Multilevel governance and the
protection of female asylum-seekers
in reception facilities in Italy and the
Netherlands
Name: Vincenzo Gomes
Student ID: 10182543
Course: The Politics of International Migration and Asylum
Supervisor: Jeroen Doomernik
Second reader: Anja van Heelsum Programme: Political Science
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Political Science
Abstract
Females are seen as one of the most vulnerable groups that are reaching the EU. This is mainly due to the fact that there are only a few legal ways to reach the EU and therefore the majority of the refugee population is forced to enter the EU illegally. During this journey female asylum-seekers have to deal with gender-based violence, including rape. So far this illustrates only the journey to Europe. According to the Council of Europe and the IOM female asylum-seekers are also exposed to gender-based violence in the reception facilities in the country of destination. However, there are huge differences in the standards for reception between the EU Member States. Therefore, the aim of this study is to contribute to an understanding to what extent the governance structure on asylum and migration policies affects the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Italy and the Netherlands.
Multilevel governance – Foggy organizational structures – Italy – The Netherlands – Female asylum-seekers
Abbreviations
AIDA - Asylum Information Database
ANCI - Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani
ASGI - Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull’Immigrazione AZC - Asielzoeker Centrum
CARA - Centri di Accoglienza per Richiedenti Asilo CAS - Centri di Accoglienza Straordinaria
CDA - Centri Di Accoglienza
CEAS - Common European Asylum System
CIAC - Centro Immigrazione Asilo e Cooperazione CIE - Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione COA - Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers CoE - Council of Europe
CPR - Centri di Permanenza per il Rimpatrio CPSA - Centro di Primo Soccorso e Accoglienza DMIM - Di Mano In Mano
EC - European Commission
ECRE - European Council on Refugees and Exiles EP - European Parliament
EU - European Union
FNPSA - Fondo Nazionale per le Politiche e i Servizi dell’Asilo IOM - International Organization for Migration
KIS - Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
PDS - Pozzo Di Sicar
RCD - Reception Conditions Directive
SPRAR - Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati
UN - United Nations
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees WEF - World Economic Forum
Table of Contents Abstract 2 Abbreviations 3 1. Introduction 6 1.1 Research Question 7 1.2 Hypothesis 7
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 9
2. Theoretical Framework 10
2.1 Definition of Concepts 10 2.2 Foggy Social and Organizational Structures 11 2.3 Multilevel Governance of Migration 12
2.3.1 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the EU 15
2.3.2 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the Case of Italy 16
2.3.3 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the Case of the Netherlands 18 2.4 The Reception of Female Asylum-Seekers 19
3. Methods 22
3.1 Research Design 22
3.2 Respondents 25
3.3 Operationalization 25
3.4 Empirical Limitations of the Research Design 27
4. Analysis 29
4.1 Formal Protection of Female Asylum-Seekers in the EU 29
4.2 Case: Italy 32
4.2.1 The Supervising and Coordination of the SPRAR and CAS Reception Systems in Italy 34
4.2.2 Gender-Based Violence and the Protection of Female Asylum-Seekers in SPRAR and CAS Reception
Facilities 38
4.2.3 Fogginess of the Reception System in Italy 39
4.3 Case: The Netherlands 42
4.3.1 The Supervising and Coordination of the Reception System of the COA 43
4.3.2 Gender-Based Violence and the Protection of Female Asylum-Seekers in Reception Facilities of the COA 46 4.3.3 Fogginess of the Reception System in the Netherlands 48 4.4 Comparison of Italy and the Netherlands 50
5. Conclusion and Discussion 56
6. Bibliography 61
Appendix I: List of Interviews 68
Appendix II: Interview Guide (Dutch version) 69
1. Introduction
Females are seen as one of the most vulnerable groups that are reaching the EU (European Parliament 2016: 3 & 10). This is mainly due to the fact that there are only a few legal ways to reach Europe and therefore the majority of the refugee population is forced to enter the EU illegally and make use of smugglers and traffickers. During this journey female asylum-seekers have to deal with gender-based violence, including rape. So far this illustrates only the journey to Europe. According to the CoE, “many migrant, refugee and asylum-seeking women and girls have been exposed to various forms of gender-based violence, either in their country of origin, during the journey to Europe, or upon arrival” (Council of Europe 2018). The IOM already acknowledged in 2004 that the experiences of male and female asylum-seekers differ “due to the role, behavior, and relationships that society assigns to, and expects from, a women or a man in a country of origin and a country of destination” (IOM 2004: 3 – 4). Once they arrive in the EU they are detained or sheltered in the reception facilities of the Member State they first arrived. Due to the huge differences in asylum and immigration policies between EU Member States, the standards for reception conditions differ as well.
These insights led to the formulation of tantalizing questions such as: Why are female asylum-seekers still exposed to gender-based violence while they are supposed to be ‘safe’ in the reception facilities in the EU? Are there differences in the protection of female asylum-seekers in the reception facilities of Member States? Why are there differences in organization of reception facilities in the Member States? And has the reception system in the EU features of foggy organizational structures?Finally, these questions established the aim of this thesis, which was to contribute to an understanding of the discussion on multilevel governance in asylum and migration policies by examining to what extent the governance structure on asylum and migration policies affects the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Italy and the Netherlands.
I chose to compare Italy and the Netherlands because both countries have a different governance structure regarding asylum and migration. Italy has decentralized its social policy system, which includes asylum and migration policies that manage the reception facilities (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 131). In contrast, the Netherlands has a centralized governance structure regarding asylum and immigration. These governance structures could culminate in interesting differences and similarities between both cases.
1.1 Research Question
This thesis contributes to an understanding between the relationship of the governance structures of asylum and migration policy in Italy and the Netherlands and the matter of protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in both countries. Given the theoretical framework in chapter 2 that outlines and discusses a plethora of issues raising from the multilevel governance structure on asylum and migration, the continual gender-based risks women face in their humdrum affairs, and the interesting differences in governance between Italy and the Netherlands led to the formulation of the following question:
To what extent is the protection of female asylum-seekers in the reception facilities affected by the governance structure on asylum and migration policies in Italy and the Netherlands?
1.2 Hypothesis
The European Migration Network conducted research on behalf of the EC on the various reception systems in Member States in 2012. In this research they ascertained that “the current [Italian] reception system consists of two parallel subsystem, with an additional subsystem that is activated in the case of emergency” (European Migration Network 2013: 27).
On the one hand, there are the CDA, CPSA, CARA and CIE facilities. The first two reception systems aim to identify the migrant and provide first aid (European Migration Network 2013: 1). After 2015 these reception centers became known as the ‘hotspots’ (European Migration Network 2017: 11). The third reception system accommodates asylum-seekers who are waiting on the examination of their application (European Migration Network 2013: 1). Thus, they await the opinion of government officials who decide whether they are a genuine asylum-seeker. The last reception system the CIE, yet to become the CPR, accommodates those who have to go back to the country of origin (European Migration Network 2013: 1; European Migration Network 2017: 12). These initial reception systems are coordinated by the central government (AIDA 2018a).
On the other hand, there is the SPRAR network. This reception system is seen as the second phase in reception in which those who already filed a claim for asylum are housed and is managed by local authorities in collaboration with third parties (d’Angelo et. al. 2017: 20). At first, this reception system was introduced “to coordinate reception measures between the Ministry of the Interior, UNHCR and the national Association of Italian municipalities [ANCI]” (Caponio and Cappiali 2018: 125 – 126). However, it eventually became the main reception system (Belloni 2016:107). Reports published by the Ministry of the Interior and research
conducted on behalf of the main actors in the field of reception demonstrate that the Italian government tries to “enhance the adhesion of municipalities to the SPRAR system” (Ministry of the Interior 2017: 18), and encourages “activities aimed at multiplying the SPRAR system to the territories (…) in order to arrive at a unified system in which quality of reception is guaranteed” (Caldarozzi et. al. 2016: 6).
Furthermore, the report published by the Ministry of the Interior also indicates that it is necessary to “overcome the system of emergency reception centers, CAS” (Ministry of the Interior 2017: 18). This subsystem is supposed to be an extra measure for the reception of asylum-seekers, however, this extraordinary system has become the ordinary structure of reception (Caldarozzi et. al. 2016: 6). According to the ECRE, the emergency reception system, the CAS, has now been “institutionalized as part of the reception system” (AIDA 2016: 31). In 2016 the CAS system housed approximately 70 percent of all asylum-seekers in Italy, while 80 percent of the asylum-seekers were accommodated in temporary reception centers (Calderozzi et. al. 2016: 6). In absolute figures this means that 128 thousand asylum-seekers lived in temporary reception centers like the CAS system, while only 23 thousand asylum-seekers lived in a SPRAR reception center (Calderozzi et. al. 2016: 6).
The existence of two parallel subsystems for reception with an additional subsystem for emergency reception is a little confusing and foggy in an organizational sense. Nonetheless, what is more important is that due to the various reception systems and the inefficiency of the collaboration between these systems most of the asylum-seekers are forced to stay in extraordinary reception facilities, i.e. hotels and other hospitality structures (Calderozzi et. al. 2016: 6). Calderozzi et. al. published a report on the Italian reception system in 2016 and they concluded that due to the use of these extraordinary reception systems the quality of these reception centers cannot be guaranteed whilst when Italy is able to adhere to the SPRAR network it could provide better quality of services (2016: 6). Hence, apparently in the current Italian reception system it cannot be guaranteed that every asylum-seeker receives the same quality of services. This is particularly interesting for answering the formulated research question in which the focus lays at the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception centers in Italy and the Netherlands.
Although the research question is formulated neutrally, there is an extensive amount of literature on the topic of multilevel governance of immigration in Europe, and particularly on Italy, that establishes that decentralized governance structures fail to provide every asylum-seeker with the same standards for reception. This indicates that centralized governance structures on
migration are better able to protect female asylum-seekers in reception facilities. Hence, the hypothesis of this research will be:
A centralized governance structure is less affected by foggy organizational structures and, therefore, is better able to protect female asylum-seekers in reception facilities.
However, the findings suggest that solely the different governance structures are not enough to explain the differences in protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Italy and the Netherlands. The theoretical assumption that a centralized or decentralized governance structure affects the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities falls short in this respect. Therefore, the findings enhance the theoretical relevance of this thesis.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This contribution is structured as follows. After the introduction in the first chapter, a theoretical framework is outlined in the second chapter. This chapter elaborates on the definition of concepts and the theories of foggy social structures and multilevel governance in general; thereafter, I discuss these theories in relation to the issue of asylum and migration in the EU, Italy and the Netherlands. The third chapter features the methodological section of this thesis. In this chapter, detailed information on the research design, the respondents, the operationalization and the empirical limitations of the research are presented. The fourth chapter analyzes the empirical evidence that is conducted in the interviews in Italy and the Netherlands. If necessary the statements made in the interviews are supported by statistical data from Eurostat or reports published by various organizations. The aim of this chapter is to explore and compare the governance structure of asylum and migration in Italy and the Netherlands and, eventually, to find an answer on the research question. The fifth chapter is dedicated to connect the theories on foggy social structures and multilevel governance with the empirical findings that are described in the fourth chapter, in order to formulate a conclusion. The chapter will end with a discussion for future research on this topic.
2. Theoretical Framework
This chapter starts with an elaboration on the definitions of important concept. Thereafter, it focuses on the theories of foggy social and organizational structures and multilevel governance in relation to migration and particularly in relation to the system of reception in the EU. In section 2.2 I elaborate on what is meant by foggy social and organizational structures and explain that the issue of asylum and migration, in the context of the reception in the EU, can be perceived as ‘foggy’. Section 2.3 complements this by providing a synopsis of the academic debate on multilevel governance in the EU that exists in the context of asylum and migration. The last section focuses on the reception of female asylum-seekers in the EU. This section briefly illustrates how the multilevel governance structure of asylum and migration in the EU affects the reception of female asylum-seekers, which is characterized by foggy organizational structures.
2.1 Definition of Concepts
People play an inseparable part in the issue of immigration and asylum. However, a misunderstand may rise when we identify these people. Often the terms “refugee”, “asylum-seeker” and “migrant” are used to describe the same thing. Therefore, in this paragraph I will explain and elaborate what the differences are between refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. In addition, it is important to note that the emphasis of this thesis will be on asylum-seekers because the general idea behind the creation of reception facilities is that they accommodate asylum-seekers pending their asylum application.
Starting with the concept of refugee, the 1951 Refugee Convention in Article 1 (A) (2) describes a refugee as a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (UNHCR 1951: 14). This is a common definition that is used by the EU in their directives and regulations that make the CEAS. Hence, a refugee is someone that has fled his or her country and seeks international protection. Countries that have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, which includes the EU, are obliged to harbor these refugees.
The term asylum-seeker is another common used concept and according to the IOM it includes a person, “who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than
international and national instruments” (IOM 2018). This definition is closely related to the definition of the concept of refugees, however, the difference is that the asylum-seeker still has to wait for the evaluation of his or hers claim of asylum. The IOM notes that, “in case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds” (IOM 2018). Hence, the concepts of refugees and asylum-seekers are often used to describe one and the same thing, however, in contrast to a refugee, an asylum-seeker is a person who still is not evaluated as a person that really cannot go back to its home country.
The last concept that is used often in relation with refugees and asylum-seekers is the term migrant. According to the IOM a migrant is “any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is” (IOM 2018). This definition actually includes a little of all the above-mentioned definitions. For example, a migrant can be someone who had to flee his or her home country because of war, persecution or other dangers. This could easily qualify a migrant as an asylum-seeker, when his or her claim on asylum is not yet evaluated, or a refugee when the person already has proved to have a valid claim. However, an important difference between a refugee, an asylum-seeker on the one hand, and a migrant on the other, is that a migrant does not have to be someone who was forced to move to another country. A migrant could also be an international student or someone who has moved for work. In short, the term migrant entails all people who move from one place to the other, whether it is voluntary or by force, for work or to flee war.
2.2 Foggy Social and Organizational Structures
The organizational structure of the EU is often discussed as complex. Engbersen and Broeders could describe some parts of the EU as ‘fogy social structures’, which have to deal with ‘foggy organizational structures’. The emerging of this fogginess, they argue, are caused by “[the] product of contradictory economic, social and judicial forces” (Engbersen and Broeders 2011: 170). The issue of asylum and immigration in the EU could be seen as such foggy social structure. In the case of asylum and immigration there are various contradictory interests, for example, employers are driven by economic motivations because they want to have access to cheap labor, therefore, they are possibly not against the idea of having a substantial number of illegal immigrants in the country; NGO’s working with a humanitarian purpose are possibly against the idea of having a substantial number of illegal immigrants but they are not against the
idea of these people coming to the country; and the government is against the idea of having a substantial number of illegal immigrants in the country and they are possibly also against the idea, in general, of these people coming to the country. Bommes and Sciortino endorse this by saying that “the root of the contemporary migration system is a structural mismatch between the huge demand for entry to the most developed regions and the comparatively small supply of opportunities to enter these areas legally” (Bommes and Sciortino 2011: 215). This example illustrates the conflicting interests of only a part of society on the issue of asylum and immigration, but nevertheless demonstrates the fogginess of the social structure.
In addition, in this field of interests some organizational structures are built, however, as asylum and immigration has become a matter of concern of the EU this organizational structure is built on the supranational level but at the same time has far-reaching implications on the national-, regional- and local level. Since 1999, the EU is working towards a CEAS (European Commission 2013: 60). With this system, which is series of directives and regulation, the EU tries to create a harmonized organizational structure. The latest revised version of the RCD aims to “further harmonise [sic] reception conditions in the EU; reduce incentives for secondary movements; increase applicants’ self-reliance and possible integration prospects” (European Commission 2016: 4). In practice, however, it appears that the CEAS in general and the RCD in particular leaves enough room for EU Member States to design and implement their own standards. Therefore, it could be established that a layer of ‘fog’ surrounds the issue of asylum and immigration in the EU, including the reception systems.
2.3 Multilevel Governance of Migration
Although migration is a phenomenon of all ages, research into the process of policy-making on migration, immigration and the integration of migrants is relatively new (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 269). The chapter of Zincone and Caponio ‘The Multilevel Governance of Migration’ (2006) contributes some interesting insights on this issue. They discuss that there are ‘four generations’ of research on the topic of policy-making on migration. The initial studies on migration focused on the demographics of migrants and “the evolution of migration flows”, on the economic integration and social behavior in the receiving country, on the political participation of migrants and integration policies, and on the “understanding how immigrant and immigration policies are decided upon and carried out” (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 269). However, only a few studies have connected the understanding of the policy-making process and the implementation of immigrant and immigration policies with a multilevel governance structure
(Zincone and Caponio 2006: 269). They argue that the latter could be identified as a fifth generation of research topic on migration (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 269).
A theoretical review of multilevel governance could enhance the understanding of multilevel governance and establish notion how multilevel governance works in relation to migration and immigration.
Multilevel governance is a system in which power is shared among tiers of government. This means that policy-makers on the supranational-, national-, sub-national- and local levels “share the task of making regulations and forming policy” (Hague and Harrop 2010: 271; McCormick 2011: 15 – 16). According to Stubbs “the main value of the concept of multi-level (sic) governance is that it allows for an understanding of complexity between levels” (Stubss 2005: 67). The study of immigration policy-making in the context of multilevel governance lies at the early 1990s (Zincone and Caponio 2014: 1). Zapata-Barrero and Barker argue that this tension is even more complex in a multilevel governance structure (2014: 19 – 20). Zincone and Caponio endorse this complexity by contending that multilevel governance has been approached from a top-down and bottom-up perspective (2006: 274). The top-down perspective sees policy-making as a vertical process in which there is a clear hierarchy between the “higher-level institutions and/or from formal policy making arenas (…) to lower level (peripheral) and informal social actors” (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 274). In contrast, the bottom-up perspective makes a distinction between two types of processes. On the one hand, there is a process that includes a reversed vertical hierarchy in which the input goes from lower-levels of government to the higher-levels, on the other hand there is a policy-making process that relates informal actors in civil society with public formal arena’s (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 275; Zincone and Caponio 2014: 1). In this thesis, both, the top-down and bottom-up perspective will be taken in consideration. The topic of migration is on the one hand a concern of EU-, national-, regional- and local policies; this means that in the process of policy-making on migration and immigration related issues there is cooperation and coordination from higher-levels to lower-levels of government and vice versa. On the other hand, the issue of migration and immigration demonstrates a close relationship between informal actors in civil society and public formal actors.
Zapata-Barrero and Barker have constructed a framework of analysis of the structure of governance for multilevel systems on immigration in which they have researched three main questions (2014: 21). The combinations of these questions are used in chapter 4 to come to a broad analysis of the Italian and Dutch reception system.
The first question, and the most relevant for this particular study, is “how the dynamics of decentralization/centralization function in immigration governance” (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 21). Migration and immigration are to some extent a EU affair, however, EU policy leaves enough room for the individual Member States to construct national-, and even local policies. Important in this system is the “competence needed at each level of government to manage all of the stages in the process of immigration” (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 21 – 22). In addition, we have to take in mind that immigration policies are, at least partially, identity policies (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 22). Hence, the efficiency of governments and the national identity “play a driving role in multilevel systems with regard to immigrant governance” (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 22) and this could result in differences in the allocation of power and responsibilities in immigration issues. Both can lead to a centralization of immigration issues or to the decentralization of these issues (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 22).
The second question is concerned with the identification of factors that moderate the driving forces. Zapata-Barrero and Barker identified the principles of coordination and coherence as the means behind the driving forces of efficiency and national identity (2014: 22). The rationale of the principle of coordination is that the different levels of government, that work together, should aim to avoid negative effects among them (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 23). The principle of coherence accentuates that the different tiers of government should not contradict each other. In other words, “a decision made at one level of government cannot contradict others, since there may be conflicting interests and approaches at different governmental levels” (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 23).
A third question builds on three potential scenario’s (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 21). According to Zapata-Barrero and Barker these three scenario’s are the centralist, the cooperative and the asymmetric scenario’s. When migration and immigration issues are centralized the central government “retains primary control and supervision of coordination/coherence of immigration decision-making and implementation” (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 27). In the cooperative scenario the central government keeps their primary control and supervision, however, they also appoint different levels of government as partners “and allows them some administrative discretion to assert or account for particular unit needs at the implementation level (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 27). In contrast to the centralist and cooperative scenario, in the asymmetric scenario the central government “allows the coexistence of several centres (sic) of decision-making based on efficiency/national identity criteria (…) but does not extend this to all units (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 28). In short, the centralist and cooperative scenario’s do
not allow different vertical relations among units, so as to link efficiency and coherence”, while the asymmetric scenario does allow this (Zapata-Barrero and Barker 2014: 26 – 27).
2.3.1 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the EU
As mentioned in the preliminary paragraphs, an essential feature of multilevel governance is that it encompasses multiple tiers of government including a supranational level such as the EU. In February 2018 a report entitled ‘2nd Migration Observatory Report: Immigrant Integration in Europe and Italy”’ was published and noted that the importance and relevance of immigration as European policy has increased in the last years (Frattini and Vigezzi 2018: 7). Lahav and Guiraudon discussed the importance of European policy on the area of immigration already a decade ago. They argued that the topic of immigration has become a topic of high salience “in public opinion and partisan politics” (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006: 213). This is partially to due to the fact that the lower tiers of government have to cope with a duality in the governance of immigrants’ policies (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 279). On the one hand, local governments are “responsible for the implementation of legislation” (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 279). On the other hand, these local authorities experience how the national legislation affects their local society, and therefore, “are called upon to answer to the demands of their local societies” (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 279 – 280). They are expected to initiate new policies when their society is negatively affected by the national legislation (Zincone and Caponio 2006: 279 – 280). Scholten argues “local governments and European institutions are often confronted with integration problems in different ways than on the national level (Scholten 2013: 152). In other words, on a local level the moment of implementation seems to be a phase when “policy goals are redefined” Zincone and Caponio 2006: 282 – 283). Hence, while the EU’s field of interest increasingly embraces asylum and immigration policies and works towards an enhanced CEAS, which will design asylum and immigration policies for its Member States, it would be expected that the local governments, who have to enforce these policies, face more difficulties in adapting policies to the demands of local society.
However, the opposite seems true in the case of reception of asylum-seekers in the Member States. According to d’Angelo et. al., “the paradigm of reception in EU law is too simplistic” (2017: 18). This leads to huge differences in minimum standards of reception among Member States and even within Member States. According to the UNHCR the current regulation in place, which is the RCD, fails to protect women against gender-based violence in the many reception facilities across the EU (UNCHR 2016: 8 – 9). In addition, Rule et. al. argues in a recently published article that this is due to the legal framework of the EU, concerning asylum
and immigration. They claim that the legal framework “is generally devoid of clear technical guidelines” (Rule et. al. 2017: 21). The special report ‘EU response to the refugee crisis: the ‘hotspot’ approach’ demonstrates that despite support from the EU, countries like Italy and Greece in some instances were not able to provide asylum-seekers with proper reception facilities (ECA 2017: 5). This indicates that there is a lot of room for the Member States’ own interpretation, and in the Member States where asylum- and immigration policies are decentralized this means that all the individual local authorities could make their own regulation without worrying that their policies do not comply with EU guidelines. Although the increased power of the EU on asylum and migration policies raises the idea of less room for local governments to adapt supranational designed policies, the example of the reception of asylum-seekers in the EU Member States establishes something different, namely that there is room for Member States and even local governments to adapt these policies.
2.3.2 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the Case of Italy
In the case of Italy, it has been argued that the multilevel governance of immigration policies was at the national level, often very vaguely and broad defined (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 132). Zincone indicates even that until 2009 Italy dealt with immigration by large regularization programs in which it regularized illegal immigrants (Zincone 2011: 248). So, the national level was, and still is, not taking its responsibility by creating constructive policies. Therefore, this leaves “the responsibility for undertaking more specific actions about reception to regional and local tiers of government” (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 132). Before 1998 the “sub-state regional units often acted in an informal way, in the absence of specific legislation and specific funding for integration measures” (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 130 – 131). In 1998 a new immigration law was implemented that provided regional governments with more power of designing and implementing reception policies (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 130 – 131).The federalist reform of the Italian state in 2001 finalized the process of further decentralization as the regions received complete autonomy in the field of social policy (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 131). The completion of the decentralization of social policies, which include the reception and integration of asylum-seekers and immigrants, raises the idea that the regional governments in Italy constructed a clear framework for asylum and immigration policies. However, Pastore wrote in 2008 that the “legal, institutional and administrative infrastructure” regarding asylum and immigration in Italy were underdeveloped (Pastore 2008: 105).
In addition, Campomori and Caponio argue “the specific configuration of the Italian system of multilevel governance has a strong impact on immigrant reception policy” (2014: 144).
Namely, the federalist reform encompassed the decentralization of all social policies, including the most welfare competencies (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 144). In general this means, that regional and local governments receive funding from the central government for the social policies and the lower tiers of government can decide how they spend this funding. This evolves in “two interrelated levels of autonomy on immigrant reception and integration policies” (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 144). On one level, this gives the regions an increasing power to determine how and with how much attention they should tackle asylum and immigration issues. On the other level, local authorities “enjoy considerable leverage in the design of specific policy actions (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 144). The decentralization of social policies in Italy affected how regions and municipalities reacted to asylum and immigration issues and this resulted, up till now, in huge differences in spending on asylum and immigration policies such as reception facilities. The reaction of the regions and municipalities has been and still is different because of different conflicting interests in the regions and municipalities. This issue clearly demonstrates how asylum and migration policies in Italy are featured by foggy organizational structures.
The decentralization of social policies becomes even more complex at the urban level where the implementation of Berlusconi’s security policies in 2008 and 2009 caused in more restrictive policies and practices (Campomori and Caponio 2014: 146). These policies gave powers to the urban level to decide on the exclusion or inclusion of asylum-seekers and immigrants. Hence, the regional governments determine how to tackle asylum and immigrant issues, while the local government of municipalities have leverage in the design of specific policy actions and cities could decide whether they include or exclude asylum-seekers and immigrants in the integration process.
In addition to the decentralization of asylum and immigration policy in Italy, more forces are involved during the decision-making and implementation of asylum and immigration policies. Campomori and Caponio discuss that the differences in regional and local asylum and immigration policies possibly are affected by the political, cultural and economic differences between Northern Italy and Southern Italy (2014: 144). Zincone establishes the complexity of Italian policy-making concerning asylum and immigration policy by noting that it is “being pulled in two directions” (Zincone 2011: 249). At the one hand, society demands harsher measures to control illegal immigration, at the other hand, policy-makers experience the pressure of employer’s who need the government to regularize illegal immigrants and who are dependent on the inflow of immigrants, and therefore benefit from less restrictive policies (Zincone 2011: 249).
In general, according to Korac, southern European countries like Italy provide asylum-seekers with “often underdeveloped and ad hoc measures of assistance” (Korac 2003: 52) Italian asylum and immigration policy, and particular interesting for this study the reception of asylum-seekers, is such a complex system that it seems as if it is surrounded with ‘fog’.
2.3.3 Multilevel Governance of Migration in the Case of the Netherlands
The aim of this thesis is to examine the reception of female asylum-seekers in Italy and the Netherlands more closely. In order to find an answer to the research question paragraph 2.3.3 elaborates on the multilevel governance structure of migration in the Netherlands.
The Dutch case is different than the Italian case. Doomernik argues that until the 1970s there were no clear regulation on labor migration and therefore the regularization of immigrants in ‘post factum’ regularization was common (Doomernik 2008: 129). However, at the end of the 1970s the Netherlands developed “centrally coordinated migrant integration policies” (Scholten 2014: 151). This was the start of a centralist approach on asylum and immigration policies in The Netherlands. This basically means that asylum and immigration policies are described in terms of “national models of integration” (Scholten 2013: 151). These models are formed by history and national identity and they define the process of asylum and immigrant integration in the country (Scholten 2013: 151). In the Dutch case this has long been the multiculturalist model (Scholten 2014: 152). These models give the idea that there is a considerable extent of “consistence and coherence of integration policies” (Scholten 2013: 151). The Dutch multiculturalist model, which is a model in a unitary state, raises the expectation of “policy coherence between the national and local level” (Scholten 2013: 157). However, in another book chapter Scholten argues, “relations between central and local governments in unitary states are often not as well structured as their state-centric structures suggest” (Scholten 2014: 150). This is partially due because other tiers of government, such as the European and the local level, “are confronted with integration problems in different ways than on the national level” (Scholten 2013: 152). Scholten illustrates this in his book chapter ‘The Multilevel Governance of Migrant Integration: A Multilevel Governance Perspective of
Dutch Migrant Integration Policies’. He compares the national policies on asylum and immigration
with local policies implemented in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Scholten comes to the conclusion that, although there is central government regulation on immigration, both, Amsterdam and Rotterdam adapted the national policies in their own way (Scholten 2013: 166). He notes that “in terms of multilevel governance, the first decade of the twenty-first century marks a period of not only national-local divergence, but also a period where policies at both levels seem to have become increasingly contradictory and the differences between Amsterdam’s
and Rotterdam’s policies more marked” (2013: 166). This example establishes that that even in a unitary state as the Netherlands, where asylum and immigration policies are centrally coordinated and supervised, the governance structure is more complex and could be defined as a foggy organizational structure.
According to Korac, the welfare states in northern Europe, like the Netherlands, “provide welfare systems of assistance to refugees” (Korac 2003: 53). “The Dutch model of reception and integration of refugees is based on a number of measures and interventions by the state which are intended to meet the immediate needs of refugees and to facilitate gradually their further structural and institutional integration in Dutch society” (Korac 2003: 54 – 55). Korac illustrates here what was proposed in the Integration Policy “New Style” according to Scholten (Scholten 2013: 159). Scholten states that this policy emphasized on the commonalities of citizens in the Dutch society, this meant that “people [should] speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch norms” (Scholten 2013: 159). As already mentioned above, the reception of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands is laid down in the law called Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers and has to manage the reception, which includes social welfare and housing, of asylum-seekers until the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Services decides positively or negatively on the claim of asylum (COA 2018a). Furthermore, the COA has to manage that de reception facilities are safe and livable for the asylum-seekers (COA 2018a). In the case of reception in the Netherlands there definitely clear guidelines for the reception of asylum-seekers and there is a good overview of which institution, the COA, has the responsibility in providing the reception of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands. Therefore, the perceived ‘fog’ in the case of Italy is less apparent in the case of the Netherlands.
2.4 The Reception of Female Asylum-Seekers
As mentioned in paragraph 2.3.1, the current EU regulation on reception fails to provide every seeker in the EU to get safe reception. This is particular alarming for female asylum-seekers. Kohlman et. al. illustrate this by arguing in 2003 that “women and girls have a different position in the Dutch reception facilities than men and boys” (Kohlman et. al. 2003: 75). Although Kohlman’s findings are a decade old, a more recently published article ‘Manifest Vrouwen Vluchtelingen Veiligheid’ (Vrouwen Van Nu 2018) demonstrate that the position of female asylum-seekers is still an underexposed issue in the Netherlands. The recast RCD from 2013 “introduced a new provision that requires Member States to consider gender (…) in relation to applicants within the premises and accommodation centres (sic)” (European Migration Network 2014: 14). However, because the huge differences in reception conditions between the
Member States remained, the EU introduced a new revised version of the RCD in 2016. In this revised proposal the European Commission noted that the aim of the new RCD was to integrate and harmonize the new directive better so it would lead to a decrease of secondary movements and increase the possibilities of integration of asylum-seekers (European Commission 2016a: 4). In addition, this new RCD claims to focus more on “the specific needs of women applicants” (European Commission 2016: 26), however, like with the guidelines on reception in general this RCD lacks clear technical guidelines that explain how female asylum-seekers are safer in the reception facilities in the future.
According to Githens, many countries in the EU including Italy, have no “provision for a married woman to apply for asylum separately from her husband” (Githens 2013: 66). This demonstrates that in many EU Member States the asylum procedure in general is not gender-sensitive. Therefore, it is very likely that the reception in these countries lack gender-sensitivity as well. Italy for example, has been “a major point of entry for women trafficked to Western Europe” (Githens 2013: 80). Githens argues that procedures of reception in Italy pose some serious question to what extent the Italian government feels obliged to care for these trafficked women (Githens 2013: 81). However, the conditions in which these female asylum-seekers are received should not be exaggerated. Githens argues that separate accommodations are a minimum standard for the reception facilities in Italy (Githens 2013: 81). A country that is doing remarkably better is the Netherlands. Githens claims, “in the Netherlands there has been an effort to be sensitive to women’s requests to enter as refugees” (Githens 2013: 67). This means that the “wives are permitted to apply for refugee status in their own right and are interviewed separately from their husbands by female interviewers” (Githens 2013: 67). Furthermore, the Dutch government provides female asylum-seekers with the necessary care and treatment when the female asylum-seekers suffered any trauma “due to gender-specific ill treatment, such as rape” (Githens 2013: 67). Hence, there are many divergences in how Member States cope with female asylum-seekers in their reception facilities.
What is possibly a progression is “the appropriate inclusion of gender and female participation in projects” that concerns the reception of asylum-seekers (Rule et. al. 2017: 43). Rule et. al. claim that this will enhance women’s position in society and “reduce the risks that can lead to [gender based violence]” (2017: 43). In addition, they note that an emphasis on the reducing of gender-based violence risks and “gender-specific needs and capacities” will lead to better and more comfortable reception for every individual (Rule et. al. 2017: 43). They suggest that in the reception facilities the general staff and the protection staff are working close together so they could identify and mitigate the risks of gender based violence in the reception facilities
(Rule et. al. 2017: 45). The mitigation of gender-based violence would “[provide the asylum-seekers with] privacy, dignity and a feeling of safety [this] can greatly influence families’ access to services and broader well-being” (Rule et. al. 2017: 45).
3. Methods
Chapter 3 features the methodological section of this thesis. In this chapter I provide detailed information on the research design in section 3.1; in section 3.2 I elaborate on the respondents; the operationalization is discussed in section 3.3; and this chapter concludes with the empirical limitations of the research in section 3.4.
This study on the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities uses a qualitative research design in which the cases of Italy and the Netherlands are compared. According to Gerring, “case study research design is still viewed by most methodologists with extreme circumspection” (Gerring 2007: 93). This is partially due to the fact that case studies are non-generalizable, provide the researcher with weak empirical leverage and often results in subjective conclusions (Gerring 2007: 93). However, a case study provides the researcher with a good insight of how the causal mechanism works (Gerring 2007: 102 – 103) and, therefore, the researcher is better able to understand certain phenomena.
Gerring defines a case as “a spatially delimited phenomenon (…) observed at a single point in time or over some time period” (Gerring 2007: 94). In this research I attempt to explain certain features of Italy and the Netherlands, namely how their governance structure affects the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities. Thus, in this study Italy and the Netherlands are the cases. Gerring notes “[a] case study may be created out of any phenomenon so long as it has identifiable boundaries and comprises the primary object of an inference” (2007: 95). In addition, the qualitative data conducted by interviews are supported by data on corruption from Transparency International and data on organized crime from the WEF. This triangulation will strengthen my arguments made in chapter 4.
3.1 Research Design
Doing qualitative research means in most cases that the researcher will take interviews with relevant interviewee’s and focuses on their point of view on the studied issue (Bryman 2012: 470). This “gives insight into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important” (Bryman 2012: 470), as the interviews were conducted with employees of the COA in the Netherlands and with employees of various NGO’s working in the field of reception in Italy and with officials of the municipality in Italy, it was interesting to see what the interviewees perceived as relevant and important. Hence, for this thesis I have conducted in-depth interviews in the Netherlands and
Italy. The list of respondents can be found in appendix I; the interview guides can be found in appendix II and III.
Dennis Chong argues that using in-depth interviews in qualitative case study research has one important advantage over mass surveys. He says “[one] of the advantages of the in-depth interview over the mass survey is that it records more fully how subjects arrive at their opinions” (Chong 1993: 868). As Gerring argued that case study research fits perfect for the purpose of understanding the causal mechanism (Gerring 2007: 104), Chong notes that “[while] we cannot actually observe the underlying mental process that gives rise to [the interviewee’s] responses, we can witness many of its outward manifestations. The way subjects ramble, hesitate, stumble, and meander as they formulate their answers tips us off to how they are thinking and reasoning through political issues” (Chong 1993: 868). Furthermore, according to Gerring the researcher is better able to make judgments about the “veracity and reliability” of the interviewee in an in-depth interview (Gerring 2007: 105). In addition, when the interviewee mentioned something interesting there has been “a great deal of leeway” to ask different questions (Bryman 2012: 470). However, every interview had similar question. In other words, the interview process has been flexible but to some extent also had to comply with the interview guide.
Besides the advantage of in-depth interviews over mass surveys, argued by Chong, it could be difficult to compare data in which one set of data does not correspond with the other. Therefore, it is necessary to have some consistency in qualitative data collection. Arthur and Nazroo note that “studies with a particular emphasis on comparison will usually also require more structure, since it will be necessary to cover broadly the same issues with each of the comparison groups” (2003: 111). Hence, during the fieldwork I needed to do semi-structured in-depth interviews in order to be able to compare the Netherlands and Italy and analyze both.
According to Arthur and Nazroo, in-depth interviews share four key features. The first establishes that semi-structured in-depth interviews “combine structure with flexibility” (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141), meaning that there is enough structure to be able to compare data but at the same time there is enough leeway for spontaneously raised questions and “to allow responses to be fully probed and explored” (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). “The second key feature is that the interview is interactive in nature” (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). A researcher who encourages the interviewee to talk freely creates an interactive interview (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). In addition, this will result in more questions that are determined by the answer of the interviewee (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). The third key feature focuses on how the interviewer should achieve depth in the answer of the interviewee (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). The interviewer tries to penetrate, explore and explain a given answer (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141).
Follow-up questions are tools to achieve this depth and gives the interviewer a better understanding of the interviewee’s meaning and illustrate the reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs behind a given answer (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 141). The last key feature of in-depth interviews is that “the interview is generative in the sense that new knowledge or thoughts are likely, at some stage, to be created” (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 142). Arthur and Nazroo indicate that every research and every interview is different, so the extent to which the interview is really generative may vary (2003: 142). Nonetheless, they say that it is very likely that the interviewer or interviewee will direct the interview to a point that is unexplored (Arthur and Nazroo 2003: 142). As afore-mentioned, this research focuses on the cases of Italy and the Netherlands. I have chosen these for 3 reasons. The first reason to pick both cases is twofold. At one hand, I chose a case out of convenience. As a native speaker in Dutch and fluent speaker in English I did not foresee any problems with arranging and conducting interviews in the case of the Netherlands. On the other hand, I chose Italy because the contrasts to the Dutch case appeared as a challenge. I did not know anybody at first hand who could help me starting up the process of field research, nor did I speak Italian. Although this made starting up the field research in Italy more stressful than the field research in the Netherlands, it also made it a very informative and challenging process.
A second and more substantive reason for the selection of Italy and the Netherlands is because both countries have a different governance structure regarding their asylum and immigration policy. As mentioned in the paragraphs 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 asylum and immigration policy in Italy are decentralized while they are centralized in the Netherlands. Both cases have different systems to manage the reception of asylum-seekers. It is interesting to compare both systems and see the similarities and differences in the manner of the reception of asylum-seekers. A third and last reason for the selection of Italy and the Netherlands as cases is that the gender distribution of asylum-seekers in 2017 in the Netherlands is closer to the average of the EU, namely 27 percent of the asylum-seekers in the Netherlands is female (AIDA 2018b: 9), the average of female asylum-seekers in the EU is 32.9 percent (Eurostat 2018a), compared to 16.2 percent of female asylum-seekers in Italy (AIDA 2018c). While there are relatively a little more female asylum-seekers in the Netherlands than in Italy, both countries have a below-average performance regarding the gender distribution of asylum-seekers. I am interested whether and, if so how, the different governance structures regarding asylum and immigration policy affect the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Italy and the Netherlands.
3.2 Respondents
In the Netherlands I will focus my in-depth interviews on the single institution of the COA, which is responsible for the reception of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands. I have used the method of snowball sampling in order to achieve a valid and reliable selection of respondents. However, it must be taken into account that the method of snowball sampling could result in biased outcomes because it is difficult to say whether the findings are limited to the sample and, therefore, it is difficult to generalize these outcomes (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981: 160). In the case of the Netherlands this meant that I e-mailed a dozen of COA employees who work in an Asielzoeker Centra [AZCs]. After many rejections I finally got in contact with a COA employee who was willing to get me in contact with COA employees that are working in the field of protection in the reception facility and with female asylum-seekers.
The case of Italy is different compared to the Dutch case. As described in preliminary paragraphs, the Italian reception system is decentralized. This means, that there is a multitude of organizations involved in the reception of asylum-seekers. Therefore, I decided to conduct as many as possible and necessary interviews with employees and/or volunteers of relevant NGO’s and employees of the municipality. Eventually I spoke with the following NGO’s in Parma ‘Centro Immigrazione Asilo e Cooperazione’, ‘Pozzo Di Sicar’ and ‘Di Mano In Mano’ and spoke with the area manager of the prefect that is responsible for asylum and immigration in the province of Parma. In accordance with the case of the Netherlands, I used a snowball sampling method in order to get in contact with relevant respondents. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, like in the case of the Netherlands. For the field research in Italy I contacted multiple persons, including Milena Belloni, Francesca Campomori, Tiziana Caponio, Giuseppe Campesi and Irene Ponzo. They gave me very helpful insights and contact information of people who are working for NGO’s in Italy. Eventually I got in contact with Silvia Vesco of CIAC, which is a broad social NGO that, among others, facilitates the reception of asylum-seekers in the region of Parma, she was willing to help me set up a number of interviews with relevant employees of NGO’s and the municipality of Parma.
3.3 Operationalization
In this thesis I argue that organizations in the field of the reception of asylum-seekers should include gender-sensitivity in the way they facilitate the reception. To simplify the measuring of the protection of female asylum-seekers I measure the issue in can two ways. First, there is a formal way of measuring the protection that female asylum-seekers need law often establishes this. In the case of asylum and immigration, EU regulations and directives should establish a certain minimum standard of quality for the reception of asylum-seekers and guarantee
immigrants and asylum-seekers that they have the same rights as citizens. However, as mentioned in paragraph 2.3.1 D’Angelo et. al. concluded that in the case of the reception of asylum-seeker “the paradigm of reception in EU law is too simplistic” (2017: 18). This means that the formal way of guaranteeing the protection of female asylum-seekers is inadequate and it would be fallacious to compare the level of protection solely on the basis of implemented laws. Second, there is also an informal way of measuring the protection that female asylum-seekers need. This assurance of the protection of female asylum-seekers is laid down in the organization’s guidelines. Hence, during the in-depth interviews I asked the interviewees whether the organization has guidelines in which the minimum standard of quality of the reception facilities is described. In addition, I have asked them whether their organization has guidelines that take gender and specifically the protection of female asylum-seekers into account. At the Istanbul Convention in 2010 the Member States of the EU and other Member States of the Council of Europe agreed to sign and complied with the ‘Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence’. This convention requires, in Article 6 and Article 60 in particular, that Member States “shall undertake a gender perspective in the implementation and evaluation of the impact of the provisions of this Convention and to promote effectively and effectively implement policies of equality between women and men and the empowerment of women” (Council of Europe 2011: 9). Furthermore, “parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to develop gender-sensitive reception procedures and support services for asylum-seekers as well as gender guidelines and gender-sensitive asylum procedures” (Council of Europe 2011: 25 – 26). Hence, the EC decided to include gender-sensitivity to their new policy proposals, including their proposal for the recast of RCD (European Commission 2016: 10). This means that organizations in the field of the reception of asylum-seekers have to include gender-sensitivity in the way they facilitate the reception. Furthermore, the scale of the reception facilities could give an interesting insight of how the reception facilities, and the reception system as a whole, work. There are examples of large-scale reception facilities in both Italy and the Netherlands. However, both countries have a different reception system, meaning that large-scale reception facilities in Italy are different than large-scale reception facilities in the Netherlands. In addition, the features of these reception facilities give important information of the level of protection. For example, are the reception facilities separated by gender or sex, or are the facilities gender-mixed. Another indicator of the level of protection, especially the level of protection of female asylum-seekers, is the gender distribution in a gender-mixed reception facility. These informal ways of measuring the level of protection combined with the formal
measure of implemented laws could give a substantive perspective on the level of protection of female asylum-seekers.
3.4 Empirical Limitations of the Research Design
At the initial stage of the research I aspired to interview with staff from the reception facilities, the municipality in the case of Italy and with female asylum-seekers in the reception facilities in both countries. However, I quickly concluded that it would be difficult to interview female asylum-seekers about their perception of safety and protection of female asylum-seekers in the reception facilities. One of the contacts in Italy stated that me that she had done a similar research a couple of years ago in Italy and that she, as a woman, experienced difficulties to conduct interviews with female asylum-seekers about this issue. She warned me that it would probably even more difficult for me, as a man, to find female asylum-seekers to speak about their perceptions of safety and protection in the reception facilities. A similar conclusion was drawn during my first interview in the Netherlands with employees of the AZC in Heerhugowaard. The interviewees noted that female asylum-seekers find it difficult to discuss such sensitive issues with a male. Hence, I decided only to conduct interviews with employees of NGO’s and the municipality. However, it is inevitable that this choice will cause a certain bias in the process of data collection. This means that I will not make claims of how female asylum-seekers perceive safety and protection in the reception facilities but this is not necessary in order to come up with a sound answer to the research question.
Besides the decision not to interview female asylum-seekers, the interviews I conducted in Italy could be considered as an empirical limitation. This is due to the fact that both the respondents and myself did not speak in our native language. This could have affected the ability of the interviewee’s to convey their opinions and experiences as well it could have affected my ability to convey my questions.
Furthermore, the interviews with the respondents allow for a possible limitation regarding the validity of the conducted interviews in both Italy and the Netherlands. This is because the interviewees were talking from their own perspective, perception and experiences. This could also result in possible information gaps and biases. Hence, this will have its consequences on the validity of the collected data. Nonetheless, these interviews yield an interesting amount of knowledge about the safety and protection of female asylum-seekers in the reception facilities.
In order to strengthen the validity of this research I used the method of triangulation. Triangulation means that I use data that I collected by interviewing respondents in combination with quantitative data that is collected by other institutions, like Transparency International and
the WEF. The ‘Corruption Perception Index 2017’ supports statements made on the problem of corruption, namely in the case of Italy. In addition, the index on organized crime published by the WEF illustrates to what extent the cases of Italy and the Netherlands are affected by organized crime and how it affects their society, and thus the reception system too.
4. Analysis
Based on the theoretical framework as outlined in chapter 2, the emphasis of the case studies will be on how the governance structure of asylum and immigration affects the protection of female asylum-seekers in reception facilities in Italy and the Netherlands. It must be noted in advance that due to limitations in time, resources and word constraints, it was impossible to go to more reception facilities in different regions in Italy and the Netherlands. However, the reception facilities that I did visit and where I interviewed employees were thoroughly enough to elucidate the hypothesis and answer my research question.
Starting with the analysis, paragraph 4.1 will shortly present what formal protection the EU female asylum-seekers offers in the reception facilities and in particular how Italy and the Netherlands this formal manner of protection include in their national legislation. Thereafter, paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 will dive deeper into the cases of Italy and the Netherlands. This means, in short, that besides the protection by law I will investigate how this protection is put in practice. Hence, how is the reception managed and supervised; do the reception facilities have minimum standards; is gender-based violence a problem in the reception facilities; are the staff in the reception facilities trained to recognize and deal with gender-based violence; what other actors significantly influence the reception of asylum-seekers; are the cases affected by foggy organizational structures. In the last paragraph of this chapter, paragraph 4.4, I will compare both cases and analyze where there are differences and similarities in the reception of asylum-seekers. 4.1 Formal Protection of Female Asylum-Seekers in the EU
In paragraphs 2.3.1 and 2.4 I have established that the issue of immigration and asylum is a EU matter of concern. Evidently, this means that the EU has put EU legislation in place to assure that citizens and non-citizens, in this case asylum-seekers, have the same basic rights in all the EU Member States. These rights are compiled in a number of charters, regulations, directives and treaties.
The main charters that ensure EU citizens and non-EU citizens with basic fundamental human rights are the ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, which is designed by the EU; the ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, the ‘Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence’ and the ‘Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings’ that are drawn up by the CoE; and the ‘Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ also known as the Geneva Convention established within the governance structure of the UN. This plethora of
