). I will not take over this particular question for reasons I will discuss below, but also due to the fact that my aim here is understanding the problem representations and how to what extent they can be explained through discourse. This question relates more to this discourse itself and the possibilities of contestation of this discourse. While it is an interesting question it does not help me uncover the issues I want to uncover here. Now that it has become clear in what ways the insights from my literature review can be combined in a theoretical framework for engaging with the subject at hand, I will operationalise my questions in the methodology section below. I will also give a short explanation of the case at hand before beginning with the actual analysis of the problem representations in the subsequent policies.
Methodology and outline of the analysis
As argues I will use the WPR approach discussed above, albeit not fully. I will now go over the presented sub questions in a more practical matter, also with reference to the data used in this research. As will become clear below there were three relevant changes in civic integration policy. Therefore the questions I will discuss here will be answered three different times: one time for every policy change, or in other words, one time for each problem representation.
1. What’s the ‘problem’ (...) represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal? (Bacchi, 2012: 21). This first question allows me to state what the problem representation is which I then can trace back using the later questions, most explicitly in the second question. These ‘policy theories’ are often represented in ‘decision’ trees, or graphs. The ‘end point’ of these graphs is indeed, the problem representation. This problem representation will be more detailed than ’there is a lack in integration’. The assumptions in discussed in question 2 will point my attention to issues such as (for example) ’integration lacks because of the lack of participation in the labour market of newcomers’. To do so I will analyse laws and regulations as well as parliamentary papers, how I collect these documents will be discussed in the data section below.
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’? As argued above, I will analyse these assumptions through the lens of both the WPR approach as the ’policy theory’ approach. Put concretely I will discuss the assumptions and presuppositions that underlie the problem representations, and list them. I will number all these assumptions to enable me to compare them when drawing conclusions. I will also mention the kinds of causality that is these assumptions ’assume’, here I will follow the typology presented in policy theory of ’causal’, ’normative’ and ’cause-effect’ (or means). As a second part of this question I will deal with the the knowledge(s) that underlie this assumption, taking a more Bacchi inspired approach. This will enable me to discuss the way in which the above assumptions have a knowledge base and how they were backed by knowledge sources. This is also relevant in respect to assessing the influence of discourse. Are findings in policy relevant research taken into account? Is the policy altered or is discourse leading?
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? (Bacchi, 2012: 21). Here I will describe the policy-making process with special attention to the changes that were made in between of assumptions of the problem representation. Through this I hope to be able to also show how previous instances of policy-making and problem representations have affected the current problem representations.
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? (Bacchi, 2012: 21). The insights from knowledge utilization and production above, as well as the problematisation of the concept of ‘integration’, its means as well as its goals, and the inherent problem that is in the term itself, would suggest that there is a multitude of answers to this question, exactly because of the unfolding nature of the subject matter at hand. Taking these all into account is (far) beyond the scope of this thesis, since it is mainly concerned with discovering the extent to which the discourse as described in sections above are represented in the problem representations. To be able to shed some light on the blind spots of this policy I will however discuss the way Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland (Refugee work Netherlands) has thought about the problem. And what their representations were, this will be done through an analysis of their annual reports and ’view points’ on their website, as well as publicly available letters they have sent.
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? (Bacchi, 2012, 21). As mentioned above, here I go beyond the initial effects Bacchi points us towards, those of discourse, subjectification and ’lived’ effects. In addition to these I will try to give some indications of the effects on puzzling, powering and participation, the concepts of Hoppe, as well.
To conclude I will compare the different problem representation and the assumptions that they were based on. Doing so will enable me to draw conclusions on continuities and discontinuities. Through this I will show how the assumptions line up with the discourse described in the second part of the literature review. Hopefully enabling me to answer the research question "What are the problem representations in the subsequent policy changes in civic integration policy between 2013 and 2017 in the Netherlands?"
The above considerations cause some changes in the original questions proposed by Bacchi. The eventual sub-questions I will use to analyse the three instances of policy-making and problem representations are the following:
1. What’s the problem represented to be in the policy (of said year)?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the problem, and on what kinds of knowledge are these based?
3. How has this representation of the problem come about in this instance? 4. How as the problem been thought about by VluchtelingenWerk Nederland?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’ in discourse and with relation to participa-tion, puzzling and powering as well?
Data
In order to answer the above questions for every policy change I will need data. This data is largely drawn from documents. Every document is found through starting at the authoritative problem definition, the policy proposal, or Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum). It is recommended to start with these ’end product’ of problem representation and policy-making (Bacchi, 2009, 20). These documents (in all three cases) start with an explanation of where the law came from. These pieces, be it a coalition agreement or a letter form a minister are subsequently scanned for references to other documents or knowledge sources. The documents were than read by me in which I marked problem definitions, the assumption and reasons stated for this policy, and arguments that try to argue in favour for a position that makes these claims. When it was not clear where the policy originated from, I attempted to find the first mention of the policy through search engines of parliament and regular internet search engines. This will be done in a similar fashion to the policy theory approach (Hoogewerf, 1990: 288). In all documents, special attention went to the knowledge sources on which these assumptions were based, if they had any. In the knowledge sources I did not have a specific standard: references to academic pieces were noted by me, but also statements relating to "examples from country X" were noted. This tally keeping helped me decide what issues I had to delve in to still. The insights gained from both Weiss as Adams will be taken into account, and the typologies presented will be used to asses the kinds of knowledge that these assumptions were based on. Next I will asses the effects of these problem representation in a manner discussed above: both in respect to discursive, subjectification and lived effects as well as through the lens of puzzling, powering and participation.
The problem representations that are rendered invisible through the dominant problem representation will be analysed through an analysis of merely one actor: Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland. Here annual reports, their pub-licly stated view points on their website and pubpub-licly available letters will be used as data.
Next to this I wanted to conduct interviews with key informants in different stages of the policy formulation, to that end I have contacted 8 organisations and individuals. My next step would have been gathering more respon-dents through the snowball method. Due to non-respons and practicalities that my responrespon-dents were dealing with, I eventually have only held two interviews (one with an important NGO, VluchtelingenWerk Nederlands and one with a public servant in the ministry of Justice and Safety concerned with migration and asylum policy), and have had personal correspondence with one actor (a leading figure in the formation of the participation agreement from ProDemos). Of one of the interviews the recording has been severely damaged, and this will not be used (other than for my own inspiration).
Most of the data in the documents as well as the interviews is in Dutch, all the translations in the text are done by me. This does cause problems since not only because translations not always work, the terminology itself is also contested. Some argue that this latter has interesting effects on the practice of integration (i.e. ’inburgeren’ and ’integreren’ are both translated by the government as ’integration’, whilst the first is a process formally end-ing when one finishes her exam, the other is ’endless’ (Schinkel, 2013)). I am concerned with ’inburgeren’, the becoming of a citizen, I will use the term ’civic integration’ throughout this thesis. Who is and is not a migrant is also an issue here, especially since not all migrants have to undergo the same procedures (for example ’knowledge
migrants’ or expats do not have to partake in the participation agreement). Also, as a member of the European Union (EU) the Netherlands receives both non-EU as EU citizens, for whom different regulations apply. When relevant I will discuss this and not speak of ’migrants’ in broad terms. A word that has become more and more popular ’newcomer’(niewkomer), this is perhaps the most positive term for a migrant used in policy discourse, and I will use it also.
Case
My case is civic integration policy in the Netherlands from 2013 to 2017, below in table 1 I show the responsible ministries, ministers, and coalitions they were situated in. The four parties that governed in this period, are the VVD: a right wing conservative party, the CDA: a christian conservative party; the social democratic PvdA, and the populist radical right-wing PVV (ProDemos, 2013: 19-23).
Years Coalition Responsible for inte-gration
Minister
2010-2012 VVD, CDA with sup-port of PVV
Interior and Kingdom Relations*
2010-2011: Piet Hein (J.P.H.) Donner (CDA) 2011-2012: Liesbeth Spies (CDA)
2012-2017 VVD and PvdA Social Affairs and Em-ployment**
Lodewijk (L.F.) Ass-cher (PvdA)
Table 1
*Within the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, Gerd Leers (CDA) was the minister of Immigration, In-tegration and Aslyum Affairs. **Here aslyum and migration was the responsibility of the Ministry of Safety and Justice (now Justice and Safety), which had 3 subsequent VVD ministers in this period
Below I will describe the civic integration procedure at length, but for readers unfamiliar with show how many need to partake in this civic integration which can be seen in table 2.
Years amount of people that became obliged to par-take in civic integra-tion 2013 9.439 2014 17.238 2015 24.796 2016 32.539 2017 22.446 Table 2
source: DUO data
The above overview of the more structural features of the civic integration debate only the framework in which my actual ’case’ or ’cases’ are situated. My case in that sense are the subsequent changes in civic integration policy. Of these changes there were three, one in 2013, one in 2015 and one in 2017. I will give an overview of the changes that occurred, albeit not all at length. Here the changes from 2013 to 2017 in integration policy in the Netherlands will be discussed, starting with 2013, the ’responsibilisation of migrants for their own integration’ in 2013, continuing with the introduction of the labour market orientation module in 2015 and the introduction of the participation agreement in 2017.
2013: responsibilisation of migrants for their own integration
Before the first of January 2013, asylum seekers and spiritual leaders that wanted to settle in the Netherlands were offered integration courses by the municipality they resided in. Migrants classified otherwise than the above were responsible for seeking out these courses themselves between 2006 and 2007, but due to disappointing results, the
government decided to change this as well, making the period between 1998 and 2012 one of obligatory integration courses, supplied by municipalities (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017, 9-10).
After the 1st of January, 2013, things changed, at face value migrants still have to partake in an exam and inte-gration courses, and content wise, little has changed. However, in order to partake in this exam, you, the migrant, are now ‘responsible’ and the main change in the practice of integration for a migrant relates to this newly found ‘responsibility’. Now you the migrant, can decide on your own how you fulfil your ‘naturalisation obligation’: you can decide which courses you take and where you take them, you can choose which location, which provider, what price (and thereby quite often what class size) suits you, and the amount of guidance provided in those courses you prefer. Whereas municipalities provided courses before, private institutions provide lessons with little interference from government. If you do not know which provider for these lessons to enrol in, the website “Blik op Werk” (vision on employment) provides an overview, and certifies institutions it deems fit. You now also have to bear the costs of these courses, this is also ’your own responsibility’. You can call upon a social loan system, enabling you to loan money to pay for the courses provided by Blik op Werk certified providers(Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017, 34). The amount of time you as a migrant can take to integrate has also reduced from three and a half years before 2013 to 3 years total, with sanctions in place if you fail to do so (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2017, 6).
2015: The labour module
In 2015, the orientation Dutch labour market module (Oriëntatie Nederlandse Arbeidsmarkt [from here on out ONA]) was added to the citizenship exam. A migrant who has completed ONA “knows what jobs are suitable; what one is to do to find and hold a job, and; as an entrepreneur you know how find and hold a job.” (Examen ONA, n.d.) This is done through creating and conversing about a portfolio, consisting of eight ‘result cards’. The result cards ask you to write down your preferred job (even if you already have a job as an entrepreneur, you are required to fill in these forms for a ‘preferred job’), and answer questions about this preferred job. The questions range from the working conditions you face in this job that you select from the form (“You have to travel far”; “you work with machines and materials”) and whether you ‘fit’ in this job (card 2), the competencies for the job (card 3), to the differences in culture between the job in your country of origin vis-à-vis the Netherlands (card 8) . You compile these cards in a portfolio, send this to DUO (Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs: service for implementation of education) and discuss this portfolio with them. At this meeting you discuss why you have answered the questions in the way you have ( “therefore it is important that u fill in the result card yourself” Examen ONA (n.d.)). During this conversation you can only speak Dutch, although possible mistakes you make language wise are not part of the exam. Aside from these changes, alterations were made to the content of the exam also, on which I will elaborate below.
2017: the participation agreement and support
Since the 1st of October 2017, a migrant has to sign the ‘participation agreement’, and follow a short course called the ‘participatietraject’, or ‘participation programme’. In this program the core values of Dutch society are explained, which are also mentioned in the participation agreement, to be eventually signed by the migrant. The agreement is included in appendix 1. Municipalities have relative autonomy in how they execute the participation agreement and the related programs. They can decide whether and what modules are used, whether they discuss it on its own or in the context of other integration courses (parliamentary papers). Not only with respect to the participation agreement itself the municipalities play a role, but in 2017, the supporting role of municipalities is defined in law as well. In particular the support municipalities provide asylum-seekers and their families (idem: 3.2), how municipalities fill in this supporting role is largely up to them. The reason for the new role (or rather, return of this role since 2013) for municipalities is the idea that asylum-seekers, in comparison to other migrants and especially family migrants, have less of a bond with the Netherlands and Dutch Society, due to the fact that
’regular’ family migrants to partake in integration exam in their country of origin and already have relations in the Netherlands (ibid).
Analysis
As discussed above, several changes to integration policy have been put in place in the four year period discussed here. The practice of integration has been altered from a practice in which the municipalities play a central role to one that is more ’marketised’ in which certificates and loans guide migrants through the integration procedures. The later changes to the practice of integration, the ONA and the participation agreement have expanded the amount of courses and ’exams’ one has to complete to be integrated. In both the ONA and the participation agreement the migrant, among other things, compares their country of origin with the Netherlands, with a focus on work culture and culture in a more general sense respectively. However, the way in which this is done may differ from case to case, since every migrant may choose a different provider of the courses on the ’integration market’. Through the re-entering of the municipality in 2017, relative local autonomy in choosing which program to use in the leading up to signing the participation agreement also causes spatial differences. If you are categorised as an asylum seeker, since 2017 you are now supported more in your integration procedure than you were (formally) between 2013 and 2017. To understand what has caused these changes in the practice of integration for the migrant, I will trace back the changes in civic integration policy in the way that has been set out in my theory and methods section.
Above I have given a short overview of the changes that occurred in the period I am studying here. Clearly the change in law in 2013 was the most thorough, whereas the 2015 addition of the ONA en the changes in the civic integration exam were more minor in scope, here I will discuss the problem representations in both the former policy changes as well as the participation agreement of 2017. Later I will sum up and analyse the assumptions and presuppositions that underlie them with respect to knowledges used specifically. As discussed in the methodology section, starting with analysing the actual change in law will help me find the origins of said policy.
1. 2013 Re-establishing responbilisation
1.1. What’s the problem represented to be in the policy in 2013
The introduction of the Memorie van Toelichting (explanatory memorandum) of the changes of 2013, points out why the law should be altered as it states the following: “With this [the 2013 law] the intent as stated in the coalition agreement to place responsibility for integration upon migrants and asylum seekers, and to the elaboration of those plans in the integration note are implemented”(Parliamentary Papers II, 2011-12, 32086, no 3: 1). In the note referred to the representation of the problem is rather complex and features multiple aspects. Many of these aspects will be discussed below, however first and foremost it speaks of the lack of integration (Parliamentary Papers II, 2010-11, 32824, no 1: 5-7). This is the main ’problem’ that needs to be solved, the assumed causes and solutions to this lack of integration are manifold. Moreover, there are underlying features that complicate the problem repre-sentation, as can be seen in the justification for a more obligatory integration policy given here, This policy would "implicate a more overall effort of improving the societal coherence, improving citizenship and consolidates Dutch coherence"(Idem: 9).
The first phrase relates to the aforementioned lack of integration, integration is phrased as a way to accomplish ’societal coherence’, which has no specific focus on cultural, economic or other forms (such as social relational) of integration. It continues on citizenship, of which, as I will discuss below, a new notion came to persist among the coalition parties. Lastly the policy would attempt to ’consolidate Dutch coherence’, which is the third, and at face value more vague policy goal. When this is phrased as a problem statement, the problem representation would be:
Problem representation 1:
"Civic integration of migrants does not correspond with notions of (civic) participation and social co-herence in Dutch society"
I have already mentioned, albeit shortly, that this problem representation is multifaceted. What these facets are will be discussed more in depth below.
