Tracing down the lobby approaches in the creation of the NOW arrangements: A media analysis

Master Thesis: Tracing down the lobby approaches

in the creation of the NOW arrangements

A media analysis

Name: M. Rijlaarsdam

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. C.H.J.M. Braun

Education: Public Administration: Public Management and Leadership Institution: Leiden University

Abstract

The coronavirus disrupts the economic stability of many businesses in 2020. Fortunately the government comes to rescue in compensating for wage costs. The NOW arrangements were created in order to compensate businesses for losses in their revenues.

In this master thesis I will reflect on the role of business associations in lobbying for these arrangements. Through process tracing, based on a media analysis, I aimed to detect which lobbying approaches, used by the employer organizations VNO-NCW and MKB Nederland, were the most prevalent and when this is likely to be the case. A distinction is made here between conveying substantive versus political information and between positive versus negative lobbying. Furthermore a distinction is made between five stages of the policy process in which lobbying behavior takes place. Namely, the agenda-setting, formulation stage, decision making, implementation and evaluation stage.

I analyzed 27 talks show and radio fragments, 18 newspaper articles, 9 news articles and 5 blogs in which perspectives of VNO-NCW and MKB were discussed. Furthermore I conducted a semi-structured interview with one of the employees of VNO-NCW/MKB. The results of this thesis suggest that conveying substantive information in the media is more prevalent than conveying political information. Due to the willingness of the government to help affected business in need, there was little necessity for the business associations to use political information in order to pressure politicians. Furthermore, negative lobbying was more prevalent than positive lobbying. The business associations used deviant arguments to settle the NOW arrangements in their favor.

There is little clarity in which stages substantive or political information are the most prevalent. However, it is evident that negative lobbying is mostly prevalent in the agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation stage, while positive lobbying is mostly prevalent in the decision-making stage.

Table of contents Introduction………p.4 Theoretical Framework………..p.7 Methods………..p.16 Results ………p.21 Conclusion………..p.28 Discussion………. .p.29 References………...p. 32 Attachments……….p.38

Attachment 1: (Transcribed) media documents………p.38 Attachment 2: Coding the media documents……….p.101 Attachment 3: Linking the codes to the policy process………...…p.226

Introduction

In 2020 the covid-19 or coronavirus disrupts global society. The tremendous effects of the virus on global health and economy has severe implications for the governance of public and private institutions (Bavel et al. 2020). Due to social distancing, businesses in which social proximity is important suffer major economic damage (Baldwin & Weber di Maduro, 2020). To survive as an industry it is important to gather financial resources in order to be able to pay the wages of the employees and keep the organization running. At the start of the corona crisis the Dutch Minister of Finance, Wopke Hoekstra used the phrase that ‘The Netherlands has deep pockets’ in order to cope with the economic complications of the corona crisis. The government would be able to spend approximately 90 billion on heavily damaged industries (Mis, 2020). It is therefore in the primer interest of affected business to influence the

government’s decision to provide them with financial support. The representation of private businesses in lobbying for favorable arrangements happens through their own lobbying efforts or by the involvement of business associations (Anastasiadis, 2006; Keller, 2018). A concrete policy which business associations aimed to influence during the coronacrisis was the NOW arrangement (Tijdelijke Noodmaatregel Overbrugging voor Werkgelegenheid) This arrangement is a regulation that is based on the former wtv arrangement (werktijdverkorting), which provides a financial safety net due to the reduction in working hours for businesses in dire straits. In December 2020 three versions of the NOW arrangements have been

established. The first and the second arrangement ensured that businesses with a revenue decline of more than twenty percent in a subsequent period of three months can be

compensated for up to ninety percent in their deficits. The third arrangement is less generous and ensures that from January 2021, businesses must have a loss in turnover of thirty percent. Furthermore, they gradually receive less compensation for their wage costs (Ministerie van Algemene zaken, 2020) .

In order to influence the NOW arrangements it is important for business associations to do this tactfully. They will use strategies which they believe has the most influence. To understand this better it is relevant to look at the academic literature on lobbying approaches. There is an extensive academic field in which researchers study the lobbying approaches used by interest groups in aiming to influence policy making. For instance, Weiler & Brandli (2015) researched the use of inside and outside lobbying by interest groups. They argue that inside lobbying is more common than outside lobbying. Inside lobbying is a strategy in which lobbyists are speaking directly to policymakers, while outside lobbying is a strategy to

lobbying a distinction can be made between several approaches of distributing information. De Brucyker (2016) distinguishes technical, legal and economic information from political information. The first three types of information are based on the substance, while the latter is based on politicizing an issue. Conveying substantive information is often associated with inside lobbying, while political information is often associated with outside lobbying (De Brucyker, 2016; Keller, 2018)). Nevertheless, according to Beyers (2008) this does not always have to be the case. Outside lobbying can just as well be used as a venue in which substantive information is distributed by lobbyists. Another way of studying lobbying is not by looking at differentiating the type of information used by lobbyists, but the opinion that is advocated. Mckay (2012) is renowned for distinguishing positive from negative lobbying. Negative lobbying means lobbying against the content of a policy, while positive lobbying is focused on lobbying in favor of a policy (Mckay, 2012). Generally negative lobbying is conceived to be more common than positive lobbying, because lobbying in favor of a policy would diminish the urgency to lobby (Mckay, 2012). Besides strategies that focus on the type of information that is conveyed or on the opinion towards a policy, there are studies that focus less on the strategies used by lobbyists and instead have a higher emphasis on when lobbying takes place. For instance, Yackee (2012) argues that lobbying approaches are primarily prevalent in the pre-proposal stage of policy making. Godwin et al. (2012) would define this as the agenda-stage in the policy process.

Currently, little research has been conducted on the prevalence of the earlier

mentioned lobbying approaches of business associations during an economic crisis. A recent study that did examine one of the approaches was conducted by Keller (2018). She argues that business associations were successful in lobbying for political influence in the European parliament short after the financial crisis. They did this by representing their interests openly in the media in order to convey their arguments to the public. This can be understood by the concept ‘noisy politics’(Keller, 2018; Weiler & Brandli, 2015). Another study was conducted by Kastner (2018). She argues that business associations used outside lobbying by means of expanding conflict in in the proposal stage of policy making. In this stage business

associations increased the salience of favorable financial regulations. By increasing the salience of this issue, they subsequently ruled the public opinion in their favor.

However, the studies that focus on lobbying during a crisis either expose the

difference between inside or outside lobbying or look at these or more general approaches in the policy process (Keller, 2018; Kastner, 2018). There exists no study that focusses on approaches within outside platforms regarding to the policy process during an economic

crisis. Nevertheless, researching this is relevant because lobbying in the outside realm is likely to have an effect on decisions by policy makers (e.g. Weiler & Brandli, 2015; Keller, 2018). This can potentially have major consequences for several subgroups within society.

Except that minimal research has been done on lobbying approaches used by business associations in crisis situations, it is important to understand the complexity of lobbying. Lobbying is a heterogeneous concept which influence differs in various contexts (Nownes, 2006; Lowerly, 2007). For instance, it was more common to use outside lobbying during the economic crisis of 2008, than in most regular forms of policymaking (Keller, 2018;

Hanegraaff et al., 2016). The emergence of the economic crisis resulting from the coronavirus provides a completely new context and is therefore likely to yield new insights. Recent

research by Sullivan & Wolff (2020) for instance, demonstrated that the lobbying approaches of the hospitality sector were insufficient in order to receive long term billions of state aid. Meanwhile, they did receive the short term benefits of the NOW arrangements. This can be explained by the notion that the NOW arrangements were created for immediate financial support and can therefore be seen as more urgent arrangements (Sullivan & Wolff, 2020).

Due to the context in which lobbying approaches can be different and the minimal attention on lobbying efforts in the media during a crisis situation, it is useful to research the lobbying approaches by business associations during the contemporary coronacrisis. The NOW arrangements can be seen as urgent crisis policies due to the importance of spending large sums of cash in order to counteract the stagnation of the economy. The efforts of business associations to influence this arrangement as favorable as possible for businesses is essential and therefore forms a good basis for studying crisis lobbying. The research question is: What lobbying approaches by business associations are prevalent in the media during the

policy process of creating the NOW arrangements?

In order to answer the research question I will use process tracing to find out which lobbying strategies were common in the policy process of creating the NOW policies. I will examine whether using substantive or political information and positive or negative lobbying prove to be prevalent in this specific context. Furthermore, I will illustrate in which policy process stage, these lobbying approaches are mostly common. I analyze the efforts of two prominent business associations, namely the VNO-NCW who is the largest employer organization and MKB Nederland who is specifically committed to small and medium sized businesses.

of consensus that existed between the business associations and the government. The necessity therefore lacked to pressure the government by using political information. Furthermore, mostly negative lobbying was used, due to the interest of the business

associations to influence the arrangement in their own benefit. There is little clarity in which stages substantive or political information are the most prevalent. This is not the case for positive and negative lobbying. It is evident that negative lobbying is mostly prevalent in the agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation stage, while positive lobbying is mostly prevalent in the decision-making stage.

Theoretical framework

In the theoretical framework I will first present theories in order to understand lobbying in a general sense. Hereafter, I will define the variables in this research in a general context. Lastly, I will look at more recent studies about lobbying by business associations during the financial crisis of 2008 and I will argue whether I expect the earlier defined variables to be (or not) prevalent in the policy process of creating the NOW-arrangements.

What is lobbying?

Lobbying is a frequently studied subject in both Political Science and Public Administration. Scholars use various definitions to indicate this concept. Generally lobbying consists of interest groups who try to convey a certain perspective on policy-makers. With this influence they strive to get a policy in a specific direction (Baumgartner, 2007). Edgett (2002) argues that the essential element of lobbying consists of representation, according to him lobbying is: "the act of publicly representing an individual, organization, or idea with the object of persuading targeted audiences to look favorably on - or accept the point of view of - the individual, the organization, or the idea" (p. 1). Lowerly (2007) looks at lobbying from a different perspective. He argues that the primary reason for interest groups to lobby is to preexist as an organization. Organizations will align their actions in order to create a

sustainable perspective to ensure their survival. Lowerly therefore opposes the notion that the motivation of influencing public policy is the most relevant. When organizations cannot guarantee their survival they will not be able to influence policies at all.

According to Smucker (2005) there seems to be a confusion between the concept of advocating and lobbying. Smucker argues that: “lobbying always involves advocacy but advocacy does not always involve lobbying” (p. 33). Advocating is therefore a more general

concept of influencing. For instance, when people are protesting on the streets they are advocating for a certain goal to advance society. What makes lobbying distinctive is that the influencing is specifically aimed at legislation. This happens from the moment an issue gains attention, until it has been decided to act in concrete terms (Godwin et al., 2012).

Lobbying has long been seen as a conniving way of achieving political influence in the public sphere. Many assume that lobbying occurs in back rooms in which ‘special interest’ comes forward (Anastasiadis, 2006). This can be understood from ‘wrong’ motives certain interest groups have, in which the - give a little, take a little - principle is

predominant (Susman, 2008). For instance, one could think of tobacco lobbying, in which lobbyists aim to keep the tax on cigarettes as low as possible. With the result that more people start smoking (Krasakovski, 2010). On the contrary, lobbying can also be used in order to achieve positive outcomes for the public good. In this manner the substantive argument of achieving a societal goal is more important (Susman, 2008). For instance, lobbying has played an important role in major societal reforms, such as the abolition of slavery and child labor (Smucker, 2005).

Interest of policymakers

The motives of interest groups are understandable when it comes to lobbying. Lobbyists try to defend the interests of certain groups (Edgett, 2012) and aim to influence policymakers in order to achieve a particular outcome (Baumgartner, 2007). Policymakers have slightly different motives by listening to these interest groups. An important argument to listen to interest groups is by creating an encompassing view of all the arguments that are at stake in the policy making process. Interest groups might add relevant arguments that had received too little attention before. With these new perspectives policy makers might create better policies than when they would not consult these groups (Fraussen et al. 2020). The inclusion of interest groups in the policy process can furthermore be understood by the concept of ‘good governance’ (Fraussen et al. 2020). Good governance can be defined as a preferred way of governance that meets certain ethical standards. In good governance the process of governance is just as important as the outcome. Certain interest groups should be able to actively participate in the governance process, because this strengthens the accountability, the transparency and democracy of governance (Abdellatif, 2003).

Both of these arguments can be understood by the emergence of New Governance around the beginning of the century (Bingham et al. 2005). New governance can be seen as a

governance between civil society groups and the public sector. In this form of governance it is important that the stakeholder is an active actor in the governance process. This idea differs largely from the earlier New Public management, which was a bureaucratic form of top-down governance in which efficiency and effectiveness predominated (Schedler & Proeller, 2000).

In contrast to the notion that policymakers are listening to interest groups, there are studies that describe why policymakers do not listen to interest groups. For instance, Bernhagen (2013) argues that organized interest groups rarely succeed in influencing the opinion of policymakers. Policymakers have a certain picture in mind on how they are able to get support from the public. When a lobbyist has an opinion that deviates from this point of view, the policymaker is more likely to stick to his earlier notion. This is so, because the costs of following the lobbyists advice may be higher than the benefits that result from this advice (Bernhagen, 2013). Chalmers (2020) adds to this that politicians will primarily listen to interest groups when these groups support the current proposal or lobby for a more stringent policy proposal.

Lobbying approaches of interest groups

Godwin et al. (2012) describe three important factors that make a lobbyist successful in influencing public policies. First, it is important to have extensive knowledge in the field in which the policy takes place. Second, lobbyists must have good social networks in order to get through to policymakers. Third, lobbyists should be aware of the procedure of policy making. Generally, lobbyists will have one of these competencies developed best due to their previous experiences. For instance, lobbyists with an academic background in the relevant policy area will have more extensive knowledge than lobbyists who used to be a politician. On the contrary, these lobbyists with political experience generally have better access to the networks of policymakers due to their previous involvement in politics (Godwin et al. 2012).

There are several approaches in which interest groups aim to influence policy making. For instance, a comparison can be made between inside- and outside lobbying (Weiler & Brandli, 2015) Inside lobbying can be defined as interest groups who directly aim to speak with policy makers in order to influence their policy. The argument of this type of lobbying can be understood by conveying the expertise lobbyists have. Policymakers often have little time to delve into an issue and can make good use of information from interest groups. Outside lobbying is a different approach in which a lobbyist aims to influence policies by public campaigning or attending in the media. (Weiler & Brandli, 2015). The aim of this type of lobbying is to influence citizens and persuade them to think in a similar way. The result of

this is that policy makers will be influenced by the social pressure of the public and adjust their policies accordingly (Kollman, 1998). According to Hanegraaf et al. (2016) inside lobbying is generally conceived to be more prevalent than outside lobbying. Interest groups will initially use inside lobbying strategies in order to directly speak to policymakers and will only use outside lobbying when their lobbying efforts did not prove to be successful. They argue that this is especially the case for business, because of their technical knowledge which they can convey to policymakers. Civil interest groups on the contrary will sooner use outside lobbying strategies, because their messages are generally more political and therefore aim to influence the public (Hanegraaff et al., 2016) . That inside lobbying is generally more prevalent than outside lobbying does not have to mean that one approach excludes the other. It is often the case that both approaches are used complementary in order to gain maximal influence (Weiler & Brandli, 2015).

Many scholars argue that outside lobbying is generally used to pressure policy makers by expanding the conflict of an issue. Interest groups would often use political information. This can be defined as influencing the public by using arguments which have less to do with the substance, but more on how information is supported by several stakeholders (De

Bruycker, 2016). Characteristic of the use of political information is that there is often a difference between the wishes of the interest groups and those of the policymakers. Political information can more concretely be understood by Keller (2018) who argues that political information contains values that underlie a policy. It is often directed to policy makers in order to seek ‘support’ instead of seeking ‘policy’ (Keller, 2018) Beyers (2008) rejects the idea that outside lobbying is equivalent on conveying political information. Outside arenas are not always exploited in order to politicize an issue and can just as well be used as a venue in which substantive information is shared with the public. This can be understood by Thrall (2006). He argues that the outside arena can be used by interest groups in order to convey substantive information in order to stabilize its position in the public debate. This is because stakeholders see interest groups as a legitimate source of information and this subsequently influences their opinion on a topic. However, it is important to mention that not every interest group is in a position to enforce this legitimacy. Primarily business associations have these opportunities because they have more resources than other interest groups (Thrall, 2006).

Another way of looking at lobbying is by the concepts of positive lobbying and negative lobbying (Mckay, 2012). Positive lobbying occurs when interest groups are

positive lobbying. When interest groups are lobbying in favor of a policy they do not have to put much pressure in order to influence policymakers. In negative lobbying the opposite happens; interest groups need to put more pressure in order to change the outcome of a policy. Exerting this extra pressure increases the intensity and thus the successfulness of lobbying efforts (Mckay, 2012). This can furthermore be understood by arguing that “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” (Mckay & Yackee, 2007, p. 340). The louder an interest group is, the more influential it will be in influencing policymakers. This argument differs from the point of view of Bernhagen (2013) and Chalmers (2020) as mentioned in the previous chapter. They argue that policymakers mainly listen to interest groups when their arguments fit with their own arguments.

Stages of influencing the policy process

Many scholars describe the influence of lobbying on decision-making (e.g. Grande, 1996; Meier, 2015). Decision making is a fairly concrete concept in which a choice is made from several options (Beach, 1993). In the field of Public Administration decision making is particularly focused on the decisions of public professionals (Meier, 2015). In order to study the approaches of lobbying on the creation of the NOW arrangement it is important not only to look at the way a decision is made, but also at the process that underlies this event. Lobbyists can influence a policy process from the moment an issue gains attention until it is decided to do something with this issue (Yackee, 2012; Furling & Kerwin, 2005, Godwin et al. 2012). That is why many American scholars study the influence of lobbying on

rulemaking (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005, Baumgartner, 2007, Yackee, 2012).

There are several stages in which interest groups try to influence the rulemaking processes. Yackee (2012) argues that rulemaking exists by means of a pre-proposal stage, a proposal stage and a notice and comment stage before a policy will be implemented. The limitations of rulemaking in understanding decision making, is that it is specifically focused on federal American legislation (Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Yackee, 2012). It is therefore relevant to look at the process of decision making through a more encompassing concept. Godwin et al. (2012) describes the way policies are created by the ‘policy’ process. This process can be reviewed according to five stages: the agenda-setting stage in which problems are defined, become salient and get to policy makers; the formulation stage in which a policy is drafted; the decision making stage in which actors are mobilized and will decide on the proposal; the implementation stage in which the policy will be implemented and the evaluation stage in which the succession of the policy will be discussed. Although it seems

like these stages occur in chronological order, Godwin et al. (2012) emphasizes that this is not necessarily the case. For instance, after evaluating a certain policy, the policy can be formulated or implemented differently. Furthermore, stages may have an overlap or exist simultaneously. In both the implementation stage as well as the evaluation stage reflection takes place. The implementation stage reflects on whether a policy is implemented

adequately enough, while the evaluation stage reflects on whether the content of the policy meets the preconceived standards (Godwin et al., 2012). Furthermore, the agenda-setting stage and evaluation stage exist simultaneously once the policy cycle have gone through. This is so, because at the moment that the succession of a policy is evaluated new problems reach the agenda (Howard, 2005).

Many scientists argue that lobbying is primarily common in the early stages of policymaking (Austin-Smith, 1993; Crombez, 2002; Furlong & Kerwin, 2005; Yackee, 2012). Yackee (2012) argues that lobbying is mainly common in the pre-proposal stage of rulemaking, what in the model used by Godwin et al. (2012) would be defined as the agenda setting stage. This is so, because the content of a proposal is not shaped yet. Interest groups therefore have the ability to scratch unwanted elements from the agenda (Yackee, 2012). Except from the agenda-setting stage, the proposal stage seems to be common. Crombez (2002) argues that lobbyists can have an important contribution in this stage by matching the interests of policymakers with their own interests.

Lobbying approaches of business associations in a crisis situation

Although a lot is known about differences between interest groups in their lobbying approaches, less research has been done on the impact of a crisis on the approaches of business associations. Keller (2018) studied the lobbying efforts by business associations shortly after the financial crisis via the concept of ‘noisy’ and ‘quiet’ politics. The concepts of noisy and quiet politics are comparable with conveying political and substantive information, because noisy politics aims to openly influence by politicizing an issue, while quiet politics is specifically focused on conveying substantive arguments to policy makers (De Bruycker, 2016; Keller, 2018).

The research of Keller (2018) showed that outside lobbying by means of noisy politics was more prevalent than inside lobbying by means of quiet politics, for financial resources in a post-crisis situation. This is due to the importance of influencing the opinion of the public. The economic crisis caused a lot of turmoil within businesses. The business

that the middle class would profit from this arrangement. This subsequently raised the public opinion in the favor of economic support and ultimately led to the decision of

parliamentarians to support these business associations. The outcome of this research can be understood by the more recent study of Stevens & De Bruycker (2020), who argue that the amount of economic resources is contingent on the effectiveness of outside lobbying by means of political information. It was argued that resourceful interest groups have fewer chances to lobby for influence when their issues gain attention in the media. This is so, because the public believes that resourceful interest groups can manage well on their own. (Stevens & De Bruycker, 2020). When resourceful interest groups have little influence in achieving public support, one might expect in line with the article of Keller (2018) that the contrary is true for less resourceful groups. Less resourceful groups would logically use outside lobbying by means political information in order to convey the public and eventually politicians of their arguments.

However, when you compare the contemporary corona crisis to the mechanisms described by Keller there seems to be one essential difference. Keller argues that there was a conflict between the opinion of business associations and policy makers during the financial crisis of 2008. The deviant opinion of the influenced public would result in policymakers to choose for the wishes of the interest groups, which is the essential element of outside lobbying by means of political information (Weiler & Brandi, 2015; Hanegraaff et al. 2016, De Brucyker, 2016). During the coronacrisis these mechanisms seem to be less important. As argued by finance minister Wopke Hoekstra, the government will invest heavily in order to save businesses from bankruptcy. The NOW arrangement is a form of short term anticipation and is designed in order to provide the employees of businesses with their income (Sullivan & Wolff, 2020). Furthermore, the NOW arrangements are based on the former structure of the werktijdverkorting (wtv) that has been around for years in order to help businesses in dire situations. Based on the structure that is already present and the willingness to invest money in businesses, it does not seem logical for business associations to convey political arguments in the media. This can be understood by De Brucyker (2016) who argues that the level

conflict between the government and business associations play an important role in the prevalence of political information. During the coronacris, the degree of conflict seems to be largely absent. I would therefore expect business associations to use the media as a venue in which they do not aim to expand the conflict, but instead make use of it in order to exploit their expertise in the public (Thrall, 2006; Beyers, 2008). I therefore hypothesize in contrast to the article of Keller (2018) that:

H1: Substantive information is shared more often by business associations than political information in communication regarding the NOW arrangements.

As earlier discussed, Mckay (2012) and Bernhagen (2013) describe the influence of lobbying differently. Bernhagen argues that interest groups rarely succeed in changing the point of view of policymakers. He argues that the decisions of policy makers should benefit their own constituency. Mckay on the contrary, argues that negative lobbying is the most influential lobbying strategy. She argues that the greater the opposition against a policy is, the more likely it is that a policy will be changed. When you consider both arguments to the article of Keller (2018) one could infer that although negative lobbying was not defined in this article, it was the most prevalent lobbying approach. Business groups had opposing interests with respect to the government and aimed to convey the public by divergent arguments. Sullivan & Wolff (2020) also describe mechanisms which can somehow be related to negative lobbying during the coronacrisis. The KLM and the hospitality sector used divergent approaches in order to obtain billions of state aid in the long term. The KLM subsequently succeeded in obtaining this aid, while the hospitality sector did not. In contrast to this, the hospitality sector did receive the benefits of the NOW arrangement. This can be explained by the notion that the NOW is a benefit that is important for the short term, while the billions of state aid are meant for the long term (Sullivan & Wolff, 2020). From this point of view one could consider the NOW to be a more urgent arrangement. I would expect that due to this urgency both interest groups and policymakers will have a less divergent perspective on the creation of this arrangement than within the earlier forms of support as described by Keller (2018) and Sullivan & Wolff (2020). I would however not expect that due to this higher consensus the prevalence of positive lobbying will change dramatically. As argued by Mckay (2012) negative lobbying is generally more relevant. Interest groups aim to convey their arguments to policymakers to bring about change. If they would primarily do this in a

positive way in which they agree with politicians instead of changing the status quo, then can you speak of lobbying at all? I therefore hypothesize that:

H2: Negative lobbying by business associations is more prevalent than positive lobbying in communication regarding the NOW arrangements.

Stages of policymaking during a crisis

in the proposal stage of the policy process. This is because after the crisis many unfavorable financial arrangements arose for financial industry groups. In order to successfully influence policy makers it was important to use political lobbying approaches. The interest groups used self-regulatory measures in order to prevent policymakers to later come up with proposals that might be detrimental (Young, 2013). Kastner (2018) argues that outside lobbying for favorable tax conditions shortly after the financial crisis of 2008 was more successful in the proposal stage of policymaking, than in the agenda-setting stage. In the early debate, the public opinion was salient and negative towards less stringent financial regulations. The public argued that more stringent regulations would prevent another crisis from occurring. However, at the moment that the proposal stage arose, public salience diminished. Lobbyists successfully used outside lobbying by means of political information in order to rule public opinion in their favor. They argued that more stringent regulations would have a negative effect on the economy (Kastner, 2018).

Both Young (2013) and Kastner (2018) indicate that conflict (or preventing conflict) led to high involvement of businesses associations during the early stages of the policy process. However, during the coronacrisis the context seems to be different than during the crisis of 2008. As argued earlier the context around the NOW-arrangements is far less conflictual due to the benevolence of the government (Sullivan & Wolff, 2020). Nevertheless, I would expect variance between the stages in the policy process in the prevalence of political information versus substantive information. As argued by Godwin et al. (2012) the agenda-setting stage is characterized by a certain level of insecurity. An emerging problem reaches the agenda and yet no solutions exist in order to cope best with this problem. This can furthermore be understood by Barkenbus (1998) who argues that expertise has a little share in the agenda-setting stage, because perceptions are at least as important as reality. In the subsequent stages this is less applicable, because issues are better mapped out and therefore attention is focused on solving issues (Barkenbus, 1998; Godwin et al., 2012). Based on this, I would expect that although the process around the NOW

arrangements is not so much conflictual, the level of conflict will be most common in the agenda-setting stage and due to the overlap in the policy cycle, also in the evaluation stage (Sullivan & Wolff, 2020; Howard, 2005). As argued by De Bruycker (2016) conflict is an important indicator for interest groups to use political information. Based on this, I

H3: Political information is more prevalent during the agenda-setting and evaluation stage in the process of creating the NOW arrangements, than during the formulation decision making and implementation stage.

As argued earlier I expect negative lobbying to more prevalent than positive lobbying, despite the benevolence of the government. This is because the role of business associations would be redundant when business associations would primarily lobby positively (Mckay, 2012). Nevertheless, I would expect variance to exist between the stages of the policy process. When you consider the policy process, lobbying efforts are mainly made in all the stages except for the decision making stage. (Godwin et al., 2012). The decision-making stage is characterized by either adopting or not adopting a policy and therefore less fruitful for advocating for change, than the other stages. However, that the decision-making stage is less suitable for advocating change does not make it automatically more suitable for agreeing with the point of view of the government. Yet, the NOW arrangements can to a certain degree be seen as a solidarity measure due to the notion that business are kept afloat, without having to provide work for it. When the best possible outcomes have already been strived for in the other stages of the policy process in which (negative) lobbying matters the most, I would expect that due to the solidarity of the measures, business associations will argue more positively once the NOW arrangements will or have been adopted. I therefore hypothesize that:

H4: Positive lobbying is more prevalent during the decision making stage in the policy process of creating the NOW arrangements, than during the agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation stage.

Methods

This master thesis will focus on a within case analysis on the creation of the NOW

arrangements during the coronacrisis in the Netherlands. The NOW support packages can be seen as multiple concrete policies that have been decided on continuing on the former wtv arrangement (Ministerie van Algemene zaken, 2020). After the coronavirus hit the

Netherlands in mid-March, it was decided on April the first, to implement the first package of this arrangement. This arrangement covers the employer costs of businesses from April 6 until June 5. Hereafter, respectively the second and the third NOW packages were installed which cover the employer costs of June until September and October until July 2021 (Ministerie van Algemene zaken, 2020).

I will use process-tracing in order to unravel which lobbying approaches were mostly prevalent in aiming to influence the policymakers responsible for these arrangements. In order to get the best possible perspective on this, it is sane to focus on interest groups who have a primary position in influencing policy makers. This is because the position and size of business associations are an important indicator for the extent in which policymakers can be reached (Bennett, 1997). This will logically also relate to outside lobbying. Smaller business associations will have less resources to convey their arguments in important media

platforms. I therefore decided to focus on two major employer organizations, namely the VNO-NCW which is the largest employer organization in the Netherlands and the MKB (Midden Klein bedrijf) Nederland who represent small and medium sized businesses. An implication in reviewing these two employer organizations is that they may represent a biased image of lobbying approaches in a crisis situation. VNO-NCW and MKB are organizations that are committed to support businesses in a general sense. This may differ from business associations that lobby specifically for their own industry, such as the hospitality sector.

In this master thesis I will perform a media analysis. This is a fruitful analysis in order to observe lobbying approaches in the field of outside lobbying (De Bruycker & Beyers, 2019). It can be determined by means of quotes that are used whether the efforts of lobbyists has a positive or negative character. It is also possible to find out whether the information is mainly based on the content or has a more political connotation. The advantage of using a media analysis is that it represents objective information which can be retrieved from these sources. Conducting surveys or interviews are less suitable for objectivity, due to the subjective interpretations of respondents which might contain several biases (Dur, 2008). The disadvantage of using this strategy is that the quotes of the business associations are still partly biased. Journalists in newspapers or radio and talk shows formulate questions in a certain way. When these questions focus on the content of the arrangement it is likely that the business associations respond accordingly. The same accounts for questions about the

behavior of political actors. Therefore, journalists have impact on the manner business associations convey their arguments in the media.

The data in this thesis will be gathered by transcribing and analyzing 27 talk show and radio appearances of the chairmen of MKB and VNO-NCW (Jacco Vonhof of MKB, Hans de Boer and Ingrid Thijssen of VNO-NCW). Furthermore I will analyze 18 newspaper articles, 9 additional media sources from the website of MKB and VNO-NCW and 5 blogs of MKB. All documents and media sources were selected from the moment the coronavirus gained attention in early March, until late December 2020. The sources were selected by

having a specific relation to information conveyed by VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland in relation with wage support, the support packages and the ensuing NOW arrangements. Furthermore, the sources were selected on having a minimum of 150 spoken words (radio and talkshow fragments) or written words (news(paper) articles and blogposts) in order to make a reasonable distinction between lobbying strategies that were used. In addition, a certain amount of reach is desirable in order to understand what strategies lobbyists use. Fragments in talk shows, radio broadcasts and newspaper articles were therefore selected by having a range of reaching a minimum of 50.000 people per day. Mostly national media sources meet this requirement. Furthermore, VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland are primarily lobbying in national politics. I therefore decided to select national newspapers and radio or television shows in this research.

In order to assess whether substantive information is more prevalent than political information I performed a framing analysis based on Robert Entmants (1993) model. Entman distinguishes framing between four distinct types. Actors aim to make topics salient by using frames to define a problem, make causal attributions to a problem, make moral judgements about a problem or propose a treatment recommendation to a problem. Defining problems and proposing treatment recommendations are closely related to each other. Both of these framing perspectives are based on expert information on how a problem is observed and what can be done to solve this particular problem (Bowe & Hoewe, 2016). This corresponds well to substantive information, because these types of information are based on transferring substantive arguments towards politicians or the public on what the urgency of issues are and how they should be solved (De Bruycker, 2016). Causal attributions and moral judgements correspond well with political information. Causal attributions attributes the actor responsible for (solving) the problem. Interest groups often use this type of framing in order to shift (or not) blame towards a political actor (Bowe & Hoewe, 2016). Subsequently, once blame or success is attributed to a political actor this might influence their popularity, due to the public who evaluates the political actor as being (in)adequate in tackling problems. Therefore, the use of causal attributions by lobbyists can be seen as a tactic in order to pressure politicians by appealing (un)favorable in the eye of the beholder, which fits well with the pressuring tactics within political information and the starting point of outside lobbying (Keller, 2018; De Brucyker, 2016). Lastly, moral judgements are often used by interest groups in order to reflect on problems as being legitimate or desirable, as argued by Keller (2018). The substantive argument is not so important here, instead arguments refer to broad common

with outside lobbying and political information due to aiming to impact politicians and the public by making morally “right” decisions (Keller, 2018).

In table 1 the definitions of problem identification, causal attribution, moral

evaluation and problem solving are presented. I largely base the definitions on the model of Eising et al., (2015), who performed a framing study on interest groups at the EU-level. However, I changed the definition of causal attribution. Eising et al. (2015) defines causal attribution as “arguments referring to the interests of policy addressees and the public”. One could argue that observing “interests” is too abstract. I therefore decided to relate causal attribution to ” arguments reflecting on the actions of policy makers as being right or wrong or arguments used to mobilize a political actor”.

Making a separation between the framing types in the model of Entman and the information types elaborated by De Bruycker (2016), do not apply to positive or negative lobbying. In order to assess whether VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland lobby positively or negatively, I will reflect whether an argument corresponds with the vision of the government or oppose the point of view of the government. When the employer organizations will emphasize on

confirming suggestions by policymakers they are lobbying positively, while putting emphasis on changing the status quo will make negative lobbying more common (Mckay, 2012). Subsequently, it is important to operationalize the policy process. As argued earlier, a bottleneck exists between the evaluation stage and the agenda-setting stage, because both stages occur simultaneously (Howard, 2005). I therefore decided to combine the agenda-setting stage and evaluation stage. This has some disadvantageous. The agenda-agenda-setting stage

Concept Variable definition

Problem identification Arguments referring to expert evidence and the urgency of the proposed measures

Treatment recommendation

Arguments referring to the distribution of costs and benefits and the social benefits of the proposed measures

Causal attribution

Arguments reflecting on the actions of policy makers as being right or wrong or arguments used to mobilize a political actor.

M oral evaluation Arguments referring to broad common goals and universal norms

Positive lobbying Agreeing with the point of view or policy makers or the current policy/status quo. Negative lobbying Opposing the point of view of policy makers or the current policy/ status quo

Agenda-setting and evaluation The impact of the coronavirus for business reaches the agenda. Furthermore, reflection is made on the content of the NOW-arragements, with the subsequent issues that reach the agenda. Formulation The NOW-arrangements are being negotiated

Decision making It has been decided to adopt and implement the NOW-arrangements

Implementation

The NOW-arrangements come into effect. Reflection takes place on the correct implementation of the arrangements

before negotiating on the NOW-arrangements has a different emphasis than reflecting on the regulations, and the points that reach the agenda from this reflection. Thus, by merging these stages it is not possible to differentiate the two from each other. The definitions of the stages are presented in table 1.

Many scholars who study framing by interest groups use large N quantitative studies and assess whether types of framing are present or not present within a source (E.g. Eising et al., 2015; Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008). Within a qualitative case study like in this master thesis, this seems less appropriate. In this study I will reflect on whether several types of lobbying are more prevalent than one another .The chosen lobbying approaches are quite common and therefore likely to exist within the selected media sources. I therefore decided not to assess whether frames are present, but to what extent they are prevalent. This gives a good image on the attention that is given by the business associations who decide what information they want to convey (Van Gorp, 2010). Therefore, I coded the amount of words within the media documents which relate to problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation or problem solving, but also for the positive and negative lobbying. For instance, an argument of 50 words relates to a problem that is addressed. Subsequently, in another argument of 100 words, the business associations argue why it is (morally) unfair that business are inadequately helped. The first example relates to problem identification, which corresponds to conveying substantive information. In the second example moral evaluation is made which refers to political information. Comparing these examples would state that 33.3% of the lobbying is based on substantive information. In comparison, 66.7% is based on conveying political information. Thus, in this example, political information is more

prevalent. Subsequently the four information types and positive versus negative lobbying must relate to the stages of the policy process. The quotes that relate to the types of

information or positive versus negative lobbying were attributed to one of the stages, based on the context of the information that was being displayed at that time. For instance, all information and lobbying, derived from the media sources that relates to constructing the NOW arrangements was defined as the formulation stage. Subsequently I have counted all words related to the types of information and the types of lobbying within a stage and compared whether those types were used more frequent than in the other stages.

An important implication in using this strategy is that coding the amount of words provides a partly biased display of results. A business association could make an argument in 100 words, but also in 500 words. It would therefore also be possible to look at the

this is that there is not taken into account the share to which lobbyists pay attention to an issue. Therefore, coding the amount of words can be seen a more fruitful base for the prevalence of lobbying behavior.

Besides the media analysis that has been conducted, I have conducted a

semi-structured interview with a relevant employee of VNO-NCW/MKB who could provide more information on how their organization has proceeded in the creation of the NOW

arrangements. With this I aimed to get a better image on the approaches that were used and to gather extra context on the manners through which this happened. Because anonymity cannot be guaranteed, the interview data will not be shown in this thesis. However, it can be

requested by sending an e-mail to: Mike.Rijlaarsdam@gmail.com.

Results

In the results chapter I will first present a timeline on the construction of the

NOW-arrangements from March until December. This timeline subsequently outlines the context in order to understand the prevalence of the used lobbying approaches by VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland. On the basis of tables and corresponding quotes I will illustrate what lobbying approaches are more prevalent and when this is likely to be the case. Lastly, I will use this information in order to adopt or reject the proposed hypotheses.

The Realization of the NOW-arrangements

At the end of February concerns of businesses arose due to the emerging coronavirus. The virus had a direct impact on employment and therefore businesses requested compensation for a reduction in working hours (wtv arrangement) (De Boer, 2020a). The wtv arrangement is an arrangement that has existed for decades and provides a financial safety net for

businesses. Through this arrangement, businesses can be compensated for a share of losses in their revenues (Ministerie van SZW, 2020).

In the weeks later the concerns of businesses increased seriously. The virus expanded rapidly, which caused that on March 15 a partly lockdown was imposed by the government. This meant that many businesses had to close their doors, with the result that their revenues came to a standstill. Luckily, Dutch Minister of Finance, Wopke Hoekstra argued a few days earlier that for the time being there were sufficient resources in order to cope with the

financial consequences of the coronavirus. Ninety billion euros was available in order to help hard-hit industries. Two days after the lockdown, Minister of Social Affairs, Wouter

Koolmees sent a letter to the parliament in which he announced his plans for the NOW-arrangement for the first time (Koolmees, 2020a). The minister argued among other things that the wtv arrangement offered insufficient relief due to the overload of applications during the crisis. The NOW arrangement would be better capable in helping more businesses. Furthermore, it was better suited for the short term and should therefore replace the wtv arrangement. On March 31 it was decided by the minister of Social Affairs, Wouter Koolmees to formally implement the first package of the NOW arrangement. Businesses could make use of this scheme from April 6, 2020 (Koolmees, 2020b).

Shortly after the introduction of the NOW, concerns about the implementation of the NOW arrangement were shared. The NOW arrangement was a robust measure, where little account was taken for customization. It turned out that the scheme provided insufficient security for businesses with flexible contracts or businesses with fluctuating revenues. It also turned out that separate businesses as part of a concern would not be able to apply for this arrangement (De Boer, 2020b). Meanwhile, the ministry of Social Affairs worked hard in order to better provide customization. On April 30, minister Wouter Koolmees announced that separated businesses which are part of a concern could make use of the NOW

arrangement. He further indicated that he was still working on arrangements for flexible employment contracts (Mkb, 2020c). In the weeks that followed work was done on the second NOW-arrangement. The first NOW-arrangement was based on the months: March, April and May, so a second NOW-arrangement had to be replaced from June. On May 20, Wouter Koolmees announced his plans for NOW 2. The second package connected to the first package and accounted for an extension of four months. The previous form of this arrangement was largely maintained. However, there were some concrete adaptations such as better arrangements for businesses who gather their income in certain months within a year (Wiebes et al., 2020a).

Towards the end of spring and the beginning of the summer, the coronavirus had a decreasing impact on the infection rates in the Netherlands. This resulted in hard-hit sectors, such as the hospitality sector opening up increasingly and thus experienced diminished effects of the imposed regulations by the government. Meanwhile, work was done in order to set up a third scheme (De Boer, 2020d; Vonhof, 2020c). On August 28, the third support package was launched. The renewed NOW package would continue until July 2021 and was thinner than the previous arrangements. From October 2020 businesses with a revenue loss of more than 30 percent instead of 20 percent can get access to this arrangement. This would

eventually rise up to 45 percent in the middle of 2021. Furthermore, wage costs coverage will gradually decline from 90 until 60 percent in July 2021 (Ministerie van EZK, 2020).

From the end of September concerns about the coronavirus started to grow intensively. A second wave of infections emerged, which had major consequences for business operations (Mersbergen, 2020). Additional measures would be required in order to provide sufficient economic stability for businesses (Thijssen, 2020). In the following moths, the coronavirus began to increasingly cause large amounts of infections. This resulted

initially in a partial lockdown and ultimately in a full lockdown on December 13. The lockdown again demanded a lot of resilience of businesses. The government therefore decided not to let the financial support decline as was argued on August 28. Instead, the level of support would remain the same in the first quarter of 2021, as in the last quarter of 2020 (Wiebes et al., 2020b)

Descriptives

The above description shows the development of the NOW-arrangements. However, yet little is known about the lobbying behavior that is displayed by the business associations in aiming to influence the NOW-arrangements. In table 2, the prevalence of the information types within the policy process are represented. As argued earlier, these types of information are based on the frames that I coded from the media documents (attachment 2). Subsequently I have defined whether the codes relate to agenda-setting and evaluation, formulation, decision making or implementation (attachment 3).

What strikes when you look at table 2 is that the percentages of substantive information are jointly bigger than the percentages of political information and that there is little variation between the stages. In all stages substantive communication is approximately 70 percent of the content and political communication approximately 30 percent. Nevertheless, there are differences between the variables within substantive communication and political

problem identification treatment recommendation Total substantive communication causal attribution moral evaluation Total Political communication Total Agenda-setting and evaluation

2640 (54.4%) 734 (15.1%) 3374 (69.5%) 460 (9.5%) 1018 (21.0%) 1478 (30.5%) 4852 (100%) Formulation 2177 (41.0%) 1475 (27.8%) 3652 (68.8%) 319 (6.0%) 1334 (25.1%) 1653 (31.1%) 5305 (100%) Decision making 2102 (37.8%) 1774 (31.9%) 3876 (69.7%) 710 (12.8%) 976 (17.5%) 1686 (30.3%) 5562 (100%) Implementation 449 (54.3%) 174 (21.0%) 623 (75.3%) 144 (17.4%) 60 (7.3%) 204 (24.7%) 827 (100%) Table 2: Wordcount and percentages of substantive and politcal communication

communication. In the agenda-setting/evaluation and implementation stage, the share of arguments referring to problem identification are far higher treatment solution (54.4 and 54.3 percent, towards 15.1 and 21.0 percent) than. For instance, this applies to the

agenda-setting/evaluation stage, because problems reach the agenda, but yet no concrete solution is proposed. An illustrative example of this is:

it is a good arrangement but too limited. If, for example, a very large part of your costs in the catering industry is staff and that reference period is exactly about a period where you had little turnover, while in the future you have more turnover in the season.(Vonhof, 2020b)

Subsequently, in the formulation stage, business associations still mostly used arguments referring to problem identification, but a relative higher emphasis was put on treatment recommendation. Concrete thoughts by the business associations were shared on how the NOW-arrangement should be (re)formed:

I would extend the support as it stands to September. With a caveat: the support will change in September. So companies: make an analysis together with unions. If your market shrinks by 60 percent, there must be a reorganization. And then you give the people who have to leave a perspective on work in other sectors. (Stellinga & Pelgrim, 2020).

Within the area of political communication, causal attribution is only more prevalent in the implementation stage. However, it is important to note that the evidence for this is very marginal. In the implementation stage only 144 words were defined as causal attribution and only 60 words were defined as moral evaluation. This is due that reflection on

implementation was only relevant after constructing the first arrangement. After the second and the second arrangement reflection only took place on the content of the arrangements. A typical example of causal attribution was retrieved from the period that the business

associations were negotiating about the second NOW arrangement and thus in the formulation stage:

So the cabinet must be said, the cabinet is really trying to listen carefully to society. Tries to keep the virus under control, but also tries to give people livelihoods, job retention and to ensure that entrepreneurs can get off to a good start again. (De Boer, 2020c)

In the other stages moral evaluation is more common than causal attribution. The highest percentage is reached in the formulation stage with 25.1 percent of the communication related to only 6.0 percent related to causal attribution. A clear example of the moral evaluation takes among other things place in the decision making stage. Once the first NOW-arrangement was adopted, the business associations argued on their websites that: “This corona crisis demands a lot from everyone. As far as I am concerned, she also and especially asks for leniency and solidarity. Understanding each other's position, helping each other where possible.” (MKB, 2020a).

In table 3 the wordcount and percentages of positive versus negative lobbying are presented. The way the codes were assigned can be retrieved from attachment 2. Furthermore, the way the definitions of the stages were assigned can be traced back in attachment 3.

It is striking that negative lobbying is more prevalent than positive lobbying in all stages except for the decision making stage. The implementation stage has the highest number of negative lobbying with 96.3 percent, while the decision making stage only has a prevalence of 38.7 percent of negative lobbying. In the agenda-setting/evaluation, formulation and implementation the lobbying behavior is primarily directed in order to change the outcome of the arrangement. A clear example of this can be found in the formulation stage. During this period the government worked on the second NOW-arrangement. The business associations used negative lobbying by saying that:

Postive lobbying Negative lobbying Total Agenda-setting and evaluation

791 (25.6%) 2299 (74.4%) 3090 (100%) Formulation 251 (10.3%) 2180 (89.7%) 2431 (100%) Decision making 1656 (61.3%) 1045 (38.7%) 2701 (100%) Implementation 25 (3.7%) 648 (96.3%) 673 (100%)

We are also talking about extending, broadening and improving the emergency package and that is also desperately needed. Businesses are seeing their chances of survival diminishing rapidly and the majority cannot survive for longer than three months with the current package, according to a survey of our members. (MKB, 2020b)

In the decision making stage, positive lobbying was primarily prevalent. Once an

arrangement was adopted the business associations generally responded positively. A clear example can be found in the decision making stage, after the first NOW-arrangement was adopted: “We are now very much in agreement on the package that now exists. That's the first package. And with that, the cash problem, the liquidity problem of companies, is largely solved in the short term.” (Vonhof, 2020a)

Analysis of conveying substantive information versus political information Based on the descriptive part of this results it can be argued that The first hypothesis :

Substantive information is shared more often by business associations than political information in communication regarding the NOW arrangements can be adopted.

The results of the framing analysis and the subsequent assigning of the stages clearly indicate that substantive information was conveyed more often than political information. The

business associations were actively involved in the discussion surrounding the coronavirus and the implications this had for businesses from the moment the virus emerged in Early March, until the end of December 2020. There was a stable commitment throughout the timeline in which the business associations constructively aimed to define what was

happening and what should be done to help businesses in the best way. This can furthermore be understood by the respondent in the interview who argued that there was a continuously process of fitting and measuring between the government and the business associations, in which the necessity lacked to actively lobby in the media (respondent 1). The emphasis was therefore less focused on conveying political information, despite the fact that still a

considerable part of the communication had a political character.

The results can be better understood by the context of the NOW-arrangement. Due to the benevolence of the government it is not so much necessary to convey political arguments in the media. The argument of Keller (2018) that the outside realm is primarily used in order to convey political information therefore does not make sense when you analyze the data in

in which they aim to gain public support by conveying their expertise. Through this they are able to legitimize its influence in the public debate and therefore they indirectly influence policy makers (Thrall, 2006; Weiler & Brandli, 2015).

Analysis of positive lobbying and negative lobbying

The second hypothesis in this research can furthermore be adopted: Negative lobbying by

business associations is more prevalent than positive lobbying in communication regarding the NOW arrangements. The evidence for this is clearly illustrated by the frequencies of

lobbying within the policy process. In four of the five stages there is a large difference between positive and negative lobbying. There was a structural pattern in which the business associations used negative lobbying in the stages in which influence could be gained and used positive lobbying once an outcome was achieved and it was less necessary to gain influence. Therefore, the continuous fitting an measuring which was argued by the respondent

furthermore applies to positive and negative lobbying. Fitting and measuring occurred in the stages in which it was worth the effort to aim to influence the arrangement. Subsequently, the custom work was delivered once an arrangement was adopted. The argument is therefore clearly consistent with Mckay (2012) who argues that interest groups will convey their arguments to bring about the change. Therefore, even though the NOW-arrangements are related to the benevolence of the government, it does not make sense to mostly lobby positively, because this would make the efforts of business associations unnecessary.

Analysis of the lobbying approaches in the policy process

The third hypothesis: Political information is more prevalent during the agenda-setting and

evaluation stage in the process of creating the NOW arrangements, than during the

formulation decision making and implementation stage cannot be adopted. As argued earlier,

there was a fairly constant basis in which lobbyists conveyed substantive information and political information throughout the whole timeframe. Therefore, the differences in conveying political and substantive information between the stages are minimal. This deviates from the notion that the agenda-setting stage is known for its high level of salience (Godwin et al., 2012). An explanation for this can be found in the context of the creation of the NOW-arrangements. From the first moment the coronavirus had an impact, the

werktijdverkorting arrangement was installed. The necessity was therefore lacking to communicate politically, because there was already a financial arrangement that provided a certain base of economic security during the agenda-setting stage. Therefore, the business

associations primarily conveyed strategical substantive arguments in order to create the best possible outcome for the subsequent NOW-arrangement. Afterwards, once the policy cycle was completed, the same mechanism applied for the subsequent agenda-setting/evaluation stage. The content of the NOW-arrangement was considered and it was discussed why something was not working properly. Political information still played a major part in the lobbying behavior of the business associations, but there are no major differences in prevalence between the stages.

On the contrary, the fourth hypothesis: Positive lobbying is more prevalent during the

decision making stage in the policy process of creating the NOW arrangements, than during the agenda-setting, formulation, implementation and evaluation stage can be adapted. As

argued earlier there was a pattern in which the business associations used negative lobbying in the stages in which influencing mattered the most. This was clearly visible in the agenda-setting/evaluation, formulation and implementation stage. In these stages active consideration was given to how the scheme could be settled as favorable as possible in favor of the

businesses. Subsequently once the arrangement was adopted, there was little opportunity to lobby. Due to the solidarity of the arrangements, the business associations primarily

responded positively once an arrangement was created. Even so positive, that positive

lobbying not only has a relatively larger share comparing to the other stages, but is also more prevalent than negative lobbying. The results can be explained by the way the policy process is structured. Influencing a policy is less likely in the decision making stage, because in this stage it is only decided whether a policy will or not be adopted (Godwin et al., 2012).

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to study which lobbying approaches were prevalent in the media during the policy process of creating the NOW arrangements. Furthermore, I aimed to trace down when this was likely to be the case. By researching these approaches, I aimed to expand the literature on lobbying in times of economic crises. The results of this research are

primarily clear. Substantive information showed to be more common than political

information within the realm of outside lobbying. This finding deviates from the earlier study of Keller (2018), who argued that outside lobbying by means of political information was primarily common shortly after the 2008 financial crisis. The reason that my findings deviate from the findings of Keller has everything to do with the context of the NOW arrangement. This scheme was urgently created in order to support dire businesses. It was in the primer

interest of the business association to think along in terms of content in order to be seen as a legitimate source of information and to actually achieve the best possible arrangement. It is furthermore clear that negative lobbying is more prevalent than positive lobbying in the media. The business associations used negative lobbying to bring about change, which fits well with Mkcay’s (2012) theory. This happened structurally during the timeframe, except for the moments in which new arrangements were adopted.

The stages showed no clear differences between the prevalence of substantive and political information. This can be explained by the notion that salience has been abolished from the outset of the coronavirus due to the installation of the werktijdverkorting. These findings contradict the research of among others, Barkenbus (1998) who argued that the agenda-setting stage is more politically charged due to the high salience that emerges in this stage. Nevertheless, there are concrete differences between the prevalence of negative and positive lobbying between the stages. Negative lobbying was predominant in the stages where exerting influence was essential, while positive lobbying was common in less charged stages. This can mainly be understood by the definition of the policy process. The business associations were less likely to lobby negatively, because the structure of the decision making stage is not suitable for influencing the content of a policy (Godwin et al., 2012).

Discussion

This master thesis has some implications. The data within the media analysis is partly biased, because the frames derived from the talkshows, radio broadcasts and newspapers depend much on the questions proposed by journalists. The consequence of this is that questions about the substance raised also answered in that way. This does not apply to the media sources derived from the website of VNO-NCW and MKB-Nederland. On their websites, the business associations had the total freedom to provide their information according to their own needs. However, the consequence of this is that the lobbying behavior might deviate from the media sources in which the business associations were interviewed. Therefore, a distinction between the two types of media sources cannot me made adequately.

In addition, there must also be a critical reflection at the operationalization of the variables within this research. Problem identification, treatment recommendation, causal attribution and moral evaluation have affinity with substantive and political communication (Entman, 1993; De Brucyker, 2016; Keller, 2018). However, it is important to note that this cannot be defined one to another. It could very well be true that there are types of substantive